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15 February 2006 

Results of PSR’s PLC Exit Poll

25 January 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 November and 2 December 2023. The period leading up to the poll witnessed the launch of Hamas’ October the 7^th offensive against Israeli towns and military bases bordering the Gaza Strip and the Israeli launch of the current ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. Video images circulating in the international and Israeli media show that some Hamas fighters have committed attacks against Israeli civilians, including women and children, and took many of them hostages. International and Palestinian reports reported that thousands of Palestinians, mostly women and children, were killed by Israeli arial and tank bombardment. Israeli attacks targeted Palestinian hospitals, public buildings, and most other civilian infrastructure including tens of thousands of homes, with many neighborhoods leveled completely to the ground. In the meanwhile, in the West Bank, the Israeli army blocked or restricted Palestinian access to main roads while settler attacks increased against vulnerable towns and villages in various parts of the B and C areas.

To ensure the safety of our field researchers in the Gaza Strip, interviews with the residents were conducted during the ceasefire, which saw Palestinian women and children released from Israeli prisons in exchange for women and children held by Hamas.

The sample size of this poll is 1231 adults, of whom 750 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip in 121 randomly selected locations. The sample is representative of the residents of the two areas. Due to the war in the Gaza Strip, we conducted interviews in the central and southern regions inside the selected sample homes, with the exception of one displaced area, where residents were interviewed in the shelter area where they had taken refuge. As for the northern Gaza Strip, residents were interviewed in 24 shelter locations, of which 20 belonged to UNRWA and 4 to governmental institutions. A total of 250 interviews were conducted in these shelters, and another 21 were conducted in the homes of relatives and friends of displaced people from the north. Despite the large representative sample, the margin of error for this poll is +/-4. The increase in the margin of error is due to the lack of precision regarding the number of residents who stayed in their homes, or in shelters, in the northern parts of the Gaza Strip which we did not sample.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

Most of the questions asked in this last quarter of 2023 revolved around the October 7 offensive and the subsequent Israel-Hamas war and ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. It also covered the debate about the future of the Gaza Strip after the war and the Palestinian perception of the positions of the various relevant countries and actors. Findings indicate that a majority of the respondents believe that Hamas' decision to carry out the offensive is correct, and believe that the attack came in response to “settler attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque and West Bank residents, and for the release of Palestinian prisoners.” It is worth noting that there are significant differences between the attitudes of the residents of the West Bank compared to those of the Gaza Strip, in terms of the “correctness” of the Hamas' decision (and other matters), as the attitudes of Gazans tend to show a greater degree of skepticism about that decision. It is clear from the findings that believing in the “correctness” of Hamas' decision does not mean support for all acts that might have been committed by Hamas fighters on October 7. The overwhelming majority of respondents say that they have not seen videos from international or social media showing atrocities committed by Hamas members against Israeli civilians that day, such as the killing of women and children in their homes. Indeed, more than 90% believe that Hamas fighters did not commit the atrocities contained in these videos. When asked what is or is not allowed in war, under international humanitarian law, the findings indicate that the vast majority believes that attacking or killing civilians in their homes is not permissible. The majority (except in the Gaza Strip) also believe that taking civilians as hostages or prisoners of war is also not permissible.

The findings also indicate that the majority believes that Israel will not succeed in eradicating Hamas, or in causing a second Palestinian Nakba, or in expelling the residents of the Gaza Strip. Indeed, a large majority believes that Hamas will emerge victorious from this war. A majority also says Hamas will resume control over the Gaza Strip after the war. The findings also indicate significant opposition to the deployment of an Arab security force in the Gaza Strip, even if its purpose is to provide support to the Palestinian Authority.  The majority also opposes a role for Arab states in delivering services to the Gaza Strip, but this majority is far less than the majority that opposes an Arab security presence.

The findings indicate that the Palestinians are questioning the moral commitment of the US, and other West European countries, to the ethical values embodied in the international humanitarian law. They show widespread conviction that the positions of the United States and the major Western powers show total disregard to international humanitarian law and that their talk of a two-state solution is not serious. All or most Palestinians say they are dissatisfied with the positions of the United States, Germany, Britain, France, the United Nations, and even Russia in this war. Also, the overwhelming majority is dissatisfied with the performance of Arab or regional countries or parties such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Jordan, while the percentage of satisfaction with the performance of Turkey and Iran is somewhat high, and a majority says that it is satisfied with the performance of Yemen, Qatar and Hezbollah. Dissatisfaction with Palestinian actors increases significantly when asked about the PA prime minister, the PA president, the PA, and Fatah. A majority of the public is satisfied only with the performance of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyyah.

Findings indicate that the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip has had a significant impact on a range of internal Palestinian issues and on Palestinian-Israeli relations. The most important of these effects can be summarized in the following changes:

• Support for Hamas has more than tripled in the West Bank compared to three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas increased but not significantly. Despite the increase in its popularity, the majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip does not support Hamas. It is worth noting that support for Hamas usually rises temporarily during or immediately after a war and then returns to the previous level several months after the end of the war.
• Support for President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fateh party drops significantly. The same is true for the trust in the PA as a whole, as demand for its dissolution rises to nearly 60%, the highest percentage ever recorded in PSR polls. Demand for Abbas's resignation is rising to around 90 percent, and even higher in the West Bank. Despite the decline in support for Fatah and Abbas, the most popular Palestinian figure remains Marwan Barghouti, a Fatah leader. Barghouti is still able to beat Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh or any other.
• Support for armed struggle rises ten percentage points compared to three months ago, with more than 60% saying it is the best means of ending the Israeli occupation; in the West Bank, the percentage rises further to close to 70%. Moreover, a majority in the West Bank believes that the formation of armed groups in communities subject to settler attacks is the most effective means of combating settler terrorism against towns and villages in the West Bank.
• Despite the above-mentioned reference to the lack of confidence in the seriousness of US and European talk about reviving the two-state solution and despite the increase in support for armed struggle, support for the two-state solution has not dropped in this poll. To the contrary, support for this solution has increased slightly in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This increase seems to come especially from those who believe that the US and European talk about the two-state solution is indeed serious.

• 72% of the public believe that Hamas' decision to launch the October 7 attack was correct
• A majority of 53% believes that Israel's war objective is to destroy the Gaza Strip and kill or expel its residents, and 42% believe it is to take revenge on Hamas and the resistance and destroy them. But a majority believes that Israel will fail to achieve these goals.
• 56% have no food and water to sustain them for a day or two, and 64% say a family member was killed or wounded during the war. 
• 85% have not seen videos showing atrocities committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians on October 7, and only 7% say Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians.
• 70% of West Bankers and half of Gazans expect Hamas to emerge victorious
• 75% of West Bankers and 38% of Gazans prefer Hamas to remain in control of the Gaza Strip after the war. 
• Expression of satisfaction with Palestinian, Arab, and international actors during the war shows dissatisfaction, or very little satisfaction, towards the Palestinian Authority and its leadership, towards Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and towards the United States, Germany, Britain, France and the United Nations.

1. Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7^th offensive:

We asked respondents to speculate about Hamas’ reasons for waging its October the 7th offensive: a response to attacks on al Aqsa and to release prisoners as Hamas claimed or an Iranian plot to thwart Arab normalization with Israel. The overwhelming majority (81%; 89% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip) said it was a “response to settler attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque and on Palestinian citizens and for the release of prisoners from Israeli prisons;” while only 14% (5% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip) thought it was an Iranian plot. 

We asked the respondents what they thought of Hamas’ decision to launch the October the 7th offensive given its outcome so far, a vast majority (72%) said it was a correct decision and 22% (12% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) said it was incorrect. The belief that Hamas' decision was right is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%), among men (75%) compared to women (69%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (76% and 71% respectively) compared to the non-religious (42%). It also increases among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fateh and other forces (55% and 45% respectively).

2. The Israeli objectives in the Gaza war:

Asked about its assessment of Israel’s objectives in the current war, the majority (53%) says it is to destroy the Gaza Strip and kill or expel its population; 42% (50% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) think the goal is to exact revenge against Hamas and the resistance and destroy them completely.  When asked if Israel will succeed in causing a second Nakba for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, as some Israeli minister called for, 73% (83% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip) said it will not and 24% (14% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) said it will succeed.   But the vast majority (70%) thinks Israel will fail in achieving its goal in eradicating Hamas and the resistance while only 8% think it will succeed, and 21% think it will only weaken Hamas and the resistance. West Bankers are more certain than Gazans that Israel will fail, 87% and 44% respectively. Moreover, only 1% of West Bankers think Israeli will succeed in eradicating Hamas compared to 17% in the Gaza Strip.  Similarly, the overwhelming majority (85%; 96% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that Israel will not succeed in expelling Gazans out of the Strip; Only 13% (3% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) think it will succeed.

3. Humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip:

Only 44% of Gazans say they have enough food and water for a day or two and 56% say they do not.  When they need food or water, only one third of Gazans say they can reach a place where they can have access to assistance while two thirds say they cannot.  Almost two thirds (64%) of Gazan respondents say a member of their family have been killed or injured during the current war in Gaza; 36% say none of their family members have been killed or injured.

A majority (52%) blames Israel for the current suffering of Gazans in the current war while 26% place the blame on the US; only 11% (6% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) place the blame on Hamas; and 9% blame the PA.

We asked the respondents whether they support or oppose the release, now before the end of the war, of the detained Israeli women and children among the civilians in the hands of the resistance groups, in return for the release of Palestinian women and children in the Israeli prisons. The overwhelming majority (85%; 92% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip) supported the exchange while only 13% (7% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) opposed it.

A majority of 71% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe Gazans who left their homes during the war to safer areas will be able to return to these homes once the war stops. West Bankers are much more optimistic than Gazans, 83% and 53% respectively.

