3-7 April 2003

These are the results of opinion poll # 7, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 3-7 April 2003. The poll deals with the public attitudes toward the appointment of a Palestinian prime minister, political reform, the Quartet's roadmap, war in Iraq, the popularity of Yasir Arafat and political affiliation. The total sample size of this poll is 1315 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face, in 120 locations in the West Bank (821) and the Gaza Strip (494). The margin of error is 3%. 

To obtain full information, explanation and results, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki, PSR – Ramallah, Tel: +972 2 296 4933, fax 02-296 4934, or e-mail: pcpsr@pcpsr.org

MAIN RESULTS:

The results indicate that despite the war in Iraq, the Palestinian public tends to be optimistic about the chances for a return to the peace process. The optimism is derived mainly from the appointment of Abu Mazin as a prime minister, an appointment that receives the support of a clear majority. The optimism may also reflect the fact that a clear majority supports a mutual cessation of violence. This majority may believe that once mutual violence stops, the two sides may find it easier to return to negotiations. At the same time however, the Palestinian public is concerned about the impact of the war in Iraq on the future of the peace process and does not show a great confidence in the ability of the Abu Mazin to control the security situation or even carry out political reforms. Despite the fact that half of the Palestinians sees in the appointment of Abu Mazin an erosion in the status and powers of Yasir Arafat, the popularity rate of both men remains unchanged compared to five months ago. 

1) The appointment of Abu Mazin as a Prime Minister

• ·        A majority of Palestinians (64%) supports the creation of the position of a prime minister while 28% oppose it
• ·        Support for the appointment of Abu Mazin as a prime minister reaches 61% and opposition 32%
• ·        50% sees in the appointment of Abu Mazin an erosion in Arafat's status and authority
• ·        A majority of 86% supports internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms, but only 44% support the call to change the political system to a parliamentary one in which power resides in the hands of a prime minister and the position of the president becomes ceremonial

The results show that a majority of Palestinians (64%) supports the creation of the position of a prime minister while 28% oppose that step. But support for Abu Mazin as a prime minister is slightly less at 61% and opposition slightly higher at 32%. Support for Abu Mazin as a prime minister increases in the Gaza Strip (64%) compared to the West Bank (59%), among the old (68%) compared to the young (53%), among the illiterates (67%) compared to holders of BA degree (52%), among the farmers and retired persons (71% and 68% respectively) compared to students (50%), and among supporters of Fateh (71%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%).

While a majority of 70% believes that a government headed by Abu Mazin would be able to renew negotiations with Israel and 50% believe that it would improve economic conditions, only 39% believe that it would be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire on all Palestinian factions and 53% believe that it would not. Moreover, only 43% believe that it would be able to carry out political reform and 44% believe that it would be able to fight corruption. It is worth noting that while the appointment of Abu Mazin has not changed Palestinian expectations regarding the prospect for combined cessation of violence and return to negotiations (standing at 18%, compared to 16% last November), a shift did occur in the expectations regarding the prospect for a combined continuation of armed confrontations and no return to negotiations. In this poll, only 27% (compared to 42% last November) believe that armed confrontations would not stop and the two sides would not return to negotiations.

Palestinians are also divided in two halves over the issue of whether Abu Mazin will be able to form a government that could win the confidence of the Palestinians, with 43% believing he would and 43% believing he would not. It is worth remembering that only 40% were willing in November 2002 to give confidence to Arafat's current government. Palestinians are also divided over the issue of whether the appointment of Abu Mazin represents erosion in the authority and status of Yasir Arafat with 50% agreeing with that and 43% disagreeing.

Belief that the appointment of Abu Mazin represents an erosion in Arafat's power increases in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), in cities and villages (51% and 52% respectively) compared to refugee camps (45%), among men (55%) compared to women (46%), among the young (52%) compared to the old (45%), among holders of BA degree (58%) compared to illiterates (37%), among students, merchants, and farmers (62%, 63%, and 71% respectively) compared to professionals, retired persons, and the unemployed (44% each), among middle income people —monthly earning between JD300-600 (55%) compared to low income people (48%), and among supporters of Hamas (54%) compared to supporters of Fateh (47%).

While a majority of 86% supports internal and external calls for wide and fundamental political reforms, only 44% support (and 50% oppose) the call for changing the Palestinian political system so that power would reside in the hands of the prime minister while the position of the president would become ceremonial. Support for this change in the political system stood at 47% last November and opposition at 49%. Support for changing the political system to make the office of the president ceremonial increases in the West Bank (46%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in cities (47%) compared to refugee camps (38%), among men (48%) compared to women (41%), among the old (53%) compared to the young (35%), among non-refugees (48%) compared to refugees (39%), among retired persons, farmers, professionals, craftsmen, and laborers (68%, 65%, 56%, 50% and 51% respectively) compared to students, employees, and housewives (33%, 39%, and 40% respectively), among those working in the private sector (50%) compared to those working in the public sector (41%), among high income people (56%) compared to low income people (44%), and among national independents and the unaffiliated (58% and 47% respectively) compared to those who support Hamas and Fateh (39% and 41% respectively).

2) The Peace Process:

• ·        The roadmap receives the support of 55% and the opposition of 39%
• ·        45% believe, and 46% do not believe, the US and other Quartet members will put great pressure on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept the read map
• ·        Support for American pressure on the Palestinian Authority to accept the roadmap does not exceed 17% while 79% oppose such pressure
• ·        48% oppose the deployment of international forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if it means pressuring the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement the roadmap; support stands at 38%; additional 9% would support the deployment if it was European only, and less than 1% support a deployment of American forces
• ·        A majority of 71% supports mutual cessation of violence

Palestinian attitude toward the Quartet's roadmap has become slightly more positive with 55% supporting it and 39% opposing it. Last November, 54% supported and 42% opposed it. Support for the roadmap is reinforced with a strong support for a ceasefire. A majority of 71% (compared to 76% last November) supports a mutual cessation of violence while 27% (compared to 22% last November) oppose it. Under conditions of mutual ceasefire, 50% of all the public would support taking measures against those who would continue to carry out attacks against Israeli civilians while 45% would oppose doing so. Last November, support for such measures stood at 56% and opposition at 40%.  Still, three quarters acknowledge that failure to take such measures would impede the revival of the peace process. On the other hand, 79% express concern that taking such measures may lead to civil war.

Support for taking measures against those who continue to attack Israeli civilians after a mutual cessation of violence increases among men (53%) compared to women (47%), among the old (54%) compared to the young (47%), among the illiterates (57%) compared to holders of BA degree (46%), among laborers, professionals, and craftsmen (59%, 56%, and 56% respectively) compared to students and employees (45% each), among those working in the private sector (57%) compared to those working in the public sector (46%), and among supporters of Fateh (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas (40%).

In the absence of a mutual cessation of violence, a majority of 57% (compared to 53% last November) continues to support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 40% oppose it. Support for attacks on soldiers and settlers remains very high (over 90%) as in the previous poll. As in November, two thirds continue to believe that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Palestinians are divided over whether the US and other members of the Quartet would put heavy pressure on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept the roadmap with 45% believing that they would and 46% that they would not. A clear majority of 79% would oppose such American and international pressure if it was put on the Palestinian Authority while only 17% would support it. Moreover, only 38% would support the deployment of international forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to force the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement the roadmap. An additional 9% would support such deployment only if the forces were European. Forty-eight percent would oppose any deployment of international forces, and less than one percent would support the deployment if the forces were made up of Americans only.

A majority of 65% (compared to 73% last November) supports reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinians state is established and recognized by the state of Israel. In this context, 82% would support open borders between the two states, 65% would support building joint economic institutions and ventures, 26% would support building joint political institutions, and 30% would support adopting Palestinian laws that would prohibit incitement against Israel. However, only 7% would support changing the Palestinian curriculum so that it no longer call for the return of all of Palestine to Palestinians

3) War in Iraq

• 99% of the Palestinians oppose the war against Iraq, with 58% believing that its aim is to control the Iraqi oil
• 46% believe the war in Iraq will make it possible for Israel to carry out mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 44% believe that it will not
• A majority of 61% believes the war in Iraq will make it more difficult for Palestinians and Israelis to return to the peace process and a majority of 78% believes the war will strengthen Palestinian motivation to carry out armed attacks against Israelis

The results show that almost all Palestinians oppose the war on Iraq; with 58% of them believing that the primary motive of the US is to seize Iraqi oil, 32% believing the motive to be to help Israel, and only 2% believing it to be to disarm Iraq from weapons of mass destruction. While 78% of the respondents believe that the war in Iraq would strengthen Palestinian desire to carry out attacks on Israelis and 61% believe that it would take Israelis and Palestinians further away from the peace process, only 46% believe (and 44% do not believe) that Israel would be able to exploit the opportunity to carry out a mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The belief that Israel will be able to exploit the war to carry out mass expulsion of Palestinians increases among residents of villages and towns (48%) compared to refugee camps (40%), among the old (50%) compared to the young (43%), among the illiterates (51%) compared to holders of BA degree (31%), among farmers, retired persons, and craftsmen (59% and 50% respectively) compared to professionals, laborers and students (33%, 40%, and 42% respectively), among those with low income (47%) compared to those with high income (22%), and among supporters of Fateh and Hamas (50% and 47% respectively) compared to the unaffiliated (40%).

Most Palestinians (61%) believe that Iraq of Saddam Hussein would win the war in Iraq while only 12% believe that the winner will be the US and its allies. Eighteen percent see all sides as losers. The results show that socio-economic factors (such as income and education), rather than political affiliation, determine beliefs regarding the outcome of the war. Belief that Iraq's Saddam would win increases among women (71%) compared to men (51%), among illiterates (73%) compared to holders of BA degree (44%), among housewives and farmers (72% and 65% respectively) compared to retired persons, professionals and employees (32%, 39%, and 47% respectively), and among low income persons (65%) compared to high income persons (33%).  On the other hand, the results show that political affiliation plays no role in shaping beliefs regarding this matter.

4) Domestic Palestinian Issues

• ·        81% believe there is corruption in the institutions of the Palestinian Authority
• ·        Arafat's popularity stands at 35%, as in our survey of last November, followed by Ahmad Yasin (15%), and Haidar Abdul Shafi (10%)
• ·        For a vice president, Marwan Barghouti receives the highest rating with 20% (compared to 21% last November)
• ·        Fateh receives the support of 26%, followed by Hamas with 17%

The poll shows that Arafat's popularity, at 35%, remains unchanged since last November. Marwan Barghouti is the second most popular Palestinian leader with 20% support. Despite his appointment as a prime minister, Abu Mazin's popularity remains unchanged at 3%. Fateh, at 26%, is still the most popular faction followed by Hamas at 17%. Fateh's support stood at 27% last November. Total support for Islamists (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and independent Islamists) stands at 29% compared to 25% last November. The combined strength of all Palestinian opposition factions, Islamist and nationalist, stands at 32% while 41% remain undecided. 

A majority of 81% believes that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority and only 30% among those believe that corruption will decline in the future. Last November, 84% believed corruption existed in the PA. Palestinians are divided over the performance of the finance minister, Salam Fayyad, with 35% satisfied, 36% unsatisfied, and 29% unsure.

Fourteen percent, compared to 20% last November, say that conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip lead them to seek permanent emigration. The desire to emigrate increases among men (19%) compared to women (9%), among the young 23%) compared to the old (5%), among the holders of BA degree (20%) compared to illiterates (3%), among professionals, students, and laborers (33%, 26%, and 22% respectively) compared to retired persons and housewives (6% and 8% respectively).

This is the Survey Research Unit's (SRU) twenty second public opinion poll and covers the topics of armed attacks, peace process and unemployment. The SRU has been conducting regular public opinion poll to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political event. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concerns to them. Following is an analysis of the results of the twenty second opinion poll conducted by the SRU.  

General Background  

The period before this poll witnessed several events, the most important of them was the assassination of Yahaya Ayyash "the engineer" which exploded in angry demonstrations in West Bank and Gaza and led to several suicide attacks. PNA and Hamas movements held talks, before that, in Cairo in order to reach a mutual understanding to improve relations between them and to stop armed operations. Israeli forces' redelployment was completed on time and civil responsibilities were transfered to the Palestinian authority. Israel released hundreds of Palestinian prisoners according to the Palestinian-Israel agreement, but it refused to release all female prisoners.

Palestinian elections for the legislative council took place leading to the election of a president and a legislative council.

