PressRelease   Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU), the Netherland Representative Office in Ramallah, and the UNDP/PAPP on behalf of the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine..

PressRelease  

Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU), the Netherland Representative Office in Ramallah, and the UNDP/PAPP on behalf of the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine..

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

●  Support for the two-state solution stands at 46% among Palestinians and Israeli Jews.  In June 2017, 53% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews supported that solution. Among Israeli Arabs, support for the two-state solution stands today at 83%.

●  Still, fewer people on both sides support three possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights, one state without rights, and expulsion or “transfer.”

●  Only 40% of Palestinians (compared to 43% in June 2017) and 35% of Israeli Jews (a three-point increase from the June survey) support a permanent peace agreement package, along with 85% of Israeli Arabs – typical of the high level support from Israeli Arabs in previous surveys. In total, 43% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. Forty-eight percent of Israelis (55% of Israeli Jews) and 57% of Palestinians are opposed to the two-state comprehensive package.

●  The skepticism about the package appears closely related to serious doubts about feasibility. Palestinians and Israelis are both divided almost equally about whether a two-state solution is still possible, or whether settlements have expanded too much to make it viable. Among all Israelis, nearly half believes the solution is still viable (48%), while 42% think settlements have spread too much for it to be viable, although among Jews more think it is not viable (46% compared to 42% who think it is). Among Palestinians, 60% say the two-state solution is no longer viable (an eight-point increase), while 37% think it is. But fully 75% and 73% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, respectively, do not expect a Palestinian state to be established in the next five years.

●  Despite the majority rejection of the two-state implementation package, their opposition can be shifted significantly based on added policy incentives. For example, 44% of Jews who are opposed would change their minds if the Palestinian government commits itself to ongoing security cooperation like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, preventing attacks and arresting terror suspects – bringing total support to a 59% majority.  Among  Palestinians who are opposed to the package, 39% would change their minds to support the agreement if Israel recognized the Nakba and the suffering of refugees and provides compensation to the refugees. When the Palestinians who change their minds for this item are added to original supporters, 62% support the agreement.

●  When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 26% of the Palestinians and 38% of Israeli Jews choose “reach a peace agreement.” However, in a departure from previous attitudes 38% of Palestinians (compared to just over one-fifth last June) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 18% (compared to 12% last June) called for “a definitive war with the Palestinians.”

The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 7-10 December, 2017. The number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 830 and in the Gaza Strip 440. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between 29 November to 14 December, 2017. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 650, West Bank settlers100, and Israeli Arabs 150. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is 3%.  It should be noted that the entire Palestinian survey was conducted immediately after the announcement by President Donald Trump that the US recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and during a period of limited Palestinian-Israeli confrontations. Most of the Israeli data was collected prior to the declaration, and about 20% of the sample responded immediately following. The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provide the respective findings for these sub groups. 

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Two-state solution: In the current survey, less than half of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, (46% each), support the two-state solution. Last June, 52% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews supported this solution, when described as a general principle, without details.  Fifty-one percent of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews are opposed; the remainder declined to give an answer. Among Israeli Arabs, support remains solid at 83%, bringing the total Israeli average to 52%. Among Israeli settlers, support stands today at 20% and 79% are opposed. As seen in the graph below, among Jews, support for the two-state principles has seen an incremental but steady decline since June 2016, when it stood at 53%. Among Palestinians support has varied: it fell from June to December 2016, when 44% supported the basic two-state solution in principle, rose to 52% last June, then declined once again. Unlike previous findings, support for the two-state solution among Palestinians is higher in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (44%). Last June 61% of Gazans came out in favor of a two-state solution compared to 48% among West Bankers.

Among Israelis, as in the past, the significant variations are found among demographic groups defined by religious observance and age. Secular Israeli Jews show a majority who support two states, 63%, compared to less than one-quarter of religious Jews (23%). Among Jewish Israelis, support is lowest among the youngest group, and rises with age – thus among the youngest Jews, 18-24 years old, just 27% support this, and just 37% among the 25-34 group – compared to a 54% majority among those whose age is 55 years or over.

Perceptions of public support. When asked if they believe their own societies support the two-state solution, 27% of Israeli Jews believe the majority of Israelis support it, almost unchanged from June, and 57% believe the majority opposes it; thus perceptions of their society are inaccurately weighted towards rejection, rather than the reality of evenly divided opinions. Among Israeli Arabs, 32% think that most Israeli Jews support the principle of a two-state solution, a 19-points decrease when compared to the June findings.

Palestinian perception of their own side’s position has changed during the past six months. Today 42%, compared to 48% last June, believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution and 52%, compared to 45% last June, think a majority opposes it.

Regarding attitudes towards the other side, the portion of Palestinians who think Israeli Jews support the two-state solution is declining: 39% of Palestinians, compared to 42% last June, think the majority of Jewish Israelis support this solution and 50%, compared to 45% last June, think they oppose it. Among Israeli Jews, just one-third believe Palestinians support the two-state solution.

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. These findings help to explain why large portions are skeptical and Palestinian attitudes have shifted in this poll. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 4% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years. Fully 75% of Palestinians, compared to 71% last June, say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a similarly large majority of 73% think the chances are low or very low, 53% of Israeli Arabs take this view, and the weighted average for all Israelis is 70% who do not believe a Palestinian state will be established in that time. The remainder, fewer than one-fifth of Israelis and Palestinians, say the chances are “medium.”

Further, the view that the two-state solution is no longer even feasible is increasingly widespread in general social and public discourse. We tested this belief directly, asking respondents on both sides whether settlements have expanded too much, making a two-state solution impossible, or whether settlements can still be dismantled or evacuated and therefore the solution is still viable. Among Palestinians, a majority of 60% believes the solution is no longer viable, an eight-point rise compared to 52% last June. The rate is higher in the West Bank, 62%, compared to 56% of Gaza residents. The increased pessimism among Palestinians regarding the viability of the two-state solution is probably linked to the announcement by President Trump in which he recognized Jerusalem as the capital of the state on Israel. The Israelis on the other hand are once again divided: 48% among all Israelis think the solution is still viable, and a smaller portion, 42% think it is not. But among Jews, attitudes have shifted from June: at present a plurality believe the two-state solution is not viable, 46%, while 42% think it is. Six months earlier, the trend was reversed: 49% of Jews said it was still viable, and 43% said it was not. Among Arab Israeli respondents, three quarters believe this solution is still viable (74%).

            Peace and violence. Unlike our June findings which showed remarkable similarities between Palestinians and Israeli Jews regarding what should happen next, the current survey shows the Palestinians moving away from their preference for a peace agreement, to growing support for waging an armed struggle. This is also likely the result of President Trump’s statement regarding Jerusalem. While a plurality of Israelis continues to support a peace agreement, findings show a slight decrease in support for peace and a similar increase in preference for violence. As indicated earlier, part of the Israeli fieldwork took place after the Trump announcement and during a period of rising tensions and confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis. When given four options for what should happen next, only 26% of Palestinians, compared to 45% last June, said there should be a peace agreement, while 38%, compared to 21% in the previous survey, chose armed struggle. Among the Israelis, the plurality (38%) chose peace (still a decline compared to 45% last June) compared to 19% who chose “a definitive war,” against Palestinians. Last June only 12% opted for the war option.

Three competing alternatives to the two-state solution: One state with equal rights, one state without equal rights (apartheid), and expulsion or “transfer”

The joint poll sought to ascertain the breakdown of Palestinians and Israelis regarding various alternatives to the two-state solution. Three alternative options were offered: (1) one state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians (one state), (2) one state solution in which one side or the other is denied equal rights (apartheid),  (3) a single state in which the other side is “transferred” or expelled from the entire territory of historic or Mandatory Palestine (expulsion). For options two and three, Israeli Arabs were asked the same questions asked of Palestinians, i.e., in which rights of Jews are denied in the second option and expulsion is applied to Jews in the third option.

