Critical Policy Brief, Number 6/2023

November 2023

Palestinian Future after the Israeli Reoccupation of the Gaza Strip

Khalil Shikaki

 

 

 

 

 

The Palestinian people confront one of the most difficult challenges they have faced since the 1967 occupation of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Given Israel’s declared twin objectives in its current invasion, to destroy Hamas' military capabilities and prevent its return to govern, the reoccupation of parts or the entire Gaza Strip is all but inevitable. An explicit or implicit softening of Israel’s goals, highly unlikely at this time, could significantly change this inevitability by opening the door, in the short term, for a ceasefire agreement, and in the long term, for future indirect negotiation between Hamas and Israel on possible long-term arrangements for the future of the Gaza Strip. If Israel’s current goals do not change, the war will continue for a long time and the Israeli tanks will reach all parts of the Gaza Strip. If so, what happens next? What should the Palestinians and others do?

The following are some of the questions that this Brief addresses. The most immediate question must address Israel’s ability to stay and consolidate that occupation given the most likely outcome that an armed insurgency will be immediately encountered. Facing that, would the Israeli army stay and for how long? If it stays, would it assume responsibility for civilian service delivery to the population or convince others, including international and regional players, or even the PA, to do that instead? Alternatively, would it unilaterally withdraw thereby creating a vacuum for all players, including Hamas, to fill? Or would it withdraw, in part or full, as part of new political and security arrangements? What kind of arrangements would be viable enough to produce a sustainable outcome? In this context what role should the international community play and who might be Israel’s Palestinian partner for such outcome?

In the meanwhile, what is likely to happen to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its control in the West Bank? Would the current West Bank limited armed clashes and the settlers’ violence lead to a large-scale violent eruption? If that happens, would the PA security forces stand on the sideline, join the armed clashes, or alternatively opt for maintaining security coordination? If the PA survives the current onslaught on the Gaza Strip without too much damage, and if new sustainable political arrangements are put at the table by the international community at one point in the near future, unlikely as that might be, what would be required from the PA to do to make itself acceptable to its own people and a viable player to others, one that can help restore governance, including law enforcement, to the Gaza Strip?

 

Background:

In its effort to end the limbo status in which the Gaza Strip found itself in since 2007 and make its control over it more sustainable in the long term, Hamas launched a massive armed attack on Israel in the hope of bringing it to the negotiating table. While Hamas might have hoped to negotiate with Israel a long-term arrangement for Gaza, one free of siege and blockade, the huge military success of the October 7 attack, the widespread scenes of great civilian killing that was committed by the fighters form Hamas and other groups, and the taking of many civilian hostages, including women and children, created a completely different reality that Hamas might not have anticipated. The rage in Israel and in many other countries provided the current most extreme government in that country’s history with the necessary sympathy and unquestionable support for its goals of eradicating Hamas even if that meant destroying large parts of the Gaza Strip and inflicting a second Nakba on its civilian population. It gave it the political and moral support for the deliberate infliction of a great deal of human suffering on Gazans leading to a level of civilian bloodshed unseen before in all Palestinian-Israeli conflicts.

It goes without saying that Hamas’ interest in ensuring its survival and the scenes and magnitude of the unprecedented level of Palestinian civilian deaths and destruction will generate determination and massive public anger and demands for revenge. This will ensure the continuation of a stiff armed resistance and the war will seem unending. Israel will find itself consolidating its occupation while seeking a political arrangement that would allow the delivery of humanitarian and other services while keeping its military control over the entire Strip. This, however, will not be a sustainable outcome as Israel’s casualties will be on the rise and the humanitarian conditions will probably continue to worsen despite the efforts of international organizations, such as UNRWA and others. Given, Israel’s declared position that it will continue to indefinitely maintain an overall security control over the Gaza Strip, it will be impossible for any regional or international body to agree to replace the Israeli army in any part of the occupied territories. Similarly, it is impossible for the PA in this context to resume any substantial service delivery, let alone have any law enforcement role.

 

Who will be in control?

Under these conditions, Israel will have to decide whether to stay or leave. If it decides to stay, it could come under pressure from its own right wing groups to rebuild the previous Gazan settlement enterprise and at the same time it will find itself pushed into more and more service delivery to 2.3 million Palestinians in an environment in which the economy and the basic infrastructure are in total disrepair on top of the destruction of tens of thousands of home, dozens of schools, and many hospitals. The Israeli army will have to devote part of its forces to the management of the civilian life but without being able to enforce law and order. While it would be difficult today to see the rebuilding of Israel’s pre 2005 Gaza settlements, the dynamics of Israeli domestic politics, in an environment of a prolonged occupation, might force this issue to become part of the domestic bargaining process.

Alternatively, under pressure of daily casualties and the desire to avoid a situation in which it would be forced, as an occupying power, to deliver services to the civilian population, the Israeli government might decide to withdraw from most of the Gaza Strip unilaterally and gradually. This outcome is highly unlikely, but in the absence of partners willing to accept Israel’s conditions for a change in the status quo, it might decide to begin such a gradual withdrawal in the hope that local, regional, or international service delivery providers might emerge, even if under Hamas’ overall responsibility.  Naturally, Hamas will fill the vacuum and, sooner or later, Israel will have no choice but to arrive to the conclusion that it needs to reach short- or long-term de facto arrangements with that organization. The advantage to Israel in such an outcome is that it relieves it from having to come up with answers to difficult questions about the future of its occupation of the Palestinian territories, as we see below.

Without a de facto arrangement with Hamas, Israel might find non-Hamas partners willing to engage it in a process leading to agreed-upon long term arrangements. This outcome is feasible under certain conditions, as we discuss below. But it is extremely difficult to see how this would unfold while a local insurgency is underway, that is, unless that outcome is coordinated with that insurgency. Similarly, it is difficult to see the viability of such a long-term arrangement if it is not part of a larger solution to the Palestinian Israeli conflict, one that ends more than five and a half decades of Israeli occupation. For example, whoever replaces the Israeli army will certainly want to know answers to three questions: the source of its authority, the end game, and the duration of its stay. None of the international or regional players will agree to derive their authority from the occupying power and Israel will find it difficult to endorse a UN or a third-party source of authority. Moreover, the current Israeli government is certainly not interested in defining the end game, and therefore, it will view the arrangements as de facto and the duration indefinite.

 

PA in control?

The only body that will agree to assume control over the Gaza Strip without too much quarrel over the source of authority or the duration of its mission is the one that already claims de jure, even if nominal, control over it, i.e., the PA. In fact, other than Hamas, Israel has no other partner. There are other advantages, to all concerned parties, to an Israeli partnership with the PA. It already provides many services to Gazans, and it is a party to the Oslo agreements and the de facto and de jure arrangements reached in 2005, in the wake of the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and all these, amazingly, continue, more or less, to define Israeli-Palestinian relations to this day.

Nonetheless, the PA too will insist on the clarity of the end game, as indeed it has already done.  This condition requires the revival of the two-state solution, the development of a plan for what it means and a roadmap for how to get there, and the restoration of a viable diplomatic path and direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. It goes without saying that the current Israeli government is not willing to contemplate such an end game. This conclusion might explain why neither the US nor any other international actor has stepped forward to provide such end-game clarity.

Yet, even if a newly elected Israeli government agrees to discuss such a vision, the current PA leadership lacks legitimacy in the West Bank, let alone in the Gaza Strip. The PA is already facing difficulties running the West Bank. If presidential elections were held on the last day before the eruption of the October the 7th war, in which three candidates competed, Marwan Barghouti from Fatah, Ismail Haniyyeh from Hamas, and president Mahmoud Abbas, also from Fatah, only 6% of West Bankers say they would vote for the current president. In that same poll, which was conducted by PSR for Wave 8 of Palestine’s Arab Barometer (AB-8) during the last week before the current war started, 85% of West Bankers demanded the resignation of the PA president.[1] In a PSR survey on public threat perception of settler terrorism conducted in the West Bank before and during the current war, about half of the West Bankers favored the formation of armed groups as the most effective means of protecting their communities from settlers’ violence; about a fifth picked the deployment of the PA police and another fifth favored protection from the Israeli army.[2]  Indeed, PSR’s AB-8 poll showed that two thirds of West Bankers believed that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people. 

Moreover, the West Bank is boiling and could erupt into widescale violence if and when the PA security services lose further control on the ground. As Israel continues to weaken the PA politically and financially, further squeeze could lead to a mutiny in the security sector ranks. Already individuals with family links to armed groups in the northern parts of the West Bank have found themselves siding with their family members and leaving their services. An expansion of the armed groups to other locations could produce further fractures within the security forces. Similarly, dissent within Fatah and its youth organization, the Tanzim, could bring about significant radicalization leading to clashes with the security services and the possibility of an internal implosion. An explosion in the West Bank could open another military front against Israel and might require moving forces from the Gaza front to that of the West Bank. 

 

Is there a way forward?

Israel and the international community could strengthen the PA and preempt such outcome.  This requires steps from Israel. These could include returning confiscated and withheld PA financial resources to the PA, stopping settler terrorism in the West Bank, stopping the army’s daily incursions in Palestinian cities, facilitate the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, assert commitment to the two state solution and stop settlement expansion, transfer parts of area C to the PA control, and agree to resume negotiations with the PLO for a permanent agreement. Obviously Israel is unwilling to do so because the current Israeli government is made up of right wing extremists who in fact seek to weaken the PA further in order to open the door wide to annexation of parts of or all of the West Bank.

Only the international community, led by the US, can, in theory, outline the plan referred to above. If so, it should embed it in a vision for regional peace within the context of the Arab Peace Initiative, one that provides for Arab-Israeli normalization in which Palestinian-Israeli peace along the two-state solution is a central component; and it needs to articulate a roadmap to get there, one that takes into consideration the immediate steps outlined above to strengthen the PA. There is no evidence at this time that the US is contemplating such a declaratory change in its current policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

Yet, even in the best case scenario in which the international community provides the vision and the road map and a new Israeli government, under pressure from the US and the major regional powers, agrees to strengthen the PA and revive the two state solution, the current PA, due to its lack of legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the Palestinian people is not in a position to be a viable player.  But it can be made one if the preconditions described above are indeed met.

If the PA survives the current onslaught on the Gaza Strip without too much damage, and if new sustainable political arrangements are put at the table at one point in the near future, unlikely as that might be, what would be required for the PA to do to make itself legitimate in the eyes of its public and a viable player in the eyes of the region and the international community, one that can help restore governance, including law enforcement, to the Gaza Strip and serve as the midwife for Palestinian statehood?

Under these conditions, the Palestinians will find themselves confronting their current two most difficult challenges: first, how to produce a legitimate political leadership acceptable to all Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and second, how to reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into one democratic political system.  In addressing these two issues, it goes without saying that the current PA leadership has failed the Palestinians. Similarly, the conditions that led to the current wave of unprecedented violence must be confronted and addressed. Only the Palestinians can change their leadership; and only they can build a democratic political system; and only they can begin an internal process of reckoning to prevent the current Gazan devastation from happening again or from happening in the West Bank. The lesson from the past few decades in the Palestinian experience and in the entire region is that no one can successfully impose regime change on other people. 

The steps the Palestinians should take within the context described above begins with the integration of all Palestinian political forces into a formal political process, one whose vision is to build strong and accountable political institutions, while enjoying complete monopoly over coercive force, a democratic political system. This process should allow Hamas to be brought back into the formal PA political process while acknowledging the PA’s monopoly over force. This should be followed by the formation of an agreed upon apolitical transitional leadership and government, one that does not derive any legitimacy from the PA president nor report to him. Indeed, in this technocratic government that represents faces acceptable to all Palestinian factions, including Hamas, the prime minister must be granted the full jurisdiction of the office as stipulated in the Basic Law while the jurisdiction of the president must be consistent with that same Basic Law but without undermining his position as the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, that paralyzed and dysfunctional body.

The most immediate tasks of the transitional leadership must be the restoration of a truly democratic Palestinian political system. The judiciary must be revived as an independent body, free speech must be restored, the police and similar security services must be made accountable to the prime minister, the space for civil society must be significantly expanded, and all controversial presidential decrees that have over the past decade marginalized the judiciary, dismissed the parliament, destroyed liberties and civil society’s pluralism, and established a politicized constitutional court that rubber stamped other unconstitutional presidential decrees, must be suspended. Within a year, all armed groups, including those of Hamas, must agree to disarm and to accept integration into the Palestinian security sector. Following that, Palestinians must hold presidential and parliamentary elections within a year or two after the formation of the transitional leadership in which all factions participate. Acceptance of the democratic process, the peaceful transition of power, and the PA’s monopoly over coercive force must be the only political preconditions for participation.

 

In Conclusion:

It should be plainly clear that none of the above will be possible without a comprehensive vision for the two-state solution, without a detailed roadmap to reach it, and without a viable negotiating process between Israel and the PLO within an Arab and regional framework based on the Arab Peace Initiative. We are very far from such a development. No regional or international leadership is willing to embrace it and no Israeli partner is willing to accept it. Israel may soon find itself returning to the implicit arrangements that existed with Hamas in the Gaza Strip before October the 7th because it absolves it of providing answers to the difficult questions posed by the alternative. So far, the international community and the regional Arab leadership seem complicit in this outcome.

 

[1] PSR has not yet published the results of its 8th wave of the Arab Barometer. But Amaney Jamal and Michael Robbins published some of the finding here. 

العربية

Public Opinion Poll No (87)

23 March 2023 
In light of the recent events in Huwara and the northern West Bank, Palestinian public attitudes become more militant as support for armed struggle rises, support for the two-state solution drops, and the vast majority opposes the Aqaba meeting; parallel to that, trust in the PA declines, demand for the resignation of president Abbas rises, and for the first time since the creation of the PA, a majority says that its dissolution or collapse serves the interest of the Palestinian people 
8-11 March 2023 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 11 March 2023. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the continuation of the teachers’ strike in public schools, the imposition by the PA of one Shekel added to each telecommunication bill as a donation to an East Jerusalem fund, the holding of student elections at Hebron University in which a Fatah affiliated bloc won against a Hamas affiliated one. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, armed confrontations continued to escalate in the West Bank, the PA announced a suspension of security coordination with Israel, and Israel took punitive measures against the PA including the confiscation and withholding of funds. Settlers attacked the town of Huwara and burned dozens of homes with residents inside as well as shops and cars and killed one civilian in a revenge attack following the killing of two settlers in the town earlier that day. A Palestinian-Israeli meeting took place in Aqaba, in the presence of Egyptian, Jordanian, and American delegations, to discuss means of de-escalation and the ending of unilateral measures. In Israel, tens of thousands demonstrated against the Netanyahu government’s plan to change the judicial system. Regionally, an earthquake hit Turkey and Syria bringing vast destruction and the death of tens of thousands.

This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The findings of the first quarter of 2023 indicate that the internal factional balance of power remains unchanged, with parity between Fatah and Hamas, if new parliamentary elections were to take place today, and a majority vote for Hamas’ candidate, Ismail Haniyyeh, over Mahmud Abbas in presidential elections. Satisfaction with president Abbas drops four percentage points and the demand for resignation increases by two points.

Public evaluation of internal conditions points to a greater deterioration in the standing of the PA and a significant loss of trust in it. Findings show a rise in the belief that the PA is now a burden on the Palestinian people and for the first time in our polls, a majority supports the dissolution of the PA and views its collapse as an interest for the Palestinian people. In fact, a majority thinks that the continued existence of the PA serves the interests of Israel and that its dissolution or collapse would strengthen Palestinian armed groups.

The declining status of the PA can also be seen in the vast public support, standing at about two-thirds in the West Bank, for the strike of the West Bank teachers in public schools and the belief of about 80% or more of the public that the current PA government will fail in conducting elections, reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or improving economic conditions. Loss of trust in the PA can be seen in the overwhelming opposition to the PA’s imposition of a one-Shekel tax on the telecommunication bill to support East Jerusalem. On top of that opposition, about 80% say the money will not really go to East Jerusalemites.

Findings of the current quarter point a significant decline in the support for the two-state solution accompanied by an increase in the percentage of those who think this solution is no longer practical or feasible due to settlement expansion. Furthermore, the public expresses widespread pessimism about the ability of international organizations and the international community, including the US, the EU, and the Arab states, to impose sanctions on the current Israeli government to pressure it to change its settlement policy or its violations of international law.

In light of all that, findings show a rise in the percentage of those who support a return to armed confrontation and intifada. In fact, 70% of West Bankers expect the eruption of a third armed intifada. Moreover, more than 70% declare support for the latest Huwara shooting attack against settlers; two thirds support the formation of armed groups, such as the Jenin Battalion or the Lions’ Den; and almost all express the view that the PA security services should not arrest or disarm members of these groups. More than 60% of the West Bankers believe that members of these armed groups will resist with arms any attempt by the PA security services to disarm or arrest them. Public support for armed resistance is further confirmed by overwhelming opposition to the Palestinian participation in the Aqaba meeting. Almost all Palestinians think Israel will not honor its commitments in that meeting. A large majority, standing at 70%, think Israeli counter measures, which are meant to punish those who commit armed attacks or their families, such as home demolition, expulsion, or the imposition of the death penalty, will only lead to an increase in the intensity of such attacks.  

On the background of the settlers’ attack on Huwara and given the current right wing government in Israel, two thirds of the public expect an increase in these attacks. In light of the call by the Israeli finance minister to wipe out Huwara, a large minority, approaching almost half of the public, expect Israel to commit massacres and force a large-scale mass expulsion. Three quarters of the public view the Huwara settlers’ attack as an expression of the behavior of the Israeli government and army rather than the behavior of the most extreme settlers. 

(1) Armed escalation, security coordination, the Aqaba meeting, and a third intifada:

  • 73% are against the Aqaba meeting and 84% think that Israel will not honor its commitments made during that meeting
  • 68% support the formation of armed groups, such as the “Lions’ Den,” and 87% believe the PA does not have the right to arrest members of these groups
  • 61% expect the eruption of a third armed intifada and 62% think that members of the PA security services will not take part in the intifada alongside members of the armed groups
  • 59% expect members of the armed groups to use their arms to resist attempts by the PA to arrest or disarm them
  • 63% support ending security coordination with Israel but 79% believe the PA has not ended that coordination as it had announced
  • 70% believe the Israeli punitive measures against the Palestinians will increase the incidence of armed attacks

A vast majority of 73% is against and only 21% are in favor of the Palestinian attendance of the Aqaba meeting which took place last month in order to stop the escalation of the armed conflict in the West Bank. Opposition to the Aqaba meeting is higher in the West Bank (81%) than in the Gaza Strip (61%), in villages/towns and cities (78% and 73% respectively) compared to refugee camps (63%), among those whose age is 30 years or higher (75%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (65%), among men (77%) compared to women (69%), among the non-refugees (77%) compared to the refugees (67%), among farmers, mechants, and professionals (87%, 87%, and 83% respectively) compared to students (64%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (78%) compared to those who work in the public sector (70%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (84% and 85% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (54%).  