Israel pursued the establishment and enlargment of new by-pass roads, confiscation of new lands, and settlement enlargement. The most important events in that period were the four suicide military operations between 25/2-4/3/1996 in West Jerusalem. Ashkelon, and Tel Aviv, leading to the death of 60 Israelis. Following that, the Israeli authorities applied harsh security measures against West Bank and Gaza. They closed the Wet Bank and Gaza, prevented movement between Palestinian villages and cities, and suspended peace negotiations.

The Israeli authorities demolished the two suicider's houses, and threatened to deport their relatives as well as other Hamas and Jihad activists. The Israelis also stormed and searched many Palestinian villages in area B under Palestinian control. They closed several institutions accused of being financed by Hamas. The economic and health situation detoriorated in Gaza because of Israeli seige and martime blockade.

Tough security measures had been taken against Hamas and Jihad by the PNA which had condemned the armed attacks. These included the arrest of hundreds of Hamas and Jihad activists. PNA also stormed Islamic University in Gaza and Al-Najah University in Nablus and banned all para-military organizations.

The most important event following the attacks was Sharm-Al-Sheikh conference, and the Israeli decision to postpone the Hebron redeployment. 

Methodology 

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution.

Sample Selection

In this poll, multistage sampling techniques was employed to select the sample. There were four stages of sampling. The order of the four stages is as follows:

• (a) selecting a population location with probabilities proportional to size sampling (PPS).
• (b) selecting a house using systematic sampling.
• (c) selecting a person 18 or older from the house.

We used 75 population locations in this poll. From which 1262 house hold were selected. The sample was designed to be selfweighting. This means that the estimates were obtained are unbiased estimates.

Fieldworkers and researchers created maps of these localities. These maps indicate the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these areas which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of one hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly.

Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be one hundred an was assigned ten interviews, the fieldworker divided the 100 by 10, obtaining 10. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 10th house, and the second in the 20th, and so on. Fieldworkers started their sample selection of housing unit from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They reported on the direction of their sampling walks, and played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and estimating the number of houses in each block. Interviews were conducted between the 29-31 March 1996. The sample distribution included 1262 persons, 786 in the West Bank and 476 in the Gaza Strip. 

Sample Distribution 

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

* Specialists (University teacher, engineer, doctor, lawyer, pharmacist, executive)
** Employees (school teacher, government employee, nurse, lower-level company employee)
-- Population Estimates are based on the "Statistical Abstract of Israel" (1993) and FAFO (1993), and Palestinian Statistical Bureau (1994).
**** for all post secondary degrees

Data Collection

Our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on household interviewing, confidence building, mapping, sampling techniques, survey methods, and scientific research. Four special training seminars for data collectors were conducted during this months, attended by a total of 75 fieldworkers.

Data collectors worked in teams of two supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. More than fifty percent of our data collectors are female so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 17 per team) to allow for careful interviewing.

Household interviews resulted in a non-response rate estimated at 3%. Some respondents, were believe, were reluctant to state their political views out of fear or disinterest in the present political factions. 

Data Analysis 

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is around + 5%...More

These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. This report is restricted to findings related to Palestinian perception of governance. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side.

The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement.

This report is the third in a series covering the results of the current eighth wave of the Arab Barometer in Palestine (AB8). The first report reviewed the findings regarding the internal balance of power and Palestinian-Israeli relations before and after October 7, and the second report reviewed Palestinian perceptions and beliefs regarding various international and regional actors and other international issues. The current report addresses one important issue covered by AB8: Palestinian perception of governance. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding this topic, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in AB7, conducted two years earlier.

This third report of the eight wave of the Arab Barometer in Palestine addresses five issues, all related to governance: (1) the top challenges facing Palestinians, (2) trust in PA leaders, government, courts, municipalities and other local councils, and societal forces, (3) satisfaction with service delivery in critical areas as well as public assessment of the performance of the government in three areas: provision of security, narrowing the gap between rich and poor, and keeping the prices down, (4) government responsiveness to what people want and public perception of the most effective means to influence PA decisions, and (5) perception of corruption at the national and local levels. 

Challenges: Palestinians identify four challenges facing Palestine as the most critical: economic conditions, instability, corruption, and settler terrorism. Most of those were cited by Palestinians in AB7 in 2021. While Gazans focused on the economic challenge, West Bankers focused on corruption and settlers’ violence. 

Trust: AB8 asked about trust in the PA leadership as well as various PA institutions. Trust in the PA president has declined in the West Bank and increased in the Gaza Strip. In total, AB8 found that about one in five Palestinians expresses trust in president Mahmoud Abbas. Almost identical findings, as those for the president, have been found regarding trust in the PA government. But the decline in trust in the PA government is evident in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. When specifically asked about trust in Hamas’ government, two-thirds indicated that they do not trust it. But Palestinian trust in the PA national security forces is higher, with just fewer than four-in-ten expressing trust.

Trust in the courts and the legal system is down by seven points; today, two thirds of the Palestinians express lack of trust in the courts and the legal system. Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to express trust. Trust in local government has dropped in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; almost 70 percent of all Palestinians express distrust in their municipalities and local councils.

Trust in civil society organizations is low, having dropped from about a third to about a quarter in two years. Trust in religious leadership has dropped in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, the trust level is very low but has essentially remained unchanged. Trust in Hamas has also declined in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the eve of October 7, less than a quarter expressed trust in it. Finally, as in AB7, the current wave in Palestine indicates that one-in-ten 10 people expresses the belief that “most people can be trusted.”

Satisfaction with service delivery: findings show differences in the level of satisfaction between West Bankers and Gazans. In the West Bank, the highest level of satisfaction went to the provision of electricity, followed by civil defense, access to the internet, water supply, the healthcare system, trash collection, the education system, the quality of the street, and finally government performance overall. The most significant 2023 decline in satisfaction, compared to the findings in 2021, was regarding government performance overall, dropping by eight points to slightly less than a third.

In the Gaza Strip, the highest level of satisfaction went to access to internet services, followed by civil defense, the educational system, trash collection, the quality of the streets, the healthcare system, and finally, as the case for West Bankers, the lowest level of satisfaction went to the government performance overall. It is worth noting that the overall trend among Gazans today is to show less satisfaction with almost everything we have asked about in AB7. The most significant decline in 2023 was regarding the healthcare system, dropping by eight points to 38 percent. 

We asked Palestinians to assess the performance of the government in providing security, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and keeping prices down. While 36 percent said the performance in providing security is good or very good, only 15 percent said the same about narrowing the wealth gap, and only 12 percent said the same about keeping prices down. It is worth noting that the current figures represent a drop ranging between seven and 12 points. It is also worth noting that the drop is evident in both areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Government responsiveness: Only one fifth of Palestinians, compared to a quarter two years ago, think the PA government responds to what people want. Gazans are a little more likely than West Bankers to think the government is responsive. Use of family connections with government officials and participation in a protest were cited as the most effective in influencing government decisions. The findings show that working with a political party is seen as the least effective when compared to several other means of influence; nonetheless, Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to view it as effective.

Perception of corruption: As we found in AB7 in 2021, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians think corruption exists in the PA either to a large or to a medium extent. Almost all West Bankers (94 percent) think there is corruption in the PA while the percentage in the Gaza Strip shows a drop to little over 70 percent. When asked if the PA government is working to combat corruption, about four-in-ten expressed the belief that it does so to a large or medium extent. This represents an improvement compared to our findings 2021.

The majority of the Palestinians think wasta, or personal connections, is essential if one is to get a job. But when asked about the role of wasta in getting legal documents from public institutions, the majority said it was not necessary. When asked about the need for rashwa, or bribery, to get a job, the percentage of those who said, “yes, frequently” was lower than those who said the same about wasta by nine points. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to think rashwa is used frequently. When asked about the role of rashwa in getting legal documents from public institutions, the percentage of those who said “frequently,” was lower than those who said the same about wasta by five points.

The perception that corruption exists in municipalities and local councils is less widespread compared to the perception that it exists at the national level in the PA institutions, a gap of 15 points. The findings show that only 70 percent believe corruption exists in local councils and municipalities to a large or medium extent. In this regard, only minor differences exist between West Bankers and Gazans.

We asked the public to describe the most important challenges facing Palestine today. Four challenges were mentioned the most: the economic situation was cited by 29% followed by instability (22%), corruption (18%), and settler terrorism (13%). The top four challenges cited in AB7 in 2021 included the economic situation (31%), Covid-19 (21%), corruption (19%), and instability (15%). It is worth noting that Gazans, at 41%, are twice as likely today to cite the economic situation than West Bankers (21%). On the other hand, West Bankers are much more likely today than Gazans to cite settler terrorism, 20% to 1% respectively, and corruption, 21% and 13% respectively. It is also worth noting that Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to cite additional challenges, such as foreign interference (7% and 2% respectively); emigration (7% and 2% respectively); and public services (4% and 0% respectively).

Trust in government and leaders

Trust in the PA president declines slightly from 24% to 22%. The decline comes from the West Bank only while Gazans expressed greater trust in 2023 than in 2021: in the West Bank trust declined from 27% to 19% while increasing in the Gaza Strip from 21% to 27%. Distrust in the PA president in 2023 stood at 73%, 75% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip.

About three quarters (74%) indicate that they do not trust the Palestinian government or do not have a lot of trust in it while only 22% indicate that they have a great of deal of trust or a quite a lot of trust in the Government. Two years earlier, in AB7, trust in government stood at 27%. Trust in the Gaza Strip stands at 29 (compared to 35% in AB7) and in the West Bank at 17% (compared to 21% in AB7).  

When West Bankers were specifically asked about trust in the PA government in the West Bank, 19% said they trusted it while 76% expressed distrust. Two years earlier 29% of West Bankers expressed trust and 69% expressed distrust. When Gazans, in the AB8, were specifically asked about trust in the Gaza government, 29% said they trusted it while 67% said they did not trust it.

Trust in the PA national security forces stands at 37% and distrust at 58%.  Two years earlier, trust stood at 41%, a 4-point decline. The decline is greater in the Gaza Strip, from 55% to 41%, while the West Bank witnessed a slight rise in trust, from 32% to 34%. Distrust in PA national security forces stands at 58%, 61% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip.  Trust in police stands at 39% and distrust at 58%. The level of trust is identical in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, about 39% each.

But when asked “how would you rate the safety of your neighborhood,” 76% said it is very or somewhat safe and only 24% said it is very unsafe or somewhat unsafe. Perception of safety in one’s neighborhood was slightly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 79% and 74% respectively.

In that context, when asked about the frequency of robberies in one’s neighborhood, 72% said never or rarely and 28% said frequently or sometimes. The percentage of those who said frequently or sometime is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 33% and 24% respectively. Similarly, when asked about the frequency of street violence and fights, 57% said never or rarely and 43% said frequently or sometimes. The percentage of those who said frequently or sometime is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 45% and 40% respectively.

Two thirds of the Palestinians express lack of trust in the courts and the legal system while trust stands at 29%. Two years ago, 36% expressed trust in the courts and the legal system. Trust in the Gaza Strip stands at 33% (compared to 46% in AB7) and in the West Bank at 27% (compared to 29% in AB7). Distrust stands at 66% in the West Bank and 65% in the Gaza Strip.

Trust has also declined in local government, from 32% two years ago to 28% today. While Gazans express greater level of trust in their local government, the findings show a decline in trust in both areas, the West Bank (from 29% to 25%) and the Gaza Strip (from 37% to 33%). Distrust in local government stands today at 69%, 71% in the West Bank and 65% in the Gaza Strip.

Societal trust:

Trust in civil society organizations declines from 33% to 27%; in the West Bank from 29% to 27% and in the Gaza Strip from 38% to 27%. Distrust in CSOs stands today at 68%; 67% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip.

Trust in religious leaders stands today at 26%, 19% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip. These figures indicate a slight drop of 6-points compared to our findings in AB7 in 2021. The decline in trust comes from the Gaza Strip, which witnessed an 8-point drop while the West Bank saw only 1-point drop. Distrust in religious leaders stood in 2023 at 69%, 76% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip.

The current poll found that trust in Hamas is in decline. Only 22% expressed trust in Hamas, 18% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. Trust in Hamas in 2021 stood at 29%, 23% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip.  Distrust in Hamas in 2023 stood at 71%, 75% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip.