The findings show a high level of overlap: in other words, a single respondent often supported more than one of the three alternative options. In the following analysis we sought to identify a “core constituency” for each alternative option: i.e., the greatest number of respondents who would support the most desirable response – for the purposes of this analysis, the two-state solution – even if they support other responses, since policymakers can count on their support for two states. We then quantified the greatest number who supported the second-best option, but who would not support the two-state solution, and so on for the third and least desirable options.

To explain how this was done - in the first stage of the analysis, respondents who support a two-state solution are removed from the constituencies that support any of the other alternatives. In a second stage, those who support a one-state solution are removed from the constituencies that support either or both of the remaining two alternatives, apartheid and expulsion. In the final stage, we separate the remaining two groups by removing those who support apartheid from the constituency that supports expulsion. 

As the two pies below show, the largest constituency is the one that supports the two-state solution. Once those respondents are excluded from the sample and the remaining public is assigned one alternative at a time, the public splits almost equally on each side, between the three alternatives without any one emerging as the most preferred. The category called “other” refers to respondents who either rejected all options or responded “do not know.” These findings are similar to those of June with two main differences: (1) those Palestinians who abandoned the two-state solution (46% support it at present, compared to 53% in June), shifted to the “other’ category, which increased from 11% to 18%. (2) On the Israelis side, support for the “apartheid” option decreased by 4 points from 15% to 11%.

On the Palestinian side, there is minimal difference between Gazans and West Bankers in their preferences for the two-state solution and its three alternatives. But gaps do emerge when looking at the political affiliation or vote preferences, with supporters of Fatah emerging as the only group that has a majority support for the two-state solution followed by the unaffiliated with about half supporting it.  Surprisingly, as in the previous survey, support among Hamas voters for the two-state solution emerges as the largest group, followed by expulsion.

A similar examination of the Israeli Jewish side shows that support for the two-state solution is highest only among secular and traditional Jews, but not among the religious. The latter prefer one equal state over all other and prefer the two-state and the expulsion options equally) and the Ultra-Orthodox (who also prefer the one equal state solution over all other followed by the two-state). But when looking at the political spectrum, support for the two-state solution is higher than all others among almost all groups, including those who define themselves as “moderate right.” Only among those who self-define as simply “right,” which can be considered firm right-wingers, two states and one equal state constituencies are tied with 20% each, while the expulsion group is largest. (The size of firm right category is 29% of the Jewish sample.)

Finally, when looking at Israeli Arabs, as the pie below shows, support for the two-state solution, as indicated above, is overwhelming, followed by support for the one state solution. This means that, as in the case of Israeli Jews and Palestinians, once the overlap in the Israeli Arab sample is removed, little support remains for the other two alternatives. There are no Israeli Arabs who support expulsion or apartheid, who do not also support a more moderate option.

Confederation: For the third time, we tested an alternative to the traditional two-state solution in the form of a confederation between two states. The confederation alternative was described as follows:

“Some people recommend the following solution: the creation of two states, Palestine and Israel, which enter into a confederation whereby citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections. There would be freedom of movement for all, and Jerusalem is not divided but serves as the capital of two states. Israel and Palestine would deal jointly with security and the economy..  

Support for the confederation concept is higher this time than it was in June 2017 and in December 2016, with 33% of Israeli Jews, a 7-point increase from June and 13-point increase from last December.

By contrast, Palestinian attitudes towards the confederation idea declined nine points, from 37% to 28% in six months, with 64% opposition – reflecting the general decline in supportive attitudes among Palestinians in the current survey. As is the case for the two-state solutions, support for the confederation idea is highest among Israeli Arabs, at 70%, with 25% opposed.

Separately we also tested one specific element that characterizes confederation or a semi-separation approach. The survey asked Israelis and Palestinians if they support each side being allowed “to live in the other state as permanent residents, if they are law abiding, and they will only vote in their own national parliament.” Among Palestinians, 38% are in favor (40% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) and 58% are opposed. Among Israeli Jews, findings are similar, with 40% in favor and 50% opposed (with one-quarter, 26%, of Jewish settlers supporting this). But Israeli Arabs show an overwhelming support (84%) for the idea, bringing the total average Israeli support to 47%.

Detailed package for implementation  

Palestinians and Israelis were then asked to support or oppose a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. They responded first to each item separately, as component parts; following nine such items they were asked if they support or opposed the combined package, and given a short summary of the basic elements. Among Palestinians, reflecting the decline in support for the general concept of the two-state solution, we found that support for the overall package declines from 43% in June to 40% today. Support among West Bankers increased slightly to from 40% to 42% while in the Gaza Strip, support plummeted considerably from half in June to 35% in the current poll. Among all Israelis, 43% support this package: 35% among Israeli Jews and 85% among Israeli Arabs. Six months ago, 32% of Israeli Jews and 83% of Israeli Arabs supported the package – at that time, the Israeli average was 41% support, thus the current survey shows little change.  

In the current survey, 54% of Jews inside the Green Line and 77% of settlers oppose this package (55% for all Israeli Jews, compared to 61% six months ago). 57% of Palestinians, compared to 54% six months ago, oppose the combined package.

Items of an agreement. A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package follows (non-italicized questions were asked of Israeli Jews and if no other wording appears, also for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Italics refer to the questions worded separately for Palestinians; some of the Palestinian wordings were used for Israeli Arabs):

1.    Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 59% of Israeli Jews support this, including 40% of West Bank settlers.

Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side. 41%, of Palestinians support mutual recognition, 45% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip. 85% of Israeli Arabs support mutual recognition.

2.     The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry). Only 20% of Palestinians support this, and more than three-quarters (77%) oppose the demilitarized state. Among Israeli Jews, 56% support this item; a nearly-identical percentage of Israeli Arabs (55%) support it. 

3.     A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Among Palestinians, 36% support this. Israeli Jews were divided, with 48% for and 45% against this item; among Israeli Arabs, 69% supported it.

4.     The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. 30% of Palestinians support this (40% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank). Among Israeli Jews, 38% support this, and among Israeli Arabs 56% support it.

5.     The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. 34% of Palestinians support this, 39% among Gazans and 31% among West Bankers. 37% of Israeli Jews support this and just 12% of settlers (85% are opposed). 71% of Arabs support this item.

6.     The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel. Just a little over a quarter of Palestinians (27%) support the territorial exchange. 35% of Israeli Jews support this, and 68% of Israeli Arabs, with settlers showing nearly the same breakdown as the previous item.

7.     West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Less than a quarter (23%) of Jews support this item, and only 5% among West Bank settlers. 

East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of the Israel. 26% of Palestinians support this, with very little distinction between West Bank and Gazan respondents. 71% of Israeli Arabs support this item.

8.     In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. 28% of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement, with 66% opposed.

In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. Here again, just over one-quarter (26%) of Palestinians support the division of the Old City, with only small differences between Gaza and the West Bank. 71%of Palestinians are opposed to this item. Almost two-thirds of Israeli Arabs support this (65%).

9.     Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.  A majority of Palestinians support this, 52%, and 45% are opposed. This item shows some difference between Gazans – with 57% support – and West Bankers, with 50% support. This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: 19% support the arrangement on refugees, while 74% are opposed, and 92% - essentially a consensus among West Bank settlers. Israeli Arabs show the opposite trend: 85% support it, with 13% opposed.

Perception of social support for package. On both sides, respondents also perceive their own society’s support for the plan to be low. Palestinians are more likely to say that among other Palestinians the majority supports the plan – 37% believe this, compared to 40% of Palestinians who actually support it – a slight difference. Over half (56%) of Palestinians believe the majority of Palestinians oppose it – close to the reality of 57%. Among Israeli Jews, however, a high portion accurately believe the majority rejects the agreement: 62%. Although 35% of Israeli Jews support the plan, only 19% believe that the majority supports it.

