Joint Israeli-Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 2005

WHILE ISRAELI SUPPORT FOR THE DISENGAGEMENT DROPS, ISRAELIS SEE DECLINING PROSPECTS FOR THE SETTLEMENT PROJECT IN THE WEST BANK, WHEREAS PALESTINIANS EXPECT IT TO GROW

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between June 6 and 11 , 2005.* 

The poll was designed to examine Israelis and Israeli settlers’ attitudes on the disengagement plan, Palestinians’ attitudes on the forthcoming legislative council elections, and both publics’ assessments of future developments. 

This is the 12^th joint poll in an ongoing research project on the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 in the wake of the Camp David summit. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, currently a senior fellow at the US Institute of Peace, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1320 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted June 9-11. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of the general Israeli public with 526 Israelis and a representative sample of 501 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza strip (sampling error of 4.5%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between June 6 and 9. 

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 202-429-3870 or email jshamir@usip.org.  

Summary of Results 

(1) Disengagement and the future of the settlement project

• Israeli support for the disengagement plan has declined in our current poll. 53% of Israelis support now Sharon’s disengagement plan and 39% oppose it. In our previous survey in March this year 65% supported the plan. Surprisingly however also 25% in the settlers sample support the disengagement.
• 45% of the Israelis and 72% of the Palestinians see Sharon's plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, compared to 52% among Israelis and 26%  among Palestinians who don’t see it as such. In addition, 51% of the Israelis and 66%  of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Intifada and armed confrontation has helped Palestinians achieve national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve. Israeli settlers are closer to the Palestinians in their perceptions. 72% of the settlers think the disengagement is a victory for the Palestinians and 77% believe the Intifada has helped them achieve political goals.
• Nevertheless, 65% of the Israeli public and 46% of the settlers believe that the disengagement will eventually take place despite being postponed to mid-August. 29% of the Israelis and 46% of the settlers do not believe it will materialize. Moreover, 52% of the general public and 69% of the settlers believe that Sharon is planning to expand the disengagement in the future and evacuate more settlements in the West Bank.
• As to the future of the settlements in the longer run, 58% of the general Israeli public and 42% of the Israeli settlers believe that in the coming years, the number of settlements in the West Bank will decrease. 18% of the general Israeli public, and 34% of the settlers expect the number of settlements to increase in the future. In contrast, a majority of the Palestinians (52%) fear that the number of settlements will increase in the future and 33% think it will decline.
• Consistent with their expectations, 62% of the Israelis support dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians. This figure represents a slight decline compared to 67% obtained last March. A surprising 30% of the settlers support dismantling most settlements for peace with the Palestinians. The Israeli public is divided as to the contribution of the settlements to Israel’s national security. 39% of the Israelis believe that the settlements hurt Israel’s national security while 37% believe they contribute to it with 19% who think that settlements neither contribute nor hurt. Among settlers 73% believe that they contribute to Israel’s security.

(2) Past and Future Resistance to the Disengagement

• In our survey we attempted to get an account of the scale of protest to be expected at the time of the disengagement and the means that seem justified to be used in such a protest. Both settlers and our general Israeli public sample were asked how one should respond to the disengagement decision. In the general public over 80% believe that the decision should be obeyed (40%) or resisted by legal means (45%). A similar majority among settlers believes in abiding by the law, although 61% support resistance by legal means and only 21% think the decision should be obeyed. However a significant minority in both samples - 15% of the settlers and 14% of the general public - believe the disengagement should be resisted by all means. Two years ago, in June 2003, we asked the same question about a future possible evacuation decision, and obtained virtually the same results.
• As to perceptions of violence that might take place during the disengagement, apparently the settlers succeeded to intimidate the Israeli public. While 15% of the settlers think that the proper response is to resist the decision by all means, 38% of Israelis think that the majority of the settlers will do so.
• When inquiring more specifically about the means justified to use in such a struggle, 71% of the settlers and 46% of the general public believe that it is justified to bring down the government, 17% among the settlers and 11% in the general public say that it is justified to endanger oneself and one's family, and 9% of the settlers and 7% of the general public believe it is justified to endanger other citizens in such a struggle. Compared to two years ago, the major change in the settlement community has been an increase in support for the political route, that of bringing down the government (from 54% to 71%). The support for the radical and violent-prone means has not increased significantly.
• As to actual intentions to participate in protest activities at the time of the disengagement, 18% of the settlers and 3% of the general public claim they will definitely participate in such a protest in person. 11% of the settlers and 2% of the general Israeli sample also definitely plan to be in person in the Gaza Strip at the time of the evacuation and take an active part in the resistance to the disengagement.
• In order to help us translate these protest intentions into actual behavior, we further inquired about our respondents’ participation in anti-disengagement protest activities in the past. 37% of the settlers in the territories reported that they participated in at least one such activity. 26% participated in demonstrations, marches or assemblies against the disengagement in the Gaza strip, 30% participated in such activities that were held within the 1967 borders, 20% participated in persuasion activities such as discussion groups, house calls, distribution of fliers or picketing on road intersections and 5% participated in person in active resistance to IDF evacuation of an outpost or settlement. Among the general population 8% participated in at least one protest activity in the past. Of those, 4% participated in demonstrations, marches or assemblies against the disengagement in the Gaza strip, 5% participated in such activities within the 1967 borders, 3% participated in persuasion activities such as discussion groups, house calls, distribution of fliers or picketing on road intersections, and only one respondent said he participated in person in active resistance to IDF evacuation of an outpost or settlement. Extrapolating from these reported protest patterns it seems that only few Israelis living within the green line may participate in active resistance to the evacuation, but more are likely to rally and demonstrate against it. As to settlers, they are obviously much more mobilized and motivated. Judging by the percent who reported participating in active resistance to IDF evacuation in the past, we might expect large numbers of settlers attempting to arrive to the Gaza strip to get actively involved in disrupting the disengagement.
• It is important to note the low degree of legitimacy that settlers afford to Israel’s democratic institutions. Less than half of the settlers in our survey consider the government and the Knesset to have legitimate authority to decide on evacuation of settlements. (49% and 48% respectively). 52% accept the Knesset authority but only by a Jewish majority. 63% accept the authority of a referendum. 26% accept rabbinical authority, of those 5% consider only rabbinical authority as legitimate. Compared to June 2003, all of these bodies have lost in legitimacy among settlers. Today, 8% consider none of these bodies as legitimate; together with the 5% of settlers who accept only rabbinical authority, these are the two groups of settlers providing the most radical and violent-prone responses in our survey.

(3) Facilitating the Disengagement

• Given the heightened level of rage among the settlers in the settlements to be evacuated, we asked both the settlers’ sample and the general Israeli public sample to rank the most important step which can facilitate the emotional frenzy among the settlers. The most important such step in the eyes of both the general public and the settlers is more generous financial or economic compensation. 41% of the public and 32% of the settlers rank this step as most important. Next for the settlers is political compensation by expanding the settlement project: 29% rank it first in importance. Third is emotional compensation through empathy and understanding, and perceived as least important is ideological compensation by strengthening the Jewish identity of the state through legislation and social arrangements.
• We further asked our samples what would be the right arrangement for the settlements included in the disengagement plan, if the disengagement were part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians. 56% of the settlers would prefer the current arrangement of compensation and free choice of where to live. 14% would prefer to allow settlers to continue to live in the territories under Palestinian rule, 11% would prefer the government to settle them in an alternate settlement in the territories, and only 4% would prefer the government to settle them in an alternate community within the green line.

(4) Palestinians and Israelis’ expectations for future developments.

• Both publics were asked to assess the coming developments following the postponement of the disengagement and Abu-Mazin’s visit to the US. 23% of the Palestinians and 9% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will completely stop. 52%  of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue, and 18% of the Palestinians and 27% of the Israelis think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
• Assessing the longer range prospects for a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians , 46% of the Palestinians and 36% of the Israelis believe that a political settlement is not possible ever, 29% of the Palestinians and  31% of the Israelis think that it will be achieved only in many generations to come or in the next generation, 19% of the Palestinians and 27% of the Israelis think it will be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years.
• 40% of the Palestinians and 15% of the Israelis believe that Hamas’ readiness to participate in the upcoming Palestinian parliamentary elections indicates more willingness to accept the peace process; 20% of the Palestinians and 17% of the Israelis think it indicates less willingness to do so, and 34% of the Palestinians and 62% of the Israelis believe that it indicates no change in Hamas position regarding the peace process. If Hamas wins the majority of seats in the next elections, 39% of the Palestinians and 53% of the Israelis believe that the peace process will slow down or stop while 30% of the Palestinians and 8% of the Israelis believe that the peace process will accelerate and 24% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe that the peace process will not be affected.

(5) Palestinian Legislative Council Elections and Other Palestinian internal Affairs

• 38% of Palestinians support and 60% oppose the collection of arms from armed Palestinian groups and factions. But 77% support and 22% oppose the current ceasefire between Palestinians and Israelis.
• If elections are held today, Fateh would win 44% of the seats of the Palestinian Legislative Council and 33% would go to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Only 3% would go to leftist forces and 8% to independents. 12% are undecided.
• With regard to current negotiations between Israel and the PA, the Palestinian public organizes its short term priorities as follows: release of prisoners would come first, stop building the separation barrier would come second, return of laborers to work inside Israel would come third, freezing settlement construction would come fourth, and removal of checkpoints would come fifth.

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Management at Tel Aviv University with funding from the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP.

The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between 12-26 August, 2020. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by Midgam in Hebrew and Arabic 12 August and 3 September 2020. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3.34%.  The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Dr. Nimrod Rosler from Tel Aviv University and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin. 

 MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provide the respective findings for these sub groups. 

Two-state solution: In the current survey, only 43% of Palestinians and 42% of Israeli Jews support the concept of the two-state solution; 56% of Palestinians and 46% of Israeli Jews are opposed. Two years ago,  43% on each side supported this solution. In all cases, only the general principle was provided. Among Israeli Arabs, support drops considerably from 82% two years ago to 59%, bringing the total Israeli average to 44%. As seen in Figure 1, among Jews, support for the two-state principle has seen an incremental but steady decline since June 2016, when it stood at 53%. Among Palestinians support has varied: it fell from June to December 2016, when 44% supported the basic two-state solution in principle, rose to 52% in June 2017, then declined once again to 46% and continued to decline in July 2018 and in the current poll.

Similar to previous surveys, support for the two-state solution among Palestinians, is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 45% and 38% respectively, among Fatah voters, and those who define themselves as “not religious” or “somewhat religious.”

Among Israelis, as in the past, the most significant variations are found between Jews and Arabs, and within the Jewish community, between the ideological and demographic groups. Israeli Jews are highly polarized along ideological lines: 91% of those who consider themselves left-wing support the two-state solution in a general question, while just under one-quarter of Jewish right-wingers support it (23%). The strong consensus on the Jewish left reflects a rebound following a decline in earlier Pulse surveys; in July 2018 support among the Jewish left dipped to 78%, still a strong majority. Jewish Israelis who define themselves as centrist show a clear majority of almost two thirds (62%) who support the two-state solution.

Demographic differences are found most visibly between levels of religious observance. Secular Jews demonstrate clear majority support for the two-state solution – two-thirds hold this view. The next “level” of religious observance, traditionalists (masorti), show the opposite trend – only one-third (32%) support a two-state solution and 58 percent are opposed (the remainder did not know). Only 15 percent and 12 percent of national religious and Haredi Israelis, respectively, support a two-state solution while strong majorities, 70 percent of the religious and 63 percent of Haredi respondents, oppose this approach.

Further, over roughly the last decade, there has been a consistent trend of more right-leaning attitudes among younger Jewish Israelis compared to older groups. Accordingly, just 28 percent of those 18-34 years old support the two-state solution, while 58 percent oppose it. The portion of supporters is ten points higher (38%) among the 35-54 group, while sixty percent of Israeli Jews over 55 years old support it and just 31 percent oppose two states – practically a reversal of the trend relative to the youngest group.  

Arab Israeli respondents show similar differentiation of support by age, in which younger people are less supportive, although with somewhat less polarization. Among 18-34 year old Arab respondents, nearly half (49%) support the two-state solution, and over one-quarter (26%) oppose it – a large portion, 25 percent say they do not know. Among the older age groups, from 35 to those over 55, well over 70 percent support two states (73% and 79% respectively). However, among Arab respondents, there is little significant variation by levels of religious observance: about 60 percent support two states among those who are moderately religious or religious, while 68 percent of non-religious Arab Israelis support the two-state solution.

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 4% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years; 76% of Palestinians say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a large majority of over three quarters (78%) believe the chances are low or very low – this is nearly unchanged from the 2018 survey (81% at that time, within the margin of error). There is only slight variation among Israelis living in the West Bank – among those, 84% believe the chances of establishing a Palestinian state are low or very low. Arab respondents in general are somewhat more optimistic, but still a majority of 59% view the chances as low or very low; 22% give “medium” chances. Among all Israelis and all sub-populations, fewer than ten percent give high or very high chances to the creation of a Palestinian state over the next five years. 

As in the past, respondents were asked if they believe that the two-state solution is still possible, in light of settlement spread. The current survey asked the same tracking question as those from the previous wave. Among Israelis, the findings have been stable for nearly two years – a very slight plurality of Jews believe it is no longer feasible, compared to those who believe it is, 45% to 43%, respectively. However, as in other areas of the survey, the change among Arab respondents is much more pronounced. Those who believe the two-state solution is still viable have dropped 20 points from the July 2018 survey, to just 45% at present and by 30 points compared to the December 2017 finding. As a result, the Israeli total at present is tied: 43% think the solution is still viable, and 43% believe it is not (the remainder don’t know). In July 2018, 48% thought it was viable, a slight plurality, while 45% thought it was not.

The change in perceptions of viability is more pronounced among Palestinians. Since June 2017 the portion who believe this solution is no longer viable has been rising fairly steadily, and reaches a peak of 65% in the currently survey – nearly two-thirds – while fewer than one-third of Palestinians now believe the two-state solution is viable, due to settlement spread.