When asked about trust in people, 90% expressed the belief that one “must be careful,” while only 9% think “most can be trusted.” No change when compared to AB7. West Bankers’ societal trust stands at 5% only while in the Gaza Strip at 15%.

We asked about satisfaction with the overall government performance as well as its performance in specific areas: the educational system, the healthcare system, the quality of the streets, and trash collection, access to internet services, provision of electricity, water supply, and civil defense:

1. Satisfaction with the government’s performance overall stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 64%. This represents a 7-point drop in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction dropped in both areas: it stands at 36% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 43% in AB7) and 32% in the West Bank (compared to 40% in AB7). 

2. Satisfaction with the educational system stands at 48% and dissatisfaction at 51%. This represents a 6-point drop in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction dropped in both areas: it stands at 54% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 60% in AB7) and 44% in the West Bank (compared to 51% in AB7). 

3. Satisfaction with the healthcare system stands at 47% and dissatisfaction at 52%. This represents a 2-point drop in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction dropped 8 points in the Gaza Strip, standing today at 38% while increasing two points in the West Bank, standing today at 53%. 

4. Satisfaction with the quality of the streets in Palestine stands at 41% and dissatisfaction at 57%. This represents a 2-point increase in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction in the Gaza Strip, at 42%, is identical to that of 2021. It increased 2 points in the West Bank, standing today at 40% 

5. Satisfaction with trash collection stands at 53% and dissatisfaction at 46%. This represents a 2-point increase in satisfaction compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of satisfaction in the Gaza Strip, at 53%, represents a drop of 5 points. In the West Bank satisfaction stands also at 52%, a 6-point increase compared to 2021.  

6. Satisfaction with access to internet services stands at 64% and dissatisfaction at 34%. The level of satisfaction is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 68% and 58% respectively.

7. Satisfaction with the provision of electricity stands at 52% and dissatisfaction at 46%. The level of satisfaction is much higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 73% and 19% respectively.

8. Satisfaction with water supply stands at 54% and dissatisfaction at 45%. The level of satisfaction is a little higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 55% and 50% respectively.

9. Satisfaction with civil defense stands at 64% and dissatisfaction at 31%. The level of satisfaction is much higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 71%% and 55% respectively.

Assessment of governmental performance: We asked the Palestinians to assess the performance of the government in three areas: provision of security, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and in keeping the prices down:

1. The share of those who think performance of the government in providing security is good or very good stands at 36% and those who think it is bad or very bad stand at 62%. This represents an 11-point drop in positive evaluation compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of positive evaluation dropped in both areas: it stands at 40% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 64% in AB7) and 33% in the West Bank (compared to 36% in AB7). 

2. Positive evaluation of the government’s performance in narrowing the gap between rich and poor stands at 15% and negative evaluation at 81%. This represents a 6-point drop in the positive evaluation compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of positive evaluation dropped in both areas: it stands at 20% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 29% in AB7) and 12% in the West Bank (compared to 17% in AB7). 

3. Positive evaluation of the government’s performance in keeping prices down stands at 12% and negative evaluation at 85%. This represents an 8-point drop in the positive evaluation compared to the findings of AB7 in 2021. The level of positive evaluation dropped in both areas: it stands at 19% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 31% in AB7) and 7% in the West Bank (compared to 12% in AB7). 

We asked about the extent to which the government responds to what people want. Only one fifth believes the government is very or largely responsive and 79% believe it is not very responsive or not responsive at all. Gazans are a little more likely than West Bankers to think the government is responsive, 26% to 16% respectively. In 2021, 25% said the government was responsive and 74% said it was not.

We asked about actions that Palestinians think are the most effective to influence a national government decision. Use of family connections with government officials and the participation in a protest received the highest percentage as the most effective, standing at 15% each. Virtual campaigns received 13%; forming a group received 12%; contacting governmental officials in social media received 10%, contacting the media received 9%, and at the bottom came “work through a political party” selected by 6% only. It is worth noting that Gazans were more likely than West Bankers to select “use of family connections,” (18% and 13% respectively) and work through a political party (11% and 3% respectively. By contrast, West Bankers were more likely than Gazans to select “participation in a protest (19% and 8% respectively) and “contact the media (13% and 4% respectively).  The largest percentage (16%) said none of these measures are effective, with Gazans selecting it much more than West Bankers, 22% to 12%. 

This question was asked in a different manner. Using the same list of measures indicated above, we asked Palestinians about the actions that they think are the least effective to influence a national government decision. The largest percentage, 18% (19% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip) selected “participation in a protest,” followed by “contacting government officials on social media,” selected by 13; “forming a group” was selected by 12%, virtual campaign by 11%, contact the media by 6%, and work through a political party by another 6%.  (4) Government responsiveness:

The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (85%) thinks corruption exists in the PA institutions either to a large (54%) or to a medium extent (31%) and 12% think it exists but only to a small extent (10%) or not at all (2%). This is almost the same as the case was in 2021 when 86% thought corruption existed in the PA and 11% thought it did not exist. But the findings do show an increase in the perception of corruption in the West Bank, now standing at 94%, compared to 90% in 2021, and show a decrease in the Gaza Strip from 81% in 2021 to 72% now.

We asked about the extent to which the government is working to crackdown on corruption. A majority of 61% believed that it does so only to a small extent (24%) or not at all (37%) while 38% believed it does so to a large (11%) or medium (27%) extent. In 2021, 41% believed it does so to a large or medium extent. Here too, there are differences between West Bankers and Gazans. In the West Bank, 35% (compared to 32% in 2021) think the government does so to a large or medium extent while in the Gaza Strip, 43% (compared to 55% in 2021) think the government does so to a large or medium extent.  

We asked about the prevalence of corruption when seeking a job or getting legal document from public institutions. In answer to the question about how often “it is necessary for citizens in Palestine to use wasta (or personal connections) to get a job, a majority of 53% said “frequently,” 22% said “sometimes,” and 24% said rarely or never. In the West Bank, 58% said frequently compared to 45% in the Gaza Strip. When asked about the role of wasta in getting legal documents from public institutions, only 36% said “frequently,” with identical results in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. One third said “sometimes,” and 29% said rarely or never.

We also asked about the role of rashwa or bribery in getting a job or obtaining legal documents from public institutions. In answer to the question about “it is necessary for citizens in Palestine to use rashwa to get a job,” 44% said “frequently,” 28% said “sometimes,” and 25% said rarely or never. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to think rashwa is used frequently, 46% and 40% respectively.  When asked about the role of rashwa in getting legal documents from public institutions, 31% said “frequently,” 33% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. One third said “sometimes,” and another third said rarely or never.

We also asked about the perception of corruption in local government, such as municipalities and local councils. A majority of 54% believe that most (42%) or almost everyone (12%) is corrupt while 41% believe that hardly anyone (11%) or not a lot (30%) are corrupt. These findings are similar to what we found in 2021, when 40% said hardly anyone or not a lot are corrupt. But they represent an improvement in the West Bank and a setback in the Gaza Strip:  a rise of 10 points in the West Bank and a decrease of 8 points in the Gaza Strip in the percentage of those who think that hardly anyone or not a lot are corrupt.

The question about corruption in local government was asked in a different manner, one similar to the question about corruption in PA institutions at the national level: “To what extent do you think there is corruption within the local/municipal agencies and institutions in Palestine?” 70% said corruption existed in local councils and municipalities to a large or medium extent while 28% said it existed to some extent or not at all.  Minor differences exist between West Bankers and Gazans: 71% and 6%7 respectively believe corruption in local government exists to a large or medium extent.

Joint Palestinian - Israeli Public Opinion Poll, December 2004

FIRST SERIOUS SIGNS OF OPTIMISM SINCE THE START OF THE  INTIFADA

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between November 30 and December 6, 2004. 

The poll was designed to examine Palestinians’ pre-election attitudes and voting intentions and Israelis’ assessments of the Palestinian elections in the post Arafat era. 

Both publics were also asked about the Israeli disengagement plan and the possibility of resuming the Quartet’s roadmap process. 

This is the tenth joint poll in an ongoing research project on the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 in the wake of the Camp David summit. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, currently at the US Institute of Peace, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1319 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip andEast Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted December 1 - 5. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of the general Israeli public with 604 Israelis (sampling error of 4%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between November 30 and December 6. 

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr.Yaacov Shamir at tel. 202-429-3870 or email jshamir@usip.org.  

Summary of Results 

(1) Palestinian Elections

• The poll shows that if presidential elections were to be held today, the results would be close with Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) receiving 40% of the votes and Marwan Barghouti receiving 38%. Mustafa Barghouti would receive 6% while all the other candidates would receive a total of 3% for all of them combined. 13% have not decided yet. The poll shows Abbas winning in the Gaza Strip (48% vs. 34% for Marwan Barghouti), but Marwan Barghouti wins in the West Bank (40% vs. 35% for Mahmud Abbas). These results represent the voting intentions of those planning to participate in the vote on January 9, 2005. The findings show that the level of non participation is going to be low (10%).
• Mahmud Abbas is seen as the candidate most capable of reaching a peace agreement with Israel, improving the economic conditions, and enforcing law and order. Marwan Barghouti is viewed as the candidate most capable of protecting the right of return. The public evaluation of the ability of the two candidates to maintain national unity and prevent internal infighting is similar for both.
• If Hamas nominates Mahmud Zahhar as its candidate in the presidential elections, 28% say they would vote for him. And if the competition for the presidency is between Zahhar, Abbas, and Marwan Barghouti, 34% prefer Barghouti, 29% Abbas, and 24% Zahhar. The overwhelming majority (83%) of those who selected one of the three believe that the person they have chosen would be able to lead the Palestinian people under the current conditions.
• 30% want to see Marwan Barghouti becoming the head of Fateh, while 26% want to see Mahmud Abbas and 7% want Farouq Qaddoumi as head of the movement. In the Gaza Strip, support for Abbas as head of Fateh reaches 31% (compared to 22% in the West Bank) and for Barghouti 28% (compared to 31% in the West Bank), and for Qaddoumi 5% (compared to 9% in the West Bank).
• The poll shows a significant increase in the popularity of Fateh from 29% last September to 40% in this poll. The increase is higher in the Gaza Strip, from 24% to 38%. The popularity of Hamas in the West Bankand the Gaza Strip combined drops from 22% last September to 18% in this poll. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ popularity drops from 30% to 22%. The total level of support for all Islamists (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) drops in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 32% to 24% during the same period.

(2) Israelis’ Assessments of the Coming Palestinian Elections

·        The Israeli public is following the coming elections in the Palestinian Authority (PA) with much curiosity and interest. While aware of Marwan Barghouti’s popularity in the Palestinian race, only 24% of the Israelis think that Barghouti should be released from prison if a compromise solution with the Palestinians necessitates it. 72% of the Israelis oppose such a step.

·        Three quarters of the Israeli public believe that orderly elections in the Palestinian Authority will be beneficial for Israel while only 12% believe they will be detrimental. 70% of the Israelis will see orderly elections in the Palestinian Authority as a step forward toward democracy there and 72% believe that a democratic Palestinian regime will increase the chances for peace.

·        More generally 81% of the Israeli public believe that major political reforms and greater democracy in the Palestinian Authority are important or very important for making progress in the peace process. However Israelis’ expectations that a democratic system will eventually be established in the Palestinian Authority or a future Palestinian State are quite low. 57% believe that the chances for this to happen are very slim or slim, 32% give it a medium chance and only 10% think it is highly probable. As to the current situation, about three quarters of the Israeli public think that the current state of democracy and human rights in the Palestinian Authority is bad or very bad.

(3) A Post Arafat Era

• Evaluating Arafat’s contribution to Palestinian society, over 80% of the Palestinians are satisfied with his contribution to promoting the status of the Palestinian cause, with his contribution to protecting Palestinian rights vis-à-vis Israel, and with his contribution in providing basic services such as health and education.  65% are satisfied with his contribution to democracy in the PA and with his contribution to instituting law and order. 54% are satisfied with his contribution to ending the Israeli occupation and 51% with his contribution to fighting corruption in the PA.
• In the post Arafat period, more Palestinians believe that the situation will be better rather than worse in the following areas: provision of basic services such as health and education, building public institutions able to enforce law and order, and building an Authority with democratic governance. More Palestinians believe that the situation will be worse rather than better after Arafat, when it comes to the areas of protecting Palestinian rights in negotiations with Israel, in promoting the international status of the Palestinian cause, and in fighting corruption in the PA. Palestinians are split half about the future being better or worse on the issue of ending the Israeli occupation.
• Half of the Palestinians expect Arafat’s death to weaken Fateh while one quarter expects it to strengthen Fateh.
• 72% believe that Arafat died of poison and most of those believing in this (64%) believe that Israel is the party responsible for the poisoning while 22% believe that a Palestinian party is responsible.