It is interesting to note that among Israeli Jews, a higher portion think Palestinians would accept the combined package, than those who think the majority of Jews support it: 29% say that the majority of Palestinians support the package. Among the Palestinians 37% think the majority of Israelis support the package – the same percentage who believe their own side has majority support.

Regional and demographic trends. Unlike all three previous surveys that asked about this package, support in Gaza is lower than that in the West Bank (35% to 42% respectively) – in the past support has been higher in Gaza. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that only minor differences exist between refugees and non-refugees (38% and 41% respectively). Support for the package drops to 34% among Palestinians between the ages of 18 and 22 years compared to all other age groups where support ranges between 40%-41%. Although young Jewish respondents are often more hard-line than older people, as seen earlier regarding the general two-state solution, in this survey support for the package varies only minimally by age among Jews.

Among Palestinians and Israelis, support for the package is higher among those who are less religious, and lower among those who are more religious. Among Palestinians who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” nearly half (47% and 46%, respectively) support the package compared to those who define themselves as religious (32%). Fatah voters support the package with a large majority (58%) compared to only 28% among Hamas voters and 35% among supporters of other factions or third parties.

Just 21% of Israeli settlers support the full package, the same as among religious Jews. Slightly higher support is found among traditional Jews (27%) and the ultra-Orthodox (33%). The findings reflect a very consistent religious-secular divide, with 44% of secular Jews in favor of the full package. (A second demographic divide is found between younger and older Jews: 30% of the 18-22 year old Jews support the package, compared to 35%-36% among older age groups.) 

Among all Israelis, with Jews and Arabs combined, support varies most of all depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: over two-thirds, 68%, of those who consider themselves left-wing support the full package, a majority of centrists (55%), and 23% of right-wingers.

Feasibility - doubts. Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. In previous surveys, it has been clear that trust in the other side is a powerful factor, and the belief that the other side wants peace. It also became clear that the perception of viability was important, therefore in the current survey we offer deeper analysis of this factor.

Among Israeli Jews who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 50% support the combined package. Further, for Israeli Jews, support for the agreement rises in part on whether the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

Among the Palestinians who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 58% support the combined package. Further, support for the agreement rises incrementally the more the respondents believe there is chance of establishing a Palestinian state within the next five years.

Peace Incentives: Changing minds

Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible,” that is, whether additional policy items can act as incentives to change their minds in favor. To this end, we developed a series of policies that could be added to an agreement, and proposed them to respondents who originally said they opposed the full, detailed package. As noted above, this included 55% of Israeli Jews and 57% of Palestinians.

Each side was offered seven incentives. Some of the incentives were similar, reflecting either the same policy or a parallel item. Three items tested the same policy: making the Israeli-Palestinian agreement part of the Arab Peace Initiative, insuring that the Palestinian state would have a democratic and clean political system, and the creation of a joint commission made of the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to provide formal guarantees to ensure proper implementation of the agreement on both sides.  The other four items were designed to be specifically favorable to one side: for example, for Israelis – allowing Jews to visit at the Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif or allow Israelis, including settlers, to live in the Palestinian state as permanent residents as long as they are law-abiding, and for the Palestinians, an Israeli recognition of the Nakba and the suffering of refugees, and providing compensation to refugees, and allowing Palestinians, including refugees, to live as permanent residents inside the state of Israel while maintaining their Palestinian citizenship, as long as they are law abiding.

The items were tested as follows (italics indicates questions asked of Palestinians). Once again these questions were asked only among those who opposed the full package of the detailed two-state agreement.

1.     And if the agreement is part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 37% of Israeli Jews who opposed the agreement at first, said that they would now support it. Added to those who already support the agreement, a total of 55% of Israeli Jews would support it with this item.

If in addition to the above items of the permanent settlement package, Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty? 24% of Palestinians who did not support the initial package said they would support it if this case.  Added to those who already support the agreement, a total of 54% of Palestinians would support it with this item.

2.    And if the agreement states that the state of Palestine will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures? 40% of Israeli Jews said this would make them support the agreement.

37% of Palestinians said they would support the agreement with this item.

3.     And what if the agreement includes formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides? 39% of Jewish Israelis who initially opposed the agreement said they would support if it this item was included.

More than one quarter (27%) of Palestinians opposed would support the agreement if it included this item.

4.     What if the agreement states that Israeli Jews, including settlers, are allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Palestine while maintaining their Israeli citizenship, as long as they are law abiding? 35% of Israeli Jews would support the agreement with this item.

And if agreement states that Palestinians, including refugees, are allowed, if they wish, to live as permanent residents inside Israel while maintaining their Palestinian citizenship, as long as they are law abiding? Among those opposed, 25% said they would change their minds and support an agreement if it includes this item.

5.     And if the Palestinians return to a Palestinian state, and the agreement states that they do not have the collective right to return to Israel proper, with exceptions only for family reunification? 31 of Jewish Israelis would support the agreement in this case.

And if the agreement states that the state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law?  21% of Palestinians said this would make them change their minds and support an agreement.

6.    And if the Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation like today, including sharing intelligence with Israeli security forces, arresting terror suspects and preventing attacks? For this item, 44% of Israeli Jews said they would change their minds from opposing to supporting the agreement. When added to the original number of supporters of the original agreement, 59% of Israeli Jews in total would support the package if it includes this incentive.

And if the agreement allows the current Palestinian National Security Force to become an army with light weapons but without heavy weapons? 16% of Palestinians, said they would change their minds and support the original agreement based on this addition.

7.     And if the agreement allows Jews to visit at the Temple Mount? 47% of Israeli Jews said they would support the agreement in that case. Added to those who already support the agreement, about 61% of Israeli Jews would support it with this item.

And if the agreement states that Israel recognizes the Nakba and the suffering of refugees, and provides compensation to refugees? 39% of Palestinians said they would support the package in that case. Added to those who already support the agreement, about 62% of Palestinians would support it with this item.

The results above are shown in the following graphs:

In all, between 31% to 47% of Jews who were opposed to an agreement said they would change their minds and support it based on one of these incentives. Among Palestinians, from 16% to 39% of those who rejected the agreement could change their minds. With added support, several of the incentives could convince enough respondents to reach a majority, or even a strong majority. This indicates significant flexibility and openness of attitudes; it also implies that rejection of the two-state implementation package is not entirely ideological, but can be changed with the right policies. A democratic state of Palestine is a powerful incentive for both parties – while for Palestinians, Israeli recognition of the Nakba is the most powerful; for the Israelis, allowing visits to the Temple Mount/Al Haram al Sharif is the most powerful.

(2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Negotiation Framework and Third Parties: We sought to examine support for alternatives to the US-brokered negotiation processes that characterized the last two decades. In the last three surveys, we tested five models for a multi-lateral approach to negotiations: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process; 4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process. Findings show that in all surveys, Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab regional, approach (31% in December and June 2017 and 27% in the current survey) followed by an EU and a UN approaches (15% and 13% respectively at present); 4% choose an American-Russian led peace process, and 3% selected a US-led multi-lateral process.

Israeli Jews prefer practically the opposite approach, with a clear preference for US involvement: the plurality consistently chooses a US-led peace process, with 28% selecting it in the current survey, while 21% selected a US-Russian approach, and 16% selected a regional approach led by Arab states.

The deep polarization over the role of the US fulfills the finding from the December 2016 survey. At that time, large majorities of both Israeli Jews (69%) and Palestinians (77%) expected the incoming Trump administration to be pro-Israeli, and just a minority on both sides expected him to be neutral (or pro-Palestinian).

A UN-led process was selected by just 7% of Israeli Jews and support for an EU-led process is just 2% - this reflects ongoing perceptions in Israeli society that both bodies are biased against Israel, a theme regularly repeated in public discourse. 

