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Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (39) 

While youth revolts in the Arab World pose a threat to Hamas and its government in the Gaza Strip, al Jazeera leaks of PLO documents recording Palestinian-Israeli negotiations pose a threat to Fateh and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and the US use of its veto power against the UNSC resolution denouncing Israeli settlements destroys much of American credibility in the peace process 

17-19 March 2011    

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-19 March 2011. The poll was conducted during a period of turmoil and revolt in the Arab World leading to regime change in Egypt and Tunisia. Moreover, the Palestinian areas witnessed demonstrations demanding end of the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Before that, al Jazeera satellite TV news station released leaked Palestinian documents pertaining to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. These documents were leaked from the PLO negotiations department. During the same period, the US used its veto power to block a UNSC resolution condemning Israeli settlements’ activities. In the settlement of Itamar, near Nablus, a family of five was killed. This press release covers issues related to the events in the Arab World, the leaks on al Jazeera, Palestinian domestic conditions, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the future of reconciliation and reunification, the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the most serious problems confronting Palestinians today, the peace process and the impact of the Arab youth demonstrations on it, and the Itamar attack. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2010 highlight a number of internal developments that came in response to external events. Three of the most significant events of the period under consideration were the publication of PLO documents related to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the eruption of youth demonstrations in the Arab World demanding regime change in their countries, and the US use of its veto power to block a settlements' related UNSC resolution.  Palestinians were affected differently by these events. For example, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leadership were negatively affected by al Jazeera leaks as findings show a decrease in support for Fateh and a similar decrease in the level of satisfaction with the performance of president Mahmud Abbas. Several factors led to this outcome: al Jazeera remains the most watched TV news station in the Palestinian areas and the most credible one. While the PA leadership in the West Bank defended itself by accusing al Jazeera of conspiring against it, a large majority of Palestinians believed that al Jazeera goal was to seek the truth and not to conspire against the PA. Moreover, in responding to the leaks, the PA’s case remained unconvincing in the eyes of a large majority of Palestinians. Above all else, and based on the leaks, half of the public concluded that the PA’s negotiating position was not committed to the vital goals and interests of the Palestinian people.

By contrast, the events in the Arab World and particularly the youth demonstrations seem to pose a threat to Hamas in the Gaza Strip rather than to Fateh in the West Bank. For example, findings show that two thirds of Gazans believe that there is a need for demonstrations in the Gaza Strip demanding regime change in the Strip. More seriously for Hamas, half of Gazans indicate that they might participate in such demonstrations. In the West Bank, the picture is different: only one third believes there is a need to demonstrate and demand West Bank regime change and only one quarter indicate willingness to participate in such demonstrations. Findings also show that if demonstrations were to erupt in the Gaza Strip, demands and slogans will focus not only on ending the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, but also on the absence of freedoms. By contrast, if demonstrations erupt in the West Bank, demands and slogans will focus on the two issues of ending the split and ending occupation.  It is worth noting that findings show that the Palestinian public expects the developments in the Arab World to have a positive impact on the prospects for opening the Rafah crossing with Egypt on permanent basis. But a large majority does not expect Palestinian demonstrations similar to those in the Arab World would lead to end of occupation or end of settlement activities.

Finally, findings show that the US use of its veto power to block UNSC resolution condemning settlement activities has dealt a severe blow to Palestinian public readiness to accept a large US role in the peace process. The poll found that the percentage of those in favor of such US role has decreased considerably to a small minority; in previous surveys, large majority favored a greater US intervention in the peace process.

(1) Youth demonstrations in the Arab World and in Palestine:

• 92% sympathize with demonstrators in the Arab World and two thirds expect this development to have a positive impact on Palestinian conditions
• 36% of West Bankers support West Bank demonstrations to change the regime and 24% are ready to participate in such demonstrations
• 67% of Gazans support demonstrations in the Gaza Strip that would seek to charge the regime and 50% are ready to participate in these demonstrations
• 51% prefer the slogan that calls for "people want to end the split" and 24% favor "people want to end the occupation"

An overwhelming majority of 92% sympathizes with the demonstrators in Arab countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen; 7% do not sympathize with Arab demonstrators. 41% believe that the first basic demand of the demonstrators in Egypt is to end the state of poverty and unemployment, 38% believe it is freedom from oppression of the ruling regime, 11% believe it is to end corruption, 5% believe it is to replace the Egyptian regime with an Islamist one, and 3% believe the demonstrators want to express opposition to Egypt’s pro Western policies.  About two thirds (64%) expect the developments in the Arab World to have a positive impact on Palestinian conditions, 17% believe they will have a negative impact, and 15% believe they will have no impact.

Two thirds (66%) expect the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt to lead to permanent opening of the Rafah international crossing with Egypt and 27% do not expect that. But a majority of 54% believes the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years will not change as a result of the developments in the Arab World, 21% believe such chances will increase and 23% believe the chances will decrease.

47% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe that there is a need for similar demonstrations in the West Bank demanding regime change and 50% believe no need exists. The percentage of the belief that there is a need for demonstrations in the West Bank similar to those in the Arab World increases in the Gaza Strip (64%) compared to only 36% in the West Bank, among the youth, 18-27 years old, (54%) compared to those over 47 years old (41%), among supporters of Hamas (72%) compared to supporters of Fateh (28%), among supporters of other parties  and those who do not wish to participate in future elections (46% each), and among the those who define themselves as religious (52%) compared to those who define themselves as "somewhat religious" (41%).

By contrast, 52% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe there is a need for similar demonstrations in the Gaza Stripdemanding regime change in that area and 40% believe no need exists. The percentage of the belief that there is a need for demonstrations in the Gaza Strip similar to those in the Arab World increases in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among the youth, 18-27 years old (62%) compared to those over 47 years old (38%), among supporters of Fateh (71%) and supporters of third parties (70%), nonaffiliated (50%), those who do not wish to participate in future elections (46%) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%), and among supporters of the peace process (57%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (37%), and among those who are "somewhat religious" (57%) compared to those who are "religious" (45%).

When asked about their possible participation in such regime-change demonstrations in their respective areas, major differences emerged between West Bankers and Gazans: while 50% of Gazans are ready to participate in demonstrations to demand regime change in the Gaza Strip, only 24% of West Bankers are ready to participate in demonstrations demanding regime change in PA in the West Bank. In the West Bank, the desire to participate in demonstrations to change the regime in the West Bank increases among the youth, 18-27 years old (34%) compared to those over 47 years old (17%). In the Gaza Strip, the desire to participate in demonstrations demanding regime change in the Gaza Strip increases among the youth, 18-27 years old (61%) compared to those over 47 years old (25%).

When asked about the most preferred slogan to raise in Palestinian demonstrations, a majority of 51% opted for “people want to end the split,” followed by “people want to end occupation” (24%), and “people want to end corruption” (14%). Four other slogans received 2% each: “people want to end negotiations,” “people want to end Oslo,” “people want an end to security coordination,” and “people want to return to the intifada.” In the West Bank, the slogan "people want to end the occupation" (29%) comes second to ending the split (46%).

(2) Al Jazeera Publishes leaked PLO negotiations’ documents:

• 79% believe all or some of what al Jazeera has leaked regarding Palestinian-Israeli negotiations; only 19% believe none of it
• 49% believe Palestinian negotiators had not been committed to the goals and interests of the Palestinian people and 44% believe they had been
• 59% are convinced that in releasing the documents, al Jazeera sought to uncover the truth and 62% are not convinced by the PA's response to al Jazeera leaks

78% say they have seen or heard, on al Jazeera or other media outlets, about leaked documents published by al Jazeera news TV channel. 79% believe in the truthfulness of all or some of what has been published by al Jazeera regarding concessions made by Palestinian negotiators and 19% do not believe any of it.  About half (49%) believes that the Palestinian negotiating position, as revealed by al Jazeera, was not committed to vital Palestinian goals and interests and 44% believe it has been committed to vital goals and interests. The belief that the PA was committed to vital Palestinian interests and goals increases in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (41%), among supporters of Fateh (78%) compared to supporters of Hamas (13%) as well as supporters of third parties (40%) the nonaffiliated and those who will not participate in future elections (36% and 35% ), and among the "somewhat religious" (49%) compared to the "religious" (38%), and among students (61%) compared to laborers and merchants (37% and 27% respectively), and among those working in the public sector (51%) compared to those working in the private sector (36%).

A majority of 59% believes that the goal of al Jazeera in publishing the leaked documents was to uncover the truth, but 36% believe the aim was to conspire against the Palestinian leadership. Percentage of those who believe that the goal of al Jazeera was to uncover the truth increases in the West Bank (63%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among women (63%) compared to men (57%), among supporters of Hamas (95%) compared to supporters of Fateh (27%), among the "religious" (71%) compared to the "somewhat religious" (51%), and among those who work in the private sector (65%) compared to those who work in the public sector (49%).

A majority of 62% believes that the PA response to al Jazeera leaks of the negotiations’ documents was not convincing and 33% believe it was convincing. Percentage of those who believe that the PA response was not convincing increases in the West Bank (67%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among those whose age is over 47 years old (74%) compared to those between the ages of 18-27 (56%), and among supporters of Hamas and those who do not wish to participate in future elections, the nonaffiliated, and supporters of third parties (89%, 70%, 65%, and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (34%).

(3) Domestic Conditions

• 21% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 33% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good
• 70% believe there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank and 59% believe there is corruption in the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip
• 65% believe that there is, or there is to some extent, free press in the West Bank and the percentage regarding the Gaza Strip is 46%
• 33% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear and only 19% believe that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities there without fear
• Perception of personal safety and security stands at 54% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 31% and 39% for the Fayyad government; 23% say Haniyeh's government is the legitimate one and 25% say Fayyad's government is the legitimate one
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 46% and dissatisfaction at 51%

21% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 56% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, in December 2010, 17% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 62% said they were bad or very bad. By contrast, 33% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 33% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 35% and 31% respectively. 70% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 59% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. 65% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 31% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 46% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 42% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip.

33% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, only 19% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These findings reflect an improvement in the situation in the West Bank and lack of change in the Gaza Strip. Since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in June 2007, these percentages have witnessed gradual and significant decrease. As the table below shows, belief that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear stood at 56% while 52% believed that people can criticize the authorities without fear in the Gaza Strip.

Table: Gradual decrease in belief about the ability to criticize authorities in the West Bank or Gaza Strip since the spilt between the two areas

Perception of safety and security stands at 54% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip.  Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 31% and Salam Fayyad’s at 39%. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 36% and 43% respectively.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries stands at 37%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 21%.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 46% while 51% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. These percentages reflect a decrease in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the president, which stood at 50% three months ago while the level of dissatisfaction stood at 45%. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 39% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank. 23% say the government of Haniyeh is the legitimate Palestinian government and 25% say the Fayyad government is the legitimate one. 37% say both governments are illegitimate. These results indicate a decrease in the percentage of those who view the Fayyad government as legitimate.

(4) West Bank-Gaza Strip split and how to end it:

• A majority of 52% opposes and 43% support Fayyad's proposal to end the West Bank-Gaza Strip split
• A majority of 62% blames Fateh and Hamas together for the continuation of the split
• A decrease in the percentage of the belief that the spilt is permanent show a drop from 39% three months ago to 21% in this poll
• 43% believe that ending the split requires "regime change" in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• To end the split, 33% support, and 61% oppose, Abbas' acceptance of Hamas conditions for reconciliation even if this leads to the return of international boycott and sanctions
• By contrast, to end the split, 47% support and 46% oppose Hamas' acceptance of existing agreements with Israel

A majority of 52% opposes and 43% support Salam Fayyad’s proposal to end the West Bank-Gaza Strip split by an immediate unification of the two areas, the formation of a national unity government under the premiership of a prime minister acceptable to Fateh and Hamas, and the maintenance of the status quo regarding security conditions in the Gaza Strip (under Hamas’s control) and the West Bank (under Fateh). Support for the Fayyad proposal stands at 45% in the West Bank compared to39% in the Gaza Strip.  Fateh and Hamas together are responsible for the continuation of the split as seen by 62% of the public, but 15% blame Hamas alone and 15% blame Fateh alone. But when asked about the future of the split if Hamas won new presidential and parliamentary elections, 46% said it would be consolidated, but in a scenario in which Fateh would win such elections, only 25% said the split would, as a result, be consolidated.

After the events in Egypt and the cessation of the Egyptian role in Fateh-Hamas reconciliation, 21% believe that unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will resume soon, 50% believe unity will resume but only after a long time, and 21% believe that unity will never return. These results reflect a significant decrease in the percentage of those who believe that the split is permanent (which stood at 39% three months ago), perhaps due to the increased public and youth demonstrations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip demanding an end to the split.

In order to end the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 43% believe that the regimes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should fall, while 16% believe that ending the split requires the downfall of the regime in the Gaza Strip only, and 15% believe it requires the downfall of the regime in the West Bank only. 18% believe that ending the split does not require the downfall of either regime.

In order to end the split, 33% support and 61% oppose a proposal whereby president Abbas would accept Hamas conditions for unification even if such a step would lead to the return of international sanctions and boycott. Findings show that 69% view such a step by the president as posing a threat to their own interests and those of the Palestinian people. A majority of 52% believe the chances for the president to take such a step are small or very small while 42% believe chances are high or medium. Support for Abbas' acceptance of Hamas conditions as a way to end the split increases in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to the West Bank (31%), among those over 47 years old (38%) compared to those between the ages of 18-27 (32%), among supporters of Hamas (56%) compared to supporters of Fateh (23%), among those opposed to the peace process (52%) compared to those who support the peace process (29%), and among the "religious" (43%) compared to the "somewhat religious" (25%).

By contrast, a larger percentage (47%) supports and 46% oppose a different proposal whereby Hamas would end the spilt by accepting international conditions imposed after it won the elections back in 2006, including accepting peace agreements with Israel. The lesser opposition to this proposal than to the previous one seems to be due to the fact that a much lower percentage (43%) perceive such Hamas shift as a threat to their interests or to the interests of the Palestinian people. But as in the previous proposal, 53% believe the chances Hamas would take such an initiative are small or very small and only 41% believe the chances are high or medium.  Support for a Hamas initiative to accept agreements with Israel as the means to end the split increases in the West Bank (49%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), among men (50%) compared to women (46%), among those between the ages of 18-27 (49%) compared to those over 47 years old (40%), among supporters of Fateh (67%) compared to supporters of Hamas (25%), among supporters of the peace process (55%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (23%), and among the "somewhat religious" (52%) compared to the "religious" (39%).

(5) Presidency and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections were to take place today, Abbas would receive 55%, Haniyeh 38%; and if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter 31%
• For vice president, Marwan Barghouti receives 30% while 18% select Ismail Haniyeh, 14% select Salam Fayyad, and 11% select Mustafa Barghouti
• If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Fateh would receive 40%, Hamas 26%, all other lists combined 12%, and 22% are undecided
• 51% believe that Hamas is opposed to holding new parliamentary and presidential elections due to its perception that it cannot work freely and 37% believe it is fear of losing the elections

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 55% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 58%. These results are similar to those obtained in our pervious poll three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives in this poll 53% and Haniyeh 42% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 56% and Haniyeh 35%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter would receive 31% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 67%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36% and in the West Bank Barghouti receives 66% and Haniyeh 28%. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 30% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Salam Fayyad (14%) Mustafa Barghouti (11%) and Saeb Erekat (2%).  These percentages are similar to those obtained by PSR three months ago.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 26% say they would vote for Hamas and 40% say they would vote for Fateh, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago with the exception of the likely vote for Fateh which dropped by four percentage points. Vote for Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (21%) and among women (28%) compared to men (23%). Vote for Fateh is higher in the Gaza Strip (42%) than in the West Bank (39%), and among men (43%) compared to women (38%). Support for Hamas increases also among those over 38 years old reaching 32% and decreases among those between 18-27 years old to 20%. Fateh's popularity is higher among those between 18-27 years old (44%) compared to those over 38 years old (36%). Hamas is more popular among the "religious" (42%) compared to the "somewhat religious" (15%). Fateh is more popular among the "somewhat religious" (47%) compared to the "religious" (31%). Hamas is more popular among housewives and laborers (30% each) and less popular among students (18%). Fateh is more popular among employees and students (50% and 49% respectively) and less popular among laborers and retired persons (32% and 22% respectively).