(4) Increased Realism and Cautious Hope among Israelis and Palestinians 

• ·        With Arafat’s departure from the scene and with the renewed political activity in the region, a sense of increased realism and cautious hope seems to settle in. 61% of the Israelis and 53% of the Palestinians believe that Arafat’s death increases the chances for reaching a political settlement in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, and only 7% of the Israelis and 23% of the Palestinians think the chances might decrease.
• ·         62% of the Israelis and 52% of the Palestinians believe that it is possible to negotiate now a compromise settlement with the other side’s current leadership. A majority in both publics (52% Israelis and 56% Palestinians) also believe that their current leadership is strong enough to convince its constituency to accept a compromise settlement. 68% of the Palestinians but only 30% of the Israelis believe that the other side’s leadership is strong enough to convince its own public. Israelis’ perceptions of the weakness of the current Palestinian leadership might explain the sharp increase in their willingness to negotiate also withHamas. 47% of the Israelis support negotiations also with Hamas if required to reach a compromise settlement, while 51% oppose it. This constitutes a sharp increase from March 2004 where only 20% thoughtIsrael should negotiate its withdrawal from the Gaza strip also with Hamas while 77% opposed it. Clearly, the recent decline in suicide bombings inside Israel, together with signs from Hamas that it may become a responsible political actor in the Palestinian Authority, are related to this significant change. Consistent with these accommodating positions, 89% of the Israelis and 80% of the Palestinians support a cease fire while 71% of the Israelis and 80% of the Palestinians support an immediate return to the negotiations table. 76% of Israelis and 83% of the Palestinians expect now negotiations to resume with or without some violence continuing, compared to 63% among Israelis and 72% among Palestinians who believed so in June 2004. This cautiously optimistic mood however is quite fragile and can easily collapse given the serious internal political challenges both leaderships face and the difficult issues they will soon have to face if negotiations resume.

(5) The Quartet’s Roadmap, Sharon’s Disengagement Plan and the Settlements

• ·        Support for the Quartet’s roadmap is basically stable with a slight increase since December 2002 soon after it has been made public. 63% of the Israelis and 59% of the Palestinians support it compared to 59% of Israelis and 54% of Palestinians who supported it in 2002. Moreover both sides have also become more optimistic about the ability to implement the roadmap after a period of increased doubts.  64% of the Israeli public and 48% of the Palestinian public now believe that the roadmap plan can still be implemented compared to only 43% Israelis and 28% Palestinians who believed so in June 2004.
• ·        Consistent with the support for the roadmap two thirds of the Israeli public also support the dismantling of most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, while 31% oppose such a step. These levels of support increased gradually since the beginning of the Intifada exceeding 60% since November 2002.
• ·         In the same vein, a majority of Israelis (62%) support Sharon’s disengagement plan, with 34% opposing it. Support for the plan has slightly decreased since June 2004 when it stood at 66%. The majority of Israelis (63%) also prefer to see the disengagement negotiated with the Palestinian Authority.
• ·        Once the disengagement takes place Israelis are split half about the Palestinian Authority’s capacity to control matters in the Gaza strip, but only 27% expect Palestinian internal fighting to happen in Gaza following the disengagement. Among Palestinians, 71% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Authority has a high or enough capacity to control matters in the Gaza Strip, but only 29% think it has high capacity and 59% are worried about internal Palestinian fighting after Israel’s disengagement.
• ·        The framing of intractable conflicts’ outcomes can play a part in their dynamics. It is thus important to track perceptions of such outcomes. Among Israelis, 42% see the disengagement plan as a Palestinian victory compared to 53% who reject this interpretation. Among Palestinians however 75% do see the disengagement plan as a Palestinian victory compared to only 23% who don’t see it as such. As to the ongoing conflict since the beginning of the Intifada, 55% of the Israelis and 44% of the Palestinians think that neither side came out a winner in the ongoing conflict and only smaller percentages think they won (35% Palestinians and 23% of the Israelis). Finally, 61% of the Israelis do not believe that the current Intifada has helped achieve Palestinian national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve, while 64% among Palestinians do believe that armed confrontations have helped them achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.
• ·        Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel drops from 54% last September to 49% in this poll. Opposition to such attacks increases from 44% to 48%. A majority of 58% says that it would support and 38% say it would oppose taking measures by the PA to prevent armed attacks against Israelis if an agreement on a mutual cessation of violence is reached. 82% support such an agreement on mutual cessation of violence.
•  

(6) Expected American Policy in President Bush second term

• ·        42% of the Israelis and 32% of the Palestinians believe that the reelection of Bush as US president for another four years will increase the chances for a political settlement of the conflict. 48% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians believe it will have no impact and 13% of the Israelis and 34% of the Palestinians believe it will decrease those chances.
• ·        As to the American support for Israel, 76% of the Palestinians and 41% among Israelis think that the second Bush administration will be more supportive of Israel during the next four years, 39% of Israelis and 12% of Palestinians believe there will be no change, and 13% of Israelis and 9% of Palestinians believe American support for Israel will decrease.

1. Peace Process

• Support for the peace process drops from 75% to 66% in two months
• Support for armed attacks against Israelis rises from 41% to 53%. Yet, in the light of the suspension of the Wye agreement, a majority of 60% still supports the continuation of political-diplomatic strategy while only a small minority of 14% supports return to Armed Struggle and 16% support return to Intifada
• Support for a unilateral declaration of statehood on May 4, 1999, rises from 46% to 57%
• A majority of 54% opposes the decision of the Palestinian National Council Conference to affirm amendment of the Charter while 37% support it
• 46% support suspension of implementation of Palestinian commitments in the Oslo and Wye agreements in response to Israel’s decision to suspend implementation of its commitments. But 44% support continuation of Palestinian implementation despite the Israeli decision
• A majority of 70% sees no difference between the three Israeli candidates: Netanyahu, Barak, and Shahak
• Only 38% see the ýClinton visit to Gaza as a signal of American recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, while 56% disagree with this view

The results of this survey show anger and frustration in the Palestinian street as a result of the Israeli decision to suspend the implementation of the Wye agreement. Support for the peace process has dropped to the pre Wye level (66%) after it had risen to 75% immediately after the signing of that agreement. Support for armed attacks against Israelis has increased significantly to 53%, a level higher than those recorded just before the signing of the agreement. Immediately after the Wye, support for violence dropped to 41%. The current level of support for violence is the highest since November 1994 when it stood at 57%.

The increase in the support for armed attacks does not mean that a majority of Palestinians is giving up on the political-diplomatic option. Sixty percent of all Palestinians support this choice, while only 14% support a return to “Armed Struggle,” and 16% support a return to Intifada. In other words, Palestinian public opinion supports the political approach and opposes the military one as matter of strategic choice; but, at the same time, it supports armed attacks as a tactic, as means of responding to Israeli intransigence and violation of peace agreements.

Support for the political-diplomatic approach is higher in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (56%), among women (66%) compared to men (55%), those with elementary education (66%) compared to holders of BA degrees (52%), and among supporters of Fateh (73%) compared to supporters of the PFLP (43%) and Hamas (45%).

Support for armed attacks is equally spread in the West Bank and Gaza, among residents of cities, villages, towns and refugee camps, among men and women, and across all age groups and educational levels. This means that contrary to previous findings, violence finds broad popular support reflecting the depth of anger in the street in response to what the Palestinians perceives as Israeli failure to honor peace commitments. Despite this, a gap in the level of support for violence still exists between supporters of the peace process such as those affiliated with Fateh (47%) and those who oppose it such as those affiliated with Hamas (76%) and the PFLP (70%).

The popular anger is also reflected in the demand of 46% of the respondents for the suspension of implementation of Palestinian commitments under the Oslo and Wye agreements as the most appropriate response to the Israel’s suspension of the implementation of its commitments under the Wye agreement. It is also reflected the decline of support for the amendment of the Palestinian charter. In June 1996, about 48% supported the decision of the Palestine National Council to amend the charter while only 32% opposed it. Today, support for the decision of the Palestinian National Council Conference, taken on December 14, 1998 in Gaza, to affirm the earlier amendment and Arafat’s letter in this regard, did not exceed 37% while a majority of 54% opposed it. The decrease in the level of support for the amendment reflects a move in the Palestinian street toward uncompromising positions in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in response to the policies of the Israeli right wing government.

Opposition to the amendment of the charter increases among men (59%) compared to women (49%), the young (58%) compared to the old (45%), holders of BA degree (65%) compared to illiterates (37%), students (68%) compared to housewives (46%) and farmers (45%), and among supporters of PFLP (75%) and Hamas (71%) compared to Fateh (44%).

One can also see the toughening of Palestinian positions in the large increase in support for the unilateral declaration of statehood on May 4, 1999 from 46% two months ago to 57% today. Support for postponement of the declaration until a Palestinian-Israeli agreement is reached dropped in the same period form 47% to 36%. Support for the unilateral declaration increases especially among men (62%) compared to women (52%). Not surprisingly however, support for the declaration is not spread along political affiliation lines as 60% of Fateh sympathizers and 57% of Hamas’ support it. Among PFLP sympathizers, however, support for the declaration reaches 79%. This finding indicates that the statehood issue is one in which national consensus is attainable.

Palestinian public opinion was not highly impressed by the Clinton visit to Gaza. A majority of 56% expressed the view that the visit did not signal an American shift toward recognition of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination while 38% believed that it did.

Furthermore, Palestinians are not looking forward to the results of the Israeli elections. A large majority of 70% sees no difference between the three Israeli candidates: Netanyahu, Barak and Shahak. Despite this some 17% still prefer a Barak-Labor government, while 4% prefer a Shahak-Center government, and 2% prefer a Netanyahu-Likud government. It is worth recalling that in March 1996, during the last Israeli election campaign, 40% of the Palestinians believed that a Labor-led government would be better for the Palestinians than a Likud-led government. At that time, only 43% saw no difference between Labor and Likud.

2. Public Perception of PNA Performance

• Positive evaluation of the performance of the PLC rises to 49%, cabinet to 49%, judicial system to 48%, security and police services to 56%, presidency to 56%, and opposition to 38%
• But positive evaluation of PNA performance regarding the latest Iraq-US confrontation does not exceed 39%

The results show a general increase in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian Authority. Positive evaluation of the performance of the PLC has increased from 39% two months ago to 49% today. The positive evaluation of the cabinet performance increased during the same period from 41% to 49%; the judicial system from 45% to 48%; security and police services from 51% to 56%; presidency from 55% to 56%; and opposition factions from 33% to37%. Generally, positive evaluation is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.

No significant changes have taken place in the performance of the Palestinian Authority during the past two months to justify the positive shift in public perception. It is more likely that the shift reflects internal solidarity and the strengthening of national motivation in face of Israeli intransigence and perceived Israeli increased hostility to the peace process in the aftermath of the suspension of the Wye agreement. The attention of the Palestinian street may have been diverted to the national political agenda away from the domestic one; thus it is showing more tolerance toward the failings of the PA.

The relatively positive evaluation of the performance of the government is not extended by the public to the PA performance pertaining to the latest Iraq-US confrontation. Only 39% of the respondents evaluated that performance positively. It is worth recalling that a much larger percentage of 62% evaluated positively the performance of the Palestinian government with regard to the March 1998 Iraqi-US crises.

3. Corruption

• Percentage of those who believe that corruption exits in PNA institutions increase to 68%
• Percentage of those who believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future increases to 65%
• Corruption exists in governmental offices and ministries according to 76% of the people, in security services according to 75%, in the PLC according to 43%, and in office of the presidency according to 43%

The results confirm the persistent alarming trend in the belief that corruption exists in PA institutions. The current level of 68% is the highest since September 1996 when the question was first asked. Two months ago it stood at 66% compared to 49% in September 1996. Moreover, the percentage of those who believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future increased to 65%, its highest level since September 1996 when it stood at 50%.