Similarly, the vast majority (84%) thinks Israel will not honor its commitments in the Aqaba meeting; only 12% think Israel will implement its commitments. 64% say that now, after the Aqaba meeting, they are less optimistic regarding possible improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations, such as the prospects for the implementation of confidence building measures or the slowing down of settlement expansion next year; only 8% say they are more optimistic and 24% say they are neither more nor less optimistic.

68% of the public (71% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 25% are against that.

Nonetheless, 52% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 44% are not worried.

83% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 12% say they are for it.

The vast majority (87%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 8% say they favor it.

A majority of 58% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 15% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 14% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups.

A majority of 61% (69% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) expect security conditions in the West Bank to continue to escalate leading to the eruption of a third armed intifada; 36% say they do not expect a third intifada.

If security conditions escalate further or if a third intifada were to erupt, a majority of 62% does not expect the PA security services to join forces with the Palestinian armed groups; 33% say they expect them to do so.

A majority of 56% says they do not expect the PA to deploy its security forces in the Jenin refugee camp or the old city of Nablus and other areas in which armed groups have recently been formed in order to enforce law and order and ensure “one authority-one gun” by disarming these groups and arresting their member in return for concessions that Israel might provide; 37% say they expect the PA to do so.

If the PA attempted to disarm the newly created armed groups, a majority of 59% thinks that members of these groups will use their arms to resist the PA security services; 8% think they will surrender; and 23% think they will resist the PA but non-violently.

A majority of 63% says it supports the ending of security coordination with Israel that was announced recently by the PA while 32% say they are opposed to it. But the overwhelming majority (79%) thinks the PA did not actually suspend security coordination with Israel; only 13% think it did. Support for ending security coordination is higher in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (61%), among those with the least income (67%) compared to those with the highest income (59%), among the religious (68%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (61% and 48% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (75%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (58% and 57% respectively).

The vast majority (77%) thinks Israel will not stop its army incursions into PA territories in order to encourage the PA to return to security coordination; 18% think Israel will do so. 61% think the PA will not return to security coordination if Israel continued its daily incursions while 32% think the PA will resume security coordination even if the Israeli army incursions continue.

70% (73% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip) believe the Israel measures aimed at punishing Palestinian attackers and their families, such as demolishing their homes, or expelling them, or imposing the death penalty, will lead to greater armed attacks; 8% think these measures will lead to lesser attacks; and 20% think they will have no impact on armed attacks.

 

(2) Whose interest is served by the continued existence or the collapse of the PA?

  • A plurality of the Palestinians thinks Israel’s punitive measures against the PA aim at weakening it but not to force its collapse
  • 57% think the continued existence of the PA serves Israel’s interests and 52% think the dissolution of collapse of the PA serves the interest of the Palestinian people
  • 57% believe the weakening or collapse of the PA strengthens Palestinian armed groups

The largest percentage (41%) says Israeli punitive measures against the PA aim at weaking it; 27% think Israel aims at forcing a PA collapse; and 27% think Israel does not want to weaken the PA or bring it to collapse.  When asked to define Israel’s interest regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse, the majority (57%) says the survival of the PA is in Israel’s interest while 39% think Israel’s interest lies in the collapse of the PA. The belief that the continued existence of the PA serves Israel’s interest stands at 62% in the West Bank compared to 49% in the Gaza Strip. It is higher in villages/towns and cities (62% and 57% respectively) compared to refugee camps (44%), among men (61%) compared to women (52%), among non-refugees (60%) compared to refugees (51%), among those holding the BA degree (61%) compared to the illiterates (46%), among those working in the private and non-governmental sector (64%) compared to those working in the public sector (54%), among the somewhat religious (61%) compared to the religious (53%), and among Hamas supporters and the supporters of third parties (66% and 61% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (50%).

When asked to define the interest of the Palestinian people regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse or dissolution, a majority of 52% says the Palestinian people’s interest lies in the collapse or dissolution of the PA while 42% define the continued existence of the PA as a Palestinian interest. The belief that the collapse or dissolution of the PA serves Palestinian interests is higher in refugee camps and cities (54% and 53% respectively) compared to villages/towns (48%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (59%) compared to those whose age is 30 years or higher (51%), among the professionals, laborers, and students (62%, 59%, and 58% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, and housewives (41%, 47%, and 48% respectively), among those working in the private and nongovernmental sector (57%) compared to those working in the public sector (40%), among those with the least income (57%) compared to those with the highest income (43%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (77% and 62% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (27%).  

In the event that the PA becomes weak or collapses, such a development is seen by 57% of the public as leading to the strengthening of the armed groups in the West Bank while 12% think it will weaken them; 27% think it will neither weaken nor strengthen the armed groups.

If it becomes pretty clear that Israel aims at weakening the PA or even forcing its collapse, 67% of the public thinks the major Arab countries, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, will abandon the PA; 28% think they will stand with the PA.

 

(3) The shooting in Huwara, the settler’s terror, and the absence of PA police:

  • 71% support the Palestinian armed attack on two Israeli settlers in Huwara
  • 75% think the behavior of settlers in their Huwara rampage reflects an official Israeli conduct and is not restricted to the extreme settlers
  • 67% expect settlers’ violence to increase under the current Israeli government
  • 59% believe the absence of the Palestinian police during the settlers’ rampage in Huwara was due to the desire of the PA to maintain security coordination with Israel and because the PA seeks to avoid an armed clash with the Israeli army
  • 44% believe that the statement by the Israeli finance minister Smotrich calling for wiping out Huwara points to an Israeli intention to commit massacres against the Palestinians and force their expulsion

A large majority of 71% say they support the shooting of two settlers in Huwara while 21% express opposition to this and similar armed attacks.  Three quarters (75%) believe the settlers’ terror attack on Huwara after the killing of the two settlers is an expression of the policy of the Israeli government and army while 20% think it is an expression of the behavior of the extreme settlers only. Two thirds (67%) expect increased settlers’ attacks under the current right wing Israeli government, but 16% say there will less attacks, and 14% think the frequency of settlers’ attacks will remain unchanged.

When asked why the PA police and other security services were unable to protect the residents of Huwara and other towns located in area B of the West Bank, despite the fact that the PA has jurisdiction over law enforcement in such areas, the public was divided into four groups. One group of 32% thinks the PA leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with Israel over protecting its own people. A second group, of 27%, thinks the PA police and national security forces do not wish to engage the Israeli army in an armed confrontation. A third group, of 24%, thinks the PA police does not have a jurisdiction over the settlers and cannot arrest them. A fourth group, of 11%, thinks the settlers’ attacks occur during the night when the PA police is not present in the targeted areas.

When asked what should the PA do to protect the residents of Huwara and other towns located in area B of the West Bank, the largest percentage (39%) says it should form civil guards units made up of volunteers from these towns; 27% say it should build police stations or place permanent police units in these areas; 13% say it should complain to the UN and the International Criminal Court; and 9% say it should issue statements of condemnation.

In light of the call by Smotrich, the Israeli minister of finance, to wipe out the town of Huwara, a large minority of 44% expects the Israeli government to commit massacres and force a mass expulsion of Palestinians if and when Palestinian armed attacks expand; but a majority of 53% says it does not expect that.

 

(4) Legislative and presidential elections:

  • 68% support the holding of general elections but 69% do not expect elections to take place soon
  • In presidential elections between president Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 36% of the popular vote and the latter 52%; in similar elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 58% and the latter 37%
  • 77% demand the resignation of president Abbas
  • In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 33% of the vote and Fatah 35%
  • 44% think Hamas and Fatah do not deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people; 26% think Hamas deserve to represent and lead the Palestinians and 24% think Fatah deserves to do so

68% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 28% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 76% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 69% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 36% and Haniyeh 52% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 36% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 61%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% and Haniyeh 43%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 62% and from among those, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 29% and the latter 60%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (35%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (18%), Khalid Mish’al (5%), Mohammad Dahlan and Mohammad Shtayyeh (4% each), Yahya al Sinwar (3%), and Hussein al Sheikh (2%); 26% said they do not know or have not decided.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 19% and dissatisfaction at 77%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 17% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 75% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 76% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 33% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 38% three months ago).

26% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 24% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 44% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 28% selected Hamas, 25% Fatah under Abbas, and 40% said neither side deserves such a role.

A majority of 53% thinks that the recent student election results of Hebron University, in which the student bloc affiliated with Fatah won sixty percent of the vote against the Islamic bloc, which received forty percent of the vote, does not necessarily reflect the balance of power between Fatah and Hamas in the larger Palestinian society in the West Bank or in the Hebron district; 19% think it reflects the balance of power in the Palestinian society in the West Bank; and 15% think it reflects the balance of power in the Hebron district. The belief that the results of the Hebron student elections does not reflect the strength of public support for the two political factions in the Palestinian society is higher in the West Bank (55%) compared to the Gaza Strip (49%), among men (55%) compared to women (50%), among holders of BA degree (57%) compared to the illiterates (45%), among those working in the private and non-governmental sector (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (52%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (70% and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (34%). 

 

(5) Domestic conditions, teachers strike, the one-Shekel tax, and the readiness to deal with a major earthquake:

  • 82% think there is corruption in the PA institutions and 71% think there is corruption in the public institutions administered by Hamas
  • 63% believe the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people
  • After four years, expectations from the Shtayyeh government keep going down
  • 24% say they want to emigrate; 32% in the Gaza Strip and 19% in the West Bank
  • 71% are opposed to the imposition of a one-shekel tax to be added to the telecommunication bill; 79% think the collected funds will not go to East Jerusalem
  • 65% of the West Bankers support the public teachers’ strike

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 9% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 46%. Three months ago, the perception of safety and security in the West Bank stood at 64% and at 77% in the Gaza Strip.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 81% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 51% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (63%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 36% viewed it as an asset.

22% are optimistic and 75% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 26%.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 81% expect failure; only 14% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 16% of the public expect success and 79% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 81% expects failure and 16% expects success.

24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 32% and in the West Bank at 19%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 30% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

A vast majority of 71% says it opposes the imposition of tax of one Shekel on each telecommunication bill to support an East Jerusalem fund and 28% say are in favor. A large majority of 79% thinks the collected funds will not go to the benefit of East Jerusalemites while only 12% think the money will go to the residents of East Jerusalem. The opposition to the one-shekel tax is higher in the West Bank (77%) compared to the Gaza Strip (62%), in refugee camps (78%) compared to villages/towns and cities (71% and 70% respectively), among those working in the private and non-governmental sector (77%) compared to those working in the public sector (58%), among the somewhat religious (74%) compared to the religious (68%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (76% and 77% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (53%). 

A majority of 56% says it supports the strike of the public-school teachers in the West Bank while 42% say they are against it. Support for the strike in the West Bank rises to 65% and declines to 44% in the Gaza Strip.

In light of the devastating earthquake in Turkey and Syria last month, a majority of 52% thinks that the chances that a similar one might hit Palestine during this or next year are slim to nonexistent while 36% think they are high or medium. When asked about their impressions about the PA’s capacity to deal with such earthquake if it were to happen in Palestine, the vast majority (81%) thinks it is slight or nonexistent while 18% think it is high or medium.

We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Palestine Today TV (9%), Maan TV (6%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Mayadeen (2%).

 

(6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations, the Peace process, and the decision to go to ICJ:

  • Support for the two-state solution declines from 32% to 27% and 74% think this solution is no longer feasible due to settlements’ expansion
  • Support for a return to armed confrontations and intifada increases from 55% to 58%
  • Support for dissolving the PA rises from 48% to 52%
  • A vast majority of 69% does not think international organizations have the capacity to stop Israeli violations of international law
  • 50% expect the fall of the current Israeli government due to the anti-government demonstrations

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 27% and opposition stands at 71%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 32%.  A majority of 74% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 24% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 74% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 69% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 26%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 57% supported joining more international organizations; 49% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 58% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 52% supported dissolving the PA; and 28% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 55% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 54% chose armed struggle (55% in the Gaza Strip and 54% in the West Bank), 18% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 51% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations.

A vast majority of 69% says that international organizations, such as the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice, will not be able to constrain Israeli policies that violate international law and that these organizations will be content with expressions of opposition and condemnation. Only 13% think they will be able to constrain these Israeli policies while 12% think they will have a limited impact.

The overwhelming majority (84%) thinks the Biden Administration will not impose sanctions on Israel to pressure it to change its settlement policy; only 12% think the US will impose such sanctions.

Similarly, 82% think the European Union and European countries like France, the UK, and Germany will not impost sanctions on Israel in order to pressure it to change its settlement policy; 14% think they will do so.

Moreover, 83% think the Arab countries that have recently normalized relations with Israel, such as UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, will not impose sanctions on Israel in order to pressure it to change its settlement policy; only 15% think they will do so.

In light of the anti-government demonstrations in Israel, half of the public (50%) thinks they could lead to the fall of the Netanyahu government while 44% think they do not expect that to happen.

 

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

  • 37% consider ending occupation and building a state as the top national goal for the Palestinians and 31% think it is the refugees’ right of return
  • 38% view the Israeli occupation as the most pressing problem confronting Palestinians today and 24% think corruption is the most pressing problem

A plurality of 37% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 15% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 26% (12% in the Gaz Strip and 35% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 21% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 20% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction;  16% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 9% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 11% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 24% said it is corruption, 15% said it is the split or division, 13% said it is unemployment, and 5% said it is the internal violence.

 

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

العربية

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (35)

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (35)

While a majority of Palestinians supports holding local elections and while a majority supports the two-state solution, an overwhelming majority opposes the proximity talks in the absence of a settlement freeze in East Jerusalem and the popularity and legitimacy of the president weaken in light of corruption reports and in light of the ending of his electoral term

4-6 March 2010   

 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 4 and 6 March 2010. The poll was conducted after the PA announcement regarding the holding of local elections in July 2010, the leveling of corruption charges against senior PA officials by a former Palestinian intelligence official, publication of reports about the Egyptian construction of an underground iron barrier along the Egyptian borders with Rafah, and reports of an American proposal to conduct proximity talks between Israel and the Palestinians.  Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

 

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2010 show a limited setback for president Abbas and his Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and a limited improvement in the standing of Ismail Haniyeh and Hamas. The change might have been caused by the end of the electoral term of the president and by press reports that revealed cases of corruption and scandals inside the PA. These reports have been seen, and most importantly have been seen as credible, by a majority of Palestinians. Despite this setback for the PA and Abbas, a majority of Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, supports the holding of local elections even before reconciliation and even if Hamas boycotts the elections. Findings also show that the top most important Palestinian priority today is the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This finding serves Fateh’s interests very well as a large percentage of Palestinians believe that while a Fateh electoral victory would strengthen the chances for reunifications, a large percentage believes that a Hamas victory would consolidate separation.

Findings also indicate widespread opposition to the American proposal to conduct Palestinian-Israeli proximity talks with US mediation but without a freeze on settlement construction in East Jerusalem. But the opposition to the resumption of peace talks does not mean an opposition to a peace settlement based on a two-state solution. A majority does indeed support the Arab Peace Initiative and prefers the two-state solution over other solutions such as a one state solution or one based on a Palestinian-Israeli confederation. Moreover, half of the public supports mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. But findings show a strong pessimistic tendency with regard to the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel during the next five years. Moreover, the overwhelming majority believes that Israel’s long term goal is to annex the occupied Palestinian territories and to expel its Palestinian population or deny them their political rights. A similar large majority expresses worry that it or family members would be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished. Increased Palestinian perception of threat leads in this poll to an increase in the support for armed attacks against Israelis despite the fact that a majority is still opposed to it.

 

(1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

  •  A majority of 54% supports the holding of local elections in the West Bank even without reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas and even if Hamas decides to boycott the elections.
  • A majority believes that recent reports about corruption are accurate and 50% do not trust the committee established by PA president to investigate the case of an alleged corruption and a video tape involving the director of his office and the role allegedly played by the Palestinian Intelligence Department in the matter; three quarters do not want to see a PA security service involved in such activity. 
  • If new presidential elections took place today, Abbas would receive 50% and Ismail Haniyeh 40%. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 63% and the latter 32%.
  • If new parliamentary elections in which all factions participate were to take place today, Fateh receives 42%, Hamas 28%, all other lists combined 11%, and 19% say they are undecided
  • 11% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good while 31% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good; but perception of personal and family safety and security stands at 70% in the Gaza Strip compared to 55% in the West Bank
  • Performance of the Haniyeh’s government is seen as good or very good by 39% and performance of Fayyad’s government is seen as good or very good by 42%; 47% are satisfied with the performance of Abbas and 50% are not satisfied
  • The top priority for Palestinians is the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip followed by ending Gaza siege and opening its crossings
  • 15% believe that unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will soon be restored, 31% believe separation is permanent and 47% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time

 

Findings show readiness in the West Bank for the resumption of the electoral process while the Gaza Strip remains opposed to elections: 54% support and 41% oppose the holding of local elections in the West Bank next July even if reconciliation talks have not succeeded by then to unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Support for holding local elections is higher in the West Bank, reaching 60%, and lower in the Gaza Strip, standing at 46%. If local elections were held in the West Bank on the stated date of July 2010, a majority of the West Bankers (53%) would participate even if Hamas boycotts the elections and even if reconciliation was not achieved by that date. 43% of the West Bankers say they will not participate in the local elections.  Respondents in Gaza were not asked about participation in the local elections.

Support for holding local elections increases in rural areas (63%) compared to cities (53%) and refugee camps (52%). It also increases among men (56%) compared to women (52%), among the somewhat religious (59%) compared to the religious (48%), among supporters of the peace process (60%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (36%), among holders of BA degree (57%) compared to illiterates (43%), among employees (61%) compared to housewives (51%), among those working in the public sector (72%) compared to those working in the private sector (53%), among those who intend to vote for Fateh (78%) and the undecided (59%) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas (31%) and for third parties (48%), and among those less than 40 years of age (58%) compared to those over 40 (48%).

But if support for holding elections is an indication of PA legitimacy, findings show an indicator in the opposite direction: corruption. Findings show that 72% have heard about reports of scandals and charges of corruption in the Palestinian Authority or saw a video tape mentioned in those reports and more than two thirds of them (69%) believe those reports and charges to be accurate while 24% do not. In this regard, only 41% have confidence and 50% do not have confidence in the investigation committee established by the PA president to examine these reports of scandals and charges of corruption. Moreover, 50% say they believe and 38% say they do not believe that the PA Intelligence Department was behind the filming of the video tape mentioned in the reports and charges of corruption. About three quarters (74%) reject or strongly reject allowing PA security services to photograph or film Palestinians in embarrassing situations, as the case may have been in the video tape mentioned in the reports and 22% accept such a role for the security services.

The percentage of those who reject or strongly reject allowing PA security services to engage in such activity increases in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (73%), among women (77%) compared to men (71%), among supporters of the peace process (77%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (64%), among those working in the public sector (80%) compared to those working in the private sector (72%), and among supporters of Fateh (82%) and third parties (84%) compared to supporters of Hamas (66%).