Among Israelis Arabs, the Arab-led regional and UN-led approaches had the highest support (18% each). 16% chose an EU process, 13% chose the US-Russian approach, and only 6% preferred a US-led process.

(3) How Israelis and Palestinians View Each Other:

We asked the two sides about perceptions of both the other, and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does, whether they trust and whether they fear the other side. We probed the extent of zero sum beliefs. The picture is mostly consistent with trends in our recent surveys, although assessment of each side of its own conditions, particularly among Palestinians in the West Bank, show significant decline.

Does the other side want peace? Among Palestinians, 37% agree that most Israelis want peace, a decline from June 2017, when 44% of Palestinians gave this response, but consistent with December 2016 when 38% thought Israelis want peace. Less than one-third (29%) of Israeli Jews think most Palestinians want peace; this is a steady decline from one year ago, when 41% thought this way, then just 33% in June 2017. Among Israeli Arabs 85% agree that most Palestinians want peace, and 57% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: As in previous recent surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (89% - almost unchanged from 87% in June). The majority of Israeli Arabs feel the opposite regarding Israeli Jews: 61% agree that Israeli Jews can be trusted, and 30% disagree.

On the Israeli Jewish side, three-quarters believe that Palestinians cannot be trusted, almost unchanged from 77% in June, and just 19% agreed with the statement that they can be trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 51% of Israeli Jews (compared to 53% in June), 53% of Israeli Arabs, and 72% of Palestinians (unchanged from June) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization.

Fear: More Palestinians fear Israeli soldiers and armed settlers more than they fear Israeli Jews. 46% agreed with the statement “I feel fear towards Israeli soldiers and armed settlers,” but 35% agreed with the statement made about Jews. This trend is nearly unchanged from December. There are significant differences between West Bank and Gaza respondents: 53% from the West Bank fear soldiers and settlers, while just 36% of Gazans do – this could reflect the fact that West Bankers have more significant daily contact with such figures.

Among Israeli Jews, a majority of 57% agree with the statement “I feel fear toward Palestinians,” a decline from June 2017 and December 2016 when two-thirds felt that way (in both previous surveys). Among settlers 79% agree. Regarding Arab-Jewish relations among Israeli citizens, 51% of Jews agree that they fear Israeli Arabs, but only 7% of Israeli Arabs agree with a statement that they fear Israeli Jews; 90% disagree.

General Conditions of the two sides: 71% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad (72% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip). These finding is fully 26-points higher than the negative assessment of conditions among West Bankers in June (46%), and reflects the rising tensions in the West Bank in the aftermath of the Trump statement on Jerusalem. Assessment of conditions in the Gaza Strip remains almost unchanged. Among Israeli Jews 46% are satisfied, with settlers indicating the same level of satisfaction as other Jews. Six months ago, 54% of Israeli Jews (and 64% of settlers) described conditions as good or very good.  Among Israeli Arabs, only 27% describe conditions as good or very good. Around 37% among all Israeli groups, and 18% of Palestinians, say conditions are “so-so.”

(4) Values and Goals

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Jews were asked about the values of: (1) a Jewish majority, (2) Greater Israel, (3) Democracy, (4) Peace. Among Israeli Jews, peace and a Jewish majority are seen as the most important values (29% and 28% respectively), followed by greater Israel (19%) and democracy (16%). The portion who chose greater Israel rose between June 2016 (10%) and December 2017 (14%), to 17% last June, to 19% in the current poll.  Democracy however decreased between June and December 2017 by 3 points.

Among the Palestinians, we asked about the following goals: (1) Israeli withdrawal and establishing a Palestinian state, (2) Obtaining right of return for refugees to ’48 Israel, (3) Establishing a democratic political system, (4) Building a pious or moral individual and religious society. For Palestinians, the ranking has been relatively stable, with almost no change over the course of the year. The top priority for Palestinian goals remains Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem (48% chose this compared to 43% last June), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (28%), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (14%) and building a democratic political system (9%, a decrease of 4 points from the previous survey in June).

The government of Dr. Muhammad Mustafa was formed by a decree of the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas. It was formed at one of the worst moments for the Palestinian people; a moment of great challenges and a perceived threat of genocide in the Gaza Strip. The war in Gaza has been accompanied by the escalation of Israeli attacks in the West Bank, including daily killings by the Israeli army and settlers, forced displacement out of area C, destruction of homes, confiscation of land, and the arrest of thousands since October 7, 2023. On top of that, the PA is going through one of its worst times since its inception in terms of its perceived and actual weakness and inability to fulfill its obligations towards the Palestinian people, in addition to the decline in public trust and confidence in the entire PA, its institutions, and its leadership standing today at the lowest level since its creation 30 years ago. The formation of the new government came in response to international pressure, essentially American and European. These PA donors emphasized the need for a "revitalized" PA with which they can cooperate to shape the Palestinian future, especially for the “day after” the end of the war on the Gaza Strip, requesting that it should be a non-political government, one consisting of respected professionals and technocrats.

The government presented its platform, which included 7 main articles, including institutional reform. A quick look at the institutional reform article shows that it contained two items:

• The development of an institutional reform plan, one that would address economic, security, judicial, financial and public administration sectors. It outlined specific financial areas, such as fiscal responsibility, budget transparency, efficient allocation of resources and expenditure management, as well as health and education.
• The formation of a ministerial working group or committee to coordinate and lead the reform process. The Government approved the mission and work plan of the Ministerial Committee, as well as the relevant sectors of reform, which can be grouped in ten areas: strengthening the principles of government, transparency, accountability and combating corruption; improving the justice sector and strengthening the rule of law; strengthening democracy and human rights; enhancing the efficiency and capabilities of the public sector; reforming the security sector and promoting civil peace; improving the quality of services such as health and education; reforming public financial conditions; improving the local government sector; integrating digital transformation into the productive and service sectors; and strengthening and developing the economic sector.

So far, about three months after the publication of the government's platform, the government has not published any further statements about the content of the reform plan. The ministerial statement omitted any reference to how this government will be able to carry out reforms and what distinguishes it from other previous governments. The government has not explained to us why it thinks it can succeed in carrying out reforms and fighting corruption. Does it think that American support for the government is sufficient to help it overcome various challenges it will most likely confront. Is there enough support from President Abbas, different this time from the support he gave to the previous government, so that the Mustafa’s government can implement its program.

This Brief aims to do two things:

1) Examine the challenges and obstacles that could prevent the current government from implementing the reforms proposed in its program. The Brief will do so by reviewing the reasons for the failure of the various previous reform programs of successive Palestinian governments; and,

2) Propose recommendations on how to move forward on the reform process in all institutions of the Palestinian political system. 

The Brief benefited from meetings with various Palestinian parties with knowledge of the developments in the reform process, the results of public opinion polls conducted during the past two years, and a review of a number of specialized reports issued by various competent authorities. The Brief concludes with an assessment of the prospects of Mustafa’s success in overcoming the daunting challenges facing the reform process.

Calls for reform in PA institutions date back to 1997, when the General Audit Institution’s (GAI) report on corruption in PA institutions was issued. This report had a great resonance in the Palestinian society as well as the PA institutions. It was followed by the release of a follow up report by a committee formed by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to study the GAI report and the claims of administrative and financial corruption in PA institutions. These reports were followed by calls for reform. Externally, there have been several such calls, most notably the report issued by the Independent Working Group for the Strengthening of PA Institutions in 1999 (the so-called Rocard report).

Palestinian calls and efforts for reform have continued over the past years, as all previous Palestinian governments have adopted ambitious reform programs that have been shattered by a set of challenges and obstacles that prevented the implementation of the reform agenda. The challenges and their sources are varied. Some of these challenges are external, such as the Israeli occupation and external pressure from donors, and some are internal, such as the absence of political will among the top Palestinian decision-makers, the absence of integrity in governance, the financial and political costs of reform, in addition to a diminished public trust in the Palestinian political system since 2010, when the term of the parliament and the president expired.