It is worth noting that the percentage of those believing that PA corruption exists is higher in the Gaza Strip despite that fact that Gazans give higher positive evaluation to PA performance. This finding may point out to the existence of separation in the public perception, especially in the Gaza Strip, between PA performance on the one hand, and the existence of corruption in the PA on the other. The street may not necessarily be blaming all corruption on the PA. It is also possible that stronger national solidarity and heightened threat perception, in the wake of current Israeli policy, is causing people to evaluate general PA performance more positively but causing the opposite with regard to corruption. The separation between performance and corruption is sharpest when it comes to security forces. While 75% of the people believe that corruption exists in police and security services, 56% give positive evaluation to their performance. Similarly, 76% believe that corruption exists in PA ministries; 49% believe that it exists in the PLC; and 43% believe that it exists in the president office.

4. The Status of Palestinian Democracy

• Positive evaluation for Palestinian democracy does not exceed 32% compared to 75% for Israeli democracy, 67% for American democracy, 30% for Jordanian democracy, and 26% for Egyptian democracy
• A majority of 53% believe that people can not criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear

Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy stands today at 32%, while 53% believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear. These results show an improvement in public perception compared to the situation two months ago when Palestinian democracy received a positive evaluation of 27%. But it represents a continuation of a negative trend recorded since April 1997 when the evaluation stood at 50%. In comparison, positive evaluation of Israeli and American democracies increased to 75% and 67% respectively, while remaining almost unchanged with regard to Jordan’s (30%) and Egypt’s (26%).

The increase in the positive evaluation of the Israeli and American democracies might be understandable in light of recent developments in these two countries. The fall of government through parliamentary vote in Israel and role of Congress in the process of the impeachment of the American president create perception of dynamic democracies. But the relative increase in positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy can not be attributed to similar developments. It might instead be a reflection of a need for internal national solidarity in the face of Israeli recent policies as mentioned above.

5. Elections for the PNA President and Vice-president, and Political Affiliation

• For the presidency: Yassir Arafat receives 47% of the votes, Ahmad Yasin 12%, and Haidar Abdul Shafi 10%
• In a competition for the vice-presidency among eight candidates: Haidar Abdul Shafi receives 17%, Faisal Hussieni and Sa’eb Erikat 8% each, Mahmoud Abbas 7%, Ahmad Qurie’, Farouq Qaddoumi, and Hanan Ashrawi 6% each, and Nabil Sha’ath 3%
• In a competition for the vice-presidency among four candidates only: Haidar Abdul Shafi receives 38%, Sa’eb Erikat 21%, Faisal Hussieni 18%, and Hanan Ashrawi 13%
• Fateh receives the support of 40% of the Palestinians, Hamas 11% (rising to 16% in Gaza), PFLP 5%, and the non-affiliated reach 37%

The results reflect a slight increase in the popularity of Yassir Arafat from 45% two months ago to 47% today. Arafat’s popularity is higher in the Gaza Strip (53%) compared to the West Bank (43%). This difference has been noticed in previous polls and may be attributed to the appreciation Gazans have for Arafat for making the Gaza Strip a headquarter for the PA. Other candidates received slightly more votes than the last poll conducted two months ago. Ahmad yasin received 12% and Haidar Abdul Shafi received 10%.

In a competition for the office of vice-president between eight candidates, Haidar Abdul Shafi received the largest number of votes (17%). Two months ago, Abdul Shafi received 10% only. The increase is probably attributed to a technical change. In previous polls, the question about a vote for the vice-president came after a question about a vote fore the president. Since Abdul Shafi was a candidate for the two offices, some of those who voted for him as a president did not vote for him as a vice-president. In this poll, the question about a vote for the vice president came before the question about a vote for the president. The popularity of the other candidates in the list of eight remained basically unchanged with Sa’eb Erikat and Faisal Hussieni receiving 8% each, Mahmoud Abbas 7%, Ahmad Qurei’ , Farouq Qaddoumi, and Hanan Ahsrawi 6% each, and Nabil Sha’ath 3%.

In a competition for the office of the vice-president between four candidates, Haidar Abdul Shafi received the largest number of votes (38%) followed by Sa’eb Erikat (21%), Faisal Hussieni (18%), and Hanan Ashrawi (13%). These names in the list of four were the only names given to the respondents when asked this question. The West Bank gave Abdul Shafi the largest number of votes (32%) as did the Gaza Strip (45%). Erikat received 26% of the West Bank vote and 16% of the Gaza vote, while Hussieni recived 20% of the West Bank vote and 17% of the Gaza vote.

Haidar Abdul Shafi received the largest number of votes even among supporters of Fateh (28%) followed by Erikat with 26% of Fateh’s vote, Hussieni with 24%, and Ashrawi with 13%.

Fateh remained the largest faction with 40% of the vote, followed by Hamas with 11%. Hamas’ support in Gaza, however, increased significantly from 11% two months ago to 16% in this survey. The popularity of the PFLP rose from 3% to 5% during the same period. The non-affiliated remained stable at 37%...More

07-14 October 2003

These are the results of opinion poll # 9, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 07-14 October 2003. The poll deals with Arafat’s popularity and other domestic issues, peace and security, public perception of the United States, and local elections. The total sample size of this poll is 1318 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face in West Bank (823) and in Gaza Strip (495), in 120 locations. The margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa at Tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org 

SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

The results of this poll point to a degree of contradictions in Palestinian public attitudes toward domestic political issues as well as issues of peace and security. The results show a large increase in Arafat’s popularity not seen during the last five years. They also show widespread support for his decision to declare a state of emergency and to appoint Ahmad Qurai’ as a prime minister. In addition, 60% support placing all Palestinian security services under the control of a national security council headed by Arafat. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians believe the increase in support for Arafat is due to Sharon’s recent threats against him. Moreover, more than 90% still support internal and external calls for extensive political reforms in the PA and 82% still believe that corruption exists in the PA.

In the realm of peace and security, the findings show widespread support, reaching 75%, for the suicide attack at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, where 20 Israelis were killed. More than two thirds believe that the Roadmap is dead and 78% believe that current Israeli measures, including the building of the separation wall, reduces that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the future. Nonetheless, almost two thirds support a return to the Hunda, 85% support mutual cessation of violence, and, for the first time since the establishment of the PA, 59% support taking measures to prevent attacks on Israelis after reaching an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. Furthermore, about two thirds still support a solution based on two states: Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Main Results:

(1) Arafat and Palestinian Domestic Conditions:

• Arafat’s popularity increases from 35% last June to 50% in this poll. This is his highest level of support in five years.
• About 80% of Palestinians believe that Arafat has become stronger and more popular due to Israeli threat to expel or assassinate him.
• Two thirds support Arafat’s declaration of state of emergency while 26% oppose it
• 61% support the appointment of Ahmad Qurai (Abu Ala’) as prime minister and 27% oppose it, but only 48% are willing, and 37% unwilling, to give confidence to his government.
• 60% support placing all Palestinian security services under the command of a national security council headed by Arafat.
• 46% believe that Abu Ala’ and his government will be more capable than Abu Mazin and his government in dealing with Arafat and the presidency; only 12% believe in the opposite.
• But only 22% believe that Abu Ala’ and his government will be more capable than Abu Mazin and his government in reaching an agreement with Israel; 23% believe in the opposite.
• While 62% believe that Abu Ala’ and his government will be able to return to negotiations with Israel, only 33% believe they will be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire. 44% believe they will be able to carry out political reforms.
• Fall of Abu Mazin and his government is the equal responsibility of Arafat and Israel (27% each). Only 17% put the blame on Abu Mazin himself.
• 32% are satisfied with the reform steps taken by Abu Mazin and 54% are not satisfied
• 90% support internal and external calls for extensive political reforms.
• 82% believe there is corruption in the PA and 71% believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.
• Popularity of Fateh increases slightly from 26% last June to 28% in this poll. Hamas’ popularity remains almost unchanged (21%). Total support for Islamists reaches 29% compared to 31% last June.
• Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular Palestinian figure for the position of vice president 17%, followed by Abdul Aziz Rantisi (14% compared to 3% in an open-ended question last June), Sa’eb Erikat (9%), Ahmad Yasin and Haidar Abdul Shafi (7% each), Farouq Qaddoumi and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), Ahmad Quarie’ (4%), Mohammad Dahlan (2%), and Mahmoud Abbas (1%).

One of the main results of this poll is the large increase in Arafat’s popularity rising to 50%. This is the highest level of support for Arafat in five years. Arafat’s popularity stood at 35% last June, which is the average percentage for Arafat’s popularity during the three years of the intifada. The majority of the Palestinian public (79%) believes that the Israeli threats to expel or assassinate Mr. Arafat has made him stronger and more popular. The findings also show that Arafat’s decisions to declare a state of emergency, appoint Ahmad Quarai’ (Abu Ala’) as prime minister, and to put the security services under the control of a national security council headed by Mr. Arafat enjoy popular support (66%, 61%, and 60% respectively).

But the street is reluctant to support Abu Ala’s government, with only 48% willing to give it a vote of confidence. In a comparison between Abu Ala’ and his government and Abu Mazin and his government, regarding the ability to deal with Arafat and the office of the presidency, the street tends to believe that Abu Ala is better able to do so. When it comes to reaching an agreement with Israel, the street sees no difference between the two.

Despite the increase in support for Arafat, the overwhelming majority (90%) still supports internal and external calls for wide scale political reforms in the PA and 82% still believes that corruption exists in the PA.

No important change has taken place in the domestic balance of power compared to the situation last June. Fateh’s popularity increased slightly from 26% to 28% and the total for the Islamists decreased from 31% to 29% during the same period. Marwan Barghouti, at 17%, remains the most popular candidate for the office of the prime minister despite the drop from his June’s 21%. But the most dramatic development has been the increase in the popularity of Abdul Aziz Rantisi, one of the main Hamas leaders, rising to 14% compared to 3% in an open-ended question last June. The increase in the popularity of Rantisi may reflect the public response to repeated Israeli attempt to assassinate him.

Arafat’s popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (47%), in refugee camps (54%) compared to villages and towns (48%), among the illiterates and those with elementary education (66% and 56% respectively) compared to holders of BA degree (44%), among housewives (54%) compared to students (43%), among those employed in the public sector (59%) compared to those in the private sector (42%), among the most religious men (55%), (with religiosity measured by the number of praying time in mosques) compared to the least religious men (37%), among those with the lowest income (51%) compared to those with the highest income (33%), and among supporters of Fateh (81%) compared to supporters of Hamas (30%).

Support for Abu Ala’, as a prime minister, increases in villages and cities (64% and 63% respectively) compared to refugee camps (53%), among the old (68%) compared to the young (54%), among the illiterates (70%) compared to holders of BA degree (56%), among merchants and housewives (68% and 65% respectively) compared to students (50%), among the least religious men (63%) compared to most religious (56%), and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (48%).

(2) Peace and Security:

• 75% support the suicide attack at Maxim Restaurant in Haifa leading to the death of 20 Israelis.
• 78% believe that current Israeli measures, including the building of the separation wall, reduce the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the future.
• But 64% still support a two-state solution (Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), while only 12% support a one-state solution (for Palestinians and Israelis). 21% want all Palestine back to the Palestinians.
• Percentage of those believing that armed confrontations will not stop and negotiations will not resume soon increases from 24% last June to 39% in this poll. 46% (compared to 56% last June) believe that the two sides will return to negotiations while some violence will continue.
• 68% believe that the roadmap is dead, but 28% believe that it can still be implemented
• 64% want a return to the Hudna that prevailed few weeks ago while 34% oppose it; but 85% (compared to 80% last June) support a mutual cessation of violence while only 14% oppose it.
• If an agreement is reached on a mutual cessation of violence, 59% (compared to 50% last June) would support taking measures by the PA to prevent attacks on Israelis.
• Despite the widespread support for the Hudna and the mutual cessation of violence, 58% would still support Hamas’ decision to oppose the ceasefire.
• 59% believe that current armed confrontations have helped the Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. In June, 65% shared that belief.

The findings indicate a high degree of pessimism regarding the chances for peace, with two thirds believing that the Roadmap has collapsed while more than three quarters believing that the Israeli measures in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including the building of the separation wall, reduces the chance for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the future. Moreover, the percentage of those believing that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations increases from 24% in June to 39% in this poll. The percentage of those believing that the two sides will return to negotiations and confrontations will stop decreased from 17% to 10% during the same period. This may explain why such a high percentage (75%) supports the suicide bombing attack at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa in which 20 Israelis were killed. It may also explain whey a majority of 58% would support Hamas’ opposition to a ceasefire.