If new presidential elections are held today, Abbas would receive the vote of 50% of the voters (compared to 54% last December) and Haniyeh would receive 40% (compared to 38% last December). But if the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 63% (compared to 67% last December) and the latter would receive 32% (compared to 28% last December). Most popular figures selected by the public as a possible vice president are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 30% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (19%), Salam Fayyad (14%) Mustafa Barghouti (11%), and Saeb Erekat (5%).  If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 42% say they would vote for Fateh and 28% say they would vote for Hamas, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago Fateh received 43%, Hamas 27%, third parties combined 14%, and the undecided stood at 17%.

11% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good and 73% say conditions are bad or very bad. By contrast, 31% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good and 36% say they are bad or very bad. Similarly, 30% say conditions of democracy and human rights under the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip are good or very good. By contrast, 37% say these conditions in the PA under president Abbas are good or very good. 61% say their security and safety and that of their families are assured. In the West Bank, perception of personal and family safety and security stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip, perception of safety and security stands today at 70%. Despite the difference in the evaluation of condition in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, evaluation of the performance of the governments of Haniyeh and Fayyad does not seem to reflect it. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government reaches 39% and positive evaluation of the performance of Salam Fayyad’s government stands at 42%. In the Gaza Strip, 44% say the performance of Haniyeh’s government is good or very good while only 36% of West Bankers say the same. Positive evaluation of the Fayyad government reaches 40% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank. 47% are satisfied with the performance of president Abbas and 50% are not satisfied. Moreover, 28% believe that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one and only 26% say that Abu Mazin’s and Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one, and 31% say both governments are illegitimate. Three months ago, 26% said Haniyeh’s government was the legitimate one and 30% said Fayyad’s government was the legitimate one. Moreover, 53% say PA president Abbas has lost his legitimacy when his term ended and 41% disagree with that. Similarly, 53% say the Palestinian Legislative Council has lost its legitimacy after its term ended and 39% disagree with that.

The largest percentage (59%) views the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the top most important Palestinian priority today, 24% believe the top priority is the opening of border crossings, and 17% believe the top priority is the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip. In this regard, if Hamas wins the next elections, 61% say such outcome would lead to the consolidation of the siege and international boycott while 12% say it would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 9% say such outcome would lead to the consolidation of the siege while 57% say it would lead to the lifting of the siege. Moreover, if Hamas wins the next elections, such outcome would lead to the consolidation of the separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the eyes of 46% of the public while only 19% believe it would lead to consolidation of unity. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 27% believe this would consolidate separation and 32% believe it would strengthen unity.

31% say unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will not be restored and two separate entities will develop while only 15% say unity will be reestablished soon. But the largest percentage (47%) says unity will eventually be restored but after a long time. In this regard, only 14% say Hams is responsible for the split and 12% say Fateh is responsible. Almost two thirds (64%) say both are responsible for the continued split. Moreover, findings show that 24% of the public believes that Hamas is responsible for the failure to hold elections on time and 12% believe Fateh is the one responsible for that. But the largest percentage, 31%, blames Israel. 

 

(2) Iron underground wall on borders with Egypt

  • 35% believe that Egypt’s goal from building its underground iron wall on its borders with Rafah is to pressure Hamas to sign the reconciliation paper while 28% believe the goal to be the protection of Egypt’s security against smugglers; but 31% believe the goal is to contribute to the siege on the Gaza Strip
  • Gazans are less  likely than West Bankers to suspect the motivation of Egypt in building the underground wall

The Gaza Strip differs from the West Bank in its evaluation of the function of the underground iron barrier being built by Egypt on its Rafah borders. Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to show understanding of Egypt’s goals. Findings show that the public is split on its views regarding Egypt’s goal: 35% believe the aim is to pressure Hamas to sign the reconciliation declaration (43% in the Gaza Strip and 30% in the West Bank), 31% believe the aim is to contribute to the siege of the Gaza Strip (25% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank), and 28% believe the aim is to protect the security of Egypt from smugglers (29% in the Gaza Strip and 27% in the West Bank).

Percentage of those who believe the goal behind the underground barrier is to contribute to the siege increases among men (33%) compared to women (29%), among the religious (35%) compared to the somewhat religious (27%), among those opposed to the peace process (46%) compared to supporters of the peace process (26%), among the illiterates (33%) compared to the holders of BA degree (24%), among those who work in the private sector (35%) compared to those who work in the public sector (26%), among those whose age is over 50 years (43%) compared to those whose age is between 18-22 years (32%), and among supporters of Hamas (40%) and third parties (39%) compared to supporters of Fateh (20%).

 

(3) Peace Process   

  • In the absence of an Israeli freeze on settlement construction in East Jerusalem, only 26% support, and 73% oppose, Palestinian participation in the US proposed proximity talks
  • 60% support and 37% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative
  • 57% prefer a two-state solution while 29% prefer a one state solution and 26% prefer a Palestinian-Israeli confederation
  • 50% support and 49% oppose a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after a peace agreement has been reached
  • But 71% believe that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non existent and 28% believe the chances are medium or high
  • Palestinians have no confidence in Israel’s long term aspirations: 63% believe it seeks to annex the occupied territories and expel its population; 18% believe it seeks to annex the occupied territories while denying its population their political rights; 16% believe it seeks to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories or part of it after guaranteeing its security
  • 77% are worried or very worried that they or a family member might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished
  • Support for armed attacks against Israelis stands at 47% and opposition at 50%

Findings show widespread opposition, reaching 73%, to return to negotiations with Israel as long as settlement construction continues in East Jerusalem, even if talks are indirect as the US proposed proximity talks. Support for the proximity talks in the absence of a settlement freeze in East Jerusalem stands at 26%. Opposition for the proximity talks increases among those opposed to the peace process (91%) compared to those who support the peace process (66%), among those whose age is over 40% (75%) compared to those whose age is between 18-22 years (66%), among supporters of Hamas (87%) compared to supporters ofFateh (59%).

Opposition to the proximity talks does not mean an opposition to a peace settlement based on a two-state solution. Findings show that 60% support and 37% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative calling for a two-state solution and for normalization of relations between Israel and all Arab countries after the Israeli withdrawal to the lines of June 1967. Moreover, a majority prefers the two-state solution over other solutions such as the one state solution or the one based on a Palestinian-Israeli confederation. Support for the two state solution stands at 57% while support for the one state solution stands at 29% and support for a Palestinian-Israeli confederation stands at 26%. Findings also show that 50% support and 49% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the settlement of all issues of the conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Preference for the two-state solution is higher in the West Bank (59%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among men (60%) compared to women (55%), among the somewhat religious (60%) compared to the religious (53%), among supporters of the peace process (66%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (33%), among employees (65%) and merchants (67%) compared to students (40%), among those who work in the public sector (67%) compared to those who work in the private sector (59%), among those over 50 years old (68%) compared to those between 18-22 years of age (44%), and among supporters of Fateh (73%) and third parties (62%) compared to supporters of Hamas (38%).

Despite the majority support for the two-state solution, the overwhelming majority (71%) believes the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non existent while 28% believe the chances are medium or high. Moreover, the overwhelming majority (81%) believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex Palestinian territories and expel the Palestinian population (as 63% believe) or annex the territories to Israel and deny Palestinians their political rights (as 18% believe). Percentage of those who believe that Israel’s aspiration is to annex the Palestinian territories and expel the population or deny them their rights stood at 76% in our last poll three months ago. The percentage of those who believe that Israel seeks to guarantee its security and withdraw from the territories or from part of it stands at 16%. Furthermore, findings show that the overwhelming majority (77%) is worried or very worried that it or members of its family might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land might be confiscated or home demolished by Israel. Only 23% say they are not worried or not worried at all.

Finally, findings show a noticeable increase in the percentage of those who support armed attacks against Israelis inside Israel, standing today at 47% compared to 43% in our previous poll conducted about three months ago.... Full Report

 
SPSS Data File: 
Binary Data 35 _ March 2010.sav
العربية

Public Opinion Poll No (68) Press-Release

4 July 2018

Abbas’ standing improves but the public is worried about possible deterioration in internal conditions in case of his absence and the majority demands compliance with the Basic Law in selecting his successor, as the case was in Arafat’s succession. By contrast, the public is dissatisfied with the manner in which the PNC managed its recent meeting and with the ability of the PLO leadership it elected to represent Palestine and its diaspora. An overwhelming majority demands immediate halt to all measures taken by the PA against Gaza. Despite wide support for popular resistance, the majority believes that the March of Return has failed to achieve its goals 

25 June-1 July 2018

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 25 June and 1 July 2018. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed important developments including the convening of the Palestinian National Council in Ramallah, the launch of the Return March in the Gaza Strip, the relocation of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, rising concerns about economic and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip and the potential impact of a reconciliation failure on these conditions. Weeks before the conduct of the poll, President Abbas entered a hospital in Ramallah for treatment fueling concerns about his health and a potential succession crisis. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and the various future directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 2150 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 2.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In light of the hospitalization of president Abbas, about two-thirds of the public express concern that domestic conditions may deteriorate in the absence of the president as long as no clarity or agreement exists on the succession process that should be followed. The public has a clear preference: it wants a full compliance with the relevant articles in the Basic Law even if this means that Aziz Duwaik from Hamas (being the current Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council) would become a temporary president for 60 days. However, a majority would also be happy if Hamas shows flexibility and allows a non-Hamas, non-Fatah speaker to be elected by the parliament thereby allowing a smoother process of succession and the holding of elections after 60 days.

Findings for the second quarter of 2018 also show that Abbas’ standing has improved somewhat. This might be due to his hospitalization. But it could also mean that the public is showing an appreciation for his strong rejection of Trump’s “Deal of the Century.” It is worth mentioning that Fatah’s popularity improved slightly as well. Yet despite this, more than 60% of the public demand Abbas’ resignation and the public stands decisively against Abbas’ domestic policies. An overwhelming majority demands the immediate halt to all measures taken by Abbas against the Gaza Strip and opposes the crackdown on demonstrations demanding an ending to these measures. Moreover, a two-third majority opposes Abbas’ demand for disarming armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip. A majority is also opposed to Abbas’ demand that Hamas hand over the entire responsibility over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including ministries, the security sector, and the “arms.”

The public expresses disappointment over some of the outcomes of the most recent meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) which was held two months ago in Ramallah and indeed, an overwhelming majority indicates that it did not follow the proceedings of the meeting.  Despite the fact that the largest percentage believes that the PNC represents the Palestinians, this percentage is less than half of the public. Perhaps one reason for this is the perception that the PNC’s proceedings and decisions are irrelevant to policy making. Indeed, about 70% believe that president Abbas and his government will not implement the PNC decisions. Moreover, about two thirds of the public are dissatisfied with the way members of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were elected by the Council and 70% expressed dissatisfaction with ability of these members to represent Palestinians at home and in the diaspora. Yet, despite all of this, a majority still views the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In light of the collapse of Palestinian-Israeli peace process, support for alternatives to negotiations varies. About three quarters continue to support PA efforts to internationalize the conflict and join various UN organizations. Moreover, about two thirds support popular non-violent resistance, a large minority supports return to an armed intifada, a similar percentage supports the dissolution of the PA, and a little less than a third  supports abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. These findings indicate a decline in support for an armed intifada and in the demand for dissolving the PA and point to a rise in support for popular resistance. It is worth mentioning that support for armed action and the dissolution of the PA is much higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank while support for popular resistance is high in both areas.

Nonetheless, confidence in the effectiveness of popular resistance is not high. This lack of confidence is demonstrated in public assessment of the effectiveness of the March of Return in the Gaza Strip. Despite popular support for the March in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, about three quarters of the public (80% in the West Bank and two thirds in the Gaza Strip) believe that the March has failed to achieve its goals or achieved very little. It is worth mentioning that the public is evenly divided in its assessment of the main party behind the March between those who think it is Hamas and those who think it is civil society organizations. Gazans however show no hesitancy on this as they strongly believe that it is indeed Hamas that stands behind the initiation and organization of the March of Return. 

 

(1) Abbas succession and presidential and parliamentary elections:

 

  • A large majority (64%) is worried that internal conditions might deteriorate or destabilize during the post-Abbas succession process due to lack of clarity and absence of agreement on the means of selecting the next PA president; 32% say they are not worried.
  • A majority (60%) says that in the case of Abbas’ absence, the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Aziz al Duwaik form Hamas, must become president for two months in implementation of the Basic Law; 29% say they are opposed to such implementation.
  • Similarly, a majority of 62% indicates that it would welcome a Hamas initiative to allow the election of a non-Hamas/non-Fatah Speaker in order to facilitate the post Abbas succession process; 29% say they are opposed to such initiative.
  • Almost half (48%) believes that the in the post Abbas period, Palestinian factions will succeed in reaching an agreement on a process that would allow for the holding of presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to elect a successor to Abbas; 41% believe the factions will not succeed.
  • 61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 33% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 68% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 62% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip.
  • If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 30% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 23% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip). Similarly, Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 6%, Mustafa Barghouti and Khalid Mishal  by 3% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.
  • Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 59%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 33% (40% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip).
  • If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 46% and the latter 47% of the vote (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 41% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 40% of the vote (compared to 35% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 53% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 45% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%.
  • If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 31% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 32% three months ago) and for Fatah at 34% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 38% three months ago).

 

(2) Domestic conditions:

  • Only 35% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 60% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.
  • Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 17%. In an open-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening of conditions in the Gaza Strip: the largest percentage (34%) blames Israel; 26% blame the PA and president Abbas and 20% blame Hamas. As we found in the previous poll, responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 38% of West Bankers compared to only 28% of Gazans blame Israel; 19% of West Bankers compared to 36% of Gazans blame the PA and Abbas, and 17% of West Bankers compared to 24% of Gazans blame Hamas.
  • Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 51%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 52%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 54% and in the West Bank at 53%.
  • We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Maan TV and Palestine TV (15% each), Al Aqsa TV and Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (12% each), Al Arabiya and al Quds TV (5% each), and al Mayadeen (4%).
  • Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%.
  • Half of the public (49%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 45% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

 

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

  • Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 30% are satisfied and 60% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 26%.
  • 30%, compared to 26% three months ago, are optimistic and 65% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. These are the same percentages we obtained three months ago.
  • A majority (71%) supports the unification of all PA institutions throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including the police force, under the control of the reconciliation government while 23% prefer to keep control over the police force in the Gaza Strip as it is now.
  • But the public is divided over the future of the police officers currently serving in the Gaza Strip: 32% want to keep all of them in place, 30% want to replace some of them by new ones while keeping the others, and 27% prefer to replace all of them with new recruits.
  • The public is also divided in its attitude regarding the demand made by Abbas requesting Hamas to fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” a large minority of 40% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 53% disagrees.
  • When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, almost two-thirds (65%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 26% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip.
  • Moreover, an overwhelming majority (79%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 17% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 83% in the West Bank but only 72% in the Gaza Strip. 
  • The overwhelming majority (81%) opposes the action taken by the PA security services to quell the demonstrations in the West Bank that demand lifting the measures taken by the PA against the Gaza Strip and only 15% support the crackdown on such demonstrations. Similarly, 81% oppose the measures taken by the Hamas police in the Gaza Strip against similar demonstrations while 13% support them.
  • Finally, we asked the public about the narrative it believes to be accurate regarding the responsibility of Fatah and Hamas over the Gaza explosion that targeted prime minister Hamdallah convoy several months ago: 26% say they believe in the accuracy of Hamas’ narrative (that the PA intelligence Department had a role in the explosion) and 16% believe in the accuracy of Fatah’s narrative regarding Hamas’ role in that explosion. But the largest percentage (45%) indicates that neither narrative is accurate. It is worth mentioning that those who see Hamas’ narrative or that of the PA as accurate are much higher in the Gaza Strip, with 38% believing in Hamas’ and 27% believing in the PA’s. The percentage of Gazans who believe that neither side is accurate declines to only 28%.

 

(4) The meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC):  

  • The overwhelming majority (83%) says that it either did not follow the proceedings or the decisions of the PNC meeting during its most recent session in Ramallah (55%) or followed only little (28%); only 13% say that they did follow all or most of them.
  • Yet, 46% agree that the PNC represents them or represents the Palestinian people at home and in the diaspora and 35% say that it does not represent them or the Palestinian people. About a fifth (19%) expressed no opinion on the matter.
  • However, when asked about the PLO, a majority (58%) agreed that the current organization, with its existing institutions and current leadership, remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; only 30% disagree with that. It is worth mentioning that our findings in June 2006, exactly 12 years ago, a larger majority of 69% viewed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
  • Almost two thirds (65%) are dissatisfied with the manner in which the PNC selected, without allowing nomination and direct personal elections, the members of the PLO Executive Committee; only 23% are satisfied with the PNC selection process.
  • Similarly, a large majority of 71% does not believe that the newly elected members are capable of representing the homeland and the diaspora given their average age and the fact that most came from the West Bank; only 20% say they are satisfied that the new members have that ability.
  • Moreover a large majority (69%) says that it has no confidence in the commitment of president Abbas and the PA government to implement the PNC decision; only 20% indicate that  has such confidence.

 

(5) The March of Return, the relocation of the US embassy, and future directions in the absence of the peace process:  

  • 38% of the public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip say that civil society organizations are behind the initiation and organization of the March of Return in the Gaza Strip. A similar percentage (37%) says that Hamas is responsible for the March, and 14% say that factions other than Hamas are responsible for its initiation and organization. It is worth mentioning that among Gazans, 61% believe that Hamas stands behind the marches.
  • A slim majority (51%) of Gazans supports the participation of family members and friends in the March of Return and 54% of West Bankers indicate their support for this form of resistance. Nonetheless, only a small minority (21%) believes the marches have achieved their goals or most of their goals and 74% believe they have not achieved their goals or achieved a little.
  • A majority (55%) believes that the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem serves to weaken Palestinian position that East Jerusalem should be the capital of the Palestinian state; 16% think the relocation of the embassy strengthens Palestinian position and 25% believes the relocation has no impact.
  • 73% of East Jerusalem residents, who carry Blue Israeli IDs, indicate that they do not intend to participate, or have not considered participation, in the Israeli municipal elections in the city but 22% indicate that they are indeed intending to vote or considering voting.
  • A large minority of 39% thinks that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while a third (34%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means and 21% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 35% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and only 31% sided with negotiation.
  • 58% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 21% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 19% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.
  • In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 75% support joining more international organizations; 67% support popular non-violence resistance; 43% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 30% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis.

 

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

  • 43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
  • The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 27% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; 21% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 2% say it is the absence of national unity.

 

العربية

Critical Policy Brief, Number 3/2019

18 June 2019

 

Reducing the Risks of President Abbas Succession

 

Jehad Harb

The dissolution of the Legislative Council per the Supreme Constitutional Court ruling on December 12, 2018, sparks off a constitutional and political crisis the instant the president office is declared vacant. This aftereffect rings particularly relevant under the clear and binding provisions of the Basic Law concerning the procedures of filling the vacancy in the office of the president. Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the lack of constitutional grounds would create a crisis over the legitimacy of the Palestinian political regime if the Palestinian Authority (PA) fails to abide by the rules and provisions spelt out in the Basic Law.