46% believe that if presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held today, Fateh would win and only 16% believe Hamas would win while 22% believe other factions will win. 51% believe that the reason Hamas is opposed to holding parliamentary and presidential elections today is due to Hamas’ belief that it is not allowed to operate freely in the West Bank or because it believes such elections would not be fair or free, while 37% believe that the reason behind Hamas’ opposition to elections is fear of losing them.

(6) Local elections:

• 60% evaluate the performance of their local councils during the last five years as good or very good
• 51% believe that the upcoming local elections in July will be fair and 38% believe it will not be fair
• 47% believe that holding local elections in the West Bank will lead to the consolidation of the split; despite this, 61% of the West Bankers say they will participate in those elections

60% evaluate the performance of their local councils during the past five years as good or very good and 34% as bad or very bad.  51% believe that the upcoming July local elections will be fair and 38% believe they will not be fair.  47% believe the holding of local elections will consolidate the split and 20% believe it contributes positively to reconciliation while 28% believe that it will have no effect on reconciliation.  46% believe that Fateh will win the upcoming local elections, and 13% believe candidates from the left and independents will win the elections and 20% believe family candidates will be the winners.  61% of the West Bankers say they will participate in the local elections and 35% say they will not participate.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the first most vital goal for the Palestinian people should be to end the occupation and build an independent state; 27% say it should be to insure the right of return, 17% say it should be to build a pious or moral individual and society, and 10% say it should be to build a democratic political system
• 28% say the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment, another 28% say it is the absence of national unity due to the split, 22% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement expansion, 11% say it is corruption, and 8% say it is the blockade of the Gaza Strip

The largest percentage (45%) believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 27% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return for refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 17% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The largest percentage (38%) believes that the second most vital Palestinian goal should be to obtain the right of return for refuges to their 1948 towns and villages. 25% believe that the second goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, 22% believe that the second goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, and 15% believe the second most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while a similar percentage believes the most serious problem is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 22% believe the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 11% believe it to be the corruption in some public institutions, and 8% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(8) The peace process:

• A majority of 69% prefers to have the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, rather than the Gaza border crossings with Israel, open for movement of goods on permanent basis; 27% prefer the opposite
• 32% support and 63% oppose the attack in the Itamar settlement
• After the US veto in the UNSC, 69% oppose a large American role in the peace process
• 56% support and 41% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative
• 48% support and 50% oppose a Palestinian-Israeli mutual recognition of national identity
• In the absence of negotiations, 33% prefer going to the UNSC while 25% prefer return to armed confrontations, 18% prefer non violent peaceful confrontations, and 17% prefer dissolving the PA
• Palestinian attempt to go to the UNSC for recognition of statehood will be met by a US veto according to 75% of the public
• A unilateral declaration of statehood will change conditions for the better in the eyes of only 24%
• Peaceful popular revolution against occupation and settlements will succeed in ending occupation and stopping settlement expansion in the eyes of only 31%
• Two thirds believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or non existent
• 70% are worried that they or members of their families will be hurt at the hands of Israelis in their daily life or that their land will be confiscated or homes demolished
• 60% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to extend its state to the whole area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River and to expel its Palestinian population while 21% believe the goal is to annex the West Bank and to deny political rights to its population. Only 17% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to ensure its security and to withdraw from all or parts of the West Bank.

In the context of youth demonstrations in the Arab World and the possible opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, we asked respondents whether they prefer to have the Rafah crossing opened for the movement of goods on permanent basis even if that led to the closure of Israeli-Gazan crossings for goods. Findings show that a big majority of 69% prefers and 27% do not prefer to have the Rafah crossing with Egypt open for goods on permanent basis over the opening of the Israeli goods’ crossings with the Gaza Strip on permanent basis. The percentage of those preferring to have the Rafah crossing with Egypt open for goods on permanent basis stands in the West Bank at 73% compared to 63% in the Gaza Strip. The percentage increases among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fateh (61%), and among those opposed to the peace process (78%) compared to supporters of the peace process (67%).

We also asked about attitudes regarding the attack in the settlement of Itamar which took place just before the conduct of the poll and led to the death of a family of five. The poll found that 63% opposed the attack while 32% supported it. The percentage of support for the attack increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (20%), among those between the ages of 18-37 years old (37%) compared to those over 37 years old (26%), among supporters of Hamas (51%) compared to supporters of Fateh (23%), among those opposed to the peace process (46%) compared to supporters of the peace process (28%), among the “religious” (37%) compared to the “somewhat religious” (28%), and among students (35%) compared to laborers (26%).

Despite the relatively large majority-opposition to the Itamar attack, 45% believe that if peace negotiations do not resume and if armed confrontation between Palestinians and Israelis erupts, it will help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not; 49% do not share this view.

Findings show that in the aftermath of the US veto against the UNSC resolution condemning settlement activities, a majority of 58% opposes a return in the future to the UNSC for a similar resolution. Furthermore, a large majority of 69% expresses opposition to a larger US role in the peace process. In our August 2009 poll, a majority of 61% indicated support for a larger US role in the peace process.

A majority of 56% support and 41% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative which calls for Israeli withdrawal to the line of 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the resolution of the refugee problem based on UN resolution 194 in return for an Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of relations with it. Support for this initiative stood at 54% and opposition at 42% in our last poll in December 2010. Findings also show that 48% support and 50% oppose a mutual recognition of national identity with Palestinians recognizing Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis recognizing Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict have been settled and after a Palestinian state has been established. These figures are similar to those obtained in our last poll in December 2010. In light of the cessation of negotiations with Israel, the public is divided over the best means for ending occupation: 33% prefer to go to the UNSC to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state while 25% prefer return to confrontations and armed attacks against Israel, 18% prefer peaceful, non violent, confrontations, and 17% prefer the dissolution of the PA.

Yet, if the Palestinian side decides to go to the UNSC in order to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state, 75% believe that the US will veto such resolution. Moreover, if the Palestinian side is to unilaterally declare independent statehood around the end of 2011, 41% say current conditions in the Palestinian areas will not change while 24% say things will change for the better and 32% say things will change to the worst. If a peaceful popular revolution against occupation is to take place in the West Bank, emulating peaceful popular revolutions in Arab countries like Egypt and Tunisia, such a revolution will be able to end occupation and stop settlement expansion in the eyes of 31% while 66% say it will not be able to do so.  

Two thirds believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non existent while 32% believe them to be medium or high. Moreover findings show that an overwhelming majority of 70% is worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 30% say they are not worried. Percentage of worry stands at 72% in the Gaza Strip compared to 69% in the West Bank. When asked about their perception of Israel’s long term goals, the largest percentage (60%) indicated that it is to extend its state to the whole area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River and to expel its Palestinian population while 21% indicated that the goal is to annex the West Bank and to deny political rights to its population. Only 17% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to ensure its security and to withdraw from all or parts of the West Bank. We found little differences between West Bankers and Gazans in their assessment of Israel’s long term goals.....Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 25 June 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including several armed attacks by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel, the Israeli army incursions into Jenin’s refugee camp, and the killing of al Jazeera journalists Shireen Abu Akleh by Israeli gunfire in one of the Jenin incursions.  Other developments included the organization of the Flag March by the Israeli right wing inside the Old City of East Jerusalem without ending up in an armed confrontation between Hamas and Israel as many had expected. Internally, a student body associated with Hamas was able to win the majority of seats in the Birzeit University student council elections, President Abbas transferred control of the secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council, and assigned to the PLO Executive Committee member from Fatah, Hussien al Sheikh, the responsibilities of the Committee’s secretariate. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the second quarter of 2022 show a significant change in the domestic balance of power in favor of Hamas and its leadership only three months after Fatah had managed to restore some of the popularity it had lost in the aftermath of the April 2021 cancellation of the legislative and presidential elections, the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel, and the killing of the opposition figure Nizar Banat at the hands of the Palestinian security services.

Today, Hamas and Fatah enjoy almost the same level of public support, with the gap narrowing to one percentage point in favor of Hamas after it was six points in favor of Fatah in March 2022. It is noticeable that the drop in Fatah’s popularity has occurred in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, though the drop has been greater in the latter. Fatah’s declining popularity is evident in two other ways. For one, the gap in popularity between the head of Fatah, President Abbas, and the head of Hamas, Ismail Haniyyeh, has now reached 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh after it was only 16 points three months ago. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’ resignation, from the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), has risen to over three quarters while those still in favor of Abbas have dwindled in size to less than one fifth of the public. Another indicator of Fatah’s decline can be seen when looking at the widening gap between those who think Hamas is the more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to those who think “Fatah under Abbas” is more deserving than Hamas. Today, the gap stands at 10 percentage points in favor of Hamas compared to just two points in favor of Hamas three months ago.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the shift in the internal balance of power has been the rise of Hamas' role over the past few months in defending Jerusalem. Other reasons might have been the release by the PA of those Preventive Security men accused of killing Nizar Banat on bail, or because the vast majority of the public believes that the Palestinian government does not make an effort to mitigate the consequences of the rise in prices, or the objection of the majority of the public to President Abbas's internal decisions, such as the transfer of powers over the Secretariat of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council or the appointment  of PLO Executive Committee member Hussein al-Sheikh to serve as the head of the Secretariat of that Committee,.

In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results for the second quarter indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution.  The results show one of the likely reasons for the decline: a significant increase in the belief that a two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion, rising to 70%. But the findings also indicate a similar decline in support for a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, indicating a hardening of public attitudes similar to what we saw in mid-2021 in the aftermath of the Hamas-Israel war. Support for a return to an armed uprising is also rising to form a clear majority, reinforced by a broad support for the recent shootings inside Israel by individual Palestinians who did not belong to known forces and movements.  However, there are significant differences in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers, where the largest percentage of the latter remains opposed to armed attacks.

Increased Palestinian-Israeli clashes over the past three months may have contributed to this attitudinal shift regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, starting with the Israeli Flag March, the repeated incursions into the Jenin camp, the killing of the very well-known and liked Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, the crackdown by the Israeli police on the raising of the Palestinian flag, and the frequent confrontations between the Israeli police and the Palestinian worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque; all might have led to a hardening of the Palestinian public attitudes.

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of those viewing positively the recent "confidence-building" measures between the PA and Israel has risen to about two-thirds. Moreover, despite the rising tension over al Aqsa Mosque, the majority continues to view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a national conflict, over land and sovereignty, rather than a religious conflict. 

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 33% of the popular vote and the latter 55%
• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 61% and the latter 34%
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%; 77% demand the resignation of Abbas
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 36% of the popular vote and Fatah 35%
• 33% say Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people and only 23% say “Fatah under Abbas’ is more deserving

A majority of 71%  supports the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 54%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 49% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 55% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 31% and Haniyeh 50%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 47% and from among those, the former receives 26% and the latter 61%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (30%) selected him in an open-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (16%), Mohammad Dahlan (6%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%), and 34% said they do not know or have not decided. It is worth noting that this is the first time that al Sheikh’s name has been mentioned by the respondents in an open-ended question. This means that we will continue to ask about his standing as a successor in the next four quarterly poll. In an closed ended questions about succession, Marwan Barghouti is preferred by 39%, Haniyyeh by 19%, Dahlan by 6%, Sinwar by 5%, Khalid Mishal by 2%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 1% each. Al Sheikh’s name was not among those listed in the closed ended question.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 73% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 72% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 69% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 7% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 37% (compared to 47% three months ago).

The largest percentage (33%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 38% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 31% selected Hamas, 29% Fatah under Abbas, and 33% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• 57% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the PLC’s secretariate to the Speaker of PLO National Council; 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to appoint Hussein al Sheikh as the Secretary General of the PLO Executive Committee
• 59% believe the electoral  victory of Hamas’ student body at Birzeit University is an expression of protest against the performance of the PA
• 79% say the PA is not doing enough to mitigate the consequences of high prices
• 26% want to emigrate from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• 86% believe there is corruption in the PA
• 59% believe the PA has now become a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset
• Only one quarter is optimistic about the future of reconciliation
• A large majority does not expect the Shtayyeh government to succeed in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the holding of general elections, or the improvement of economic conditions

A majority of 57% is opposed to President Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the Secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council; only 27% support Abbas’ decision.  The opposition the president’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (54%), among the holders of BA degree (64%) compared to the illiterates (36%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 83% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (36%).

Similarly, a majority of 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to ask the PLO’s Executive Committee member from Fatah, Husein al Sheikh, to assume the responsibility over the secretariate of that Committee; only 23% support Abbas’ decision.

In explaining the reasons for the electoral victory of the Hamas-affiliated student body at Birzeit University, the majority (59%) attributed it to students’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the PA while about one third (32%) said the victory came as a result in a shift in public opinion in favor of Hamas. The belief that there is a shift in public attitudes in favor of Hamas is higher in the Gaza strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (26%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (37%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (33%), among refugees (36%) compared to non-refugees (29%), among merchants and students (47% and 40% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (25% and 32% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (38%) compared to those who work in the private sector (32%), among the lowest income group (38%) compared to the highest income group (34%), among the religious (40%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (27% and 17% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (61%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (22% and 16% respectively).

The majority (57%) of the public says it was supportive of the teachers’ strike who were demanding better representational and associational rights from the government and led to a partial halt to the educational process in public schools; 31% say they were opposed. Support for the strike is higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 63% and 48% respectively.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 48%. The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 18% say it is doing so.

26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 27% and in the West Bank at 26%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 37% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

42% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 54% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 38% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 62% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 55% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.

26% are optimistic and 70% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 28%.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 73% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 23% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 75% expects failure and 19% expects success.

The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 41%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (11% each), Palestine TV (10%), Maan (6%), al Arabiya (3%), al Mayadeen (2%), and al Manar (1%). 

(3) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the two-state solution declines from 40% to 28%
• Support for the one-state with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis declines from 32% to 22%
• 55% support a return to confrontations and armed intifada and 47% support dissolving the PA
• 59% view armed attacks against Israelis inside Israel as serving the national interest in ending the occupation and 56% support these attacks
• 65% view positively Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures
• 78% think the versus of the Quran contain a prophecy regarding the demise of the state of Israel; but 63% do not believe that this demise will take place in the year 2022
• A semi consensus that the killing of the journalist Shireen Abu Akleh was a deliberate assassination
• A majority of 53% believes the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains national, over land and sovereignty and 45% believe it has become a religious conflict   
• Half of the public welcomes the resumption of US aid to the PA

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 69%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  A majority of 70% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 60% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 32%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 48% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 51% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

A majority of 59% says that the armed attack inside Israel carried out by Palestinians unaffiliated with known armed groups contributes to the national interest of ending the occupation; 37% believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest. The belief that armed attacks contribute to the national interest is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (46%), in cities and refugee camps (59% respectively) compared to villages/towns (50%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (69%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or older (57%), among refugees (68%) compared to non-refugees (51%), among students (66%) compared to professionals (51%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in  the private sector (55%), among the lowest income group (71%) compared to the highest income group (55%), and among supporters of Hamas (86%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third powers (51% and 55% respectively).

Similarly, a majority of 56% (73% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) supports armed attacks similar to those carried out lately by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel; 39% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) say they are opposed to such armed attacks.

A majority of 56% expects the acts of armed resistance in the Jenin refugee camp to spread to other parts of the West Bank. However, a large minority of 41% expects the acts of armed resistance to remain restricted to the Jenin camp.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 65% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 63% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 50% chose armed struggle (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank), 22% negotiations, and 21% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 25% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 69% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

65% are opposed, and 29% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  

The vast majority (78%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 17% say it does not.  However, the majority (63%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 25% say they believe it.