Notably, among Israeli Jews there is a stark contrast between younger and older respondents, as on many issues related to the two-state solution. Presumably due to growing up during a time when the idea of reaching a negotiated two-state solution has not been prominent on the political agenda, as well as being generally more right-leaning, just one-third of Jews aged 18-34 believe this solution is still possible, while 55% believe it is no longer feasible. This trend is completely the reverse of the oldest respondents: a 56% majority of Jews aged 55+ believe the two-state solution is still viable, while just one-third (32%) believe it is not. Among Arab Israelis too, with some variations, the pattern holds: a 48% plurality of the youngest, the 18-24 year old respondents, believe the solution is no longer viable, but this group is the outlier – among all other age groups a majority believe the solution is viable. The latter belief is strongest among the oldest group, 63% (although this is a small number of respondents in the sample).

Among Palestinians, there is less variation in responses to the question of viability, but in this case the youngest respondents (18-24 years) are slightly more likely believe the solution is viable – 40%, compared to 30% of the oldest respondents (55+). This is consistent with our previous findings in 2016 and 2018 and it probably reflects the refusal of the youth to acknowledge the role of settlement expansion in determining the fate of the two-state solution.  

Two competing alternatives to the two-state solution: One state with equal rights, one state without equal rights, and confederation  

The joint poll sought to ascertain the breakdown of Palestinians and Israelis regarding various alternatives to the two-state solution. Two alternative options were offered: (1) one state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians was offered to all those who rejected the two-state solution (one democratic state); and (2) one state solution in which one side or the other is denied equal rights was offered to those who rejected the two-state solution and the one democratic state.

As the two pies in Figure 2 show, the largest constituency is the one that supports the two-state solution. In the survey, each respondent was asked each question separately. In the following analysis, all respondents who support a two-state solution are excluded from the next categories of support (for one equal state, and one unequal state) to avoid overlap, and the remaining public is assigned one alternative after the other, each time eliminating overlap, to ascertain the size of each constituency. Among those who do not support two states, the public splits between the two alternatives (one equal democratic state, or one non-equal state – referred to here as apartheid. The confederation approach is not included in this analysis as it is rather an alternate version of two states.) The category called “other” refers to respondents who either rejected all options or responded “do not know.”

The findings among the Palestinians are almost identical to those of mid- 2018 with the exception of the significant rise in the support for “other” from 22% to 39%. Israeli Jews too show a marked rise in the percentage of those who selected “other,” in all three questions, from 16% to 27%.  But support for the option of a single democratic state dropped among Israeli Jews from 19% to 10% while support for support for apartheid increased from 15% to 22%”. The previous study in 2018 included a third alternative for those who did not support the two-state solution: expulsion or transfer. This was not included in the current study and in all likelihood explains the rise of respondents who fall into the "other" group on both sides.    

On the Palestinian side, as indicated earlier, there is a difference between Gazans and West Bankers in their preferences for the two-state solution. But, as Figure 3 below shows, the two areas are almost identical in the way they view the two proposed alternatives, one democratic state and an apartheid state, with about 10% for each. Nonetheless, the largest percentage of Gazans (44%) supports unidentified alternatives, referred to in the chart below as “other,” while 35% of West Bankers selected this “other.”  As the chart also indicates, religiosity affects support for the two-state solution and the “other” solution or solutions. Religious respondents are less likely to support it (39%) and the “not religious” are more likely to support it (53%). The Gaza-West Bank difference mentions above reflects a major difference between the two regions in the level of religiosity (65% of Gazans and 41% of West Bankers describe themselves are religious), a factor that contributes, as the chart below shows, to a reduced level of support for the two-state solution and a greater support for “other”.

Gaps also emerge when looking at the Palestinian political affiliation or vote preferences (Figure 4), with likely voters of Fatah showing majority support (51%) while supporters of Hamas and third parties standing at 40% and unaffiliated and undecided at 45%.  It is worth noting that the highest support among Hamas voters goes to the “other” solutions followed by the two-state solution. It is worth noting that support for Fatah, among likely voters, stands in this poll as 35%, Hamas at 32%, and third parties at 8%, and the unaffiliated/undecided at 25%.

As in all previous surveys, the Israeli public is extremely divided internally over the two-state solution. Compared to other solutions, such as one democratic state or a two-state confederation, the two-state solution still enjoys a higher level of overall support, 44% among all Israelis and 42% for Israeli Jews.

However, in the elimination analysis shown in the pie chart (Figure 2), the next largest portion is “other” – referring to those respondents who did not support two states, but declined to choose an answer for any of the other options, and instead responded “don’t know.” The fact that this category is the second largest – 27% of Israeli Jews and fully 39% of Palestinians – indicates a growing trend in public thought: that there is no political framework that is viewed as an apt or acceptable resolution of the conflict. On both sides this is the second largest group; on the Palestinian side those who do not choose solution are just a few points fewer than two-state supporters. 

The portion of those who refrain from choosing any solution is highest, however, among the Israeli hardline communities, particularly among the more religious groups (see Figure 5). Secular Israeli Jews were the only community in which a majority – and a strong two-thirds majority, prefer a two-state solution to any other; among traditionalists, national religious and ultra-orthodox, the largest constituency (once those who support two states are eliminated from the analysis) is those who refrained from supporting any solution at all.

When looking at the political spectrum, a majority of support for the two-state solution is found among the left and the center but not the right (see Figure 6). Among the “moderate right,” at 29%, support for the two-state solution is higher than the two alternative options offered, and lower only than the portion who declined to support any alternative. Those who define themselves as “right” support apartheid by 42% followed by two states (15%). It is worth noting that the size of the moderate right category in this poll is 33%, the right 26%, the “center” 24%, the moderate left 11%, and the left 3% of the Jewish sample. 

Finally, when looking at Israeli Arabs, as the pie in Figure 7 shows, support for the two-state solution, as indicated above, is high, followed by support for the one democratic state solution.

Confederation:

The alternative of a two-state confederation has been tested in the joint survey since December 2016, when it was asked in a general way with minimal explanation, then in later surveys with somewhat more detail.

“Some people recommend the following solution: the creation of two states, Palestine and Israel, which enter into a confederation whereby citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections. There would be freedom of movement for all, and Jerusalem is not divided but serves as the capital of two states. Israel and Palestine would deal jointly with security and the economy.  

Since testing began, support rose among the Israeli public from 28% in December 2018, to a high of 39% in late 2017. In the current survey, this support reverts back to 30% among Israelis, almost precisely the range of support among Palestinians from December 2017 onwards (28% in December 2017 and 29% today).

Among the Israeli public, the pattern shows that support among Jews declined three points compared to the previous survey (from 31 to 28% support), but much more dramatically among Arab Israelis – from over two thirds in July 2018 (68%) to just 44% in August 2020. This is consistent the overall sharp drop among Arab respondents in other questions related to solutions.

The most consistent change in that time appears among the Israeli Jewish left. Among this group support has risen steadily since the question was first asked, from 35% in the first survey (December 2016) to 56% - an eight-point rise since two years earlier, and the first time support among this group reaches an absolute majority.

By contrast, Palestinian support remains fairly unchanged overall from December 2017, in the 30% range. The pattern for confederation follows Palestinian trends related to the other options: a slightly stronger starting point in December 2016, a rise in mid-2017, but lower attitudes towards all solution since that time.

Peace and violence. When given four possible options regarding what should happen next in Palestinian-Israeli relations, findings show similarities between the preferences of Israeli Jews and West Bank Palestinians but major differences emerge between these two groups and the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip. West Bankers and Israeli Jews prefer to “reach a peace agreement” with the other side (49% and 41% respectively). But the preference for this outcome declines to 13% among Gazans. Total Palestinian preference for a peace agreement stands at 34%. Two years ago, 45% of the Israelis and 41% of the Palestinians chose this option. Overall Palestinian preference for a second option, “waging an armed struggle,” stands at 37% (26% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) and the preference for “waging a definitive war against the Palestinians” stands at 19% among Israeli Jews. Two years ago, 27% of Palestinians and 20% of Israelis chose this option. A third option, “waging an unarmed resistance,” was chosen by 10% of the Palestinians and annexation was chosen by 12% of Israeli Jews. Finally, 13% of the Palestinians and 14% of Israeli Jews chose “maintain the status quo.”

Detailed peace packages for implementation  

As in all five previous surveys of the current series of joint polls, Palestinians and Israelis were asked in this survey to support or oppose a detailed combined peace package based on the two-state solution, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The package included 12 items addressing all issues of the so-called permanent status negotiations, such as borders, security, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees and several other matters, such as mutual recognition, end of conflict, external guarantees, and the Arab Peace Initiative. In the 2020 survey, the details for a two-state solution incorporate three of the most successful incentives from the previous phase of research, alongside the common features of the two-state plan that have been tested in the past.

Palestinians and Israelis were asked to respond first to each item separately, as component parts; following the 12 items they were asked if they support or opposed the combined package, and given a short summary of the basic elements.

• Israeli support was significantly lower than the last survey two years earlier: In August 2020, just 38% of Israelis in total supported the detailed plan, and 36% of Jews (see Figure 8). This is a decline relative to both the original and enhanced plan examined in July 2018: at that time, the “original” package that did not incorporate the strong incentives received 46% support from all Israelis, while the enhanced detailed two-state agreement – the one tested in the current survey – was supported by a majority of 53% among all Israelis (45% of Israeli Jews). Therefore, support among the Israeli population for the identical plan fell 15 points.
• The decline is seen among both the Jewish and Arab respondents: support among Jews fell from 45% in 2018 to 36% today, a nine point decline. Among Arabs, as in other parts of the survey, support fell more dramatically – at 49% it is still higher than support among Jews, following a long-standing pattern. But in 2018, 91% of the Arab respondents supported this plan.
• Similarly, Palestinian support for the package is significantly lower than the last survey conducted two years ago: only 27% of those who were asked about the agreement, compared to 42% in June-July 2018, said they would support it.  A majority of 70% opposed the package.  As the chart below shows, the current level of support for the package is the lowest since it has been first presented to the Palestinians in June 2016.

Items of an agreement. A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the twelve components of the package follows (non-italicized questions were asked of Israeli Jews and if no other wording appears, also for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Italics refer to the questions worded separately for Palestinians; some of the Palestinian wordings were used for Israeli Arabs).

1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 68% of Israeli Jews support this item.

Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side. 33% of Palestinians support mutual recognition and 58% of Israeli Arabs support mutual recognition.

2. The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry). Only 12% of Palestinians support this (10% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip).  Among Israeli Jews, 53% support this item and among Israeli Arabs only 29% support it – once again Arab support declined significantly relative to the previous survey.
3. The future Palestinian state will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures. The state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 43%.  Among Israeli Jews: 66% support this, and 43% of Arab respondents. Here too, support from Israeli Arabs dropped significantly from 2018.
4. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Among Palestinians, 35% support this,  4 point rise from 2018. Israeli Jews support stands at 59% - an eleven point rise from 2018, and Israeli Arab support at 51%.
5. The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. 24% of Palestinians support this. Among Israeli Jews and Arabs alike, 41% support this item.
6. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. 22% of Palestinians support this (16% among West Bankers and 31% among Gazans). 36% of Israeli Jews support this and 39% of Arabs support it.
7. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel. 19% of Palestinians support the territorial exchange (16% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip). 35% of Israeli Jews support this, and 42% of Israeli Arabs.  
8. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Less than a quarter (23%) of Jews support this item. 

East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of the Israel. 18% of Palestinians support this (20% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). 40% of Israeli Arabs support this item.

9. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. 23% of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement.

In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. 18% of Palestinians support the division of the Old City (20% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). 41% of Israeli Arabs support this.

10. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.  36%of Palestinians support this (34% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip). 48% of Palestinians supported this item in 2018. This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: just 13% of Jews (an 8-point drop from 2018) support the arrangement on refugees, and among Israeli Arabs 55% support it.
11. The agreement will include formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 28% (20% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip). For this item, Israeli Jews actually showed slightly higher support than in 2018, 53% compared to 46%  at that time; a rise that may be linked to the announcement of a deal between Israel and the UAE during the period of data collection. 47% of Israeli Arabs support it this item.
12. The agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative. Among the Palestinians, support stands at 32% (28% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip).  In 2018, support for this item stood at 46%. 59% of Israeli Jews support this, which is also an eight-point rise from 2018,  and 53% of Israeli Arabs support it.

Perception of social support for package.  After considering all the detailed items included in a two-state peace plan and being asked to support or oppose each one, as well as the total package, each side was asked how they perceive the support of majority of their fellow citizens for the two-state package. On both sides, respondents perceive their own society’s support for the original plan to be low.

Israelis were asked whether they believe the majority of Israeli Jews support or oppose it – just 18% said they believe the majority of Israeli Jews support it. Settlers living in the West Bank showed a lower rate, with just 11% who believe Jewish Israelis support it, and only slightly higher among Arab Israeli respondents – 22%. These assessments have declined somewhat from the previous survey, when 23% of Israelis believe the majority of Jews would support it, and a steady decline during recent years. However, the perception of majority support is lower than reality; in fact, 36% of Jews support the total two-state package in the current survey – double the portion who believe a majority of Jews support it (49% of Arab respondents, and 38% among the total of Israeli respondents support the package.

When Palestinians were asked if most Palestinians would support the plan, 25% stated that most would support it. And when asked if they believe the other side would embrace the peace package, a majority of 54% of Palestinians believed a majority of Jews might support the plan. By contrast, only 18% of Israelis thought the majority of Palestinians would accept the plan, respectively.

Regional and demographic trends. The internal breakdowns of each population show which sub-groups respond differently to the peace plan. Among Palestinians, there are variations in responses primarily by region, political affiliation and levels of religious observance (see Figure 9).

• As in previous surveys, Gaza respondents are more supportive of the agreement. 31% of all Gazans supported the new plan. Among West Bank respondents, 25% supported the plan. It is worth noting that while support for the two-state solution among Gazans is lower than it is among West Bankers, as indicated earlier, support in the Gaza Strip for the peace package is higher than it is in the West Bank. However, in both regions, support for the concept of the two-state solution is higher than the support they give to the detailed package.
• Among Fatah supporters, 38% support the package, a 19 point drop compared to our findings in mid-2018. Surprisingly, support among Hamas voters rose from 21% in 2018 to 25% in the current poll.
• Support for the package is higher among those who are less religious, and lower among those who are more religious. Among Palestinians who define themselves as “not religious” a majority of 51% supports the package. Support among the religious stands at 23%.
• Young Palestinians between 18 and 22 years of age, which in past surveys were associated with hardline views, show little or no age differences this time.