Trampling on the established mechanisms set out by the Basic Law would further aggravate the political schism over legitimacy between Fatah and Hamas and stir up resistance from several Palestinian political parties under the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as civil society organisations (CSOs). In a similar vein, such a move would increase the risk of dragging the whole country into chaos and rampant insecurity and a struggle over control and influence, threatening an internal conflict that would diminish the capacity of the PA, a turn that would give a rise to rival powers to dominate some cities and towns with the force of arms. As a spill-over, the PA would dissolve as an umbrella body and overarching authority, and the public security would fall apart. In both cases, the citizens’ feeling of insecurity for their families, properties, and themselves would rage on. Along these lines, the security forces would cave in, and the PA would fail in providing basic services - needless to mention the economic difficulties the public needs to endure; such as a sharp rise in the unemployment rate and the number of Palestinian households under the poverty line.  It is also highly unlikely that the PA would be able sell such ‘trampling on constitutional mechanisms’ to the international community or donors.

Although the call to hold parliamentary, but not presidential, elections in the aftermath of the transition of the PA to a UN-recognised state, the elevation of the status of Palestine from a permanent observer entity to a non-member observer state, has no legal standing, it can perhaps be understood from a political standpoint if it reflects concerns over Hamas's commitment to holding fair and free elections in the Gaza Strip. It might also be understood if presented as a process that begins with parliamentary elections but would soon be followed by a presidential one, or if it is meant to provide time for Fatah to select its candidate for the presidency, one other than Abbas.  Keeping the office of president without re-election after the transition to a status of a state is a patent violation of the Basic Law. Article 115 of the said Law spells it out that, ‘[t]he provisions of this Basic Law shall apply during the interim period and may be extended until the entry into force of the new Constitution of the State of Palestine.’ In other words, the change to the status of the PA does not permit it to breach the Basic Law provisions on power transfer arrangement and the fact that the legitimacy of its political institutions must be rock-bedded on free public elections and subject to regular public accountability.

The vacancy in the office of the president of the State of Palestine/PA poses an additional challenge to the Palestinian political regime in the heat of ultra-complex circumstances. While the political division is on the rise, the political system would lack any legitimacy without elections. This paper reviews the legal status of the vacancy in the office of the president of the PA. It tackles the reasons for the broad local and international interest in this situation and its impact on the Palestinian political system. Along these lines, the paper presents the options available to fill the vacancy in the post and the positions of the different actors that have a direct impact on the Palestinian political system. The paper also aims to put forward a set of recommendations for the PA to avoid probable risks that would arise from the vacancy in the office of the president of the PA and to maintain the legitimacy of the Palestinian political system.

 

 

The reasons behind the keen interest in the vacancy in the office of the president of the State of Palestine/PA

The interest in this matter is mainly attributed to the constitutional uncertainty of the succession process if President Mahmoud Abbas fails to perform the role and responsibilities constitutionally assigned thereto after the health conditions he went through and the medical checks he has undergone at several places without clear information or official statement on the health conditions of the head of the PA. Moreover, President Mahmoud Abbas is over 83 years of age; a fact that cause concern given that the average life expectancy for men in Palestine is 72 years.

This increasing concern also stems from the curiosity to know the identity and background of the prospect successor and the impact of his/her policies on the future Israeli Palestinian relations. This worry is particularly relevant, given that President Mahmoud has been in office for more than fourteen years, blurring the lines between the state and the head of the state and the political regime, just as is the case in many other third world countries. The Palestinian situation, nevertheless, proves to be more complicated. It, therefore, warrants fathoming the relationship with the Israelis and its future and how to handle the international interests that are more related to Israel than the Palestinians. The absence of a constitutional mechanism for the transfer power due to the dissolution of the Legislative Council and the Palestinian schism further complicates the situation. 

As article 37 of the Basic Law stands,

‘The office of the President shall be considered vacant in any of the following cases:

  1. death;
  2. Resignation submitted to the Palestinian Legislative Council if accepted by two-thirds of its members;
  3. Loss of legal capacity, as per a ruling issued by the High Constitutional Court and subsequently approved by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Council.

If the office of the President of the National Authority becomes vacant by any of the reasons above, the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council shall temporarily assume the powers and role of the President of the National Authority for a period not to exceed sixty (60) days, during which free and direct elections to elect a new President shall take place in accordance with the Palestinian Election Law’

This jus cogens as per the constitutional legislature stipulate that when the office of the president is vacant, the Speaker of the Legislative Council must take the helm. In other words, it presumes a duly elected legislative council to be functional and in place. Notwithstanding, this provision does not provide for any other parties to act as a president pro tempore. Moreover, this provision is based on the premise that the political system is rock-bedded on democratic rules for the transfer of power -such as transfer of the office of the president and the membership of the Legislative Council, and is incompatible with the appointment mechanisms. If the Palestinian are to enter the situation of a ‘vacant president office’ any time in the offing, they will stand in need of the other side of the equation of article 37 of the Basic Law that hauls the Palestinian political system to, but a constitutional deadlock.

It goes without saying that the transition requires triggering the constitutional and legal rules and observing the role of the existing political situations. The shift also necessitates performing the constitutional powers of the president of the PA/State in a manner that safeguards its statutory nature and respects the rule of law by maintaining the legitimacy of the political system of one of the most critical offices in the state. To that end, the president pro tempore shall carry presidential elections per article 37 of the Basic Law and the Public Elections Law, performing the primary mission a president pro tempore in any event within 60 days of the vacancy in the office. Otherwise, any action by the president pro tempore after that period shall be constitutionally null and void.

From a constitutional perspective, the acting president shall take up all the powers provided for in the Basic Law and other laws. The ethical norms, however, exclude some powers during the interim period on the premise that the president pro tempore is an acting president to fill the constitutional gap and perform the jus cogens that shall never be set aside.

 

Available options to mitigate the risks of the vacancy in the office of the president

To weather the constitutional and political crisis that may hit the Palestinian political system the day the office of the president of the PA is vacant, a choice needs to be made from the constitutional and political options below:

 

Option 1: The Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee or the Chairman of the Central Council

As per this option, the new Chairman of the Executive Committee may fulfil the president pro tempore office based on a decision made by the Central Council according to the Palestinian National Authority Establishment Decision made by the Central Council in October 1993. Otherwise, the Chairman of the PLO Central Council, who also chairs the PLO National Council, may assume the interim presidency upon a special session of the Central Council is held for that purpose. Of note, the Central Council assumes all the powers of the National Council during the period between the two sessions of the National Council per the latter's decision in its last session. “The Jerusalem and Return Declaration” of May 4, 2018, states, ‘the National Council has decided to delegate all the powers vested therein during the period between its two sessions to the PLO Central Council to promote and activate the PLO's role and develop the relevant competence and performance in such demanding and challenging times.’[1]

This pathway offers a soft option. It takes the Central Council one session to determine whether the Chairman of the Executive Committee or the Chairman of the National Council is more capable of dealing with international and regional stakeholders and promote the Palestinian demarches to clear the transition from the PA to the State of Palestine at the international level.  On the other hand, this option would aggravate the schism between Fatah and Hamas and increase the rejection within the PLO by the parties that did not take part in the last National Council meeting, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or did not attend the last sessions of the Central Council, such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian National Initiative. Furthermore, this option raises concerns over blurring the lines between the PLO and its departments and the PA and its institutions, particularly given the incapacity to conduct elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within the terms (60 days) set forth in the Basic Law. Consequently, the PLO would become directly responsible for implementing Palestinian obligations under the Oslo Accords and their various annexes.

 

 Option 2: The Prime Minister as an interim president

As per this option, the prime minister may assume the president pro tempore post for 60 days. The prime minister is the only senior officer that remains functional if the office of the president is vacant after the dissolution of the Legislative Council per the Supreme Constitutional Court Ruling. The Fatah Central Committee insisted one of its members fill the office of the prime minister in case the office of the President is vacant; Fatah, the ‘Ruling Party’, otherwise would be out of the PA political institutions.

 

As the Public Elections Law stands, the government is responsible for laying the groundwork and necessary conditions for holding the presidential elections. Still, this option contradicts the provisions of the Basic Law and accentuates the concerns over having the government taking over the reins of power without a reference point or a body to supervise its activities and performance during the transitional period in the absence of a president and the Legislative Council. In return, the government resources would be brought into the service of the candidate of the ruling party.

 

Option 3: The Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court as an interim president

This option names the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court to assume the office of the president as an impartial judicial official free of partisan biases and political interests. This route requires a ruling from the Supreme Constitutional Court for interpreting article 37 of the Basic Law if the office of the president is vacant under the absence of the Legislative Council. This option is similar to the Egyptian model that was applied in 2013 after the removal of the former president Mohammad Mursi. Back then, Adly Mansour, the Head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, acted as the president pro tempore until the presidential elections were held in 2014.

Needless to say, this option is not based on any constitutional provision but draws from the discretion power of the Supreme Constitutional Court to survive a critical constitutional bottleneck. However, several Palestinian parties challenge the legitimacy of the head of the Palestinian Supreme Constitutional Court and the Court itself - let alone the fact that it has not gained the acceptance by the majority of the Palestinian parties.  

 

Option 4: The Speaker of the Legislative Council as an interim president

This option names the Speaker of the dissolved Legislative Council Dr Aziz Dweik, the Hamas politician, as the next interim president. Such a bet sets Hamas eye to eye with the commitments of respecting and implementing the intricate contractual relations with the Government of Israel under the Oslo Accords. The advantage of this option lies in the fact that it respects the legislative elections held in 2006 and would gain massive support from Hamas, its supporters, and some countries in the region such as Turkey, Iran, and Qatar. By contrast, this option violates the Supreme Constitutional Court ruling to dissolve the Legislative Council. Fatah and the PA institutions and bodies would, moreover, flatly reject such an option due to the lack of confidence in Hamas and the Speaker of the dissolved Legislative Council, leaving the reins of the interim presidency unmanageable. The interim president would hit a deadlock in terms of accessing the international society to exert pressure to hold presidential elections as per the Special Protocol on Holding Elections in Jerusalem. In addition, the Israeli Government is most likely to withhold the PA clearance revenues, bring pressure to bear on the PA and dissolve it. 

 

Option 5: A consensual interim president agreed by Fatah and Hamas

As per this scenario, a national figure, one of the dissolved Legislative Council members, or any of the first three options may assume the interim president office upon a national agreement brokered by the PLO Reorganization Committee, also known as the “Leadership Committee.” The advantage of this option is that it would gain the support of the majority of the Palestinian factions, and thus it would allow holding the presidential elections within the statutory deadlines and ease the political tension between Fatah and Hamas. Nonetheless, this option is fraught with the difficulty of reaching an agreement between Fatah and Hamas within a timeframe that leaves legroom to set the constitutional election procedures in motion. This option also does not rely on a constitutional provision; thus, it legitimizes the agreement between the political parties at the expense of the constitutional provisions. 

 

Option 6: Holding Legislative Elections Now

This option provides for holding legislative elections, without presidential elections, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (according to the Supreme Constitutional Court ruling concerning the dissolution of the Legislative Council) or in the West Bank only before the office of the president becomes vacant. This alternative would breathe life into the constitutional option, which was nipped by the dissolution of the Legislative Council.

The results of the Public Poll No. 71 published by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in March 2019[2] indicate that 61% of the Palestinian oppose holding legislative elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This opposition leaps to three quarters (74%) of the Palestinian that are against holding parliamentary election in the West Bank alone; 41% of the Palestinian indicated that they would participate in the election if it is held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, only 29% would join if it is held in the West Bank only. 

The probability of holding elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip together remain limited in light of the current positions of the Palestinian parties, especially Hamas’ as stated by Dr Khalil al-Hayya, ‘the delegation of the Elections Committee presented to Hamas President Mahmoud Abbas's call for holding legislative elections only, and Hamas declined.’ This rejection bars the Palestinian in the Gaza Strip from taking part in the election as long as the Gaza Strip is under the control of Hamas. A majority of the public, 53%, believes that Hamas will not permit the holding of elections if only the legislative election is to be held. Over and above, an election in the West Bank without the participation of the citizens in the Gaza Strip would be limited and disintegrated. If any, this election would result in a legislative council that lacks public legitimacy. Another majority, 50%, believes that such an elected legislative council may represent the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the electoral lists include representatives from the Gaza Strip. Bottom line, an elected legislative council would ensure a smooth transfer of office any time the office of the president is vacant.  

 

Conclusion:

It is beyond question that mitigation of the legitimacy risks across the Palestinian political system due to the vacancy in the office of the president because of incapacity or death poses a challenge to the political system. On the other hand, it offers a window of opportunity to contemplate the pressing need for public elections to avoid the risks that might develop in such a circumstance in the absence of an elected legislative council.

Further, Option 6 (i.e. the prior legislative elections) ensures the compliance with the transfer mechanisms provided for in the Basic Law and respects the constitutional rules. Besides, it gains legitimacy for the political system and mitigates the difficulties that beset the succession of President Mahmoud Abbas, which could lead to the collapse of the PA, put the public security at stake, and deny the members of the public basic services. To buttress this conclusion, the prior legislative elections option does not trample on the Supreme Constitutional Court Ruling concerning the holding of parliamentary elections and saves the Palestinian the threat of an international boycott or the collapse of critical agreements with the Israeli side.   

 

 

[1]  See the text of the Declaration, the Palestinian News Agency- Wafa http://wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=44C019a819631600293a44C019

[2]  Please see the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey website: http://pcpsr.org/en/node/752

العربية

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (36)

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (36)

In the aftermath of the Free Gaza flotilla incident, Turkey is the most popular regional country, but Hamas’s popularity remains unchanged while Salam Fayyad and his government gain greater public support, and while support for compromise increases, two thirds remain pessimistic about the future of the peace process and the majority does not believe in the efficacy of alternative options to negotiations such as popular resistance or unilateral declaration of statehood

10-13 June 2010  

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 10 and 13 June 2010. The poll was conducted few days after the Israeli raid on the Free Gaza flotilla. It is worth noting also that the PA government of Salam Fayyad announced the cancellation of the local elections during the conduct of the poll. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

 

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2010 indicate that despite the events associated with the Free Gaza flotilla and the Israeli attack on it, a significant improvement in the status of Salam Fayyad and his government has been registered. Moreover, findings also show no change in the popularity of Hamas compared to its standing in our previous poll last March. But it is worth mentioning that decision by Fayyad’s government to cancel local elections scheduled for next month came during the conduct of the poll. Our findings therefore do not necessarily reflect the views of the public in the aftermath of that decision. It is likely that the cancellation of elections will have a negative impact on the standing of Fayyad and his government and the standing of Abbas and Fateh. The public is likely to view the cancellation as an indication of a major failure in state and institution building,  a process led by Fayyad and his government, and an indication of fragmentation, panic and lack of leadership within Fateh. 

Findings show that the public views positively the outcome associated with the Israeli attack on the Free Gaza flotilla seeing it as a victory for Palestinians and the beginning of the end or the weakening of the Gaza siege. But perhaps the biggest winner is Turkey who emerges from this as the most popular regional country.  Findings also show that the decision to boycott settlements products is clearly supported by a majority of the Palestinians. But the decision to prevent Palestinian laborers from working in Israeli settlements is rejected by the majority. The opposition to preventing laborers from working in settlements is probably motivated by lack of confidence in the ability of the Palestinian Authority to find alternative jobs to settlement workers at a time when findings show that poverty and unemployment is one of the most important problems that deserve, in the eyes of the public, to be made the second top priority for the PA, right after the first priority, the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Findings also show an increase in support for a political settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters or the Geneva Initiative, but the mood remains decidedly pessimistic about the chances for success in the current negotiations or for establishing a Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years. If negotiations fail, findings show that a majority of the public is in favor of a diplomatic initiative, such as turning to the UN Security Council or a unilateral declaration of statehood, or resort to non violent resistance while a majority opposes return to armed intifada, dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, or abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one state solution. What is most interesting however is the fact that the overwhelming majority does not believe in the efficacy of any of the measures it supports in ending occupation or halting settlement expansion. It is evident that the public is looking for a way out and so far it finds none.  

 

(1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

  • 9% believe conditions in the Gaza Strip today are good or very good while 35% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. But similar percentages, reaching about 60% in both areas say they feel that today their personal safety and security and that of their families are assured.
  •  Increase in support for the Fayyad government; similarly, there is an increase in the percentage of those who believe that the Fayyad government is the legitimate one. But positive evaluation of the Fayyad government decreases in two areas: political detention and right to demonstrate.
  • Ismail Haniyeh’s government receives public support (57%) for banning rocket launching from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns but a majority (59%) opposes the taxes it imposes on cigarettes and other products.
  • In presidential election, with Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh competing, the former receives 54% and the latter 39% of the votes. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 65% and the latter 30% of the votes.
  • If Salam Fayyad competes in the presidential race, he loses against Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Mustafa Barghouti. But he wins against Haniyeh.
  • If parliamentary elections are to take place today, Fateh would receive 45% of the participants’ votes, Hamas 26%, all other election lists 12%, and 18% remain undecided.
  • Dealing with the West Bank-Gaza Strip split is the top priority of the Palestinian public.
  • A majority of 62% gives positive evaluation to the performance of the current local councils and 56% say they will participate in new elections in the West Bank even if boycotted by Hamas.

Findings show that only 9% believe conditions in the Gaza Strip today are good or very good while 35% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. But 62% of the Gazans and 60% of the West Bankers say that today they feel that their personal safety and security and that of their family are assured. In our last poll in March 2010, the percentage of those who expressed similar feelings reached 70% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank. Despite the increased perception of safety and security, 44% say they are worried that they could be hurt in their daily life at the hands of someone from Fateh or Hamas. Worry levels reach 51% in the Gaza Strip compared to 40% in the West Bank.

Despite the drop in the perception of safety and security among Gazans, positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government remains unchanged since last March at 38%. But positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government increases from 42% last March to 48% in this poll. Moreover, satisfaction with Abbas’s performance increases slightly during the same period from 47% to 49%.

Perception that compared to the Haniyeh government, the Fayyad government is the legitimate one increases, with 27% indicating that the Haniyeh government is the legitimate one while 31% say the Fayyad government is the legitimate one; and 10% say both governments are legitimate and 27% say both are illegitimate. Last March, 28% said Haniyeh’s is the legitimate one and only 26% said Fayyad’s is the legitimate one. With regard to Abbas, now that his term as president has ended, 48% say he lost his legitimacy while 46% say he did not lose it.