Despite the pessimism and the high level of support for violence, the findings show an additional side to the Palestinian street, one that fully supports a mutual cessation of violence (85%) while a majority (64%) supports a return to the Hudna that prevailed few weeks ago. More importantly, an unprecedented majority of 59% now supports taking measures by the PA to prevent attacks on Israelis once the two sides reach an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. Despite the continued buildup of the separation wall, a majority of 64% still supports a solution based on a two-state solution, while only 12% support a one-state solution, and 21% support a solution that would restore all of historic Palestine to the Palestinians.

Support for the bombing attack at the Maxim restaurant increases in the Gaza Strip (82%) compared to the West Bank (70%), in refugee camps (84%) compared to towns and villages (69%), among women (79%) compared to men (71%), among the young (78%) compared to the old (66%), among students (81%) compared to professionals (33%), and among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fateh (69%).

Support for the two-state (Palestine-Israel) solution increases in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (61%), among the old (69%) compared to the young (52%), among the illiterates (70%) compared to holders of BA degree (59%), among the professionals (72%) compared to students (48%), among married persons (66%) compared to the unmarried (53%), and among supporters of Fateh (74%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%).

(3) Perceptions of the US:

• 96% believe that the US is not sincere when it says it works toward the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
• 92% believe that the US is not sincere when it says it wants political reforms and clean government in the PA.
• 78% believe the US is not serious in its declared opposition to the Israeli decision to expel or assassinate President Yasir Arafat.
• 97% believe the current US policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is biased in favor of Israel.
• But Palestinian evaluation of the current US conditions and policies varies on case by case basis. For example, positive evaluation reaches 85% when evaluating American medicine, science, and technology, and reaches 74% when evaluating the status of gender equality, and 63% when evaluating the status of US economic conditions. Positive evaluation drops to 53% with regards to arts and entertainment, 53% with regard to freedom of press and expression, and 44% to democracy and respect for human rights. Positive evaluation drops further when it comes to treatment of minorities (17%), respect for religious freedom (27%), or foreign policy (23%).

The findings show a clear lack of trust in the US policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli issue. But Palestinians show a positive evaluation of American values and achievements. For example, almost all Palestinians (97%) believe the US policy is biased in favor of Israel, while 96% believe the US is not sincere when it says it is working toward the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the Palestinians believes the US is not sincere in its position toward Palestinian political reform and that it is not serious about its opposition to the Israeli decision to expel or assassinate Yasir Arafat.

On the other hand, the Palestinians tend to give a positive evaluation to US achievements in medicine, science, and technology (85%), US gender equality (74%), arts and entertainment (53%), and freedom of the press (53%). Positive evaluation drops when it comes to democracy and human rights (44%), religious freedom (27%), foreign policy (23%), and treatment of minorities (17%).

It is clear that the US response to 11 September has affected Palestinian evaluation of internal American conditions regarding human rights, religious freedom and treatment of minorities especially Arabs and Muslims. The Bush Administration’s support for Israeli assassination and incursion policy may have contributed to the clear distrust in the USintentions in the peace process. While half of the Palestinians were convinced last June the belief that President Bush was determined to implement the Roadmap and move the peace process forward, this conviction has completely disappeared in this poll.

(4) Municipal Elections:

• 60% support holding local elections today, but 32% support the continued functioning of the appointed local councils due to existing conditions
• If elections are held today, 61% oppose holding them piecemeal, wherever possible, and demand holding them in all areas at once
• 80% support the direct election of the head of the local council by the voters while 18% support the election of the council head by the elected members of the council
• 67% support the participation of refugee camps located inside cities in the local elections while 25% support independent elections of local camp committees
• 42% give a positive evaluation for the work of the local councils in their areas; 46% believe these councils does represent the majority of the residents while 47% believes that they do not.
• If elections take place today, 33% would vote for the current local council in their area
• If elections take place today, 70% would participate
• Despite the support for local elections and despite the high level of readiness to participate, 51% believe that if local elections are held today, they would not be honest while only 38% believe they would be.
• 80% say they would vote for the candidate in accordance with their knowledge of the candidate’s positions, ethics, and qualifications, while 11% say they would vote for the candidate chosen by the family or tribe. In all cases, 81% say they would vote that candidate even if it turns out to be a woman. 16% say they would not vote for a woman candidate.

The findings show a majority of 60% in support of holding local elections today, while a third of the public supports, due to current conditions, the continued functioning of the existing PA-appointed councils. If a decision is made to hold elections now, a majority of 61% would oppose holding them piecemeal, wherever possible, and would insist on holding them simultaneously in all Palestinian areas. Two thirds of the public support the participation of the residents of refugee camps that are located within the municipal boundaries of existing cities, while 25% support holding separate elections for independent camp committees. There are no differences between refugees and non-refugees regarding the inclusion of the refugee camps in the municipal elections. But in refugee camps, support for the participation of refugee camp residents in the local elections decreases to 58% while support for separate elections for camp committees increases to 36%. The opposition to refugee camp participation in local elections does not exceed 5% among the public at large and among the residents of the camps. The findings also show that the overwhelming majority (80%) supports the direct elections of council heads, while only 18% support the election of the council heads by elected council members.

If local elections are held today, 70% say they would participate in them. When participating, 80% say they would vote for based on their knowledge of the candidate’s positions, ethics, and qualifications. 11% say they would vote for the candidate chosen by their family while only 6% say they would for the candidate chosen by their political party or faction. In all cases, an overwhelming majority (81%) says that it would vote for its preferred candidate even if it was a woman.

Despite the fact that a majority supports holding local elections today, and despite the fact that a large percentage is ready to participate in them if held today, confidence in the honesty of such elections is not high, not exceeding 38% while 51% say they would not be honest. Perhaps the reason for demanding elections now despite the lack of confidence in their honesty is the belief of almost half of the public (47%) that the current appointed councils do not represent the majority of the residents in their areas while only 46% believe that they do indeed represent the majority of the residents. Moreover, the percentage of the positive evaluation of the performance of the appointed local councils does not exceed 42%. In case local elections are held today, only 33% would vote the current heads of their local councils....Full Report

This is the thirteenth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The following topics are covered in this poll: unemployment, the Jordanian-Israeli treaty, armed operations, Palestinian-Israeli relations, elections of the PNA president, and elections of PISGA.

SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. In a broader sense, CPRS strives to promote the status of scientific research in Palestine. SRU disseminates the results of the polls through a number of means, including its community outreach program where the results are shared and discussed with a large number of Palestinians.

The majority (74.2%) of the interviews for this poll were conducted Thursday and Friday (November 17-18) and before the violent confrontations in Gaza after Friday prayers between the Palestinian police and demonstrators from Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The remainder of the interviews (25.8%) were conducted after the confrontations, on Saturday, November 19. These confrontations led to the killing of fifteen Palestinians and the wounding of over two hundred more. It was difficult for us to measure possible changes in attitudes as a result of the confrontations in Gaza because the questionnaire was not designed to measure these changes. However, a comparison of the two sets of interviews (conducted before and after the Friday confrontations) revealed that there was no appreciable difference between them.

Enclosed are the results of the most recent public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank (including Arab Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (see Appendix).

General Background

The period preceding the poll was full of political activity, which could be summarized as follows:

1. Izzidin al-Qassam, the military wing of Hamas, declared its responsibility for a number of armed operations against Israeli targets, including the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Naschon Wachsman where the kidnappers demanded the release of a number of Hamas prisoners and other Palestinians in Israeli jails. One of Hamas' supporters carried out a suicide bombing of an Israeli bus in Tel Aviv, killing 22 Israelis and wounding many more. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for an armed operation in Gaza that led to the death of three Israeli army officers and the wounding of another six soldiers and a few Palestinians. A Palestinian journalist and Islamic Jihad leader was assasinated by a car bomb. Israelis were suspected of carrying out the attack. Ten thousand Palestinians attended his funeral in Gaza.
2. The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was signed, which increased tensions between the Palestinian and Jordanian sides because of fears concerning the subject of sovereignty over the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, where the treaty gives Jordan the right of supervision over these sites. King Hussein and His Highness Hassan assured the Palestinians that the Muslim holy sites would come under their sovereignty as soon as they restored their sovereignty over their land.
3. November 15th marked the sixth anniversary of the Declaration of Palestinian Independence. A number of celebrations were taking place, especially in Gaza. At the same time, the PLO executive committee was supposed to meet in Gaza. The meeting was attended by only eight members out of the eighteen.
4. Negotiations continued between the Palestinians and the Israelis concerning the transfer of power and responsibilities and also concerning elections. At the same time Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin announced that Israel demands amending the Palestinian National Charter as a prerequisite to holding elections. Mr. Saeb Erakat and other Palestinian leaders described the latest position of Rabin as stalling, aimed at obstructing elections and transfer of authority to the Palestinians. Also during this period the Palestinians assumed their responsibilities at the border crossings.
5. During this period, an economics conference was held for the Middle East and North Africa with the participation of a number of states and organizations and companies. Palestinian and Israeli delegations participated in the conference. The conference coincided with a declaration presented by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin lifting the closure of the West Bank and Gaza to allow some Palestinians workers to return to jobs in Israel, while still prohibiting the majority of the Palestinian workers from working in Israel.
6. The delay in delivering the funding on the part of the donor countries to the Palestinian Authority caused concern to the Palestinian leadership and other leaders in Arab countries. For example, the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, said that the West Bank and Gaza Strip will become another Afghanistan if funding did not reach the autonomous areas in time.
7. There were numerous calls for dialogue and national unity presented by the leadership of the Palestinian authority and the opposition, especially Hamas.
8. During this period, the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron was re-opened. The mosque had been closed since the massacre which took place February 25, 1994. The mosque was divided between the Muslims and the Jews, a procedure which Palestinians and other Arabs opposed.
9. This period witnessed the beginning of internal Fateh elections, where elections were actually held to choose the leadership in the Ramallah area. However, after these elections, the elections for the other areas were postponed indefinitely.
10. Cholera was resported in Gaza which affected a number of Palestinians.... More

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the reversal of PA’s May 2020 decision to end security and civil coordination with Israel and the resumption of that coordination, the election of Joe Biden as president of the US, the signing of a normalization agreement between Sudan and Israel, and the failure of Palestinian reconciliation efforts to reach an agreement on holding Palestinian elections. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2020 show a majority is opposed to the PA leadership decision to resume coordination with Israel. Yet, they also show that this opposition is not strong and that it is in fact closer to a split between support and opposition. Even when it comes to security coordination with Israel, attitudes reflect an almost even split. Nonetheless, the findings paint a dark public assessment of Palestinian conditions in light of the return to coordination with Israel. The majority believes that Israel is the one to came out a winner from this political battle over coordination and that the Palestinian side is the one that paid the heavy price for engaging in it. Moreover, the overwhelming majority believes Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its commitments under signed agreement; indeed, this overwhelming majority thinks Israel has not abandoned its annexation plans for the Jordan Valley and West Bank settlements. On top of all that, the public thinks that the resumption of coordination will lead to greater Arab 

normalization with Israel, greater settlement expansion, and greater chances for annexation while at the same time diminishing the chances for reconciliation and the holding of elections. But the majority does express satisfaction with the resumption of coordination in the health sector; expects Israelis and Palestinians to resume negotiations; and a large minority expects an improvement in economic conditions.

The optimism about a resumption of negotiations seems linked more to public belief that the electoral victory of Joe Biden in the US elections will lead to an improvement in Palestinian-American relations. Similarly, the expectations about improved economic conditions seem to reflect the belief of two thirds of the public that the Biden Administration will resume financial aid to the PA. Despite the fact that the majority of the public does not expect Biden to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century, or reverse the decision to transfer the US embassy to Jerusalem, a clear majority is in favor of resuming dialogue with the new administration.

Yet, despite the optimism generated by the election of Biden, support for the two-state solution remains low, unchanged from September. Moreover, three quarters do not expect the creation of a Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years, and the majority thinks the two-state solution is no longer practical or realistic because of settlement expansion. Nonetheless, we see in this poll an increase in the percentage of those who prefer to reach a peace agreement with Israel compared to three months ago while the percentage of those who prefer waging an armed struggle against occupation declines during the same period. Still, the largest percentage of the public views armed struggle as the most effective means of ending occupation.