Among Israelis, as shown in Figure 10, the internal breakdowns of the population show variations similar to those related to the general question about a two-state solution. These patterns are consistent over the years, with higher support among the left, low support on the right; higher support among secular Jews, but only a minority who support it among all other more religious groups." Arabs in general support the detailed two-state package at a higher rate than Jews – but far less than in 2018.

• A majority of left-wing Israeli Jews (70%) and among centrist Jews (54%) support the total package. Among the Jewish right-wing, just 20% supports the detailed package
• The religiosity divide remains strong among Jews: Among seculars, a 55% majority support the plan, but just 28% among masortim (traditionalists) and fewer among the religious and ultra-orthodox (14% and 16% respectively).
• There is a modest age gap: 35% of the youngest Jewish Israelis (18-24) support it, and 50% of Jewish respondents 65 and above support the detailed package.

Feasibility - doubts. Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. The perception of viability is important.  Among Israelis who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 82% support the two-state solution; among those who think it is not viable due to settlement spread, only 13% support it, while 78% of all Israelis who believe the solution is no longer viable also oppose this solution in the general question about the concept. Similarly, as shown in Figure 11, the perception of viability is also clearly linked to support or opposition to the detailed package for a two-state solution: 63% of Israelis who believe the solution to be feasible, also support the package, but just 18% of those who think this solution is no longer viable.

Among the Palestinians who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 78% support the package declining to 21% among those who believe it is no longer viable.  

INCENTIVE PAIRS

The current survey includes two experiments that aimed at testing the value of incentives in two ways: (1) Separately pairing some of the zero-sum incentives in order to determine their benefits as well as the harm they might inflict on the support for the peace package; and (2) presenting the respondents with some of the most important list of demands from their side and from the other side and asking them to determine their side’s priorities: what demands are the most important and what concessions are acceptable.  Half of the sample on each side was asked to participate in the first exercise and the other half was asked to participate in the second exercise. For the Israelis, only Jews were asked to participate in these exercises.

First experiment: For the second time, we considered a new mode of testing incentives. In the first four surveys of the Pulse, most of the incentives proposed were developed specifically for one side or the other. To offset the possibility that an incentive for one side, such as the zero-sum measures, might alienate the other side, in the June 2018 survey and in the current one we paired incentives to show reciprocal benefits to each side. The incentives were paired based on the priorities attached to them by the two publics, drawing on six items, representing some of the top-ranked incentives from the previous surveys of the Pulse. 

Respondents in the selected half of the sample were asked directly if these pairs – an incentive to their own side coupled with a benefit to the other side – raised or lowered their support for an agreement. All respondents were asked these questions, not only those who rejected the agreement. The goal was to see whether in a real situation where people are likely to learn of all benefits/incentives offered to all sides, whether respondents of either disposition would switch: would supporters defect and oppose an agreement, would rejectionists possibly switch towards support? And for those who had not made up their mind, could the mutual incentives convince them to support an agreement, or push them to oppose it?

The following is the list of pairs tested:

1: Jewish character and Palestinian prisoners: The state of Palestine will acknowledge the Jewish character of the state of Israel and will recognize the Jewish religious and historic roots in the historic land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael) and Israel will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners when the peace agreement takes effect. 

2: Security cooperation and Israeli military presence: The Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation with Israeli security forces, and Israel in return will agree to end its military presence in the territories of the Palestinian state.

3: Visits to Holy places: As a sign of reconciliation, Jews will be allowed to visit at the Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif and Palestinians will be allowed to visit the Western Wall, while at the same time affirming that neither religious group interferes or attempts to change the status of either holy site.

4: Recognition of Nakba and Holocaust: The state of Israel will recognize the Nakba and apologize for the suffering of the Palestinian refugees and Palestinians will recognize the Holocaust and express sympathy with the suffering of the Jews at the hands of at the hands of their persecutors.

5: Combat incitement: The state of Palestine and the state of Israel will agree to combat incitement against the other and if necessary make changes in school textbooks to remove any such incitement, and to call for tolerance and reconciliation and to fight against violence

6 Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories: Israel will allow an agreed number of Palestinian laborers to continue to work in Israel if they wish to do so, and Palestine will allow Israeli factories to continue operating in its territory if they wish to do so.

Since all respondents in this half-sample, both those who supported the package and those who opposed it, received these questions, those who said the item raised their support but who already supported the initial agreement were set aside, and the same for those opposed. Focusing on those who switched sides, we then calculated new levels of predicted support following each pair.

Comparing just those who opposed the plan in the current survey, the average responses for the paired, mutual incentives is as follows:

Among Israeli Jews, respondents displayed wide variation in their assessment of the incentive pairs. Broadly speaking, those who opposed the detailed two-state peace package at the start reacted in similar ways to those who supported the two-state peace package: The strongest incentive pairs, those that were most successful in convincing the opposition camp, were also the least likely to cause supporters of the initial plan to defect.

As seen in the table below, the incentive of combatting incitement and changing textbooks if needed – in both the Palestinian and Israeli state – was the most attractive to the opposition respondents: nearly seven-in-ten said this made them more likely to support the two-state package agreement. Just a small segment of the initial supporters would defect based on this condition (12%).

From a measure viewed as highly symbolic, the next most successful incentive pair was allowing Israeli factories to remain inside the West Bank, while allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel – a very pragmatic, concrete policy item. Here too, a majority of those originally opposed said this would make them more likely to support a two-state package agreement (63%), while just a small minority of supporters said it made them less likely to do so (13%).

Thus overall, an average of 45% of Israeli Jews changed their minds from rejection of the full package to support based on the incentive pairs, but this average contains wide deviation among the different items offered.

Among Palestinians, the average portion of those who changed from rejection to support is just 21%, with significantly less variation in response to the different incentives. In 2018, only 14% made the switch from rejection to support based on incentive pairs.  This percentage is significantly lower than the 41% of rejectionists who changed to support when the incentives were first tested separately (as items that were beneficial to one side, without a corresponding “cost”)  between 2016-18, in the first four surveys of the Pulse.

The following table summarizes the change generated by the incentive pairs for those who opposed the peace package and those who supported that package:

This finding reflects the fact that each side is offered a benefit but it comes packaged together with an item for the other side, which apparently dampens enthusiasm compared to the original incentives. At the same time, the fact that on both sides and for each incentive-pair, some portion of opposition switched to support means that there is some potential.

Therefore, the next valuable comparison is the original level of support in the current survey, for the permanent status package, among the two societies, compared to the new levels of support following each pair. In other words, the analysis below calculated all defections from support to opposition, along with switchers from opposition to support, to determine the new levels of support or opposition. The graphs in Figure 12 show the findings for the Israeli side (the baseline support indicates the half-sample who were given these incentive pairs).

On the Israeli side, the shift to more support among the opposition and defections among supporters based on the pairs ultimately shows a fairly successful set of incentives. This relative success of the pairs is seen in the fact that all six items generated higher levels of support (those who said the item raised their support for the current plan) than the initial level for the comprehensive plan, among Israeli Jews. While support for the detailed plan stood at 34% for the half-sample that was given these incentive pairs, even the least successful pairs caused 38% to say the incentive (coupled with an incentive for the Palestinians side) made them more likely to support the plan.

Ending incitement on both sides was the most effective of all incentive pair, consistent with findings from 2018. At that time, the net shift led to 61% support for the plan; at present, out of all respondents, fully 74% said it made them more likely to support the two-state detailed package.

The second most effective pair was the notion that Israeli owned factories could remain in the new Palestinian state, while Palestinian workers would be allowed to continue coming to Israel – this caused fully 71% of all Israeli Jews to say it made them more likely to support the plan.

The two most symbolic pairs – involving mutual recognition of each side’s historic and religious attachment to the land, as well as mutual recognition of the Holocaust and the Nakba – received the lowest portion who said it raised their likelihood of supporting the package, 38% each.

The incentive of ongoing security cooperation, coupled with Israel agreeing to remove the army from the areas of the Palestinian state, raised support for 48% of Israeli Jews, and 50% said they were more likely to support the two-state peace plan if given access to visit the Temple Mount – in return, Palestinians would be allowed to visit the Western Wall, while both sides agree not to change the status quo or interfere in each site.

Among Palestinians, the pairs were less successful than they were among the Israelis as only three out of the six paired incentives proved effective in substantially increasing support for the package from the baseline of 28%. This baseline is based on the responses of half of the sample, those who took part in the first experiment in which paired incentives were offered. As indicated earlier, total support for the package stood at 27%. One pair in particular, Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories, proved most successful by increasing support for the package by 18 points, to 46%. The second most effective pair proposed concessions related to security cooperation and the ending of Israeli military presence, increasing support by 11 points, to 39%, followed by commitment from both sides to combat incitement, increasing support by 8 points, to 36%. 

Most importantly, our findings show that the four most successful pairs for the Palestinians are also effective, or more so, for Israeli Jews, as indicated above.  One paired incentive proved successful for the Israeli sides and neutral for the Palestinians: the recognition of the Nakba and Holocaust, increasing support for the package among the Israelis to 38% and keeping support among Palestinians unchanged.

A second experiment considered a new mode of testing incentives.  We presented the respondents with some of the most important demands from their side and from the other side and asked them to determine their own side’s priorities: what demands are the most important to them, and what concessions are acceptable that their own side might make. Below is a list of Israeli and Palestinian demands and concessions:  

These demands and concessions were asked through an exercise in which respondents were told that the other side’s negotiating team would be making a specific demand of them, and then asked which concession they would ask of the other side, in order to consider meeting the demands. The respondents were offered a list of four demands their side could make and asked to choose (respondents could also chose none). This was repeated for three hypothetical demands by the other side.

Next, each respondent was told that its negotiators would be making specific demands of the other side, then asked which  concession they would be most willing to offer in return, from the list of four.

This exercise was conducted among half samples (those who did not receive the incentive pairs); on the Israeli side among Jews only.

Palestinians were reminded of three Israeli demands raised by Israeli leaders in the past. In response to each one of these demands, Palestinians were asked to select their own counter demand from among four important such demands raised by their negotiators in previous rounds of talks. In response to the first Israeli demand, that Palestinians “agree to recognize Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people,” the largest percentage (33%) selected the request to “release all Palestinian prisoners.” One fifth selected the Palestinian request that the Israeli government “recognize the Palestinian religious and historic homeland in historic Palestine.” Only 7% selected the request to “allow Palestinian citizens, such as refugees, to live in Israel without becoming Israeli citizens,” and 4% selected the request that Israel “issues an apology to Palestinian refugees for the pain and suffering inflicted on them during the 1948 war.”

This hierarchy of priorities for the Palestinian respondents was repeated almost in the same exact order in response to a second and third Israeli demands. In response to the second demand: “the removal from Palestinian textbooks all material deemed inciting against Jews;” 34% selected the release of prisoners, 19% selected the recognition of Palestinian religious and historic homeland, 6% selected the request to allow Palestinians to live in Israel, and 5% requested the apology.  In response to the third Israeli demand: “to commit to imprison every person involved in violent activities against Israel,” 31% selected the first Palestinian demand, 14% selected the second, 7% selected the fourth demand, and 6% selected the third demand. It should be noted that in the three cases, between 30% and 37% of the respondents refused to make a request from Israel, thereby indicating that the Israeli demands were unacceptable regardless of what Israel would offer in return. 

In a second set of questions, respondents were asked to offer concessions to Israel in response to three demands made by the Palestinian negotiators. In response to the first demand, “release of prisoners,” the largest percentage (20%) selected the concession that demanded the “removal of incitement” from textbooks and between 5% and 9% selected three other concessions requested by Israel. The same pattern repeated itself in response to the other two Palestinian demands: the apology and allowing some Palestinians to live in Israel. It is worth emphasizing however that the majority of Palestinian respondents, between 55% and 62%, refused to offer any concessions from among those proposed.  

For the series of three questions in which the Israeli Jews were told that the Palestinian negotiators demand various items, the results showed a mixture of pragmatism and symbolism.

• When told that Palestinian negotiators would demand that Israel release all Palestinian prisoners, the top demand Israeli Jewish respondents made in return was that Palestinian leaders commit to imprisoning anyone involved in violent activities against Israel (31% chose this, with similar results among settlers and Jewish respondents within the Green Line). One quarter chose the demand that Palestinians recognize the land of Israel as the historic homeland of the Jewish people, and just under one-quarter declined to choose any demand that they would consider a reciprocal trade.
• When told that Palestinian negotiators would ask that Israel apologize for the suffering of Palestinian refugee as a result of the events 1948, this time the symbolic recognition of Israel as the historic Jewish homeland was cited in first place, by one-quarter of respondents. In the second place, nearly one-quarter (23%) said chose “none of these” demands of Palestinians. The three remaining demands (commitment to imprisoning Palestinians involved in violence, Palestinian recognition of Jews expelled from Arab countries in 1948, and Palestinians removing incitement from textbooks) received similar levels of support each – 16%, 18% and 15%, respectively).
• When told that Palestinian negotiators would ask to allow some agreed number of Palestinians, including refugees, to be allowed to live in Israel as residents (not citizens), once again one-quarter chose to demand symbolic recognition of Israel as the historic home of the Jewish people. Once again just over one-quarter declined to choose a reciprocal demand, but the second most frequently chosen demand was that Palestinian leadership commits to imprisoning those involved in violence (18%).

These show a fairly consistent pattern in which Israelis believe that recognition of the land of Israel as the historic Jewish homeland is the most commonly cited demand they would make of Palestinians, in response to three of the Palestinian demands. Only for one Palestinian demand, regarding security prisoners, did the Israeli preference change to a more practical, less symbolic issue, that Palestinians must apprehend those involved in violence. In all cases, about one-quarter (just above or just below), selected the option “none of the demands.” It is worth noting that in open responses, Israeli Jews expressed their opinion mostly in hardline directions in response, such as “there is no need to give any concessions”.

However, a different trend was found with regard to Israeli demands of Palestinians. When told that their own Israeli negotiators would be asking certain concessions of Palestinians, and asked which concessions they would be willing to have Israel make in return, the results showed greater intransigence.