When asked why they think Hamas did not launch rockets against Israel on the day of the Flag March throughout East Jerusalem, the largest percentage (35%) said that the movement did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for; one third said that Hamas was willing to comply with the advice and mediation of Arab and international actors. Only 13% said it was afraid of the Israeli reaction against it and the Gaza Strip. One tenth (11%) said that Hamas did not threaten to launch rockets against Israel if he Flag March took place in the Old City of East Jerusalem. The belief that Hamas did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (28%), in refugee camps (43%) compared to villages and cities (30% and 35% respectively), among women (37%) compared to men (33%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (44%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (31%), among the holders of BA degree (38%) compared to the illiterates (19%), among students (39%) compared to employees and laborers (33% each), among the lowest income group (44%) compared to the highest income group (29%), among the religious (37%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (34% and 28% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (48%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (28% and 31% respectively).

The largest percentage (40%) believes that Hamas’ unwillingness to launch rockets against Israel during the Flag March will encourage Israeli to take more measures against Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque. By contrast, 26% said that Hamas’ decision will deter Israel in the future, and 28% said it will neither encourage nor deter Israel.

A consensus is emerging regarding the killing of the al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh: 92% believe Israel has deliberately sought to kill her while only 5% think the killing by the Israeli army was accidental.

A majority of 61% believes that the reasons the Israeli police attacked the funeral procession of Abu Akleh in Jerusalem had to do with the fac that the funeral demonstrated the unity of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. On the other hand, one third thinks that the police attack was prompted by the raising of the Palestinian flag during the funeral.

When asked why Israel insists on preventing the raising of the Palestinian flag in Jerusalem and other occupied territories and in areas inside Israel, the public was split evenly, 49% said the reason has to do with Israeli rejection of the Palestinian national identity while an identical percentage said it has to do with Israeli fear of the Palestinian national identity.

A majority of 53% (56% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) says that despite the repeated incidents of attacks by the Israeli police against Palestinian worshipers at al Aqsa Mosque, the conflict remains first and foremost over land and sovereignty while 45% say the conflict has now become first and foremost a religious one. The percentage of those who believe the conflict has now become religious is higher in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (41%), in cities and refugee camps (46% and 45% respectively) compared to villages/towns (39%), among the illiterates (58%) compared to the holders of BA degree (45%), among those who work in the private sector (50%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), among the highest income group (51%) compared to  the lowest income group (43%), among the religious (50%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (42% and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (58%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 41% respectively). 

We asked the public about the expectations that the US aid to the PA will soon resume and asked if they welcome or do not welcome aid resumption. The public is evenly split on US aid: 48% welcome it and 49% do not. It is worth noting that Gazans are more likely to welcome US aid, by 59%, while the percentage drops to 40% in the West Bank.  The percentage of those welcoming the resumption of US aid is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in cities and refugee camps (49%) compared to villages/towns (41%), among refugees (53%) compared to non-refugees (44%), among employees and professionals (57% and 55% respectively) compared to farmers and merchants (33% and 36%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), among the highest income group (57%) compared to the lowest income group (52%), and among supporters of Fatah (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (44% and 48% respectively). 

(4) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• 42% blame Russia for starting the war in Ukraine and 35% blame the Ukraine
• Three quarters want the PA to remain neutral in the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine

The largest percentage of the public (42%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 35% blame Ukraine. An overwhelming majority (75%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 6% think it should stand with Ukraine. A majority of 43% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 53% are not worried. Three months ago, the percentage of those expressing worry that the war would expand stood at 54%.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe the ending of occupation to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state should be the top priority of the Palestinian people
• Unemployment and poverty followed by corruption are the two most important problems confronting the Palestinian society today; but the largest percentage (32%) view the ending of the Israeli occupation as the most urgent problem.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 9% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 26% (29% in the Gaz Strip and 23% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; 25% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 17% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 12% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 13% (17% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 23% said it is corruption, 17% said it is unemployment, 16% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (43)

With a majority objecting to return to negotiations without an Israeli acceptance of Palestinian conditions, and while a majority reaches the conclusion that the two state solution is no longer viable, domestic conditions - such as the financial crisis, the electricity crisis, and the failure of reconciliation - contribute to internal frustration and weaken the standing of PA leadership and all Palestinian factions

15-17 March 2012 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-17 March 2012. This poll was conducted immediately after a ceasefire went into effect in the Gaza Strip after more than 20 people were killed in Israeli missile attacks that came in response to rocket attacks launched from Gaza by resistance forces in retaliation for an Israeli assassination of the top commander of the Popular Resistance Committees. The period preceding the poll also witnessed talks by the Fayyad government about increasing taxes. It also witnessed the signing of the Doha agreement between Khalid Mish'al and Mahmud Abbas for the formation of a reconciliation government to be headed by Abbas. Ismail Haniyeh declared from Cairo his support for the Syrian revolt in what seemed to be the first statement by a Hamas leader on the subject. Security conditions in the West Bank somewhat deteriorated as a result of settlers' attacks or due to Israeli measures, such as setting more checkpoints, that came in response to the escalation in the Gaza Strip.  This poll covers Palestinian attitudes regarding the PA financial crisis, the Doha Agreement, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The first quarter of 2012 brings bad news to the governments of Fayyad and Haniyeh, to Fateh and Hamas, and to president Abbas. Findings show a significant drop in the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government, particularly in the West Bank. The drop is probably due to anticipated fallout from the PA's financial crisis and in response to government talk about a tax increase and/or a reduction in the size of the public sector, two measures clearly rejected, as findings show, by a majority of respondents. The financial crisis, the slowdown in the UN bid, and pessimism about the chances for reconciliation might also be some of the factors behind the decline in the popularity of Fateh and the dissatisfaction with Abbas, especially in the West Bank.

Findings also indicate a significant decline in the popularity of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and a decrease in the positive evaluation of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, probably due to Hamas' behavior, standing on the sideline, during Gaza's rocket war with Israel and due to the prevailing pessimism about the chances for reconciliation, particularly given the outspoken criticism of the Doha agreement by some of Hamas' Gaza leaders at a time when the agreement receives massive public support from all sectors of the public. Perhaps the only positive sign for Hamas is the significant increase in the popularity of Ismail Haniyeh in the West Bank, which might have come as a result of his visibility lately during his travels to Arab and Islamic countries and as a result of his public support for the popular revolt in Syria, a revolt that receives the overwhelming support of the Palestinian public. It is worth noting in this context that a majority of the public does not believe that Hamas supports the Syrian revolt or simply does not know Hamas' real position regarding that revolt.

Findings also show that a majority of the public is opposed to the resumption of exploratory talks with Israel and almost half of the Palestinians believe that Abbas made a mistake by taking part few months ago in such talks in Amman. When asked about the viability of the two-state solution, a clear majority expressed the belief that settlement expansion has made such a solution unworkable. But when asked about abandoning it in favor of a one state solution, a clear majority opposed such a shift.

(1) PA's Financial Crisis:

• To solve PA's financial crisis, 29% support forcing early retirement in the public sector, 9% support increasing income tax, 11% support both adopting both measures, and 48% oppose both solutions.
• In searching for alternative solutions to the financial crisis, 52% support returning to peace negotiations as the means to obtain international financial support while 27% support dissolving the PA. 
• A majority of 60% believe that the PA is capable of surviving for a period between 3 to 10 years or longer

We asked the public about its view on how to deal with the financial crisis facing the PA, a crisis that might constrain its ability to pay salaries: 48% opposed solving PA's financial deficit by increasing taxes or forcing some public sector employees to take early retirement. Only 9% came in favor of a tax increase and 29% came in favor of the early retirement solution. 11% favored adopting options, the tax increase and the early retirement. Support for early retirement  increases among holders of BA degree (35%) compared to illiterates (14%), among farmers and students (56% and 35% respectively) compared to retirees and housewives (12% and 25% respectively), and among Hamas supporters (34%) compared to Fateh supporters (28%).

When we asked the public for alternative solutions to the financial crisis, other than the tax increase and the early retirement, a majority of 52% selected the option of returning to negotiations with Israel in order to obtain greater international financial support while 27% selected the option of dissolving the PA altogether. 21% selected various other options or could not come up with any. It is worth noting that about half of those who favor return to negotiations oppose unconditional return that does not insure an Israeli settlement freeze and an acceptance of the 1967 borders. Support for dissolving the PA increases among the youth between the ages of 18-28 (31%) compared to those over the age of 50 (20%), among graduates of colleges (31%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (7% and 21% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (46%) compared to those who support the peace process (22%), among those who work in the private sector (30%) compared to those who work in the public sector (25%), among supporters of Hamas (38%) compared to supporters of Fateh (17%).

When we asked the public about its expectations regarding the ability of the PA to survive for long given the current financial crisis, the continuation of occupation and settlement construction, and the suspension of peace negotiations, about one third (34%) said it can survive for ten or more years, 26% said it can survive for three to ten years, 14% said it can survive for a year or two, and 16% said it can survive for a year or less.

(2) The Doha Agreement and Reconciliation: 

• 84% support and 12% oppose the Doha Agreement, but only 46% believe that reconciliation will succeed and 49% believe it will not succeed.
• 62% want the reconciliation government, when established, to follow the peace policies of Abbas and 20% want it to follow Hamas' policies regarding the peace process.
• A majority of 57% expects international sanctions and suspension of financial aid to follow the formation of the reconciliation government.
• 69% welcome the Qatari role in reconciliation and other internal Palestinian matters.

An overwhelming majority of 84% supports the Doha Agreement signed by Mahmud Abbas and Khalid Mish'al and calling for the formation of a reconciliation government to be headed by Abbas and to be tasked with conducting elections and starting Gaza reconstruction. 12% oppose the agreement.  Findings show that 93% of Fateh supporters and 81% of Hamas supporters are in favor of the Doha Agreement. But the public is split over the chances for reconciliation in the aftermath of the Doha Agreement with 46% expecting the two sides to succeed in implementing the agreement and 49% expecting them to fail. Worse yet, only 16% believe that a reconciliation government will be formed within weeks while 46% believe it will be formed after a long time and 31% believe that it will never be formed. Moreover, only 30% believe that Gaza and West Bank parliamentary and presidential elections will take place as scheduled in May or a little after that, 57% believe they will not take place, and 13% do not know. It is worth mentioning that three months ago 43% believed that elections will indeed take place on schedule or a little after that. Optimism about the chances for reconciliation increases among women (51%) compared to men (40%), among illiterates (55%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (43%), among the religious (51%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among supporters of the peace process (49%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (38%), among farmers and housewives (62% and 51% respectively) compared to business men, professionals and employees (33%, 33%, and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh and Hamas (51% and 48%) compared to supporters of third parties and those who do not intend to participate in new elections (33% and 40% respectively).

If a reconciliation government, headed by Abbas, is established, 57% expect, and 35% do not expect, the return of international boycott, financial sanctions and aid cuts.  Perhaps this is why a majority of 62% believe that a new reconciliation government should abide by the peace policy of Abbas and the PLO while only 20% believe it should abide by the peace policy of Hamas. Belief that a new reconciliation agreement should follow the peace policies of Abbas and the PLO increases among men (67%) compared to women (57%), among graduates of colleges and holders of BA degree (66% and 64% respectively) compared to illiterates (42%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (67%) compared to the religious (54%), among supporters of the peace process (69%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (46%), among farmers and professionals (75% and 70% respectively) compared to housewives (55%), and among supporters of Fateh (91%) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%).

Half of the public (49%) believes that internal disagreements between Hamas leaders regarding the Doha agreement and the appointment of Abbas as prime minister for the reconciliation government are major and fundamental disagreements while 43% believe they are minor and marginal. In the context of the role played by Qatar in facilitating the Doha Agreement, a large majority of 69% welcomes, and 27% do not welcome, a Qatari role in Palestinian affairs.   Findings also show that if parliamentary and presidential elections were to take place now, 40% expect Fateh to win and 23% expect Hamas to win. The rest expects others to win or does not know.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• In the context of the rocket war in Gaza and southern Israel, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank drops from 47% to 31% and positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 26% to 13%.
• Belief that corruption exists in the West Bank's PA institutions stands at 73% while belief that corruption exists in the institutions of the Gazan dismissed government stands at 62%.
• Perception that press freedom exists in the West Bank stands at 66% and in the Gaza Strip at 50%. 
• Perception of safety and security drops in the Gaza Strip from 69% to 47% and in the West Bank from 59% to 51%.
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government drops from 41% to 36% and the Fayyad government from 44% to 34%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops in the West Bank from 67% three months ago to 60% today.

13% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 70% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, 26% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% described them as bad or very bad. It seems clear that the rocket war between Israel and resistance groups, which took place just before the conduct of the poll, has been responsible for the decrease in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip. By contrast, 31% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 36% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 47%.

73% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 62% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. In the context of the recent step by the PA in the West Bank to submit corruption cases to courts, we asked the public if it thinks the PA is serious about fighting corruption: 53% said it was serious and 43% said it was not serious. Moreover, 66% of the public say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 31% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 50% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 40% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Findings also show that 30% of the public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 22% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security deteriorates in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank due to the war in the Gaza Strip and due to the deterioration of security conditions in the West Bank. It stands today at 51% in the West Bank (compared to 59% three months ago) and 47% in the Gaza Strip (compared to 69% three months ago).

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands today at 36% and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 34%. These findings indicate a decline in the positive evaluation of the performance of the two governments compared to the situation three months ago when it stood at 41% for the Haniyeh government and 44% for the Fayyad government. The decline, in the case of the Hamas government, might be due to the position taken by Hamas during the recent war in the Gaza Strip. In the case of the Fayyad government, the decline might be attributed to the talk about increasing taxes and reducing public expenditure as means of dealing with the PA's financial crisis. It is worth noting in this context that the positive evaluation of the Fayyad government has declined considerably in the West Bank from 48% three months ago to 33% in this poll while the positive evaluation of the Hamas government declined in the Gaza Strip from 37% to 31% during the same period. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Hamas government is higher among residents of the West Bank (40%) compared to residents of the Gaza Strip (31%), among women (40%) compared to men (33%), among those over the age of 50 (40%) compare to youth between the ages of 18-28 (35%), among illiterates (43%) compared to holders of BA degree (33%), among those who define themselves as religious (45%) compared to the somewhat religious (31%), among those opposed to the peace process (55%) compared to those who support the peace process (32%), among housewives (40%) compared to students (26%), among those who do not use the internet or use it once or several times every week (40% and 39% respectively) compared to those who use it every day (27%), and among those who say they will vote for Hamas or those who have not decided to whom they will vote (78% and 42% respectively) compared to those who will vote for Fateh, third parties, and those who will not participate in future elections (19%, 29%, and 26% respectively).

By contrast, positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government increases among men (38%) compared to women (31%), among residents of rural areas (39%) compared to residents of cities and refugee camps (33% and 34% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (42%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (18%), among farmers (71%) compared to laborers and housewives (30% and 31% respectively), among those employed in the public sector (39%) compared to those in the private sector (33%), and among supporters of Fateh (57%) compared to supporters of Hamas (21%).

Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 43% and 24% respectively.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 55% while 43% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Three months ago, these figures stood at 60% and 38% respectively. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands in this poll at 48% in the Gaza Strip and 60% in the West Bank. Three months ago, 67% of West Bankers were satisfied with the performance of the president. The decline in the West Bank might be due to the slowdown of the UN bid, a bid that had been responsible, three months ago, for the increase in public satisfaction with Abbas in the first place. It is also possible that the public is unhappy with Abbas for accepting to take part in the exploratory negotiations in Amman early in the year despite continued Israeli refusal to suspend settlement construction or accept the 1967 borders as a basis for negotiations. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas is higher among men (58%) compared to women (52%), among those over the age of 50 (67%) compared to youth between the ages of 18-28 (51%), among residents of towns and villages (67%) compared to residents of cities (52%), among illiterates (71%) compared to college graduates (42%), among supporters of the peace process (64%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (29%), among farmers and retirees (84% and 70% respectively) compared to housewives and laborers (52% and 53%), and among supporters of Fateh (87%) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%).