On domestic condition, findings show that the percentage of those demanding the resignation of president Abbas has increased to two-thirds despite the fact that the balance between Hamas and Fatah support remains unchanged compared to the previous six months. Findings show that three quarters  of the public demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections but only a third or less expects the PA to hold them. If elections are held under current conditions, findings show a sharp split among Fatah voters: the largest percentage of them is more likely to vote for an independent list formed by Marwan Barghouti than for an official Fatah list formed by Abbas and the Fatah leadership. Moreover, if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, he is more likely to take away from the official Fatah list about one fifth of Fatah voters, particularly in the Gaza Strip.

Finally, findings show that only half of the public is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine, when available, while the other half refuses to take it. 

(1) The resumption of PA coordination with Israel:

• A large minority of 44% (54% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) supports, and 53% oppose the decision by the PA leadership to resume civil and security coordination with Israel.
• When asked specifically about security coordination, 41% agreed, and 38% disagreed, with the statement that security coordination should be stopped even if it leads Israel to stop the transfer of clearance funds thereby stopping salary payment to PA employees; 18% said they neither agree nor disagree with the statement.
• A majority of 56% believes there is little or no chance the PA will reverse its decision and once again suspend security coordination with Israel; 13% think the chances of PA doing so are high or very high.
• A majority of 53% says that Israel came out the winner from the PA decision to stop and then resume coordination with Israel; only 9% think the PA came out a winner; 13% think both sides came out winners; and 22% think neither side came out a winner.
• A majority of 60% believes the Palestinians have paid a heavier price for stopping civil and security coordination with Israel while only 12% think Israel paid a heavier price.
• The overwhelming majority (82%) says that Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its signed commitments with the PA despite the written letter submitted to the PA; only 14% think Israel has indeed agreed to honor its commitments.  
• Even if Israel agreed to honor its commitment to signed agreements with the PA, the overwhelming majority (89%) believes Israel will not in fact abide by such commitment; only 8% think Israel will abide by these commitments.
• Similarly, 87% believe that Israel has not abandoned its plan for the annexation of the Jordan Valley and the West Bank settlements; 8% think it has.
• Now, after the resumption of coordination with Israel, 43% expect, and 55% do not expect, an improvement in economic conditions.
• But two thirds (67%) expect, and 28% do not expect, the return of the Palestinian and Israeli sides to the negotiating table.
• A majority of 61% expects the resumption of coordination with Israel to lead to an increase in normalization agreements between Arab countries and Israel; 68% expect it to lead to greater settlement expansion; and 54% expect it to lead to greater chances for Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and the settlements in the West Bank.
• On the domestic implication of the resumption of coordination with Israel, 57% expect it to diminish the chances for reconciliation and the largest percentage (44%) expects it to diminish the chances for holding general Palestinian elections.
• But 60% are satisfied, and 36% are dissatisfied, with the resumption of PA coordination with Israel on health issues and the combating of the coronavirus pandemic.
• If Israel transfers partial clearance funds to the PA, the largest percentage (35%) thinks the PA should accept it and take Israel to the International Court of Justice to demand the rest of the funds; 28% say the PA should accept the partial transfer; and only 34% say the PA should not accept the partial transfer.

(2) Expectations from the Biden Administration and attitudes regarding resumption of Palestinian-American dialogue:

• Now that Biden has won the US presidential elections, a majority of 58% expects, and 36% do not expect, an improvement in Palestinian-American relations.
• In fact, two-thirds (68%) expect the new US administration to resume economic aid to the PA and 52% expect it to allow the reopening of PLO diplomatic mission in the US capital.
• Yet, only 37% expect the Biden Administration to re-open the US consulate in East Jerusalem; 29% expect it to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century; 26% expect it to relocate the US embassy to Tel Aviv; and 22% expect it to reverse the decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
• At the regional level, a large minority of 42% expects, and 46% do not expect, the new US administration to recommit itself to the nuclear deal with Iran.
• A majority of 59% supports and 36% oppose the resumption of Palestinian dialogue with the US under the new administration.
• But only 44% think, and 49% do not think, Palestinians should return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership.

(3) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 40% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  
• A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 34% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 38% of the public while 29% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 19% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 35% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 39% chose armed struggle, 35% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 41% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices, 68% supported joining more international organizations; 63% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 44% supported dissolving the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis.

(4) Taking the Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• Only half of the public (50%) is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine when it is available and the other half refuses to take it.
• Half of the public (50%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to contain the spread of coronavirus pandemic and 48% are dissatisfied.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 53% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 45% today compared to 48% three months ago and 62% six months ago.
• The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 73% say their income or salary has been reduced; 62% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 54% say they stopped working or became unemployed.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• Three quarters demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections; but only 32% expect such elections to be held soon in the Palestinian territories.
• Among those who demand the holding of elections, the majority (55%) says it should be for simultaneous legislative and presidential elections with no separation between them; 22% prefer holding simultaneous legislative and presidential elections but are not opposed to separating the two by holding them at different dates; and 21% prefer holding legislative elections first followed few months later by presidential elections. A majority of 56% supports, and 39% oppose, holding general elections if Israel does not allow holding them in East Jerusalem.
• We asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 46% three months ago).
• If legislative elections are held today, 38% expect Fatah to win; 25% expect Hamas to win; 23% expect third parties and new lists that are unknow today to win.
• If Marwan Barghouti forms an electoral list independent of the official Fatah list formed by Abbas and Fatah leadership, 25% of the entire public say they would vote for this Barghouti list; only 19% say they would in this case vote for Fatah’s official list. But if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, only 7% of the entire public (mostly in the Gaza Strip) would vote for his list while 27% would vote for the official Fatah list.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 43% and the latter 50% of the vote (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 39% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 42% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 47% and the latter 47%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 41% and Haniyyeh 51%. 
• 66% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 30% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 61% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 37% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• We asked, in a close-ended question, about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 23% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (2% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Salam Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouti by 3% each. 
• If Fatah nominates Abbas as its candidate for the presidential elections, a majority of 52% of the public would view him as the wrong choice believing that Fatah has other better candidates; only 25% of the public think his is the best Fatah candidate. When asked to name a better candidate, 42% selected Marwan Barghouti, 10% selected Mohammad Dahlan, and 7% selected Mohammad Shtayyeh.  
• The largest percentage (28%) says that the top priority for Palestinian elections should be to restore unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 24% say it is improving economic conditions; 18% say it is the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip; 15% say it is to fight corruption; 6% say it is to bring back democracy; and another 6% say it is to strengthen resistance to occupation.
• 52% say if elections are held today under current conditions, they will not be fair and free; 41% do not agree with that.  Moreover, 76% think that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah will not accept the results and 58% think if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will not accept the results.

(6) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 72% and in the West Bank at 54%.
• 28% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 38% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 24% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and only 25% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. Three months ago, 80% expressed a similar view. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, only 63% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions.
• 45% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 54% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas authorities without fear and 46% think they cannot.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 55% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 62% viewed the PA as a burden.
• A year and nine months since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 66% expect failure; only 27% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 35% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 22%, followed by Palestine TV, Al Aqsa TV, and Maan TV at 12% each, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 5% each, and finally al Manar at 1%.  

(7) Reconciliation: 

• An overwhelming majority (77%) thinks the reconciliation efforts are not serious and insufficient.
• Only 29% are optimistic and 68% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 37%.

(8) The Arab Peace Initiative, Arab normalization with Israel, and Arab visits to Jerusalem: 

• Three quarters of the public (75%) believe the Arab Peace Initiative is a thing of the past while 19% think it remains standing.
• 81% expect Saudi Arabic will soon join the Arab normalization train while 15% do not expect that.
• Only 11% believe that Arab normalization agreements help in resolving the conflict with Israel while 57% think they cause damage to the efforts to resolve the conflict.
• 29% say they are for and 69% say they are against visits from Arab countries, particularly from the Gulf, to East Jerusalem and for praying at Al Aqsa Mosque. But a majority of 52% says that these visitors should be allowed to pray at the mosque or should be left alone without interference.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and an identical percentage (13%) believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 29%, the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 26%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 20%,  the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 11%.

 Joint Poll in year 2017:

• A majority of Israelis and just under half of Palestinians still support the two state solution in principle, but under half on both sides support the detailed framework for its implementation.  However, despite mutual fear, distrust and pessimism regarding the likelihood and feasibility of the two-state solution, a majority of Palestinians and Israelis may support comprehensive peace agreement that ends the conflict if offered additional symbolic or concrete incentives

 Joint Poll in year 2016:

• A slight majority of Israelis and Palestinians support the two-state solution. However, they do not trust each other, have disparate views on the terms of a permanent settlement, underestimate the level of compromise on the other side, and view its intentions as threatening. Nonetheless, at least a quarter of the opposition to a permanent settlement on both sides is flexible and it is likely that its opinion might be changed with the right incentives.
   

 Joint Poll in year 2015:

 In the past year, support for the two state solution decreases among Palestinians and Israelis; today only 51% on each side support it. Meanwhile, each side continues to view the intentions of the other as posing an existential threat.   - _{2-14 June 2015
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  Joint Poll in year 2014:  

 Joint Poll in year 2013:

• The majority of Israelis (63%) and of Palestinians (53%) support the two-state solution. However, the mutual threat perceptions are very high and 83% of Palestinians and 55% of Israelis feel threatened by the intentions of other side. - 13 - 16  December  2013 
   
•  Despite the launching of the efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and the modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative (API) accepting minor territorial swaps, both sides display pessimism regarding the peace process and Israeli support for the API drops - 13 - 16 June 2013 

 Joint Poll in year 2012:

• Given the outcome of the Israeli operation in Gaza and the UN recognition of a Palestinian state, Palestinians move towards Hamas’ over Abbas’s way, whereas Israelis stand steadfast in their evaluations and preferences. - December 2012 
   
• Around 80% of Palestinians and of Israelis think that if Israel were to carry out a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, a major regional war will erupt. However a majority of Israelis do not believe that Israel will strike and the climate of opinion is against it - September 2012 
   
• Israelis are split and Palestinians oppose a new Israeli unilateral plan designed to encourage settlers to move back to Israel in order to bolster the two-state solution and the Israeli government’s ability to reach a peace solution with the Palestinians. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians think that the plan is likely to be implemented by the Netanyahu government - June 2012 
   
• In the aftermath of the exploratory talks in Amman, Israelis reject Palestinians’ conditions for returning to negotiations, and Palestinians oppose returning to negotiations unconditionally- March 2012 

 Joint Poll in year 2011:

• Increase in Palestinians’ and Israelis’ willingness to compromise amidst climate of feud and mistrust - December 2011 
   
• Over 80% of the Palestinians support turning to the UN to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state. About 70% of Israelis think that if the UN recognizes a Palestinian state Israel should accept the decision - September 2011 
   
• Palestinians are determined to go to the UN in September and not to return to negotiations with Netanyahu, in line with Israelis’ expectations - June 2011
   
• In the backdrop of the demonstrations in the Arab world, neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider such demonstrations to be capable of ending occupation in the West Bank - 6 April 2011 

 Joint Poll in year 2010:

• A majority of Israelis opposes intolerant steps toward Arab citizens. Palestinians incorrectly believe that the majority of Israeli Jews supports such steps  December 2010
   
• PALESTINIANS BELIEVE THEY ARE OF GREATER NEED OF SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ISRAELIS THINK BOTH SIDES NEED IT EQUALLY, BUT BOTH PUBLICS ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THEIR SUCCESS. October 2010 
   
• Despite the Gaza Flotilla incident, Rise in Willingness to compromise among Palestinians and Israelis, but two-thirds on both sides remain pessimistic about the future of the peace process June 2010
   
•  Majority of Palestinians and Israelis prefer two-state solution over binational state or confederation  March 20, 2010 

 Joint Poll in year 2009:

• In Israel: A slim majority (52%) believes Israel should pay almost any price to return prisoners of war.In the PA: If released from jail, Marwan Barghouti would beat Ismail Haniyeh for Presidency by a large margin.   December 2009
   
• Israelis are more apprehensive and Palestinians somewhat more favorable about US involvement in the Peace Process compared to their expectations last December after Obama's election.  August 2009
   
• Pessimism among Israelis and Palestinians regarding the prospects for a settlement and a Palestinian state in the next few years, but majorities on both sides support a two-state solution.Following Obama’s Cairo speech, Israelis’ pessimism decreased somewhat and support for the two-state solution increased slightly - June 2009  
   