4. War crimes and atrocities:

We offered the public a list of acts or measures and asked respondents whether they are permitted under international law. The majority (84%) said it allows taking soldiers prisoners. But the vast majority (78%) said it does not allow attacks on or the killing of civilians women and children in their homes; 77% said it does not allow the bombing of hospitals; 76% said it does not allow cutting electricity and water from the civilian population; and 52% said it does not allow taking civilians as prisoners of war.  The belief that international law does not allow the killing of civilians, women and children, in their homes is higher in the West Bank (84%) compared to the Gaza Strip (68%), and among supporters of Hamas (80%) compared to supporters of Fateh and other forces (75% and 74% respectively).

While 95% think Israel has committed war crimes during the current war, only 10% think Hamas also committed such crimes; 4% think Israel has not committed such crimes and 89% think Hamas did not commit war crimes during the current war.  85% say they did not see videos, shown by international news outlets, showing acts committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, such as the killing of women and children in their homes; only 14% saw these videos.  The percentage of those who say they have seen these videos is higher in the Gaza Strip (25%) compared to the West Bank (7%), among the non-religious (31%) compared to the religious (15%), and among supporters of other forces and supporters of Fateh (21% and 20% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (12%).

When asked if Hamas did commit these atrocities, the overwhelming majority said no, it did not and only 7% said it did. Those who say that Hamas did not commit the atrocities seen in the videos are higher in the West Bank (97%) compared to the Gaza Strip (83%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (91% and 92% respectively), compared to the non-religious (75%) and among supporters of Hamas (97%) compared to supporters of Fateh and other forces (85% and 81% respectively). Belief that Hamas fighters have committed atrocities against civilians is also higher among those who did watch videos showing such atrocities (31%) compared to those who did not (3%). In the Gaza Strip, 41% of those who watched the videos believe that Hamas did commit these atrocities while only 8% of those who did not watch these videos believe that Hamas committed atrocities.

5. When will the war stop and who will win?

Half of the public (45% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) expect to see a ceasefire in Gaza in the upcoming weeks while a quarter (21% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) expect the war to continue for weeks and months. One fifth (28% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) expect Israel to “unilaterally end the war and begin to withdraw under the pressure from the resistance.” Only 2% expect that “Hamas and other resistance forces in Gaza will stop the fighting and withdraw to safer areas in the Gaza Strip.”

While the vast majority of West Bankers (70%) thinks Hamas will emerge victorious in this war, only half of Gazans think the same. Similarly, while only 1% in the West Bank think Israel will emerge victorious, almost one third of Gazans (31%) think that; 14% (12% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip) think neither one will emerge victorious. Belief that Hamas will emerge victorious from this war is also higher among the religious and the somewhat religious (72% and 70% respectively) compared to the non-religious (40%), and among supporters of Hamas (91%) compared to supporters of Fateh and other forces (50% and 41% respectively).

6. Who will rule Gaza after the war?

Almost two-thirds (64%) are opposed to the participation of the PA in meetings with the US, with the involvement of Arab countries such as Jordan and Egypt, in order to discuss the future of the Gaza Strip after the war stops. Only 33% (28% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) support PA participation in such meetings.  We asked the respondents to speculate about the party that will be in control of the Gaza Strip in the day after the end of the current war. Almost two thirds (64%; 73% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) said it will be Hamas; 11% selected a PA national unity government but without President Abbas; 7% selected the PA with Abbas; 4% selected Israel; 3% selected one or more Arab country; 2% selected a national unity government under Abbas leadership; and 1% selected the UN.

When asked about their own preferences for the party that should be in control in the Gaza Strip after the war, 60% selected Hamas; 16% selected a PA national unity government without President Abbas; 7% selected the PA with Abbas; 3% selected one or more Arab countries; 3% selected a national unity government under Abbas, and 2% selected the Israeli army.  The percentage of those who prefer Hamas to remain in control of the Gaza Strip after the war increases in the West Bank (75%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), among men (64%) compared to women (57%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (61% and 62% respectively) compared to the non-religious (32%), and among supporters of Hamas (87%) compared to supporters of Fatah and other forces (32% and 26% respectively).

72% (80% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip) think Hamas will succeed in returning to rule over the Gaza Strip after the war despite Israel’s declared objective of eradicating that organization; 23% (15% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) do not think Hamas will succeed in resuming control over the Gaza Strip.  After the end of the war, and in the event that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are unified under the control of the Palestinian Authority, only 28% (20% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) would support and 70% (77% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip) would oppose the deployment of an Arab security contingent, from countries like Egypt or Jordan, in order to provide support for the PA and help it to maintain security. But in the event that this Arab presence, after the end of the war, is to provide basic, administrative, and health services to the Palestinian residents in support of the PA, support would increase to 45% (43% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) but 53% (54% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) would still oppose that presence.

7. Satisfaction with relevant actors:

The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (87%) thinks that the response of the US and other major Western powers, such as the UK, France, and Germany, to the Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip indicates show disregard to international humanitarian law; only 10% (4% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) say the response indicates they are committed to that law.  The vast majority (70%) thinks the recent talk about two-state solution in the US and other Western countries is not serious; 27% think it is.

We asked about public satisfaction with the role played during the war by various Palestinian, Arab/regional, and international actors:

1. On the Palestinian side, satisfaction with the role of Hamas (72%; 85% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) was the highest followed by the role played by Yehia Sinwar (69%; 81% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip), Ismail Haniyyeh (51%; 57% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip), Fatah (22%; 23% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), the PA (14%; 10% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), Mahmoud Abbas (11%; 7% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip), and Mohammad Shtayyeh (10%; 6% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Satisfaction with Yahya Sinwar is higher in the West Bank (81%) compared to the Gaza Strip (52%), among men (74%) compared to women (64%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (76% and 67% respectively) compared to the non-religious (42%), and among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (53% and 40% respectively).

2. For the Arab/regional actors, the highest level of satisfaction went to Yemen (80%; 89% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip), followed by Qatar (56%), Hizballah (49%), Iran (35%), Turkey (34%), Jordan (24%), Egypt (23%), UAE (8), and finally Saudi Arabia (5%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

3. For the non-regional international actors, the highest level of satisfaction went to Russia (22%, 17% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip), followed by China (20%), Germany (7%), UN (6%), France (5%), UK (4%), and the US (1%). The following figure shows the distribution of satisfaction over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

• In elections between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 51% and the latter 45%
• 92% of West Bankers and 81% of Gazans want Abbas to resign
• Support for Hamas increases in the West Bank from 12% three months ago to 44%; in the Gaza Strip support for Hamas rises from 38% three months ago to 42% today. Support for Fateh decreases in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to 17% compared to 26% three months ago.
• 54% believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people and only 13% believe that Fateh, led by Mahmoud Abbas, is the most deserving.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two candidates, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the voter turnout would be only 53%, and among those who would participate, Abbas would receive 16% of the vote and Haniyeh 78% (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 37% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, the vote for Abbas stands at 24% and for Haniyeh at 71%, while in the West Bank Abbas receives 10% and Haniyeh 82%.

• If the presidential competition is between three, Marwan Barghouti, Abbas, and Haniyeh, participation would rise to 71% and among those voting, Barghouti receives 47%, Haniyeh 43%, and Abbas 7%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti stood at 49% and Haniyeh at 36%, and Abbas at 13%.

• If the presidential competition is between two, Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, participation would rise to 69% and among those voting, Barghouti receives 51% and Haniyeh 45%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti stood at 60% and Haniyeh at 37%.

• In a closed question, we asked the public to select the person they prefer to see as President Abbas's successor. The largest percentage (36%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti; 19% preferred Ismail Haniyeh; 16% chose Yahya al Sinwar; 4% preferred Mohammed Dahlan, 3% preferred Khaled Meshaal, 2% chose Muhammad Shtayyeh, and 1% chose Hussein al-Sheikh; 18% said they did not know or chose someone else.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 14% and dissatisfaction at 85%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 10% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip.  Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 22% and dissatisfaction at 76%.
• 88% want Abbas to resign while 12% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas' resignation stands at 92% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip.

• When asked which political party or political trend they support, the largest percentage selected Hamas (43%), followed by Fatah (17%), while 12% selected other or third-party groups, and 28% said none of them or did not know. Three months ago, support for Hamas stood at 22% and Fatah at 26%. In the West Bank, support for Hamas today stands at 44% (compared to 12% three months ago), and for Fatah at 16% (compared to 26% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas today stands at 42% (compared to 38% three months ago) and support for Fatah at 18% (compared to 25% three months ago).

• However, if new parliamentary elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, only 69% say they would participate in them, and among these participants, Fateh receives 19%, Hamas' Change and Reform 51%, all other lists combined 4%, and 25% say they have not yet decided whom they will vote for. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 52% (compared to 44% three months ago) and for Fateh at 21% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 50% (compared to 24% three months ago) and Fatah at 18% (compared to 40% three months ago).
• 54% believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 13% believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving; 26% believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership. Three months ago, 27% said Hamas is the most deserving, 24% said Fateh led by Abbas is the most deserving, and 44% said both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

• Only 14% of West Bankers feel safe and secure compared to 48% three months ago
• 68% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 28% say it is an achievement

The question about personal safety and security was asked in the West Bank only. The findings show that only 14% feel safe and secure while 86% feel unsafe and unsecure. Three months ago, the perception of safety stood at 48%.

A majority of 68% believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 28% believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 62% said the PA is a burden and 35% said it was an achievement.

• Support for the two-state solution rises from 32% three months ago to 34%
• Support for armed struggle in the West Bank rises from 54% three months ago to 68% today
• Support for the formation of armed groups in communities targeted by settlers rises from 47% three months ago to 56% today

34% support and 64% oppose the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 32%.

• Support for the two-state solution is linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Today, 65% believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion but 32% believe it is still practical. Moreover, 66% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or nonextant, and 32% believe the chances are medium or high. Three months ago, 71% said that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion.
• When asked about public support and opposition to specific policy measures to break the stalemate: 55% supported joining more international organizations; 39% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 69% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 58% supported dissolving the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 58% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 53% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 52% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of one state.

When asked about the best way to end occupation and establish an independent state, the public was divided into three groups: a majority of 63% (68% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) said it was armed struggle; 20% said it was negotiations; and 13% said it was popular non-violent resistance. Three months ago, 53% said armed struggle was the best way, 24% said popular non-violent resistance, and 20% said negotiation was the best way. As shown in figure (X) below, West Bankers’ support for resort to arms increased 19 percentage points since the formation of the current far right Israel government and increased another 14 points during the past three months. 

• In light of the increase in settler terrorist attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we again asked West Bankers what means are most effective in combating this terrorism that are also the most feasible. The majority (56%, compared to 47% three months ago) chose the formation of armed groups by residents of the targeted areas in order to protect their areas; 15% (compared to 30% three months ago) chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas; 16% (compared to 10% three months ago) chose the demand that the Israeli army take measures to prevent settler terrorism; and only 8% (compared to 8% three months ago) chose to form unarmed groups of residents of the targeted areas to protect their areas.

Figure (7) below, show the extent of the public distrust in the West Bank in the role of the Israeli army in protecting the vulnerable communities and that the trust of the public in the Palestinian police is much less than the trust it places in the armed groups and that trust in the PA police has declined in three months by half to reach the current 15%. It also show that a majority now supports the formation of armed groups as the most effective means of combating settler terror.

• the areas occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state
• A majority of 51% believes the most urgent problem today is the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip and 32% believe it is Israeli occupation.

43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 36% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 7% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (51%, 42% in the West Bank and 64% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the continued war in the Gaza Strip; (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 7% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 5% said it is unemployment, and 4% said it is corruption.

______________________________________

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

16-18 March 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during March 16-18, 2006. The poll deals with Palestinian perceptions and the popularity of Fateh and Hamas in the post election period, attitudes towards the peace process after Hamas’ victory, attitudes regarding the Israeli raid on Jericho jail, and several domestic issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (809) and the Gaza Strip (463) in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.  

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings

This poll was conducted less than two months after the Palestinian legislative elections which took place on 25 January 2006 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but before Hamas government was presented to the new PLC and gained its vote of confidence. At the time of the poll, the international community was threatening to suspend aid to the PA but no action had been taken at that time.

The results indicate that despite threats of sanctions and despite public expectations that donors will indeed cut off support once a Hamas government is formed, support for Hamas has never been as high as it is today. In fact, support for Hamas today is higher than the support it received on the day of elections. By contrast, Fateh’s popularity decreased significantly compared to where it was before the elections. In fact, support for Fateh today is less than the support it had on the day of elections.

These results indicate that Israeli and Western threats increase rather than decrease public support for Hamas. Support for Fateh is dropping as some Palestinians might be punishing it for the role it seems, in their eyes, to play in bringing about the downfall of Hamas and the undoing of its victory.  

But the increased support for Hamas does not indicate increased support for its views on the peace process. To the contrary, Palestinian public opinion seems today more moderate and willing to compromise than it has been at any time before. Despite public objection to a  Hamas’ recognition of Israel in response to international pressure, a majority wants Hamas to negotiate with Israel and to implement the Road Map. More importantly, a majority supports the two-state solution and in this context supports a mutual recognition of Israelas the state for the Jewish people in exchange for an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.

(1) Hamas and Fateh in the Post Legislative Elections’ Environment

• Hamas’ popularity continues to increase: 47% would vote for Hamas and 39% for Fateh if new elections are held today
• Two main reasons are given by the public for Hamas’ victory: the desire to have an authority that would implement Islamic Sharia code and the desire to have an authority that would fight corruption
• Fateh’s loss is attributed by the public to three main factors: the voters’ desire to punish it for corruption, its divisions and fragmentation, and its failure to enforce law and order
• Majority expects Hamas’ success in government, donors’ suspension of aid, and Hamas’ success in finding alternative sources of support
• Majority opposes a Hamas recognition of Israel in compliance with donors’ demands

In the estimate of 37% of the respondents, Hamas won the January parliamentary elections because voters wanted first and foremost an Islamist authority that implements the Sharia code. But 36% believe that voters wanted instead a clean government that fights corruption, 9% believe that voters wanted a strong authority that can put an end to anarchy and enforce law and order, and 7% believe that voters wanted a fighting authority that resists occupation. In the estimate of 52% of the respondents, Fateh lost the elections because voters wanted first and foremost to punish it for the spread of corruption in the PA. But 19% attribute the loss to Fateh’s divisions and lack of leadership, 17% to its failure to put an end to anarchy, and 5% to the failure of the peace process.

If new elections are to take place today, 47% of those who would participate say they would vote for Hamas, 39% for Fateh, and 8% for the four other factions represented in the current PLC. When asked about their actual vote in the last parliamentary elections in January, 46% said they voted for Hamas, 44% for Fateh, and 8% for the four other factions. (Actual official results were 44% for Hamas, 41% for Fateh, and 12% for the four other winning factions.) 

Support for Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (45%). By contrast, support for Fateh increases in the West Bank (40%) compared to the Gaza Strip (37%). Support for Hamas increases in cities (52% compared to 36% for Fateh) and refugee camps (47% compared to 37% for Fateh). The two factions receive equal support in rural areas. Support for Hamas increases among women (51% compared to 36% for Fateh) and decreases among men (43% for Hamas compared to 41% for Fateh). It also increases among refugees (49% for Hamas compared to 37% for Fateh) and decreases among non refugees (45% for Hamas compared to 41% for Fateh). It also increases among the illiterates (57% for Hamas compared to 33% for Fateh), students (48% for Hamas compared to 37% for Fateh), housewives (51% for Hamas compared to 35% for Fateh), religious respondents (54% for Hamas compared to 35% for Fateh), and among those opposed to the peace process (68% for Hamas and 16% for Fateh).

A majority of 70% expects Hamas to succeed in leading and managing the affairs of the PA while 22% expect the opposite. A similar percentage (69%) is not worried about its personal freedom after Hamas’ victory and 30% are worried. The large percentage of those expecting a Hamas success is somewhat surprising given the fact that a similar percentage (68%) believe that the PA can not manage without donor support and that 50% of the respondents believe that aid will indeed be suspended as long as Hamas does not meet donors’ conditions. Despite the strong moderate peace tendencies of the respondents in this poll, a majority of 59% nonetheless believes that Hamas should not recognize the state of Israel in compliance with donors’ demands while 37% believe it should.

(2) The Peace Process in the Post Hamas’ Victory

• 75% want Hamas to negotiate peace with Israel
• Majority supports the implementation of the Road Map and a majority supports a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people under conditions of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state in a two-state solution
• Sharp divisions over collection of arms from armed groups but an overwhelming majority supports the integration of armed groups into PA security services
• About three quarters welcome a negotiated Israeli disengagement from the West Bank while only 23% would support the disengagement if it was unilateral
• 80% would support a declaration of Palestinian statehood if it comes as an outcome of negotiations with Israel and 59% would support it if it was unilaterally declared by the PA

Despite Hamas’ electoral victory and despite the added increase in its popularity after the elections, public support for the peace process is on the rise. Public willingness to compromise has increased significantly during the last few months with about three quarters of the Palestinians wanting Hamas to conduct peace negotiations with Israel and only 22% opposing it. A majority of 64% says it supports the peace process while only 14% says it is opposed to it. These percentages stood at 59% and 17% respectively in our exit poll on the day of elections last January. A majority of 53%, compared to 51% in the exit poll) wants the Hamas government to implement the Road Map and 40% oppose that.

But perhaps the most moderate and surprising attitude is the one toward the two state solution and mutual recognition of identity. In this poll, 66% said they would support, and 32% would oppose, the recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people in the context of peace based on a two-state solution and an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. Support for this solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict stood at 57% and opposition at 41% last December. On the day of elections, only 49% supported this solution and 48% opposed it. As in our December poll, three quarters would support reconciliation between the two peoples under conditions of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel.

But divisions remain over how to handle the issue of arms collection. About half (49%) wants the new government to collect the arms of the various armed groups while 21% wants it to do nothing about those arms and 27% prefer to see the new parliament enacting a law that would allow armed groups to keep their arms. Identical results were registered on the day of elections.

Findings show that about three quarters of the respondents (73%) prefer to see a new Israeli disengagement from the West Bank carried out through negotiations while only 23% prefer to see it accomplished unilaterally. Moreover, the poll found that a majority (59%) believes that unilateral steps reduce the chances of eventually reaching permanent settlement to the conflict. Despite this, 59% would support a Palestinian unilateral step such as a PA unilateral declaration of statehood while 37% would oppose that. If the statehood declaration is the outcome of negotiations with Israel, a larger percentage (80%) would support it and only 17% would oppose it.

(3) Jericho Jail Raid

• A semi consensus that both the US and the UK are implicated in the Israeli raid on the Jericho jail
• 51% support non-violent reactions to protest the US and UK involvement but 46% support in various degrees other steps such as kidnappings or armed attacks

Findings show an almost total consensus among the Palestinians (93%) that the US and UK are implicated with Israel in the raid on the Jericho jail which took place few days before the poll was conducted. The raid and the arrest of Ahmad Sa’adat and his colleagues from the PFLP was followed by various types of reaction including demonstrations, attacks and burning of offices and other facilities belonging to the two countries, and kidnapping of foreigners. Findings show that 51% of the respondents supported only peaceful reaction or no reaction at all. Other types of reaction were supported to various degrees. For example, 9% supported attacks on and burning of offices and installations, 12% supported also the kidnapping of foreigners, and 25% supported also armed attacks against nationals from those two countries.

(4) Domestic Issues

• Poverty and unemployment is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today followed by Israeli occupation and PA corruption
• Three quarters do not feel safe or secure in the PA
• 91% believe corruption exists in the PA but two thirds believe it will decrease in the future
• Large percentage wants to give greater jurisdiction to the new legislative council than the president
• If new presidential elections are held today, 37% would vote for Mahmud Abbas, 25% for Mahmud Zahhar, and 15% for Mustafa Barghouti from among a closed list
• If elections are held today for a vice president, 30% would vote for Ismail Haniyyeh, 20% for Marwan Barghouti, 11% for Mahmud Zahhar, 8% for Mohammad Dahlan, 7% for Farouq Qaddoumi, and 6% each for Saeb Erikat and Mustafa Barghouti
• Support for Fateh drops considerably from 45% in our December 2005 poll to 34% in this poll. Support for Hamas increases from 28% to 37% and for the Islamists in general from 35% to 43% during the same period.

The period in the post Hamas’ victory is witnessing a significant change in public priorities. Concern is growing over economic issues such as poverty and unemployment with 44% of the respondents viewing it as the most important problem confronting the Palestinians today while only 25% views the continued occupation as the most important problem and 24% views corruption as the most important problem. On the day of elections only 27% identified poverty and unemployment as the most important problem with corruption coming first with 29% and occupation coming second, like poverty and unemployment, with 27%.

Findings also show that three quarters of the Palestinians do not feel safe in their homes. This finding is identical with that we found on the day of elections. Absence of safety is felt more strongly in the West Bank, which is under semi full Israeli control, reaching 79% compared to 68% in the Gaza Strip, which is under semi full Palestinian control.

The poll shows that Hamas’ victory has also affected public perception regarding the future of corruption in the PA. While 91% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions (the highest level registered since the formation of the PA), findings show that 65% believe that this corruption will decrease in the future. This is the first time that a majority indicated its belief that corruption will decrease in the future. Last December, only 34% believed that corruption will decrease in the future.  

But Hamas’ victory caused no change in public perception regarding the status of Palestinian democracy. Positive evaluation of democracy under the PA reached 34% in this poll compared to an almost identical result (35%) last December.

Despite the fact that 61% of the public are satisfied (and 37% are dissatisfied) with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, only a small minority of 19% wants to give him more powers than those of the newly-elected PLC. On the other hand, 44% want to give the PLC greater powers than those enjoyed by the president and 32% want both to have equal powers.

Despite this result, the popularity of Fateh’s Abbas (37%) remains higher than that of Mahmud Zahhar of Hamas (25%) and Mustafa Barghouti of other groups (15%). This came in a response to a closed question with respondents asked to choose one of the three. In another closed question on a vote for a vice president, Ismail Haniyyah, the current prime minister, emerged as the most popular with 30% followed by Marwan Barghouti with 20%, Mahmud Zahhar with 11%, Mohammad Dahlan (8%), Farouq Qaddoumi (7%) and Saeb Erikat and Mustafa Barghouti (6% each).

Findings show that support for Fateh has dropped significantly compared to last December while support for Hamas has increased during the same period. Support for Fateh stood at 45% three months ago dropping to 34% in this poll. Hamas’ popularity reached 28% last December rising to 37% in this poll. Support for the Islamists in general (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) increased from 35% to 43% during the same period. .... Full Report

6-8 September 2007   

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during September 6-8, 2007. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. This poll release covers three issues: Hamas’s military action in the Gaza Strip, elections and balance of power, and the peace process. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or emailpcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that only one fifth of the Palestinians supports Hamas’s military takeover of the Gaza Strip and that Fateh and PA President Mahmud Abbas have benefited from Hamas’s step as their popularity has increased significantly. Moreover, a majority supports the recently released presidential decree regarding election law and supports holding early elections. Findings show that a larger percentage of the public blames Hamas rather than Fateh for the problems confronting the Gaza Strip today. A large percentage accepts the position of the PA president regarding resumption of dialogue with Hamas while a much smaller percentage supports the position of Hamas regarding dialogue. Nonetheless, 40% of the public wants the government of Ismail Haniyeh to stay in office and half of the Gazans say their security and personal safety and that of their families are now assured.

These findings indicate that Hamas has failed in convincing Palestinians to accept its narrative regarding the need to carry out its military takeover or the best way to resolve the crisis created by the takeover. Moreover, Hamas has failed to convince the public to accept its narrative regarding the responsibility of president Abbas and Fateh for the problems Gazaconfronted after the takeover such as the closure of the Rafah Crossing or the electricity cutoff. For all this, Hamas paid dearly by losing six percentage points in its popularity during the last six months. But Hamas succeeded in enforcing law and order in the Gaza Strip where half of the population feel their security and safety are now assured; a feeling they did not have for years. It is for this reason perhaps that 40% of the public want the Hamas government led by Haniyeh to stay in office.

Findings show that Fateh and Abbas’s government have gained more than they have lost as a result of the Hamas takeover. Fateh and the PA government led by Salam Fayad have failed to meet public expectations in two of its most important needs: enforcing law and order and fighting corruption. They have also failed in wining the battle over hearts and minds through the effective use of the media. As importantly, they have failed to positively affect the level of public optimism about the future of the peace process. But Abbas and Fateh succeeded in wining public support for their position regarding the best way out of the current crisis with Hamas and regarding the need to amend the electoral system and the need to introduce eligibility conditions for party and individual nomination for the parliamentary and presidential elections, conditions that are strongly opposed by Hamas. They have also succeeded in convincing the public of the need to hold early elections. For all this, and for the first time since the last parliamentary elections, Fateh managed to increase its popularity by five percentage points during the last three months.  

(1) Hamas’s Military Takeover of the Gaza Strip

• 22% support and 73% oppose Hamas’s military takeover of the Gaza Strip. Support for Hamas’s military action reaches 31% in the Gaza Strip compared to 17% in the West Bank.
• 40% agree and 52% disagree that Haniyeh’s government should stay in office despite dismissal by the president. 32% evaluate the performance of the Haniyeh government as good or very good and 43% think it is bad or very bad.
• By contrast, 49% agree and 44% disagree that the government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad should stay in office. Positive evaluation of the Fayyad government reaches 44% and negative evaluation 28%.
• The party most responsible for the closure of the Rafah Crossing is Israel in the eyes of 41% of the Palestinians, Hamas in the eyes of 26%, Fateh in the eyes of 15%, and Egypt in the eyes of 2%. Blaming Hamas for the closure of the Rafah Crossing increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (22%). Similarly, blaming Fateh increases in the Gaza Strip (19%) compared to the West Bank (12%).
• To end the current crisis between Fateh and Hamas, 27% accept Hamas’s view which calls for unconditional dialogue with President Abbas based on the exiting status quo today and 46% accept Abbas’s and Fateh’s view which calls for a dialogue but only after Hamas transfers control over the security headquarters to its rightful owners and return to the status quo ante.
• The largest percentage (29%) expects the unification of the two authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within months and 19% expect it within a year or two. On the other hand, 20% believe unification will not take place in the next two years and 22% believe that the separation will become permanent. 

Findings show that Hamas’s military takeover in June finds little support among the public with only 22% favoring it and about three quarters (73%) opposing it. Support for the Hamas step increases in the Gaza Strip (31%) compared to the West Bank (17%), among those opposed to the peace process (45%) compared to those supporting it (18%), among Hamas’s supporters (72%) compared to Fateh’s supporters (4%), among refugees (27%) compared to non-refugees (18%), among students (33%) compared to retired persons (14%), laborers (17%), and employees (18%), and among the youth between 18-22 years of age (28%) compared to those over 52 years of age (18%).

Despite the high level of opposition to the Hamas takeover, a large percentage (40%) agrees that the government of Ismail Haniyeh can stay in office despite the fact that it was dismissed by the PA president. Almost a third (32%) evaluates the performance of the Haniyeh government as good or very good while 43% evaluate it as bad or very bad. Support for keeping the Haniyeh government in office increases in the Gaza Strip (44%) compared to the West Bank (38%). Moreover, positive evaluation of the Haniyeh government increases in the Gaza Strip (38%) compared to the West Bank (28%).

However, support for keeping the government of Salam Fayyad in office is greater than support for keeping the Haniyeh government in office. About half of the respondents (49%) agrees and 44% disagree with keeping the Fayyad government in office. Findings show no difference on this matter between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the performance of the Fayyad government receives more positive evaluation than that of the Haniyeh government with 44% giving it a positive evaluation and 28% giving it a negative evaluation. Here too we find no differences between residents of the West Bank and those of the Gaza Strip.

These positions toward the two governments affect public perception of their legitimacy with 30% viewing the Haniyeh government as the legitimate PA government and 38% viewing the Fayyad government as the legitimate one; 22% believe both governments are illegitimate and 5% say the two governments are legitimate. Belief in the legitimacy of Haniyeh’s government increases in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (27%), among those who identify themselves as “religious” (34%) compared to those who identify themselves as “somewhat religious” (19%), among those opposed to the peace process (51%) compared to supporters of the peace process (24%), and among supporters of Hamas (80%) compared to supporters of Fateh (4%) .

Reluctance from a majority of Palestinians to grant legitimacy to either government is in part explained by the failure of the two governments to win the battle over hearts and minds. Findings show that the largest percentage (45%) does not trust the media of Hamas/Haniyeh or Fateh/Fayyad and only 19% trust the media of Hamas/Haniyeh while 27% trust the media of Fateh/Fayyad. Trust in Hamas/Haniyeh’s media increases in the Gaza Strip (27%) compared to the West Bank (15%). Similarly, trust in Fateh/Fayyad media increases in the Gaza Strip (30%) compared to the West Bank (25%). It is noticeable that while in the West Bank 50% say they do not trust either media, the percentage in the Gaza Strip of those not trusting either side decreases to 37%.

Perceptions of legitimacy and media effectiveness affect views regarding responsibility for the problems that plagued the Gaza Strip after the military takeover. The percentage of those blaming Hamas for those problems is higher than the percentage of those blaming Fateh and president Abbas. For example, 26% say that Hamas is responsible for the closure of the Rafah Crossing while only 15% blame Fateh. It is noticeable that the percentage of those blaming Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (22%) and that the percentage of those blaming Fateh is also higher in the Gaza Strip (19%) compared to the West Bank (12%). However, the largest percentage (41%) blames Israel while only 2% blameEgypt for the closure of the Rafah Crossing. Similar findings are found regarding the recent electricity cutoff with 23% blaming Hamas and 18% blaming president Abbas and the Fayyad government. The largest percentage (43%) blamed Israel and 10% blamed the European Union. Blaming Hamas and Fateh increases in the Gaza Strip (29% and 22% respectively) while blaming Israel increases in the West Bank (49%) compared to the Gaza Strip (32%).

Findings show that about one third of the public believes that the top priority for the Fayyad government should be the enforcement of law and order and ending lawlessness followed by conducting political reforms and fighting corruption (22%). Ending international sanctions and returning to the peace process come third and fourth (18% each).

Findings show greater public willingness to accept positions advanced by president Abbas and Fateh to solve the current crisis with Hamas than those advanced by Hamas. For example, 46% say that they accept Abbas/Fateh’s position which calls for dialogue only after Hamas transfers control over the security headquarters to its rightful owners allowing the return to the status quo ante. On the other hand, only 27% say they accept Hamas’s view which calls for unconditional dialogue with President Abbas based on the existing status quo today. Support for Hamas’s position increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (24%). It is interesting to note that support for Abbas/Fateh’s position increases also in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (44%). About one quarter (24%) opposes both views.

Finally, poll findings indicate a strong split among the public regarding the future of the political unity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The largest percentage (29%) expects the unification of the two authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within months and 19% expect it within a year or two. On the other hand, 20% believe unification will not take place in the next two years and 22% believe that the separation will become permanent.  In other words, 48% expect unification within the next two years and 42% do not expect unification in the future or near future. Optimism about unification within the next two years increases in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (42%).

(2) Public Evaluation of West Bank and Gaza Conditions

• Among all respondents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, only 8% evaluate the situation in the Gaza Strip as good or very good while 27% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good.
• West Bank-Gaza Strip public expectations regarding future conditions in the Gaza Strip tend to be pessimistic while expectations regarding future conditions in the West Bank tend to show some optimism.
• Percentage of those wishing to immigrate to other countries continues to increase from 28% last June to 32% in this poll. The percentage is higher in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to West Bank (29%).
• 41% say they feel their security and personal safety and those of their family are assured today and 59% say they are not assured. Feelings of security and safety increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (35%).

Findings show that the public is highly pessimistic about current and future conditions in the Gaza Strip and a little optimistic about conditions in the West Bank. Only 8% of all respondents view current conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good. This evaluation is shared equally by respondents in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By contrast, 27% say that current conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. Here, however the evaluation is not shared equally by respondents in the two areas as 40% in the Gaza Strip compared to 20% in the West Bank say that conditions in the West Bank are good or very good.  Similarly, expectations about the future reflect much greater pessimism about conditions in the Gaza Strip than about conditions in the West Bank. For example, while only 21% expect economic conditions to improve in the Gaza Strip, 56% expect these conditions to improve in the West Bank. Moreover, while only 28% expect conditions of democracy and freedom of speech and press will improve in the Gaza Strip, 47% expect these conditions to improve in the West Bank. In general, residents of the Gaza Strip tend to show more optimism regarding conditions in their area as well as in the West Bank while residents of the West Bank tend to show less optimism regarding conditions in both areas.

The negative and pessimistic evaluation of conditions today and in the future affects the percentage of respondents’ wish to immigrate to other countries leading to an increase from 28%last June, during the Hamas military takeover of the Gaza Strip, to 32% in this poll. The wish to immigrate increases in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to West Bank (29%), among residents of refugee camps (39%) compared to residents of cities (30%) and towns and villages (31%), among supporters of Fateh (40%) compared to supporters of Hamas (20%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to illiterates (13%), among men (38%) compared to women (27%), among students (53%) compared to farmers (10%) and housewives (25%), and among the youth between ages of 23-27 years (46%) and 18-22 years (44%) compared to those over 52 years of age (8%) and those between 43-52 years of age (26%).  

Finally, findings show an increase in the perception of security and safety in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip compared to the situation three months ago. Today, 41% (compared to 26% in mid June) say they feel their security and personal safety and those of their family are assured and 59% say they are not assured. Feelings of security and safety increase in the Gaza Strip (49% compared to 41% three months ago) compared to the West Bank (35% compared to 18% three months ago).

(3) Presidential Decree on Elections, Early Elections, and Balance of Power:

• 58% support and 34% oppose the most recent presidential decree regarding the amendment to the electoral system basing it on proportional representation with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip becoming one electoral district and with the distribution of seats reflecting the percentage of popular vote received in the whole country.
• Moreover, 62% support and 32% oppose eligibility conditions imposed by the decree on candidate lists wishing to participate in elections including their commitments to the PLO, the Declaration of Independence, and the Basic Law. A similar percentage (61%) accepts and 32% oppose the application of this eligibility condition on candidates for the presidential elections.
• Support for early elections reaches 62% and opposition 33%. Support increases in the Gaza Strip (65%) compared to the West Bank (60%).
• Popularity of Hamas drops to 31% losing two percentage points compared to its popularity in mid June and six percentage points compared to mid March. The popularity of Fateh increases from 43% three months ago to 48% in this poll.
• If new presidential elections took place today and the only two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the percentage of non participation would reach 38%. From among those willing to participate, 59% say they will vote for Abbas, 36% say they will vote for Haniyeh, and 5% remain undecided.
• Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas increases from 36%  last June to 45% in this poll.

Findings show that the public supports the presidential decree issued in early September regarding the election law. Support covers two aspects of the decree.  A majority of 58% support, and 34% oppose, changing the electoral system so that it becomes fully based on a proportional representation system; whereby seats are distributed based on percentage of popular vote in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as one electoral district. The last legislative elections, conducted in January 2006, were based on a mixed system, proportional representation in a single district and a majority system in 16 district. Findings also show that a majority of 62% supports and 32% oppose eligibility conditions imposed by the decree on candidate lists wishing to participate in elections including their commitments to the PLO, the Declaration of Independence, and the Basic Law. A similar percentage (61%) accepts and 32% oppose the application of this eligibility condition on candidates for the presidential elections.

Support for amending the electoral law to proportional representation increases in West Bank (60%) compared to the Gaza Strip (53%), among supporters of the peace process (64%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (33%), and among supporters of Fateh (82%) compared to supporters of Hamas (35%). 

Findings also show that a majority of 62% supports and 32% oppose the holding of early presidential and legislative elections. Support for early elections increases in the Gaza Strip (65%) compared to the West Bank (60%), among supporters of the peace process (71%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (26%), and among supporters of Fateh (89%) compared to supporters of Hamas (39%). It is interesting that 32% of the public say that the lists and candidates they have voted for in the last legislative elections no longer represent them while 63% say they still represent them. Of those who voted for the Hamas list and candidates in the last elections, 36% say they no longer represent them while only 28% of Fateh voters say that Fateh and its candidates no longer represent them.

If new parliamentary elections are held today, Hamas would receive 31% and Fateh would receive 48%. These findings indicate a drop of two percentage points in the popularity of Hamas compared to its standing in mid June and a drop of six percentage points in its popularity compared to its standing in mid March. For Fateh, the finding indicates an increase of five percentage points compared to its standing in mid June. It is noticeable that this is the first time since the January 2006 elections, when it won 42% of the vote, that Fateh’s popularity has significantly increased. The popularity of all the third parties combined reaches 11%, and 10% remain undecided. Hamas’s popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (28%) and Fateh’s popularity too increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to West Bank (47%).

If new presidential elections took place today and the only two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the percentage of non participation would reach 38%. From among those willing to participate, 59% say they will vote for Abbas, 36% say they will vote for Haniyeh, and 5% remain undecided.  If the competition is between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, nonparticipation would drop to 29% and from among those willing to participate, 63% say they will vote for Barghouti, 32% say they will vote for Haniyeh, and 5% remain undecided. These results indicate a significant increase in the percentage of those voting for Abbas compared to the situation in mid June when it reached 49% compared to 42% for Haniyeh. Moreover, vote for Barghouti increases in this poll compared to where it was last June when it stood at 59% compared to 35% for Haniyeh.

Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas increases from 36%  last June to 45% in this poll.

(4) Peace Process

• Only one quarter (26%) of the public expects the November peace conference called for by the US to succeed and 67% expect it to fail in making progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
• 57% agree and 41% disagree with the proposed two-state solution whereby Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis recognize Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the solution of all the issues of the conflict.
• Similarly, 58% support and 37% oppose conducting negotiations with the aim of establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel on the permanent issues such as the permanent borders, holy places and refugees.
• But only 46% would support and 48% would oppose a permanent settlement of the borders of the Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with the exception of settlements in about 5% of the West Bank where a swap would take place with Palestinians receiving an equal amount of territories from Israel proper. Support for this settlement increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (42%).

Poll findings show that the public remains highly pessimistic about the chances of success for the international peace conference proposed by the US Administration for November 2007. Only one quarter (26%) of the public expects the November peace conference to succeed and 67% expect it to fail in making progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Optimism increases in the Gaza Strip (30%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among supporters of the peace process (31%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (11%), among supporters of Fateh (41%) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), and among the illiterates (34%) compared to holders of BA degree (22%).

Findings show that a majority of 57% agrees and 41% disagree with the proposed two-state solution whereby Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis recognize Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the solution of all the issues of the conflict. Similarly, 58% support and 37% oppose conducting negotiations with the aim of establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the state ofPalestine and the state of Israel on the permanent issues such as the permanent borders, holy places and refugees. But only 46% would support and 48% would oppose a permanent settlement of the borders of the Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with the exception of settlements in about 5% of the West Bank where a land swap would take place with Palestinians receiving an equal amount of territories from Israel proper. Support for this compromise increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (42%), among residents of refugee camps (51%) compared to residents of villages and towns (44%), among supporters of the peace process (54%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (24%) and among supporters of Fateh (60%) compared to supporters of Hamas (33%).... Full Report

This PSR Poll has been conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah. 

26-30 August 2014

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 26-30 August 2014. The period before the poll witnessed the eruption of the Gaza War which was preceded by the kidnapping and killing of three Israelis. More than 2000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, were killed during the war. About 70 Israelis, mostly from the military, were killed during the war. Our fieldwork started on the last day of the war and continued during the first four days of the ceasefire.  This press release covers public perception of the war, who came out a winner, the ceasefire agreement, targeting of civilians, evaluation of the performance of various Palestinian actors during the war, and war impact on reconciliation. It also covers Palestinian elections, the internal balance of power, the June kidnapping and killing of the three Israelis, and others. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of this special Gaza War poll highlight dramatic changes in public attitudes regarding major issues. It goes without saying that the war was the major driver behind these changes. As expected, and as we saw in previous instances during and immediately after Israeli wars with Hamas, findings show a spike in the popularity of Hamas and its leaders and a major decline in the popularity of Fatah and president Abbas.  But, as in previous cases, these changes might be temporary and things might revert in the next several months to where they were before the war.

It is worth noting that the size of the change in favor of Hamas is unprecedented since 2006. Indeed, if presidential elections were to take place today, Ismail Haniyeh would easily win over Abbas and Hamas would win the largest percentage of the popular vote in parliamentary elections. The overwhelming majority of the public views Hamas as the winner and Israel as the loser in this war. Furthermore, a similar majority views Hamas’ approach of armed confrontation with Israel as the most effective means of ending Israeli occupation. Indeed, an overwhelming majority of West Bankers wants to transfer “Hamas’ way” to the West Bank and rejects the demand to disarm the Islamist group or to disband the other Gazan armed groups. Findings also indicate that the public see Iran, Turkey, and Qatar as the most instrumental in supporting Hamas and helping Gazans remain steadfast against the Israeli attacks. By contrast, Egypt’s role is seen as week and unhelpful. Indeed, a majority believes that Egypt played a negative role in the ceasefire negotiations.

Finally, despite the fact that the Palestinian Authority, Abbas, and prime minister Rami al Hamdallah received little positive evaluation for their role during the war, a majority tends to give the reconciliation government a big role in the affairs of the Gaza Strip in the post war period. For example, a majority wants it to control border crossings and to supervise police and security sector employees; the largest percentage wants it to control borders with Israel and Egypt and to lead the reconstruction process in the Strip

(1) Gaza War:

• 79% believe that Hamas has won the Gaza War; 79% believe Israel was responsible for the eruption of the Gaza war, and 94% are satisfied with Hamas’ military performance in confronting Israeli forces.
• 63% believe that the ceasefire agreement satisfies Palestinian interests, but 34% disagree with that. Moreover, 59% are satisfied and 39% are dissatisfied with war accomplishments
• An overwhelming majority of 86% support the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.
• 49% think it is justified for Hamas to launch rockets from populated areas and 46% disagree with that.
• 57% oppose disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip while 25% support such a measure after the ending of the siege and the conduct of elections.
• Yet, a majority of 54% support and 40% oppose Abbas’ position that argues that the reconciliation government must be committed to existing agreements reached between the PLO and Israel.
• But only 43%, compared to 53% last June, agrees with the statement that the inclusion of Hamas into the PLO means an implicit acceptance by Hamas of the PLO peace program and the existing agreements with Israel.
• About two thirds (64%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli attacks and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war; only 9% believe Egypt too has contributed to that.
• Moreover, only 25% describe Egypt’s role in the ceasefire negotiations as positive while a majority of 52% describe it as negative.
• In an evaluation of the performance of the various Palestinian actors during the war, Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah comes at the bottom, with 35% giving him a positive rating. The PA comes next with 36%, Abbas with 39%, the reconciliation government with 43%, and the PLO with 44%. On top comes Khalid Mish’al with 78% approval and Hamas with 88% approval.

79% believe that Hamas has won the Gaza War; 3% believe Israel came out the winner; and 17% believe the two sides were losers. Moreover, 79% believe Israel was responsible for the eruption of the Gaza war; 5% believe Hamas was responsible; and 12% believe the responsibility lies with the two sides. 63% believe that the ceasefire agreement satisfies Palestinian interests, but 34% disagree with that. Moreover, 59% are satisfied with the accomplishment gained in the agreement compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip; 39% are dissatisfied with the accomplishment. Satisfaction with war accomplishments is higher in the West Bank (61%) compared to the Gaza Strip (56%), among those who oppose the peace process (69%) compared to those who support the peace process (55%), among Hamas supporters (69%) compared to supporters of Fatah (53%), among those who hold a BA degree (60%) compared to those who are illiterates (47%), and among students (62%) compared to housewives (58%).

An overwhelming majority of 86% support the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended. Support for launching the rockets is higher in the West Bank (88%) compared to the Gaza Strip (82%). 60% say that Hamas does not launch rockets from populated areas, but 30% say it does. 49% think it is justified for Hamas to launch rockets from populated areas and 46% disagree with that. Percentage of those who believe that launching rockets from populated areas is unjustified increases to 59% among Gazans while standing at 38% among West Bankers. The percentage of those who believe that it is unjustified to launch rockets from populated areas increases among supporters of the peace process (48%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (42%), among supporters of Fatah (62%) compared to supporters of Hamas (38%), and among illiterates (57%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (46%). Only 30% believe that Hamas should warn Israeli civilians in the specific targeted areas before launching its rockets; 68% believe it should not do so.

57% oppose disarming armed groups in the Gaza Strip while 25% support such a measure after the ending of the siege and the conduct of elections; 13% support this measure but only after reaching a peace agreement with Israel. In our June 2014 poll, only 33% said it opposed disarming and dissolving armed groups in the Gaza Strip. Despite the current opposition to disarming Gaza groups, a majority of 54% support and 40% oppose Abbas’ position that argues that the reconciliation government must be committed to existing agreements reached between the PLO and Israel and rejects Hamas position that opposes Abbas’ argument.  In our previous poll in June, support for Abbas’ position stood at 59%. Yet, only 43%, compared to 53% last June, agrees with the statement that the inclusion of Hamas into the PLO means an implicit acceptance by Hamas of the PLO peace program and the existing agreements with Israel.

About two thirds (64%) believe that Iran, Turkey and Qatar combined have given the Gaza Strip the ability to remain steadfast against Israeli attacks and to be able to continue to launch rockets during the war; only 9% believe Egypt too has contributed to that. Iran comes on top with 28%, followed by Turkey (21%) and Qatar (15%); 25% select other countries or actors.  Moreover, only 25% describe Egypt’s role in the ceasefire negotiations as positive while a majority of 52% describe it as negative and 22% as neutral. Positive evaluation of Egypt’s role is higher in the Gaza Strip (29%) compared to the West Bank (22%), among supporters of the peace process (32%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (13%), among supporters of Fatah (40%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (15% and 21% respectively), among illiterates (42%) compared to holders of BA degree (22%), and among housewives (28%) compared to students (21%).

In an evaluation of the performance of the various Palestinian actors during the war, Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah comes at the bottom, with 35% giving him a positive rating. The PA comes next with 36%, Abbas with 39%, the reconciliation government with 43%, and the PLO with 44%. On top comes Khalid Mish’al with 78% approval and Hamas with 88% approval. The approval rating for Abbas rises to 49% in the Gaza Strip and drops to 33% in the West Bank. By contrast, Khalid Mish’al’s approval rating drops in the Gaza Strip to 70% and rises to 83% in the West Bank.

(2) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza after the war:

• Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split rises to 69%; 28% remain pessimistic.
• Three months after its establishment, 46% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government and 46% are dissatisfied.
• A majority of 51% wants to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 38% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control.
• 48% want the reconciliation government to control the border with Egypt and 39% want it under Hamas’ control.
• 44% believe the responsibility for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip should be placed in the hands of the reconciliation government while 39% prefer to place it in Hamas’ hands.
• 83% want the reconciliation government to pay the salary of the Gaza public sector that served the previous Hamas government; 13% are opposed to that.
• 65% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of supervising the work of the employees of Gaza security sector who worked in the past under Hamas government; 29% disagree with that.

Findings show that optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split rises to 69%; 28% remain pessimistic. In our last poll in June 62% were optimistic. Three months after its establishment, 46% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government and 46% are dissatisfied. Indeed, 60% prefer to get rid of the reconciliation government and form a unity government in which leaders and politicians from all major factions would participate; 34% oppose such a step and prefer to keep the reconciliation government. The preference for a unity government drops significantly to 49% in the Gaza Strip and increases to 66% in the West Bank.

A majority of 51% wants to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 38% prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, 64% want to place the Rafah crossing under the control of the reconciliation government and only 25% want it under Hamas’ control. The same, with minor variation, applies to control over the crossings with Israel. 48% want the reconciliation government to control the border with Egypt and 39% want it under Hamas’ control. The same, with minor variation, applies to the border with Israel; with 45% in favor of keeping the border under the control of the reconciliation government and 41% say they should stay under Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, 56% say borders with Egypt should come under the control of the reconciliation government and 49% say the border with Israel too should come under the control of the reconciliation government. In the West Bank, 42% say that the Rafah crossing should come under the control of the reconciliation government and 45% say it should remain under Hamas control. The demand to place the control of the Rafah crossing under the reconciliation government increases among men (56%) compared to women (45%), among the somewhat religious (53%) compared to the religious (47%), among supporters of the peace process (58%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (39%), among supporters of Fatah (85%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (31% and 49% respectively), and among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (47%).

44% believe the responsibility for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip should be placed in the hands of the reconciliation government while 39% prefer to place it in Hamas’ hands. But 83% want the reconciliation government to pay the salary of the Gaza public sector that served the previous Hamas government; 13% are opposed to that. In this regard, 65% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of supervising the work of the employees of Gaza security sector who worked in the past under Hamas government; 29% disagree with that, wanting instead to keep these employees under Hamas’ control. In the Gaza Strip, the demand for placing the security sector employees under the control of the reconciliation government rises to 72% and only 24% want them under Hamas’ control. In the West Bank, demand to place supervision over those employees under the reconciliation government stands at 61% while 32% want them to come under the supervision of Hamas. Demand to place the security sector employees under the supervision of the reconciliation government among men (68%) compared to women (62%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (79% and 75% respectively) compared to supports of Hamas (54%). Nonetheless, 72% agree with Hamas’ demand that security and police should remain under its control during the next 6 months, up until the elections; 24% disagree with that. Two months ago 66% agreed with that.

(3) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Haniyeh would receive a majority of 61% and Abbas would receive 32%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas decreases from 50% two months ago to 39% in this poll.
• If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 45% and the latter would receive 49% of the participants’ votes.
• If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Haniyeh would receive 48% of the vote, Barghouti 29%, and Abbas 19%.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 46% say they would vote for Hamas and 31% say they would vote for Fatah, 7% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided.

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Haniyeh, for the first time since we have started asking about his popularity about 8 years ago, would receive a majority of 61% and Abbas would receive 32%. Vote for Haniyeh stands at 53% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank. Abbas receives 43% in the Gaza Strip and 25% in the West Bank. Two months ago, Abbas received the support of 53% in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Haniyeh 41%. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 71%.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas decreases from 50% two months ago to 39% in this poll. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas rises among supporters of the peace process (52%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (16%), among supporters of Fatah (86%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (15% and 32% respectively), among those who are over 50 years of age (44%) compared to youth between the ages of 18 ad 28 (37%), and among the illiterates (63%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (33%). With regard to Abbas’ vote in the presidential elections, the vote increases among non-religious (66%) compared to the religious and the somewhat religious (25% and 36% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (46%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (8%), and among supporters of Fatah (89%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (3% and 29% respectively).

If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 45% and the latter would receive 49% of the participants’ votes. This is the first time in 8 years in which Haniyeh receives more votes than Barghouti. In our previous poll, Barghouti received the support of 58% and Haniyeh 38%. The rate of participation in this case would reach 77%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Haniyeh would receive 48% of the vote, Barghouti 29%, and Abbas 19%. The rate of participation in this case would reach 80%. In our previous poll in June 2014, Barghouti received 36% of the vote, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 28%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 78% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 46% say they would vote for Hamas and 31% say they would vote for Fatah, 7% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Two months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and for Fatah at 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 44% and in the West Bank at 47%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 36% and in the West Bank at 27%.

A majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 14% want them to take place after a year or more, and 12% do not want elections.

(4) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 24% two months ago to 20% today, and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged at 32%.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip drops dramatically from 64% two months ago to 22% in this poll. In the West Bank perception of safety and security drops from 51% to 47% during the same period.
• Hamas’ official TV station, Al Aqsa, is the one with the most viewership (37%) in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip followed by al Jazeera (21%), Palestine TV (16%), Ma’an-Mix (11%), and al Arabiya (5%).
• In the West Bank, 35% of the respondents expected economic conditions in their area to improve in the next few years. But in the Gaza Strip 56% expected economic conditions to improve.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 24% two months ago to 20% today, and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged at 32%. Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip drops dramatically from 64% two months ago to 22% in this poll. In the West Bank perception of safety and security drops from 51% to 47% during the same period. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 20%. For the first time ever, Hamas’ official TV station, Al Aqsa, is the one with the most viewership (37%) in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip followed by al Jazeera (21%), Palestine TV (16%), Ma’an-Mix (11%), and al Arabiya (5%).

In the West Bank, 35% of the respondents expected economic conditions in their area to improve and a similar percentage (33%) expected them to worsen. But in the Gaza Strip 56% expected economic conditions to improve and only 20% expected them to worsen.

(5) Peace Process:

• Only 47% believe the chances for the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are medium or high; 51% believe the chances are low or non-existent.
• The public is divided over the two-state solution: 49% support it and 50% oppose it.
• A majority of 53% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means to establish a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Only 22% believe negotiation is the best means to establish a Palestinian state.
• 62% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion and 35% think it is still practical.
• 81% are worried that they could be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their homes would be demolished and land confiscated.
• An overwhelming majority of 81% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the land occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny them their political rights.
• 57% of the public supported the June 2014 kidnapping of the three Israelis in the West Bank. Similarly, a majority of 54% supported the killing of the three kidnapped Israelis and 42% opposed it.
• An overwhelming majority of 88% supports Hamas’ way of confronting the Israeli occupation as it did in the Gaza Strip; only 11% is opposed to that. A majority of 72% favors the transfer of Hamas’ approach to the West Bank.

Findings show that only 47% believe the chances for the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations are medium or high; 51% believe the chances are low or non-existent. Similarly, the public is divided over the two-state solution: 49% support it and 50% oppose it. In our last poll two months ago, 54% supported this solution and 46% opposed it. A majority of 53% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means to establish a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Only 22% believe negotiation is the best means to establish a Palestinian state and 20% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route to statehood.  62% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion and 35% think it is still practical. Yet, only 24% support the alternative one-state solution; 75% reject the one-state solution. These findings indicate a drop in the support for the one-state solution which two months ago stood at 31%. The belief that armed confrontations are the most effective means to establish a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel increases in the Gaza Strip (56%) compared to the West Bank (51%), among men (56%) compared to women (50%), among the religious (56%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (52% and 36% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (78%) compared to those who support the peace process (39%), among supporters of Hamas (72%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (34% and 48% respectively), among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (51%), among holders of BA degree (58%) compared to illiterates (49%), and among students (58%) compared to housewives (49%).

81% are worried that they could be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their homes would be demolished and land confiscated. Only 19% are not worried. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 81% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the land occupied in 1967 and expel its population or deny them their political rights. By contrast, 63% believe that the long term aspiration of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO is to recover part or all of the land occupied in 1967.

57% of the public say that they supported the June 2014 kidnapping of the three Israelis in the West Bank when that incident took place. Support for the kidnapping reached 76% in the Gaza Strip and only 45% in the West Bank. Similarly, a majority of 54% supported the killing of the three kidnapped Israelis and 42% opposed it. Support for the killing reached 69% in the Gaza Strip and only 42% in the West Bank. 52% of the West Bankers opposed the killing of the three kidnapped Israelis. But the public is divided over the identity of those who carried out the kidnapping and the killing of the three Israelis: 32% accuse Israel, 30% accuse Hamas, 21% believe a Palestinian acted on his own, and 2% accuse Fatah. Support for killing the kidnapped Israelis among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (50% and 29% respectively), among those who oppose the peace the peace process (73%) compared to those who support the peace process (43%), among supporters of Hamas (72%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (40% and 50% respectively), among refugees (62%) compared to non-refugees (46%), and among illiterates (72%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (56%).

In the absence of viable negotiations, 85% support joining more international organizations; 84% support joining the International Criminal Court; 62% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance; 60% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support a dissolution of the PA; and 24% support abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution. It is worth mentioning that two months ago only 41% indicated support for a return to an armed intifada.  61% believe that massive popular demonstrations could contribute to ending the Israeli occupation. But a larger majority of 72% favors the transfer of Hamas’ armed approach to the West Bank. Support for emulating Hamas in the West Bank stands at 70% among West Bankers and 74% among Gazans. Support for emulating Hamas in the West Bank is higher among those who oppose the peace process (86%) compared to those who support the peace process (63%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (86% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (50%), and among refugees (75%) compared to non-refugees (68%).

82% say they participate in boycotting Israeli goods that have local alternatives and 18% say they do not participate in the boycott. An overwhelming majority (87%) believes that the boycott movement is effective and 11% believe it to be ineffective. ...More

14-16 September 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during September 14-16, 2006. The poll deals with public evaluation of the performance of the Hamas government, views on the national unity government, attitudes towards peace and violence in the aftermath of the Lebanon war, and the domestic balance of power. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at

 Tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Six months after the establishment of the Hamas government, poll findings show widespread public dissatisfaction with its performance especially in the economic areas of salaries and poverty as well as the enforcement of law and order. This dissatisfaction leads the majority to support the formation of a national unity government that is not under the full control of Hamas. The largest percentage supports the formation of a government in which Hamas and Fateh would enjoy equal weight.

But the dissatisfaction with the performance of the government does not lead to a reduction in the popularity of Hamas compared to where it was three months ago. Moreover, Fateh does not benefit from Hamas’ lack of performance with its popularity remaining essentially stable. Moreover, despite the criticism of the performance of the government, two thirds of the public does not believe that Hamas should recognize Israel as required by the international donor community. This view does not reflect a hardening of public attitude toward the two-state solution. Rather it reflects public rejection of recognition of Israel as a precondition for negotiations. Poll findings show that a Palestinian majority supports recognition of Israel as a state for the Jewish people but only as part of a settlement that creates a Palestinian state along side Israel and resolves all other issues of the conflict.

(1) Domestic Conditions, Governmental Performance, and Views on a National Unity Government

• Only 42% are satisfied with the overall performance of the Hamas government; 54% are dissatisfied. The public is least satisfied with the government’s performance regarding economic issues (26%) and most satisfied with its performance in fighting corruption (46%).
• 46% want a national unity government in which Fateh and Hamas would have equal weight; 25% prefer a national unity government under Hamas’ control; and 24% prefer an apolitical government made up of professionals, not politicians.
• The largest percentage (32%) wants the top priority of the national unity government to be the enforcement of law and order while 25% want the top priority to be the return to the peace process and 23% want it to be the ending of the financial and political sanctions.
• An overwhelming majority (84%) sees conditions of the Palestinians today to be bad or very bad and only 5% see them good or very good; 80% say they are not safe and secure.
• 89% believe corruption exists in the PA and 72% believe that jobs are obtained mainly through wasta, or personal connections.
• 46% believe the strike of PA employees and teachers is not political while 36% believe it is political aimed against Hamas
• 41% define poverty and unemployment to be the biggest problem confronting Palestinians today while 25% define the biggest problem as being occupation and 22% say it is corruption and 11% say it is internal anarchy.
• 86% oppose kidnapping of foreigners residing in Palestinian areas and 13% support it. 

Poll findings show that 54% of the public is dissatisfied with the overall performance of the Hamas government and 42% are satisfied. Satisfaction is at its lowest with regard to performance in economic issues such as providing salaries and alleviating poverty with only 26% satisfied and 69% dissatisfied. Satisfaction is at its highest with regard to performance regarding fighting corruption with 46% satisfied and 49% dissatisfied.

Satisfaction with the overall performance of Hamas government increases in the Gaza Strip (45%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in cities (44%) compared to villages and towns (40%), among the most religious (44%) compared to the least religious (39%) among supporters of Hamas (75%) compared to supporters of Fateh (17%), and among those most unwilling to buy a lottery ticket (51%) compared to those most willing (27%).

Poll findings show that strong correlation exists between satisfaction with the overall performance of Hamas government and those willing to vote for Hamas if new elections are held today: 90% of the highly satisfied intend to vote for Hamas (compared to 4% for Fateh) and 4% of those who are not satisfied at all intend to vote for Hamas (compared to 66% for Fateh) 

To find a way out of the current crisis, the largest percentage (46%) supports the formation of a national unity government in which Fateh and Hamas would enjoy equal weight. A quarter supports the formation of a national unity government in which Hamas would dominate while a similar percentage (24%) prefers a non political government made up of professionals. With regard to the priorities of the future national unity government, the public is divided with about one third (32%) focusing on fighting lawlessness by enforcing law and order, a quarter focusing on renewing the peace process, and a similar percentage (23%) focusing on ending the current financial and political sanctions. Only 18% want the top priority to be fighting corruption.

Findings show a great deal of depression regarding existing conditions with 84% describing current condition as bad or very bad and only 5% describing it good or very good. Moreover, 80% say they and their families do not feel secure and safe in PA areas. The percentage of those believing that corruption exists in PA institutions is at its highest (89%) while 72% believe that jobs today can be obtained largely through wasta, or personal connections.

This gloomy perception might be the reason why the largest percentage (46%) does not view the strike by public employees and teachers as a political strike targeting the Hamas government and instead view it as motivated by professional consideration, a protest against the existing miserable conditions. Only 36% view it as an attack against the Hamas government.

(2) Lebanon War

• 86% believe that Hezbollah emerged as a winner in the Lebanon war and 2% see Israel as a winner.
• 90% oppose the position advanced by some Arab countries that saw the war as an uncalculated adventure by Hezbollah and 9% support this position.
• 73% believe the war strengthens the resistance option in Palestine and 24% believe it weakens it while 75% believe that in light of the war they would support taking Israeli soldiers prisoners in order to exchange them with Palestinians.
• 65% believe that the war was an Israeli calculated step since Hezbollah represented a threat to Israel and only 5% believe it was caused by Iranian and Syrian intentions.
• 84% agree that one of the war lessons is the need to establish soon a Palestinian state in order to prevent in the future a war between Palestinians and Israelis similar to the war in Lebanon but 64% agree with the view that Israel will never allow the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.
• About three quarters agree with the views that the Palestinians can not count on Arab support, that they are in need for international understanding, and that they can not count on armed action only.
• 63% agree that Palestinians should use the same methods as Hezbollah such as the launching of rockets at Israeli cities and 41% only agree with the view that only after it ends its occupation of the West Bank Israel would be able to live in peace.

Findings show a semi consensus among the public (86%) that Hezbollah has emerged victorious from the war in Lebanon while the percentage of those who believe that Israel came out winner is 2%. Moreover, the overwhelming majority (90%) does not share the views expressed by some Arab countries that the war in Lebanon was an uncalculated risk by Hezbollah with about two thirds (65%) believing that the war was a planned Israeli measure because Hezbollah has become a threat against Israel. The percentage of those who believe that the war had  Syrian and Iranian origins did not exceed 5%. In brief, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians accepts Hezbollah’s, rather than Israel’s narrative regarding the origin and outcome of the war in Lebanon.

With regard to lessons learned from the war and their implications for the Palestinian-Israeli situation, findings show apparent inconsistency. On the one hand, 73% believe that the war has strengthened the armed resistance option in Palestine and in light of the war 75% would support taking Israeli soldiers prisoners in order to exchange them with Palestinian prisoners. Moreover, 63% believe that the Palestinians should emulate Hezbollah’s methods by using rockets against Israeli cities.

On the other hand, three quarters agree with the view that Palestinians can not depend on armed action alone and must reach a political settlement with Israel. Moreover, a similar percentage believes that Palestinians can not count on themselves alone and that they need the help and understanding of the international community.

One reason for this apparent inconsistency can be found in the belief of 84% that there is a need to establish soon a Palestinian state in order to prevent a future a war between Palestinians and Israel similar to the war in Lebanon while almost two thirds (64%) believe that Israel will never allow the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. In other words, while the Palestinians recognize the need for a political settlement acceptable to Israel and the international community they do not believe that Israel would agree to a settlement that would establish a Palestinian state; therefore, most Palestinians support armed confrontations.

(3) Peace Process and Olmert’s Realignment Plan

• 74% want permanent status negotiations between Mahmud Abbas and Ehud Olmert but only 44% believe such negotiations if they were to take place would succeed and lead to a compromise agreement.
• 59% want Hamas to negotiate with Israel but only 36% believe such negotiations if they were to take place would lead to a compromise permanent status agreement.
• 67% do not believe Hamas should recognize the state of Israel in order to meet international donor demands. But 63% would support a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a state for the Jewish people after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established.
• 77% support the call for a ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians and 22% oppose it.
• 62% have not heard of Olmert’s realignment plan to evacuate most of the West Bank settlements while realigning into large blocks of settlements along the line of the separation barrier.
• 70% do not welcome Olmert’s plan and only 20% believe it will be implemented.
• 75% believe that the evacuation of the settlements in the Gaza Strip was a victory for armed struggle.
• 52% support the Road Map and 42% oppose it. Also, only 44% support collection of arms from Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This percentage increases to 64% if collection of arms is restricted to Gaza Strip. 82% support the integration of armed groups into the Palestinian security services.
• 57% support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 57% believe that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Findings show that two thirds of the public do not believe that Hamas should accept the international demand to recognize the state of Israel in order to end the current financial and political sanctions. This view does not mean that the public opposes a future Palestinian recognition of Israel as 63% support recognition of Israel as a Jewish state but only as part of a package of permanent status that would resolve all issues of the conflict and lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel as the state for the Palestinian people. Moreover, about three quarters (74%) want President Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) to conduct permanent status negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. A majority of 59% (compared to 70% last June) supports Hamas’ engagement in peace negotiations with Israel. But expectations that such negotiations would succeed are not high: 44% if conducted by Abu Mazin and 36% if by Hamas.

Findings show that 52% support the Road Map plan while 42% oppose it. But only 44% support collection of arms from armed groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as required by the plan. However, if collection of arms is restricted to the Gaza Strip (now, after the Israeli withdrawal from it) support would increase to 64%. Moreover, if the solution to the arms and the armed men and militias can be found in merging them into the Palestinian security services, the overwhelming majority (82%) would support that.

Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians remain relatively high as it was three months ago, standing today at 57% and opposition at 41%. Findings also show that three quarters believe that the Israeli evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip has been victory for armed struggle while 57% believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not and 40% do not share that view.

Most Palestinians have not heard about Olmert’s Realignment Plan for the evacuation of some settlements in the West Bank and the relocation of settlers to settlement blocs near the separation wall. Findings show that 70% do not welcome the plan while only 26% welcome it. Given the war in Lebanon and the continuation of armed confrontations in the Gaza Strip, the majority (65%) does not believe that the plan will be implemented while only 20% think it will.

(4) Domestic Balance of Power

• Despite the dissatisfaction with the performance of Hamas’ government, the percentage of those willing to vote for it in new elections remain as it was three months ago (38%) while Fateh’s popularity increases slightly to 41%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Mahmud Abbas reaches 55%. But if new elections are held today, only 31% would elect him, 24% would elect Ismail Hanieh, 13% Marwan Barghouti, 5% Mustafa Barghouti, and 3% Mahmud Zahhar.
• If elections were to be held for a vice president, Ismail Hanieh would receive 20% of the vote, Mahmud Zahhar 16%, Marwan Barghouti 15%, Mohammad Dahlan 9%, and Saeb Erikat, Farouq Qaddoumi, and Mustafa Barghouti 7% each.

Findings show that despite the dissatisfaction with Hamas government, the popularity of Hamas has not dropped compared to where it stood three months ago. 38% say they would vote for Hamas if new elections are held today compared to 39% last June and 47% last March. Support for Fateh remains relatively stable with a slight increase in this poll compared to three months ago. 41% would vote for Fateh if elections are held today compared to 39% in March 2006 and again in June 2006.

Findings show that satisfaction with the performance of Abu Mazin stands today at 55% compared to 53% last June and 61% last March. But if new elections for the presidency are held today and five candidates competed, Abu Mazin would receive 31% followed by Ismail Hanieh, the current Prime Minister, with 24%, Marwan Barghouti (13%), Mustafa Barghouti (5%) and Mahmud Zahhar (3%).

If elections are held for the office of a vice president and seven candidates competed, Ismail Hanieh would receive the largest percentage (20%) followed by Mahmud Zahhar (16%), Marwan Barghouti (15%), Mohammad Dahlan (9%), and Saeb Erikat, Farouq Qaddoumi, and Mustafa Barghouti (7% each)..... Full Report

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. (26)

A Total Lack of Confidence in the Annapolis Process Keeps Hamas’s Popularity Stable Despite Worsening Conditions in the Gaza Strip

11-16 December 2007