The performance of the Fayyad government receives positive evaluation in the area of service delivery and negative evaluation in the area of freedoms. Three years after the establishment of the first Fayyad government, larger percentages believe conditions have become better in the areas of economy (47%), enforcement of law and order (57%), educational services (54%), and health services (56%) while much smaller percentages believe conditions in these same areas have become worse (27% for economic conditions, 19% for enforcement of law and order, 18% for education, and 14% for health services). But only 30% say conditions of corruption have improved compared to 31% who say these conditions have actually worsened. On the other hand, larger percentages believe conditions have become worse in the areas of political arrests (47%) and the right to demonstrate (44%) while only 19% say conditions regarding political arrests have become better and 27% say conditions regarding the right to demonstrate have become better. But if Fateh sought to replace Fayyad with one of its own members, the largest percentage (48%) would oppose that while 43% would support it. Similarly, if Fateh asked Fayyad to appoint one of its members as a minister of finance, only 44% would support that while 48% would oppose it.

For Hamas’s government in the Gaza Strip, a majority of 57% support and 38% oppose its efforts to prevent the launching of rockets against Israeli towns. Support for these efforts reaches 49% among Gazans but increases to 62% among West Bankers. On the other hand, a majority of 59% believe the taxes imposed by the Hamas government on cigarettes and other products are not reasonable while only 34% view such taxes as reasonable. Belief that the taxes imposed by the Hamas government are reasonable reaches 31% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank.

In light of the failure of Fateh and Hamas to reconcile, only 16% believe that re-unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be achieved soon while 55% say it will be achieved but only after a long time and 26% say unity will not resume at all and two separate entities will emerge.

If new presidential elections are held today, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 39% of the vote of those participating while 7% say they are undecided. The rate of participation in such election would reach 61% with 39% saying they will not participate in elections in which Abbas and Haniyeh are the only candidates. Last March Abbas received 50% and Haniyeh 40%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 30% of the participants with non-participation rate dropping in this case to 28%.

If the competition over the presidency is between Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the former would receive 34% and the latter 19% while 3% say they are undecided and the remaining percentage (44%) say they will not vote for either candidate. But if the competition is between Fayyad and Marwan Barghouti, the former would receive the same percentage as in the previous case (19%) while the latter would receive 50% with 3% undecided and 28% voting for neither. If the competition was between Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouti (the head of al Mubadara), Fayyad’s vote would increase to 30% but Mustafa Barghouti would defeat him but with only 34% of the vote; 3% say they are undecided and 32% say they will vote for neither. Fayyad however would defeat Haniyeh in a presidential elections by 36% to 32%, with 3% undecided and 30% voting for neither. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 28% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (20%), Salam Fayyad (14%) Mustafa Barghouti (10%), and Saeb Erekat (6%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 45% say they would vote for Fateh and 26% say they would vote for Hamas, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip reaches 49% and in the West Bank 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip reaches 32% and in the West Bank 22%. Last March, Fateh received 42% and Hamas 28%, which means that Hamas has not benefited from Free Gaza flotilla incident which took place only few days before the conduct of the poll.

Hamas’s problem with the public remains unchanged as many believe it brings about siege and contribute to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while the public tends to believe that Fateh contributes to the lifting of the siege and the ending of the spilt. For example, findings show that if Hamas wins the next presidential and legislative elections, a majority of 62% believes this would lead to the consolidation of the siege and boycott on the Palestinian government while only 12% believe the opposite. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 11% believe this would lead to the tightening of the siege and blockade while 56% believe the opposite. With regard to unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in case of a Hamas win, 47% believe it would lead to the consolidation of the spilt while only 23% say it would consolidate unity. By contrast, if Fateh wins, only 29% believe it would consolidate the split while 36% believe it would consolidate unity.

In this regard, what worsens conditions for Hamas is the public belief that the two issues of national unity and ending the siege should be two of the most important Palestinian priorities. In an open question about the main problems confronting Palestinians which should be the top priorities of the PA, the largest percentage (33%) mentioned the absence of national unity due to the split, while 24% mentioned poverty and unemployment, 18% mentioned the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings, and 11% mentioned corruption in some public institutions, and 10% mentioned occupation and settlement activities.

A majority of 62% gives a positive evaluation to the performance of their local councils during the past five years while only 35% give it a negative evaluation. If local elections do take place, as was planned before the cancellation of the elections by the Fayyad government, 56% say they would participate in those elections even if boycotted by Hamas while 41% say they will not participate. Moreover, a majority of 51% believe that these elections, if they were to take place as scheduled, would be fair and free while 37% say they would not be fair or free. A larger percentage (48%) believes that if local elections are to take place on time, Fateh would win while 12% believe leftists and independents would win, Finally, a majority of 51% believe that if election do take place with Hamas boycotting it, it will lead to the consolidation of the internal split while only 17% say it would make reconciliation easier and 27% say it would have no impact on reconciliation or split.

 

(2) Peace Process

  • Increase in the percentage of support for compromise, as in the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative, but two thirds remain pessimistic about the chances for a peace settlement
  • If peace talks fail, a majority supports turning to the UN Security Council, unilaterally declaring a state, or turning to non violent resistance. But a majority opposes return to armed intifada, dissolution of the PA, or abandonment of the two-state solution and adoption of the one state solution.
  • Despite support for non violent resistance, the overwhelming majority does not believe its efficacy in ending occupation or halting settlement expansion.
  • Moreover, despite support for unilateral declaration of statehood, only one quarter believes things will become better after the declaration while 73% believe things will become worse or remain unchanged.
  • About 80% say the policy of the Obama Administration favors Israel while only 4% say it favors Palestinians.

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic activity of the US with regard to the conflict and the beginning of the proximity talks between the parties. The findings indicate an increase in support for the overall package. Palestinians are now split half between support and opposition to the overall package: 49% support and 49% oppose it. This level of support represents an increase in support of 11 percentage points from 2009.

Looking at the various items in the package, findings show a majority support for two out of the six:

 (1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 60% support or strongly support and 38% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in August 2009, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 49% and opposition at 50%.

(2) Refugees: 48% support and 49% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In August 2009, 37% agreed with an identical compromise while 61% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 37% support and 62% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In August 2009, an identical compromise obtained 31% support and 68% opposition.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 28% support and 70% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in August 2009, 24% support, and opposition reached 76%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

 (5) Security Arrangements: 41% support and 57% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In August 2009, 34% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 64% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 63% support and 35% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in August 2009 were 55% support and 44% opposition.

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2010

 

Dec

03

Dec

04

Dec

05

Dec

06

Dec

07

Dec

08

Aug

09

June 10

1) Borders and Territorial Exchange

57%

63%

55%

61%

56%

54%

49%

60%

2) Refugees

25%

46%

40%

41%

39%

40%

37%

48%

3) Jerusalem

46%

44%

33%

39%

36%

36%

31%

37%

4) Demilitarized State

36%

27%

20%

28%

23%

27%

24%

28%

5) Security Arrangements

23%

53%

43%

42%

51%

35%

34%

41%

6) End of Conflict

42%

69%

64%

62%

66%

55%

55%

63%

Overall Package

39%

54%

46%

48%

47%

41%

38%

49%

 

If the US under the leadership of Obama pressures Israel and the Palestinians to accept and implement this package as a permanent settlement, 48% think Palestinians should accept it, and 47% believe that they should reject it.

Findings also show an increase in support for a mutual recognition of identity: 58% support and 39% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. A year ago in June 2009, 50% supported and 49% opposed this mutual recognition of identity. Moreover, two thirds support the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative and 30% oppose it. The Saudi initiative calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees’ problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our December 2009 poll 68% supported it in December and 30% opposed it.

60% of the Palestinians support yielding to American pressure to accept and implement the Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative, while 35% oppose it. In August 2009, 58% thought Palestinians should accept such American pressure and 39% thought they should reject such pressure. As to their assessments of the other side’s response to such pressure: 53% of the Palestinians think Israel will reject and 42% think it will accept it. In the August 2009 poll, 49% of Palestinians thought that most Israelis would reject such pressure, 46% believed that most Israelis would accept it.

Despite the increased support for compromise, pessimism regarding the chances for the peace process remains very high: Two thirds of the Palestinians think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low; 32% believe the chances are medium or high. In June 2009, 69% thought that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low. Even if an agreement is reached in the current proximity talks mediated by George Mitchell, 55% of the Palestinians will not grant legitimacy to such agreement, while only 35% will. Needless to say, the fact that 48% of the public believe that the PA president has lost his legitimacy when his term as president  has expired, as mentioned above, contributes in a significant manner to this conclusion regarding an agreement negotiated by the president.  Belief in the legitimacy of the agreement increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (31%), among supporters of Fateh (57%) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), and among those who work in the public sector (41%) compared to those who work in the private sector (33%). In any case, findings show that 57% are pessimistic about the outcome of these proximity talks, while 23% are optimistic.

In the backdrop of the opening of the proximity talks and the raid on the flotilla to Gaza, 31% of the Palestinians think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 23% of the Palestinians think that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 40% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue. Moreover, 74% are worried that they or a family member might be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Last March, the percentage stood at 77%.

If the proximity talks fail, the option endorsed by most Palestinians is to ask the UN Security Council to recognize a Palestinian State (65%). The next most popular option (60% support) is to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state.  51% support the option to start a non-violent resistance. The other options asked about received only minority support: 44% support the resumption of the armed Intifada (54% oppose it); 39% support the dissolution of the PA if the talks fail (56% oppose it), and 27% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding instead a one-state solution (71% oppose it).

But findings show that support for non violent resistance does not indicate a belief in its efficacy. Despite the fact that it is supported by 51%, as mentioned above, only 27% believe that it can contribute to ending occupation or halting settlement construction while 71% believe it can not. Moreover, 44% believe that the boycott on products produced in settlements, a non violent resistance measure, will hurt the proximity talks, 28% believe it will benefit the talks and 25% believe it will have no impact. Similarly, support for a unilateral declaration of statehood does not indicate a belief that such a declaration would change Palestinian conditions for the better. Indeed, only one quarter believes that conditions would improve after such declaration while 32% say conditions will remain the same while the largest percentage (41%) believes conditions for Palestinians will become worse. Over and above all this, the overwhelming majority (80%) believes the US will not recognize the new unilaterally declared state while only 15% believe the US will recognize it. When asked about the policy of the Obama administration, 79% said it favored Israel, 4% said it favored the Palestinians, and 13% said it favored both sides.

 

(3) Attack on the Free Gaza flotilla incident

  • 43% say Turkey is the regional country most supportive of the Palestinians
  • 63% say the Palestinians came out winners in the aftermath of the Israeli attack on the Freedom Flotilla

In an open question about the regional country seen as the most supportive of the Palestinians and their cause, 43% mentioned Turkey while only 13% mentioned Egypt, followed by 6% for Iran, 5% for Saudi Arabia, 5% for Syria, 3% for Lebanon, and 2% for Jordan. Turkey is slightly more popular in the Gaza Strip (45%) than in the West Bank (41%). It is interesting to note that Egypt has been mentioned by 25% of Gazans compared to only 6% of West Bankers. Turkey’s popularity increases in refugee camps (54%) compared to cities (41%), among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of Fateh (36%), and among students (53%) compared to laborers (38%).

A majority of 63% believe the Palestinian side is the one who came out the winner from the Free Gaza flotilla incident while 27% believe Israel came out the winner and 9% believe none of them came out a winner. Moreover, a majority of 60% believe that in the aftermath of the incident, the Gaza siege will be weakened or ended while only 18% believe it will be strengthened.

 

(4) Boycott of settlements’ products and work in settlements

  • 72% support and 26% oppose boycott of settlements’ products
  • But only 38% support and 60% oppose a ban on Palestinian labor in settlements 

While a majority of 72% support and 26% oppose a boycott of settlements’ products, only 38% support and 60% oppose preventing Palestinian laborers from working in settlements. While the Gaza Strip and the West Bank support the boycott of settlements’ products equally, support for preventing laborers from working in settlements is greater in the Gaza Strip, reaching 45%, than the West Bank (34%). Support for preventing Palestinian laborers from working in settlements is also greater in cities (40%) and refugee camps (38%) than in rural areas (30%), among supporters of Hamas (46%) compared to supporters of Fateh (40%), and among holders of BA degree (41%) compared to illiterates (33%)....Full Report

SPSS Data File: 
Binary Data 36 _ June 2010.sav
العربية

Public Opinion Poll No (75)

94% of the Palestinians reject the “Deal of the Century;” large majorities support various responses to the plan including ending the WBGS split, the withdrawal of PA recognition of Israel, the ending of security coordination with Israel, the ending of the implementation of the Oslo agreement, and the resort to armed struggle; more than 80% believe the plan returns the conflict to its existential roots; support for the two-state solution drops to its lowest level since the signing of the Oslo agreement; and while about two-thirds endorse president Abbas’s policy against the plan, about 70% believe that he will not keep his word or follow through

5-8 February 2020 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-8 February 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the release of the Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and its immediate rejection by the Palestinian leadership. The Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo few days later and unanimously rejected the plan. A similar rejection followed by representatives of the Islamic countries. Despite the consensus, some Arab countries expressed timid welcome of US efforts and three Arab countries sent their ambassadors to the event in the White House in which the plan was announced. Internally, Fatah and Hamas issued conciliatory statements calling for reconciliation but this was not followed by any concrete measures and efforts to hold Palestinian elections witnessed some serious setbacks. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, tensions rose significantly during the fieldwork period as popular confrontations developed in various cities and signs of an emerging trade crisis were visible. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings: 

This quarterly poll was conducted one month earlier than planned in order to measure, in a timely manner, the immediate public response to the American plan known as the “Deal of the Century.” Findings show a Palestinian consensus against the plan as a package and against each of its components, including the economic part if linked to acceptance of the political section of the plan. Moreover, more than 80% of the public believe that the plan has returned the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to its existential roots. The majority speculates that the Trump plan has been deliberately designed to ensure a Palestinian rejection in order for the US to allow Israel to unilaterally annex the Jordan valley and the Jewish settlements. 

Findings also show that two-thirds of the public support president Abbas’ policy against the plan. But the majority, ranging between two-thirds and three quarters, does not trust the president’s word, as it believes he will not implement his own decision to end relations with Israel and the US. In response to the Trump plan, the overwhelming majority wants the president to end the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to withdraw PA recognition of Israel, to end security coordination, to stop the implementation of the Oslo agreement, and to even resort to armed struggle.

Findings also show unprecedented decline in support for the two-state solution to less than 40%, the lowest reported by PSR since the signing of the Oslo agreement. They also show a rise in the percentage of those who think that the most effective means of ending the occupation is armed struggle; they also show a decline in the percentage of those who think negotiation is the most effective means.

In domestic matters, finding show a decline in Abbas’ popularity and that of Fatah compared to our findings two-months ago. They also show a rise in the popularity of Hamas’ Ismael Haniyyeh during the same period. If presidential elections were to take place today, 50% would vote for Haniyyeh. Findings also show a drop in the level of optimism regarding the prospects of holding of parliamentary elections soon. But optimism about the prospects for reconciliation increases a little compared to two months ago and about half of the public indicates that if elections were to take place today, they would contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 

(1) US “Deal of the Century”:

  • 94% oppose and 4% support the “deal of the century”
  • Two-thirds support Abbas’ position in opposing the American deal, but between 68% and 73% believe that Abbas will not implement his own declared policy against the plan
  • The overwhelming majority does not believe the US plan puts an end to the Israeli occupation
  • 77% support ending security coordination, 69% support ending the implementation of the Oslo agreement, and 64% support resort to armed struggle as the means to fight against the US plan
  • 69% are optimistic that the US plan will fail
  • 83% believe that the Palestinians must rely on themselves while 14% think it is possible to rely on the Arab countries
  • 76% oppose and 11% support resumption of Palestinian contacts with the US Administration 

We presented to the respondents the various components of the American plan, known as the “Deal of the Century,” one component after the other, and asked them if they support or oppose each. We then asked the public about the entire plan as one package. Opposition to the package stood at 94% and support at 4%. Opposition to the components ranged between 91%, for the item on the billions in economic support conditioned on accepting the political plan, and 95%, for the item on Jerusalem and the Palestinian capital and the one on holy places.  Similarly, 94% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 3% believe a majority supports it.  By contrast, 70% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews support the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.

A majority of 65% expresses support and 27% express opposition for the policy outlined by president Abbas against the Trump plan in which he stated that he is ending relations with Israel and the US including security relations. But a majority of 68% believes that the PA president will not implement his decision to end security coordination with Israel and 73% believe that he will not actually turn conditions to where they were before the Oslo agreement. This seems to be the reason why despite supporting his policy, a majority of 58% is dissatisfied with the actual response of the PA leadership to the American plan; 38% are satisfied.

In light of the terms of the US plan, an overwhelming majority of 82% believe the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 7% think the plan makes peace more attainable. If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 58% think the chances are zero; 21% think the chances are less than 50%; and 7% think that the chances are more than 50%.

We proposed to the public 10 possible responses to the American plan and asked it about its support and opposition to each response; expectation regarding what the PA will adopt or allow as a response; and its expectations regarding what will actually happen on the ground: 

         

 Public support is highest (90%) to the response of ending the split and reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, followed by waging a diplomatic warfare against Israel in international organizations (85%); withdrawing Palestinian recognition of Israel (84%); waging non-violent popular demonstrations (78%); ending security coordination (77%); ending the implementation of the Oslo Agreement (69%); waging an armed struggle or return to an armed intifada (64%). We found that a large majority (59%) is opposed and 37% are not opposed to the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of a one-state solution (it is worth mentioning that two months ago support for the adopting the one-state solution stood at 28%); 56% are opposed and 40% are not opposed to a response in which the status quo is essentially maintained with no major changes introduced; and a 52% are opposed and 45% are not opposed to dissolving the PA.  

Support for the return to armed struggle as a response to the Trump plan is higher in the Gaza Strip (81%) compared to the West Bank (53%), in refugee camps and cities (76% and 66% respectively) compared to villages/towns (51%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 29 (63%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (58%), among refugees (68%) compared to non-refugees (61%), among holders of BA degree (72%) compared to those who completed elementary school (50%), among employees and students (69% and 68% respectively) compared to retirees, professionals, and farmers (49%, 54%, and 57% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (72%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (61%), among those with the least income (73%) compared to those with the highest income (51%), among the religious (71%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (63% and 60% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (73%) compared to those who support the peace process (58%), and among supporters of Hamas and the third parties (82% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (50%).

  An overwhelming majority of 83% anticipates that the PA leadership will not allow the dissolution of the PA; 73% anticipate that the PA leadership will not allow a resumption of armed struggle or an armed intifada; 67% anticipate that the PA leadership will not allow the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution; 66% anticipate that the PA leadership will not stop security coordination with Israel; 60% anticipate that the PA leadership will not stop the implementation of the Oslo agreement; 55% anticipate that the PA leadership will not allow the withdrawal of the Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel. By contrast, a majority of 67% anticipates that the PA leadership will allow popular non-violent demonstrations; 65% anticipate that the PA leadership will allow waging a diplomatic campaign against Israel in international organizations;58% anticipate that the PA leadership will maintain the status quo without any major changes; and 52% anticipate that the PA leadership will seek to end the split and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The belief that the PA leadership will not allow the termination of security coordination is higher in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (63%), in refugee camps and cities (70% and 66% respectively) compared to villages/towns (61%), among men (68%) compared to women (64%), among the holders of BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (53%), among those with the highest income (77%) compared to those with the lowest income (66%), among the unreligious and the religious (74% and 68% respectively) compared to the somewhat religious (64%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (56%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (83% and 74% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (51%).