(4) Presidency and Legislative Elections:

• If new presidential elections are to be held today, Abbas would receive 54% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the competition was between Marwan  Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the first receives 64% and the second 32%
• If new legislative elections are to be held today, Fateh would receive 42%, Hamas 27%, all other electoral lists 10%, and 20% remain undecided.
• The strongest alternative Fateh candidate to Abbas is Marwan Barghouti and if Abbas and Marwan Barghouti did not participate in the elections, the strongest Fateh alternative is Saeb Erikat.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 61%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 55% and Haniyeh 37%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 55% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 42%. These results indicate a considerable increase in Haniyeh's popularity in the West Bank compared to the situation three months ago when he received only 33%. The increase in Haniyeh's popularity in the West Bank might be due to his visibility during his recent visits to Arab and Islamic countries and due to his support for the Syrian popular revolt. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter would receive 32% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 72%.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 27% say they would vote for Hamas and 42% say they would vote for Fateh, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 27% indicating a significant decline of eight percentage points compared to the situation three months ago. This decline might reflect public dissatisfaction with Hamas' behavior during the recent war in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% compared to 25% three months ago. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 46% and in the West Bank at 40%. These results indicate a decline in Fateh's popularity in the West Bank by four percentage points, probably due to government talk about a tax increase and a reduction in expenditure.

In a question about the favored Fateh candidate to replace Abbas as a president, assuming Abbas would not run, a majority of 55% selectedMarwan Barghouti, followed by Saeb Erekat, Nasir al Qidwa, and  Mahmud al Aloul (3% each).  Abu Mahir Ghnaim and Ahmad Qurie’ received 2% each, Azzam al Ahmad and Jibril al Rojoub received 1% each. When we asked the public to select a candidate from a list that did not includeMarwan Barghouti, a large part of the vote went to Saeb Erikat (18%) followed by Nasir al Qidwa (9%), Mahmud al Aloul, Ahmad Qurie' and AbuMahir Ghnaim (7% each), Azzam al Ahmad (5%), Jibril al Rojoub (4%), and finally Salim al Za'noun (2%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation and build a state and 32% believe it should be to obtain the right of return
• 28% believe the first problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment while 25% think it is the continuation of Israeli occupation and 23% think it is the absence of national unity. 

45% believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 8% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. These findings reflect continued stalemate in the UN bid, a bid that pushed the statehood goal to 59% six months ago at the peak of the UN drive. This percentage dropped to 48% three months ago and dropped an additional three percentage points in this poll.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while 25% believes the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 23% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 14% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 9% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(6) The Syrian Popular Revolt and Hamas' and Hezbollah's attitudes:

• 83% support the Syrian popular revolution against the Assad regime and 9% support the Assad regime.
• 42% believe that Hamas supports the Syrian popular revolution and 27% believe Hezbollah supports the Syria revolution.
• The public is divided over the issue of foreign intervention to topple the Assad regime: 50% oppose it and 46% support it.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public (83%) supports the Syrian demonstrators seeking to bring down the Syrian regime led by president Assad. Only 9% support the Assad regime. But only 42% of the public believe that Hamas supports the Syrian demonstrators while 23% believe the movement supports the Assad regime, 5% believe it supports both sides, 7% believe it supports neither side, and 24% say they do not know Hamas' position.  With regard to Hezbollah's position on the Syrian revolt, only 27% of the public believe that it supports the Syrian demonstrators while 44% believe it supports the Assad regime, 4% believe it supports both sides, 3% believe it supports neither side, and 21% say they do not know Hezbollah's position. But Palestinian public support for the Syrian popular revolt does not necessarily mean it supports external military intervention to bring down the Assad regime: 50% oppose such intervention and 46% support it.

In the context of the Syrian revolt and the talk about the departure of Hamas leaders from Damascus, findings show that the largest percentage of the public (41%) wants Hamas to make the Gaza Strip the headquarter for its leadership while 19% selected other locations: 19% selected Doha, 17% selected Cairo, and 14% selected Amman.  

(7) Peace Process

• 58% support and 35% oppose a return to exploratory talks with Israel without an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement construction and accept the lines of 1967 as a basis for negotiations.
• 48% believe that Abbas' decision few months ago to take part in exploratory talks with Israel in Amman without a settlement freeze or acceptance of the 1967 lines as a basis for negotiations was a right decision and 43% believe it was a mistake.
• Now after the suspension of peace negotiations, 76% support returning to the UNSC for recognition of a Palestinian state and 61% support launching a popular peaceful resistance. By contrast, only 40% support dissolving the PA, 39% support an armed intifada, and 29% support giving up the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years to be slim or non-existent while 31% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• 58% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion while 37% believe that the solution remains feasible as settlements can be dismantled after reaching an agreement.
• 56% support and 42% oppose the Arab (Saudi) peace initiative and 55% oppose and 43% support mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people.
• 76% are worried and 24% are not worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished by Israel.
• 57% believe that the hunger strike by Palestinian prisoner Khader Adnan will help speed up the process of closing the file on administrative detention and 39% do not believe that.
• Arab revolts will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the eyes of 51% and a negative impact in the eyes of 22%. 24% believe they will have no impact, positive or negative.

Findings show that 58% oppose and 35% support return to Palestinian-Israeli exploratory talks in the absence of a settlement freeze and an Israeli acceptance of the line of the 1967 as a basis for negotiation. Support for returning to the talks is higher in the West Bank (38%) compared to the Gaza Strip (31%), among women (40%) compared to men (31%), among the youth between the ages of 18-28 (40%) compared to those over 50 years of age (31%), among the illiterates (39%) compared to those with a BA degree (30%), among the somewhat religious (39%) compared to the religious (32%), among supporters of the peace process (43%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (22%), and among supporters of Fateh (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%).

Findings also show that 43% believe that president Abbas made a mistake when he agreed few months ago to take part in exploratory talks with Israel in Amman without an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement construction and accept the line of the 1967 borders as a basis for negotiations. 48% believe Abbas' decision was the right one.  Belief that Abbas made the right decision increases in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (42%), among non refugees (52%) compared to refugees (45%), among residents of villages and towns (56%) compared to refugee camps and cities (44% and 47% respectively), among illiterates (53%) compared to holders of BA degree (45%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (54%) compared to the religious (41%), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (27%), among farmers (72%) compared to professionals, employees, and students (42%, 46%, and 46% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

Findings also show that a majority of the public supports two alternatives to negotiations and oppose three others. 76% support returning to the UN to gain recognition of a Palestinian state and 61% support launching a non violent campaign against Israeli occupation. On the other hand, only 40% support dissolving the PA, 39% support launching a new armed intifada, and 29% support abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

Findings also show that 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be slim to non-existent while 31% believe the chances to be medium or high. Worse yet, 58% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to expanded settlement construction while only 37% believe the two state solution remains viable because settlements can be dismantled or evacuated once an agreement is reached. Belief that the two-state solution is no longer practical increases among holders of BA degree (65%) compared to illiterates (46%), among those opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to supporters of the peace process (52%), and among supporters of Hamas (65%) compared to supporters of Fateh (45%).

Findings show that a majority of 56% supports and 42% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative which calls for Arab recognition of Israel and for normalization of relations with it in return for its withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. On the other hand, 55% oppose and 43% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.

Findings also show that more than three quarters (76%) of the Palestinian public are worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished. They also show that 67% believe that the hunger strike by administrative detainee Khader Adnan and the agreement reached to end that strike will contribute to speeding up the process of closing the file of administrative detention while 39% do not share this view. Finally, more than half of the Palestinians (51%) believe that Arab revolts will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause while 22% believe that they will have a negative impact. 24% believe they will have no impact, positive or negative. 

 (8) An attack on Iran

• 46% expect and 48% do not expect an Israeli military offensive against Iran in the coming months.
• If Israel does carry out a military strike on Iran, 85% expect such an attack to lead to a major regional war.

Findings show that the Palestinians are divided regarding the assessment of an Israeli military strike against Iran: 46% believe Israel will indeed strike Iran in the coming months and 48% believe it will not. But findings show a semi consensus (85%) that such a strike, if it takes place, would trigger a major regional war and 11% do not expect that..... Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17 and 19 March 2016. The period before the poll witnessed continued limited Palestinian-Israeli confrontations with a number of stabbings by young Palestinians in the West Bank and in Israel and stone throwing at checkpoints and other areas of friction.  It also witnessed efforts to move forward Hamas-Fatah reconciliation efforts with a meeting held in Doha. The fieldwork started few days after the government and the teachers reached an agreement that ended a strike that was declared by the teachers in order to increase their wages and improve their work conditions. This press release addresses many of those issues and covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, teachers’ strike, reconciliation, Palestinian-Israeli confrontations, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2016 indicate significant changes in some of the findings obtained in the second half of 2015. A majority now backs a two-state solution and support for stabbing attacks against Israelis has dropped, particularly among West Bankers. Nonetheless, a majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continues to support an armed intifada and continues to believe that such an intifada would help Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Demand for Abbas’ resignation remains unchanged with about two thirds supporting it. As we found in our previous two polls, in September and December 2015, the “Oslo generation” of youth between the ages of 18 and 22 are the least supportive of the two-state solution, the most supportive of stabbing attacks, and the most likely to think that an armed intifada would help Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Findings show a significant drop in the support for stabbing attacks compared to our December 2015 poll. This is particularly true in the West Bank where a majority is opposed to such attacks. Indeed, only a little over one third believes that if the current confrontations continue as they are now they would help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not; the majority does not believe that. By contrast, a majority in the West Bank, reaching about 60% (and 75% in the Gaza Strip), believes that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada it would help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Nonetheless, this West Bank percentage is four percentage points fewer than what we found in the West Bank three months ago. In other words, there is a notable drop in the West Bank in the support for knifing attacks due, it seems, to a rising perception in its inefficacy, and a large majority continues to view an armed intifada as more effective than these attacks. We also see a drop in the level of support for abandoning the Oslo agreement, but a large majority continues nonetheless to support such an abandonment.  

Support for the two-state solution is on the rise in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it remains higher in the former than in the latter. Findings also show that the public rejects the proposed idea of separation advanced recently by the head of the Israeli opposition Labor party which calls for separation between Palestinians and Israelis in East Jerusalem and the West Bank within a context of temporary unilateral interim arrangements.

If new presidential elections are held today in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh would win against Mahmud Abbas with a margin of 11 percentage points. But if the competition is between Marwan Barghouti, for Fatah, and Haniyeh, the former would win by a margin of 18 percentage points. If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah and Hamas are likely to obtain almost identical results. Nonetheless, findings show a small increase in support for Fatah and a small decrease in support for Hamas in the West Bank; in the Gaza Strip we see the reverse: a small decrease for Fatah and a small increase for Hamas. It is possible that reaching an agreement with the striking teachers have contributed to the slight improvement of Fatah standing in the West Bank.  Yet, it is clear that this development did not have an impact on Abbas’ standing (despite a minor improvement in the West Bank) as a majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continues to demand his resignation. It should be noted that an overwhelming majority of the public sympathizes with the teachers and their demands and rejects the government policy regarding the teachers’ strike. If the poll was conducted before reaching an agreement to end the strike, it is likely that support for Fatah and Abbas would have been less than what today’s findings show.  It is also possible that the talk about negotiations to build a seaport in the Gaza Strip and the recent reconciliation talks between Hamas and Egypt have contributed to the improvement of Hamas’ standing in the Gaza Strip. It should be noted that an overwhelming majority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip looks positively at the idea of Hamas-Israeli negotiations under Turkish sponsorship to establish a seaport for Gaza.

(1) Popular Palestinian-Israeli confrontations:

• Support for stabbing attacks declines from 67% to 58%.
• 56% support return to an armed intifada and 65% think that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it would serve Palestinian national interests.
• 65% oppose and 30% support measures taken by PA security services to prevent attacks on Israel.
• 70% believe Hamas supports the current confrontations, 55% believe Fatah supports them, and 29% believe Abbas supports them.

Findings show that support for use of knives in the current confrontations with Israel drops from 67% three months ago to 58% in this poll. Support for knifing attacks in the Gaza Strip stands at 82% and in the West Bank at 44%. Three months ago, support among West Bankers for knifing attacks stood at 57% and among Gazans at 85%. Support for knifing attacks is also higher among men (60%) compared to women (57%), in cities and refugee camps (62% and 58% respectively) compared to villages (40%), among those whose is age is between 18 and 22 (62%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (55%), among refugees (66%) compared to non-refugees (52%), among those who work in the public sector (63%) compared to those who work in the private sector (53%), among those who hold a BA degree (59%) compared to illiterates (53%), among the religious (65%) compared to the somewhat religious (51%), among supporters of Hamas and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in new elections (82% and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah, third parties, and those who will not participate in new elections (49%, 48%, and 45% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (47%), and among those who use social media on daily basis (61%) compared to those who do not use social media (53%).

Findings also show that 29% believe that the current confrontations will develop into a new armed intifada, 15% believe they will develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, and 17% believe they will develop in both directions. By contrast, 22% believe the confrontation will stay as they are now and 14% believe they will gradually dissipate. Three months ago, 37% said that the current confrontations will develop into an armed intifada.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 56% support a return to an armed intifada; 77% support joining more international organizations; 64% support a popular non-violent resistance; 46% support the dissolution of the PA. Three months ago, 60% supported return to armed intifada. In the West Bank, current level of support for an armed intifada stands at 52% (compared to 60% three months ago).

About two thirds (65%) of the public believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 66% (71% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. The belief that if the current confrontations developed into an armed intifada it would serve Palestinian national interests in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (59%), in cities and refugee camps (69% and 65% respectively) compared to  villages (51%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 (73%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (61%), among holders of BA degree (67%) compared to illiterates (59%), among the religious (71%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (61% and 58% respectively) among Hamas supporters (86%) compared to those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections, those who will not participate in the next elections, supporters of third parties, and supporters of Fatah (70%, 60%, 58%, and 51% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (57%), and among those who use social media on daily basis (67%) compared to those who do not use social media (61%).

A majority of 54% of the public (68% in the Gaza Strip and 46% in the West Bank) believes that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 50% said that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not.  Moreover, 43% of the public (54% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, they would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 51% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not.

We asked the public about the efforts made by the PA security services during the current confrontations to contain the violence, leading, according to a statement by PA head of intelligence Majid Faraj, to the prevention of 200 attacks against Israelis. 30% of the public indicated its support for the action taken by the PA security services while 65% indicated opposition. Support for the action in the West Bank stands at 34% and opposition at 59% and support in the Gaza Strip stands at 22% and opposition at 74%.  Opposition to the action taken by the PA security services is also higher in cities (68%) compared to refugee camps and villages (62% and 52% respectively), among refugees (68%) compared to non-refugees (62%), among holders of BA degree (69%) compared to illiterates (61%), among the religious (71%) compared to the somewhat religious (59%), among Hamas supporters, supporters so third parties and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections (85%, 68%, and 68% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in the next elections and supporters of Fatah (62% and 45% respectively), and among those who are opposed to the peace process (80%) compared to supporters of the peace process (53%).

When comparing the level of support of various parties for the current confrontations, Hamas comes on top with 70% of the public believing that it supports them, followed by the PFLP, receiving 62%, Fatah (55%), and al Mubadara or the Initiative (52%). By contrast, only 29% say president Abbas supports the confrontations, 23% say Jordan supports them, and only 13% say Egypt supports them.  After Iran announced that it intends to provide financial assistance to the families of martyrs and the families whose homes are destroyed by Israel in the current confrontations, 69% say that their impression of Iran is now positive and only 24% say their impression of Iran is negative.

(2) The future of the Oslo agreement:

• 63% support and 30% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement.
• 65% believe that Abbas is not serious about abandoning the Oslo agreement.