The Palestinian society demands a set of reforms, including the need to hold general legislative and presidential elections, respect for the rule of law, building effective governance institutions with accountability, applying the principle of separation of powers in the political system, ensuring the independence and professionalism of the judiciary, and implementing the principles of transparency in the practice of governance and the management of public affairs and funds.

Internal challenges:

External Challenges:

The Israeli occupation and donor pressure are additional challenges that constrain the reform process, although donor pressure can sometimes be a driver of reform. The Israeli occupation still imposes its military and administrative control over the largest area of the West Bank, Area C, which constitutes 62% of the territory of the Palestinian Authority. Israel separates the two parts of the PA territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from each other, in addition to controlling the crossings and commercial movement of imports and exports, and thus collects Palestinian taxes to be returned to the PA. In recent years, however, it has imposed various financial sanctions on the PA, plunging it into an escalating financial crisis that has weakened the its inability to fulfill its obligations to its citizens. The PA cannot carry out many economic reforms related to the tax system or modify them in line with Palestinian conditions due to the restrictions of the Paris Agreement signed between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, which made the Palestinian economy dependent on Israel’s.

Over the past years, donors’ pressure have been placed on the PA to carry out reforms within PA institutions. This pressure has varied between financial and political. Most donor reform demands have been linked to political developments with Israel raising suspicion among the Palestinians about the real agenda of the donors. These reform demands were seen as the donors’ means of evading responsibility for pressing Israel to implement its own commitments.[14] Western demands for reform began with the end of the Interim Period of the Oslo process and intensified during the second intifada. Steps that Israel was required to take where occasionally linked to reforms that the PA was required to make despite the fact that these reforms were not part of PA commitments under the various peace agreement with Israel. Nonetheless, despite the politicization of the reform process by donors to appease Israel, donor pressure has sometimes succeeded in forcing the PA ruling elite to embrace the reform agenda, especially when donor pressure coincided with growing internal pressure on the same reform agenda, such as the approval of the highly significant 2003 amendments on the Basic Law in. On the other hand, the PA's response to external reform pressure while ignoring internal demands demonstrates its weakness to its citizens and contributes to undermining confidence in it and its institutions.

After 30 years since the establishment of the PA, it has become necessary to face these challenges and overcome the obstacles to the reform process in order to build strong and accountable institutions capable of advancing the interests of the Palestinian society. Only success in this effort can strengthen the society’s steadfastness in the face of the Israeli occupation, both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The following proposed measures are steps the Mustafa government can explore today:

Can the government of Mohamed Mustafa overcome the reform challenges addressed in this Brief? Needless to say, the current government has no popular support, no factional mandate, no meaningful public trust, and have not received a vote of confidence from a parliamentary majority.  So far, it has not articulated a clear vision for moving forward, one characterized by willingness to take the initiative or boldness in facing the reform challenges. Without such attributes, the Mustafa government will not be able to face the various challenges, foremost among them is the lack of political will for reform. The government continues to operate as if it derives its powers and legitimacy from the president, whose electoral legitimacy expired fourteen years ago, and not from the constitution, as it should. Other than lip service, there are no signs of a serious change on the part of the president or the new prime minister regarding the introduction of serious reforms. Neither the prime minister nor his ministers have indicated any desire to challenge those who have appointed them to office, even if it is to demonstrate their independence or to affirm their loyalty to the Basic Law that they have sworn to uphold.

However, we should not give in to despair. This Brief presented a set of recommendations capable of opening a window of hope for the required reforms. Even a limited success today can open the door to a greater and more vital tasks in the future: providing critical support to the residents of the Gaza Strip, reunifying state institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on a professional basis, preparing for general elections, and opening the door toward an inclusive political future for the Palestinian people in organizing their relationship with the international community. To get closer to such goals, the government must not only exercise its full powers and jurisdiction in choosing its course of action, but also receive the support it deserves through accountability and oversight over its actions.

This moment might prove to be a turning point in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, perhaps as important as the one that unfolded 30 years ago and became known as the Oslo process. While it is difficult to assess the future outcome of the current dynamics, it does not look good for Palestine or Israel.

The near future will be shaped by the collision of two developments, one Palestinian and one Israeli. On the Palestinian side, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has now reached the point where it can no longer fully meet Israel’s security expectations in ensuring a “monopoly” over coercive force in areas under its control. This development is currently evident in the formation of armed groups led by young Palestinians in cities and refugee camps, most prominently in the northern part of the West Bank. On top of that, Palestinians strongly believe that it was the costs imposed on Israel during the first and second intifadas that convinced it to view a Palestinian state as an Israeli national interest. It is this belief in the utility of force that is now fueling the rise of armed groups in the West Bank.

On the Israeli side, a “New Israel” is emerging, one characterized by a national-religious ideology eager to push away the Secular Israel that Palestinians have known during most of the past 30 years of the Oslo agreement and assert Israel’s permanent control over the West Bank. The formation of the current Israeli right wing and extreme government, dominated for the first time in Israel’s history by mostly religious and national-religious political parties, is the clearest sign to date of the second development. In the “New Israel,” the national-religious coalition seems to take the Palestinian-Israeli conflict back to its existential roots.

This paper explores the conditions that have led to the current developments in Israel and Palestine, conditions that might lead to the anticipated collision, and how Palestinians and Israelis might be able to avert it. In the scenario of collision, the PA continues to lose legitimacy and the trust of its own people. It is weakened further by Israeli punitive measures and increased military incursions into the Palestinian territories. The combined effect could lead to reduced PA law enforcement capacity thereby generating increased security vacuum in parts of the West Bank and the resultant formation of new Palestinian armed groups willing to challenge both the PA security forces and those of Israel. As the Israeli army seeks to fill the vacuum, it further weakens the PA leading to a vicious cycle of violence and bloodshed. Last year was the most violent in Palestinian-Israeli relations since the end of the second intifada. The number of armed clashes[1] with the Israeli army has increased at least three times compared to 2021. Palestinian deaths in the West Bank alone stood at 146, the highest since 2005[2]. Israeli deaths stood at 31, the highest since 2008[3]. Settlers’ violent incidents against Palestinians stood in 2022 at 755 compared to 496 in 2021 and 358 in 2020.

Conditions could further escalate if in the midst of this cycle, Abbas becomes marginal or even departs the scene. The most probable outcome in this scenario, is increased anarchy in the West Bank that could be followed by an Israeli return to the reoccupation of parts or all of the occupied territories, as it did in 2002 in the midst of the second intifada. To avoid this outcome the PA needs to restore its legitimacy. Despite the low probability of this outcome under the current Palestinian leadership, the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections is the most critical and urgent remedial step without which the current dynamics cannot be stopped or mitigated.  For Israel, the most critical measure is to restore the viability of the two-state solution, a step the current Israeli government cannot take, which means only dramatic Palestinian action or external pressure can slow down the gradual demise of the two-state solution.  

Four features

Without Palestinian elections and the reversal of Israel’s efforts to consolidate its occupation and make it permanent, the next step in the escalatory process will most likely be the reoccupation of all or parts of West Bank urban areas. Given Israel’s experience with the 2002 reoccupation of the West Bank, the decision to do so in the near future might not be seen as too risky.

But the conditions that might be triggered by this anticipated Israeli reoccupation might be different than those prevailing back then in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian urban areas. Four main features of the current reality explain the difference between this scenario and that of 2002. The first is that the PA back then was still enjoying considerable legitimacy and support and was therefore able to maintain its capacity and restore control once the Israeli army pulled out. By contrast, the current PA, depending on the prevailing Palestinian domestic conditions during the reoccupation, might be deprived, partly or completely, of that capacity thus compelling the Israeli army to stay longer.