• In the aftermath of Israel’s military operation in Gaza and the February elections, Israelis and Palestinians share hawkish positions and gloomy expectations regarding the peace process Among other findings of the joint Truman PSR poll: Both Palestinians and Israelis believe that given the outcome of the Israeli military operation in Gaza, Palestinians are worse off than before the operation. Two thirds of Israelis believe that Israel stopped its military operation in Gaza too early, but only 30% think that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there if shelling of Israeli communities continues -  March 2009

 Joint Poll in year 2008:

• Following Obama’s Election, Palestinians and Israelis Seek a more active role of the US in Moderating the Conflict Among other findings of the joint Truman-PSR poll: both publics support continuation of the cease-fire agreement between Hamas and Israel. Only about a quarter of Israelis support reoccupation of the Gaza Strip if shelling of Israeli communities continues - December 2008
   
• Sweeping majority of Israelis support release of Marwan Barghouti in return for Gilad Shalit; three-fourths of Palestinians back soldier kidnappings in exchange for Palestinian prisoners Among other findings of joint Truman-PSR poll: both publics support continuation of cease-fire agreement with Hamas - September 2008 
   
• Israelis strongly oppose cease-fire with Hamas if agreement does not include release of Gilad Shalit; Palestinians strongly oppose such an agreement if it does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt - June 2008
   
• THREATENED ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS DISENCHANTED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS AND SUPPORT FURTHER VIOLENCE- March 2008  

 Joint Poll in year 2007:

• SKEPTICAL ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS ARE SPLIT HALF IN SUPPORT FOR A FINAL STATUS PACKAGE ALONG THE CLINTON PARAMETERS- December 2007

• IN THE BACKDROP OF THE GAZA TAKEOVER BY HAMAS, ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS SHARE GRIM EXPECTATIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE'S LEADERSHIP AND THE CHANCES FOR THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS- June 2007

 Joint Poll in year 2006:

• STRONG PREFERENCE AMONG PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OVER AN INTERIM POLITICAL TRACK - December 2006

• IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN LEBANON, PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR HAMAS UNCHANGED WITH GREATER PRAGMATISM AMONG ISRAELIS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS- September 2006

• WITH SUPPORT FOR A PERMANENT DEAL ALONG THE CLINTON PARAMETERS DROPPING AMONG ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS, ONLY 46% OF THE ISRAELIS SUPPORT OLMERT'S REALIGNMENT PLAN AND ONLY 47% OF THE PALESTINIANS WOULD APPROVE THE PRISONERS' DOCUMENT IN A REFERENDUM - June 2006

• OVERWHELMING MAJORITY AMONG ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS FOR NEGOTIATED RATHER THAN UNILATERAL FURTHER DISENGAGEMENTS 60% of the Israelis support negotiations with Abu Mazin over a final status settlement - March 2006

 Joint Poll in year 2005:

• STABLE MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR CLINTON'S FINAL STATUS PACKAGE AMONG ISRAELIS BUT DECLINE IN SUPPORT AMONG PALESTINIANS: Large support in both publics for the extension of the cease fire - December 2005

• TWO THIRDS AMONG PALESTINIANS, ISRAELI JEWS AND ISRAELI ARABS SUPPORT THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS THE STATE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND PALESTINE AS THE STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. - September 2005

• WHILE ISRAELI SUPPORT FOR THE DISENGAGEMENT DROPS, ISRAELIS SEE DECLINING PROSPECTS FOR THE SETTLEMENT PROJECT IN THE WEST BANK, WHEREAS PALESTINIANS EXPECT IT TO GROW - June 2005

• PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS DISAGREE ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS - March 2005  
   
•  In The Post Arafat Era, Palestinians And Israelis Are More Willing To Compromise: For The First Time Majority Support For Clinton's Permanent Status Settlement Package. January 2005 

 Joint Poll in year 2004:

• ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS SUPPORT THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE GAZA STRIP AFTER ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL AS PART OF SHARON'S DISENGAGEMENT PLAN. - July 2004

 Joint Poll in year 2003:

• ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS ARE LUKEWARM AND FAR APART ON THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE GENEVA DOCUMENT - December 2003  
   
• MAJORITY SUPPORT AMONG PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS FOR ROADMAP AND FOR A MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS THE STATE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND PALESTINE AS THE STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BUT EACH PUBLIC MISPERCEIVES THE POSITION OF THE OTHER - June 2003
   
• Stable majorities of the Israeli and Palestinians publics support the Quartet's roadmap. Abu Mazin's nomination as Prime Minister increases optimism about return to negotiations. - April 2003

 Joint Poll in year 2002:

• IMPORTANT BUT FRAGILE PRAGMATIC SHIFTS IN PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE INTIFADA AND THE PEACE PROCESS - November 2002

 Joint Poll in year 2001:

• PESSIMISM' UNDERSCORES FINDINGS OF NEW ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION POLL - July 2001

 Joint Poll in year 2000:

• ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION BUT ARE LESS WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE THAN THEIR LEADERS. - July 2000
    

These are the results of opinion poll #35, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 30 July to 1 August. The poll deals with the peace process, domestic situation, economic situation, ability to confront threats, presidential elections and political affiliation. The total sample size of this poll is 1325 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 817 in the West Bank and 508 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%. 

1. Peace Process

• 68% support the peace process and 29% oppose it
• Support for armed attacks declines to 44% and opposition to armed attacks rises to 49%
• Trust in the Israeli government is at 6% and in the Israeli people at 27%

Support for the peace process did not change compared to last month, as 68% continue to do so. But support for armed attacks against Israelis declined to 44% compared to 50% last month, while 49% declared their opposition to it.

The level of trust in the Israeli government remained the same at about 6% only, while the percentage of those who believe that the Israeli people are sincere and serious about the peace process reached 27%. The poll indicates a significant decline in the percentage of those expecting the peace process to lead to the emergence of a Palestinian state in the coming years reaching 37% compared to 48% one month ago and 62% in November 1997.

The results show that a low level of expectation regarding the Palestinian state is evident especially in Bethlehem (26%), Jabalia (29%), Nablus (30%), Hebron and Deir al-Balah (31% each); among men (31%) compared to women (43%), the youngest (27%) compared to the oldest (50%), holders of BA degrees (18%) compared to illiterates (54%), students (18%) compared to housewives (44%), private sector employees (29%) compared to those employed in the public sector (45%), and among supporters of Hamas (31%) compared to supporters of Fateh (46%).

These results indicate that the Palestinian street has little confidence in the peace process despite its continued support for it, and that it sees in the current policies of the Israeli government an obstacle to the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Therefore, Palestinian support for the peace process seems conditional as a large percentage continues to support armed attacks against Israelis.

Support for armed attacks increases especially in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (39%), in Khan Younis (61%), Deir al-Balah (55%), and Hebron (51%) compared to Jerusalem (28%), Ramallah and Bethlehem (36% each), and Tulkarm (35%), in refugee camps (53%) compared to cities and villages (41%), among the youngest (51%) compared to the oldest (45%), holders of BA degrees (52%) compared to illiterates (39%), students (54%) compared to laborers (34%), and among Hamas supporters (65%) compared to Fateh supporters (40%).

2. Domestic Situation

• 56% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions and 61% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future;
• Corruption is seen especially in ministries by 78%, in security and police agencies by 69%, in PLC by 45%, and in the office of the presidency by 36%;
• 83% believe the jobs can only be obtained through wasta (connections);
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy does not exceed 33% compared to Israeli democracy (68%), and Jordanian (34%), and Egyptian (31%).

The results show that a large percentage of 56% continues to believe that corruption exists in the PNA institutions, indicating a decrease of 8 percentage points compared to the situation a month ago. But the percentage of those believing that corruption will increase or remain the same increased from 58% one month ago to 61% now.

The results show that those who believe in the existence of corruption tend to see it mostly in ministries (78%), in security and police offices (69%), in the PLC (45%), and in the office of the presidency (36%).

The poll shows that a majority of 83% thinks that one can not find a job without wasta to a large or medium extent. The percentage of those who do not think that wasta is not essential does not exceed 7%.

Similar to previous polls, the results show a low level of positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy not exceeding 33% compared to 35% one month ago. Israeli democracy received a positive evaluation of 68%, the Jordanian 34%, and the Egyptian 31%.

3. Economic Situation

• 26% seek permanent emigration due to current situation
• 38% describe their economic situation during the past three years as better than now, 31% as worse; while 50% are optimistic about their economic future

The unemployment rate for this poll is 26%, 19% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip. Thirty eight percent described their economic condition as being better in the past three years than today, and 31% described it as being worse in the past three years than today, while another 31% said that it had been the same as today. These conditions lead some 50% of respondents to be optimistic about their economic future while 29% remain pessimistic.

Palestinian general conditions lead about 26% of the Palestinians to seek permanent emigration to other countries. The desire for emigration increases in the Gaza Strip (32%) compared to the West Bank (22%), and reaches 30% in Jerusalem. It also increases among residents of refugee camps (33%) compared to residents of villages (22%), men (36%) compared to women (17%), the youngest (33%) compared to the oldest (15%), holders of BA degrees (36%) compared to illiterates (10%), students (47%) and laborers (33%) compared to housewives (15%) and retired persons (16%), the unmarried (40%) compared to the married (23%). The results show no significant differences between supporters of Fateh (24%) and Hamas (27) in the desire to emigrate.

4. Ability to Confront Threats

• 36% only believe that the PA is capable of meeting security threats;
• 29% only believe that the PA is capable of meeting economic threats.

The poll reveals the existence of doubts in the Palestinian street in the ability of the PNA to meet security and economic challenges such as the threat to cut economic aid, embargoes, closures, and preventing workers from working in Israel in the economic side, and military invasion, siege and entrance of Israeli forces into Palestinian-controlled areas in the security side.

In fact, the percentage of those who believe that the PNA is fully capable of meeting security threats is not more than 10%, and those believing that it can fully meet economic threats is not more than 8%. Some 26% think that the PNA has a medium capability to meet security threats and 21% think it has a medium capability to meet economic threats. Some 44% expressed the belief that it has no capability to meet security threats and 50% said it has no capability to meet economic threats.

The percentage of those who believe that the PNA can not meet the security threats increases among men (50%) compared to women (37%), holders of BA degrees (52%) compared to illiterates (42%), and among supporters of Hamas (54%) compared to supporters of Fateh (34%).

5. Presidential Elections and Political Affiliation

• In a three-way race for the presidency: Arafat receives 48%, Ahmad Yassin 12%, and Haider Abdel Shafi 9%;
• In a three-way race for a vice-president: Abu Mazen receives 29%, Abu al-Ala' 23%, and Abu al-Lutuf 19%;
• Fateh declines to 39%, Hamas receives 12, and 38% are nonaffiliated.

In a direct question about voting for the office of the presidentin case of a three-way race, Yasir Arafat received 48% of the votes, the lowest he has received since November 1994. Ahamd Yasin received 12% of the votes, the highest he has received since his release from prison and similar to the percentage he received in October 1995. Haydar Abdul Shafi received 9% of the votes, similar to what he used to receive during 1994-95 before the January 1996 elections.

One month ago, some 61% expressed their readiness to elect Yasir Arafat as president, while Abdul Shafi and Yasin received less than 3 percent each. The difference between the two polls lies in the way the question was presented. Last month, respondents were not given a list of candidates to choose from. Therefore, those who enjoy more name recognition benefited most. Arafat's name is much widely known than either Yasin or Abdul Shafi. In this poll, the respondents were given three names to choose from. In the last poll, some votes went to many other candidates other than Arafat whose name can be easily remembered. This time, those who gave votes to candidates other than Arafat, gave their votes only to Yasin or Abdul Shafi. Nonetheless, the difference between the two percentages in the popularity of Arafat may have also been due to other reasons such as the deadlock in the peace process, the continued existence of corruption and the lack of democracy.

In a race for the post of the vice president, respondents, who were given a list of eight names to choose from, voted to Abdul Shafi first with 12% of the votes, followed by Abu Mazin with 9% of the votes, Abu al-Lutuf with 8% of the votes, Faisal al-Husaini, Hanan Ashrawi, and Sa'eb Erekat with 7% each, and Abu al-Ala with 6% of the vote. But in a three-way race for the post of vice-president, respondents gave Abu Mazin the largest number of votes (29%) followed by Abu al-Ala' (23%) and then Abu al-Lutuf (19%).

Support for Fateh decreased from 43% one month ago to 39% in this poll; Hamas received 12%, and the nonaffiliated received 38%...More