An overwhelming majority of 91% of the public believes that Israel does not abide by the Oslo agreement and 5% believe it does. Findings also show that 63% support and 30% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 68% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 25% opposed it.  But 65% of the public believe that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 26% think he is serious. Three months ago, 67% expressed the view that the president is not serious.  Support for abandonment of the Oslo agreement is higher in the West Bank (64%) compared to the Gaza Strip (62%), among men (68%) compared to women (58%), in cities (66%) compared to villages and refugee camps (56% and 53% respectively), among holders of BA degree (70%) compared to illiterates (39%), among those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections, supporters of Hamas, and supporters of third parties (71%, 70%, and 65% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in new elections and supporters of Fatah (59% and 56% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (53%), and among those who use the social media on daily basis (68%) compared to those who do not use social media (56%).

(3) Palestinian Elections:

• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36%, and 64% demand his resignation.
• In presidential elections, Ismail Haniyeh receives 52% of the vote and Abbas 41%.
• In presidential elections between Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, the former receives 39% and the latter 57%.
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 33% of the vote and Fatah 34%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% which is similar to the level of satisfaction we obtained three months ago.  Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our previous poll three months ago. Demand for Abbas’ resignation is higher in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (63%), among men (66%) compared to women (63%), in cities (66%) compared to refugee camps and villages (63% and 57% respectively), among the Oslo generation, those between 18 and 22, (69%) compared to those whose age is over 50 (60%), among holders of BA degree (68%) compared to the illiterates (62%), among the non-religious (57%) compared the religious (66%), among Hamas supporters, supporters of third parties, and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections, and those who will not participate in the next elections (90%, 74%, 69%, and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (28%), and among those who are opposed to the peace process (85%) compared to supporters of the peace process (51%).

If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh;  Ramil al Hamdallah, Khalid Mishal, and Mustapha Barghouti receive 5% each; Mohammad Dahlan receives 4%; and Salam Fayyad receives 3%. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would win 52% (compared to 51% three months ago) and the latter 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 54% (compared to 48% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 41% (compared to 37% three months ago and Haniyeh 50% (compared to 53% three months ago).    If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 57% and the latter would receive 39% of the participants’ votes. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 37% and Haniyeh 39%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 33% say they would vote for Hamas and 34% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 33%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 35% three months ago) and for Fatah at 34% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 32% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 30% three months ago).

(4) Domestic Conditions:

• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 47% and in the West Bank at 39%.
• 48% of Gazans and 21% of West Bankers say they want to emigrate.
• Viewership of Hamas’ al Aqsa TV station is highest at 21% followed by PA’s Palestine TV at 20%.
• Belief that there is corruption in PA institutions stands at 79% and belief that there is free press in the West Bank stands at 17%.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 14% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 47%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 39%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 50% and in the West Bank at 29%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 48%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 21%. Three months ago 41% of Gazans and 24% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate. The largest percentage (37%) of those who seek to emigrate indicates that the main motivation is search for jobs; 22% say difficult conditions imposed by Israeli occupation forces them to seek to emigrate; 15% say it is the lack of security and 10% say it is the lack of freedoms and democracy that push them out.

Hamas’ al Aqsa TV viewership is the highest, standing at 21%, followed by Palestine TV (20%), Maan-Mix at 19%, Al-Jazeera at 17%, and Al Arabiya at 6%.  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  17% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 20% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  29% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear.

(5) Reconciliation, the National Reconciliation government and Gaza seaport negotiation:

• Optimism about reconciliation stands at 38% and pessimism at 59%.
• 26% are satisfied and 65% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• Only 20% believe that Hamas is responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government; 51% believe that the PA, Abbas, and head of the reconciliation government are responsible for the bad performance.
• 72% believe that the reconciliation government must pay the salaries of the Gazan public sector that worked for the former Hamas government.
• 65% believe that the reconciliation government, not Hamas, must be in charge of the security sector in the Gaza Strip.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 38% and pessimism at 59%. Three months ago optimism stood at 30% and pessimism at 66%.  26% say they are satisfied and 65% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 62%.  Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 20% (12% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) while 34% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 17% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

72% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salary of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (70%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salary of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government.  In return, 65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; only 25% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  Similarly, 75% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the pervious Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 21% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

We presented the public with the news that negotiations between Israel and Hamas, with Turkish mediation, were underway to build a Gaza seaport in return for a long term truce between Hamas and Israel and asked if respondents supported or opposed such a deal: 70% of the public indicated support and 27% indicated opposition for such a deal.

(6) Teachers’ strike:

• 73% believe that the teachers’ wages are not fair.
• Three quarters blame government policy, not teachers’ strike, for the closure of schools and the interruption of teaching.

Almost three quarters (73%) of the public believe that the teachers’ wages are not fair and 23% think they are fair. Moreover, three quarters of the public believes that it was the government policy that was responsible for the closure of the schools and the interruption of teaching during the teachers’ strike; only 22% blame the teachers. Belief that the government policy, not the teachers, is responsible for the closure and interruption is higher in the West Bank (77%) compared to the Gaza Strip (73%), among those who work in the public sector (78%) compared to those who work in the private sector (75%), among holders of BA degree (77%) compared to the illiterates (69%), among the married (77%) compared to the unmarried (73%), among those who will not participate in the next elections, supporters of Hamas, supporters of third parties, and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections (86%, 82%, 75%, and 73% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (60%), and among those who oppose the peace process (84%) compared to supporters of the peace process (71%).

An overwhelming majority of 84% indicates that it views as unacceptable the behavior of the PA security services in establishing checkpoints to prevent striking teachers from reaching the government headquarter in Ramallah; only 14% find that behavior acceptable.  Now after an agreement has been reached between the government and the teachers to end the strike, only 32% express the view that the teachers have gained most of their demands; 63% believe the teachers did not gain most of their demands.

(7) Peace Process and Israel’s long term aspirations:

• 51% support and 48% oppose the two-state solution.
• 47% support and 50% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative.
• 61% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction.
• 82% are worried that they would hurt by Israelis.
• An overwhelming majority believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex all Palestinian territories.
• An overwhelming majority believes that Israel plans to change the status quo in al Haram al Sharif.

A slim majority of 51% supports and 48% oppose the two-state solution. Three months ago, 45% supported and 54% opposed this solution. Support for the two-state solution is higher in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (49%), among men (53%) compared to women (50%), in villages (60%) compared to cities and villages (50% and 47% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (61%) compared to the Oslo generation, 18 to 22 years, (42%), among non-refugees (54%) compared to refugees (48%) among those who work in the private sector (56%) compared to those who work in the public sector (53%), among the illiterates (60%) compared to those who hold a BA degree ( 50%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (73% and 56% respectively) compared to the religious (44%), among supporters of Fatah, supporters of third parties, and those who did not decide to whom they will vote in the next elections (71%, 64%, and 53% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in the next elections and Hamas supporters (49% and 30% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (65%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (28%), and among those who do not use the social media (56%) compared to those who use social media on daily basis (51%).

Findings also show that 47% support the Arab Peace Initiative and 50% oppose it. Similarly, only 39% support a mutual recognition of national identity of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people and 60% oppose it.  We also asked the public about the separation plan proposed by the head of the Israeli opposition Labor party, Isaac Herzog, which talks about a temporary interim arrangement that would lead to separation from the Palestinians along the following lines: (1) place 28 Palestinian villages and towns currently inside Jerusalem under the control of the PA; (2) cessation of settlement construction in the West Bank with the exception of building inside the large settlements; (3) removal of setters’ outposts in the West Bank; (4) transfer civil jurisdiction over most of the West Bank to the PA with the exception of the large settlement blocs which Israel wants to annex in the final status agreement; and (5) the Israeli army stays in its current deployment in the West Bank until a final status agreement is reached. Only 30% of the public said they are in favor of the plan and 66% indicated opposition.

Palestinian views on the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel vary: 42% think that armed action is the most effective, 29% think negotiation is the most effective, and 24% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 46% said armed action was the most effective and 26% said negotiation was the most effective.  Findings also show that majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion while 37% say it is still practical.  Moreover, 74% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 24% believe the chances are high or medium. Despite this, only 29% support, and 70% oppose, a one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 82%; 18% are not worried.  Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of 82% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. 17% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 61% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 25% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 52% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 20% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 9% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 9% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change. 

(8) Hezbollah, the Arab World and ISIS:

• 33% support and 60% oppose the resolution of Arab League labeling Hezbollah a terrorist organization.
• 76% believe that the Arab World no longer cares about Palestine and that Palestine is no longer its principle cause.
• 88% see the Islamic State (Daesh) as a radical group that does not represent true Islam.

60% disagree and 33% agree with the resolution of the Council of the Arab League labeling Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Opposition to the Arab League resolution is higher in the West Bank (68%) compared to the Gaza Strip (46%), in villages (75%) compared to cities and refugee camps (57% and 53% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (63%) compared to the Oslo generation, 18 to 22 years, (54%), among non-refugees (64%) compared to refugees (54%), among those who work in the private sector (62%) compared to those who work in the public sector (57%), among the illiterates (62%) compared to holders of BA degree (57%), among the married (62%) compared to the unmarried (56%), among supporters of third parties, those who will not participate in the next elections, and Hamas supporters (77%, 62%, and 61% respectively) compared to those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections and supporters of Fatah (56% and 54% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (62%) compared to supporters of the peace process (59%), and among those who do not use the social media (72%) compared to those who use social media on daily basis (54%).

Moreover, 76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. 23% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. In fact, 64% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 28% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

An overwhelming majority of 88% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 7% believe it does represent true Islam. 5% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 13% (compared to 4% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.  80% support and 17% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 48% believe that the first Palestinian priority should be to end occupation and build a state.
• Settlements and occupation is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today followed by unemployment and poverty.

48% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 30% of the pubic; 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 23% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; 17% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (44)

While the popularity of Fateh and President Abbas drops, and while Hamas' popularity improves, popular criticism of crackdown on freedoms increases and opposition to a two-state solution rises

21-23 June 2012

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 21-23 June 2012. This poll was conducted during a military escalation and exchange of rocket fire in the Gaza Strip. The period preceding the poll witnessed the ending of the prisoners' hunger strike and the announcement of the elementary results of the Egyptian presidential elections with reports of a victory of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate MohammadMorsi. The weeks before the conduct of the poll witnessed the signing of an agreement between Fateh and Hamas that allowed the Central Election Commission to begin voter registration in the Gaza Strip and the beginning of consultation to form a reconciliation agreement. It also witnessed the arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites by the PA in the West Bank. The journalists were released and sites opened before the conduct of the poll. Finally, this period witnessed the formation of a new government in the West Bank headed by Salam Fayyad. This press release covers Palestinian attitudes regarding the arrest of journalists and blocking of internet sites, reconciliation, prisoners' hunger strike, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The second quarter of 2012 shows clear improvement in the standing and popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh, especially in the Gaza Strip, and a decline in the popularity of Fateh and President Abbas. The increased Hamas popularity might be due to the fact that it has allowed the Palestinian election commission to begin voter registration in the Gaza Strip and might reflect optimism about future improvement in the conditions of the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate in the Egyptian presidential elections. The decline in the popularity of Fateh and president Abbas comes in light of widespread popular anger with the PA for the arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites. It might also reflect public perception of a reluctance on the part of Abbas to form a reconciliation government despite Hamas' decision to allow the election commission to operate in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, it is possible that Abbas' reluctance to go to the UN or take the initiative to break the deadlock in the relationship with Israel might in part explain the increase in public dissatisfaction with his performance and the decrease in the percentage of votes he might receive in a new presidential elections.  Findings also indicate that the overwhelming majority of the public opposes the arrest of journalists or the blocking of internet sites and view such measures as harming the Palestinian cause in international public opinion. A majority is also pessimistic about the chances to implement the reconciliation agreement and a very small minority is optimistic about the chances of forming a reconciliation government in days or weeks or organizing parliamentary and presidential elections before the end of the year.

Parallel to the decline in the popularity of president Abbas and Fateh, findings show a significant decline in the support for a two-state solution. Findings also show continued majority belief that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion while more than two thirds believe that the chances for establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years is slim or non-existent. Despite all this, a majority of about two-thirds opposes a one-state solution. Moreover, a clear majority opposes a unilateral Israeli plan aimed at strengthening the two-state dynamics through cessation of settlement construction in those areas to the east of the separation wall and encouraging settlers in those settlements to the East of the wall to evacuate those settlements.

(1) Arrest of Journalists and Blocking of Internet Sites:

• 88% oppose and 7% support the arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites for the views they express or articles they publish
• 86% believe that the PA's arrest of journalists and the blocking of websites harm the Palestinian cause
• 71% indicate that they felt angry when hearing about the PA's arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites
• 67% say that these days they feel they are living in a non democratic political system that crack down on freedoms

We asked the public about its views regarding the arrest of journalists and the blocking of internet sites by the PA, incidents that took place during the weeks that preceded the conduct of the poll: 88% oppose and 7% support the arrest of the journalists and the blocking of sites for the views or articles they publish or post. Moreover, 86% believe such measures as those taken by the PA in the West Bank in arresting journalists or blocking internet sites cause harm to the Palestinian cause in international public opinion. When asked how they felt when they first heard about these measures, 71% said they felt angry and 21% said they felt indifferent and 3% said they felt satisfied. Feeling of anger rises in the West Bank (75%) compared to the Gaza Strip (61%), in cities (73%) compared to refugee camps (55%), among women (75%) compared to men (66%), among those with BA degree (78%) compared to illiterates (59%), among those between the ages of 40 and 50 years old (78%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 (63%), and among supporter of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fateh (64%).

Findings also show that 67% feel as if they are living in an undemocratic system that cracks down on freedoms while only 29% say they feel they live in a democratic system that protects freedoms. 4% say they have no opinion. It is interesting to note that the feeling that one lives in an undemocratic system that cracks down on freedoms is higher in the West Bank (72%) than in the Gaza Strip (58%) despite the fact that a majority in both areas feel that it lives in such a system. The feeling of living in an undemocratic system rises also among non refugees (70%) compared to refugees (63%), among holders of BA degree (66%) compared to illiterates (51%), among those who do not intend to participate in future elections (76%) and those who do not know to whom they intend to vote (70%) and those who intend to vote for third parties, other than Fateh and Hamas, (69%) compared to those who intend to vote for Fateh and Hamas (59% and 61% respectively). When we separate Gaza findings from those of the West Bank, the feeling of living in an undemocratic system increases in the West Bank among those who do not intend to participate in new elections (76%) and among supporters of Hamas (45%) compared to supporters of Fateh (37%). In the Gaza Strip, feeling of living in an undemocratic system rises among supporters of Fateh (73%) and those who will not participate in new elections (51%) compared to supporters of Hamas (20%).

(2) Reconciliation: 

• 71% are dissatisfied with the fact that no parliamentary or presidential elections took place last may
• Only 35% believe that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and 57% believe they will not succeed
• Only 12% believe that a  reconciliation government will be formed in the coming days or weeks and 47% believe one will eventually be formed but after a long time
• Only 12% believe that presidential and parliamentary elections might take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during 2012 and 55% believe it might take place after a year or two or after several years

71% say they are dissatisfied with the fact that presidential and parliamentary elections did not take place last May as originally planned in the reconciliation agreement reached between Fateh and Hamas. 22% say they are satisfied that the elections did not take place. Findings show that 60% blame Fateh and Hamas together for the failure to hold elections last May while 13% blame Hamas, 10% blame Fateh, and 7% blame other parties. In light of the start of voter registration by the Central Election Commission in the Gaza Strip and the start of consultation to form a reconciliation government, only 35% believe that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 57% say they will not succeed. In fact, 32% believe no reconciliation government will ever be formed, 47% believe it will be formed but only after a long time, and only 12% believe it will be formed in the next days or weeks.  Similarly, 20% expect that no election will ever be organized jointly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the future while 24% believe it will be organized after many years, 31% say it will be organized after one or two years, and 12% say it might be organized this year. 