Secondly, while the Israeli governing coalition in 2002 was not at all interested in annexing, or even fully controlling, the entire West Bank, the current one is at least open to the idea of keeping its army in place or even annexing large parts of the West Bank. A new Palestinian-Israeli order would thereby be created, one that would replace the currently dying order created by the Oslo process.

Thirdly, in 2002 the international community, led by the US and the Quartet, made up of the US, Russia, the EU, and the UN, were still deeply involved in the Middle East and were willing to step in and provide a “Performance-based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” That plan provided for a political process out of the raging violence. Under current conditions, particularly given the US withdrawal from the Middle East, the US and the international community are not likely to play any tangible role. The current efforts led by the US, Jordan, and Egypt to facilitate a Palestinian-Israeli de-escalation, as in the meetings in Aqaba and Sharm al Sheikh[4], seem too little too late to make a dent on the current escalatory dynamics.

Fourthly, while the Arab World was willing at that time to come together in an unprecedented manner and offer Israel its Arab Peace Initiative (API), a Saudi initiative that offered to permanently end the Arab-Israeli conflict that was endorsed by the Beirut Arab Summit in 2002, the Arab world is now much less interested in the Palestinian issue. Instead, it is focused on the regional threat of Iran. The Abraham Accords have shattered the API and contradicted its logic by offering Israel peace with Arab countries without necessarily ending its occupation or allowing the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. While these accords might not expand under current conditions, it is highly unlikely that Israel or its Arab normalization partners would be interested in making the Palestinian-Israeli peace central to their efforts. The Negev Forum that joins these normalizers with Israel in facilitating economic and security cooperation already excludes the Palestinians. Even if the PA is invited to join the forum, it will find it impossible to do so in the absence of a commitment to restore Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on the basis of API, a condition that will most likely be rejected by Israel and the Arab normalizers. The end result is that the PA will continue to be unable to find the means to regain Arab political or financial support

As these two developments described above begin to collide, US efforts, and those of the rest of the international community and the main regional Arab players, are currently restricted to encouraging de-escalation. These efforts are not interested in addressing the dynamics that have gradually generated the new developments. They will therefore fail. It is true that all international players seem to endorse the two-state solution that leads to the creation of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel. But no one is willing to take effective measures to make it a reality; the support, therefore, is empty rhetoric. 

To understand the reason behind the expectations of failure, one needs to understand the nature of the dynamics that produced the two developments: what brought us to this point, and the long-term implications.

The birth of the “New Israel”

What characterizes the New Israel in addition to the dominance of religious-nationalist forces is the rejection of the two-state solution and any engagement with the Palestinians in peace negotiations based on that solution. It is also characterized by a de facto creeping annexation, one that is gaining momentum driven by policies of the new government and that will soon be further facilitated by the weakening of the Israeli judiciary. The religious agenda of New Israel could undermine and eventually destroy the status que in holy places in Jerusalem. The New Israel is showing greater determination to impose punitive measures against the PA due to the latter’s international campaign against Israel. In February 2023, the new Israeli finance minister doubled the amount of the Palestinian monthly custom revenues Israel normally withholds, by directing an additional $40 million to the families of Israeli victims of Palestinian attacks in a punitive measure against the PA’s international campaign against Israel.[5]  In doing so, the minister, Bezalel Smotrich, leader of the Religious Zionist Party, made it clear that he has no interest in the continued existence of the PA. The inevitable outcome is that the current weakening of the PA will accelerate.

Three external factors contributed to the current development over a period of almost 15 years, giving Israel’s right wing and national-religious extremism room to grow and rule. The first was the failure of the US to use leverage on the newly created right-center coalition government led by Netanyahu in 2009, when the Palestinian leadership was still enjoying popular legitimacy and hence was still capable of making peace. The Obama Administration did pressure Israel to freeze settlement construction, but it did nothing to press Netanyahu to continue the so-called Annapolis process that was initiated more than a year earlier by the Bush Administration. In the contest between Obama and the Israeli prime minister, it was Netanyahu who managed to demonstrate that Israel had at least parity in the bilateral relations and that Israel, in fact, had significant leverage over the US administration.

Then came the perception of invincibility.  Donald Trump’s four years in office gave Israel’s right-wing polity and public the perception that their state can do whatever it wants without regard to international law or the most vital interests of the Palestinians. By mid-2020, support among Israeli Jews for the annexation of parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley, exceeded half, standing at more than 70%[6] among right wing voters. Support for the two-state solution among Israeli Jews dropped from 51% in mid-2016, before Trump took office, to 42% by August 2020, just before the end of the Trump term in office; a 9-point drop[7].

Then came the greatest temptation. Before Trump left office, Arab regional players, pushed by perceived regional threats and pulled by Israeli successes and Palestinian impotence, rewarded Israel with normalization of security and economic relations. Why make concessions to the Palestinians if the fruits of Arab-Israeli peace can be gained without having to pay a price. Arab normalization contributed to the ongoing weakening of secular Israel and the empowerment of the national-religious one. After two years of Arab normalization, by December 2022, Israeli Jewish support for the two-state solution dropped further to just one third; another 8-point drop in just two years, and just 14% among right wing voters. Support for a single state in entire area of historic Palestine where Jews enjoy full rights and Palestinians enjoy partial rights received more support than the support for the two-state solution, 37% and 34%[8] respectively.

Domestically, in addition to the gradual shift to the right in Israeli political life, a process that started in 1977, perhaps the first and most critical contribution to the making of national-religious Israel was the trend that started in 2009 and consolidated in 2015, by which religious and extreme national-religious groups, allied themselves in government coalitions solely to Netanyahu and his right-wing Likud party. To take full advantage of his coalition making gains, the secular Netanyahu needed to appease and legitimize the most extreme fringe thus making them mainstream. In 2022, he made efforts to help small extremist parties to join forces, most importantly those represented in the electoral list of Religious Zionism and its allies from Otzma Yehudit and Noam party, so that all of them would be able to pass the electoral threshold. Then came Netanyahu’s personal legal problems. His corruption trial forced him in late 2022 to form a coalition with only those who could allow him to restructure the Israeli judiciary and weaken its independence.

Given these developments, it goes without saying that the current national-religious Israel can be expected to only take additional measures that would accelerate the demise of the two-state solution rather than saving it.   To save it, the Palestinian leadership would have to prepared to take confrontational measures that could risk the collapse of the PA, a step the current leadership will most likely insist on avoiding. Alternatively, the PA leadership could seek Arab and international support for steps that might make it more difficult for national-religious Israel to completely destroy what remains of the two-state solution. With US and EU support, it could coordinate its own policy with the Arab countries interested in normalizing relations with Israel, such as Saudi Arabia and others. Additional normalization could be conditioned on concrete Israeli quid pro quo, such as an Israeli withdrawal from most of area C, greater PA jurisdiction  in areas of its current control, opening area C for Palestinian economic activities, and the construction of a PA-controlled corridor linking the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. None of these measures will be acceptable to the current Israeli government without a strong and unified Arab and international stand, highly unlikely under current conditions and the lack of focus on the Palestinian-Israeli issue.

Palestinian failures

What characterizes Palestinian recent developments in addition to the growing inability to maintain monopoly over coercive force is an inability to organize elections or reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the absence of a peace process, Palestinian-Israeli relations became hostile. The main venue for PA confrontation with Israel has been international institutions. This confrontation is costly, mostly due to the fact that it is asymmetric; the PA has little leverage over Israel while Israel can punitively impose financial costs on it by denying the Palestinians resources and economic opportunities.