In this case, for each demand that Israeli negotiators would make of Palestinians, the largest portion of Israeli Jews refused to select any concession in return that Israel should make. The portion ranged from 39% to 46%, nearly half, who selected “none of these” rather than choose a specific concession Israel could make in return for its demands. This indicates that from the perspective of the Israeli Jewish respondents, their demands ought to be viewed as unconditional.

• For example, the expectation that Palestinian leadership imprison those involved in violence against Israel led 46% of Israeli Jews to refrain from choosing any concession in return, including 63% of the settlers. From the concession that were offered, there was only moderate variation; the highest portion (14%) chose to apologize for the suffering of Palestinian refugees due to the events of 1948.
• Similarly, when told that Israel would demand the removal of incitement from Palestinian school textbooks, 44% of respondents declined to choose a concession they would like Israel to offer. In this case, a higher portion selected the apology to Palestinians for the suffering of 1948 – 27% (although just 18%) of settlers. But once again the plurality of nearly half who avoid offering a concession indicates that this viewed as an unconditional demand.
• In return for the symbolic Israeli demand of recognition that the land of Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, slightly fewer, 39%, selected “none” and instead 21% each chose either an apology for Palestinian suffering or allowing a portion of Palestinians and refugees to live in Israel as residents.

It is notable that an apology to Palestinians for the suffering caused by 1948 was among the higher-ranked responses when choosing concessions, despite the long-standing sensitivity of this issue. However, at each point, roughly one-quarter chose this item, showing reluctance on the part of Israelis in general when it comes to offering concessions for their negotiating demands.

Palestinian and Israeli respondents were asked about their views on the Trump plan, the “deal of the century,’ and its various components.  Ten components were presented:

1 A demilitarized Palestinian state would be created after a transitional period of four years, and the state of Israel recognizes Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people and  in which the Palestinian side recognizes Israeli as the state of the Jewish people

2 The Palestinian state would be created only if Palestinians fulfill a number of criteria including democratic governance and rule of law, constructing financial institutions, demilitarization including full dismantling of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, ending all incitement against Israel in schools

3 The plan allows Israel to have sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley and all Israeli settlements, about 30%of the West Bank , and the Palestinians are allowed to have sovereignty over most of the remaining West Bank territories – about 70% - and over two Israeli areas in the Negev close to the Gaza Strip

4 The plan allows the possibility that some areas of the Triangle in Israel, such as the towns of  as Tayibe, Kafr Qasim and Qalansawe could come under Palestinian sovereignty

5 Jerusalem is to be unified under Israeli sovereignty including the Arab neighborhoods which Israel annexed with the exception of those areas located today outside the Jerusalem wall, such as Kofor Aqab, and these areas or Abu Dis can become the Palestinian capital

6 The Old City of Jerusalem will come under Israeli sovereignty including al Haram al Sharif and al Aqsa Mosque and current status quo would be maintained in terms of Muslim access for prayer and under the waqf supervision and Jordanian custodianship but Jews would be allowed to pray in al Haram al Sharif during time periods allocated to them.

7 Israel would have overriding security control over all Palestinian territories and all borders and international crossings in the West Bank while security arrangements would be implemented in the Rafah crossing in coordination between Egypt and Israel

8 Palestinian refugees can live in the Palestinian territories or in the current host countries or emigrate to other countries but they are not granted a right of return to Israel and their settlement in the Palestinian territories will be restricted by security or economic consideration and they and the host countries are compensated

9 Palestinian security prisoners in Israel will be released in stages with the exception of those convicted of killing, attempted to kill, or planned to kill Israelis

10 In case the Palestinian side accepted the US plan, the US and Arab and non-Arab countries would provide financial assistance to the Palestinians in the tens of billions

On the Palestinian side, support for overall plan did not exceed 5% with opposition standing at 93%. Support for the components ranged between a high of 15%, for item 4, that allowed for the possibility of placing some Israeli-Arab towns, such as Tayibe, Kafr Qasim and Qalansawe, under Palestinian sovereignty to a low of 4% for item 3, that allowed Israel to have sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley and all Israeli settlements, about 30%of the West Bank. Opposition to the various components ranged between a high of 94%, for components 3 and 5, and a low of 83% for component 4.

When asked about the majority view among Palestinians regarding the Trump plan, an overwhelming majority of 89% thought it would oppose it and only 7% thought the majority would support it. But when asked about the majority view among Israeli Jews, more than two-thirds (69%) expressed the view that the majority would support it; less than a quarter (23%) thought the majority would oppose it. 

We asked the respondents about the implications of the plan for the future prospects of the two-state solution: 68% expressed the view that it will harm the prospects for that solution and 10% expressed the opposite view, while 21% believe it will do neither harm nor advance the two-state solution. But a consensus (91%) view among the Palestinian public asserts that the Trump plan aims to create a Palestinian state that is neither independent nor sovereign; 6% expressed the opposite view.

On the Israeli side, the Trump plan was greeted with ambivalence. Support for various items differed widely by ideology, but also within the average of the total population each item showed wide variations in support.

• Fewer than half of all Israelis, 47%, supported the idea of a demilitarized Palestinian state being established after a transitional four year period and being recognized by Israel. This includes 49% of Jews, but of those, just 29% of settlers supported the item. At the same time, just 33% of Arab Israelis supported this item – leaving Jews inside the Green Line as the highest supporters (50%).
• Israeli Jews were far more enthusiastic about the conditioning of Palestinian statehood on a number of conditions stipulated in the Trump plan – a democratic government and rule of law, financial institutions and dismantling of armed groups including Hamas. Among Jews, a clear majority of two-thirds support this item and even 62% of settlers; but again just under one-third of Arabs (32%).
• Notably, the clause related to Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and all settlements – about 30% of the West Bank – showed significantly lower support than the conditionality of statehood: just over one-third (34%) of all Israelis supported this. In an unusual finding, Arabs Israelis and settlers were the least supportive, 23% and 28% respectively. But even Jews inside the Green Line were unenthusiastic, with 36% support. Also notable was the high rate of respondents who declined to give an answer, 23% in total. However, perhaps most interesting is that only a minority of Israeli Jewish right wingers support the annexation plans as well; further, the most firm right wingers show even lower support than moderate right for this item (20% compared to 39%, respectively).
• Nearly half of Israeli Jews, 47%, support the possibility that Arab Israelis from the Triangle area might come under Palestinian sovereignty; just 19% of Arabs support this. Here too, the Israeli right wing is split, with a majority of 54% among the moderate right who support the item, and 39% of the firm right – who apparently oppose any mention of Palestinian sovereignty. Notably, a strong majority of Israelis believe the Palestinian state envisioned by the Trump plan (after hearing all the items) is not truly sovereign - just 20% of Israelis think it is, and 62% said it is not truly sovereign. Yet apparently even the symbolic understanding of Palestinian statehood, despite not being truly independent, is unacceptable to the furthest-right-wing certain portion of Israeli Jews.
• The item regarding united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, except for specific neighborhoods outside the wall, was supported by half of all Israelis, and 54% of Israeli Jews. Just 24% of Arab Israelis supported this.
• A majority of Israelis, 54%, supported the maintenance of the status quo on the Temple Mount, while allowing Jews to pray there at agreed times. However, this majority contains a deep split between Jews, 60% of whom support the item, and Arab Israelis – just 19% support this item.
• The notion that Israel maintains full security control over the entire West Bank and all international crossings is embraced by Jews both inside the Green Line and the settlers – nearly three-quarters support. 27% of Arab Israelis support this item.
• The Trump plan’s approach to refugees allows them to return to a Palestinian state subject to security approval by Israel, or gives them the option of immigrating to other states, with no right of return at all to Israel. Over sixty percent of all Jews support this, with little variation, and one quarter of Arab Israelis. However, the mild variation among Jews shows lower support among the right-wing population – over ten points lower among the firm right than the left (58% and 69% respectively). Here too, the most likely explanation is that the item mentions a Palestinian state, which the firm right opposes strongly.
• The phased release of Palestinian prisoners except those charged with murder is supported by 44% of all Israelis: 44% of Jews, and 40% of Arabs, making this among the more successful items for Arab Israelis.
• The item stipulating a package of financial support for Palestinians from the US, Arab and non-Arab states is supported by about half of Jews, and 39% of Arabs.

For all the items of the Trump plan, a fairly high portion of Israelis declined to choose support or oppose, and roughly one-fifth overall responded “don’t know.” Among Arab respondents the number is higher, over one-third.

After hearing all the items of the Trump plan, the Israeli respondents voted similar to the initial exercises regarding a two-state solution. In this case a higher portion, 47%, supported the Trump plan after hearing all the details, as a package; 33% opposed, and 20% chose “don’t’ know.” This is nine points higher than those who chose the traditional two-state peace package (including the enhancements added through the earlier survey project) – 38%.

Among Israeli Jews, after hearing all the items, 51% supported the Trump plan, 30% rejected it, and 19% did not know (here support is 15 points higher than for the traditional two-state peace plan). Yet support for the Trump plan is much lower among Arabs: 27% support it, while 46% oppose, and the remainder do not know. This dynamic nearly reverses the trend of Arab Israeli support for the two-state peace package: nearly half (49%) supported the traditional approach and 25% opposed the two-state peace package in the current survey.

Normative environment and impact of the plan

The Israeli public views the Trump plan as an accurate reflection of itself. When asked their impression of how other Israeli Jews would respond, the breakdown was surprisingly similar to those who actually support or opposed it: 46% of the total sample believed a majority of the population would support it (which is technically inaccurate, since a plurality supports it but not over 50%, but does indicate the general trend). 36% of respondents believe Israelis reject it (very close to the 33% who in fact reject it) and once again nearly one-fifth do not know.

Israelis are under few illusions about the Palestinians: two-thirds of Israelis believe that most Palestinians will reject the Trump plan. This rate is only slightly lower among Arabs (58%), due to the higher portion who respond that they do not know.

Few Israelis believe the plan will advance a two-state solution – just 26% of Israelis and only minor variations between the different sectors. The large plurality, 41%, believe it will neither advance nor delay the two-state solution – this is an indicator that many believe it will have little impact at all.

It is appropriate to say that the Trump plan shook up the long-atrophied dynamics of left and right in Israel; but this does not necessarily lead to a clear path towards peace. Ultimately, Israeli Jews are quite aware that the Trump plan is squarely in their favor; there are at the very same time realistic that it is unlikely to contribute to actual peace. In other words, the survey results indicate that Israeli Jews are open about supporting conditions that favor them at the expense of advancing peace.   

Following the last Israeli election and the announcement of the Trump plan, the Israeli government announced its intention to begin with the annexation aspect of the plan, unilaterally. The details of exactly where and how Israel would annex parts of the West Bank were never made entirely clear; nevertheless the survey tested the various most likely options that were being discussed and which might yet re-emerge in the future (the subsequent deal between Israel and the UAE contains a disputed clause about either suspending or canceling the planned annexations).

Respondents were given a range of options they prefer, from annexing nothing at this time, to annexing various portions of the West Bank: Just the Jordan Valley, some of the settlements, the Jordan Valley and some of the settlements, the Jordan Valley and all settlements, or the entire West Bank. The plurality of responses went to no annexation – 29% chose this. The other respondents broke down with different preferences; all those respondents who chose one of the annexation items as their preference added up to 48% of the sample (24% said they did not know). The number is significant as it is markedly consistent with nearly all public polls prior to Israel’s declared July 1^st date to begin annexation: in all polls, support for annexation, no matter what form the question took, ranged in the mid-40s; at most only a slight majority of Israeli Jews supported it. This figure was consistent throughout the months ahead of July 1st and the current survey confirms the trend, despite asking an original question offering a range of response choices.

Both Israelis and Palestinians were asked about what impact they believe annexation will have on four aspects of the conflict:

• The peace process between Palestinians and Israelis
• Israel’s security
• Israel’s Jewish character
• Israel’s future as a democracy.

Israeli responses highlight the conflicting interests involved in annexation. Israelis are aware that unilateral annexation is unlikely to act as a catalyst for peace: just 11% think it will advance peace, while 47%, a clear plurality, believe it will delay peace further. 28% of Israelis do not believe it will have an impact (the remainder do not know). Only settlers show a higher portion who believe annexation contributes to peace, but even among them only 22% believe this, roughly one-third each believe it delays peace or has no impact.

Counterintuitively, just a minority of Israelis, 29%, believe annexation will advance Israeli security; while 39%, a plurality, believe it will actually harm security.  Here the variation is clear: 29% of Jews inside the Green Line believe it will help, and just 18% of Arabs, but 54% of settlers believe annexation will advance security. However, Israelis appear fairly unperturbed by security concerns, perhaps in part because they are skeptical of the PA’s claim to have ended security cooperation in response: 48% of all Israelis believe the PA has not followed through on its claim, and just 15% think it has in fact ended security cooperation. Although about half believe that ending such cooperation could in fact lead to another widespread outbreak of violence against Israel, many apparently believe the situation is fairly static and that this will not happen. 37% believe that if security cooperation ends, there are good chances the PA might collapse, but slightly more, 40%, believe that even in that case, the chances of PA are low.

We also asked if annexation will strengthen Israel’s Jewish character; over one third, 36% of Israelis and 39% of the Jewish respondents believe it will. 23% (of Jews and all Israelis) believe it will weaken Israel’s Jewish character. Among settlers, 58% believe annexation will strengthen Israel’s Jewish character.  In a separate question asking whether annexation will strengthen or weaken Israel’s Jewish and democratic character, responses were spread across all options, with the largest portion (23%) saying that it would strengthen both. When added to respondents who believed it would strengthen Israeli democracy even while weakening the Jewish identity, the total who thought annexation could help democracy was 31% - once again a minority.

In sum, only a minority of Israelis believe annexation will strengthen Israel’s security, Jewish character, democracy or contribute to the peace process. Pluralities believe it will harm or have a negative impact on all these aspects which are thought to be in Israel’s interest. However, Israeli Jewish settlers are the only groups among the Israeli sample in which a majority believe annexation will yield positive results on these questions.

Finally, the most direct question regarding the logical future of annexation was whether Israelis would like to return to direct control over Palestinians in the West Bank, as in the pre-Oslo days. Here too, the population was divided and uncertain: a minority of 31% support the idea, with 49% of all Israelis who are opposed and 20% who do not know. Among Jews, support level was just over one-third (34%); among Arab Israelis, 57% oppose direct Israeli rule and only 13% support it, but fully 32% declined to state an opinion.