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands today at 22%  and in the West Bank at 30%
• Belief that there is corruption in public institutions in the Gaza Strip stands at 57% and in the PA institutions in the West Bank at 71%
• 34% say there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip and 21% say there is press freedom in the West Bank
• 25% say people in the Gaza Strip can these days criticize the authorities without fear and 29% say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear
• Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip at 58%
• Positive evaluation of the performance of Ismail Haniyeh's government stands at 38% and Fayyad's at 36%
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 49%

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises to 22% while 56% say conditions are bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, only 13% said conditions in the Gaza Strip were good or very good and 70% said conditions were bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains stable at 30% while 37% say conditions are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 31% three months ago.

71% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 57% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 21% say there is, and 41% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank while 34% say there is no press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 17% say there is, and 34% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 38% say there is no press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  Similarly, 29% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 25% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank reaches 55%  and in the Gaza Strip 58%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands today at 38% and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 36%. These figures are similar to those we obtained three months ago. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 42%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 27%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 45% and 22% respectively.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 49% while 49% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 55% and dissatisfaction at 43%. Satisfaction with the president's performance in this poll stands at 37% in the Gaza Strip and 56% in the West Bank. In our previous poll, three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 60% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip. The decline in the level of satisfaction with the president's performance might be due to public belief that conditions of freedoms have worsened, the lack of progress in the reconciliation process, and the lack of movement on the Palestinian UN statehood bid.

 (4) Presidency and Legislative Elections:

• In a new presidential election, Abbas receives 49% and Haniyeh 44% and if the contest is between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 60% and the latter 34%. If the competition was between all three, Barghouti receives 37%, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 25%.
• In a new parliamentary election, Hamas receives 29%, Fateh 40%, and all third parties combined 12%, and 19% have not decided yet to whom they will vote
• With a vote of 53%, Marwan Barghouti is the most preferred candidate for Fateh in a presidential elections in which Abbas does not run, and Saeb Erikat is the most favored, by 17%, if Abbas and Barghouti do not run

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 49% and Haniyeh 44% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 65%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 54% and Haniyeh 42%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 49% and Haniyeh 45% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 50% and Haniyeh 43%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 60% and the latter would receive 34% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 72%.  If the presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas,Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives the highest percentage (37%) followed by Haniyeh (33%), and Abbas (25%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 75%. This is the first time that we have asked about possible presidential elections with these three candidates. Support for Barghouti is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (37% and 38% respectively), but support for Haniyeh is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank (35% and 32% respectively), and support for Abbas is slightly higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip (26% and 22% respectively). Support for Barghouti is higher among men (41%) compared to women (34%) while support for Haniyeh is higher among women (40%) compared to men (26%), and support for Abbas is higher among men (28%) compared to women (21%). Support for Barghouti is also higher among the youth, between the ages of 18 and 28 years old (40%) compared to those over 50 years of age (33%) while support for Haniyeh is higher among those over 50 years of age (38%) compared to those between 18 and 28 years of age (30%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 40% say they would vote for Fateh, 12% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 31% and in the West Bank at 27%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% and in the West Bank at 41%. These results indicate a decline in Fateh's popularity in the Gaza Strip by seven percentage points and an increase in the popularity of Hamas in the Gaza Strip by 4 percentage points. When we asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the parliamentary and presidential elections, 41% said they expect Fateh to win, 23% expected Hamas to win, 20% expected other parties to win, and 16% said they do not know.

In a question about the favored Fateh candidate to replace Abbas as a president, assuming Abbas would not run, a majority of 53% selectedMarwan Barghouti, followed by Saeb Erekat and Abu Mahir Ghnaim (3% each).  Mahmoud Aloul, Nasir al Qidwa, and Ahmad Qurie’ received 2% each, Azzam al Ahmad, Jibril al Rojoub, and Salim al Za'noun received 1% each. When we asked the public to select a candidate from a list that did not include Marwan Barghouti, a large part of the vote went to Saeb Erikat (17%) followed by Abu Mahir Ghnaim (9%), Mahmud alAloul and Nasir al Qidwa (8% each), Azzam al Ahmad (5%), Jibril al Rojoub and Ahmad Qurie' (4%), and finally Salim al Za'noun (2%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 47% select ending occupation and building a Palestinian state based on the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as a capital is the most vital national priority and 30% say the most vital priority is to obtain the right of return
• Selected by 27%, continued occupation and settlement activities is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today followed by the spread of poverty and unemployment, selected by 26%, and the absence of national unity, selected by 24%

47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 8% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 27% of the public while 26% believe the most serious problem is the spread of poverty and unemployment, 24% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 8% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

(6) The Peace Process:

• 49% support and 49% oppose the two-state solution and 55% believe such a solution is no longer practical due to continued settlement expansion. But 65% oppose a one-state solution.
• 35% believe that an Israeli unilateral plan to stop settlement construction in those settlements located to the east of the separation wall and in Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and to help settlers relocate outside those settlements is good for Palestinians and 59% believe it is bad for them. 69% believe that the chances for implementing this plan by the Netanyahu government is slim to non-existent.
• 51% support the Saudi peace initiative and 45% oppose it
• 43% support and 55% oppose recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people after reaching a peace agreement that resolves all issues of the conflict.

Findings show a significant decline in the level of support for the two-state solution from 57% in March 2010 to 49% in this poll. Opposition to this solution stands at 49% compared to 41% in the previous poll. Findings also show that a majority of 55% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to expanded settlement construction while only 39% believe the two state solution remains viable because settlements can be dismantled or evacuated once an agreement is reached. Despite the belief of the majority that the two-state solution is no longer practical, only 31% support the alternative solution known as the one-state solution, one in which Palestinians and Jews enjoy equality. Opposition to the one-state solution reaches 65% in this poll.

Opposition to the two-state solution increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (46%), among those who oppose the peace process (62%) compared to those who support the peace process (43%), among refugees (53%) compared to non refugees (46%), among holders of BA degree (56%) compared to illiterates (33%), among students (61%) compared to laborers, merchants, and retirees (40%, 40%, and 20% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private sector (42%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (58%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (34%), among supporters of Hamas and those who do not wish to participate in future elections (62% and 56% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh, those who would vote for third parties and those who have not decided yet to whom they will vote (35%, 41%, and 46% respectively).

Support for the one-state solution is higher in the West Bank (36%) compared to the Gaza Strip (23%), in refugee camps (35%) compared to residents of cities (31%), among those who define themselves as somewhat religious (33%) compared to those who define themselves as religious (29%), among supporters of the peace process (34%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (23%), and among those who say they will not participate in new elections (36%) and supporters of Fateh (33%) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%).  

We asked the public about its views regarding an Israeli plan calling for unilateral steps that would stop construction in those settlements located to the east of the separation wall and in Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and encouraging settlers to evacuate those settlements while keeping the Israeli army in those areas. Findings show that 59% view the plan as bad for Palestinians while 35% view it as good for Palestinians. Yet, a big majority (70%) believe the chances that the Netanyahu government will implement such a plan are slim or non-existent. Perception that the plan is good for Palestinians increases in cities and villages (36% each) compared to refugee camps (27%), among supporters of the peace process (41%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (27%), among holders of BA degree (35%) compared to illiterates (27%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (37%) compared those whose age is over 50 years (26%), among those who use the internet on daily basis (39%) compared to those who use the internet once a month (28%), and among supporters of Fateh (41%) compared to supporters of Hamas (25%).

Findings show that a majority of 51% supports and 45% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative which calls for Arab recognition of Israel and for normalization of relations with it in return for its withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. On the other hand, 55% oppose and 43% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people after all issues of the conflict have been resolved. Findings also show that 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be slim to non-existent while 30% believe the chances to be medium or high.  A majority of 54% believe that the inclusion of Kadima in the coalition government of Netanyahu means the government will be less willing to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians while only 12% believe that the government will be more willing to do so. 26% believe that the addition of Kadima to Netanyahu government will have no impact on its peace policies.

Findings also show that about three quarters (74%) of the Palestinian public are worried that they or members of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished. Moreover, the level of perceived threat regarding the aspirations of Israel in the long run is very high. 62% of Palestinians think that Israel’s long term goals is to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 19% think the goal is to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Only 17% think Israel’s aspiration in the long run is to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967.

(7) Palestinian Options in the confrontation with Israeli occupation:

• Largest percentage (73%) supports going to the UN in order to obtain an international recognition of the Palestinian state and 58% support a unilateral declaration of statehood.
• 57% support a non violent popular resistance and only 37% support an armed intifada.
• 39% support and 55% oppose the dissolution of the PA.
• Half of the public is satisfied and the other half is dissatisfied with the performance of the PA leadership in its efforts to obtain an international recognition of Palestinian statehood.
• 56% believe that the Palestinian leadership is still trying to obtain an international recognition of Palestinian statehood and 39% believe that the leadership has abandoned that goal.

We asked the public about its views regarding six options that Palestinians have in their relations with Israel in the absence of negotiations. Findings show that the public supports three of these options and opposes the other three. The highest support (73%) goes to the option of turning to the UN for international recognition of Palestinian statehood followed by a unilateral declaration of statehood (58%), and a non violent popular resistance (57%). By contrast, only 37% supported going back to an armed intifada, 39% supported dissolving the PA, and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

When asked about the performance of the Palestinian leadership in its efforts to obtain an international recognition of Palestinian statehood, half of the public indicated satisfaction with these efforts while the other half indicated dissatisfaction. When asked whether it thought the PA leadership has abandoned such efforts or is still seeking international recognition of Palestinian statehood, a majority of 56% indicated that it believes that the PA is still continuing its efforts while 39% indicated that it has abandoned them. Dissatisfaction with the performance of the leadership in its efforts to obtain international recognition of Palestinian statehood increases among those who oppose the peace process (61%) compared to those who support the peace process (41%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to illiterates (37%), among professionals (67%) and merchants (60%) compared to employees (50%) students (47%) housewives (45%), and laborers (37%), among those who work in the private sector (54%) compared to those who work in the public sector (45%), and among supporters of Hamas (60%) and those who do not intend to participate in future elections (55%) compared to supporters of Fateh (33%). Similarly, belief that the PA leadership is continuing its efforts to obtain international recognition of Palestinian statehood increases among supporters of the peace process (63%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (40%), among Fateh supporters (73%) compared to Hamas supporters (46%) and those who will not participate in new elections (47%).

(8) Other Topics: Prisoners' hunger strike, Visits to Jerusalem, Arab Spring, Salafis, and Egyptian Elections:

• 59% are satisfied and 40% dissatisfied with the size of public participation in solidarity activities with the prisoners in Israeli jails during their hunger strike and 42% believe conditions of prison will improve after the strike,
• 72% see benefits in Arab and Muslim visits to Jerusalem these days
• 49% believe that Arab revolutions will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the next year or two.
• 27% say that they would vote for a Salafi party and 63% say they would not vote for such a party.
• 40% believe that the results of the Egyptian presidential elections, and the victory of Mohammad Morsi, will serve the Palestinian cause while 33% believe it will not.

Prisoners' Hunger Strike: Findings show that 59% are satisfied and 40% are dissatisfied with the size of public participation in solidarity activities with the prisoners in Israeli jails during their hunger strike. When asked if they personally participated in solidarity activities, 35% said yes and 65% said no. When asked about their expectations, now after the hunger strike, regarding the future conditions of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, 42% said conditions of Palestinian prisoners will improve, 15% said conditions will worsen, and 41% said conditions will not change.

Visiting Jerusalem: In light of the recent talk about the benefits or harm that might be generated by visits to Jerusalem by Arabs and Muslims, we asked the public what it thought: 72% indicated that they believe it will benefit the Palestinians while 25% indicated the opposite.  

Arab Spring: Findings show that half of the public (49%) believes that Arab revolutions will have a positive impact on the Palestinian cause in the next year or two and 23% believe they will have a negative impact while 25% say they will have no impact, positive or negative.

A Salafi Party in Palestine: Given the surprising size of the electoral victory of the Salfists in the Egyptian elections, with their Nour party receiving about 25% of the popular vote, we asked the Palestinian public about its possible electoral behavior if a Salafi party were to be established in Palestine: 27% said that it would vote for such a party if established and 63% said they would not vote for one. Willingness to vote for a Salafi party increases in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (22%), in cities (29%) compared to refugee camps (19%), among women (30%) compared to men (24%), among the religious (35%) compared to the somewhat religious (20%), among refugees (32%), compared to non refugees (22%), among those who use the internet only once a month (34%) compared to those who use it every day (26%), and among Hamas supporters (46%) compared to supporters of Fateh (20%).

Egyptian elections: After the initial announcement of the Egyptian election results, 40% believe that these results will serve the Palestinian cause while 33% believe it will not. 22% said they do not know. When asked to tell us who they think won the Egyptian elections, 64% said it was the Muslim Brothers' candidate Mohammad Morsi while 20% thought it was General Shafiq and 15% said they did not know...Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13 and 17 September 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli army without the participation of Hamas, the visit of the US president Joe Biden to Bethlehem and his meeting with president Abbas, the appointment of Yair Lapid as a prime minister replacing Bennet and the setting of a date for new Israeli elections, an announcement by the United Arab Emirates of $25  millions in support to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem, talk about opening the Israeli Ramon airport to Palestinian travel, an Israeli decision to increase the number of Gazan laborers working in Israel, an attempted assassination against the former deputy prime minister in Hamas’ government, Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir, near Nablus, a PA announcement that salaries of Palestinian laborers working in Israel would be paid via Palestinian banks, plans by the PA to reduce the number of employees working in the public sector, and Abbas talk during his visit to Germany of 50 Holocausts.  This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The results of the third quarter of 2022 show a limited change in the domestic balance of power as the gap between Fatah and Hamas is now two percentage points in favor of Fatah while, three months ago, it was one point in favor of Hamas. Similarly, the gap in the 

popularity of president Abbas vs. Ismail Haniyyeh has now narrowed to 15 percentage points in favor of Haniyyeh while, three months ago, it was 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh. It seems there are two main reasons for this limited change: the disapproval of Hamas, especially in the West Bank, regarding its non-involvement in the armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel in August and the rise of Abbas popularity, also especially in the West Bank, in light of the Israeli and German criticism of his reference to the “Holocaust” when describing the Israeli massacres against the Palestinians.

Among the findings on the domestic side, three in particular stand out and should raise an alarm:

1. There is a widespread worry among all Palestinian sectors, reaching about 70% in the West Bank, who view the attempted assassination of Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir as an indication that an internal armed strife might erupt in the West Bank when conditions are ripe, as happened in the past in the Gaza Strip.
2. The narrative of the PA government, regarding the transfer of salary payments to Palestinian laborers who work in Israel, has no credibility among the public as the poll finds only one in ten Palestinians trusting the PA statements regarding this matter while the vast majority stand with the laborers and sympathize with their fears.
3. There is a widespread rejection, reaching about 80%, of the PA government plans to cut down the number of the public sector employees. In case the PA goes ahead with its plans, a large majority wants the cuts to take place in the security sector only which reveals existing concerns among the public regarding the justification for having such a large security sector to begin with.

On Israeli- Palestinian relations, support for the two-state solution and for the one-state solution rises in this poll. It now resembles the support that existed about 6 months ago. This development is accompanied, as expected, with a decline in the percentage of those who think the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion. The findings also show a continued rise in the positive view of the public regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures, reaching 70% for the first time, with an even greater appreciation of the measure in which a larger number of work permits are issued by Israel for laborers from the Gaza Strip.

Perhaps because of the above, but also due to the negative public assessment of the last armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel, the findings indicate a significant decline in support for armed attacks or a return to an armed intifada and a significant rise in support for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. 