  With regard to expectations of what will actually happen on the ground as a Palestinian response to the American plan, 74% expect to see organized popular and peaceful demonstrations; 66% expect that the PA will wage a diplomatic campaign against Israel in international organizations; 61% expect to see a return to armed struggle or armed intifada; and, yet, 51% expect the status quo to continue without major change. By contrast, 69% expect the PA to remain committed to the two-state solution; 62% expect to see continued security coordination with Israel; 61% expect to see no ending of the Oslo agreement; and 54% expect to see no withdrawal of PA recognition of Israel. With regarding to ending the split and reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the public is divided: 48% expect it will happen and 46% expect it will not.

The percentage of those who expect the status quo to remain relatively unchanged is higher in the Gaza Strip (53%) compared to the West Bank (50%), in villages/towns (59%) compared to cities and refugee camps (50% and 48% respectively), among the illiterates (60%) compared to the holders of BA degree (50%), among those who work in the public sector (61%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (45%), among the religious (55%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligious (49% and 42% respectively), and among supporters of third parties and supporters of Fatah (66% and 54% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (44%).

 

Nonetheless, a majority of 69% believes the “Deal of the Century” will fail due to Palestinian opposition while 26% think it will succeed despite that opposition.  We asked the public about its view on why the Trump Administration designed this its plan in the manner it did: a majority of 60% said the Administration deliberately wanted the Palestinians to reject the plan so that Israel can annex the Jordan Valley and the settlements while 34% thought the US actually expected the Palestinian weakness to force them to accept the plan.  We also asked the public to speculate about the motivation of the three Arab countries (UAE, Bahrain, and Oman) that participated in the event in the White House in which the Trump plan was revealed: 83% said they wanted to demonstrate their support for Israel; 6% said they wanted to demonstrate support to Israel and the Palestinians, and only 3% said they wanted to demonstrate support for the Palestinians alone.  The Arab League’s unanimous decision to reject the Trump plan notwithstanding, 83% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinians must nonetheless rely only on themselves while 14% believe they can rely on the Arab countries.

A majority of 76% is opposed and 11% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Two months ago 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.  A majority of 59% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 35% expect him to win it. Similarly, a majority of 53% expects the indictment of Netanyahu in corruption charges to lead to his ouster from leadership in Israel soon while 41% expect him to succeed in staying in power despite the indictment. Two months ago, 58% expected Netanyahu to be removed from power.

 

(2) The peace process:

  • Support for the two-state solution drops in two months from 42% to 39%
  • Support for armed struggle, as the means to change the status quo, rises in two months from 39% to 45%
  • 50% believe that the best means to end the Israeli occupation is armed struggle, 21% say it is negotiations, and 23% pick non-violent popular resistance 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Two months ago, support for the concept stood at 42%. 36% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 57% believe that the majority opposes it.  A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 33% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 76% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 22% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 22% of the public while 45% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Two months ago, 29% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, half of the public (50%) chose armed struggle, 21% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Two months ago, 47% chose armed struggle and 26% chose negotiations.

 

(3) Legislative and presidential election

  • 62% demand Abbas’ resignation and in presidential elections between Ismail Haniyyeh and Abbas, 49% vote for the former and 44% for the latter
  • In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 38% of the vote and Hamas 32%
  • Optimism about the holding of elections declines in two months from 52% to 45%
  • Support for holding elections if Israel prevents holding them in East Jerusalem drops in two months from 56% to 46%
  • Trust in the integrity of the election commission stands at 51% and only 45% believe that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair
  • 70% believe that Fatah will not accept a Hamas electoral victory and 60% think that Hamas will not accept a Fatah electoral victory 

62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 33% want him to remain in office. Two months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip. Two months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 52% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Two months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip).  Only 33% think president Abbas is the best Fatah candidate for the presidency while 43% think that Fatah has better candidates; 25% say they do not know or have no opinion on the matter. 

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 44% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 49% for Abbas and 44% for Haniyeh two months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 37% two months ago) and Haniyeh receives 63% (compared to 56% two months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 54% (compared to 58% two months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 34% two months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%.  We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 36% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 3% each. 

We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Two months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 41% two months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 32% two months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 22% (compared to 24% two months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 46% wo months ago).

We asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the upcoming elections: 39% (44% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) expect Fatah to win the upcoming legislative elections while only 26% (19% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) expect Hamas to win.  A plurality of 45% of the public expects general elections to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 43% believe no elections will take place. Two months ago, a majority of 52% expected elections to take place soon.  43% support the holding of simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose a separation between the two, while 20% say they support the holding of parliamentary elections to be followed few months later by presidential elections, and 23% prefer simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections but do not oppose separating them by few months.  46% (51% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) say that if Israel prevented Palestinian legislative elections in East Jerusalem, voting should be made possible for the residents in any polling station in the Jerusalem governorate or in the West Bank; 46% disagree and say that no election should take place if Israel prevents it in East Jerusalem. Two months ago, a majority of 56% said that if Israel prevented East Jerusalemites from voting in the city, they should be allowed to vote in any polling station in the Jerusalem governorate or in the West Bank.

51% trust and 42% do not trust the integrity of the Palestinian Election Commission in managing the election process.  Similarly, only 45% believe, and 45% do not believe, that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair.  Moreover, only 47% trust, and 47% do not trust, the ability of the West Bank Palestinian police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Similarly, only 49% trust, and 40% do not trust, the ability of the Gaza Strip police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. 

A majority of 63% say that it will not be possible, and 32% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Hamas’, to conduct their election campaigns in the West Bank without restrictions or interference from the Palestinian security services. Similarly, a majority of 55% says that it will not be possible, and 39% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Fatah’s, to conduct their election campaigns in the Gaza Strip without restrictions or interference from the Gaza security services.  70% believe that if Hamas wins the upcoming elections, Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 24% think Fatah will indeed allow Hamas to do so. Similarly, 60% believe that if Fatah wins the upcoming elections, Hamas will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 34% think Hamas will indeed allow Fatah to do so.

 

(4) Domestic conditions:

  • Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and in the West Bank at 21%
  • Belief that there is corruption in the PA stands at 85% and the belief that there is corruption in the public institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 65%
  • 47% view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people and 46% view it as an asset
  • The largest percentage views the performance of the Shtayyeh government as similar to that of the previous government while 13% to 24% see a better performance and 26% to 42% see it worse 
  • Evaluation of the judiciary is not high: 50% say they will not receive a fair trial if they find themselves in front of a Palestinian court 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 21%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 58%.  23% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 28% and declines in the West Bank to 19%.

Only 42% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 54% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 55% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 42% say they cannot. Moreover, perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 85% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 65%. Generally speaking, the public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 47% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than ten months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (50%), the economy (41%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (50%), the preparation to hold general elections (49%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (51%). But a percentage ranging between 26% and 42% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 13% and 24% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a slight decline in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings two months ago.  Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 55% expects failure; only 35% expects success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a plurality of 48% expects failure and 41% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 55% expects failure and 35% expects success.

Half of the public (50%: 58% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 42% (33% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.  A majority of 54% (64% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 41% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (14% each), Maan TV at 13% each, Palestine Today TV at 10%, al Mayadeen at 5%, and Al Arabiya at 4%.  

 

(5) Reconciliation: 

  • Optimism about the chances for reconciliation rises in two months from 36% to 40% and 49% think elections could contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
  • A majority believes that the chances for a long term hudna or truce in the Gaza Strip is slim 

40% are optimistic and 56% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Two months ago, optimism stood at only 36%. But 49% are optimistic, and 45% are not optimistic, that the upcoming legislative elections will contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A majority of 58% believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 30% believe the chances are medium and only 8% believe the chances are high.

 

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

  • 49% view ending occupation and building a state as the most vital goal of the Palestinian people and 30% think it should be the protection of the right of return
  • Continuation of the occupation is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today in the eyes of 29% while 28% think it is poverty and unemployment 

49% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 10% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 29% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (25%); 14% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

العربية

Public Opinion Poll No (73)

22 September 2019

While a majority is dissatisfied with the behavior of the PA and Palestinian factions in response to the Israeli demolition of homes in Wadi al Hommos, a greater majority believes that Abbas’ response, to stop implementation of agreements with Israel, is merely a media stunt and will not be implemented; and while support for two-state solution declines, support for armed attacks rises and an overwhelming majority rejects the US “deal of the century” and believes it will not end the occupation. In domestic matters, an overwhelming majority views “honor killing” as a heinous crime, a majority has no trust in the Palestinian judiciary, and more than 60% demand the resignation of president Abbas

11-14 September 2019

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 11-14 September 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a presidential termination of the work of the Supreme Judicial Council and the formation of a transitional one, a presidential statement requiring former ministers, who illegally received salary increases, to return these funds, and a widespread internal debate over “honor killing” in the context of the death of a woman from Bethlehem in suspicious circumstances. In relations with Israel, five main developments occurred during this period: an Israeli demolition of a large built up area in Wadi Hommos which is located in an area under PA zoning control, responding to this incident, Abbas announced his intention to suspend the implementation of agreements with Israel, an explosive device was detonated in an area near the settlement of Dolev, west of Ramallah, killing an Israeli woman, Israeli prime minister Netanyahu announced his intentions to annex the Jordan Valley if he wins the Israeli elections scheduled for 17 September 2019, and finally, Israel transferred to the PA about two billion Shekels from the Palestinian custom revenues which the PA had previously announced it will not accept if it was not transferred in full. On Palestinian-American relations, US ambassador David Friedman stated that the US peace plan does not call for the creation of a Palestinian state but that it allows for Palestinian autonomy. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2019 show an overwhelming majority, reaching about three quarters, dissatisfied with the performance of the PA and the political factions in their response to the Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes in Wadi al Hommos, near Jerusalem. The majority views the response of president Abbas to the demolition—by declaring that the PA is stopping its implementation of the agreements with Israel— as inappropriate. Indeed, an overwhelming majority, exceeding three quarters of the public, believes that Abbas’ decision is merely a media stunt aiming at absorbing public anger with the PA leadership over its failure to prevent Israel from carrying out that demolition. Furthermore, public anger with the PA is probably driven by the belief of more than 80% that the Palestinian leadership will not implement the decision to stop implementing the agreements with Israel.

In domestic matters, findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public views “honor killing” of women as a heinous crime that must be punished severely. Only 10% think that this type of crimes is understandable and punishment should thereby be reduced. By contrast, findings show that almost half of the public, much more in the Gaza Strip, believes human beings can be possessed by Jinn or demons while a slightly smaller percentage believes this to be a superstition.

Findings also show that Shtayyeh’s government has failed so far in winning the trust of the public. Indeed, public trust in the ability of the government to perform better than the previous government has declined compared to the findings three months ago. Similarly, the public is dissatisfied with the performance of the judiciary, particularly the courts, with about two-thirds believing that its functioning is marred by corruption, lack of independence, or that it rules not according to the law but in accordance with whims and personal interests. But the public is evenly divided in its satisfaction with the decisions made by Abbas regarding the judiciary. Moreover, the largest percentage believes that the Transitional Judicial Council will not succeed in the next year or two in reforming the judiciary. Furthermore, trust in the presidency is also low as more than 60% demand the resignation of president Abbas; slightly more than a third wants him to stay in office. If Abbas runs in a presidential election against Ismail Haniyyeh, the votes would be very close.

In foreign affairs, findings show that the largest percentage of the Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, does not view Iran as a friend or an ally of the Palestinians. Yet, a majority, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, believes that if war breaks out between Iran and Israel, the former would be able to defeat the latter, as Iran is believed to have a stronger military force.  

In light of prime minister Netanyahu’s statement announcing his intentions to annex the Jordan Valley, findings show a significant increase in the percentage of those who believe that the two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical. As in the past, feasibility is linked to support for the two-state solution. Findings show a significant decline in support for that solution accompanied by an increased support for armed attacks against Israelis. Moreover, public perception of the Trump peace plan continues to worsen, compared to attitudes two years ago, with two-thirds of the public demanding the Palestinian leadership to reject the plan out of hand even before reading the plan’s content, because it must be bad. More than 80% reject the idea presented by the US ambassador to Israel offering self-rule, rather than sovereign and independent statehood, to the Palestinians. More than 70% oppose resumption of the dialogue with the Trump Administration. 

 

(1) Home demolition in Wadi al Hommos and Abbas’ response by suspending implementation of agreements with Israel:

  • 74% are dissatisfied with the performance of the PA and the various political factions toward the Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes in Wadi al Hommos
  • 61% the believe that the decision of president Abbas to stop implementing agreements with Israel was not an appropriate response to the Israeli demolition of homes in Wadi al Hommos
  • 76% think Abbas’ decision to stop implementation of agreements with Israel was just a media stunt or show
  • 78% think the PA will not stop implementing agreements with Israel

An overwhelming majority of 74% thinks that the PA and the political factions have not done all they could to prevent the Israeli demolition of buildings and homes in Wadi al Hommos near Jerusalem and 19% think they have done their best. Two thirds of the public (66%) believe that it was the duty of the PA and its security services and the police to protect the homes in Wadi al Hommos by serving as a buffer between the buildings and the Israeli bulldozers.  61% say that Abbas’ decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel was not the most appropriate response to the demolition of homes in Wadi al Hommos while 32% think it was the appropriate response.  The belief that the PA and the political factions have not done all they could to prevent the demolition is higher among supporters of Hamas and third parties (83% and 82% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (62%), among those who oppose the peace process (84%) compared to supporters of the peace process (70%), and among those who work in the private sector (75%) compared to those who work in the public sector (65%).

A large majority of 71% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean dissolving the PA and 18% think he does mean that.  Similarly, a majority of 67% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending security coordination with Israel and 24% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 69% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending civil coordination with Israel and 19% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 69% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean annulling the PLO recognition of Israel and 20% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 76% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending negotiations with Israel and returning to armed struggle and 15% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 65% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean returning to Israel those VIP cards issued to senior PA officials and 22% think he does mean that.

We asked the public if it thinks the PA is serious about implementing Abbas’ decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel. An overwhelming majority of 78% says the PA will not do that and only 16% say it will.  Similarly, we asked the public about Abbas’ motivation behind making the decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel. A similar overwhelming majority (76%) indicates that the president’s decision is a media stunt or show and it will not be implemented while only 16% say the decision is serious and will be implemented.  The belief that Abbas’ decision is a media stunt or show and will not be implemented is higher among supporters of Hamas and third parties (87% and 78% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (61%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (90%) compared to those who support the peace process (72%), and among those who work in the private sector (79%) compared to those who work in the public sector (72%).

 

(2) “Honor killing,” Jinn possession, economic conditions, the performance of the Shtayyeh government, and others:

  • 81% view “honor killing” as a dreadful crime
  • 48% believe and 44% do not believe in “demon possession”
  • Support for the PA decision to reject a partial custom revenue transfer drops from 62% to 54%
  • Wish to emigrate stands at 41% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank
  • Positive evaluation of the performance of the Shtayyeh government worsens rather than improves

  

An overwhelming majority of 81% say that “honor killing” is an dreadful crime that should be punished severely while 7% say that it is a normal crime that should be punished like any other crime. Only 10% (5% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) say that it is an understandable act that should be punished lightly. The belief that “honor killing” is a dreadful crime is higher in the West Ban (90%) than in the Gaza Strip (66%), in villages/towns and cities (86% and 82% respectively) compared to refugee camps (60%), among women (84%) compared to men (77%), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (76% and 72% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (82%) compared to those who work in the public sector (77%), among the married (82%) compared to the unmarried (72%), and among those with the highest income (87%) compared to those with the lowest income (69%).

The public is divided on the issue of humans being possessed by Jinn or demons: 48% say they believe it is real while 44% (56% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip) believe it is superstition. The belief that demon possession is real is higher in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (37%), in refugee camps and cities (55% and 50% respectively) compared to villages/towns (37%), among supporters of Hamas (57%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (48% and 44% respectively), among the religious (55%) compared to the somewhat religious (43%), among those who work in the public sector (53%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), and among those with the lowest income (68%) compared to those with the highest income (36%).

59% of the public say that their income has declined during the past six months due to the inability of the PA to pay the salary of the public sector in full; 35% say their income did not change and 4% say it has increased. A majority of 54% supports and 37% oppose the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues. However, 43% say that they are worried that this decision could lead to the collapse of the PA while 50% indicate that it could not. Three months ago, 62% said they supported the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues and 52% said they were worried that this decision could lead to PA collapse.

 Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%. But perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 63% and in the West Bank at 52%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%. 31% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 41% and declines in the West Bank to 24%.

Only 36% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 59% say that they cannot. Three months ago, 57% of West Bankers said they could not criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear. In the Gaza Strip, 43% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 53% say they cannot. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 65%. When asked about Abbas decision mandating that ministers of the previous government return illegal pay raise they received, 80% said this measure was not sufficient. The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 49% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than five months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (44%), the economy (37%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (50%), the preparation to hold general elections (49%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (47%). But a percentage ranging between 50% and 32% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 16% and 8% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a drop in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings three months ago. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 61% expects failure; only 27% expects success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 30% expects success. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 60% expects failure and 28% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Al Aqsa TV and Maan TV (13% each), Palestine TV (12%), Palestine Today TV (11%), al Al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).  

 

3) Public evaluation of the judiciary and views on the president’s decisions regarding the judiciary:

  • Trust in Palestinian judiciary and its integrity is low, especially in the West Bank
  • The public is divided in its view on Abbas’ decision to dissolve the Supreme Judicial Council and to form a transitional judicial council
  • Half of the public does not expect success in reforming the judiciary in the near future

 

A majority of 60% (65% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 32% believe that they will receive a fair trial. The belief that one can receive a fair trial is higher in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (26%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to cities and villages/towns (31% and 29% respectively), among supporters of Hamas (43%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (36% and 32% respectively), among the religious (37%) compared to the somewhat religious (29%), among the illiterates (44%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (32%), and among those with the lowest income (37%) compared to those with the highest income (30%).

A majority of 63% thinks that the Palestinian judiciary is marred by corruption, lacks independence, or rules according to whims and interests; 29% disagree and believe that it is has integrity, independence, or rules according to the law. The belief that corruption or other defects exist in the judiciary is higher in the West Bank (72%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), in villages/towns and cities (71% and 63% respectively) compared to refugee camps (54%), among men (66%) compared to women (61%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (65% and 61% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (49%), among the somewhat religious (67%) compared to the religious (57%), among those who work in the private sector (68%) compared to those who work in the public sector (59%), and among those with the highest income (76%) compared to those with the lowest income (52%).

The public makes a similar assessment of Palestinian layers: 66% (74% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) think lawyers’ work is marred by corruption and incompetence and that lawyers are untruthful with clients; 25% think lawyers’ work has integrity, competent, and lawyers are truthful with the clients.