Among Palestinians, 78% think such annexation will harm the peace process and only 6% think it will advance it. Surprisingly however, unlike the Israeli respondents, a majority of the Palestinians (52%) views annexation as beneficial for Israel’s security while 29% think the opposite. Similarly, 53% view it as helping to guard Israeli Jewish identity and 22% think the opposite. Finally, the largest percentage (38%) thinks annexation will help strengthen Israel’s Jewish and democratic character, 22% think it will strengthen its Jewish character but weaken its democratic character, 8% think it will weaken its Jewish character and strengthen its democratic character, 15% think it will weaken both characters, and 12% think it will have no impact on the state’s character.

When asked if the PA has indeed stopped security coordination with Israel in response to the Israeli intention to annex parts of the West Bank, 64% indicated it has not and only one quarter believed that the PA has indeed stopped it. But the public was split on the implications of an actual ending of security coordination on the chances for an eruption of violence: 49% think the chances are high or very high while 48% think the chances are low or non-existent. A majority of 54% does not think an end to security coordination would bring about a collapse of the PA while 41% think it would. An overwhelming majority of 81% expressed opposition to an Israeli resumption of full control over the West Bank similar to that that prevailed before the Oslo agreement and 16% expressed support for such a step.  

Thus, ironically, Israeli Jewish settlers and Palestinians were in greater agreement about the outcome of potential annexation as communicated by the Israeli  government ahead of July 2020.

Following the difficult reality of this protracted conflict, we examined the conflict-related experiences of both parties. Findings reflect the high levels of violence in the conflict and its negative psychological impact.

Experiencing conflict-related violence: A majority (61%) among Palestinian participants said they have never participated in a violent political incidents or demonstrations. While 65% of respondents aged 18-34 replied so, the proportion among people older than 55 was lower (53%). However, when asked about participation of a close family member n such incidents, 53% responded positively. Similarly, 60% reported that they have never been hurt in violent incident related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but 61% said a close family member has been hurt once (22%) or more than once (39%). Here again, a meaningful gap was found between younger respondents aged 18-34 how reported never being hurt (67%) and older ones aged 55 and more (51%). Finally, a majority of Palestinian respondents (59%) said they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict once (20%) or more than once (39%). The proportions of those who have witnessed conflict-related casualties rose from 43% among the youngest group (18-24) to 65% among the oldest group (55+). When we asked Palestinians whether they have been detained for a long time on an Israeli checkpoint, 25% responded ‘never’, 35% responded positively, and 40% (all Gazans) said the question does not apply for them. These findings indicate that living in a society that has experienced violent conflict for so long, the chances that individuals will have participated in the conflict as actors or victims increases over the years. Moreover, very large segments of Palestinian society experience the harshest consequences of the conflict directly or indirectly, which likely leaves an imprint on their conflict-related attitudes.

We asked the Jewish-Israeli side about participation in violent incidents or witnessing of casualties related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While, there are no major differences between participation in such incidents during the military service (their own or their relatives) between Jewish settlers and non-settlers, considerable differences exist between these groups regarding the question of being hurt in such incidents. Among non-settler Jews, 69% said they never took part in violent incidents relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during their military service, and 52% reported the same about their relatives. Among Jewish settlers, the numbers were 70% and 44% respectively. When asked about being hurt in such incidents, 85% of non-settler Jews said they have never been hurt, and 74% reported the same about their relatives. Among Jewish settlers, the numbers were lower—68% and 54% respectively—meaning that larger proportion of this population has been hurt once (16% for both questions) or more than once (16% and 30% respectively) in such incidents. Finally, as shown in Figure 14, 38% of non-settler Jews reported they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict once (13%) or more than once (25%), while about half (51%) of settler Jews have witnessed such casualties once (14%) or more than once (37%).  Compared to Palestinians, fewer non-settler Jews were exposed to conflict-related violence, while settlers – who are the immediate neighbors of Palestinians – report similar levels to those of Palestinians.

Worry and Fear: Most Palestinians (58%) expressed worry and fear that they or a member of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished or that they would be expelled or prevented from reaching their land behind the separation barrier or wall; 40% are not worried. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of 81% indicated that it is worried or very much worried about the future of the Palestinian people. 

In the current survey, 42% of Israeli Jews said they “greatly or very greatly” agree with a statement that “I fear being harmed by a Palestinian terror attack, rocket fire or war.” 59% responded that they share this concern only a little or not at all.

Moreover, 56% of Israeli Jews indicated that they are worried or very much worried about losing the Jewish majority in Israel and losing the Jewish character of the state; 44% are not worried.

We asked the two sides about perceptions of both the other, and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does, whether they trust and whether they fear the other side. We probed the extent of zero sum beliefs. The overall findings show a marked decline in perceptions of the other side’s commitment to peace and in the level of trust. In the current Pulse we added more detailed questions about the potential antecedents of (mis)trust and how various social actors contribute to it. These assessments were already majority negative in the 2016-2018 series, but at present mutual perceptions have sunk even lower.

Does the other side want peace?

Among Palestinians, 18% agree that most Israeli Jews want peace, a significant decrease from 39% in June 2018 and much less than our findings in June 2017 when 44% of Palestinians gave this response. In this poll, 76% expressed the view that they do not think most Israeli Jews want peace.

Among Israeli Jews just 19% agree that Palestinians want peace, a significant drop from 35% in July 2018. In December 2016, 41% thought this way, then just 33% in June 2017, making the current survey among the poorest results in terms of Israeli perceptions that Palestinians want peace. Negative view of the other side’s actions: We asked Jewish-Israelis whether they heard during the last year about offensive actions that the other party took. While 58% of Jewish non-settlers reported they heard about Arabs taking land illegally, 76% of Jewish settlers said so. Smaller differences can be found between the two groups when asked regarding hearing about Palestinians taking action against Israel in international forums, lobbying individual foreign governments against Israel or delegitimizing Israel in the media and colleges abroad: 87% and 88% respectively responded positively; when asked about a Palestinian terrorist harming Israeli soldiers or civilians 89% and 97% reported they have heard about it either in the media or from personal contacts and experience, with most of them saying they heard about it many times (43% and 56% respectively).  

The education system: We examined which view of the other Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis think that their own education system and that of the other side promotes. When thinking about their own education system, 37% of Palestinians said it calls for seeing Israelis through negative stereotypes and labels (see Figure 15), with some interesting variations according to age: While 33% of people 55 and older replied so, the proportion among respondents aged 18-34 was 42%. Looking at the Palestinian sample as whole, 31% thought their education system is indifferent to Israelis, and 16% said it calls for seeing Israelis positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights. On the Jewish-Israeli side, more than half of Jewish-Israelis (54%) said that their education system is indifferent to Palestinians, while 18% said it calls for seeing Palestinians positively as fellow human beings with legitimate needs and rights, and only 9% thought it calls for seeing Palestinians through negative stereotypes and labels (the rest had no opinion). When thinking about the education system of the other side, the answers were dramatically different: 72% of Palestinians and 79% of Jewish-Israelis said it calls for seeing the other group negatively. Interestingly, Palestinians are more open and willing to admit that their education system is negatively biased against the other side, compared to Israeli-Jews. However, both societies are similar in their dominant view of the other side's negative bias.

The answers to the three sets of questions regarding the other side's perceptions and actions are strong potential antecedents of mistrust: Both parties believe that the other side does not want peace, many Israelis report hearing about of various negative actions taken by Palestinians, and both sides believe the other party's education system is biased against them.  Naturally, all of these perceptions could contribute to low levels of trust.

Trust and Zero-Sum Conflict: As in previous recent surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (90% - almost identical to June 2018 finding).  More Israeli Arabs than Palestinians are willing to trust Israeli Jews: 31% agree that Israeli Jews can be trusted, but 47% disagree (see Figure 16).

Among Israeli Jews, 79% disagree with a statement “Palestinians can be trusted,” among the worst results during recent testing, and an 11-point rise from July 2018; but closer to December 2017 (when three quarters believed that) and June 2017 (when 77% believed that). Just 15% in the current survey agree that Palestinians can be trusted.

When asked why they do not trust the other side, Palestinians focused on the political goals of Israeli Jews (42%) and on their religion and culture (24%) while Israeli Jews focused on the incitement in Palestinian education (37%) and on their leaders (28%). Other factors picked by Palestinians were the Israeli leadership (16%), negative personal experiences (10%), and incitement in the Israeli educational system (5%). Among Israelis, religion and culture was picked by 13%, and 11% indicated that they do not trust Palestinian political aims. 

Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 58% of Israeli Jews currently agree, an 11-point rise from July 2018 (when 47% of Israeli Jews agreed), 46% of Israeli Arabs agree (this is in fact significantly lower than the two previous surveys, one of the only positive findings among Arab Israelis), and 74% of Palestinians (compared to 71% in July 2018) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization.

Trust and different social actors: We examined the extent to which Palestinians and Israelis believe that different social actors help foster or diminish trust among the two peoples. As expected, there is a large gap between the beliefs that Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians have regarding the same actor from their own party and from the other side, while Arab Israelis have a more balanced view. Among Israeli Jews, 40% believe that the current leadership of the Israeli government diminishes trust, 29% believe it neither diminishes or fosters trust, and only 21% think it fosters trust (See Figure 17). Similar results can be found among Israeli Arabs, where 44% believe that the current leadership of the Israeli government diminishes trust, 12% believe it neither diminishes or fosters trust, and 17% think it fosters trust (the rest have no opinion). Among Palestinians, a vast majority of 78% think that the current Israeli leadership diminishes trust. When looking at the current Palestinian leadership in the West Bank, 34% of Palestinian respondents thought it diminishes trust, 32% though it neither diminishes or fosters trust, and 27% thought it fosters trust. Two-thirds of Israeli Jews believe that the Palestinian leadership diminishes trust, while among Israeli Arabs, 38% believe that the current Palestinian leadership in the West Bank diminishes trust, 22% believe it neither diminishes or fosters trust, and 10% think it fosters trust.

When asking about the role of Israeli and Palestinian press, 44% of Jewish Israelis, 39% of Arab Israelis and 67% of Palestinians believe Israeli press diminishes trust, whereas 73%, 37% and 39% respectively think the same about the Palestinian press. Relating to the Israeli and Palestinian school curriculum, 17% of Jewish Israelis, 39% of Arab Israelis and 67% of Palestinians believe that the Israeli curriculum diminishes trust, whereas 80%, 38% and 33% respectively believe think the same about the Palestinian curriculum. Finally, when asking about Israeli and Palestinian social media, 44% of Palestinians, 38% of Arab Israelis, and 70% of Jewish Israelis say Palestinian social media diminishes trust, whereas 67%, 42% and 46% respectively think the same about Israeli social media.

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve.

Jews were asked about the values of: (1) a Jewish majority, (2) Greater Israel, (3) Democracy, (4) Peace. Among Israeli Jews, a Jewish majority and democracy are seen as the most important values (39% and 30% respectively; see Figure 18). This reflects a somewhat erratic shift with a significant rise in the Jewish majority portion relative to July 2018 (when 28% chose this, closely tied to peace at the time). At present, 12% chose greater Israel, a six-point decline from the previous survey and ending what had been an incremental rise up to that point). Among settlers, the shifts are also erratic: Greater Israel declined to 24%, and is now in second place, while the portion who chose a Jewish majority more than doubled, from 21% who chose this in 2018, to 45% - a clear plurality – at present. Democracy was cited by 15% of settlers, and just 10% of settlers cited peace..

Among the Palestinians, we asked about the following goals: (1) Israeli withdrawal and establishing a Palestinian state, (2) Obtaining right of return for refugees to ’48 Israel, (3) Establishing a democratic political system, (4) Building a pious or moral individual and religious society. For Palestinians, the ranking has been relatively stable, with little change over the course of the past two years. The top priority for Palestinian goals remains Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem (34%, compared to 43% in 2018) chose this, followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (28%, compared to 29% in 2018), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (23%, a 10 point increase from 2018), and building a democratic political system (13%, compared to 14% in 2018; see Figure 19). 

This is the Survey Research Unit's (SRU) twentieth public opinion poll, and covers the following topics: the Taba Agreement, elections, evaluation of the Palestinian Authority, and Jordanian- Palestinian relations. The part of this survey dealing with Palestinian- Jordanian relations has been conducted in cooperation with the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at Jordan University. Residents of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Jordan were asked the same questions at the same time. Results from the Jordanian sample are reproduced in the text of the analysis. The SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community the opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them.

The main findings of this poll are:

• A total of 72.1% of Palestinians support the Taba or Oslo B Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
• Over 509 support the amendment of the charter; 39% oppose it.
• Around 46% believe the Taba Agreement and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
• Some 43% evaluate the Palestinian negotiating performance regarding the release of prisoners as good, but less than 20% consider the performance regarding Hebron as good.
• About 91% consider participation in the upcoming election for the Palestinian Council as a national duty. But 40% believe the elections will provide the Palestinian Authority with justification to oppress the Palestinian opposition.
• Some 68% intend to participate in the elections for the Palestinian Council even if the opposition calls for a boycott. Some 81% intend to register for the elections.
• About 51% support a proportional representation system; 40% support a simple majority system.
• A total of 54% believe the elections will be fair, and 22% think they will not be fair.
• A majority of 70% show willingness to elect a woman candidate, but 25% will not do so
• Popularity of Fateh and Arafat is increasing: over 58% of those polled said that they will elect Arafat and over 52% will elect Fateh candidates.
• More Jordanians agree that the Palestinians and Jordanians have a special relationship not found between the Palestinians and any other Arabs (79%) agree in Palestine and 91% in Jordan).
• More Jordanians support the establishment of a form of unity between Jordan and Palestine in the future (there is 74% support among respondents in Palestine and 86% support among those interviewed in Jordan).
• A majority of Palestinians (61%) support a confederation between Palestine and Jordan, while significantly fewer Jordanians (17%) favor such an arrangement.
• On the other hand, more Jordanians (53%) support complete unity than do Palestinians (25%).

Following is an analysis of the results of the twentieth public opinion poll (see Appendix) conducted by the SRU .