What made the PA so weak that it cannot ensure monopoly over force? The answer lies in its loss of legitimacy, electoral and non-electoral. The term of the president ended in 2010. He ruled for 13 years without a popular mandate. For all these years the PA president has prevented the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections. As a result, public trust in the PA government declined from 68% when it was first elected in 2006 to 27% by the end of 2021. Perception that corruption exists in the PA institutions went as high as 86% for most of the past decade. During the same period, the vast majority of Palestinians demanded the resignation of president Abbas[9]; demand for his resignation stands today at 80%. Palestinians now view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people; a majority views its continued existence as serving the interests of Israel and views its dissolution or collapse[10] as serving the interest of the Palestinian people.

This PA failure came mostly from its own internal dynamics. In the past decade, the PA in the West Bank has taken several measures that have severely undermined good governance and eliminated any meaningful accountability in the political system. Four areas have been severely damaged: the separation of power, the independence of the judiciary, the independence and pluralism of civil society and its organizations, and the media and freedom of expression. Without general elections since 2006, the damage inflicted in these four areas was destructive: the parliament was dissolved, rule of law has been sacrificed, the judiciary has been weakened and its independence damaged, media freedoms have been highly curtailed, and the space for civil society has significantly shrunk as its organizations lost much of its independence from the government.

It should be pointed out that, as the case with Israel, external factors were also critical. With little or no attention from the international community, the PA had over the last decade, particularly since the Arab Spring, become bolder in ignoring its own Basic Law and rule of law while seeking to strengthen the power of the presidency and the executive as a whole and to weaken all opposition, including that of civil society. Fearing Islamism, terrorism, and civil wars, the international community seemed much less interested in Palestinian good governance. A post Arab Spring a focus on stability was replacing the traditional agenda of democracy and good governance.

Nonetheless, Palestinian authoritarianism is home grown. As early as 2007, when Hamas violently took over control over the Gaza Strip, the early seeds of authoritarianism in Palestinian politics were planted. It led the PA under Abbas to take immediate measures that sacrificed constitutional requirements and rule of law. Internal rivalry inside Fatah came next, leading to a power struggle in which further damage to rule of law, freedom of speech, and pluralism in civil society was easily done. The reason it was easy can only be explained by the non-democratic nature of the ruling Palestinian elite. Only few of the members of the secular nationalist elite and almost none of the Islamist elite are truly democratic. Without the brakes normally found among democrats, the senior Palestinian bureaucracy in the executive branch found itself free of any meaningful oversight or accountability. Without restrictions on its ability to rule as it saw fit, members of the PA leadership, most importantly the president and his ministers, found it easier to rule without being bothered by a parliament, courts, civil society, or the media.

The PA will almost certainly not embrace a strong or decisive stance in confronting the new national-religious Israel, such as forging a national consensus on a one-state solution, leading a large-scale peaceful popular resistance campaign, or adopting an armed defense strategy in areas under its control. Similarly, holding elections under current conditions might also be out of the question. If so, perhaps steps should be taken to slow down or reverse the authoritarian measures the PA has taken during the past decade. With Arab and international support, efforts could be made to form a national unity government with Hamas and other opposition groups that could reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Short of holding elections, four tasks might be entrusted in the new government. It could adopt a legislative agenda that seeks to amend existing presidential decrees to make them consistent with the Palestinian Basic Law. The restoration of a truly independent judiciary could be a second vital measure for the national unity government. That government could also remove current debilitating restrictions on civil society and the media allowing them to prosper and regain the strength and vitality they had lost during the past decade. Finally, the national unity government could restore liberties and respect for human rights and put an end to the excesses of the security services and bring those services to accountability. While these measures might not be sufficient to restore full legitimacy to the PA and its leadership, it could help to restore some of the lost trust in public institutions and allow the PA to regain the initiative thereby giving it the courage to make difficult decisions.

Where to?

The dynamics described above might usher in a new era in Palestinian-Israeli relations. With the prospects for peace based on a two-state solution coming to an end, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict enters a new phase, one in which partition of the land might no longer an option. With that comes the end of diplomacy and negotiations. Attention of the actors now shifts to other means of resolving the conflict. For the Israelis, this means consolidated settlements construction and domestic legal steps to change the status quo regarding control and sovereignty over the land and the holy places. For the Palestinians, it could mean a return to the use of force.

The PA and the international community will find it difficult to acknowledge this reality. Nonetheless, they are not stupid; they just have no viable alternative. The PA is interested in survival and continued donor support.  For that, it is highly dependent on Israel and therefore cannot directly challenge it. Instead of taking effective concrete measures of its own to shape conditions on the ground and counter the punitive measures of the new Israel, it is content with calling upon the international community do so. Thus, it is faced with navigating its conflicting interests at a time when it is at a historically low point in terms of legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of its own public. As it becomes weaker the prospects for a violent conflict with Israel increases.

The US and the rest of the international community cannot but realize that the process that is now ongoing can only end in the demise of the two-state solution. Nonetheless, they are unwilling to take the only effective measures to force Israel and the PA to turn away from the path of folly: elections for the Palestinians and a commitment, in words and deeds, to the two-state solution for Israel. 

The need for reform

The split in the Palestinian political system during the past 13 years has caused considerable damage to the prospects of transition to democracy in the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) political system by harming its separation of powers. The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) could no longer meet or exercise its legislative and oversight functions and was eventually dissolved in 2018. Since 2007, legislative power has been placed in the hands of the Palestinian president in the form of issuing laws by decrees. This concentration of power in the hands of the executive affected the functioning of the Palestinian judiciary as well. A statement by the Chief Justice, Sami Sarsoor, the former head of the SJC, on 24 October 2016 (in which he, upon being forced to resign, revealed that he was asked by an official from the security sector, to sign his own resignation just before he was sworn in) exposed the extent of executive interference in the justice sector. It was also revealed at that time that other chief justices before judge Sarsoor were asked to do the same.[2] On top of that, evidence grew over time that the judicial authority was unable to locate and address deficiencies within its own institutions. A  High Court judge, Abdallah Ghozlan, stated  that the  judiciary  was incapable of reforming itself and that some of the judges would not trust the ruling of the court if they were to find themselves in front of one.[3] Civil society organizations demanded in many occasions the implementation of serious judicial reform, particularly after it failed to reform itself or guard its own independence and after the exposure of internal conflicts and quarrels among the judges.[4]

The functioning of the judiciary was marred by several problems.  Among those, the issuance of contradictory rulings regarding the retirement process of the public sector employees raised suspicion of interference from the executive.  Interference by groups and individuals associated with the executive was also suspected to be behind court rulings regarding transportation companies.[5]  Similar suspicions were seen behind internal decisions within the judiciary, such as the formation of judicial committees or the questioning of judges over instances in which they expressed their own opinion on public matters or their participation in civil society workshops. Years of delays in issuing decisions regarding court cases reduce public trust in the effectiveness of the judiciary leading people to seek alternative mechanisms such as the tribal system of justice.

It should also be noted that according to the 2002 Law of the Judiciary, the formation of the SJC provides for significant independence for that body restricting membership essentially to those filling judicial positions, i.e., judges.  This leads to a concentration of power in the hands of one judicial institution which might raise questions about possible biases in favor of other members of the same profession thereby reducing the prospects for accountability. Moreover, the law allows for possible conflict of interest when specifying the responsibilities of the head of the High Court (who is also the head of the SJC) and those of the head of the SJC: it is the head of the SJC who recommends the appointment of the head of the High Court.  