The public is divided in its view of Abbas’ decision to lower the retirement age for judges, to dismiss the Supreme Judicial Council, and to appoint a Transition Supreme Judicial Council: 42% are in favor, 42% are not in favor, and 16% are uncertain. 49% believe that the Transitional Judicial Council will not succeed in the next year or two in reforming the judiciary while 36% believe it will succeed.  A plurality of 47% does not agree and 39% agree, with the view that the judicial matters are not part of jurisdiction of the PA president or that his decisions regarding the judiciary constitute an interference in the affairs of the judiciary.  The public is divided on the view that Abbas’ decision regarding the judiciary was necessary in light of the fact that it has failed to reform itself: 43% agree and an identical percentage disagree with this statement.

 

(4) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

  • 61% demand Abbas’ resignation and 35% want him to stay in office
  • In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% of the vote and the latter 46%
  • In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 38% and Hamas 29%

 

Only 38% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 49% believe no elections will take place. An overwhelming majority (72%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 12% want parliamentary elections only. 12% do not want any elections. If elections were held for a parliament and a president, 69% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 21% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip. 

61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 57% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 49% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 38% (42% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter 46% of the vote (compared to 48% for Abbas and 42% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 39% of the vote (compared to 43% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 57% (compared to 52% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 56% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 36% (compared to 36% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 62% and Haniyeh 34%. Support for Haniyeh is higher in cities and refugee camps (49% and 47% respectively) compared to villages/towns (30%), among women (49%) compared to men (42%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (95% and 57% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (3%), among the religious (58%) compared to the somewhat religions (37%), among those opposed to the peace process (71%) compared to those who support the peace process (37%), among those who work in the private sector (43%) compared to those who work in the public sector (36%), among the married (47%) compared to the unmarried (34%), and among those of lowest income (50%) compared to those of the highest income (32%).

We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 36% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 8% (2% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 3% each. 

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 38% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 31% (compared to 33% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 20% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 43% three months ago). Support for Fatah is higher in villages/towns (51%) than in cities and refugee camps (36% and 34% respectively), among men (40%) compared to women (35%), among the somewhat religious (43%) compared to the religious (31%), among supporters of the peace process (47%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (20%), among those who work in the public sector (44%) compared to those who work in the private sector (40%), and among those with middle and highest income (44% and 38% respectively) compared to those with the lowest income (33%).

 

(5) Reconciliation, Hamas and Iran: 

  • Optimism about reconciliation continues to drop
  • 72% demand the removal of measures taken by the PA against the Gaza Strip
  • 48% say that Iran is not an ally to the Palestinians and 40% say it is
  • 55% believe that Iran can defeat Israel in war

 

30% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 33%. Moreover, the overwhelming majority (72%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 23% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government. A majority of 52% (down to 37% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 9% believe the chances are high.

In the context of the visit of a senior Hamas delegation to Iran, we asked the public to tell us how it views Iran: a plurality of 48% says Iran is not a friend or ally to the Palestinians and 40% say it is a friend and ally. The belief that Iran is a Palestinian ally is higher in the Gaza Strip (48%) than in the West Bank (36%), in refugee camps (54%) compared to cities and villages/towns (39% each), among women (43%) compared to men (38%), among those whose age is 50 or higher (43%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 (33%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (66% and 56% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (28%), among the religious (48%) compared to the somewhat religious (35%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (52%) compared to supporters of the peace process (38%), among the illiterates (44%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (38%), among those with the lowest income (52%) compared to those with the highest income (37%).

In the context of the statements by Iran and its allies indicating that the Islamic republic has the military capacity to defeat Israel in war, we asked the public if it believes this to be true: 55% say they believe this to be true and 32% believe it to be untrue. The belief that Iran can defeat Israel in war is higher in the West Bank (57%) than in the Gaza Strip (52%), among supporters of Hamas (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% each), among those opposed to the peace process (60%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (55%), and among those who work in the private sector (53%) compared to those who work in the public sector (48%).

 

 (6) The Trump peace plan:

  • 83% think the “deal of the century” does not end the Israeli occupation and 65% think it allows Israeli annexation of a large part of the West Bank
  • 69% want the PA to reject the US plan, 19% want it to accept it with reservation, and 5% want it to accept it without reservation
  • 81% reject the proposal made by the US ambassador to Israel in which the Palestinians are offered self-rule, not a state
  • 72% reject US plan for refugees’ resettlement in host countries

 

We asked the public if Palestinian acceptance of the Trump peace plan would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 83% say no; only 9% say yes it would. When asked if the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 65% of the public says it does and only 27% say it does not. Two thirds (67%) believe that in response to a Palestinian rejection of the Trump peace plan, the US will impose further sanctions on the Palestinians; 23% say it will amend its plan in case of Palestinian rejection. 

A large majority of 69% believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan; 19% say it should accept it with reservations; and 5% believe it should accept it without reservation. Three months ago, 75% said the PA leadership should reject the plan.  We asked this same question with a slightly different options: 64% indicate that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 21% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 9% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo. A year ago, only 50% said the PA should reject the plan out of hand. 

An overwhelming majority of 81% reject the proposed self-rule idea that deny Palestinian statehood that was proposed by US ambassador to Israel David Friedman while 9% say they accept it and 10% are uncertain.  Similarly, 72% say that they are against, and 22% for, American ideas proposed to solve the refugee problem in which Palestinian refugees are offered full citizenship and rights in the host countries and in which the host countries receive billions of US dollars in assistance and investments.  A majority of 68% is opposed and 20% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

 

7) The peace process:

  • Support for the two-state solution drops from 47% to 42% in three months
  • 44% think armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the occupation and 24% think negotiation is the most effective
  • 50% are in favor of a return to an armed intifada, 62% are in favor of non-violent resistance, and 32% support the one-state solution
  • 61% support the armed attack that took place few weeks ago in an area west of Ramallah
  • 83% support the local and international movement to boycott Israel

 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 42% and opposition at 56%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 47%. 37% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 56% believe that the majority opposes it. Support for the two-state solution is higher among those whose age is 50 and above (45%) compared to the youth between 18 and 22 years (35%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (61% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%), among the somewhat religious (45%) compared to the religious (36%), among supporters of the peace process (50%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (20%), among the illiterates (52%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (38%), among farmers (66%) compared to students (32%), and among those who work in the public sector (51%) compared to those who work in the private sector (42%).

A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 34% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 78% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high. The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 32% of the public while 37% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 17% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 36% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 34% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the largest group (44%) chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Three months ago, 38% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.  The percentage of those who view armed struggle as the most effect means is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in refugee camps (56%) compared to cities and villages/towns (45% and 35% respectively), among men (49%) compared to women (40%), among those between the 18 and 22 years (50%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or above (44%), among Hamas’ and third parties’ supporters (69% and 48% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (24%), among the religious (52%) compared to the the somewhat religious (39%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (64%) compared to supporters of the peace process (37%), among those who work in the private sector (47%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), and among those with the lowest income (50%) compared to those with the highest income (41%).

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 62% support popular non-violent resistance; 50% support a return to an armed intifada; 40% support dissolving the PA; and 32% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 47% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 38% said they prefer to dissolve the PA. We asked about the armed attack that took place few weeks ago in an area west of Ramallah, near the settlement of Dolve, in which one Israeli woman was killed: 61% supported it and 33% opposed it. A majority of 54% views this attack as a one-time, lone wolf, event while 39% think it is the beginning of the return to armed struggle. Support for the attack near Dolev is higher in the Gaza Strip (80%) compared to the West Bank (49%), in refugee camps and cities (74% and 62% respectively) compared to villages/towns (50%), among men (63%) compared to women (59%), among those between 18 and 22 years old (63%) compared to those who are 50 or above (56%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (79% and 78% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (52%), among the religious (68%) compared to the somewhat religious (57%), among those who oppose the peace process (75%) compared to those who support the peace process (56%), among students (67%) compared to laborers (59%), among those who work in the public sector (67%) compared to those who work in the private sector (60%), and among those with the least lowest income (86%) compared to those with the highest income (47%).

An overwhelming majority of 83% supports the local and international boycott movement against Israel while 15% are opposed to it. A majority of 52% say that they are currently boycotting non-essential Israeli products and those that have non-Israeli substitutes while 33% say they are not. 57% say the boycott of non-essential Israeli products and those that have non-Israeli substitutes will be effective in contributing to the end of occupation and 42% say it will not. About two-thirds of the public believe that the European countries will not boycott Israel or impose sanctions on it while 26% believe they will.  An overwhelming majority of 74% says that Palestinians should condemn visits of Arab journalists to Israel while 7% say the visits should be encouraged.

A majority of 52% expects the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 19% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections; 29% do not know who is likely to win.  About half of the public (48%) does not encourage the participation of the Joint Arab List in an Israeli government coalition led by the center and the left while 37% encourage such participation and 15% have no opinion. The public is divided in its position regarding the participation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel in the Knesset elections: 46% support and 42% oppose such participation.  Support for the boycott of elections is higher in the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (41%), among supporters of Hamas (56%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (40% and 46% respectively), among the religious (52%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (55%) compared to those who supportive of the peace process (44%), and among those with the lowest income (60%) compared to those with the highest income (35%).

 

8) Most vital goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

  • 44% view the end of occupation and the establishment of a state as the first top priority for the Palestinians
  • Poverty/unemployment is viewed by 28% as the most serious problem confronting the Palestinians today

 

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; another 25% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

العربية

Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (88)

14 June 2023 
On the 75th anniversary of the Nakba, the Palestinian public sees the WBGS split as the most damaging development that has happened since 1948, followed by the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967. But two-thirds of the public do not fear a repeat of the Nakba; to the contrary, two-thirds say Israel will not celebrate the centenary of its establishment, and the majority believes that the Palestinian people will be able in the future to recover Palestine and return its refugees to their homes. 
7-11 June 2023 
This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 7 and 11 June 2023. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several important developments including the passing of 75 years since Nakba and the rocket exchange between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ student body, the Islamic Bloc won student elections at Birzeit University and al Najah University. In a speech at the UN, president Abbas asked for international protection for the Palestinian people. In Israel, widespread demonstrations by the opposition to the Israeli government judicial reforms continued while in the West Bank violent confrontations between Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli army led to increased exposure to violence. Regionally, an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement create shock waves throughout the Middle East. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

This poll examines the 75th anniversary of the Nakba. Findings indicate that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians blame Arab or international parties or the Zionist movement for the Nakba, while internal Palestinian weakness comes at the bottom of the list. Although this outcome was expected, the small percentage that saw Palestinian weakness as responsible for the Nakba indicates the persistence of a huge Palestinian sense of victimhood. However, when asked about the most damaging developments since the Nakba, the largest percentage referred to internal division, the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while the Israeli 1967 occupation came in the second place. When asked about the best thing that happened to the Palestinians since the Nakba, about two-thirds listed two: the establishment of the PLO in the 1960s and the establishment of the PA in the 1990s, while a quarter believed that the formation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their entry into armed struggle in the 1980s was the best development followed by those who selected the formation of Fatah in the 1960s and its launch of armed struggle.

Findings also indicate that about two-thirds of the public do not fear a repeat of the Nakba. To the contrary, two-thirds of the public do not believe that Israel will celebrate its centenary, and a majority, albeit a small one, believes that the Palestinian people will, in the future, be able to recover Palestine and return its refugees to their homes.

The results of the second quarter of 2023 also indicate a decline in the popularity of Fatah and President Abbas in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, accompanied by a decline in satisfaction with the president's performance, especially in light of his recent speech at the United Nations. The increased dissatisfaction led to greater demand for Abbas’ resignation, reaching 80%.  The PA's standing is also worsening, with the percentage of those who believe that its continued existence is in Israel's interest increasing by six percentage points in three months while half of the public says that the collapse or dissolution of the PA serves the Palestinian interest.

We asked about the recent armed confrontations between the Gaza Strip and Israel. Although a small percentage of the Palestinian public believed that Hamas did not participate or participated to a small extent in these confrontations, Hamas's popularity was not damaged in either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.

We explored attitudes on the peace process. Support for the two-state solution remains as low as it was three months ago. So does the support for the one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israeli Jews. We also asked about the most effective way to end the Israeli occupation. Although the majority still sees armed struggle as the best way to achieve this goal, this percentage has fallen by three points compared to three months ago. Expectations of a third intifada have also dropped dramatically in the West Bank, falling by 15 points.

Findings show that a quarter of the public views the pro judiciary protest demonstrations in Israel with admiration, with the largest percentage saying that the Israeli judicial system is independent while the Palestinian judiciary is subordinate to the president or the government. In comparing the two judicial systems, the Palestinian and the Israeli, only one-fifth of the Palestinian public believes that the Palestinian judiciary is independent of the executive branch.

On regional developments, the largest percentage believes that the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation will not have a negative or positive impact on the Palestinian issue in general or on the prospects for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, or on Saudi-Palestinian relations, or on Arab normalization with Israel, or even on stopping the war in Yemen. But between one-fifth and one-third expect the impact on all these issues to be positive. 

    1) 75 years after the Nakba:

     

    • On the occasion of the Nakba, the overwhelming majority places the blame for it on non-Palestinian parties while only 7% believe that the weakness of the Palestinian people is primarily responsible. The "weak and conspiratorial Arab role" comes first with 38%, followed by the British Mandate with 36%, and Zionist organizations and movements with 16%.
    • The largest percentage (35%) believes that the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is the most damaging development that has befallen the Palestinian people during the past seventy-five years; 32% believe that the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 was the most damaging since the Nakba. With 25% selecting it, comes the inability of the refugees to return to their homes and the unresolved nature of the refugee problem; 7% believe that armed conflicts between Palestinians and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon were the most damaging development that happened during the past 75 years. The following figure shows that there are no significant differences in the perceptions of the Palestinian public in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip regarding these four damaging developments.

    • When asked what has been the most positive or the best thing that has happened to the Palestinian people since the Nakba, the largest percentage (24%) said that it was the establishment of Islamic movements, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their participation in armed struggle; 21% said that it was the eruption of the first and second intifada; 18% said the establishment of the PLO; 14% said the establishment of the PA in the mid-nineties, and 9% said it was the establishment of Fateh in the sixties and the launch of the armed struggle. The following figure shows that there are significant differences in the perceptions of the Palestinian public in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip regarding these positive developments.

    • About two thirds (64%) say they do not fear a recurrence of the Nakba while 33% say they fear it will happen again.
    • When asked about the most important lesson from the Nakba for the Palestinian people, the largest percentage (44%, of which 54% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the need to remain steadfast on the ground and to remain in the land even in the event of war; 23% believe it is the necessity of self-reliance rather than the reliance on Arab or friendly countries; and only 9% (15% in the Gaza Strip and 5% in the West Bank) believe it is the need to seek political solutions to the conflict with Israel.
    • We asked about the main reasons for the flight of refugees from their homes in 1948: the largest percentage (43%) said it was the mass displacement by armed Zionist forces; a similar percentage (40%) said it was fear of massacres; and 15% said it was a desire to seek safer places.
    • In comparing the current Palestinian leadership with the one that led the Palestinian people during the Nakba, the largest percentage (40%) said that neither leadership is better than the other as the performance of the two leaderships is not good; 23% said that the leadership of the Nakba was better than the current leadership while a similar percentage (22%) said the current leadership is the best; 10% said that neither is better than the other because both performed well.
    • In describing the standing of the State of Israel today, the largest percentage of the public (42%; 51% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip) said Israel is one of the most powerful countries in the world economically and militarily. By contrast, 35% (44% in the Gaza Strip and 28% in the West Bank) believe Israel is a weak and fragmented state on the verge of collapse; and 21% believe it is a normal state like most other small states in the world.
    • When asked whether Israel will celebrate its 100th anniversary, a majority of two thirds (66%) says it will not do so while 27% say it will; 7% say it does not know.
    • When asked whether the Palestinian people will be able in the future to regain Palestine and repatriate the refugees, a slim majority of 51% says that this will indeed happen while 45% believe that this will not happen.
    2) Rocket exchange between the Gaza Strip and Israel:

     

    • The largest percentage of the Palestinian public, 32% (41% in the West Bank and only 18% in the Gaza Strip), believes that no side has won the recent rocket confrontations between Israel and the Gaza Strip. One quarter believes that all armed resistance groups in the Gaza Strip have emerged victorious. Additionally, 19% believe that Islamic Jihad has emerged victorious while 6% believe Hamas has won, i.e. 50% of the public believe that the Palestinian side emerged victorious. By contrast, 14% (23% in the Gaza Strip and 9% in the West Bank) believe that Israel has won.
    • We asked the public what it thinks of Hamas's role in the most recent rocket confrontation between the Gaza Strip and Israel. The largest percentage (41%) said Hamas did not participate and that Islamic Jihad fought alone, while only 13% said Hamas participated fully in the confrontation alongside Islamic Jihad. 37% (46% in the Gaza Strip and 31% in the West Bank) said Hamas participated in the fighting but not with all its weight. 
    3) Armed escalation and a third intifada:

     

    • 71% of the public (79% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den” and the “Jenin Battalion,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 23% are against that.
    • Nonetheless, 55% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 41% are not worried.
    • 80% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 16% say they are for it.
    • The vast majority (86%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 11% say they favor it.
    • A majority of 58% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 14% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 16% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups.
    • A majority of 51% (54% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) expect security conditions in the West Bank to continue to escalate leading to the eruption of a third armed intifada; 36% say they do not expect a third intifada. It is worth noting that three months ago, 61% (69% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) expected the current escalation to lead to a third intifada. 
    4) Whose interest is served by the continued existence, or the collapse, of the PA?