General Background

One of the most important events that took place prior to this poll was the reaching of an interim agreement in Taba between the Israeli government and the PLO to expand Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank. The Taba, or Oslo B, agreement was signed amidst much celebration at the White House on September 28, 1995. Before the agreement was secured, many demonstrations were held in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners still held in Israeli prisons. As a result, dozens of prisoners were released, most of whom had light sentences. However, in an act that breached the agreement, the Israeli president refused to release four female prisoners. The agreement also stipulated that redeployment from the populated areas of the West Bank, except Hebron, would be concluded before the end of the current year and that elections for a Palestinian legislative council would be conducted on the 20th of January 1996.

A security closure was imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Jewish holidays causing a general feeling of frustration and anger among Palestinians. Four young men died in Nablus during confrontations with the Israeli army. Settler harassment and provocation of the Arab inhabitants of Hebron continued.

A reconciliation committee was created in an attempt to renew internal Palestinian dialogue and rebuild an atmosphere of mutual trust between the Palestinian National Authority and Hamas. The National Authority released Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahhar and other Hamas leaders as a gesture of goodwill. After the redeployment of the Israeli army from Jenin, the town was handed over to the PNA. Preparations for the elections continued, along with the publication of the proposed election law and other draft laws.

Methodology

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution.

Household Sample Selection

SRU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A proportional random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists, and fieldworkers and researchers created maps of these localities. These maps indicate the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these areas which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of one hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly.

Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be one hundred and is assigned ten interviews, the fieldworker divided the 100 by 10, obtaining 10. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 10th house, and the second in the 20th, and so on. Fieldworkers started their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They reported on the direction of their sampling walks, and played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and estimating the number of houses in each block. Interviews for the poll were conducted simultaneously in Palestine and Jordan between the 13th and 15th of October, 1995. The sample distribution included 1144 persons in Palestine (729 in the West Bank and 415 in the Gaza Strip) and 1600 in Jordan (including 400 refugee camp residents).

Sample Distribution

(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

*Specialists (University teacher, engineer, doctor, lawyer, pharmacist, executive)
**Employees (school teacher, government employee, nurse, lower-level company employee)
--Population Estimates are based on the "Statistical Abstract of Israel" (1993) and FAFO (1993), and Palestinian Statistical Bureau (1994)

Data Collection

Our data collectors have participated in a number of workshops where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on household interviewing, confidence building, mapping, sampling techniques, survey methods, and scientific research. Four special training seminars for data collectors were conducted during this month, attended by a total of seventy fieldworkers. Training for data collection was conducted in the field where actual illustrations of the sample selection and interviewing techniques were demonstrated.

Data collectors worked in teams of two supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. More than fifty percent of our data collectors are female so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 15 per team) to allow for careful interviewing.

Household interviews resulted in a non-response rate estimated at 2%. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their political views out of fear or disinterest in the present political factions.

Data Analysis

Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is 3%.

Results

1. The Taba "Oslo B" Agreement

A majority of 72% Palestinians support the Taba Agreement. This percentage can be compared with 65% support for the Oslo Agreement signed in September 1993 (Table 2).

Table 2
Support for Agreements

The results show that opposition to the new agreement tends to increase with more education (Table 3).

Table 3
Support for Agreement by Education

Table 4 below indicates how opposition decreases with age.

Table 4
Support for Agreement by Age

Although over 70% of respondents support the Taba Agreement, fewer Palestinians (50%) support the amendment of the Palestinian National Charter as stipulated in the Taba Agreement. The greatest opposition to the amendment is found among the most educated and residents of refugee camps (Tables 5 and 6).

Table 5
Amendment of Charter by Education

Table 6
Amendment of Charter by Place of Residence

As is the case in support for the Taba Agreement, older respondents were more supportive of amending the Charter than were younger persons (Table 7).

Table 7
Amendment of Charter by Age

Palestinian Elections

I. Views of the Elections

Palestinians were questioned about the factors that might influence their decision concerning participation or boycott of elections. The results can be summarized as follows:

• Participation: Palestinians generally have a positive view of participation in elections. A total of 90% of those polled said that participation is a "national duty". More than 70% believe that elections will bring about change for the better, will enhance personal security, will be an implementation of the right to self-determination, and will lead to the establishment of a legislative council.

About 67% think that elections will promote democracy and will guarantee that the "best" wins. Expectations that an improvement in economic conditions would be a result of elections were expressed by 61%. A majority of the supporters of Hamas, PFLP, and Islamic Jihad believe that elections will promote democracy, will bring about change for the better, will improve economic conditions, and will lead to a legislative council. An even higher percentage of the supporters of Fateh and National Independents expressed these views. Incentive to participate in elections is lowest among respondents in refugee camps since, compared with non-refugees, refugees are more skeptical about what will emerge from the elections (Table 8).

Table 8
Views of elections by Place of Residence
(% of those who answered "yes")

The least favorable evaluation of elections may be found in the middle and south of the Gaza Strip, areas under the authority of Palestinians and predominantly populated by Palestinian refugees. Palestinians between the ages of 23 and 35, compared with other age groups, are less enthusiastic about participating in the elections. Education also plays a role in shaping peoples' views of what influence elections will have on their economic conditions, personal security, and other issues as skepticism increases with more education (Table 9).

Table 9
Views of Elections by Education
(% of those who answered "yes")

• Boycott: It would seem the most important factor that could lead to a boycott of elections is the belief on the part of 41% of respondents that elections will result in the establishment of a limited executive council. Palestinians are also anxious that elections might lead to the legitimizing of oppressive measures against the Palestinian opposition. Less than one-third of the Palestinians feel that elections will give legitimacy to an unsatisfactory agreement and that the results of these elections are predetermine. A quarter of the respondents believe elections will consolidate Israeli control. The percentage of those who think that elections violate religious instructions does not exceed 17%. Doubts about elections are higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip owing to the fact that many West Bank residents feel that elections will consolidate Israel's control, provide legitimacy to an unsatisfactory agreement, and will lead to the formation of an executive (admin.) council only. Palestinians in Jerusalem are also skeptical about elections, as they, more than any other group, feel that election results are pre-determined, and that elections will reinforce Israel's control and give legitimacy to a bad agreement. Refugees and camp residents are more critical than non-refugees, and educated Palestinians are more critical than those with less education (Table 10).

Table 10
Views of Elections by Education
(% of those who answered "yes")

.......More

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, December 2009

In Israel: A slim majority (52%) believes Israel should pay almost any price to return prisoners of war.

In the PA: If released from jail, Marwan Barghouti would beat Ismail Haniyeh for Presidency by a large margin.

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between December 9-15, 2009. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

Following important domestic developments in Israel and the Palestinian Authority, our poll focused on these developments:

• In the PA President Abbas announced his decision not to run in the next presidential elections; 57% of the Palestinians support and 36% oppose this decision. Nevertheless, 58% believe Abbas will withdraw his decision and will eventually run in the next elections. If presidential elections were between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas receives 54% and Haniyeh 38%; and if they were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive 67% and Haniyeh would receive 28%.
• In Israel, 52% think that Israel should pay almost any price to return prisoners of war home since this is the moral obligation of the state which sent them to war. 35% however think that Israel should not free “terrorists” who killed Israelis in “terrorist” acts inside Israel since this will encourage further abductions and acts of “terror.” 58% of the Israelis support and 36% oppose the release of Israeli Arabs who carried out violent attacks within Israel in return for the release of Gilad Shalit.
• 49% of Israelis support and 42% oppose Netanyahu’s decision to enforce a 10 month freeze on construction in the West Bank settlements, excluding East Jerusalem.
• Following these developments, 44% of the Israelis and 38% of the Palestinians think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 8% of the Israelis and19% of the Palestinians think that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 38% of the Israelis and 37% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue.
• Given the continued American involvement in an attempt to resolve the conflict, 69% among Palestinians but only 13% of the Israelis see Obama’s policy as supportive of Israel; 37% of Israelis and 3% of Palestinians see his policy as supportive of the Palestinians; and 36% of Israelis and 22% of Palestinians see this policy as supportive of both sides equally.

The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between December 10 and 12, 2009. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 604 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 9 and 15, 2009. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

(A) US policy toward the conflict

• Since the election of President Obama and following the intensified involvement of the US in the region we have been tracking in our poll Israelis and Palestinians' attitudes toward the US policy in the region. Our previous polls revealed an increased apprehension of Israelis with regard to a more intensive American involvement to resolve the conflict while Palestinians were somewhat more favorable to it.
• Our current poll indicates that 13% of Israelis and 69% of the Palestinians think that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel, 37% and 3% respectively think it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 36% and 22% respectively think it is supportive of both sides equally. In August, 12% of Israelis and 64% of Palestinians believed that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 40% and 7% respectively thought it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 38% and 23% respectively thought it is supportive of both sides equally.
• 55% of the Palestinians believe and 39% do not believe that the US has now abandoned its demand from Israel to implement a comprehensive freeze on settlement construction. 68% of the Palestinians oppose and 30% support unconditional return to negotiations, as requested by the US, before Israel implements a comprehensive freeze on settlement construction that would include East Jerusalem. 

 (B) Israeli and Palestinian Domestic Developments

• Netanyahu’s decision to put a freeze on construction in the West Bank settlements caused a significant political roar mainly from settlers and right wing parties. Our poll however indicates that 42% among Israelis oppose such a freeze, whereas 49% support it.
• Moreover, 58% among Israelis support the removal of illegal settlement posts in the West Bank, while 32% oppose.
• 49% of the Israelis also support and 43% oppose the dismantling of most of the settlements in the West Bank as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians. However support for this step has been decreasing consistently since the disengagement from Gaza in August 2005.
• Another related development which intensified following Netanyahu’s freeze decision is protest and refusal to evict settlers from illegal posts within the Israeli military. Our poll examined Israelis attitudes on this issue:34% of Israelis support and 57% oppose the refusal of soldiers to evict settlers in the West Bank
• Only 27% support and 66% oppose to the refusal of soldiers to serve in the West Bank.
• 43% of the Israelis think that soldiers who refuse to serve in the territories and those who refuse to remove settlements should be equally punished. 19% believe that those who refuse to serve in the territories should be punished but not those who refuse to remove settlements, while 6% think that those who refuse to remove settlements should be punished but not those who refuse to serve in the territories. 22% think that both kinds of refusals should not be punished.
• In the Palestinian Authority, President Abbas announced his decision not to run in the next presidential elections, 57% of the Palestinians support this decision, while 36% oppose it. Nevertheless, 58% believe Abbas will withdraw his decision and will eventually run in the next elections. If presidential elections were between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 54% and the latter 38% and if they were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive 67% (compared to 62% last August) and Haniyeh would receive 28% (31% in August).

 (C) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda 

The Israeli-Palestinian Track

• Now, more than 40 years after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 66% of the Israelis and 68% of the Palestinians believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are non-existent or low. 30% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe they are medium or high. These figures are very similar to those we obtained in August.
• Similarly, 65% of the Israelis and 67% among Palestinians think that it is impossible to reach these days a final status settlement with the Palestinians; 32% in both publics believe it is possible.
• 64% of Palestinians and 73% of Israelis believe that the best solution to the conflict is the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution. 20% of the Palestinians and 9% of the Israelis think that the best solution is to establish one state shared by Palestinians and Israelis in all the area west to the Jordan River
• 57% of the Israelis support and 35% oppose the proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. Among Palestinians, 53% support and 46% oppose this step. In August, 64% of the Israelis supported this proposal, while 31% opposed it. Among Palestinians, 49% supported the proposal in August and 49% opposed it.

The Saudi Plan

• 57% of the Israelis oppose and 36% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees' problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In August, 54% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 40% supported it. Among Palestinians, 68% support the plan, and 30% oppose it; 64% supported it in August and 34% opposed it.

 (D) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• 53% of the Israelis support and 42% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In August, 52% supported and 44% opposed such talks.
• A sizeable Israeli majority (66%) support and only 27% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. In August, these figures were 66% and 30% respectively.
• 17% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe that Israel will agree in the future to a complete freeze on settlement construction, including in East Jerusalem. 81% and 59% respectively don’t believe this will happen.
• 58% of the Israelis support and 36% oppose the release of Israeli Arabs who carried out violent attacks within Israel in return for the release of Gilad Shalit. In August, 63% of the Israelis supported and 27% opposed this act.
• Some 52% of Israelis think that Israel should pay almost any price to return prisoners of war home since this is the moral obligation of the state which sent them to war. 35% however think that Israel should not free “terrorists” who killed Israelis in “terrorist” acts inside Israel since this will encourage further abductions and acts of “terror.” This reflects the general parameters of public debate in Israel regarding the negotiations with Hamas over Gilad Shalit, but we deliberately avoided mentioning his name in this question in order not to bias our respondents.
• Among Israelis, 57% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 50% in August. Among Palestinians 77% are worried or very worried that they or members of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished and 23% are not worried. But we also found that 36% of the Palestinians fear that their security and safety and that of their family are not assured, compared to 40% in August, indicating further increased public perception of safety and security among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• 14% of the Israelis believe that Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to return some of the territories occupied in 1967. 26% think that they aspire to return all the territories occupied. 14% think that they want to conquer the State of Israel, and 40% fear that they plan to conquer the state of Israel and destroy its Jewish population. Palestinians similarly don’t trust Israelis long run aspirations. Only 12% of the Palestinians believe that Israel wants to guarantee its security and withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967. 11% of the Palestinians believe that Israel wants to Guarantee its security and withdraw from part of the occupied territories. 23% believe that Israel plans the annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinians, and 53% fear that Israel aspires the realization of Greater Israel borders and transfer of the Palestinians.  With regard to their own long term aspirations, about half of the Palestinians (49%) believe they aspire to reach a peace agreement with Israel that would establish a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital;, 10% believe the aspiration is to force Israel to end its occupation and withdraw to the 1967 lines without a peace agreement, 16% believe the goal is to return all Palestine from the river to the sea to Arab sovereignty by force, and 23% believe the goal is to conquer the state of Israel and destroy its Jewish population. As to Israelis, a majority of them (54%) think that the aspirations of Israel for the long run are to guarantee its security and withdraw from part of the territories occupied in 1967; 10% think that the aspirations are to guarantee security and withdraw from all the territories; 8% believe Israel’s aspirations for the long run are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinians, and 15% think it is the realization of Greater Israel borders and transfer of the Palestinians. These results emphasize the mirror image perceptions and misperceptions of the two sides which remain severe obstacles in the peace process.