Decline in public trust in the Judiciary

Trust in the Palestinian judiciary declined considerably during the past 10 years among the general public and particularly among those who had the opportunity to interact with the justice system. Findings of the Arab Barometer in Palestine show a decline in trust from 60% during the period from 2007 to 2010 to 42% during the period between 2016 and 2019.[6]

Recent polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) depicts a similar lack of trust. PSR’s poll 73, conducted in September 2019, shows lack of trust in the judiciary among most of the public, with 65% believing that they would not receive a fair trial if they find themselves in a Palestinian court. Moreover, the same poll shows that 72% of the pubic in the West bank believe that the work of the judiciary in Palestine is marred by corruption or non-independence and that it operates based on interests rather than the rule of law. The internal political split is also reflected in the public assessment of the judiciary and chances for a fair trial, as 37% of Fatah supporters, compared to only 9% of Hamas voters, believe that they would have a fair trial in a Palestinian court.[7]

According to the findings of the fifth report of the Legal Monitor[8], issued in 2018, only 39% of Palestinian lawyers agree that the judiciary is in continued improvement and 49% disagreed with the statement. Moreover, 62% agreed that court rulings are subject to external influence and pressure while only 16% disagreed with the statement. More than a quarter (27%) agreed that the judiciary is corrupt while 36% disagreed. The overwhelming majority (85%) believed that regular courts are considerably slow in deciding cases.

Those Palestinians who had experiences with the justice system are the most pessimistic about it and the ones who gave it the most negative assessment, According to the second Palestinian Security Sector Index, prepared by PSR in 2016, 75% of those with such experiences believed that corruption exists in the courts and among the judges.; 78% thought that the judiciary does not treat people equally regardless of financial, social, or party affiliation or their membership in the security sector of PA institutions. As the case with the lawyers, 78% believe that court procedures are too slow.[9]

Failed reform efforts

Judicial reforms confronted several challenges during the past 20 years. The most significant has been the split in the political system between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the absence of the PLC, and the repeated interferences by the executive. Moreover, the conflict within the justice system, the quarrels between the judges and the manner in which they viewed the judicial authority, in terms that are inconsistent with the of the Basic Law which grants independence to the judges’ decision making but rejects conflict of interest. The judiciary has also suffered from a weak performance and limited capacity as well as a huge load of cases. All these problems contributed to a declining public trust in the entire body and the justice system as a whole.

The first PA effort to reorganize the judiciary came in June 2000 when a transitional SJC was formed and entrusted with the task of putting the judiciary house in order. This was followed in May 2002, after the issuance of the Law of the Judiciary, by the appointment of the first SJC. An effort to reform the system was made by a presidential decree, issued on 14 March 2005, to form a Steering Committee for the Development of the Judiciary and Justice. The committee was asked to prepare a draft proposal to amend the Law of the Judiciary and to propose rules and procedures to ensure the independence of the judiciary and maintain the dignity, qualifications, and integrity of the judges. The committee proposal that was soon submitted to the PLC was rendered inoperative as the High Court ruled on 27 November 2005 that the effort was unconstitutional.   

In September 2017, Abbas issued another presidential decree, this time to form the National Committee to Develop the Justice Sector by reviewing the various relevant legislative instruments and preparing a comprehensive vision to develop the entire sector. The committee was given 6 months to complete its work, which was eventually completed within a year. The committee’s report proposed several recommendations aiming at strengthening the independence of the judiciary by broadening the membership of the SJC, reducing the retirement age of the judges from 70 to 65 years, and addressing the various technical and professional aspects of the functioning of the sector.[10]

Finally, in July 2019, Abbas, as mentioned earlier, issued two decrees in which he amended the Law of Judiciary (reducing retirement age from 70 to 65 years), dissolved the SJC, and formed the TJC. The TJC was given a year to put in place the required reform measures including the reestablishment of court bodies for the various levels of litigation, drafting amendments to the relevant legislative instruments, and the re-formation of the SJC. The two presidential decrees were welcomed by many civil society organizations while at the same time cautioning against possible executive interference. Other civil society organizations opposed the decrees viewing them as incompatible with the Basic Law and the Law of the Judiciary and that they represent a blatant executive interference.

Findings of PSR poll 73, mentioned above, showed a split in public response to the presidential decrees. Half of the public (51%) expressed satisfaction. Moreover, about a half (49%) in the West Bank expressed disagreement with the criticism of the decrees, the claim that they addressed matters that were not within the jurisdiction or mandate of the president or that they represent interference in the affairs of the judiciary. Findings also showed that 47% of the public agree with the statement that the decrees were essential in order to introduce judicial reforms at a time when the judiciary has failed to reform itself or earn public trust; 37% of the public did not agree with this statement.[11]

Strengthening the SJC as a guarantor of judicial independence

Six months after its formation, this brief proposes three options for the TJC to review. All three focus on the institution of the SJC viewing its role as the most critical component in the Palestinian justice sector. Here below is a summary of the main features of each:

1. Broadening the membership of the SJC: This can be done by adding new elected members from the judicial establishment and increasing the membership of the council to 12. This would include the chief justice, the oldest deputy head of the high court, two of the oldest judges of the high court, the heads of the court of appeal in Jerusalem, Gaza, and Ramallah, the attorney general, the deputy minister of justice, the first inspector, and two judges from the court of the first instance. This option has been proposed by the current TJC in its draft amendment of the Law of the Judiciary. It also proposes that some members of the SJC should be elected. The proposal however keeps SJC membership restricted to members of the profession, the judges, which may undermine the ability of the judiciary to bring judges to accountability. It also does not address the potential conflict of interest mentioned above and it does not allow members of the appeal courts to elect their own representatives in the SJC, a right granted to the judges of the high court and those of the court of the first instance.
2. Democratically electing all members of the SJC: In this option, all members of the council from the judiciary would be elected by their respective judicial bodies. Council members would elect the chief justice. This option allows representation of all levels of the judicial institution and ensures removal of the potential conflict of interest in the administrative jurisdiction of the chief justice and his role as the head of the high court. By contrast, this option maintains the current concentration of authority in the justice sector in the hands of one judicial body which might raise questions about possible bias in favor of the members of the profession thereby potentially undermining the ability of the SJC to bring judges to accountability.
3. A mixed judicial council: in this option, members of the SJC would come from within and outside the judiciary. Member judges would be elected by their respective judicial bodies while those from outside the judiciary would come from among the lawyers, professors of law, members of professional association and other prominent civil society characters. The chief justice is elected by the council members. Time limit is set to membership in the council. The Steering Committee for the Development of the Justice Sector and civil society organizations recommended that public figures from outside the judiciary and the executive authority be asked to join the SJC. Examples from the international community point to a variety of models for similar bodies as long as they enjoy independence and are able to function effectively. But a trend is evolving in which a mixed membership is preferred.[12] 

One of the faults of this option is that given the current political polarization in Palestinian politics and society, it might potentially allow for political interference in the process of selecting the non-judicial members of the council. By contrast, it creates the right balance between the need for to guard against external interference and the need to avoid the negative consequences of the consolidation of power into judicial hands. It also allows for the incorporation of professionals from sectors other than law, such as experts in administration, financial affairs, and social sciences. It allows fair representation to all levels of the judicial institution and show respect for its pluralism. It also removes the concern about potential conflict of interest in the jurisdiction of the chief justice and reduces the concern about potential biases in favor of judges.  

Conclusion

A mixed judicial council, as proposed in the third option above, provides greater legitimacy to the SJC and reduces the concerns about the concentration of power into the hands of one judicial body or potential biases and ensures fair disciplinary procedures while facilitating democratic oversight over the justice sector. However, other measures should also be taken protect the independence of the judiciary. These include the following:

1. Those constitutional and legal measures that criminalize interference in the affairs in the judiciary should be activated and implemented and, if not sufficient, should be augmented by additional amendments to the Law of the Judiciary.
2. The selection of the SJC members should be done in a public and transparent manner to remove any suspicion of political interference and reduce any potential biases in favor of the members of the judicial profession.
3. Measures that promote gender equality should be sought and any discrimination eliminated.
4. Steps should be taken to ensure that the election of the non-judicial members of the SJC, as in the third option above, is not placed in the hands of the executive and that non-political bodies are entrusted with overseeing such process.
5. It goes without saying that it is the responsibility of the executive to make sure that the judiciary has access to sufficient human and material resources to allow it to carry out it mission in a satisfactory manner.

Introduction: