Search

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

Overwhelming Majority Among Israelis and Palestinians for Negotiated Rather than Unilateral Further Disengagements 60% of the Israelis support negotiations with Abu Mazin over a final status settlement   

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted March 16-21 jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah 

The joint poll examined Israeli and Palestinian attitudes towards unilateralism in handling the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. These tendencies became prominent on the political agenda in the region following Israel’s disengagement in Gaza and the rise of Hamas to power in the Palestinian Authority (PA). Our results indicate consistent and strong support in both publics for negotiated over unilateral steps in handling the conflict by both sides. Specifically,three quarters of the Palestinians (73%) and Israelis (76%) prefer to see further disengagements in the West Bank negotiated between the PA and Israel. Only 23% of the Palestinians and 17% of the Israelis prefer further disengagements to be unilateral. Moreover, 60% of the Israelis support entering talks with Abu Mazin and the Fateh leadership over a final status settlement. 

The survey further examined the impact of the political turnabout in the PA on both publics’ support for mutual recognition of identity and political recognition. Only 37% of the Palestinians support the recognition of the State of Israel by Hamas, while 59% oppose it. However, under conditions of peace and given an independent Palestinian State, 66% of the Palestinians and 68% of the Israelis support a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. Similar levels of support among Israelis and Palestinians were obtained in September 2005 before Hamas rose to power in the PA. 

The Palestinian sample consists of 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 16 and 18, 2006. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 603 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic, or Russian between March 16 and 21, 2006. The margin of error is 4%.The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il. 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 

(A) Unilateralism vs. negotiations in handling the conflict 

• ·         About three quarters of the Palestinians (73%) and Israelis (76%) prefer to see further disengagements in the West Bank negotiated between the PA and Israel while 23% of the Palestinians and 17% of the Israelis prefer further disengagements to be unilateral.
• ·         A majority in both publics (59% of the Palestinians and 63% of the Israelis) also believe that taking the unilateral path decreases the chances to eventually reach a final status settlement.
• ·         Consequently, a considerable majority among Israelis (60%) support entering talks with Abu-Mazin over for a final status settlement, while only 38% oppose. These results are highly significant given the internal debate in Kadima between Olmert and Peres on whether to take a unilateral or negotiated path in handling the conflict with the Palestinians.
• ·         Despite these levels of support, Israelis are not very optimistic with regard to the results of such talks. 46% believe that it is possible these days to reach such a settlement with Abu Mazin and the Fateh leadership while 51% think it is impossible.
• ·         Given the recent salience of unilateralism on Israel’s political agenda, we examined Palestinians’ attitudes towards unilateral steps that the PA may consider, such as unilateral declaration of an independent state. 59% of the Palestinians would support a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian State while 37% would oppose it. However if such a step were negotiated with Israel, 80% of the Palestinians would support it, and 17% would oppose it. As to Israelis, if an independent state were to be declared by Palestinians, 83% of the Israelis would prefer it to be negotiated with Israel while 14% would prefer it to be unilateral.

(B) Attitudes towards full separation 

• ·         47% of the Palestinians believe it is possible and 51% believe it is not possible to achieve in the future full economic, political, and physical separation from Israel. If such a separation was possible, 75% among Palestinians would support it while 24% would oppose it.
• ·         As to Israelis, they too prefer fuller rather than partial separation from Palestinians. 56% support and 41% oppose the evacuation of both settlements and the army from parts of the West Bank. However only 41% of the Israelis support and 56% oppose the evacuation of civilian settlements in the West Bank without the evacuation of the army their.  17% support and 80% oppose the evacuation of the army without the evacuation of settlements and 38% support and 58% oppose the evacuation of neither. In the same vein, 61% of the Israelis support and 34% oppose the dismantling of most settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

(C) The political turnabout in the PA 

(1) Interpretations of Hamas’ victory 

The survey examined Israelis’ and Palestinians’ explanations of Hamas victory in the PA and attitudes towards the complex policy dilemmas that both sides face following the political turnabout in the PA. 

• ·         Palestinians and Israelis seem to attribute different reasons to Hamas’ victory in the PA. 37% of the Palestinians and 20% of the Israelis believe that Hamas won because Palestinians wanted an Islamic authority that rules according to Sharia and religion. The prevalent explanation among Israelis however (33%) was that Hamas won because Palestinians wanted a fighting Authority that resists Israel by force but only 7% of the Palestinians think so.
• ·         Following Hamas victory in democratic elections there is no change in Palestinians’ evaluations of the status of democracy and human rights in the PA. 34% of the Palestinians believe that the current status of democracy and human rights in the PA is good or very good (35%) thought so in December 2005,  26% think it is fair (28% in December)  and 37% believe it is bad or very bad (36% in December). Among Israelis however, 6% believe the status and democracy in the PA is good or very good, 22% think it is fair and 70% think it is bad or very bad. A year ago in March 2005, 6% of the Israelis evaluated the status of democracy and human rights in the PA as good or very good, 28% thought it was fair and 61% believed it was bad or very bad.

(2) Israelis’ reactions to Hamas’ victory 

• ·         Only 42% of the Israelis think that the threat to Israel’s security increased following Hamas’ rise to power in the PA. 50% of the Israeli public think the level of threat did not change as a result of it and 7% believe the threat rather decreased.
• ·         At the same time, 58% of Israelis believe that the aspirations of the Hamas leadership eventually are to conquer the State of Israel or to conquer it and annihilate a considerable part of the Jewish population in the State. Only 38% believe that these aspirations are to take back part or all of the pre-67 territories.
• ·         On a personal level, 75% of the Israeli Jews are worried and 24% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. This constitutes a marginal increase in their threat perceptions compared to June 2005 when 71% of the Israeli Jews were worried and 27% were not. As to Palestinians, the level of personal threat also increased somewhat. 75% believe their own and their families’ security and safety are not assured these days compared to 64% who felt so in June 2005. 25% feel their security is assured compared to36% who thought so in June 2005.
• ·         The majority of the Israeli public (55%) believes there are low or very low chances that Hamas will moderate over time. 44% of the Israelis think there are medium or high chances for this to happen.
• ·         Nevertheless, 62% think that Israel should talk to Hamas if this is required in order to reach a settlement with the Palestinians while 37% think Israel should not do it. Only 33% of the Israelis however believe that this is the majority position. This suggests that talks with Hamas are not considered normative in the eyes of Israelis.
• ·         Among Palestinians, 75% think Hamas-led PA should negotiate with Israel if it agrees to conduct peace negotiations with it while 22% think a Hamas-led PA should not negotiate with Israel.
• ·         Nevertheless, only about a third among Palestinians (37%) support the recognition of the State of Israel by Hamas. 59% oppose it even under international pressure.

(3) Israeli attitudes towards Abu Mazin and Fateh 

• ·         Israelis seem to be less threatened by the Fateh leadership. Only 37% believe their aspirations eventually are to conquer the State of Israel or to conquer it and annihilate a considerable part of the Jewish population in the State; 58% believe that these aspirations are to take back part or all of the pre-67 territories.  Thus a considerable majority among Israelis (60%) support entering talks for a final status settlement with Abu-Mazin while only 38% oppose it. Nevertheless only 46% among Israelis believe that it is possible these days to reach such a settlement with Abu Mazin and the Fateh leadership compared to 51% who believe it is impossible.
• ·         In this regard 19% of the Israelis believe that Abu Mazin and Fateh have the most say nowadays with regard to the PA policy with regard to the conflict with Israel while only 58% believe that it is Hanyeh and Hamas who have the most say in this regard.
• ·         34% of the Israelis believe that it is Hanyeh and Hamas who represent more faithfully the position of the majority of Palestinians in the PA with regard to Israel compared to 40% who believe it is Abu Mazin and Fateh who represent Palestinian positions more. 4% think both represent them to a similar extent and 10% think that neither does.
• ·         As to the influence that Palestinian public opinion has on its leaders, Israelis don’t see much difference in this regard between Fateh and Hamas’ leaderships. 44% of the Israelis think public opinion has little influence on Abu Mazin and the Fateh leadership, 30% think it has medium influence and 22% think it has much influence. With regard to Hamas, 43% of the Israelis think it has little influence on Hamas leadership 23% think it has medium influence and 29% who think it has much influence.

(4) Expectations for future developments 

• ·         Following Hamas victory in the PA elections, 18% of the Palestinians and only 6% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop, 41% of the Palestinians and 39% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue and 34% of the Palestinians and 52% of the Israelis think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
• ·         Following Hamas victory in the PA elections, 59% of the Palestinians and 45% of the Israelis expect negotiations to resume with or without violence continuing. 75% of the Palestinians and 91% of the Israelis expect violence to continue with or without negotiations.
• ·         These expectations mark a sharp decline in hopes for the resumption of negotiations from what they were before the rise of Hamas in the PA. In our December 2005 poll, 75% of the Palestinians and 72% of the Israelis expected negotiations to resume with or without violence continuing. However expectations with regard to continuing violence have not changed:  in December, 77% of the Palestinians and 90% of the Israelis expected violence to continue with or without negotiations.  
   

(D) Long range issues: Reconciliation and mutual recognition of identity 

• ·         68% of the Israelis and 66% of the Palestinians support a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute. 28% of the Israelis and 32% of the Palestinians oppose such a step. Among Israeli Jews 67% support and 28% oppose this mutual recognition of identity. Similar levels of support among Israelis and Palestinians were obtained in September 2005 before the Hamas rose to power in the PA.
• ·         50% of the Israelis and 57% of the Palestinians believe that a majority in their society supports a mutual recognition of identity under conditions of peace and the existence of an independent PalestinianState. These levels of awareness indicate that such a step is acquiring normative legitimacy in both societies.
• ·         Following the rise of Hamas to power in the PA, there is no change in both publics support for reconciliation under conditions of peace and the existence of a Palestinian state. Among Israelis it stands now at 82% percent compared to 85% in December 2005. Similarly among Palestinians, 74% support reconciliation today compared to 75% who supported it in December.
• ·         There is also no change in the two publics’ expectations as to when reconciliation will be achieved. 29% of the Israelis expect now full reconciliation to be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years compared to 30% who thought so in December 2005. 18% of the Palestinians expect full reconciliation to be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years now and in December. 27% of the Israelis and 45% of the Palestinians believe now reconciliation is not possible ever compared to 24% of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians who thought so in December.

(E) Israeli Elections 

• ·         At the time of the survey, 18% have not decided yet whom to vote for in the coming election. The survey was not designed to predict election outcomes, therefore we do not attempt to “crack” the undecided. 7% of Israeli eligible voters claim they will not vote. “Kadima” obtains 20% of the vote, the Labor party headed by Amir Peretz obtains 13% of the vote, and the Likud 7% of the vote.
• ·         24% of the Israelis believe that the security issue will have the most influence on their vote; 10% will be influenced most by the political process with the Palestinians. 34% believe that social economic issues influence their vote most in the current elections, and 10% think they are influenced most by corruption and rule of law issues.
• ·         37% of the Israelis believe that among the major parties, the Likud will stand firm in negotiations over territories and peace. 34% believe that of the major parties, it is Kadima that will lead to true peace with the Arabs. 36% believe that the Likud will know best how to deal with terror,.and 44% think that the Likud will best secure a Jewish majority in the state. 55% think that among the major parties, Labor will decrease social gaps. Finally, among the major parties, 33% choose the Likud as the party with corruption in it.

(F) Palestinian Elections 

• ·         If elections are held today, 47% of the Palestinians would vote for Hamas and 39% for Fateh. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas receives 51% of the vote and Fateh 37%. (In this poll 46% said that on the day of the elections in January 25, they have voted for Hamas and 44% said they have voted for Fateh. The actual official figures of the Palestinian Central Elections commission gave only 44% for Hamas and 41% for Fateh.)

_{^{This PSR Poll has been conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah.}} 
 

19-21 March 2015

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 19-21 March 2015. The period before the poll witnessed the conduct of the Israeli elections and the victory of Netanyahu. Earlier, the PA joined the International Criminal Court (ICC), a step that led to an Israeli decision to suspend the transfer of PA custom funds. As a result, the PA was unable to pay the full salaries of the public sector. Palestinians responded by taking a decision to stop security coordination with Israel and to wage a boycott campaign against selected Israeli products. The period also witnessed a failure in implementing the reconciliation agreement due to the inability of the reconciliation government to take control over Gaza from Hamas. This failure greatly slowed down reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip as donors were unwilling to provide the necessary funds due to the absence of the PA.  This press release covers attitudes regarding the Israeli elections, Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the salary crisis, reconciliation, the peace process, ICC, security coordination and the boycott of Israeli products. Total size of the sample is 1262 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the public views negatively the outcome of the Israeli elections, believing it will increase the number and intensity of Palestinian-Israeli confrontations and will diminish the opportunity to resume negotiations. Despite this, and despite public concerns about the Israeli suspension of the transfer of PA custom funds, which constrained the ability of the PA to pay the salaries of its public sector, half of the public is optimistic about the chances for ending the suspension, now that the election in Israel is over.

Findings also show a reversal in some of the effects generated by the Gaza war nine months ago. This is particularly true regarding the internal balance of power as well as attitudes regarding the war outcome. The popularity of Abbas has improved considerably allowing him to run neck and neck with Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh. This change might have been generated by public satisfaction with Abbas’ decision to join the ICC. Similarly, Fatah’s popularity improved, particularly in the West Bank where it gains greater support than Hamas for the first time since June 2014, before the Gaza war.

Findings show a significant decline in the belief that Hamas had won the 2014 Gaza war and the level of satisfaction with the outcome of the war drops considerably. Despite this, support for launching rockets against Israel if the siege and blockade over Gaza do not end remains very high. Similarly, support for an armed intifada—which witnessed some decline—remains high. Hamas’ armed approach remains preferable to the public and the majority supports implementing it in the West Bank.

The public shows considerable satisfaction for joining the ICC despite the Israeli retaliation by suspending PA custom funds. Indeed, an overwhelming majority wants the PA to submit a complaint to the ICC against Israeli settlement policy. The public supports the PLO decision to stop security coordination but a majority believes that the PA will not implement this decision. Similarly, an overwhelming majority supports the boycott of selected Israeli products but one third say that they have not stopped buying such products. The public is opposed to the confiscation or destruction of boycotted products found in Palestinian shops; instead, it supports enacting a law banning displaying them in shops or alternatively waging a popular campaign to convince the public to stop buying these products.

Finally, a large majority remains dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. The public wants the government to assume control over crossings of the Gaza Strip and to supervise the reconstruction efforts. It also wants it to take full control over all civil and security institutions in the Gaza Strip. A clear majority wants the reconciliation government to have full control over the police force in the Gaza Strip and rejects the current status quo whereby Hamas remains in charge. The public wants the government to pay the salaries of the public sector that worked before reconciliation for the Hamas government. Finally, the public wants the reconciliation government to organize presidential and parliamentary elections within six months.

(1) Israeli Elections:

• Israeli right-wing electoral victory heightens concerns about security conditions
• An overwhelming majority expect chances for renewal of negotiations to worsen.
• But the public is optimistic about Israeli release of PA custom funds
• A majority supports return to negotiations if construction in settlements in frozen.

After the Israeli right-wing electoral victory, 47% expect increased confrontations and worsening security conditions while 18% expect the opposite: less confrontations and better security conditions. 32% expect conditions to remain as they are today.  Furthermore, 36% expect fewer chances to renew negotiations and 23% expect greater chances. 38% expect chances to remain as they are today. Half of the public expects Israel, now with the elections behind it, to resume the transfers of PA custom funds and 43% expect it will not do so.

Given the outcome of the Israeli elections, only 16% support an unconditional return to negotiations with Israel. By contrast, 42% support return to negotiations only if Israel agreed to freeze settlement construction. Still, 36% oppose return to negotiations even if Israel agreed to freeze settlement construction. Opposition to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government even if it agreed to freeze settlement construction is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (34%), among men (41%) compared to women (31%),  among those who hold a BA degree (38%) compared to those who completed elementary education only (28%), among students (39%) compared to farmers and housewives (19% and 30% respectively), among the religious (43%) compared to the somewhat religious (31%), among those who oppose the peace process (60%) compared to those who support the peace process (20%), and among Hamas supporters (58%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (18% and 27% respectively).

(2) Palestinian Elections:

• In a presidential election, Abbas would receive 48% of the vote and Haniyeh 47%
• Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas rises from 35% to 40%
• In a parliamentary elections, Fatah would receive 39% of the vote, Hamas 32%, all other lists combined 9%, and 21% remain undecided
• 69% want general elections within six months

If new presidential elections were held today and only Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh were nominated, , the former would win 48% (compared to 42% three months ago) and the latter 47% (compared to 53% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 46% and Haniyeh 52%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 50% and Haniyeh 42%.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas rises to 40% (compared to 35% three months ago). Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% in June 2014 in the aftermath of the Shati reconciliation declaration but before the Gaza war.  If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 38% of the participants’ votes. Three months ago, Barghouti received 52% and Haniyeh 43%. But if the presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 25%, Barghouti 37%, and Haniyeh 35%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 34%. In June 2014, just before the Gaza war, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% (compared to 42% three months ago) and for Fatah at 36% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 27% (compared to 32% three months ago) and Fatah at 41% (compared to 33% three months ago). A majority of 69% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 9% want them to take place after a year or more, and 16% do not want elections.

(3) Domestic Conditions, salary payment crisis, and ISIS:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 30% and in the Gaza Strip at 8%; perception of safety and security stands at 45% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank.
• Belief that corruption exists in the PA stands at 77%
• 33% say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear
• 56% are worried that the PA might collapse if Israel continues to suspend transfer of PA customs funds
• 8% believe ISIS (Daesh) represents true Islam

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 30%.  On the other hand, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 45%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 51%.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 25%.

Al Jazeera viewership is the highest, standing at 24%; Al Arabiyya stands at 7%. Viewership of PA’s Palestine TV stands at 20% and Hamas’ al Aqsa TV at 16%.  Maan-Mix viewership stands at 19%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77% compared to 81% three months ago.  23% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 18% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. An identical percentage say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

If Israel continues to suspend transfers of PA custom funds, 38% say the PA should borrow from banks to pay the public sector, 44% say the PA should either reduce salaries (29%) or reduce the size of the public sector (15%). A majority of 56% believes that continued withholding of PA custom funds, and the subsequent inability to pay the public sector salaries, will lead, if it lasts long, to the collapse of the PA; 40% do not believe that. Support for borrowing from the banks to pay the public sector is higher in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (36%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (40%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (35%), among women (40%) compared to men (35%), among those who work in the public sector (42%) compared to those who work in the private sector (35%), among supporters of Fatah (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%), and among those who support the peace process (44%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (28%).

An overwhelming majority of 86% believes that ISIS (Daesh) is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 8% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 13% (compared to 5% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. Belief that ISIS represents true Islam increases among the youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (10%) compared to those whose age is over 50 (7%), among residents of cities (10%) compared to residents of villages and towns (4%), among men (9%) compared to women (7%), among those who hold a BA degree (12%) compared to those who completed elementary education (7%), among students (15%) compared to farmers and retirees (0% and 2% respectively), among the religious (12%) compared to the somewhat religious (5%), and among supporters of Hamas (18% compared to supporters of Fatah (3%). Findings show that only 12% of the public support while 84% oppose allowing ISIS supporters to demonstrate publicly in the Palestinian areas (as they did in the Gaza Strip few months ago). In the Gaza Strip, support for allowing ISIS supporters to demonstrate stands at 20% compared to only 8% in the West Bank.

(4) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza:

• Pessimism regarding success of reconciliation stands at 54% and optimism at 42%
• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 28%
• 45% say Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip but only 24% blame Hamas for the poor performance of the reconciliation government
• 73% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the employees of the former Hamas government and 64% believe the reconciliation government should be in charge of the Gaza police
• 72% want the unification of the police force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the control of the reconciliation government

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 42% and pessimism at 54%. Satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 62%. Similarly, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 28%; dissatisfaction stands at 62%.  It is worth mentioning that nine months ago, right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government.

51% (59% in the Gaza Strip) want to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 30% (26% in the Gaza Strip) prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 51% (55% in the Gaza Strip) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government.  44% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 30% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

45% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip and 39% reject this claim. But the belief that Hamas is responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 24% while 30% believe that the PA and president Abbas are to blame and 17% blame the head of the reconciliation government.

73% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salaries of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (72%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salaries of the Gazan police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government. 64% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; 30% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  Similarly, 72% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the previous Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 23% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip. Support for the unification of the police force under the control of the reconciliation government is higher among Fatah supporters (79%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%), among the somewhat religious (76%) compared to the religious (67%), and among supporters of the peace process (77%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (65%). Support for the unification in the West Bank is similar to that in the Gaza Strip (73% and 71% respectively).

If money to pay the Gazan public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government is not readily available, 47% support reducing the salary of the current PA public sector by 15% thus allowing the reconciliation government to have the resources to pay the Gazan public sector. A slim majority of 51% is opposed to the reduction of the salary of the current PA public sector.

49% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 42% believe it is an accomplishment. Nine months ago, right after the formation of the reconciliation government, 50% said the PA was an accomplishment and 45% said it was a burden.

(5) Gaza War and the peace process:

• A drop in the percentage of those who believe Hamas won the last Gaza war with Israel
• Satisfaction with the achievement of the last Gaza war drops to 37%
• More than two thirds support launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip if the siege and blockade continue
• 51% support the two-state solution but only 29% believe negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state
• Wide spread support (82%) for joining international organizations and 48% support an armed intifada
• 47% believe that Israel plans to destroy the two mosques, al Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock, and replace them with a Jewish temple

Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War drops from 66% three months ago to 60% in this poll; 24% believe the two sides were losers. In the Gaza Strip, only 51% say Hamas came out a winner. Six months ago, 69% said Hamas came out a winner. Percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip drops from 42% threes month ago to 37% in this poll. 62% are currently dissatisfied with the achievements. In the Gaza Strip, 60% are dissatisfied with war achievements.  Despite that, a majority of 68% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended. Satisfaction with the war achievements is higher in the Gaza Strip (39%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among those who hold a BA degree (37%) compared to the illiterate (26%), among students (47%) compared to farmers (29%), among refugees (40%) compared to non-refugees (34%), among the religious (45%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (32% and 29% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (50%) compared to supporters of the peace process (30%), and among Hamas supporters (64%) compared to Supporters of Fatah (22%).

A majority of 51% supports the two-state solution and 48% oppose it. But the public is more divided over the most effective means of ending occupation and building a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel: 37% believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means; 29% believe negotiation is the best means, and 30% believe that popular non-violent resistance is the most effective route to statehood. Three months ago, 42% said armed confrontations were the most effective means while 26% selected negotiations, and 28% selected popular non-violent resistance. Percentage of those who believe that armed confrontation is the most effective means increases in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (34%), among residents of cities (39%) compared to residents of refugee camps and villages (31% each), among men (42%) compared to women (32%), among the religious (42%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (33% and 25% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (66%) compared to supporters of the peace process (22%), and among Hamas supporters (66%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (15% and 26% respectively).

60% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion and 38% think it is still practical. Similarly, 71% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent.  Despite that, only 31% support and 68% oppose the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution. Support for the one-state solution increases in the West Bank (33%) compared to the Gaza Strip (27%), among women (32%) compared to men (29%), among the illiterate (34%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (26%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (51% and 33% respectively) compared to the religious (25%), among supporters of the peace process (39%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (17%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (42% and 40% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%). 

46% support and 51% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative; but only 39% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people in return for an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.

In the absence of viable negotiations, 82% support joining more international organizations; 68% favor resort to popular non-violent resistance; 48% support return to an armed intifada, and 43% support dissolving the PA. Three months ago, support for a return to armed intifada stood at 56% and nine months ago, i.e., before the Gaza war, at 41%.  A majority of 74% favors Hamas way of resisting occupation; this percentage stood at 79% three months ago. Furthermore, 56% favor the transfer of Hamas’ armed approach to the West Bank and 40% oppose that. Three months ago support for this transfer stood at 62%. Support for an armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (44%), in cities (50%) compared to refugee camps and villages (41% and 45% respectively), among men (52%) compared to women (45%), among students (53%) compared to housewives (45%), among the religious (52%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (35% and 46% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (72%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (38%), and among Hamas supporters (78%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (30% and 44% respectively).

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 77%. 23% are not worried. An overwhelming majority of 82% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 63% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 28% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 47% believe that Israel intends to destroy al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 20% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 10% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 14% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.  More than half of the public (52%) believes that Israel will indeed succeed in implementing its plans for al Haram al Sharif and 43% believe it will not succeed.

(6) ICC, security coordination, and the boycott campaign

• 86% want the PA to submit a complaint against Israel to the ICC
• 60% support stopping security coordination with Israel
• 85% support the campaign to boycott Israeli products  

Despite the fact that the PA decision to become a member in the ICC has led Israel to suspend transfers of PA custom funds, 69% believe that the PA decision was a correct one and 26% believe it was the incorrect decision. Now, after joining ICC, 86% want the PA to submit a complaint against Israel for building settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. Despite that, public confidence in the effectiveness of the court is not high: only 42% believe it will be effective in reducing or stopping settlement construction and 54% believe it will not be effective. Confidence in ICC effectiveness is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (39%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (47%) compared to those who are over 50 years of age (41%), among women (46%) compared to men (37%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (51% and 45%) compared to the religious (38%), among supporters of the peace process (49%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (28%), and among supporters of Fatah (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas and the third parties (32% and 37%).

A majority of 60% favors and 35% do not favor stopping security coordination with Israel. But a majority of 57% believes that the PA will not implement the decision of the PLO Central Council to stop security coordination with Israel; only 34% believe the PA will implement it. Support for stopping security coordination is higher in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (55%), among those who hold a BA degree (67%) compared to the illiterate (55%), among refugees (65%) compared to non-refugees (57%), among the religious (64%) compared to the somewhat religious (56%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (71%) compared to supporters of the peace process (56%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (74% and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (56%).

85% support the local and international campaign to boycott Israel and impose sanctions against it; 13% oppose it. 54% say that they have stopped buying boycotted Israeli products from Tnova and Strauss; 14% say they did not buy these products in the past; and 31% say they have not stopped buying them.  Two thirds (65%) believe that the boycott of Israeli products will be effective in contributing to ending occupation and 34% do not believe that.  The public is divided over the question of what to do to convince shops from selling boycotted Israeli products: one third (32%) supports confiscating or destroying these products; a second third (31%) wants the PA to enact a law banning selling them; and finally 34% want the PA to encourage people not to buy these boycotted products. In the West Bank, only 23% are in favor of confiscating or destroying these products (11% favor confiscation and 12% favor destruction). Opposition to destroying or confiscating boycotted products is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (37%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (29%), among refugees (37%) compared to non-refugees (28%), among holders of BA degree (36%) compared to the illiterate (28%), among students (36%) compared to merchants and housewives (25% and 31% respectively), among the religious (34%) compared to the somewhat religious (28%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (36%) compared to supporters of the peace process (31%), and among Hamas supporters (40%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (30% and 31% respectively).

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 39% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state is the top most important goal for the Palestinian people and 36% believe it is obtaining the right of return for refugees
• 28% say that the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment and 26% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlements.

39% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 36% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% while 26% of the public say that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; and 19% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.  

14-20 June 2007 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during June 14-20, 2007. This poll deals with several issues including early elections, infighting, future of the PA, confidence in leaders and institutions, and the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults, 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at Tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the recent infighting has angered most Palestinians and led to a loss of confidence in the leadership and most of the security services. They also show that while there is a clear support for the American security plan and for holding early parliamentary and presidential elections, the public is split over other alternatives such as the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority and replacing it with an international trusteeship or the establishment of a confederation with Jordan.

Findings show that more than 40% support alternatives to the current status quo such as the dissolution of the PA and its replacement with an international trusteeship or return to Israeli occupation. A similar percentage supports a confederation with Jordan now or later after the establishment of a Palestinian state. Findings also show that Hamas has lost some of its popularity in light of the events in the Gaza Strip but that Fateh’s popularity has not benefited from those same events. Pessimism characterizes public assessment of domestic developments with a majority describing infighting and lawlessness as the most immediate and dangerous threat to Palestinians while Israeli occupation came third in a list of threats. A relatively large percentage expressed desire to immigrate to foreign countries. Similarly, a relatively large percentage said it was not proud of being Palestinian.

Despite the continued support for the peace process and the two-state solution, the poll shows a great level of pessimism regarding the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years. Pessimism also prevails regarding the chances of reaching a compromise agreement with the Israeli Olmert government. Nonetheless, a large percentage expressed support for the American security plan after being told of its main components. 

(1) Early Elections and Domestic Balance of Power  

• Overwhelming majority (75%) supports holding early parliamentary and presidential elections and 22% oppose it.
• 56% support the declaration of the emergency situation and the formation of an emergency government and 38% oppose that. Support for the declaration and the emergency government increases to 59% in the West Bank and decreases to 49% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fateh would receive 43% of the popular vote and Hamas would receive 33%.
• If new presidential elections are held today, Mahmud Abbas would receive 49% and Ismail Haniyeh would receive 42%. If the competition is between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 59% and the latter would receive 35%.

Findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip support the holding of early parliamentary and presidential elections while 22% oppose it. The high level of support indicates public conviction that the split caused by the Gaza events might deepen with time leading to a permanent separation between the two geographically separated entities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Support for early elections might reflect public desire not only to reject violence as the means to solve domestic problems but also to reunify the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Attitudes of Gazans do not differ from those of West Bankers regarding early elections. In fact, support for early elections is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to theWest Bank (73%). Support for early elections increases among illiterates (83%) and those with elementary education (79%) compared to those with BA degree (72%), among those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (82%) compared to those who define themselves as opposed to the peace process (47%), and among supporters of Fateh (91%) compared to supporters of Hamas (60%).

Findings show that a majority of 56% support the declaration of emergency and the formation of an emergency government while 38% oppose it. The relatively low level of support for the emergency declaration compared to the support for early elections indicates that a significant part of the public is concerned about the consequences of the formation of an emergency government on the infighting and the split between Gaza and the West Bank. Concern about the emergency situation increases in the Gaza Strip where only 49% support it compared to 59% in the West Bank. Support for the declaration of emergency and for the emergency government increases also among those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (62%) compared to those who define themselves as opposed to the peace process (30%), and among supporters of Fateh (83%) compared to supporters of Hamas (30%).

If new elections are held today, support for Fateh would remain as it was three months ago (43%) while Hamas’s popularity drops to 33%. Hamas’s popularity stood at 37% in our last survey in March 2007. Hamas’s popularity drops particularly in the West Bank (27%) compared to its popularity three months ago when it stood at 35%. In the Gaza Strip, findings show Hamas’s popularity unchanged compared to three months ago (40%). Fateh’s popularity increases slightly in the West Bank (from 41% to 43%) and drops slightly in the Gaza Strip (from 46% to 42%). These findings show that the Gaza events did not have a great impact on the domestic balance of power between Fateh and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, support for Hamas drops while support for Fateh increases slightly. Yet, most of those who defected from Hamas have not shifted loyalty to Fateh and have opted instead to become “undecided.” Findings show that the undecided category has increased from 8% in our March survey to 13% in this poll. The implication is that the decrease in Hamas’s popularity could be temporary and that Fateh remains unable to benefit from Hamas’s mistakes. Findings also show that the other parties and factions have also failed to present themselves as an alternative to the two large factions, Fateh and Hamas. The combined strength of all other parties remains unchanged at 12% compared to their strength three months ago.

Findings regarding the presidential race show a decrease in the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh. In a competition between Haniyeh and Mahmud Abbas, the former receives 42% and the latter 49%. But 40% say they will not participate in such elections if the only two candidates are Haniyeh and Abbas. If the competition is between Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, the non participation rate drops to 31% and Barghouti wins by 59% compared to 35% for Haniyeh. Barghouti wins against Haniyeh in the Gaza Strip (55% compared to 41%) and theWest Bank (62% compared to 30%).

(2) Infighting, Performance of Public Institutions, and the Future of the PA  

• 59% believe that Fateh and Hamas are equally responsible for the infighting, but 15% believe Fateh is more responsible than Hamas and 14% believe Hamas is more responsible than Fateh for the infighting.
• 71% believe that neither Fateh nor Hamas came out a winner from the infighting. But 18% believe that Hamas came out a winner and only 4% believe Fateh came out a winner.
• Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas during the infighting does not exceed 13% and dissatisfaction 84%. Satisfaction with the performance of Ismail Haniyeh reaches 22% and dissatisfaction 74%. Satisfaction with the overall performance of Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 60%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of the National Unity Government during the three months since formation stands at 17% and dissatisfaction at 81%.
• Confidence in various security services and armed groups ranges between the low for Preventive Security, Intelligence, Executive Force, and Presidential Guard (33% to 37%) and medium for the National Forces (48%), al Qassam Brigades (45%), al Aqsa Brigades (50%), and Police (58%).
• 41% support the dissolution of the PA and 49% oppose that. The percentage of those who support the dissolution of the PA is divided into those who would like to replace with an international trusteeship (26%) and those who want to replace it with a return to Israeli occupation (16%).
• Support for a confederation with Jordan reaches 42% and opposition 52%.

Findings indicate that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians does not blame foreign parties for the infighting. Instead, responsibility is placed equally on Fateh and Hamas. Only 9% believe Fateh and Hamas are not responsible for the infighting and 59% blame both sides equally while 15% believe Fateh is more responsible and 14% believe Hamas is more responsible. Moreover, a majority of 71% believe that Fateh and Hamas have not come out winners from the infighting. But in light of the reality of Hamas control in Gaza, 18% believe it has emerged a winner while only 4% believe Fateh has been the winner.

Findings also show that the public has lost confidence in its leadership and in the majority of the security services and armed resistance groups. Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas during the infighting does not exceed 13% and dissatisfaction stands at 84%. Similarly, satisfaction with the performance of Prime Minister Haniyeh does not exceed 22% and dissatisfaction stands at 74%. Dissatisfaction with the overall performance of Mahmud Abbas drops from 53% three months ago to 36% in this poll. Dissatisfaction with Abbas’s performance stands today at 60%.  Findings also show a great disappointment with the performance of the national unity government during the last three months with 81% saying that they are dissatisfied with its performance and only 17% expressing satisfaction.

Confidence in the security services and armed groups ranges between little and medium. Confidence in the preventive security stands at 33%, General Intelligence 34%, Executive Force 35%, Presidential Guard 37%, al Qassam Brigades 45%, the National Security forces 48%, al Aqsa Brigades 50%, and Police 58%.

The worsening conditions and the lack of trust in the PA leadership and institutions force people to seek alternatives. Findings show that 41% support the dissolution of the PA and 49% oppose that. The percentage of those who support PA dissolution is the sum of those who want to replace it with an international trusteeship (26%) and those who want to replace it with a return to full Israeli occupation (16%). Similarly, findings show that 42% support and 52% oppose the establishment of a confederation with Jordan. The percentage of those who support the confederation is the sum of those who want such a confederation now--before the creation of a Palestinian state-- (25%) and those who wish to have a confederation with Jordan but only after a Palestinian state is established (17%). Support for a confederation-now is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Support for this step increases among residents of cities (29%) compared to refugee camps (20%), among illiterates (28%) compared to holders of BA degree (22%), among those over 52 years of age (35%) compared to those between 18-22 years of age (19%), and among supporters of Fateh (28%) compared to supporters of Hamas (17%).

(3) Other Domestic Issues  

• 90% describe current Palestinian conditions as bad or very bad.
• The most serious and immediate threat to Palestinians today is infighting and lawlessness in the eyes of 56% followed by poverty and unemployment , Israeli occupation and settlements, and finally international sanctions
• 73% do not feel secure in their homes and 26% say they feel secure. Feeling of security increases in the Gaza Strip to 41% and decreases in the West Bank to 18%.
• 85% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions and 59% of those believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future.
• 28% say they want to immigrate to foreign countries and 23% say they are not proud of being Palestinian.
• 41% believe that democracy is a successful system suitable to Palestine and 54% say it is a failed system unsuitable for Palestine.
• Overwhelming majority (82%) describes acts such as kidnappings of foreigners and bombing of internet cafes and foreign schools as criminal deserving condemnation and only 3% describe them as nationalist deserving support.

Overwhelming majority of Palestinians (90%) describes current condition as bad or very bad while only 6% describe it as good or very good. Findings show that the most immediate and dangerous threat confronting Palestinians today is infighting and lawlessness as perceived by 56% of the public followed by poverty and unemployment as perceived by 21%, Israeli occupation and settlements as perceived by 12%, and finally international boycott and financial sanctions as perceived by 10%. 73% of the public say they do not feel safe or secure in their homes while 26% say they do feel safe and secure. It seems that with Hamas’s control over Gaza complete, more Gazans (41%) feel safe and secure than West Bankers (18%). Findings also show that a great majority of 85% believes that corruption exists in the PA institutions and that among those 59% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future.

Conditions described above lead 28% of the Palestinians to seek immigration to other countries while 23% say they are not proud of being Palestinians. It is worth mentioning that more than a year ago, in May 2006, the percentage of those wishing to immigrate stood at 17% and the percentage of those not proud of being Palestinians did not exceed 2%. 

Similarly, events in Gaza have affected public evaluation of democracy. In this poll 41% (compared to 56% in our last survey in March 2007) said that democracy is a viable system suitable for Palestine and 54% (compared to 40% last March) said that democracy is a failed system unsuitable for Palestine. Despite this negative assessment of democracy, 42% of those who said that democracy is unsuitable for Palestine said they want to maintain it despite its problems while 45% said it should be replaced with an undemocratic system.

Findings show that despite the spread of violence and calls for extremism in the Gaza Strip, the overwhelming majority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (82%) describes acts such as kidnapping of foreigners, burning of internet cafes, and bombing of foreign schools as criminal deserving condemnation while only 3% describe them as nationalist deserving support. 12% say some of these acts are nationalist and others are criminal. 

(4) Peace Process   

• Support for the Saudi initiative stands at 66% and opposition at 31%. 36% say they believe that Hamas supports the Saudi Initiative and 41% say it opposes it.
• 60% support and 38% oppose a two-state proposal based on mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict. In such a case, 70% would support and 28% would oppose reconciliation between the two peoples.
• After being informed of its main items, 63% support and 36% oppose the May 2007 American Security Plan.
• 63% support the proposed ceasefire proposal of PA president and 34% oppose it.
• 35% support and 61% oppose deployment of armed international forces along the Gaza borders with Egypt and Israel in order to prevent smuggling and rocket attacks againstIsrael.
• Only 26% believe that the chances are medium or high for the creation of a Palestinian state in the next five years; 70% say the chances are slim or non existent.
• Similarly, only 31% believe that it is possible these days to reach a compromise agreement with Olmert’s government and 65% say that it is impossible to do so.

The poll asked about public attitudes regarding various aspects of the peace process in order to asses the impact of the infighting on those attitudes. Findings indicate a slight decrease in support for the Saudi initiative and for the two-state solution but show support for security proposals aimed at restoring stability to Palestinian-Israeli relations. They also show a great deal of pessimism about the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state or for reaching a compromise settlement with the Israeli Olmert government.

Support for the Saudi initiative drops to 66%, compared to 72% in our March poll. Opposition to this initiative stands at 31%. Findings also show that 36% of the public believe that Hamas supports the Saudi initiative while 41% believe it does not. Moreover, 25% believe that the Olmert government supports the initiative while 55% believe it does not. When, in an elaboration of a possible version of the Saudi initiative, we inserted a proposed solution to the refugee problem based on the Clinton Parameters of 2000, i.e., a solution based on UN resolution 194 but in which return to Israel is subject to an Israeli decision, support for this version of the Saudi initiative drops to 46% and opposition increases to 49%.

Findings also show that 60%, compared to 63% last March, support and 38% oppose a two-state solution whereby Israel is recognized as the state for the Jewish people and Palestineis recognized as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict. In such an environment, 70% would support reconciliation between the two peoples.

Respondents were presented with a list of the major components of the American security plan that was presented to the parties in May 2007 and included from the Palestinian side the ending of terrorism, stopping the launching of rockets against Israel, ending smuggling of arms, and putting an end to lawlessness, and from the Israeli side the opening of international crossings, linking the West Bank with Gaza, and removal of Israeli check points in the West Bank. 63% said they support and 36% said they oppose the American security plan. Similarly, 63% supported and 34% opposed the plan presented by PA president Abbas for a ceasefire with Israel that would start in the Gaza Strip and then extend to the West Bank. Support for this ceasefire plan stands at 54% in the Gaza Strip and 68% in the West Bank.

Findings indicate a strong opposition to the deployment of armed international forces along the borders with Egypt and Israel in order to prevent smuggling and launching of rockets against Israel. Only 35% supported and 61% opposed this proposal. Support for the deployment of such forces increases to 38% in the Gaza Strip and decreases to 33% in the West Bank. Support also increases among supporters of Fateh (48%) compared to supporters of Hamas (18%).

Despite the support for the Saudi initiative and the two-state solution, only 26% believe that the chances are medium or high for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years while 70% believe the chances are low or non existent. Similarly, only 31% believe that it is possible these days to reach a compromise agreement with the Olmert government and 65% believe it is impossible.... Full Report

15 December 2005  

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted its exit poll for the fourth round of local elections on 15 December 2005. The poll aimed at examining voters’ behavior and predicting the results after the closing of polling stations. The poll was conducted in the four main cities of Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah, and al Bireh. Our sample included 60% of all polling centers. These were selected randomly with special attention paid to the geographic locations of the selected centers. One station was randomly selected in each polling center. The total size of the sample for prediction purposes was 2531 and for the purpose of the full poll 819 voters. The total size of the stations was 36 from 36 polling centers. One out of five voters were selected for prediction purposes and one out of 15 for the full poll.

The results of the exit poll in the four large cities show that Hamas’ lists received 59% of the vote compared to 26% for Fateh and 15% for all other lists. But more importantly, the results show that when it comes to voting intentions in the upcoming legislative elections, Hamas will most likely come out victorious with 41% of the vote compared to 21% for Fateh and 15% for all other lists, while 23% remain undecided.

What caused this dramatic change? 

(1) The poll shows that most voters in the four cities (56%) believe that their former local councils were corrupt while 93% believe that the newly elected councils will fight corruption. Moreover, the findings show that in the view of the voters, the most important problem confronting the Palestinians today is not occupation, poverty and unemployment, or internal anarchy; rather, it is corruption. The largest percentage believes that the top Palestinian priority should be fighting corruption and implementing reforms followed by improving economic conditions. When selecting their preferred lists in the local elections, 99% of the voters said that the integrity of the candidates in those lists and their incorruptibility was the most important consideration. 

(2) The low turnout in the large cities, particularly in the cities of Ramallah and al Bireh (50% for each) benefited Hamas and proved detrimental to Fateh’s interests. This turnout coincided with the split in Fateh and the formation of two separate lists to the legislative elections. When findings of this exit poll are compared to the findings of another PSR poll conducted one week earlier on a representative sample, major differences emerge between the two polls showing greater increase in Hamas support. This difference is explained in part by the low turnout. In other words, the low turnout  contributed to Fateh’s poor showing in the local elections and in the intentions regarding voting in the legislative elections.  

(3) Hamas’ lists received considerable number of votes from voters who do not consider themselves supporters of Hamas. For example, while 42% in all four cities stated that they support Hamas, the percentage of the actual votes received by Hamas in our poll was 59% as indicated above. By contrast, while 28% of the voters said they support Fateh, only 26% actually voted for Fateh. In other words, about one quarter of the votes received byHamas’ lists came from voters who do not support Hamas, including voters who in fact support Fateh. In Nablus, for example, 20% of the supporters of Fateh voted for Hamas’ list while another 20% voted for lists other than those of Fateh or Hamas. In other words, only 60% of Fateh supporters voted for Fateh’s list. This pattern can be seen in other cities, even if the percentages involved are smaller. Needless to say, Fateh supporters were highly critical of their own lists in the local elections in the four cities, particularly in Nablus.

Voting in the Local Elections Compared to Voting Intentions in the Upcoming Legislative Elections (all results are taken from PSR’s exit poll) 

One should not draw general conclusions regarding the outcome of the legislative elections from the results of this exit poll in the four cities for two reasons: 

(1) The percentage of the actual voters does not exceed 4% of the total eligible voters in the legislative elections. Polls as well as the outcome of the local elections have shown that results vary considerably between cities, refugee camps, and rural areas. 

(2) Results of this exit poll clearly indicate that despite the high percentage of votes for Hamas’ lists at the local level, this percentage drops considerably when it comes to voting intentions in the legislative elections. This pattern is explained by the different considerations of the voters in the local vs. national elections. At the local level, voters’ concern is focused on corruption and much less on other priorities such as the peace process; at the national level, as in the case of the legislative elections, voters’ top priority is the improvement of economic conditions. 

21-23 May 2009   

 These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 21 and 23 May 2009. The poll was conducted in the aftermath of the failure of the latest round of Palestinian reconciliation talks in Cairo and the formation of a new government headed by Salam Fayyad and after the meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with US president Barak Obama in Washington DC. The poll examines the following topics: domestic issues such as the balance of power, the performance and legitimacy of two governments, that of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad, confidence in the police, the effects of the continued conflict between Fateh and Hamas, as well as the various issues of the peace process such as the support for the two-state vs. the one-state solutions. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. This press release covers domestic Palestinian issues; issues related to the peace process and Israeli-Palestinian relations will be covered in a separate joint Palestinian-Israeli press release. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2009 show a stable balance of power between Fateh and Hamas compared to the situation in the first quarter. Abbas’s popularity increases slightly in comparison to that of Haniyeh. Findings also show that most Palestinians have no confidence in the ability of Fateh and Hamas to reach a reconciliation agreement. In this regard, the public tend to support Hamas’s position on what kind of electoral system should be adopted but the majority supports Fateh’s position on the government platform issue. Findings show a split regarding the new Fayyad government with a larger percentage opposing its formation. Findings show that public evaluation of the performance of various actors during the Gaza war clearly favors Hams and those who support it, like Iran and Syria, while Fateh, Abbas, Fayyad’s government, and Egypt receive lower positive evaluation ratings.

With regard to the peace process, findings indicate a continued state of widespread pessimism regarding the chances for establishing a Palestinian state in the next five years and regarding the chances for a permanent peace agreement with the Netanyahu government. But despite this pessimism, a majority still supports the two-state solution while less than a quarter supports the one-state solution. Pessimism however is reflected sharply in two major issues. Support for launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli communities across the border increases considerably among the pessimists and decreases among the optimists.  Similarly, a larger percentage among the pessimists tends to view positively an Iranian attainment of nuclear weapons while the opposite is true among the optimists.

(1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• 42% support the formation of the new Salam Fayyad government and 48% oppose it
• 55% are worried that they or members of their families might be harmed by other Palestinians and 44% are not worried
• 46% support a mixed electoral system as proposed by Hamas and 39% support a fully proportional system as proposed by Fateh; but 50% support Fateh’s position that the program of national unity government must accept all previous agreement signed between Israel and the PLO while 44% support Hamas’s position which rejects this condition
• If new presidential elections are held today, Abbas would receive 49% of the vote and Haniyeh 44%, and if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter 32%
• Fateh receives the support of 41% of potential voters, Hamas 33%, all other electoral lists 9%, and 18% remain undecided; public estimates of the likely outcome of elections are similar with 39% saying Fateh would win and 28% saying Hamas would win
• 41% believe that the performance of Haniyeh’s government is good or very good and 32% say the performance of Fayyad’s government is good or very good
• 33% believe that Fateh’s Sixth Congress will be held in July as announced while 42% say it will be postponed and 14% say it will never be held
• 13% say they have been have been attacked or robbed by other Palestinians during the past year, and among those 43% say they have submitted a complaint while 56% say they have not

Findings indicate that the pubic is divided with regard to the formation of the new Fayyad government with a larger percentage (48%) opposing its formation and 42% supporting it. Opposition increases slightly in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (46%), in cities (53%) compared to refugee camps (49%) and villages and towns (43%), among men (52%) compared to women (44%), among holders of BA degree (56%) compared to illiterates (30%), among those working in the private sector (55%) compared to those working in the public sector (42%), among those opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (36%), and among Hamas supporters (78%) compared to Fateh supporters (17%).

Findings also indicate that the conflict between Fateh and Hamas is causing anxiety among the majority with 55% saying that they are worried that they or members of their family might be harmed by other Palestinians from Fateh or Hamas and 44% saying they are not worried. The level of worry increases in the Gaza Strip, reaching 65% compared to50% in the West Bank.  In the Gaza Strip, worry among supporters of Fateh reaches 74% compared to 48% among supporters of Hamas. In the West Bank, worry among supporters of Hamas reaches 56% compared to 48% among supporters of Fateh.  Findings also indicate that the overwhelming majority (90%) believes that the price of Fateh-Hamas conflict is high or unbearable while only 10% say it is medium or bearable. Moreover, 60% believe that Palestinian society can endure the price of division between Fateh and Hamas for less than a year or for few years while 8% say it can endure it for a period between 5-10 years, and 23% say it can endure it forever.  Only 25% believe that Fateh’s goal is to integrate Hamas into the political system while avoiding international siege and boycott while 32% say its goal is destroy Hamas’s political, military, financial and social power; 21% say the goal of Fateh is to insure Hamas’s participation in some public institutions as long as it does not pose a threat to Fateh’s dominance, and 16% say its goal is to keep Hamas outside the Palestinian political system. With regard to Hamas’s goal, 38% say it is to integrate itself into the political system on the basis of equality with Fateh and other factions and 29% say the goal is destroy Fateh’s political, military, financial, and social power; 12% say the goal of Hamas is to control the Palestinian political system and marginalize Fateh and other forces, and anther 12% say the goal is to control the Palestinian political system and eliminate Fateh politically.

Findings also indicate the 60% believe that neither Fateh nor Hamas are able to unilaterally settle the conflict in its favor by military or political means and therefore they need dialogue while 22% say that the conflict between the two factions can not be settled unilaterally or even through dialogue. But the largest percentage (56%) believes that dialogue between Fateh and Hamas will fail and only 40% believe it will succeed. In light of this, 27% believe that unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will never resume while only 19% believe it will resume soon. A majority of 51% believes that unity will resume but only after a long time. In our September 2007 poll, only 20% believed that separation between the two Palestinian territories will become permanent and 29% believed unity will be resumed within months.

With regard to the debate between Fateh and Hamas on the terms of reconciliation, 46% tend to support Hamas’s position on the electoral system, preferring a mixed one as proposed by Hamas while 39% tend to support Fateh’s position, preferring a fully proportional representation system as proposed by Fateh. By contrast, 50% support Fateh’s position which insists that the program of national unity government must accept all previous agreement signed between Israel and the PLO while 44% tend to support Hamas’s position which rejects this condition.

Findings show that Abbas’s popularity improves slightly. If new presidential elections were held today and the two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 49% of the vote and the latter 44%. In the Gaza Strip Abbas wins with 53% of the vote compared to 42% for Haniyeh. Three months ago, Abbas received 45% and Haniyeh 47%. It is worth noting that immediately after Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in mid 2007, 59% said they would vote for Abbas and only 36% said they would vote for Haniyeh.  But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former wins the presidency with 64% of the vote compared to 32% for Haniyeh. These results are similar to those we obtained three months ago and those obtained in September 2007 after the Hamas violent takeover of the Gaza Strip.  

42% say that Abbas is the legitimate president today and 43% say they are satisfied with his performance while 54% say they are dissatisfied. 41% describe the performance of Haniyeh’s government as good or very good while 32% describe the performance of Fayyad’s government as good or very good. However, only 10% describe conditions of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as good or very good while 31% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good.

If legislative elections were to take place today with the participation of all the lists that participated in the last elections, 33% say they would vote for the Reform and Change list of Hamas while 41% say they would vote for Fateh. All other lists would receive 9% while 18% remain undecided. Vote for Fateh and Hamas is identical with that registered three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas’s popularity stands at 35% compared to 46% for Fateh. In the West Bank, Hamas stands at 31% compared to 37% for Fateh. With regard to public expectations of election results, 39% say Fateh will win and 28% say Hamas will win. 

With regard to the performance of various actors during the Gaza war, Hamas receives the highest positive rating (51%) followed by Haniyeh’s government (46%), Iran (41%), Syria (34%), Fateh (34%), president Abbas (25%), Fayyad’s government (23%), and finally Egypt (22%).

13% of the public say they have been victims of attacks or robbery by other Palestinians during the past year. Among those, 43% say they have submitted a complaint to the police and security services and 56% say they did not. 35% of those who did not submit a complaint say the reason they did not submit one is that they do not trust the police while 44% say the police can not do any thing to help them. 26% of those who did submit a complaint say they were satisfied with the police work in the investigation to uncover the circumstances of the crime while 73% say they were not satisfied. The percentage of those who have been attacked or victimized during the past year is higher in the Gaza Strip (17%) than the West Bank (10%) but the percentage of those who submitted complaints is higher in the West Bank (50%) than in the Gaza Strip (36%). Nonetheless, the level of distrust in the police among those who did not submit a complaint is higher in the West Bank (41%) than in the Gaza Strip (30%). The levels of satisfaction with the performance of the police among those who submitted a complaint are similar in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Only 33% of the public believe that Fateh’s Sixth party congress will be held in July as announced, 42% say it will be postponed, and 14% say it will never be held. With regard to the venue, 34% prefer holding the congress in the Palestinian territories while only 21% prefer holding it outside. 36% prefer holding it inside and outside through a video link. If during the congress Fateh selected its head, 34% would prefer the election of Marwan Barghouti and 16% would prefer electing Mahmud Abbas. On their expectations regarding who will lead Fateh in the future, the public is evenly divided with 46% believing the leaders will come from the young guard and 45% believing they will come from the old guard.

(2) Peace Process   

• 67% believe that it is not possible these days to reach a permanent peace agreement with Israel and 30% believe it is possible

• 69% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 28% believe it medium or high

• 61% support the two-state solution, 23% support the one-state solution, and 9% support other solutions

• 78% prefer a comprehensive peace settlement rather than an interim one and 18% prefer an interim settlement

• 50% accept a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict have been resolved

• 57% support the Arab (or Saudi) Peace Initiative and 40% oppose it

• 51% support and 46% oppose launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli communities across the border inside Israel

• 43% believe that an Iranian acquirement of nuclear arms would have a positive impact on the Arab region and 33% believe it would have a negative impact

Findings indicate a continued slide toward pessimism among Palestinians regarding the chances for peace. A majority of 70% believes that it is impossible to reach a permanent peace agreement with the new Netanyahu government while only 27% believe it is possible. Similarly, 69% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state within the next five years are slim to non existent and 28% believe the chances are medium or high. In general, two thirds say that it is impossible these days to reach a permanent peace while only 30% think it is possible.

Findings also show that one third of the Palestinians believe that reaching an agreement on a two-state solution is more difficult than reaching an agreement on a one-state solution while a slightly larger percentage (35%) believes that reaching an agreement on a one-state solution is more difficult and 29% say the two solutions pose similar difficulties. A majority of 61% says that regardless of which negotiation is more difficult, it prefers the two-state solution while only 23% say they support the one state solution. When asking respondents about their preferences, the two state solution was presented as one based on the establishment of a Palestinian state along side Israel and the one-state solution was presented as one in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state whereby Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews would be equal. Support for the one-state solution is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But it increases slightly among residents of refugee camps (28%) compared to residents of cities (23%), among men (26%) compared to women (21), among holders of BA degree (27%) compared to illiterates (18%), among supporters of Hamas (27%) compared to supporters of Fateh (20%) and among supporters of the peace process (28%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (22%).

The overwhelming majority of Palestinians (78%) supports a comprehensive peace settlement, one that lead to permanent peace and end of conflict and resolution of all issues while 18% prefer an interim settlement, one in which a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while postponing issues such as refugees. Within the context of a comprehensive settlement and after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues, 50% say they would accept and 49% say they would reject a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. These results indicate a decline in the support for this mutual recognition of identity. The highest level of support (66%) was recorded in March 2006, in out poll #19, but has since declined.

Findings also show that 57% support and 40% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative.  The initiative, as presented to the respondents, calls for an Arab recognition of Israel and the signing of peace agreement and normalization of relations with it after it ends its occupation of Arab lands occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of the refugee problem in a just and agreed upon settlement based on UN resolution 194.

Despite the support for the two-state solution, the Saudi initiative, and the mutual recognition of identity, a majority of 51% supports and 46% oppose the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli communities inside Israel. Pessimism regarding the future of peace or changing conditions of boycott and closure imposed on the Gaza Strip seems to influence attitudes regarding violence. For example, support for the launching of rockets reaches 59% among those who believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state in the next 5 years are non existent; but it drops considerably to 38% among those believe the chances are high.

Similarly, 43% believe that an Iranian attainment of nuclear capacity would have a positive impact on the region while 33% believe it will have a negative impact. As in the previous example, a larger percentage of pessimists, reaching 52%, believes that a nuclearized Iran would have a positive impact while only 30% of the optimists regarding the chances for a Palestinian state during the next five years tend to view a nuclear Iran positively..... Full Report

28-30 August 2008

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 28 and 30 August 2008. This period witnessed a relative consolidation of the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip and the release by Israel of about 200 Palestinian prisoners as a gesture to President Mahmud Abbas. The poll examines the following topics: the domestic balance of power, the performance and legitimacy of two governments, that of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad, the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip, and the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

 Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2008 indicate continued slow decline in Hamas’s popularity while Fateh’s popularity remains stable as it was during the second quarter. Similarly, findings show a slightly wider gap between the popularity of President Abbas compared to that of Ismail Haniyeh in favor of the former. Positive evaluation of the conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank remains higher than that of conditions in the Gaza Strip. This applies to overall conditions as well as those of democracy and human rights. Findings show also significant opposition to Hamas’s military entry into Shijaiah in the Gaza Strip in early August. They also show widespread belief that the term of President Abbas ends in the first month of January 2009, as Hamas claims, and not in the first month of 2010, as the presidency claims. Findings also indicate an overwhelming support for the continuation of the current ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip despite recognition of many that it will not lead to the opening of the Rafah Crossing with Egypt. Despite the support for the ceasefire, about two thirds also support kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in order to exchange them with Palestinian prisoners.

It was expected that the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel would lead to improvement in Hamas’s standing among the public. But the fact that Hamas continues to lose public support might be due to strong opposition to its behavior in dealing with Shijaiah incident which led to several deaths and the escape of several members of the Hillis family to Israel. Moreover, the fact that the Rafah crossing remained closed since the ceasefire and that the other crossings were only partially opened might have weakened Hamas’s appeal. On the other hand, findings show an improvement in the perception of security and safety in the West Bank which might have been responsible in part for the improvement in Abbas’s standing. Moreover, Israel’s release of about 200 Palestinian prisoners at the end of August might have also played in Abbas’s favor.  

1)Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• If new presidential elections are held today, and the only two candidates were Abbas and Haniyeh, the former would receive the support of 53% and the latter 39%.  If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% to Haniyeh’s 34%.
• If new parliamentary elections are to take place today, Hamas would receive 29% and Fateh would receive 43%. Percentage of those who would vote for other factions and parties stands today at 11% and the undecided at 16%.  
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Salam Fayyad stands at 34%; similarly, positive evaluation of Haniyeh’s government stands today at 34%. 33% say Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one while 27% say Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one.
• Perception of personal and family security and safety stands at 43% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip.
• An overwhelming majority (69%) opposes Hamas’s armed entry into the Shijaiah neighborhood in the Gaza Strip and 20% support it.
• 63% believe that Abbas term as president ends in January 2009, not in January 2010.

The Gap between the standing of PA President Mahmud Abbas and Hamas’s Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh has increased to 14 percentage points in favor of Abbas. If new presidential elections are held today, and the only two candidates were Abbas and Haniyeh, the former would receive the support of 53% and the latter 39%. This finding represents a slight increase in the popularity of Abbas which stood at 52% last June compared to 40% for Haniyeh. Haniyeh’s popularity reached its peak last March, in the aftermath of the breaching of the Rafah border, when it stood at 47% compared to 46% for Abbas. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% to Haniyeh’s 34%. Level of non-participation in the presidential elections would reach 37% if the competition was between Abbas and Haniyeh and 27% if the competition was between Barghouti and Haniyeh. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas increases slightly from 46% last June to 48% in this poll. Level of dissatisfaction reaches 47% today.

 Moreover, the gap between Fateh and Hamas increases from 12 percentage points last June to 14 percentage points in this poll. If new parliamentary elections are to take place today, Hamas would receive 29% (compared to 31% last June) and Fateh would receive 43% (same as in June). Percentage of those who would vote for other factions and parties stands today at 11% and the undecided at 16%.  

Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Salam Fayyad remains as it was last June standing at 34% and the negative evaluation at 34%. Similarly, positive evaluation of Haniyeh’s government stands today at 34% and negative evaluation at 39%. Last June, positive evaluation of Haniyeh’s government stood at 37% and negative evaluation at 35%. Today, 33% say Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one while 27% say Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one. Last June, belief in the legitimacy of the Fayyad government reached 31% compared to 29% for Haniyeh’s. Last March, Haniyeh’s government was perceived as legitimate by 34%.  

Perception of personal and family security and safety increases in the West Bank from 40% last June to 43% in this poll. But the percentage of personal and family security and safety in the Gaza Strip is higher than in the West Bank as it reaches 54% (compared to 49% in Gaza last June).  By contrast, positive evaluation of the overall conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank is higher than in the Gaza Strip, with only 8% describing conditions on the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 27% describing the same conditions in the West Bank and good or very good.  Last June, positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stood at 5% compared to 25% in the West Bank.  Similarly, 34% give a positive evaluation of the status of democracy in the West Bank while only 24% describe the same conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good.

An overwhelming majority (69%) opposes Hamas’s armed entry into the Shijaiah neighborhood in the Gaza Strip (an event that led to several deaths and the escape of several members of Hillis family to Israel) while only 20% support it. Support for Hamas’s action increases in the Gaza Strip, reaching 35% compared to 12% in the West Bank. The wide gap in support between the two areas might reflect a greater Hamas media influence in Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank. Indeed, our findings show that 21% in the Gaza Strip watch Hamas’s satellite TV station, al Aqsa, compared to only 6% in the West Bank. Moreover, support for Hamas’s action in Shijaiah increases in refugee camps (27%) compared to villages and towns (16%), among men (25%) compared to women (16%), among those who identify themselves as religious (23%) compared to those who identify themselves as somewhat religious (17%), among those opposed to the peace process (41%) compared to supporters of the peace process (16%), among supporters of Hamas (53%) compared to supporters of Fateh (5%), among refugees (25%) compared to non refugees (16%), among those who hold a BA degree (24%) compared to those how hold a preparatory certificate (13%), among those with the least income (25%) compared to those with the highest income (15%), and among those whose age is between 18-22 years old (26%) compared to those whose age is over 52 years (17%).

23% believe that Fateh is responsible for the Gaza explosion that led to the death of five Hamas members last June while 43% believe it was not responsible; 33% say they do not know.

A majority of 63% believes that Abbas term as president ends in January 2009, as Hamas claims (i.e., four years after he was elected), while only 23% believe that his term extends to five years ending in January 2010, as the presidency claims.  Belief that the president’s term ends in January 2009 increases among those who oppose the peace process (74%) compared to those who support the peace process (59%), among supporters of Hamas (79%) compared to supporters of Fateh (52%), among those who hold a BA degree (69%) compared to illiterates (40%), among students (71%) compared to employees (56%), and among those whose age is between 18-22 years old (67%) compared to those whose age is over 52 years (56%).

2)Ceasefire and Prisoners’ Exchange  

• 81% support and 15% oppose the continuation of the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip
• 49% believe that if the ceasefire continues, it will lead to the opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt and 42% believe it will not
• 60% describe Hamas’s performance in the ceasefire negotiations with Israel as good or very good and 28% describe it as bad or very bad
• 75% view the prisoners’ exchange deal between Hezbollah and Israel as a victory for Hezbollah and 7% view it as a victory for Israel
• If an agreement is reached on a prisoners’ exchange between Hamas and Israel, 46% expect the deal to be a victory for Hamas and 26% expect it to be a victory for Israel
• 59% believe that the best way to free Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails is by reaching a peace agreement that would include release of prisoners, but 39% believe the best way is by kidnapping Israeli soldiers and exchanging them with Palestinian prisoners
• But given the experience of the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, 74% support and 21% oppose kidnapping of soldiers to exchange them with Palestinian and Arab prisoners

Findings show that 81% of the Palestinians support and 15% oppose the continuation of the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.  It is worth noting that our June 2008 poll found that 78% supported and 21% opposed a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel. But we also found at that time that support was very low (23%) to a ceasefire that was restricted to the Gaza Strip and did not include the West Bank. Support was even lower (20%) for an agreement that did not allow for the opening of the crossings, particularly the Rafah crossing. Findings of the current poll indicate that 49% of the Palestinians believe that if the ceasefire continues, it will lead to the opening of the Rafah crossing and 42% believe it will not. Despite the fact that the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel was restricted to the Gaza Strip and did not allow for a normal functioning of the Rafah crossing, a majority of 60% describes Hamas’s performance in the ceasefire negotiations as good or very good while only 28% view it as bad or very bad.

Findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians believe that the prisoners’ exchange agreement between Hezbollah and Israel was a victory for Hezbollah while only 7% view it as a victory for Israel. But the percentage of those who believe that a prisoners’ exchange agreement between Hamas and Israel will be a victory for Hamas does not exceed 46% and 26% believe it will be a victory for Israel.

A majority of 59% believes that the best way to free Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails is by reaching a peace agreement that includes their release while 39% believe the best way is by kidnapping Israeli soldiers and exchanging them with Palestinian prisoners. But when asked about the lessons learned from the experience of the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, the overwhelming majority (74%) says it supports and only 21% say it opposes kidnapping of soldiers to exchange them with Palestinian and Arab prisoners. In other words, despite the preference for diplomacy, the majority shows little confidence in its viability and opts instead for non-diplomatic means.

Belief that the best way to release Palestinian prisoners is by reaching a peace agreement increases in villages and towns (62%) compared to refugee camps (53%), among women (64%) compared to men (53%), among supporters of the peace process (68%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (21%), among supporters of Fateh (77%) compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), among holders of preparatory certificate (68%) compared to holders of BA degree (48%), among farmers (71%)  and housewives (66%) compared to students (52%), and among private sector employees (59%) compared to public sector employees (47%).

3)Peace Process   

• 57% support and 41% oppose a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of the conflict
• 68% support and 30% oppose the Saudi Initiative
• 70% support and 28% oppose reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement between the two sides
• But 43% believe that reconciliation between the two peoples is not possible ever
• Moreover, 69% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are low or non existent while 28% believe the chances are medium or high
• 12% believe that negotiations unleashed by the Annapolis Conference will succeed in ending Israeli occupation while 76% believe it will fail
• Similarly, 74% believe that it is impossible to reach a permanent settlement with the current Olmert government and 64% say that Abbas-Olmert meetings are not beneficial and should be stopped.

Findings show that a Palestinian majority (57%) supports a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of the conflict. Opposition to this mutual recognition stands at 41%. These figures are almost identical to those obtained last June. Findings also show that two thirds (68%) of the public support and 30% oppose the Saudi Initiative. The Initiative calls for an Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state and for reaching a just and agreed upon solution to the refugee problem based on UN resolution number 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders and will sign peace treaties and establish normal diplomatic relations with it. These findings are almost identical to those obtained last June.

Findings also show that a large majority of 70% supports reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement between the two sides and after the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel. Opposition to reconciliation stands at 28%. In this context, support for open borders and free movement of individuals and goods between the two states reaches 84%. Support for the establishment of joint economic institutions and ventures reaches 71%. Support for the establishment of joint political institutions, such as a parliament, with the ultimate goal of creating a confederation between the two states reaches 41%. Support for taking legal measures against incitement against Israel reaches 36%, and support for adopting a school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians reaches 13%. In the context of reconciliation, 32% say that they would invite an Israeli colleague to their homes and an identical percentage says it would accept an invitation from an Israeli colleague to visit his or her home.

Despite support for reconciliation, a large percentage of 43% believes that reconciliation is not possible ever. Moreover, 69% believe that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the next five years are low or non existent while only 28% say the chances are high or medium. More than three quarters (76%) believe that the negotiations unleashed by the Annapolis conference will fail in ending Israeli occupation while only 12% believe it will succeed. In the same context, 74% believe that it is impossible to reach a compromise permanent agreement with the government of Ehud Olmert and 64% say that Olmert-Abbas meetings are not beneficial and should be stopped..... Full Report

17-19 September 2015

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17 and 19 September 2015. The period before the poll witnessed the announcement that president Abbas has submitted his resignation from the PLO Executive Committee and called for convening a session for the Palestinian National Council. The session was later postponed by three months. The period also witnessed settlers’ terrorism in the village of Duma leading to the death of three members of the Dawabsha family. It witnessed a reconciliation government reshuffle introducing five new ministers; a step that deepened the rift between Hamas and Fatah, particularly given the reports of recent indirect Hamas negotiations with Israel over a long term truce. The period witnessed setting a date in November 2015 for convening Fatah’s seventh Congress. Finally, an escalation of tension in Jerusalem and al Haram al Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) characterized the days of data collection as Palestinians suspected an Israeli intention to change the status quo in the holy places in the city. This press release addresses many of those issues and covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reconciliation, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2015 indicate that two thirds of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas and two thirds do not believe his current resignation from the PLO Executive Committee is real. Moreover, findings show that the popularity of Abbas has dropped significantly in the West Bank while improving slightly in the Gaza Strip.

Fatah’s popularity has declined in both West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By contrast, the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh increased significantly in the West Bank and declined slightly in the Gaza Strip. The popularity of Hamas dropped significantly in the Gaza Strip and improved in the West Bank. If Abbas does not participate in the next presidential elections, the only viable candidates from Fatah to replace him are Marwan Barghouti followed, but with much less support, by Mohammad Dahlan and Saeb Erikat. Among Hamas candidates, Isamail Haniyeh and Khalid Mishaal are the most popular to replace Abbas and among the independents the most popular is Rami al Hamdallah followed by Salam Fayyad.

Two thirds of the public support Hamas-Israel indirect negotiations over a long term Hudna, or truce, in return for ending the siege over the Gaza Strip. But a majority believes that these negotiations will not succeed. A majority rejects the belief that such negotiations, even if they succeed, would harm the chances for reconciliation.

The public does not view the PLO or its Executive Committee positively and declines to give it a mandate to make important decisions on behalf of the Palestinians. Instead, the public prefers to give such a mandate to the PA even if the decisions in question relate to the permanent settlement with Israel. This however does not mean that the public has considerable trust in the PA; to the contrary, a majority believes that it has become a burden on the Palestinian people and for the first time since we started asking, a majority now demands the dissolution of that authority.

Findings show that two thirds of the public believe that protection of Palestinians against settler’s terrorism is the responsibility of the PA, not the Israeli army. But two thirds believe that the PA is not doing enough to protect the Palestinian citizens. To protect Palestinian towns and villages targeted by settlers, the largest percentage has selected, from among several options, the deployment of the Palestinian security forces in those areas. The public believes that if the PA formally establishes civil guard units made up of volunteers in such areas, it too would help provide protection. Indeed, half of West Bankers say that if such unarmed units were established, they would volunteer to join them. 

Findings indicate a decline in the level of support for the two-state solution. Additionally, two thirds of the public reject a return to unconditional negotiations if such a return does not mean a freeze on settlement construction and a majority rejects the so-called “French proposals.” By contrast, support for a return to an armed intifada rises sharply with a clear majority in favor.

Several factors might shed light on the drop in the popularity of Abbas and Fatah, the diminishing legitimacy of the PA and the PLO, the decline in support for the peace process, and the rise in support for armed struggle. Current tensions and confrontations in al Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, and the rest of the West Bank might be at the heart of these developments. Additionally, anger at the PA might have recently accumulated due to various factors: the belief that the PA prevents demonstrations against the Israeli occupation waged in solidarity with Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque, the belief that the PA is failing to protect Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism in the aftermath of the settlers’ burning of the Dawabsha family in the village of Duma, the PA manipulation of the rules to hold a quick session for the Palestine National Council including the submission of fake resignations from the PLO Executive Committee, and the recent leak of documents showing cases of financial corruption within the PA. Additionally, the developments indicated in this poll might have also been triggered by anger at the Arab World as the overwhelming majority believes that Arabs no longer care about the fate of the Palestinians, that Palestine is no longer the primary cause of the Arabs, and that Arab countries have in fact entered an alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation.

(1) Palestinian Elections:

• Two thirds want the resignation of president Abbas and the remaining third wants him to stay in office.
• Marwan Barghouti is the most preferred to replace Abbas followed by Ismail Haniyeh and then Rami al Hamdallah.
• In presidential elections in which Abbas and Haniyeh are the only nominees, the first wins 44% of the vote and the second 49%; if Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh are the only nominees, the first wins 55% and the second 39%.
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 35%, Fatah 35%, and all other third parties combined 11%.
• A majority is opposed to holding a West Bank-only or a Gaza Strip-only general elections.

65% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Demand for the resignation of the president is higher in the Gaza Strip (67%) than in the West Bank (63%), among the religious (70%) compared to the somewhat religious (61%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (82%) compared to those who support the peace process (55%), and among supporters of Hamas  and third parties (93% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (27%).

Two thirds believe the president’s recent resignation from the PLO Executive Committee is not real while 23% think it is real. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new elections, 32% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh, and 8% prefer Ramil al Hamdallah.  Khalid Mishal and Mohammad Dahlan follow with 6% each; 5% prefer Mustapha Barghouti, 4% prefer Saeb Erikat, and 3% prefer Salam Fayyad. In the Gaza Strip, the order is slightly different: Marwan Barghouti comes on top (28%), followed by Haniyeh (20%), Dahlan (10%), Mishal (9%), Rami al Hamdallah and Mustapha Barghouti (8% each), Erikat (6%), and Fayyad (4%). In the West Bank, Marwan Barghouti receives the largest percentage (35%), followed by Haniyeh (19%), Hamdalah (7%), Mishal (4%), Dahlan and Mustapha Barghouti (3% each), and Erikat and Fayyad (2% each). The popularity of Marwan Barghouti is higher in towns and villages (40%) compared to refugee camps and cities (33% and 30% respectively), among men (37%) compared to women (28%), among the somewhat religious (36%) compared to the religious (28%), among supporters of the peace process (38%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (22%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (53% and 42% respectively) compared to Hamas supporters (9%).

But if new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would win 49% (compared to 46% three months ago) and the latter 44% (compared to 47% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas and Haniyeh receive an equal number of votes (48% each) and in the West Bank Haniyeh wins with 49% compared to 42% for Abbas.  Moreover, the level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas drops from 44% three months ago to 38% in this poll. Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% in June 2014 in the aftermath of the Shati reconciliation declaration but before the latest Gaza war.  By contrast, if presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 55% and the latter would receive 39% of the participants’ votes. Three months ago, Barghouti received 58% and Haniyeh 36%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 24%, Barghouti 34% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 35% say they would vote for Hamas and 35% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 35% and Fatah at 39%. In June 2014, just before the Gaza war, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 34% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 44% three months ago). In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 35% (compared to 32% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 36% three months ago).

Findings show that even if the West Bank-Gaza Strip split continues throughout this year, 56% oppose and 41% support holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the West Bank only. Similarly, 62% oppose and 36% support holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the Gaza Strip only.

If Fatah succeeds in holing its seventh congress on time before the end of the year, 53% believe the movement will nonetheless remain weak regardless of whether it will or will not elect a new leadership. 32% believe Fatah will remain or will become stronger after holding its seventh congress 

(2) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 12% and in the West Bank at 31%.
• Perception of security in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip (49% compared to 40%),
• Belief that corruption exists in the PA stands at 79%.
• 23% believe that there is press freedom in the West Bank and 19% believe it exists in the Gaza Strip.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 12% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%.  Similarly, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 40%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 49%. Moreover, findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 52%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 24%.

Al Jazeera viewership is the highest, standing at 22%; Al Arabiyya stands at 9%. Viewership of PA’s Palestine TV stands at 20% and Hamas’ al Aqsa TV at 15%.   Maan-Mix viewership stands at 18%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  Moreover, only 23% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 19% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  In fact, only 31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. 29% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Finally, 50% believe that the latest reconciliation government reshuffle will not make the government more able to deliver services to the public but 42% believe that it will indeed become more able to do that

(3) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza:

• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 34% only; dissatisfaction stands at 60%.
• 35% say the PA and president Abbas are responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government and 12% put the blame on the prime minister. Only 22% blame Hamas.
• Three quarters of the public believe that the reconciliation government should pay the salaries of the civil public sector that worked for the Hamas government before the establishment of the reconciliation government.
• 61% want the reconciliation government to supervise police and security personnel in the Gaza Strip and 75% want to unify the police in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip so that it would come under the control of the reconciliation government.
• 53% say the PA is now a burden on the Palestinian people; only 40% say it is an asset.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 40% and pessimism at 56%. Three months ago optimism stood at 38% and pessimism at 59%. Fifteen months after its establishment, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 34%; dissatisfaction stands at 60%.  Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 35%. It is worth mentioning that right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government. Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 22% while 35% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 12% blame the head of the reconciliation government.

51% (56% in the Gaza Strip) want to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 34% (28% in the Gaza Strip) prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 54% (59% in the Gaza Strip) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government. 48% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 30% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

74% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salary of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (71%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salary of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government. 61% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; 33% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  Moreover, 75% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the pervious Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 23% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

We asked the public for its assessment of the likely impact of a successful Hamas negotiations with Israel, the convening of the Palestine National Council, and the reshuffling of the reconciliation government on the chances for reconciliation. Findings show that only 28% agree that a successful Hamas-Israel negotiations for a long term hudna, or truce, would have a negative impact on the chances for reconciliation. By contrast, 34% believe such a success would have a positive impact on reconciliation and 32% believe it would have no impact. Similarly, only 23% agree that the convening of the PLO National Council would have a negative impact on reconciliation. By contrast, 33% believe it would have a positive impact and 36% believe it would have no impact. On the other hand, 52% believe that recent reconciliation government reshuffle will have a negative impact on reconciliation while 32% believe it will have a positive impact.

Finally, findings show that a majority of 53% believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 40% believe it is an accomplishment. Three months ago, 48% said the PA was a burden and 46% said it was an accomplishment.

(4) Hamas, Hudna negotiations, and the Gaza War:

• Two thirds support and one third oppose Hamas negotiations with Israel for a long term hudna or truce.
• 59% say that Hamas came out a winner in the last Gaza war, but satisfaction with war achievements does not exceed 38% and dissatisfaction stands at 60%.

65% support indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel to reach a long term hudna, or tuce, in the Gaza Strip in return for lifting the siege and 32% oppose such negotiations. But only 41% believe that the chances for success in the Hamas-Israel negotiations are high or medium while 56% believe the chances are slim or non-existent.

Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War stands at 59%; 26% believe the two sides were losers. In the Gaza Strip, only 42% say Hamas came out a winner while in the West Bank 69% believe Hamas came out a winner. A year ago, 69% of the public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip said Hamas came out a winner. But the percentage of satisfaction with war achievements, compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip, stands at 38% and dissatisfaction at 60%.  Despite that, a majority of 67% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.

(5) The Palestinian National Council (PNC):

• A majority of the public views the PLO as an institution inferior to the PA.
• 52% say the PA, not the PLO, has the mandate to decide on holding new presidential and parliamentary elections.
• Similarly, 50% say the PA has the mandate to stop security coordination with Israel; only 19% say the PLO has the mandate to do so.
• 48% say the PA has the mandate to appoint a deputy president for the PA; only 22% say the PLO has the mandate to do so.
• 45% say the PA has the mandate to make decisions regarding resumptions of negotiations with Israel; 25% say the PLO has the mandate to do so.

A majority of 52% believes the PLO will remain weak even if the Palestine National Council (PNC) elects a new leadership while 36% believe the PLO will remain strong, or will become stronger, after the convening of the PNC. Under current conditions of West Bank-Gaza Strip split, the absence of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and the failure to hold new elections, we asked the public to identify the Palestinian actor that has the legitimate authority and mandate to make decisions regarding eight major issues. In all eight issues, the largest percentage selected the Palestinian Authority and its reconciliation government rather than the PLO and its Executive Committee. For example:

•  52% selected the PA to make decisions regarding the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections while only 20% selected the PLO.
• Similarly, 50% selected the PA to make decisions regarding cessation of security or civil coordination with Israel while only 19% selected the PLO.
• 48% selected the PA to make decisions regarding the appointment of a PA deputy president while 22% selected the PLO.
• Even with regard to return to negotiations with Israel, 45% selected the PA and only 25% selected the PLO.
• Similarly, 43% selected the PA to make decisions regarding accepting or rejecting a UN Security Council resolution that outlines the terms for permanent peace with Israel. Only 27% selected the PLO to make that decision.
• Answers where similar to other issues such as decisions to dissolve the PA or to find a temporary replacement to PA president in case of his resignation.
• The only issue in which the public divided responsibility more equally was regarding the replacement of the chairman of the PLO Executive Committee in case of his resignation. In this case, 37% said the PA should make the decision while 36% said the PLO should make that decision.
• In all issues, a small minority ranging between 10% and 14%, depending on the issue, selected Hamas as the actor with the mandate to decide while 5% to 9% selected Fatah.

(6) Settlers’ terrorism and the absence of security for Palestinians:

• Two thirds of the public believe that the PA does not do all it can to protect Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism.
• 68% believe that the PA is responsible for providing security for Palestinians targeted by settlers.
• 43% believe that the deployment of Palestinian security forces in areas targeted by settlers is the best way to protect those areas; 28% believe an armed intifada is the best means of protecting those areas.
• A majority of 60% believe that the formation of an unarmed civil guard contributes to the security of Palestinian areas targeted by settlers. 

A majority of 67% say the PA does not do all it can to protect Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism while 31% say it does. Moreover, a majority of 68% believes that the PA should be responsible for protecting Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism while 18% believe that Palestinian citizens should protect themselves. 11% believe it is the responsibility of the Israeli army to protect Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism. The belief that the PA is responsible for protecting Palestinians against settlers’ terrorism is higher in the Gaza Strip (71%) compared to the West Bank (66%), in refugee camps (75%) compared to villages and cities (70% and 66% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (73%) compared to those who support the peace process (64%), among refugees (71%) compared to non-refugees (66%), among supporters of Hamas and Fatah (69% and 67%) compared to supporters of third parties (52%). Findings show that the largest percentage (43%) believes that deployment of Palestinian security forces in villages and towns targeted by settlers’ violence is the best means of delivering security for Palestinians while 28% believe that a return to an armed intifada is the most effective means to deliver security. 27% believe that towns and villages should form their own unarmed local defense committees.

If the PA officially forms unarmed civil guard units made up of volunteers to protect areas targeted by settlers’ violence, such a step would contribute to Palestinian security in those areas according to 60% of the public. 39% believe such a step would not do that.  If such civil guard units are established by the PA, 48% of respondents in the West Bank say they would volunteer to join them while 49% said they would not.

(7) Peace Process and Israel’s long term aspirations:

• In the absence of a viable peace process, 57% support a return to an armed intifada.
• 60% oppose and 37% support the French proposal for a UN Security Council resolution.
• Two thirds oppose resumption of negotiations without a settlement freeze.
• 48% support and 51% oppose the two-state solution.
• 42% believe that armed action is the most effective means to establish a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel; 29% believe in the efficacy of negotiations.
• 81% are worried that they would be hurt at the hands of Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished.
• An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) is in grave danger due to Israeli intentions to change the status quo.

In the absence of a peace negotiation, 83% support joining more international organizations; 63% support a popular non-violent resistance; 51% support the dissolution of the PA; and 57% support a return to an armed intifada. Three months ago, only 46% supported the dissolution of the PA and only 49% supported return to armed intifada. Findings also show that an overwhelming majority of 88% demands that the PA take Israel to the International Criminal Court for building settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. Support for an armed intifada increases in the Gaza Strip (61%) compared to the West Bank (54%), in cities (58%) compared to camps and villages (52% each), among men (60%) compared to women (53%), among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious (52%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (76%) compared to supporters of the peace process (46%), among the illiterates (62%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (55%), and among Hamas supporters (75%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (40% and 51% respectively).

A majority of 60% rejects and 37% accept a French proposal that would request the UN Security Council to issue a resolution affirming the establishment of a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967 with territorial swaps, making Jerusalem a joint capital for Palestine and Israel, setting a timetable for ending Israeli occupation, and holding an international peace conference. Furthermore, a majority of 66% rejects and 32% accept return to unconditional negotiations with Israel if that means no cessation of settlement activities. Acceptance of the French proposal is higher in the West Bank (38%) compared to the Gaza Strip (34%), among men (40%) compared to women (34%), among the somewhat religious (42%) compared to the religious (30%), among supporters of the peace process (45%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (21%), among the illiterates (56%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (34%), among laborers (43%) compared to students (32%), among those whose age is over 50 years (38%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (33%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (56% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (20%).

Only 48% support and 51% oppose the two-state solution. Three months ago, 51% supported and 48% opposed this solution. Moreover, findings also show that 45% support the Arab Peace Initiative and 49% oppose it. Similarly, only 40% support a mutual recognition of national identity of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people and 58% oppose it. Findings show that Palestinian views on the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel vary: 42% think that armed action is the most effective, 29% think negotiations is the most effective, and 24% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, only 36% said that armed action was the most effective and 32% said negotiations was the most effective. Belief that armed action is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel is higher in the Gaza Strip (44%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in cities and refugee camps (45% and 38% respectively) compared to villages and towns (27%), among men (47%) compared to women (36%), among the religious (50%) compared to the somewhat religious (33%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (66%) compared to those who support the peace process (29%), among students (57%) compared to farmers, housewives, and laborers (26%, 36%, and 39% respectively), among the unmarried (47%) compared to the married (40%), and among Hamas supporters (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (20% and 25% respectively).

A majority of 65% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion while 32% say it is still practical. Three months ago, only 55% said the two-state solution was no longer practical. Despite this, only 30% support, and 69% oppose, a one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights. Three months ago, 34% supported the one-state solution. Furthermore, 78% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 21% believe the chances are high or medium.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 81%. 19% are not worried. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of 85% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. 15% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967. When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 64% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 26% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 50% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 21% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 10% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 12% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.  One half of the public believes that Israel will indeed succeed in implementing its plans for al Haram al Sharif and 48% believe it will not succeed.

(8) Israel and the Arab World, Hamas and Iran, and ISIS:

• 80% believe that the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns.
• 58% believe that there is today an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued occupation.
• 91% reject ISIS and 83% support the war against it.

80% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. 18% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. Indeed, 58% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 31% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state. The belief that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran is higher in the West Bank (62%) compared to the Gaza Strip (52%), among men (60%) compared to women (56%), among the illiterates (73%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (58%), and among supporters of Hamas (62%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (54% and 47% respectively).

The nuclear agreement with Iran is an accomplishment for the US in the eyes of 26% of the public; an accomplishment for Iran in the eyes of 23%; and an accomplishment for both sides in the eyes of 34%. In the context of the recent visit to Saudi Arabia by Hamas leaders, 40% of the public believe that Hamas will improve relations with that country while maintaining good relations with Iran; 27% believe that Hamas will remain close to Iran and its relations with Saudi Arabia will not improve; and 16% believe that Hamas will join the Saudi anti-Iran axis.

An overwhelming majority of 91% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 6% believe it does represent true Islam. 3% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 9% (compared to 4% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.  83% support and 13% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 48% consider the establishment of a Palestinian state and ending Israeli occupation to be the most vital goal of the Palestinian people while 30% consider the right of return to be the most vital need; 13% consider the building of pious individual and a religious society to be the most vital goal.
• 28% say the top most important problem confronting Palestinians today is the continuation of the Israeli occupation; 26% say it is poverty and unemployment and 24% say it is corruption. 

48% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 28% of the pubic; 26% say it is poverty and unemployment; 24% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; 16% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 5% say it is the split and the absence of national unity.

These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side.

The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30^th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement.

This report is the first in a series of reports that cover the findings of the current wave of AB.  It addresses two important issues covered by AB8: the domestic balance of power in the Palestinian territories and the state of Palestinian-Israeli relations. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding these two topics, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in two of its regular polls, one conducted before AB8 and one after it. The poll conducted after AB8 came several weeks after the launch of Hamas’ October the 7^th offensive against Israeli towns and military bases bordering the Gaza Strip and the Israeli launch of the current ground invasion of the Gaza Strip. In the meanwhile, in the West Bank, the Israeli army blocked or restricted Palestinian access to main roads while settler attacks increased against vulnerable towns and villages in various parts of the B and C areas.

Domestic Balance of Power: On the eve of October the 7^th war, Arab Barometer 8 in Palestine found the Palestinian domestic setting favoring nationalist groups, such as Fatah, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. At the national level, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip combined, more than 2 in 5 favored the nationalists, such as Fatah and third parties, while only 1 in 5 favored Islamists, such as Hamas, and the rest disliked both.  Even in the Gaza Strip, which is traditionally more religious and Islamist, support for Hamas was slightly higher than a quarter while support for nationalists stood at half. When looking at the findings of PSR’s earlier poll, conducted immediately before the AB poll, the trend in both areas, but more clearly in the Gaza Strip, was decidedly moving against Hamas. The October 7 war reversed that trend leading to a great rise in Hamas’s popularly and a great decline in Fatah’s in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, support for Hamas did not reach a majority in either area; only slightly more than 2 in 5 favored Hamas by early December 2023. Furthermore, as shown in all previous PSR polls, Hamas’ increased popularity during wars begins to erode soon after the wars end, eventually returning to where it was before the war.

But the nationalist’s Achilles heel lies in its ruling leadership. Long before October the 7^th, the current PA president lost public support as the overwhelming majority demanded his resignation. Even within his own political party, the majority wanted him out. The events in October, exposed the tremendous public dissatisfaction with the performance of that leadership. One of the most important ramifications of that loss of public satisfaction with the PA leadership has been the unwillingness of the nationalist public to vote in an election in which he would compete against a Hamas candidate thus ensuring a resounding victory for the Islamist. Nonetheless, the nationalists do have a leader who cannot lose regardless of who the other candidate is: Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti, currently serving several life sentences in an Israeli jail. Even after October the 7^th, he is still able to defeat Hamas’ most popular leader, Ismail Haniyeh.

Palestinian-Israeli relations AB8 explored attitudes of Palestinians toward various solutions that would put an end to the conflict. The poll offered three solutions: the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, the one-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis, and a confederation between the two states. Respondents can select one of the three or alternatively reject all three and select “other” solutions. The poll found a slim majority favoring the two-state solution followed by “other” solutions, one-state solution, and the confederation. Palestinian youth and those who support Hamas are more likely to oppose the two-state solution while older Palestinians and those who support all other factions are more likely to support that solution.

This is the second time that AB has asked this question. Two years ago, the findings were greatly similar to the current ones. Nonetheless, the current level of support for the two-state solution is much higher than the support documented by PSR when the question is about support and opposition to that solution. This report argues that one reason for this has to do with substance, the fact that while the regular support-opposition question omits any reference to the borders of the state, the single most important attribute of statehood for Palestinians, the question on the three solutions defines these borders as those of the 1967 lines. A second reason has to do with the formal framing of the question. While the regular support-opposition question forces respondents to oppose the two-state solution if they prefer some other negotiated ones, the three-solution framing forces respondents to select their most preferred negotiated outcome or alternatively select their own preferred solutions. As pointed out in the report, PSR regualr polls conducted before and after the eruption of the October 7 war shows that support for the two-state solution in its regular format did not decline; to the contrary it slightly increased.

The report shows that those who support the two-state solution in its regular framing (support-opposition), tend to overwhelmingly support the two-state solution in its three-solution framing. Most other two-state supporters prefer one of the other two negotiated solutions, i.e., the one-state and the confederation. Most importantly however, some of those who oppose the two-state solution in that regular framing, change their mind and support it, presumably because that solution now defines the borders as those of 1967. AB8 asked about Palestinian priorities. We crosstabulated the answers to this question with those of the three-solution question. As expected, the findings show that those who prioritize Palestinian statehood and a system of rights and freedoms over other Palestinian goals, such as the right of return and religious society, tend to favor the two-state solution by the largest percentage. AB8 also asked about perception of Israeli discrimination against Palestinians. Here too, we crosstabulated the answers to this question with those of the three-solution question. Is seems that the concern about potential discrimination against Palestinians in a future one-state solution might have deterred respondents from supporting that solution. 

The domestic balance of power between the various Palestinian political parties has been explored in two ways: party preferences and electoral behavior. To explore the popularity of Palestinian figures, we asked about vote in hypothetical elections in which the contest was between the current PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, and the two most popular rivals, Marwan Barghouti from Fatah and Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas.

PARTY PREFERENCES

• On the eve of the October the 7^th war, AB8 asked about public preferences for the various political parties: when asked which party is closest to you, respondents selected Fatah by 30% (same percentage in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and Hamas by 21% (17% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip); and third parties by 12% (6% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip). The largest percentage, 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip), selected “none of the above.”

A month earlier, in early-September when respondents in one of PSR’s regular polls were asked “which political party you prefer, 26% selected Fatah (26% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip), 22% selected Hamas (12% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip, 13% (12% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip) selected third parties, and 40% (52% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip) selected “none of the above.”

A third poll was conducted in late November and early December 2023, about six weeks after the Hamas launch of its October 7 offensive. The poll, one of PSR’s regular polls, was conducted during the ceasefire period in which West Bank women and children held prisoners by Israel were exchanged for Israeli civilian hostages held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Respondents in this post-Gaza War poll were asked “which political party you prefer?" Finding of that post-Gaza War poll indicated a dramatic rise in the popularity of Hamas in the West Bank and a slight rise in the Gaza Strip. Support for Hamas in the West Bank increased considerably by more than three times to 44% but increased slightly in the Gaza Strip to 42% for a total of 43%.  Support for Fatah dropped considerably to 17% only (16% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip). The preference for third parties and others dropped by one percentage point to 12% (4% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of those who selected “none of the above” dropped by11 points to 28%.

Figure (1): Party Preference before and after the eruption of the October 2023 Gaza War

“AB8: Which party is closest to you?” or “PSR polls: Which party you prefer?”

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR:

1. Parliamentary Elections

The 8^th Arab Barometer survey in Palestine explored electoral behavior: how respondents would vote in new parliamentary elections, AB8 shows support for Fatah standing at only 24% (23% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip), while support for “Change or Reform,” i.e., Hamas stood at only 15% (9% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip); 8% supported known third parties that participated in the last parliamentary elections in 2006; and 10% did not support any of the parties.

The reason for the decline in the percentage of those willing to vote for Fatah and Hamas compared to the percentage of favorability or preference, mentioned above, is the fact that a large number of respondents decline to participate in the elections. The percentage of those refusing to participate in the elections in early October stood at and 41% (51% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip). In other words, 51% of the entire public either refused to vote or selected “none of the above.”

When the vote is restricted to those actually participating in the elections, support for Fatah rises to 40% (46% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) and support for Hamas rises to 25% (18% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of the undecided rises to 21%.

In early September 2023, the vote for Fatah stood at 23% (22% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip), Hamas at 21% (13% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), third parties at 6% (5% in the West Bank and 7% in the Gaza Strip), and the undecided at 13% (14% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of those who declined to participate in these elections stood at 36% (46% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip). In other words, 49% either refused to vote or selected “none of the above.”

When the vote is restricted to those actually participating in the elections, vote for Fatah rises to 36% (40% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) and vote for Hamas rises to 34% (24% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of the undecided rises to 21% (26% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip).

The October 7 war dramatically changed the hypothetical electoral behavior. Vote for Fatah declined by 10 points to 13% (11% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) while the vote for Hamas rose by 14 points to 35% (31% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip), and third parties received the vote of 3% (2% in the West Bank and 5% in the Gaza Strip). The percentage of the undecided stood at 17% (18% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip) and the percentage of those who declined to participate stood at 31% (38% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip). In other words, 48% either refused to vote or selected “none of the above.”

When the vote is restricted to those actually participating in the elections, i.e., 69% of the eligible voters, Fateh receives 19% (18% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), Hamas' Change and Reform 51% (50% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip), all other lists combined 5% (3% in the West Bank and 6% in the Gaza Strip), and 25% (28% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip) select “none of the above.”.

It is worth noting that AB8 shows support among the voters for Fatah and Hamas is higher among those 30 years of age or older (43% and 26% respectively) compared to only 35% for Fatah and 22% for Hamas among those between 18 and 29 years old. The percentage of youth is higher among those voting for third parties or those undecideds (17% and 26% respectively) while the percentage for older voters stand at 12% and 19% respectively. Religiosity is an important driver of the vote: support for Hamas among the religious stands at 37% compared to 18% among the somewhat religious and zero among the not religious. By contrast, support for Fatah among the religious stands at 35% compared to 45% among the somewhat religious and 41% among the not religious. Support for third parties stands at 11% among the religious, 11% among the somewhat religious, and 44% among the not religious. The undecided receives 18% from the religious, 26% from the somewhat religious, and 15% among the not religious.  

2. Presidential Elections

Like other PSR polls, Palestine’s AB8 found that Marwan Barghouti is the most popular presidential candidate. If elections took place on the eve of the October Gaza war, 34% (35% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) would have voted for him. Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, would have come second, with 16% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank). Current PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, receives 8% (12% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank). The rest of the public, 40% (47% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip declined to participate in the elections.

When restricting the vote distribution to those participating, Barghouti receives 57% (66% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip); Haniyeh receives 27% (21% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip, and Abbas receives 14% (10% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip). About a month earlier, in early September, the vote for Barghouti stood at only 49% (63% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), while 36% (25% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) voted for Haniyeh, and 13% (10% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip) for Abbas. In other words, Barghouti became more popular and Haniyeh less popular on the eve of the October Gaza war. In that September The war reversed this trend. By the end of November and early December, the vote for Barghouti declined to 47% (55% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) while the vote for Haniyeh increased significantly to 43% (39% in  the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip), and the vote for Abbas declined by about half to 7% (3% in the West Bank and 13% in the West Bank).

Figure (4): vote in presidential elections; voters only

It is worth noting that AB8 shows support for Barghouti, when competing about Haniyyeh and Abbas simultaneously, is almost the same regardless to age and gender. But it is higher among the somewhat religious (63%) compared to the religious (51%). Surprisingly, 66% of Fatah voters give their vote to Barghouti. Also, surprisingly 70% of those who select “none of the above” vote for him. He receives more votes from those voting for third parties (73%) and receive only 9% of Hamas voters.

3. Demand for the resignation of president Abbas:

The 8th Arab Barometer survey in Palestine explored other aspects of the domestic balance of power, most importantly the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, the ability of the Palestinians to hold elections and the reasons why national elections have not been held since 2006.

• AB8 found the demand for the resignation of president Abbas on the eve of the Gaza October 7 war standing at 78% (85% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip). A month earlier, PSR found 79% (78% in the West Bank and 79% in the Gaza Strip) demanding the resignation of president Abbas. The October 7 war increased the demand for the resignation of Abbas to 88% (92% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip).

Figure (5): Demand for the resignation of President Mahmoud Abbas in three polls

“If it were up to you, would you want to have Abbas resign or not resign?”

It is worth noting that AB8 shows support for the resignation of Abbas is almost the same among the young and the olde, the men and the women. But it does show that support for that resignation is highest among the religious (82%) declining to 77% among the somewhat religious, and 59% among the not religious. Surprisingly, a majority of 54% of those voting for Fatah, among those taking part in hypothetical parliamentary elections, demand the resignation of Abbas. The demand for Abbas’ resignation is much higher among voters of third parties, those selecting “none of the above” and those voting for Hamas: 77%, 80%, and 95% respectively.

• The public is almost evenly split on whether the Palestinians can today elect their own national leadership, with 48% saying “yes” and 50% saying no. In the Gaza Strip, 58% said “no” compared to 46% in the West Bank. Among those who said “no,” the largest percentage (33%) said the Palestinians cannot elect their own national leadership due to the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip making it difficult to hold elections in the two areas simultaneously. This belief is slightly stronger in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank, 36% and 32% respectively.  Another 29% of those who said the Palestinians cannot elect their own national leadership said the reason for that is the fact that the PA leadership in the West Bank is afraid of losing the elections. This view is stronger in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 36% and 20% respectively.
• A majority of 60% of the Palestinians believe the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people while 37% believe it is an accomplishment. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans, 66% and 52% respectively, think the PA is a burden.
•  

The 8^th Arab Barometer survey in Palestine explored aspects of Palestinian-Israeli relations, most importantly the support for various solutions to end the conflict, the place of Palestinian statehood in Palestinian priorities, solidarity with the Palestinian cause, and the extent of racial discrimination in the Israeli control over the Palestinians. It should be pointed out that PSR has asked about support for the two-state solution in two different manners. In all regular poll, the traditional manner has been to ask about support and opposition to that solution. Occasionally however, the question was more specific allowing respondents to opt for other negotiated solutions, such as the one-state solution, or reject all solutions and state their own preferences. The following analysis reviews the findings for both, the regular support-opposition and the three-solution questions.

Three solutions to end the conflict: AB8 offered Palestinians three possible solutions to the conflict with Israel, solutions that would help end the conflict between the two side, and asked them which one they prefer. All three solutions offered were possible outcome of peace negotiations, but respondents could opt for some “other” solution, if they so wish. The three included a two-state solution, one-state solution, and confederation. It should be noted that the “one-state solution” did not specify that the two sides would have equal rights. Therefore, theoretically one could select this solution regardless of whether Israeli Jews or Palestinians would receive equal rights. The two-state solution received the largest support (51%) with Gazans showing a little more support than West Bankers, 54% and 49% respectively. The one state solution received 10% and the confederation received 7% support. One quarter, 28% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip opted for “other” and 7% said they do not know or gave no answer. In other words, 32% did not support any of these three proposed solutions.  

It is also worth noting that support for the two-state solution in this AB8 poll is higher among those who are 30-year-old or older compared to youth between the ages of 18 and 29 years, 54% and 45% respectively.  It is also higher among voters of third parties and voters of Fatah, as well as those who select “none of the above,” 61%, 55%, and 47% respectively, compared to the voters of Hamas, 34%.

Palestine’s AB7 asked the exact same question two years earlier, in October 2021. The findings are greatly similar to those obtained in the latest AB wave of October 2023. Support for the two-state solution stood at 53% (49% in the West Bank and 58% in the Gaza Strip) while support for the one state solution stood at 8% (10% in the West Bank and 4% in the Gaza Strip), and support for the Palestinian-Israeli confederation stood at 6% (3% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip). Those opting for “other” and those who did not provide an answer stood at 34% (38% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).

The same three-solutions question was asked in PSR’s December 2020 and June 2021 regular polls. Support for the two-state solution stood at 49% (44% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) in December 2020. About a third (31%) selected “other” or did not give any answer. Six months later, one month after the May 2021 Hamas-Israel fourth war, support for the two-state solution dropped slightly to 46% (41% in the West Bank and 54% in the Gaza Strip) while support for “others” and those who did not select an answer rose to 38% (48% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).

Figure (6): support for three possible solutions to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict:

“Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

Understanding the high level of support for the two-state solution in AB8: As indicated above, the three solutions presented to respondents in the four polls mentioned above, including in AB7 and AB8, are negotiation-based solutions of which respondents are forced to select one or alternatively reject them all and describe one they favor. The alternative and more regular manner in which we asked about the two-state solution was asked in the September and December 2023 but not in AB8. The findings in September showed that about one third (32%) supported and two thirds opposed the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. It is worth mentioning that three months before that, in June 2023, support for that solution stood at 28%. The December 2023 poll showed that despite the October the 7^th war and the significant rise in support for Hamas and for armed struggle, support for the two-state solution did not drop. In fact, it increased slightly to 34% and opposition dropped from 67% to 64%.  As shown below, in figure (7), support for the two-state solution in December 2023 was the highest in that year.

Figure (7): Support and opposition to the two-state solution throughout 2023

“Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution”

A crosstabulation between this three solution-question and the regular question normally asked in PSR’s surveys, on support and opposition to the two-state solution, reveals that more than three quarters of those who support the two-state solution in the regular question tend to favor that same solution in the three solution-question and the majority of those who oppose the two-state solution in the regular question tend to opt for “other” or refuse to answer when forced to choose a negotiated solution.  

As shown in the figure below, the vast majority of those who supported the two-state solution in PSR’s regular June 2021 poll question (76%) gave their support to the two-state solution when forced to choose one of the three negotiated solutions, while 9% of them supported the one-state solution, and 6% supported the confederation solution. In other words, some of the supporters of the one state and the confederation solutions, in the three-solution question, were forced in the regular question (about support or opposition to that solution) to select that solution despite the fact that they preferred these two other solutions. By contrast, the majority (56%) of those opposed to the two-state solution in the regular PSR question opted to select “other” or refused to answer when asked to select one of the three negotiated solutions. Moreover, 5% of those opposed to the two-state solution preferred a one-state solution and 12% preferred the confederation solution. Nonetheless, 27% of those who expressed opposition to the two-state solution opted to select that solution when forced to choose one of three negotiated solutions. The reason why this might have happened has probably to do with the fact that while the regular question about the support and opposition to the two-state solution does not describe the borders of the Palestinian state while the three-solution question define that solution as one based on the 1967 borders.  

Figure (8): Crosstabulation of support and opposition to the two-state solution “Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution” with support for the three negotiated solutions “Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

Linking Palestinian priorities to support for the two-state solution: AB8 finding that a slim majority of the Palestinians support the two-state solution, under the two conditions outlined above, i.e., when the borders of the Palestinian state are defined as those of 1967 and when respondents are forced to choose one of three negotiated solutions, is supported by other findings of that October survey. When asked to select the most vital Palestinian goal, 46% (50% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) selected the building of a Palestinian state along the lines of the 1967 while 32% selected the “right of return for the refugees,” 11% selected the establishment of a system with Palestinian rights and freedoms and another 11% selected the building of a pious religious society that applies Islamic teaching. In other words, the percentage of those prioritizing the Palestinian state and its democratic nature stands at 57%. As the figure below indicates, when the hierarchy of priorities is crosstabulated with the support for the various solutions, the greatest support for the two-state solution comes from those who prioritize Palestinian statehood followed by those who prioritized a system of rights and freedoms, 64% and 43% respectively.

Figure (9): Crosstabulation of the hierarchy of Palestinian priorities/goals “which in your view should be the first most important one most important goal that the Palestinian people should strive to achieve? with support for the three negotiated solutions “Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

Role of perception of Israeli discrimination against the Palestinians and the low level of support for the one-state solution: Finally, in the context of public attitudes toward the three negotiated solutions, it is worth looking into the reason for public reluctance to embrace the idea of “one state for Palestinians and Israeli Jews” when two other alternatives are offered, i.e., the two-state solution and the Palestinian-Israeli confederation.  AB8 provides one possible explanation: when asked about the extent to which racial discrimination by Israelis against Palestinians exists today, 92% said yes, it does exist to a greater or medium extent while only 8% said it exists to a small extent or does not exist at all. As indicated earlier, this solution did not specify that it would be based on equal rights for the two national groups. Therefore, this concern about potential discrimination against Palestinians in a future one-state solution might have deterred respondents from selecting it.  The figure below shows that the greater the extent of perceived discrimination, the smallest the support (8%) and the absence of perceived discrimination leads to the greatest level of support for that one state solution (24%).

Figure (10): Crosstabulation of perception of Israeli discrimination against Palestinians “To what extent do you believe racial discrimination by Israelis against Palestinians is a serious problem in the West Bank and Gaza? with support for the three negotiated solutions “Which solution from among the following you prefer?”

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 11-14 December 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the announcement by the Palestinian Election Commission and President Abbas that all factions have agreed to the holding of legislative elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But no decree was issued by Abbas during the period of the data collection. The period also witnessed a debate among Palestinians over the decision of the PA Attorney General to ask the court to block public access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites. Hamas allowed the construction of an American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel. Power was cut by the Israeli Electric Corporation to central West Bank for two hours every day in many locations served by the Jerusalem District Electricity Company due to unpaid bills. On the Israeli side, prime minister Netanyahu was indicted for corruption and Israeli political parties failed to form a government coalition leading to a decision to hold a third parliamentary election in a single year. The US government declared a new position regarding Israeli settlements in which it disputed the illegality of these settlements from an international law standpoint. In the meanwhile, the US Congress started an on-going effort to impeach president Trump for the use of the presidency to attain personal gains.  This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2019 show a small majority indicating optimism about the holding of legislative elections in the near future. Moreover, the poll shows that majority is in favor of holding these elections even if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem; in case of Israeli opposition, the public says that East Jerusalemites should vote wherever they can, in Jerusalem and outside it. The bad news however, is that half of the public believes that these upcoming elections will not be free or fair. Furthermore, only half of the public trusts the ability of the Palestinian Election Commission (PEC) to manage the election process with integrity and less than half has confidence in the ability of the police, whether in West Bank and the PA or in the Gaza Strip under Hamas, to provide protection to the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Indeed, a majority believes that Hamas will not be able to conduct its election campaign in the West Bank, and Fatah in the Gaza Strip, without restrictions and interference. These findings indicate a diminished public trust in the entire election process, due probably in part to a distrust in PEC, as indeed supported by the findings, and in the PA public institutions in both areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Worst of all, a large majority believes that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah, in the West Bank, will not accept the outcome and if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas, in the Gaza Strip, will not accept the outcome. This finding demonstrates beyond any doubt the absence of public confidence in the democratic credentials of the two major political parties, Fatah and Hamas, and raise a big question about the extent of the damage and political corruption that have been generated by the absence of democratic life and by the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2007.

On the ability of a newly elected legitimate government to dissolve the armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms, a large majority indicates opposition to such measure. Indeed, the majority believes that protecting or keeping the arms of the armed groups has greater legitimacy than that of the electoral legitimacy of the government. These findings reveal that the public does not take the election and its legitimacy seriously (which might be an outcome of the problems identified above) and that in the absence of a viable peace process, the public puts its trust, first and foremost, in armed struggle. 

Findings show that if elections take place today, Fatah would receive the biggest share of the vote, followed by Hamas, existing third parties, newly created third parties, and finally an electoral list loyal to Mohammad Dahlan. With this range of options, only a small percentage of participating votes remains undecided. Needless to say, the formation of an electoral list loyal to Dahlan will significantly weaken the size of Fatah’s share of the vote and might threaten its ability to emerge as the biggest party. This problem, unique to Fatah, can be exacerbated by its persistent lack of discipline, as demonstrated by the elections of 1996 and 2006, if, for example, other unofficial Fatah lists were formed by disgruntled senior party members who fail to make it to a realistic spot in the party’s election list. This means that Fatah might find itself competing against itself thereby ending up with greater fragmentation and great many lost votes. But the greatest threat to a Fatah electoral victory would be its failure to integrate Marwan Barghouti and his supporters in its electoral list. In such a case, as temporarily happened in the 2006 elections, he might form his own electoral list thereby splitting Fatah’s vote and insuring that Hamas would receive the greatest share of the vote.   

On other domestic political issues, findings indicate that a plurality in the West Bank thinks that Hamas should have participated in the recent exchange of rocket fire between Israel and Islamic Jihad. But the situation in the Gaza Strip is different as a greater plurality thinks that Hamas’ decision of refraining from participation has been the correct decision. We also found a large majority views the decision of the PA Attorney General to seek court authorization to block Palestinian media websites as an attack on freedom of speech and therefore he should not stay in his office because he apparently does not believe in free speech. We also found an overwhelming majority supporting the PA government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years.

Two thirds of the public view the US decision recognizing the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as destructive the two-state solution. A majority views the decision as destructive also to the one-state solution and that one of its outcomes will be to push Israel to annex parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley. This American position led to a significant increase in the percentage of Palestinians, standing today at three quarters, who demand that the Palestinian leadership reject the American peace plan, or the Deal of the Century, out of hand, without even looking at its substance while 70% indicate opposition to a restoration of PA dialogue with the Trump Administration.

Finally, findings show that a majority is opposed to the two-state solution, but support for it remains higher than the support for the one-state solution. They also indicate a slight increase in support for armed struggle or a return to armed intifada. It is noticeable however that a majority of the public thinks that the indictment of Israeli prime minister Netanyahu will soon lead to his removal from power. Similarly, a majority is optimistic about the ability of the US Congress to impeach President Trump and a similar majority is optimistic that he will lose the upcoming US presidential elections. This public betting on the dynamics of domestic Israeli politics and on the workings of the US Congress might be one of the reasons why we still find more public support for the two-state solution compared to other alternative solutions to the conflict with Israel.

(1) A new legislative election?

• The majority supports holding elections even if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem
• Only half of the public has confidence in the ability of the Palestinian Election Commission to manage the election process successfully
• Only about half trusts the police force in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip to protect to the election process with integrity and neutrality
• About two-thirds believe that opposition parties are unable to conduct election campaigns without restrictions and interferences
• Only 42% believe the upcoming elections will be fair and free
• 40% expect Fatah to win and 25% expect Hamas to win the upcoming elections
• But a large majority expects the losing party to reject the outcome of the elections
• The majority believes that the legitimately-elected government has no right to dissolve the armed groups currently in the Gaza Strip and about two thirds do not support such a decision if one is made
• The top priority for the elections, in the eyes of more than a third, is to unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

A majority of 52% of the public expects general elections to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 37% believe no elections will take place. Three months ago, only 38% expected that elections will take place soon.  44% support the holding of simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose a separation between the two, while 23% say they support the holding of parliamentary elections to be followed few months later by presidential elections, and 22% want simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections but do not oppose separating them by few months. Moreover, a majority of 56% (65% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) says that if Israel prevented Palestinian legislative elections in East Jerusalem, voting should be made possible for the residents in any polling station in the West Bank; 35% disagree and say that no election should take place if Israel prevents it in East Jerusalem. Opposition for holding elections if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem’s post offices is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (27%), among those who work in the public sector (45%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (34%), among those who oppose the peace process (52%) compared to those who support the peace process (25%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (60% and 44% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (25%).

On the other hand, only 50% trust and 44% do not trust the integrity and capacity of the Palestinian Election Commission to successfully manage the election process. Trust in the integrity and capacity of the election commission is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (49%), in refugee camps (56%) compared to cities and villages/towns (50% and 49% respectively), among men (54%) compared to women (46%), among those whose age is over 49 years (53%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (46%), and among those who support Fatah, Hamas, and third parties (62%, 54%, and 54% respectively) compared to those who do not intend to participate in the elections (36%).

Moreover, only 48% trust, and 46% do not trust, the ability of the West Bank Palestinian police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Similarly, only 47% trust, and 41% do not trust, the ability of the Gaza Strip police force to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias.  Trust in the integrity and neutrality of the police force deployed in the West Bank is higher in that same area, i.e., the West Bank (56%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), in villages/towns (58%) compared to cities and refugee camps (47% and 45% respectively), among men (51%) compared to women (46%), among those whose age is over 49 years (50%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (40%), among the married (50%) compared to the unmarried (45%), among those whose income is much higher than the average income (58%) compared to those whose income is much lower than the average (39%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (55% and 51% respectively) compared to the religious (43%),  among those who support the peace process (56%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (33%), and among supporters of Fatah (75%) compared to those who support Hamas and third parties and those who will not participate in the elections (27%, 41%, and 40% respectively

Trust in the integrity and neutrality of the police force deployed in the Gaza Strip is higher in that same area, i.e., the Gaza Strip (60%) compared to the West Bank (39%), in refugee camps and cities (55% and 48% respectively) compared to villages/towns (42%), among men (50%) compared to women (44%), among those whose age is over 49 years (52%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (38%), among those who work in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (46%), among the married (48%) compared to the unmarried (39%), among those whose income is much less than the average income (61%) compared to those whose income is much higher than the average income (42%), among the religious (54%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (44% and 43% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (56%) compared to those who support the peace process (43%), and among supporters of Hamas (75% compared to supporters of third parties, Fatah, and those who will not participate in the election (29%, 39%, and 39% respectively). 

A majority of 64% say that it will not be possible, and 29% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Hamas’, to conduct their election campaigns in the West Bank without restrictions or interference from the Palestinian security services. Similarly, a majority of 56% says that it will not be possible, and 37% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Fatah’s, to conduct their election campaigns in the Gaza Strip without restrictions or interference from the Gaza security services. On top of that, only 42% believe, and 50% do not believe, that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair.  The belief that the elections will be fair and free is higher in the West Bank (45%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among men (45%) compared to women (39%), among those who work in the public sector (45%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (40%), among supporters of the peace process (46%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (36%), among supporters of Fatah (56%) compared to those who will not participate in the elections and the supporters of third parties and supporters of Hamas (27%, 36%, and 44% respectively). 

The public is divided into two equal halves (43% each) in calling for taking away the jurisdiction of Palestinian courts, especially the Constitutional Court, in annulling the outcome of the legislative elections because of the fear that these courts might do so if the opposition to Abbas and Fatah were to win the elections.

We asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the upcoming elections: 40% (47% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip) expect Fatah to win the upcoming legislative elections while only 25% (19% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) expect Hamas to win. We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 40% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 41% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 31% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 24% (compared to 20% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 43% three months ago). It should be noted that among Fatah voters, as we see in another question, some are loyalists to Mohammad Dahlan, a former senior Fatah official.  If these Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 35%.

We asked again about the voting intentions, but this time with the assumption that other newly created electoral lists, ones that have not participated in the previous elections in 2006, added to the list of candidates.  In this case, the participation rate would increase from 68% to 72% and the share of the undecided would drop from 20% to only 6%; Fatah share would rise from 40% to 44% (including Dahlan loyalists); Hamas share (32%) would remain unchanged; share of third parties (10%) would also remain unchanged; and 8% would vote for the newly created electoral lists. If Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 39%.

More than two thirds (68%) believe that if Hamas wins the upcoming elections, Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 25% think Fatah will indeed allow Hamas to do so. Similarly, 59% believe that if Fatah wins the upcoming elections, Hamas will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 34% think Hamas will indeed allow Fatah to do so.  It is worth mentioning that among those who intend to vote for Fatah, only 38% think that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah would accept the results while 58% think that Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow Hamas to form a government with jurisdiction in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Among Hamas voters, only 20% think that Fatah will accept the result in case Hamas wins. By contrast, a large percentage of 69% of Hamas voters believe that if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will accept the results while only 25% believe Hamas will not accept the results in this case. Among Fatah supporters however, only 26% believe Hamas will accept the result if Fatah wins the election.     

A majority of 59% say that after the upcoming elections and the formation of a new government, such a government does not have the right to dissolve existing armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms because maintain the arms of these groups is more important than electoral legitimacy; 33% say that the newly elected government does indeed have the legitimacy to do so.  Regardless of the policy of a newly elected government on the armed groups, two-thirds (67%) say that it would be wrong, and 26% say it would correct, to dissolve Gaza’s armed groups and collect their arms.  The belief that a new legitimate government can dissolve the Gazan armed groups is higher in the West Bank (34%) compared to the Gaza Strip (31%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (45% and 34% respectively) compared the religious (28%), among supporters of the peace process (38%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (26%), among supporters of Fatah (47%) compared to supporters of Hamas, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (24%, 28%, and 31% respectively).  

If new parties or movements were to be created to take part in the upcoming elections, 13% of the participants say that while they have not yet made up their mind, they will be willing to consider supporting a new party or movement. Also, 12% of committed voters are willing to shift support to a new party or movement. Nonetheless, the largest percentage of participating voters says they will not shift vote to a new party or movement. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority (79%) encourages, and 18% discourage, the participation of independent youth lists in the upcoming elections.

The top priority that should be the aim of the upcoming elections is the unification the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the eyes of 36% of the public while 18% think it is the improvement of economic conditions, 17% say the ending of Gazan blockade and siege, 13% say fighting corruption, 7% say creating a democratic political system, and 6% say strengthening the resistance to occupation and settlements.  The largest percentage (32%) believes that Fatah is the most able of all factions to succeed in realizing the top priority it has selected; 24% say Hamas is the most able, and 20% believe that none of the existing or newly created factions will be able to succeed in achieving the top priority they have selected.

(2) Presidential elections:

• 61% want Abbas to resign and only 37% are satisfied with his performance  
• Only 31% believe Abbas is the right presidential candidate for Fatah
• In a presidential election, Abbas receives 49% of the vote and Haniyyeh receives 44%
• Marwan Barghouti is the most popular: he receives 62% compared to Haniyyeh’s 34% of the popular vote

61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 49% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 59%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip). Only 31% think president Abbas is the best Fatah candidate for the presidency while 41% think that Fatah has better candidates; 29% say they do not know or have no opinion on the matter.  The belief that Abbas is the best Fatah candidate is higher in the West Bank (34%) c0mpared to the Gaza Strip (27%), among supporters of the peace process (40%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (18%), among supporters of Fatah (65%) compared to supporters of Hamas, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (7%, 21%, and 24% respectively).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 49% and the latter 44% of the vote (compared to 48% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the vote (compared to 39% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 57% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 58% (compared to 56% three months ago) and Haniyeh 34% (compared to 36% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 62% and Haniyeh 34%.  We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 21% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (2% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 5%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 4% each. 

(3) Blocking websites, the justice system, the electricity crisis, the American field hospital, the Shtayyeh government, and other domestic conditions:

• 60% of the public reject the decision of the Palestinian Attorney General to block some media website and 53% demand his resignation
• 54% say they are not likely to receive a fair trial in a Palestinian court and 55% think the Palestinian judiciary rules in accordance with whims and interests
• 61% are in favor of exempting refugee camps from paying the electricity bills and want the PA to cover the cost
• 36% support the building of the American field hospital along the Gaza borders with Israel
• 31% are interested in emigrating from the Gaza Strip and 20% from the West Bank
• The overwhelming majority supports the government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years

A majority of 60% of the public views the decision by the attorney general to ask the court to block access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites as an imposition of restrictions on free speech, a right guaranteed by the Basic Law; but 33% think the decision to do so is correct as it seeks to implement the law. In light of his decision to block more than 50 media websites, 53% think the attorney general should not stay in his position because he apparently does not believe in free speech. But 38% think that he should stay in his position because he simply implemented the law.  The belief that blocking access to the sites is an imposition of restrictions on free speech is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (58%), among men (64%) compared to women (56%), among the youth, between 18 and 22 years (65%) compared to those whose age is over 49 years (61%), among those who work in the public sector (63%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (57%), among the unmarried (66%) compared to the married (59%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (73%) compared to those who support the peace process (51%), among supporters of Hamas, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (67%, 63%, and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (47%).

A majority of 54% (59% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 39% (34% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial. A majority of 55% (60% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary is rules according to whims and interests; 42% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law.

In light of the current electricity crisis in central West Bank, 61% think that refugee camps should be exempted from paying their electricity bill and the PA should cover the cost; 35% disagree and think that refugee camps should pay their bills like everybody else. If refugee camps are indeed exempted from paying for their electricity, 89% want the PA to cover the cost while only 5% think that other paying customers should cover the cost.

The largest percentage (36%) says that it supports, and 32% say they oppose, the construction of the American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel; 28% say they have not heard about it. Support for the construction of the hospital is higher in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (26%), in refugee camps and cities (46% and 40% respectively) compared to villages/towns (13%), among men (41%) compared to women (31%), among those  whose income is much lower the average income (43%) compared to those whose income is much higher the average income (33%), among the religious (40%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (34% each), among those who are opposed to the peace process (51%) compared to those who support the peace process (30%), among supporters of Hamas (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah, third parties, and those who will not participate in the election (23%, 34%, and 28% respectively).

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 60%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 63% and in the West Bank at 52%. 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 31% and declines in the West Bank to 20%.

Only 35% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 62% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 51% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 46% say they cannot. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 67%. The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 50% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 45% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than eight months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (49%), the economy (39%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (53%), the preparation to hold general elections (47%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (51%). But a percentage ranging between 24% and 45% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 12% and 24% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a slight improvement in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings three months ago.  Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 58% expects failure; only 33% expects success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a plurality of 48% expects failure and 44% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 55% expects failure and 37% expects success.

An overwhelming majority of 77% supports, and 22% oppose, the government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years. 

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (15%), Palestine TV and Maan TV (13% each), Palestine Today TV (9%), al Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (4% each).  

(4) Reconciliation, Hamas and Islamic Jihad: 

• 59% are pessimistic about the prospects for reconciliation but 44% think the holding of new elections might contribute to reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• 46% believe that chances for a Hamas-Israel long term cessation of violence or hudna is medium or high
• 39% believe that Hamas should have participated in the rocket exchange against Israel in the latest wave of violence in the Gaza Strip

36% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at only 30%.  44% are optimistic, and 51% are not optimistic, that the upcoming legislative elections will contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  An overwhelming majority (78%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 20% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government.

A majority of 52% (down to 44% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 10% believe the chances are high.  Given Hamas’ position during the latest round of fire exchange in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Islamic Jihad, the largest percentage, standing at 39%, believes that Hamas should have participated in the exchange of rocket fire against Israel while 32% think Hamas made the correct decision by not participating, and 16% think that Hamas did in fact participate. The percentage of those who think Hamas’ decision was the right one is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (23%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to villages/towns and cities (21% and 33% respectively), among those youth whose 18 and 22 years (39%) compared to those whose age is over 49 years (30%), among those who work in the public sector (42%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (29%), among those whose income is much lower than the average income (50%) compared to those whose income is much higher than the average income (27%), among the religious (38%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (29% and 30% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (44%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (27%), and among supporters of Hamas (56%) compared to supporters of Fatah, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (22%, 29%, and 28% respectively).

 (5) US declaration of settlements’ legality, the Trump peace plan, and Trump impeachment:

• Two thirds believe the US decision declaring Israeli settlements legal under international law will destroy the two-state solution and three quarters believe it will lead to an Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories
• 85% believe the Trump peace plan will not end the Israeli occupation and allows the annexation of Palestinian territories
• About three quarters reject the Trump peace plan regardless of its content
• 69% oppose the resumption of Palestinian-American dialogue and 60% expect Trump to lose the upcoming American presidential elections

66% view the US declaration of the legality of Israeli settlements according to international law as destructive to the two-state solution while 18% think it will have no impact and 10% think that it will in fact strengthen the two-state solution.  Similarly, 57% view the same decision as have a weakening impact on the one-state solution while 23% think it will have no impact and 9% think it will in fact strengthen the one-state solution.

Almost three quarters (74%) think the US decision will lead to an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley, while 20% think it will have no such impact

We asked the public if Palestinian acceptance of the Trump peace plan would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 85% say no; only 10% say yes it would.  When asked if the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 75% of the public says it does and only 21% say it does not.  We asked the public what should the Palestinian leadership do about the US peace plan: 74% indicate that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 16% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 6% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo. Three months ago, 69% said the PA should reject the plan out of hand. 

A majority of 69% is opposed and 19% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. A majority of 60% expects US president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 53% expect the US Congress to succeed in impeaching him.

(6) The peace process:

• 42% support the two-state solution but 61% view it as unfeasible due to Israeli settlement expansion
• To end the occupation, 47% view armed struggle as the most effective means, but 26% select negotiations and 20% select non-violent resistance

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 42% and opposition at 55%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 42%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 54% believe that the majority opposes it. A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 35% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 24% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 29% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 15% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 32% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 37% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the largest group (47%) chose armed struggle, 26% negotiations, and 20% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 60% support popular non-violent resistance; 52% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 28% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 40% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.

A majority of 58% expects the indictment of Netanyahu in corruption charges to his ouster from leadership in Israel soon while 34% expect him to succeed in staying in power despite the indictment.

(7) Arab uprisings, Turkish incursion into Syria, and visit of Saudi football team:

• The majority looks positively as the uprisings in the Arab world today but the majority is opposed to spreading it to Palestine
• 63% encourage Arab visits, such as the visit of the Saudi football team to Palestine

57% of the public are in favor and 37% are not in favor of the current uprisings in the Arab world, in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.  Moreover, 63% reject, and 26% accept, Hizbollah’s position which is opposed to the Lebanese uprising. But 65% do not expect, and only 31% expect, these uprisings to spread to Palestine. Similarly, 65% do not wish to see these uprisings spreading to the West Bank and a little more (70%) do not wish to see them spreading to the Gaza Strip.  Support for the spread of the uprisings to the areas of the West Bank is higher in the Gaza Strip (45%) compared to West Bank (22%), in refugee camps and cities (40% and 33% respectively) compared to villages/towns (19%), among men (34%) compared to women (28%), among the youth whose age is between 18 and 22 years (33%) compared to those whose age is over 49 years (28%), among those whose income is much lower than the average income (39%) compared to those whose income is much higher than the average income (32%), among the religious (35%) compared to the somewhat religious (28%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (44%) compared to those who support the peace process (26%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (43% and 35% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah and those who will not participate in the elections (25% and 26% respectively).

On the other hand, support for the spread of the Arab uprisings to the Gaza Strip is higher among Gazans (32%) compared to West Bankers (22%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to villages/towns and cities (16% and 27% respectively), among men (29%) compared to women (23%), among those who work in the private  and the non-governmental sectors (30%) compared to those who work in the public sector (25%), among the unmarried (32%) compared to the married (26%), and among supporters of Fatah (32%) compared to supporters of Hamas, third parties, and those who will not participate in the elections (20%, 26%, and 23% respectively).

A majority of 51% (60% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) views the Turkish incursion into the northern border area of Syria as unacceptable aggression while 40% (31% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) view it as a legitimate temporary incursion.

A majority of 63% say that visits from Arab countries, such as that of the Saudi football team, should be encouraged while 34% say such visits should not be encouraged.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that that the top Palestinian goal should be ending the 1967 occupation and building a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• The continuation of the Israeli occupation is seen by 28% as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment and the spread of corruption in public institutions (26% each); 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

 (A) Reactions to the Israeli operation in Gaza and the recognition by the UN of the Palestinian state as a non-member state