This is the nineteenth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate politically motivated attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. This poll focuses on prospects for peace, direction of the Palestinian society, the PNA performance, armed attacks, elections, and political affiliation. The main findings are:

• A majority of Palestinians (59.5%) do not expect a lasting peace with Israel; only 23% expect a lasting peace.
• Respondents were equally divided as to whether or not Palestinian society is headed in the correct direction: 32.6% affirm the present direction and 28.9% question it.
• A majority of 97.1% believe the PNA must guarantee freedom of speech.
• A total of 37.4% of respondents support a form of unity with Jordan and 61.2% support two independent states.
• A total of 49.5% were optimistic about the future compared to 28.8% who said they were pessimistic.
• Support for the continuation of peace negotiations is at 70.6%.
• About 70% of Palestinians support armed attacks against Israeli army targets and against settlers, while less than 19% support attacks against other civilians.
• Most Palestinians feel their economic situation or standard of living has either gotten worse (43.5%) or stayed the same (45.2%).
• About 39% of Palestinians feel that the performance of the PNA is above average.
• Support for Arafat is at 53.7%, and Fateh is at 43.2%.
• A large majority (86.3%) believe that political elections offer the best means to choose the members of PISGA.
• 74.1% say that they will participate in the elections if and when they occur.

Enclosed are the results of the current public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (See Appendix), including a summary of the analysis of the results. For the full text of the poll or for further information, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki or the coordinator of SRU, Dr. Nader Izzat Sa'id, at Tel (09) 380383/381619 - Fax (09) 380384.  

General Background 

The period preceding this poll was marked by increasing provocations by settlers as they occupied a number of mountain tops around the West Bank and succeeded in closing several roads. The negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis faced problems especially regarding the issue of withdrawal from Hebron. Two suicide bombings were carried out against Israeli targets in Ramat Gan and Jerusalem resulting in the death of eleven Israelis. The Israeli military and the Palestinian Authority arrested a large number of Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists. The West Bank and Gaza Strip were under tightened closures on several occasions. The PNA issued an order to close two newspapers supportive of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. In this period, Jerusalem was the focus of many observers as settlers and the Jewish city council waged a campaign against Palestinian institutions in the city, resulting in confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis. 

Methodology 

The present poll is part of a larger survey of social and political attitudes that includes 300 items, the results of which will be published in the near future. The results of this survey will be the basis for a large number of scholarly research papers on political and social attitudes among Palestinians. For the purpose of this survey, some adjustments had to be made in the research methodology. More specifically, the selection of the respondents in the household was based on a table designed by CPRS researchers to guarantee the representation of all ages, education levels, and men and women. Our system resulted in the over representation of educated Palestinians as 40% of the respondents had more than 12 years of education. To adjust the sample, we had to weight for education by deflating the percentage of the educated sample.

Survey Instrument

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution.

Household Sample Selection

SRU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A simple random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists. Fieldworkers and researchers created maps for these localities. These maps indicated the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these localities which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of two hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly. 

Sample Distribution 

(Expressed as a % of the total sample / Data is not weighted in this table)

*Specialists (University teacher, engineer, doctor, lawyer, pharmacist, executive)
**Employees(school teacher, government employee, nurse, lower-level company employee)
--Population Estimates are based on the "Statistical Abstract of Israel" (1993), FAFO(1993), and Palestinian Statistical Bureau, 1995.

Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be one hundred and is assigned five interviews, the fieldworker divided the 100 by 5, obtaining 20. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 20th house, and the secin the 40th, and so on. Fieldworkers were asked to start their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They were asked to report on the direction of their sampling walks. Fieldworkers played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and in estimating the number of houses in each block. We received 740 questionnaires from the West Bank and 449 from Gaza, representing a total of 1190 interviews with Palestinians 18 years or older....More

This is the eighteenth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The following topics are covered in this poll: redeployment, unemployment, elections, and evaluation of the Palestinian Authority. The SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them.

Here are the main findings of this poll:

• A majority of 56% supports the proposed Palestinian-Israeli agreement on redeployment and transfer of authority to the PNA. Only 29% is opposed to the proposed agreement.
• Some 44% are looking forward to the assumption of control of the Palestinian authority in the West Bank. But 51% say they are "neutral" or have reservations.
• Only 43.5% believe that the Israeli redeployment in the West Bank means that the establishment of the Palestinian State is near, and 39% do not share their view.
• Only 31% evaluate positively the Palestinian authority's management of the negotiations with the Israelis. 29% said it was fair, and 26% said it was weak.
• 38% think the Palestinian leadership performance regarding the release of prisoners is weak; 19% said it is fair, and 36% said it is good.
• 81% of the Palestinians do not trust the Israeli intentions regarding the peace process.
• 64% think that appointments to Palestinian institutions are based on Wasta (family and factional connection).
• 51% supports a proportional representation system, while only 32% supports a majority system.
• Only 68% say they will participate in the elections if and when they occur.
• Support for Arafat is at 49%; dropping from 64% to 52% in the Gaza Strip.
• Support for Fateh is at 44% in the Gaza Strip.
• Nablus residents evaluate positively the performance of the city's municipal council, but Hebron and Gaza City residents evaluate negatively the performance of their cities' municipal councils.
• Unemployment rate is 29%.

Enclosed are the results of the current public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (see Appendix) and analysis of the results.

General Background

The days preceding this poll witnessed an important breakthrough in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations regarding the Israeli army redeployment in the West Bank. The main points of a possible agreement were published in the local press, and it was expected that the agreement itself would be signed before the end of July 1995. In the few weeks preceding that breakthrough, the following events took place. Palestinian prisoners declared a hunger strike. The strike was accompanied by protest action and street demonstrations in the West Bank resulting in 3 deaths when the Israeli army opened fire with live ammunition on a Palestinian demonstration by anNajah University students. A Palestinian-Israeli confrontation regarding Israeli settlement policy in East Jerusalem led to the Israeli decision to suspend the confiscation of 530 dunams of Arab land in East Jerusalem. Several members of Islamic armed cells belonging to Hamas and Islamic Jihad were killed or assassinated by Israelis during the same period. This period also witnessed the cessation of attacks, against Israeli targets, by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Meanwhile, the Palestinian authority continued to arrest Islamists accused of planning attacks against Israeli targets. Arms, belonging to Islamists, were found and confiscated. This, however, did not stop talks between the PNA and the opposition. Finally, important student elections took place at Birzeit and anNajah Universities with the main political factions maintaining their strength at the two universities. These elections showed Fateh to be the largest student faction, but opposition forces (Islamists and national opposition) were able, nonetheless, to form a coalition enjoying the support of the majority of the students.

Methodology

The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A proportional random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists. Fieldworkers and researchers created maps for these localities. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly. Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. To select the individual within the selected household to be interviewed, fieldworkers had to flip a coin twice to determine gender and age of the respondent. We received 719 questionnaires from the West Bank and 390 from Gaza, for a total of 1109 interviews with Palestinians 18 years or older. Interviews took place primarily over a four day period, Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday July 6-9, and were conducted on a face-to-face basis. The non-response rate is estimated at 7%. Data were processed through the use of SPSS, a computer package that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. The margin of error for this poll is less than 3%.

Survey Instrument

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution. A total of 35*** variables and questions are included in this questionnaire. The section on unemployment that was added recently remained in this questionnaire.

Household Sample Selection

SRU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A simple random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists, as shown in Table 1. Fieldworkers and researchers created maps for these localities. These maps indicated the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these localities which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of two hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly.

Table 1

Sample Localities Selection*

The Following table lists the localities that were included in the sample for this month.

District (Sample       Localities             District (Sample       Localities                

Size/ %)                                      Size/%)                                          

Nablus  (113/10.2)     Nablus City, Qusra,    Tulkarm (92/8.3)       Tulkarm City and Camp,    

                       Kabalan, Balata (RC)                          anNazla asSharkia,        

                                                                     Balah, Faroun             

Jenin (88/7.9)         Jenin City, Deir Abu   Jericho (25/2.3)       Jericho                   

                       Daief, Kufur Rai,                                                       

                       Arabouna, Jenin (RC)                                                    

Ramallah (107/09.6)    Ramallah City, al      Hebron (126/11.4)      Hebron, Beit Kahib,       

                       Bireh, amMazra'a                              Yatta, Beit Om'ar, Beit   

                       Sharkieh, Beitunia,                           Oula                      

                       Kherbet Abu Falah,                                                      

                       al Jelezon (RC)                                                         

Jerusalem (74/6.7)     Beit Hanina, atTour,   Bethlehem (73/6.6)     Bethlahem, Nahalin,       

                       asSouwana, Shu Afat                           alKhadar, Deheisheh (RC)  

                       (RC)                                                                    

Gaza North (66/6.0)    Jabalya(Village/RC),   Gaza City (152/13.7)   asShati, anNasar,         

                       anNazla, Beit Hanoun                          arRimal, asSadara,        

                                                                     al-Zeitun, asShoja'aya    

Gaza Middle            Dir Balah,             Gaza South (67/6.0)    Rafah City and Camp       

(126/11.4)             anNsairat, al                                                           

                       Bureij, Khan Younis,                                                    

                       'Absaan Kabira, Beni                                                    

                       Suhaila                                                                 

*The fieldworkers conducted interviews in 60 cities, villages, and camps where over 145 sampling units were used.

Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be two hundred and is assigned ten interviews, the fieldworker divided the 200 by 10, obtaining 20. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 20th house, and the second in the 40th, and so on. Fieldworkers were asked to start their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They were asked to report on the direction of their sampling walks. Fieldworkers played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and in estimating the number of houses in each block.

To select the individual within the selected household to be interviewed, fieldworkers had to flip a coin twice. The first flip was to choose gender of the respondent and the second was to choose whether the respondent was to be older or younger than forty years. When in the household, fieldworkers would conduct the interview with the person who has the characteristics that they selected in this manner.

We received 719 questionnaires from the West Bank and 390 from Gaza, for a total of 1109 interviews.... More

These are the results of opinion poll # 43, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 2-4 September 1999. The poll deals with the peace process, donor community assistance, domestic Palestinian conditions, elections for the president and vice-president and political affiliation, home and mobile phones, computers and Internet, and Satellites and TV Stations. The total sample size of this poll is 1320 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 824 in the West Bank and 496 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

1. The Peace Process

• Support for the peace process remains high at 75% and opposition at 22%.
• Continued drop in support for violence reaching 36% and opposition to violence reaching 57%
• Only 25% expect the actual implementation of the Wye agreement
• Only 35% believe in the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable permanent settlement in final status negotiations
• Before the signing of Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, trust in Barak’s government dropped from 29% two months ago to 21% in this survey
• A large majority of 85% support a Palestinian referendum on a permanent settlement agreement

The results indicate that support for the peace process remains high among the Palestinians at 75% with opposition to it standing at 22%. The level of support for the peace process dropped to 66% at the end of 1998 and began to increase gradually to reach 75% two months ago. The results show also a new drop in support for violence against Israelis to reach 36% today while opposition to violence stands at 57%. The percentage of support for violence increased to 53% at the end of 1998 after the Israeli freezing of the implementation of the Wye River agreement. But it began to drop gradually to reach 39% two months ago.

Despite these positive changes, Palestinian trust and confidence in the peace process is not high. Only 25% expect Israel to implement the Wye agreement. This poll was conducted during the last two days of negotiations over the implementation of the Wye River Momorandum leading in the last day of the poll fieldwork to the signing of Sharm el-Sheikh Momorandum. The lack of confidence in the peace process can be seen also in the large percentage (55%) of those who believe that it is not possible to reach a mutually acceptable permanent status agreement and in the low percentage (21%) of those who trust the intentions of Barak’s government. The percentage of trust in Barak’s government stood at 29% two months ago before it dropped to its current level. The drop may have been caused by Barak’s insistence on revising the Wye agreement and his refusal to release a larger number of security prisoners. It is likely that the level of trust in the Israeli government will increase again as Israel fulfils its commitments under the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement.

Finally, the results show that 85% of the Palestinians support the idea of holding a referendum among the Palestinians in the West Bank-Gaza and diaspora on any permanent status agreement reached between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators. Support for the referendum increases in refugee camps (89%) and among holders of BA degree (93%) and supporters of Fateh (90%) and DFLP (94%).

2. Donor Community Assistance

• The European Union and its member states came first as the most contributing to the development of the Palestinian economy in the views of 23% of the people, followed by Japan with 15%, the US with 10%, and Arab counties with 8%
• Donor community support has a positive impact on the Palestinian conditions in the views of 42% and a negative impact in the views of 15%
• Most important areas of donor support are: education (25%), water (23%) and health (18%)
• Least important areas of donor support are: women programs, police, housing, roads, and democracy and human rights
• Positive evaluation of the performance of Palestinian NGOs reaches 59%

The results show that the Palestinian street sees the European Union and its member states as contributing the most to the development of the Palestinian economy. The EU came first with 27% followed by Japan with 15%, the US with 10% and the Arab countries with 8%.

A large percentage of 42% tends to believe that the donor community support has a positive impact on the Palestinian conditions while 15% tend to believe that it has a negative impact. The belief in the positive contribution of donors’ support increases among residents of Jabalia (55%) and Rafah (57%), holders of BA degree (54%), farmers (54%), retired persons (52%) and supporters of Fateh (51%).

A majority of 66% believe that the most important donors’ support is the one invested in the area of education followed by water and health (separately receiving 25%, 23%, and 18%). Areas identified as being least important are women programs, police, housing, roads, and democracy and human rights.

These results are similar to the ones obtained on our survey of January 1999. Public perception of the role of different donors remained stable except of that of the US, which dropped from 14% to 10%. Areas of priority remain also the same except for an added importance given to water from 17% to 23% in this survey. It is noticeable that the interest of the Gazans in water remained low in comparison to that of the West Bankers (13% vs. 28%) despite the seriousness of the water problem in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Gazans show a special interest in the problem of sewage in comparison with the West Bank (11% vs. 2%). As in the previous survey, however, the two areas show little interest in social issues such as women or democracy programs. This result may reflect the heavy economic burden felt by the two areas.

3. Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• 39% describe their economic conditions during the past three years as better than now and 28% describe them as worse than now
• 50% are optimistic about their economic conditions during the next three years and 28% are pessimistic
• 27% say that current Palestinian conditions force them to consider permanent emigration while 72% do not consider such a move
• 35% believe that corruption exists in Palestinian NGOs while 62% believe that it exists in PA institutions. 60% of those who believe in the existence of corruption in PA institutions think that it will increase or remain the same in the future
• 80% of those who believe in the existence of corruption in PA institutions see it in ministries, 74% see it in police and security services, 48% see it in the PLC, and 40% see it in the president’s office
• A majority of 87% believe that wasta (personal and family connections) is involved to some degree in employment process
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy reaches 30% compared to 69% for Israeli democracy, 58% for American democracy, 50% for French democracy, 32% for Jordanian democracy and 27% for Egyptian democracy
• 60% believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear

Personal economic conditions remain a major source of concern for the man in the street. About one third (32%) describe their economic conditions as being unchanged during the past three years, but 39% believe that their conditions were better than now, and 28% feel they are better off today. This result indicates that some 70% of the Palestinians do not notice any improvement in their economic conditions with the passing of time. Despite this negative perception, half of the Palestinians are optimistic about their future economic conditions, while only 28% are pessimistic.

Economic and other conditions seem to explain why about 27% of the Palestinians are considering permanent emigration. This percentage is higher than the one obtained last January which stood then at 21%. The desire to emigrate increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (23%). The percentage increases especially in areas such as Bethlehem (35%), Jerusalem (30%), and Rafah and Kh(38% each). It increases also among the youngest (44%) compared to the oldest (10%), and among refugees (32%) compared to non-refugees (24%). It also increases among those with secondary education (36%), college graduates (33%), students (55%), craftsmen (39%), and supporters of Hamas (34%), PFLP (49%) and People’s Party (39%). It is likely that the public perception of lack of improvement in many aspects of Palestinian national reconstruction provides the context for the emigration desires.

The results show that while only 35% of the Palestinians believe that corruption exists in Palestinian NGOs, a majority of 62% believes that it exists in PA institutions. Among those who believe that corruption exists in PA institutions, 80% see it in ministries, 74% in police and security services, 48% in the PLC, and 40% in the president’s office. What makes things even worse is the belief of almost every one (except 6%) that wasta (personal and family connections) is essential in one degree or another in any employment. A larger percentage of Gazans compared to West Bankers (76% vs. 58%) tend to believe that wasta is highly prevalent.

No change is noticeable in the public’s positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy which remained stable at 30%, while that of Israel's stood at 69%, the US 58%, and France 50%. Public evaluation of Jordanian democracy dropped from 38% two months ago to 32% today, and Egypt’s from 33% to 27%.

4. Elections for the president and vice-president and political affiliation

• In elections for the presidency, Arafat receives 43% of the vote, Haidar Abdul Shafi 14%, and Ahmad Yasin 11%
• In elections for the vice-presidency Farouq Qaddumi receives the largest percentage of votes (8%), followed by Sa’eb Erikat (5%), Haidar Abdul Shafi (3%), Faisal al-Husseini, Ahmad Qurai’ and Mahmud Abbas (2% each), and Hanan Ashrawi and Nabil Sha’ath (1% each)
• Fateh receives the support of 38% of the people, Hamas 10%, PFLP 4%, Islamic Jihad 3%, and the non-affiliated 38%.

The results show no change in the popularity of Yassir Arafat which stands today at 43%. The same is true with regard to Haidar Abdul Shafi (14%) and Ahmad Yasin (11%). Arafat’s popularity remains higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) than in the West Bank (40%).

In the competition over the office of vice president, the results of this survey differ greatly from those obtained two months ago. The change has been caused by a different methodology employed in this survey. While we normally provide respondents with a list of names to select from, we have asked them this time to select a name from memory. The new methodology revealed that no single Palestinian leader is seen by the public as a natural successor to Arafat. Nonetheless, Farouq Qaddumi received the highest percentage of votes with 8%, followed by Sa’eb Erikat with 5%, Haidar Abdul Shafi with 3%, Ahmad Qurai’, Faisal al Husseini, and Mahmud Abbas with 2% each, and Hanan Ashrawi and Nabil Sha’ath with 1% each. A majority of 55% could not or chose not to give the name of their preference, 15% declared that they do not intend to participate in the elections, and 7% gave their vote to persons who could not reach a 1% threshold.

It is worth mentioning that four of those candidates received a much greater percentage of support in our survey which was conducted two months ago when respondents were provided with a list of four names only. At that time, Abdul Shafi received 37%, Husseini 23%, Abbas and Qurai’ 14% each.

Fateh recovered some of its popularity in this survey increasing its percentage from 35% two months ago to 38% in this survey. The Islamists received 16% of people’s support divided over Hamas (10%), Islamic Jihad (3%) and Independent Islamists (3%). The PFLP dropped slightly from 5% to 4% and the percentage of the non-affiliated remained the same at 38%.

5. Home and Mobile Phones, Computers and Internet, and Satellites and TV Stations

• Increase in home phone ownership from 42% in January 1999 to 45% today and in mobile phones from 21% to 29%
• Increase in satellite dish ownership from 27% in June 1998 to 38% today
• Al Jazeera satellite TV station is watched by 51% of those who own satellite dishes, followed by Egyptian TV (11%), ART TV (9%), and MBC TV (6%)
• Home computer ownership reaches 12% and Internet subscription reaches 14% among those who own computers at home and 5% among those who have computers at work

The results show an increase in the percentage of home phone owners from 42% in early 1999 to 45% today, and a larger increase in the percentage of mobile phone ownership from 21% to 29% during the same period. It is noticeable that home phones are found more in cities (57%) than in refugee camps (40%) or towns and villages (36%). Home phones are equally found in the West Bank (45%) and the Gaza Strip (44%). But they are not equally found in homes of the rich (79%) compared to homes of the poor (35%).

Mobile phones are found more in the West Bank (37%) than in the Gaza Strip (14%) and in rural areas (34%) than in cities (25%).

Similarly, the results show an increase in the percentage of satellite dish ownership from the 27% recorded fifteen months ago to 38% today. Satellite dishes are found more in the Gaza Strip (45%) than in the West Bank (34%), in cities (48%) more than refugee camps (35%) or towns and villages (30%), and among the highest income people (74%) than the lowest income people (28%).

The results show that the most watched satellite TV station is al Jazeera (51%), followed by the Egyptian TV (11%), ART TV (9%), and MBC TV (6%). It is noticeable that more men (67%) watch al Jazeera than women (37%). The station is also popular among the holders of BA degree (76%) compared to illiterates (42%), and among those with the highest income (70%) compared to those with the lowest income (49%).

Home computer ownership remained stable at 12%, of which 14% have Internet connections. Internet connection reaches 5% among those with office computers....More

These are the results of opinion poll #34, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 25-27 June 1998. The poll deals with the American initiative, armed attacks, Palestinian state, cabinet reshuffle, corruption, democracy, election of the president and vice president, ownership of satellite dishes and computers, and subscription in the Internet service. The total sample size of this poll is 1335 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 851 in the West Bank and 484 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%. 

1) The Peace Process

·  A majority of 51% opposes the US initiative for redeployment while 43% accept it.

·  A serious rise in support for violence, the highest since 1994: 50% support it and 45% oppose it.

·  Meanwhile 68% still support the peace process and 29% oppose it; but only 31% see a possibility for reaching agreement during final status negotiations, and 90% do not trust the intentions of the Israeli government and 76% do not trust the intentions of the Israeli people.

·  Major decline in the percentage of those expecting the establishment of a Palestinian state from 62% in November 1997 to 48% today. But 58% support the transformation of the PA into a Palestinian state after the end of the transitional period in 4 May 1999.

·  Fifty percent describe their economic and living conditions as worse than they were when the peace process started and 46% can not provide for their basic needs. Nonetheless, 65% are optimistic about the future.

The results of this poll clearly indicate a major shift in Palestinian mood regarding the peace process. Despite the continued high level of support for the process in general, a majority is opposed to the American initiative for Israeli redeployment, does not believe in the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable permanent settlement, and does not trust the intentions of the Israeli government or the Israeli people. Moreover, a major drop occurred in the percentage of those who expect the peace process to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next few years. In addition, a majority perceives its economic conditions as becoming worse since the start of the peace process. As a result of all these factors, the poll shows a dramatic increase in support for violence against Israelis and a majority favoring a unilateral Palestinian decision to transform the PA into a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999 regardless of Israel's position.

A majority of 51% is opposed to the American initiative for Israeli redeployment from 13% of the West Bank territory while 43% support it. Opposition to the initiative is stronger in the Gaza Strip where it reaches 58% while it is only 46% in the West Bank. Opposition is also stronger among men, the young, residents of refugee camps, the more educated, the students, and supporters of opposition forces and factions. But even among supporters of Fateh, opposition to the initiative reaches 44% while 50% support it.

Meanwhile, the results show a dramatic increase in the support for violence against Israelis as 50% said they supported armed attacks against Israeli targets. Opposition to violence has dropped to 45%. Support for violence was highest in 1994 when it reached 57%. Since then it gradually dropped as the peace process made progress to reach 21% in March 1996. It began to rise again to reach 40% in April 1997 after the Israeli decision to build the Har Homa settlement in Arab East Jerusalem, and to 36% in September 1997 after Israel ignored a deadline for redeployment from the West Bank.

Support for violence increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (47%). It also increases among residents of refugee camps, women, young people, students, and supporters of opposition factions and especially among supporters of Hamas (72%). But even among Fateh supporters, violence is supported by 44% and opposed by 53%.

Despite the rise in support for violence, a large majority of 68% still supports the peace process while only 29% oppose it. Nonetheless, a majority of 62% does not expect the final status talks to lead to mutually acceptable solutions to the difficult issues of borders, refugees, settlements, and Jerusalem. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of 90% does not trust the intentions of the Israeli government and 76% do not trust the intentions of the Israeli people. In addition, a major drop has been registered in the percentage of those who expect the peace process to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state during the next few years. Seven months ago, 62% expected such a state while only 48% expect one in the current poll. This may explain the fact that a majority of 58% supports a unilateral Palestinian decision to transform the PA into a state when the transitional period ends in May 1999 without the need to wait for an agreement with Israel.

2) Palestinian Domestic Politics

• About 38% wish to see a comprehensive change in cabinet, while a majority of 51% supports a more limited change in which some ministers and senior officials are changed.
• Over 64% believe there is corruption in the PA and 58% believe that the corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.
• Only 35% give the Palestinian democracy a positive rating, while 57% believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear.

Despite the high percentage of people who believe that corruption exists in PA institutions and agencies, and despite the low positive rating of the status of democracy in Palestine, a majority supports only a limited cabinet reshuffle. This finding may mean that the man in the street does not believe that a cabinet reshuffle, no matter how limited or comprehensive it may be, can satisfactorily address the problems facing the process of Palestinian national reconstruction.

The poll results show a majority of 51% supporting a limited change in government while 38% supported a comprehensive change that would replace all or most of the ministers and senior officials. Support for a comprehensive change increases among men (46%) compared to women (31%), and among young people, the more educated, students, and supporters of opposition factions.

The results also show that the percentage of those believing in the existence of corruption in PA institutions and agencies is still very high standing today at 64%. This percentage is similar to the one obtained in CPRS' last survey in early June 1998 and to those obtained during 1997.

The findings also indicate that Palestinians are not impressed by their own democracy as only 35% gave it a positive rating. A similar percentage was obtained in CPRS' poll # 29 in September 1997, while it reached 50% in April 1997. Similarly, the percentage of those who believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear remained high at 57%, compared to 58% in September 1997 and 52% in December 1996.

3) Election for the President and Political Affilitation

• About 61% would reelect Yasir Arafat if elections were held tody, while 2% would vote for Ahmad Yassin and 2% for Haidar Abdul Shafi
• The largest percentage of votes for a vice-president reaches 6% only and would go to Abu Mazin.
• Fateh remains stable at 43% while the Islamists continue to rise from 17% to 19%.

The results clearly show that Arafat is the only Palestinian leader who can command the loyalty of the majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. He received 61% of the votes in this poll, while the next competitor received less than 2%. Both Ahmad Yassin aHaidar Abdul Shafi receive1.6% each, while 15 other Palestinians received less than 1.5% each. It is worth mentioning, however, that the Palestinian presidency received a 71% positive rating only one month ago. However, current results are not different from those obtained in CPRS' poll # 30 in November 1997. It should be remembered that respondents were not given a list of candidates and had to select one form memory.

Results for the position of the vice-president were similar to those obtained in poll # 30 which indicated a lack of consensus in the Palestinian street with regard to the selection of a Palestinian leader other than Arafat. This also means that the subject is still open to all possibilities. Nonetheless, the results show Abu Mazin receiving about 6% of the votes followed by Sa'eb Erekat with 4%, Abu al-Ala' with 3%, Haidar Abdul Shafi with 3%, and Farouq al-Qaddumi, Al-Tayyib Abdul Rahim, and Nabil Sha'ath with 2% each. Another 11 Palestinians received less than 1.5% each while 65% said that they did not know or did not have any candidate.

The political affiliation results show Fateh maintaining its position with 43%, followed by Hamas with a slight increase from 12% last month to 13% today. Support for the Islamists increased from 17% last month to 19% in this poll.

4) Satellite, Computers, and Internet in Palestinian Homes

• About 27% have satellite dishes at home
• About 12% own computers at home and among those 7% are Internet subscribers.
• About 2% have access to the Internet at work

The poll results show that more than a quarter of the Palestinians has satellite dishes at hom. The percentage is higher in the Gaza Strip, reaching 33%. More dishes are found in cities (33%) compared to refugee camps or villages and towns (about 24% each). One is more likely to find them in the areas of Jerusalem (52%), Ramallah (32%), Gaza City (41%), Deir al-Balah (37%), and Jabalia (31%), but less likely to find them in the areas of Jenin (9%), Nablus (13%), and Tulkarm and Qalqilia (15% each.

Home computers are owned by 12% of the people, especially in the areas of Jerusalem, Ramallah, Hebron, and Gaza City. The Internet is used by 2% of the people in their work place, while less than 1% use it at home (7% of those who own a computer at home have access to the internet)...More