     

    • The largest percentage (43%) says Israeli punitive measures against the PA aim at weaking it; 25% think Israel aims at forcing a PA collapse; and 28% think Israel does not want to weaken the PA or bring it to collapse.
    • When asked to define Israel’s interest regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse, the majority (63%) says the survival of the PA is in Israel’s interest while 34% think Israel’s interest lies in the collapse of the PA. Three months ago, 57% said the continued existence of the PA is an Israeli interest.
    • When asked to define the interest of the Palestinian people regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse or dissolution, half (50%) says the Palestinian people’s interest lies in the collapse or dissolution of the PA while 46% define the continued existence of the PA as a Palestinian interest. Three months ago, 52% said the interest of the Palestinian people lies in the PA dissolution or collapse.
    • In the event that the PA becomes weak or collapses, such a development is seen by 50% of the public as leading to the strengthening of the armed groups in the West Bank while 13% think it will weaken them; 33% think it will neither weaken nor strengthen the armed groups. 
    5) Legislative and presidential elections:

     

    • 69% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 28% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 77% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 67% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon.
    • If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 56% of the votes (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 36% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 30% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 65%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 61% and from among those, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 28% and the latter 61%.
    • In an open-ended question, where no names were provided to respondents, we asked the public to select a successor to president Abbas. The largest percentage (27%) selected Marwan Barghouti, 16% went to Haniyyeh, followed by Shtayyeh and Mohammad Dahlan (4% each), Khalid Mishal and Yahya al Sinwar (3% each), Hussein al Shaykh (2%), and 1% selected Mustafa Barghouti. A total of 41% said they do not know or do not support anyone.
    • When the same question was asked in a close-ended format, with names provided, the public expressed preference to Marwan Barghouti to succeed Abbas by 35,, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Khalid Mish’al, Mohammad Dahlan, and Mohammad Shtayyeh and Yahya al Sinwar (4% each), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%); 28% said they do not know or have not decided.
    • Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 17% and dissatisfaction at 80%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 17% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 19% and dissatisfaction at 77%. Moreover, a vast majority of 80% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 16% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 77% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 78% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip.
    • 51% say they heard and 47% say they did not hear Abbas' recent speech at the UN in which he demanded international protection for the Palestinian people. But 82% of those who heard the speech say they are dissatisfied with what the president said in his speech while only17% of those who heard the speech say they are satisfied with it.
    • If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 66% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 31% say they will vote for Fatah, 11% will vote for all third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 44% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 25% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago).
    • 31% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 21% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 43% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 26% selected Hamas, 24% Fatah under Abbas, and 44% said neither side deserves such a role.
    • A majority of 51% thinks that the recent student election results of Birzeit and al Najah universities, in which the student bloc affiliated with Hamas won over the student bloc affiliated with Fatah, does not reflect the balance of power in the Palestinian society in the West Bank or among the students in general; 46% think these results do reflect the positions of the total public in the West Bank.
            6) Domestic conditions:

             

            •  Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%.
            • Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 46%. Three months ago, the perception of safety and security in the West Bank stood at 46% and at 73% in the Gaza Strip.
            • Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 73% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 82% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 71% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
            • 40% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 55% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.
            • In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (63%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, the findings were exactly the same: 63% viewed the PA as a burden and 33% viewed it as an asset.
            • 23% are optimistic and 74% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 22%.
            • After more than four years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 81% expect failure; only 15% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 16% of the public expect success and 79% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 81% expects failure and 16% expects success. The following figure shows that the trend, which started four years ago with a little optimistic expectation to begin with, have declined significantly over the last two years.

            • 25% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 29% and in the West Bank at 22%. Three months ago, 19% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 32% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
            • We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 33%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Palestine Today TV (9% each), Maan TV (5%), al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (at 3% each), and al Manar at 1%.. 
              7) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

               

              • Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 70%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 27%.  Support for the two-state solution is correlated with perception of feasibility and the prospects for the creation of a Palestinian state. A vast majority of 71% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 28% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 78% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 74% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion. The following figure shows the significance of the correlation between support for the two-state solution and the perception of feasibility.

              • Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 21% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 76% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 22%.
              • When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 47% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 53% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 58% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 52% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
              • When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 52% chose armed struggle (55% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank), 21% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Three months ago, 54% chose armed struggle and 18% chose negotiations.
              • In light of the anti-government demonstrations in Israel, 46% think they could lead to the fall of the Netanyahu government while 49% think they do not expect that to happen. Three months ago, 50% expected the fall of the Netanyahu government.
              • When asked whether the public views the Israeli demonstrations against the Netanyahu government with admiration, a quarter (33% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip) said these mass protests do indeed deserve admiration. But a larger percentage, standing at 35% (56% in the Gaza Strip and 21% in the West Bank) said they do not see in these demonstrations anything worth admiration and 38% (43% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) said the protest are of no concern for the Palestinian people.
              • When comparing the Israeli and Palestinian judiciaries, the largest percentage of the Palestinians, standing at 36% (40% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip), said that the Israeli judiciary is independent but the Palestinian judiciary is subordinate to the president or the government; 31% believe that the two judicial systems are not independent; 13% believe the Palestinian judiciary is independent and the Israeli judiciary is not; and 9% believe that the two judiciaries are independent. 
              8)  Iranian-Saudi rapprochement:

               

              • 60% believe that reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia will not leave a positive impact on the Palestinian issue while 30% believe it will reflect positively on it.
              • 36% believe that the impact of such reconciliation on Palestinian-Saudi relations will not be negative or positive, while 28% believe it will have a positive impact and 26% believe it will have a negative impact.
              • 38% believe that the impact of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement on reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas will be neither negative nor positive; 27% believe it will have a negative impact, and 25% believe it will be positive.
              • Moreover, 37% believe that reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran will have neither negative nor positive impact on chances of stopping Arab normalization with Israel. But 35% believe that the effect will be negative and lead to further normalization and 19% believe it will be positive and stop or decrease normalization.
              • Moreover, the largest percentage (39%) believes that the impact of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement will be neither negative nor positive on stopping or reducing the intensity of the war in Yemen while 27% believe that it will have a positive impact and stop or reduce the war intensity, and 18% believe the impact will be negative and increase the intensity of that war. 
              9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

               

              • 38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 14% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
              • In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 25% (9% in the Gaz Strip and 35% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 22% (30% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 19% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction;  18% (30% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 10% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 3% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  Not surprisingly, the following figure shows significant differences in the assessments of the West Bankers of the main problems compared to that of Gazans.
              • When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 18% said it is unemployment; 13% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 5% said it is the internal violence, and 1% said it is the inadequate infrastructure. The following figure shows that West Bankers and Gazans agree that the Israeli occupation is the most pressing problem, but differ in their assessment of the rest of the problems.

              Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No - 51

              While a majority would reject the Framework document if it includes recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, most Palestinians support extending negotiations and postponing joining international organizations to the end of the year in return for an Israeli release of new Palestinian prisoners; a majority also believes that Abbas will accept the Framework document and will extend negotiation to the end of 2014

               

              This survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah. 

               

              20-22 March 2014

               

              These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 20-22 March 2014. The period before the poll witnessed continued Palestinian-Israeli negotiations but with significant instances of sharp disagreements over the contents of the American proposed Framework document.  It also witnessed the release by Israel of another group of Palestinian prisoners. Several deadly confrontations between Palestinians and the Israeli army led a growing number of Palestinian martyrs.  Talks continued regarding the appointment of a vice president and conflict and acrimony between Abbas and Mohammad Dahlan were evident to the public to see. This press release covers the peace process, public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Rami al Hamdallah, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and others. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

              For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

              Main Findings:

              Findings of the first quarter of 2014 show Palestinian flexibility regarding the extension of negotiations with Israel if Israel agrees in return to release more Palestinian prisoners or freeze settlement construction in some settlements. Similarly, more than two thirds of the public support postponing joining more international organizations in return for an Israeli release of more prisoners. Findings also show that the public believes that Abbas will accept the Framework document when presented by John Kerry and that Abbas will also agree to extend negotiations to the end of 2014. Similarly, the largest percentage believes that Netanyahu too will accept the Framework document. But a majority of Palestinians indicates that it would reject the Framework document if it includes a request to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people even if the document states that the 1967 lines are the basis of negotiations and that East Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine.

              In domestic matters, findings indicate a limited increase in Fatah’s popularity while at the same time indicating a significant decrease in the level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas. Surprisingly, the percentage of those voting for Abbas in presidential elections did not decease; in fact it increased slightly. Findings also show an almost equal split among the public regarding the idea of appointing a vice president and if one is appointed, Marwan Barghouti emerges as the most acceptable. The public is also split on its position regarding instances of strikes in the public sector, which recently increased significantly, with a little over half looking at the strikes negatively and a little less than half viewing them positively.

               

              (1) Peace Process:

              • 56% of the public believe that Abbas will accept the Framework document and 32% think he will reject it.
              • 62% reject the Framework document if it includes a recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.
              • 76% believe that Abbas will extend negotiations, but 55% say they are opposed to such extension.
              • A majority of 65% supports extending negotiations in return for an Israeli release of Palestinian prisoners.
              • 60% support seeking Palestinian membership in new international organizations but 68% say they would agree to postpone such a step in return for the release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel.
              • 56% believe that a majority of Palestinians will vote in favor of a peace agreement that Abbas might reach with Israeli leaders.
              • 77% oppose and 21% support allowing settlers to remain under Palestinian sovereignty in the permanent settlement.
              • A majority supports the two-state solution but 74% of the public believe that a Palestinian state will not be established in the next five years.
              • 64%  say they participate in the boycott of Israeli products that have non-Israeli alternatives.

              ​

              A majority of 56% believes that president Abbas will accept the Framework document that will be presented by John Kerry while 32% believe he will reject it; similarly, the largest percentage (47%) believes that Netanyahu too will accept the Framework document while 41% believe that he will reject it. A majority of 62% rejects and 32% accept the framework document if it includes a request to recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people. The percentage of rejection is almost equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (62% and 63% respectively). But rejection is greater in refugee camps (68%) compared to cities and villages (62% and 61% respectively), among men (65%) compared to women (59%), among those who oppose the peace process (80%) compared to those who support the peace process (54%), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (52% and 57% respectively), and among those who hold a BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (54%).

              An overwhelming majority (76%) believes that president Abbas will agree to extend negotiations with Israel to the end of the year and only 14% believe he will not agree to that. Yet, a majority of 55% of the public is opposed to extending negotiations to the end of the year; 42% support such an extension. Opposition to extending negotiations is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (52%), in refugee camps and cities (63% and 57% respectively) compared to villages and towns (43%), among men (62%) compared to women (48%), among those who oppose the peace process (86%) compared to supporters of the peace process (38%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 66% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (28%), and among holders of BA degree (66%) compared to the illiterates (43%). Support for extending negotiations increases to 51% if Israel agreed to freeze settlement construction in some settlements; support increases sharply to 65% if Israel agrees to release more Palestinian prisoners.

              An overwhelming majority (75%) believes that president Abbas will go to international organizations after the end of the current round of negotiations while 17% believe that he will not do that. A majority supports this policy: 60% support joining more international organizations even if this leads to the imposition of financial sanctions on the PA; 34% oppose this step. But  more than two-thirds (68%) agree to postpone joining more international organizations in return for release of more Palestinian prisoners by Israel; 28% disagree with that. Furthermore, a majority of 56% believes that a majority of the Palestinians will vote in favor of a peace agreement reached between Abbas and Israel in the current negotiations and 34% believe a majority of Palestinians will vote against it.

              An overwhelming majority of 77% opposes and 21% support continued presence of settlers under Palestinian sovereignty in a Palestinian state after reaching a peace agreement.  Opposition to continued presence of settlers in Palestine is equal in the West Bank (77%) and the Gaza Strip (76%). It increases among supporters of Hamas (84%) compared to supporters of Fatah (73%), among those who oppose the peace process (84%) compared to supporters of the peace process (73%), among the religious (79%) compared to the somewhat religious (75%), and among women (80%) compared to men (74%).

              A majority of 51% supports the two-state solution but 57% believe that such a solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion and 74% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent; only 24% believe the chances are high or medium. Yet, the overwhelming majority (72%) is opposed to a one-state solution and only 26% support such a solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equality.

              A majority of 64% says that it participates in the boycott of Israeli products that have non-Israeli equivalents.  Boycott level is higher in the West Bank (66%) compared to the Gaza Strip (59%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (70%) compared to supporters of the peace process (62%), among residents of cities (65%) compared to residents of villages and refugee camps (60% and 61% respectively), and among the religious (67%) compared to the somewhat religious (62%). 

               

              (2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

              • In presidential elections, Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 41%.
              • If the presidential contest was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 60% and the latter 34%.
              • If the contest was between Barghouti, Abbas, and Haniyeh, the first receives 36%, the second 30%, and the third 29%.
              • 45% support and 44% oppose the idea of appointing a deputy to president Abbas.
              • In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 43%, Hamas 28%, all other electoral lists combined 12%, and 17% are undecided.

              ​

              If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 53% and Haniyeh 41% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 60%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 52% and Haniyeh 42%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 52% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 57% and Haniyeh 34%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 60% and the latter would receive 34% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 68%. In our December 2013 poll Barghouti received 61% of the vote and Haniyeh 34%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (36%) followed by Abbas (30%), and Haniyeh (29%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 74%. In our previous poll last December, Barghouti received 40%, Haniyeh 31%, and Abbas 26%. 

              45% support and 44% oppose the appointment of a vice president to Abbas. Among those who support appointing a vice president, Marwan Barghouti is the favorite, selected by 32% in an open question, followed by Rami al Hamdallah who was selected by 13%, Ismail Haniyeh by 8%, Saeb Erikat by 7%, Mohammad Dahlan by 7%, Mustapha Barghouti by 6%, and Azzam al Ahmad by 3%.

              If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 28% say they would vote for Hamas and 43% say they would vote for Fatah, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 37% and in the West Bank at 23%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 38% and in the West Bank at 45%. These results indicate an increase in the vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip which stood at 33% last December.  Fatah, on the other hand, increased its popularity in the West Bank by four percentage points and lost one percentage point in the Gaza Strip during the same period.     

               

              (3) Domestic Conditions:

              • Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 15% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains unchanged at 30%
              • 80% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank and 64% believe it exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip
              • Only 31% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear and only 22% believe people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the dismissed Hamas government in the Gaza Strip without fear.
              • Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 51%  and in the Gaza Strip at 56%
              • Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37% and positive evaluation of the performance of Al Hamdallah government stands at 41%
              • Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops from 53% three months ago to 46% in this poll.
              • 51% find public sector strikes acceptable and 48% find them unacceptable.
              • An overwhelming majority of 78% supports stiffening sentences against killers of women in the so-called honor killings.
              • 54% believe that drug abuse among Palestinian youth is on the rise and 7% believe it is declining.
              • In light of the recent mutual personal accusations, 57% say they do not believe Abbas or Dahlan. 
              • The public is pessimistic regarding economic conditions in the next few years.

              ​

              Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stabilizes at 15% in this poll compared to 16% three months ago. 62% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are bad or very bad.  Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains unchanged compared to three months ago standing today at 30%. But the percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad increased from 36% to 42% during the same period.

              Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 80% in this poll. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 64%.  19% say there is, and 41% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 18% say there is, and 33% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 22% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

              Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 51% and in the Gaza Strip at 56%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 55% in the West Bank and 62% in the Gaza Strip. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 44%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Last December these percentages stood at 45% and 27% respectively. 

              Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37%. Positive evaluation of the government of Rami al Hamdallah in the West Bank stands at 41%.  Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops from 53% three months ago to 46% in this poll.

              We asked the public about its views regarding the recent increase in the cases of public sector strikes: a majority of 51% said it sees these strikes as unacceptable while 48% saw them as acceptable.

              We also asked the public about the increase in the cases of the so-called honor killing: an overwhelming majority of 78% supported and 20% opposed the imposition of stiffer sentences against the killers.

              We asked the public about the increased talk about the spread of drug abuse among the youth in their communities: a majority of 54% indicated that it detected an increase in this practice among the youth while only 7% said it detected a decrease. The belief that drug abuse is on the rise increases in the West Bank (58%) while decreasing to 47% in the Gaza Strip.

              We asked the public about the personal accusations made by President Abbas against Mohammad Dahlan and about Dahlan’s denial: a majority of 26% said it believed Abbas’ accusations to be true; 7% said it believed Dahlan’s denial; and 57% believed none of them.

              We asked West Bank and Gaza publics about their expectation regarding economic conditions in their respective areas in the next few years: 19% of the West Bankers expected better conditions and 52% expected worse conditions. In the Gaza Strip, 28% expected better conditions and 34% expected worse conditions.

               

              (4) Reconciliation: 

              • Optimism about the chances for reconciliation and reunification stands today stands at 15%
              • 52% support and 45% oppose holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if separation continues for a long time
              • 24% believe that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one and 30% believe that the government of Abbas-Hamdallah is the legitimate one
              • 39% believe that Hamas’ way is the best for ending occupation and building a state and 36% believe that Abbas’ way is the best

              ​

              Given the existing status quo between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Hamas and Fatah, percentage of optimism about the chances for reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip remains low, standing at 15%. The belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge stands at 39%. 42% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time. These findings are similar to those we obtained in our last poll in December.  For the first time since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% see a necessity for holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the current disunity continued for a long time; 45% believe it to be unnecessary. 

              The largest percentage (41%) believes that the PA, with its two parts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 25% believe that it is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Furthermore, 15% believe that the PA in the West Bank is an accomplishment while the PA in the Gaza Strip is a burden. By contrast, a similar percentage (13%) believes that the PA in the Gaza Strip is an accomplishment while the PA in the West Bank is a burden.

              24% believe that the Haniyeh government in the Gaza Strip is the legitimate Palestinian government while 30% believe that the Abbas-Hamdallah government in the West Bank is the legitimate one; 9% believe that the two governments are legitimate. 31% believe that both governments are illegitimate. These findings indicate a rise of four points in the percentage of those who believe that the two governments are illegitimate compared to December findings.

              The percentage of those who believe Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and build a Palestinian state stands at 39% while the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way stands at 36%. The current findings are identical to those of December 2013.  Support for Hamas’ way is higher in the Gaza Strip (45%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among the religious (46%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among those who oppose the peace process (67%) compared to supporters of the peace process (27%), among supporters of Hamas (95%) compared to supporters of third parties, the undecided, and Fatah (43%, 35%, and 10% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (49%) compared to those who have elementary education or illiterate (28% and 40% respectively).

               

              (5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

              • 42% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be the most vital Palestinian goal and 34% believe that obtaining of the right of return should be the most vital goal.
              • 27% view the spread of poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 25% view the continued occupation and settlement construction as the most serious problem. 

              42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, 42% said ending occupation and building a state was most vital goal and 33% said the most vital goal was the right of return.

              The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the public while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 21% believe the most serious problem is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 10% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings. 

               

              (6) Electricity Crisis:

              • 70% of West Bankers and 30% of Gazans believe that residents in their areas pay their electricity bills.
              • About half of the West Bankers and a little over a quarter of Gazans support cutting off electricity for those who do not pay their bills.
              • 82% of West Bankers and 59% of Gazans support the imposition of a prison sentence on those who steal electricity.

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              70% of West Bankers and 30% of Gazans believe that residents in their communities pay all their electricity bills. While a third of the West Bankers believes that failure to pay electricity bills in justified, almost two-thirds of Gazans say the same.  Around half of the West Bankers and a quarter of Gazans believe that the electricity company in their area should deny electricity to those who fail to pay. Yet, when the question involves other options, 56% of the West Bankers and 75% of Gazans believe that the PA should pay the debt of the electricity companies. In this question, support for denying electricity to those who do not pay drops to 32% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip. Only 4% believe the electricity companies should raise prices in order to address the problem of debt and non-payment.

              In order to strengthen the capacity of the electricity companies to fight electricity theft, 82% of the West Bankers and 59% of Gazans support imposing fines and jail sentences against those who steel electricity. Also, 75% of West Bankers and 56% of Gazans support sending police escorts with electricity workers to help them cut off electricity from the homes of electricity thieves. 76% of West Bankers and 45% of Gazans support forming special courts to try electricity thieves. Finally, 29% of West Bankers and 22% of Gazans support cutting off electricity on whole neighborhoods in which electricity theft is widespread.

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              Full Report PDF: 
              PDF icon p51e.pdf
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