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• In presidential elections between president Abbas and Hamas leader Haniyyeh the former receives 38% and the latter 53%
• But in presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 63% and the latter 33%
• Satisfaction with president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71% and 74% demand Abbas' resignation
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 32% of the vote and Fatah 34%
• 27% believe that Hamas is most deserving to lead the Palestinian people while 26% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving 

69% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 29% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 78% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 57%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 53% of the votes (compared to 55% for Haniyeh and 33% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 59%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 40% and Haniyeh 46%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 63% and Haniyeh 33%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 45% and from among those, the former receives 32% and the latter 60%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (41%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), Mohammad Shtayyeh (3%), Hussein al Sheikh (2%), and 22% said they do not know or have not decided.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 26% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, a vast majority of 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 77% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 34% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 44% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 21% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 37% three months ago).

27% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 26% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 42% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 33% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 38% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%; in the Gaza Strip, 29% want to emigrate and in the West Bank, 23% want to emigrate
• 86% say there is corruption in the PA institutions and 73% say there is corruption in the institutions under Hamas’ control in the Gaza Strip
• 57% say the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 38% say it is an asset
• 27% accuse the PA security services or armed men from Fatah of the responsibility over the attempted assassination against Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir and 63% are worried that this incident might signal possible future internal armed strife
• 79% are opposed to PA plans to reduce the size of the public sector
• Only 12% trust PA statements regarding the transfer of salary payments of laborers, who work inside Israel, to Palestinian banks
• 73% believe the PA government is not doing enough to reduce prices 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 76% and in the West Bank at 54%. Moreover, 25% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 29% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 26% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 27% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 73% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 86% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 71% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas. On free speech, 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 46% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 54% think they cannot. Moreover, in its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (57%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 38% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 36% viewed it as an asset. On the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 25% are optimistic and 73% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 26%.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 25% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 73% expects failure and 22% expects success. But the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 67% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 49%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 41%.

We asked the public about its expectations regarding the identity of the perpetrators of the attempted assassination against Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir near Nablus two months ago. The responses did not indicate a clear trend but about 27% pointed the figure at the Palestinian security services and Fatah: 14% said the security services and 13% said armed men from Fatah. Additionally, about 14% said the assassination attempt came as a result of a struggle within al Najah university, where Dr. al Sha’ir works, while an identical percentage accused the Israeli army, 9% thought it resulted from personal or family conflict, and 6% thought it resulted from conflict within Hamas. A large majority of 63% is worried that this assassination attempt might lead to internal armed confrontations when conditions are ripe as had happened in the past in the Gaza Strip; 28% say they are not worried. The level of worry is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 69% and 53% respectively. Worry is also higher in villages/towns (72%) compared to cities and refugee camps (61% and 66% respectively), among the less educated (64%) compared to the more educated (60%), among the somewhat religious (67%) compared to the religious (59%) and among supporters of Fatah (69%) compared to supporters of Hamas (57%).

A majority of 61% is opposed the lawyers’ strike which was waged to protest the decisions of the PA president to amend legislation affecting the judiciary; 26% stand in favor.

An overwhelming majority of 79% says it opposes PA plans to cut down the size of the public sector while only 19% say they are in favor.  When asked about the sector whose size should be cut, the majority (62%) selected the security sector, 15% selected education, 10% selected health, and 6% selected social affairs. The percentage of those who selected the security sector for downsizing is higher in the West Bank (73%) compared to the Gaza Strip (46%), in villages/towns (68%) compared to refugee camps and cities (51% and 63% respectively), among men (67%) compared to women (56%), among those whose age is 30 years of higher (64%) compared to those whose age is less than 30 years (54%), among the less educated (68%) compared to the more educated (54%), among non-refugees (73%) compared to refugees (49%), and among supporters of Fatah (66%) compared to supporters of Hamas (55%).

The overwhelming majority (85%) expresses solidarity with Palestinian laborers who work in Israel in rejecting the PA announcement that the salaries of these laborers will be paid to them via Palestinian banks while only 12% say they trust the government assurances to the laborers that this measure will help protect their interests, allowing them to benefit from the banking services, and that no new taxes will be imposed on those salaries. Trust in the PA assurances stands at 6% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Trust in PA assurances is also higher in refugee camps (25%) compared to cities and villages/towns (11% each), among refugees (16%) compared to non-refugees (10%), among those who work in the public sector (23%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (12%), and among supporters of Fatah (24%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (14% each).  

The vast majority (73%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 25% say it is doing so. We asked the public about the burden imposed on their households due to the rise in prices and asked them to tell us which sector or sectors were the most affected: 48% selected the food sector; 27% selected energy such as electricity, solar, and gasoline, 14% said rent, 6% said education, 3% said transportation, and 3% said health.   

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 29%, followed by al Aqsa TV (11%), Maan, Palestine Today TV, and Palestine TV (10% each), al Arabiya (4%), al Mayadeen (3%), and al Manar (1%).

(3) Islamic Jihad-Israel armed confrontation:

• Only 12% think Islamic Jihad came out a winner in its last battle with Israel
• 50% think Hamas’ decision not to be directly involved in Islamic Jihad’s battle with Israel was the right one and 37% think it was the wrong decision 

The largest percentage (42%) thinks that neither Israel nor Islamic Jihad won the last armed confrontations between the two sides last month. But 27% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank) think Israel came out a winner while only 12% think Islamic Jihad came out a winner. Surprisingly, 11% think Hamas, who did not participate in the confrontation, came out a winner. The belief that Islamic Jihad won is higher in the West Bank (13%) compared to the Gaza Strip (11%), in cities and villages/towns (13% and 12% respectively) compared to refugee camps (8%), among supporters of third parties (15%) compared to supporters of Hamas and Fatah (12% each).

  Half of the public (50%) says that Hamas’ decision not to become directly involved in the armed exchange between Islamic Jihad and the Israeli army was the correct decision while 37% say it was the wrong decision.  The view that Hamas did the right thing is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (68%) compared to the West Bank (38%), in refugee camps and cities (54% and 53% respectively) compared to villages/towns (35%), among men (54%) compared to women (47%), among the more educated (57%) compared to the less educated (47%), among refugees (59%) compared to non-refugees (43%), among those who work in the public sector (58%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (50%), among the religious (57%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (45% each), and among supporters of Hamas (74%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 57% respectively).

But only 27% expect Hamas’ decision to lead to an improvement in economic conditions in the Gaza Strip while the largest percentage (42%) thinks economic conditions will remain unchanged and 22% think they will worsen. In the Gaza Strip, 34% expect conditions to improve while only 23% of West Bankers think that.

(4) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the two-state solution rises from 28% to 37%
• Support for a one-state solution with equal rights rises from 22% to 30%
• Support for a return to armed confrontations and an armed intifada drops from 55% to 48%
• Support for negotiations rises from 22% to 30%
• 69% look positively at confidence building measures
• 41% are willing to travel via Ramon airport and 55% are unwilling
• 42% support negotiations with Israel under Arab and international sponsorship and 56% are opposed
• 58% are less optimistic about an improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations after the Biden visit to Bethlehem 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 37% and opposition stands at 60%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 28%.   When few details were added, such as “two states for two peoples” along the lines of 1967 with small and equal border modifications, support rose slightly to 38% and opposition dropped to 57%.  But a majority of 64% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 76% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 18% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 70% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 30% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 67% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 22%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 55% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 46% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 55% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 41% chose armed struggle (50% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank), 30% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 22% chose negotiations.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 69% said it looks positively, while 27% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 65% of the public said it viewed these measures positively. A vast majority of 78% looks positively at the Israeli decision to increase the number of laborers from the Gaza Strip who work in Israel; only 20% look at that decision negatively.

We asked the public about its willingness to use the Israeli Ramon airport, located near Elate, instead of the Amman or Cairo airports: 41% expressed willingness to do so while a majority of 55% said it is not willing to do so.  But when we asked the public if it looks positively or negatively about the possibility of allowing Gaza residents to use that airport, the majority (58%) said it looks at such a step positively and only 37% said it looks at it negatively. Willingness to travel via the Ramon airport is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (39%), among those whose age is less than 30 years (48%) compared to those whose age is 30 years or higher (40%), among the somewhat religious (45%) compared to the religious (36%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (59% and 52% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (24%).

Under current conditions, a majority of 68% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about support and opposition to negotiations with Israel under Arab and international sponsorship, 42% were in favor and 56% against. Support for a return to negotiations with Israel under Arab and international sponsorship is higher in refugee camps (57%) compared to villages/towns and cities (45% and 40% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (47%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (39%), among those with the lowest income (45%) compared to those with the highest income (36%), among the somewhat religious (44%) compared to the religious (40%), and among supporters of Fatah (65%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (20% and 46% respectively).

Similarly, when asked about PA negotiations with the current Israeli prime minister, Yair Lapid, only 35% said they opposed such negotiations while 30% said they support negotiations with him on a peace agreement and confidence building measures while 13% said they support negotiations if restricted to a peace agreement and an identical percentage said they support negotiations with him if restricted to confidence building measures. In other words, a total of 43% are in favor of negotiations with Lapid about a peace agreement and an identical percentage is in favor of negotiations with him about confidence building measures.  

The largest percentage (36%) expects Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and form the next government while 21% expect Lapid to win the elections; 26% say neither will win.

61% are opposed, and 34% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the US administration under president Joe Biden.  In light of the visit to Bethlehem by the US president Joe Biden, 53% say they are less optimistic about the prospects for improvement in economic conditions after the visit and the meeting with Abbas while only 16% express optimism and 26% say they are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Similarly, 53% are less optimistic that internal conditions, such as reconciliation or the holding of elections, will improve now after the visit by Biden; 17% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Moreover, 58% are less optimistic that Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as agreement on more confidence building measures or reduction in settlement construction, will see improvement now after the Biden visit; only 13% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Despite the overall lack of optimism, 43% say they now, after the Biden visit, expect the US to increase its aid to the PA while 53% say the do not expect that.

Two-thirds think it was right for Abbas to use the “Holocaust” in reference to Israeli massacres against Palestinians during his visit to Germany; 26% think it was wrong for him to use that term.

(5) Support from the UAE to East Jerusalem hospital:

• 61% think aid from the UAE to al Makasid Hospital helps the steadfastness of the Palestinians
• But only 31% say they welcome aid to residents of East Jerusalem or the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from Arab countries that recently normalized relations with Israel 

We asked about the support provided by the United Arab Emirates to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem: 61% said the support helps the steadfastness of the Palestinians while 36% said it does not help.  We then asked about expectations that other Arab countries, that recently normalized relations with Israel, such as Bahrain and Morocco, would also provide similar support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank: a majority of 54% said it does not expect that while 42% said they expect that.

We then asked the public if it welcomes or does not welcome support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip from these countries that recently normalized relations with Israel: two thirds said the do not and 31% said they do. The percentage of those who welcome aid from these Arab countries is higher in the Gaza Strip (33%) than in the West Bank (30%), in refugee camps (52%) compared to cities and villages/towns (29% and 32% respectively), among men (33%) compared to women (29%), among those whose age is below 30 years (35%) compared to those whose age is 30 and above (30%), among the more educated (34%) compared to the less educated (30%), among those with the highest income (35%) compared to those with the lowest income (29%), among the somewhat religious (34%) compared to the religious (27%), and among supporters of Fatah (46%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (22% and 27% respectively).

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 40% believe that the most vital goal for the Palestinians should be the ending of Israeli occupation and the building of a Palestinian state
• Poverty and unemployment followed by corruption are the two most important problems confronting the Palestinians today while the largest percentage (32%) says the Israeli occupation is the most pressing problem 

40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 17% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 27% (28% in the Gaz Strip and 26% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; another 27% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% (34% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 11% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 8% (11% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (36%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the split or division, and 9% said it is the internal violence.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

3-5 December 2008

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 3 and 5 December 2008. This period witnessed the collapse of the Egyptian efforts to bring Palestinian factions to reconciliation talks in Cairo due to Hamas’s decision to boycott these talks. It also witnessed serious deterioration in the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The poll examines the following topics: domestic issues such as the balance of power, the performance and legitimacy of two governments, that of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad, the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip, the peace process, and attitudes toward and expectations from the Obama administration. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults, 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2008 indicate an end to the slow decline in Hamas’s popularity and continued stability in Fateh’s popularity despite Hamas’s boycott of the reconciliation talks scheduled to take place last month in Cairo. In fact, findings show that the gap between the popularity of President Abbas compared to that of Ismail Haniyeh has narrowed from 14 percentage points in the third quarter to 10 percentage points in the last quarter of 2008. The largest percentage blames both Hamas and Fateh for the collapse of the reconciliation efforts and the continuation of the divisions among Palestinians while smaller but similar percentages blame Fateh or Hamas alone. Positive evaluation of Palestinian conditions in the West Bank remains much higher than the positive evaluation of Palestinian conditions in the Gaza Strip. As we found in our previous poll, almost two thirds share Hamas’s belief that the term of President Abbas ends in the first month of January 2009 as Hamas claims and not in the first month of 2010 as Fateh and the presidency claim. Findings also show that about three quarters support the call by the president to organize new elections in early 2009 if reconciliation talks do not succeed. But we also found that the majority opposes holding elections in the West Bank only, to be followed later by elections in the Gaza Strip that would be organized once reconciliation is achieved.

Findings show stability in public support for the Saudi initiative reaching two thirds. But they indicate significant decline in support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Most interestingly, findings show a majority support for a strong role for the new Obama administration in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. However, a majority of Palestinians does not expect that to happen. Findings also show a majority of Palestinians supporting a strong American intervention to pressure the two sides to accept and implement the Saudi Initiative. They also show that the percentage of support for a similar American intervention to pressure the two sides to accept and implement a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative is higher than the percentage of Palestinian acceptance for that permanent settlement. This might indicate that one reason for Palestinian rejection of that settlement might have to do with lack of trust in the willingness of the other side to implement that settlement.

 (1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• Popularity of Hamas and Fateh remains unchanged despite Hamas’s boycott of the national dialogue in Cairo, Hamas receives 28% and Fateh 42%.

• Gap between Abbas and Haniyeh narrows: if new presidential elections are to take place today, Abbas receives 48%, Haniyeh 38%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 59% and the latter 32%.

• Largest percentage blames Fateh and Hamas together for failure of national dialogue

• 64% believe that Abbas’s term in office ends in January 2009.

• 73% support Abbas call for early and simultaneous presidential and legislative elections in early 2009.

• 88% of the Palestinians say that conditions in Gaza are bad and 40% say conditions in the West Bank are bad.

• Positive evaluation of Haniyeh’s government reaches 36%, positive evaluation of Fayyad’s government reaches 34%

• Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas reaches 46%

• Public is divided over the ability of the new Palestinian security deployment in Hebron: 45% expect the new deployment to lead to enforcement of law and order while 48% expect it will fail in enforcing law and order.

Findings show that Hamas’s popularity remain unchanged despite its boycott of the national dialogue scheduled to take place in Cairo. If new parliamentary elections were to take place today with the approval of all factions, the Change and Reform list of Hamas would receive 28% of the vote (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fateh’s list would received 42% (compared to 43% three months ago). The combined strength of all other factions and parties stands today at 10% (compared to 11% three months ago). The undecided stands today at 20%. In the Gaza Strip, support for Hamas stands at 32% and for Fateh at 46%.  In the West Bank, support for Hamas stands at 25% and Fateh at 39%. If new presidential elections were held today and Abbas was nominated by Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh was nominated by Hamas, 48% would vote for Abbas and 38% for Haniyeh. Three months ago, support for Abbas stood at 53% and for Haniyeh at 39%. In other words, the gap between the two men has decreased from 14 percentage points to 10. In the Gaza Strip, support for Abbas stands at 46% (compared to 42% for Haniyeh), and in the West Bank, support for Abbas stands at 48% (compared to 36% for Haniyeh). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 59% to Haniyeh’s 32%. In the Gaza Strip, support for Barghouti stands at 54% (compared to 39% for Haniyeh), and in the West Bank support for Barghouti stands at 62% (compared to 28% for Haniyeh).

If reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas succeeds and early legislative and presidential elections were to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 39% believe that the main issue that will occupy people’s mind and affect their vote will be the ending of the boycott and blockade and the improvement of living conditions while 29% say the main issue will be the consolidation of the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the realization of national unity. Fighting corruption is believed to be the main issue by 12%, 8% believe the issue will be continuation of resistance to Israeli occupation, and another 8% believe it will be the continuation of the peace process.

The largest percentage (46%) believes that both Fateh and Hamas are responsible for the failure of national reconciliation efforts while only 23% blame Hamas alone and 20% blame Fateh alone. Similarly, only 19% blame Hamas for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 18% blame Fateh; but the majority (55%) blames the two sides together. Palestinians are divided over the main reason for Hamas’s boycott of the dialogue and reconciliation meetings in Cairo: 30% believe it was arrest of Hamas members in the West Bank, 26% believe it was external pressure on Hamas, 17% believe it was due to internal divisions within Hamas, and 10% believe it was due to Egypt’s siding with Fateh against Hamas.

A majority of 64% believe that the term of President Abbas ends in January 2009 while only 24% believe it ends one year later, in January 2010. When we asked those who believe the president’s term ends in January 2009 who should in that case be the president on that date, the overwhelming majority (72%) said new elections should take place on that date while only 15% said it should be the Speaker of the Palestinian parliament and 7% said that Abbas should stay in office after that date.  Similarly, 73% support the call by the president to organize presidential and parliamentary elections in early 2009 if the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas fails. But support drops considerably to 40% for elections that would take place in the West Bank only to be followed later by elections in the Gaza Strip after reconciliation is achieved.

Support for presidential and legislative elections in the West Bank now and in Gaza later increases in the West Bank (45%) compared to the Gaza Strip (32%), among those who identify themselves as somewhat religious (43%) compared to those who identify themselves as religious (38%), among supporters of the peace process (43%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (33%), among public sector employees (46%) compared to private sector employees (39%), among those who say they intend to vote for Fateh (48%) compared to those who say they intend to vote for Hamas (33%).

An overwhelming majority of 88% describes conditions of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as bad or very bad while only 40% describe conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank as bad or very bad. Similarly, only 25% describe conditions of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, under Haniyeh’s government, as good or very good while 36% describe the same conditions in the West Bank, under Abbas, as good or very good. Despite this, 61% of the residents of the Gaza Strip, compared to only 48% of the residents of the West Bank, say they and their families feel these days that they are safe and secure. The percentage of those wishing to immigrate is much higher in the Gaza Strip (reaching 40%) than in the West Bank (standing at 25%).

Positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh’s government stands at 36% and positive evaluation of the performance of Fayyad’s government stands at 34%. These results are similar to those obtained in our last poll three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh’s government stands today at 42% (compared to 32% in the West Bank), and in the West Bank, positive evaluation of the performance of Fayyad’s government stands today at 35% (compared to 33% in the Gaza Strip). 28% say that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one and 30% say Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one. 29% say both governments are not legitimate and 9% say both are legitimate. Three months ago, 33% said Fayyad’s government was the legitimate one while 27% said Haniyeh’s government was the legitimate one. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas decreases slightly from 48% three months ago to 46% in this poll. Satisfaction with Abbas reaches 47% in the West Bank compared to 43% in the Gaza Strip.

With the recent deployment of Palestinian security forces in Hebron, the public is divided over the issue of capacity: 45% believe the new deployment will succeed in enforcing law and order while 48% believe it will not succeed. Belief regarding the goal of the Hebron security forces’ deployment is also split with 31% believing that the goal is to enforce law and order while an identical percentage believes that the goal is to disarm the resistance forces. 23% say the goal is to achieve both while 9% say the goal is neither.

(2) Peace Process   

• 53% accept and 46% reject a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people; 48% think a majority of Palestinians support the mutual recognition while 38% think a majority of Israelis support it.

• 66% support and 30% oppose the Saudi Initiative that calls for an Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967 in return for an Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of relations with it.

• 72% would support reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement and establishing a Palestinian state recognized by Israel.

• 41% accept and 57% reject a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support varies for the various elements with the highest level (55%) going to end of conflict and the lowest (27%) going to the demilitarization of the Palestinian state so that it would not have an army. 45% think a majority of Palestinians would accept such a settlement and 40% think a majority of Israelis would accept it.

• 75% expect Palestinian-Israeli negotiations launched by the Annapolis process to fail and only 15% expect them to succeed.

• 70% believe that the chances for the creation of an independent Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 29% think chances are medium or high. 

• 32% expect the Likud to win the next Israeli elections, 18% expect Kadima to win, and 18% expect Labor to win.

• 47% expect the Israeli elections to have no impact on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, 23% expect them to lead to cessation of negotiations, and 18% expect them to improve chances of success in the negotiations.

• 48% support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 49% oppose such attacks.   

• Three quarters (74%) support renewal of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip while 23% oppose the renewal.

Findings indicate that 53% support and 46% oppose a permanent settlement in which each side recognizes the national identity of the other with the Palestinians recognizing Israel as the state for the Jewish people and the Israelis recognizing the Palestinian state as the state for the Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict, including Jerusalem and refugees, have been resolved. Findings show that 48% think a majority of Palestinians support this recognition while 42% think a majority does not. 38% think a majority of Israelis support this mutual recognition and 49% think a majority of Israelis does not.

A majority of 66% support and 30% oppose the Saudi Initiative. The initiative calls for a full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the resolution of the refugee problem in an agreed and just manner based on UN resolution 194, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. In return, the initiative calls for a recognition of Israel and its right to live in secure borders by all Arab states and the establishment of normal relations with it. After a permanent settlement is reached and a Palestinian state is established along side Israel, 72% would support reconciliation between the two peoples and 26% would oppose such reconciliation. These percentages are similar to those obtained during the last six months.

But support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative drops from 47% last December to 41% in this poll. Opposition to the terms of this settlement stands today at 57%. Support for the various elements of the settlement varies from a high of 55% to the item related to end of conflict, followed by support for borders compromise (based on the 1967 borders with mutual and equal territorial exchange) receiving 54%, followed by the refugee solution (40%), Jerusalem as a capital for the Palestinian state after the annexation of its settlements to Israel as part of a territorial exchange (36%), followed by the terms of sovereignty and security arrangements (35%), and finally, the element related to the demilitarization of the Palestinian state so that it would not have an army (27%).

Public expectation for the chances of success of diplomacy is grim. Three quarters of the Palestinians expect the negotiations unleashed by the Annapolis process to fail and only 15% expect them to succeed. Similarly, 70% believe the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim to non-existent while only 29% think the chances are medium or high. The largest percentage (32%) expects the Likud to win the next Israeli elections. But 47% believe those elections will have no impact on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations while 23% expect them to lead to cessation of negotiations and 18% expect them to improve the chances for successful diplomacy.

Finally, findings show a decrease in the level of support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel from 55% last June to 48% in this poll. Support for armed attacks against Israelis increase in the Gaza Strip (60%) compared to the West Bank (41%), among those who identify themselves as religious (54%) compared to those who identify themselves as somewhat religious (42%), among those opposed to the peace process (68%) compared to those who support the peace process (43%), among those whose age is between 18-27 (51%) compared to those whose age is over 47 (45%), among those who have a BA degree (50%) compared to the illiterates (37%), among students (54%) compared to employees (44%), and among those who would vote for Hamas (74%) compared to those who would vote for Fateh (39%).  Despite the support for violence among about half of the respondents, three quarters (74%) support renewal of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip while 23% oppose the renewal. Last September 81% of the Palestinians supported the ceasefire and 15% opposed it.

(3) Expectations from and attitudes toward the Obama administration

• Only 29% expect a stronger American role in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict now that Obama has been elected the next US president. 59% expect no change in the current US role as a result of Obama’s election.

• 57% want a stronger American role under Obama in the peace process and 35% want the US not to intervene in that process.

• If the US under the leadership of Obama played a stronger role in the peace process, such intervention would lead to a successful outcome in the view of 49%, but 30% expect such an intervention to lead to failure in the peace process.

• 66% believe that if the US intervened strongly in the peace process, such intervention would benefit Israel more, 10% expect the Palestinians to benefit more, and 18% expect the two sides to benefit.

• 56% expect the election of Obama to lead to a stronger American military, economic, and political support for Israel while 28% expect no change in US position, and only 7% expect US support to weaken.

• If the Obama administration pressured the two sides to accept and implement the Saudi initiative, 56% think the Palestinian side should accept such an American intervention and 39% think the Palestinian side should reject it.

•  If the Obama administration pressured the two sides to accept and implement a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva initiative, 47% think the Palestinian side should accept such an American intervention and 49% think the Palestinian side should reject it.

Findings show that only 29% of the Palestinians expect a stoner role for the new Obama administration in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process while 59% expect to see no change in the current role of the US. 7% expect the US to play a weaker role. But findings indicate that most Palestinians (57%) want a stronger American role while 35% want a weaker role in the peace process. Only 4% want the new Obama administration to continue to play its current role. Support for a stronger American role in the peace process increases among women (60%) compared to men (54%), among the somewhat religious (61%) compared to the religious (54%), among supporters of the peace process (65%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (30%), among those whose age is over 47 (60%) compared to those between 18-27 years of age (53%), among illiterates (63%) compared to those who have a BA degree (56%), among housewives (61%) compared to students (53%), among Fateh voters (74%) compared to Hamas voters (38%), among those who are certain that such intervention would lead to a successful outcome (87%) compared to those who are certain it will lead to failure (25%), and among those who believe such intervention would benefit both sides (83%) compared to those who think Israel would benefit more (48).

Half of the Palestinians (49%) believe that if the US intervened strongly in the peace process, the process would succeed while 30% expect it to fail. 16% expect American intervention to have no impact. But findings show that two thirds of the Palestinians (66%) believe Israel will benefit more from the American intervention while 18% expect the two sides to benefit, and only 10% expect the Palestinians to benefit. In this regard, 56% expect US military, economic and political support for Israel to increase after Obama’s elections while 28% expect no change in US support for Israel and 7% expect a decrease in US support.

If the Obama administration decided to pressure the Palestinian and Israeli sides to accept and implement the Saudi Initiative, 56% believe the Palestinians should accept such intervention and 39% believe they should not. Half of the Palestinians (49%) expect a majority of Israelis to accept this American pressure while 43% expect a majority of Israelis to reject it. If the Obama administration decided to pressure the two sides to accept and implement a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative, Palestinian acceptance of American pressure would decrease to 47% while 49% would reject it. 56% of the Palestinians believe a majority of Israelis would accept such American pressure and 36% believe a majority of Israelis would reject it.

Support for accepting American pressure on both sides to accept and implement a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton parameters and the Geneva Initiative increases in cities (50%) compared to refugee camps (37%), among men (53%) compared to women (41%), among those who are somewhat religious (51%) compared to those who are religious (43%), among supporters of the peace process (50%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (35%), among those whose age is over 47 (52%) compared to those whose age is between 18-27 (42%), among non refugees (49%) compared to refugees (44%), among those who have a BA degree (54%) compared to illiterates (40%), and among Fateh voters (60%) compared to Hamas voters (31%).....Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-19 March 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the announcement of a presidential decree to hold parliamentary elections on 22 May and presidential elections on 31 July 2021. It also witnessed a significant rise in number of coronavirus deaths and infections. The coronavirus vaccine was not made available in large numbers by the PA government during the period before the conduct of the poll. A limited vaccination process did however start using a small quantity that was made available to the PA. The process however was marred by accusations of favoritism and lack of transparency. The ICC issued a statement affirming jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories. Joe Biden assumed his position as the new US president during this period. Israel announced the holding of new parliamentary elections to take place on 23 March. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The focus of our poll for the first quarter of 2021 has been placed on the expected election process. Findings show that the overwhelming majority is still in favor of holding these elections and that the public is much more optimistic that these elections will indeed take place soon. This realization seems to have impacted attitudes and voting intentions, which are now probably more serious and calculated. The poll sought to explore public priorities and expectations in these elections. In particular, we sought to examine the likely consequences of the election results, particularly if Hamas wins and forms a government. The poll sought also to understand the implications of the emergence of rivals to Fatah, from within its own ranks, to the movement’s performance in the elections.

Findings show that the top priorities in these elections for the voters are four: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, improving economic conditions, combating corruption, and the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip. The largest percentage believes that a Hamas electoral victory would most likely have a negative impact on all these priorities except combating corruption where no negative impact is expected. These expectations might have affected voting intentions as the findings indicate a rise in the vote for Fatah and a decline in the willingness to vote for Hamas compared to our findings three months ago.

Fatah does have its own problems, particularly in the Gaza Strip, because of the probable competition over the likely Fatah’s votes from two independent electoral lists of Mohammad Dahlan and Naser al Qidwah. More seriously, if Marwan Barghouti decides to have his own electoral list, Fatah’s vote would split into two equivalent shares. As for other third parties outside Fatah and Hamas, such as those of the left, Salam Fayyad’s, Hasan Khraishah’s, and others, it is probably too early to reach definitive conclusions at this stage regarding the likelihood that most of these lists would pass the 1.5% electoral threshold.  The findings do show that al Mubadarah, led by Mustafa Barghouti, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine would probably succeed in passing that threshold. For the presidency, the findings indicate a limited increase in public demand for Abbas’ resignation despite the fact that he is doing better than he did three months ago in a competition with Hamas’ leader Ismael Haniyyeh. The findings make it clear however that the public prefers to see Marwan Barghouti as the next president of the PA as he is preferred over all other potential candidates including Fatah’s Abbas and Hamas’ Haniyyeh.

In other domestic issues, public attitudes seem stable compared to three months ago. This applies to the perceptions of safety and security as well as corruption within the PA. There is however a limited rise in optimism regarding reconciliation and in the perception that people can criticize the PA without fear.  Slightly less than what we found three months ago, a large segment of the public, almost half, is still reluctant or unwilling to be vaccinated.

On the peace process, findings show that support for the two-state solution remains unchanged. Similarly, public preference for armed struggle vs. negotiations remains almost unchanged. But findings do show that a majority is opposed to a return to an unconditional bi-lateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiation despite the optimism generated by the election of the new Biden Administration. On the other hand, despite its recent decision to assert jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories, the public is not optimistic about the ability of the International Criminal Court, to restrict Israeli behavior in the occupied territories. In fact, a large majority thinks that no Israeli official will ever be prosecuted by the court.   

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• Great increase in public expectations that elections will take place soon from 32% to 61%
• But only 42% expect the elections to be free and fair
• In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the largest percentage wants Fatah to form the next government
• IF Marwan Barghouti forms a separate electoral list, Fatah would split into two equivalent parts and if Dahlan and Qidwah form their own separate electoral lists, Fatah would be weakened
• 57% support the formation of a joint Fatah-Hamas list
• In new legislative elections, Fatah receives 43% of the vote and Hamas 30%; and in an election in which Dahlan and Qidwah participate with two electoral lists, Fatah receives only 32% of the vote
• Top priorities of the voters are four: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, improving economic conditions, combating corruption, and removing the siege on the Gaza Strip
• Hamas is seen less able to remove the siege and improve economic conditions and Fatah is seen as less able to combat corruption
• Most respondents want Marwan Barghouti president of the PA and in a trilateral election between Marwan Barghouti, Mahmoud Abbas, and Ismail Haniyyeh, the first receives 48% of the vote, the second 29% and the third 19% 

76% demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections and 61% expect parliamentary elections to take place soon. Three months ago, only 32% expected the holding of Palestinian elections soon. If Israel refuses to allow elections to take place in the occupied City of East Jerusalem, 65% believe elections should nonetheless take place and that East Jerusalemites should be allowed to vote in places in the Jerusalem district just outside the city limits; 27% oppose that and demand the cancelation of elections if Israel does not allow East Jerusalemites to vote in their city. Three months ago, only 56% supported, and 39% opposed, the holding general elections if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem.  But only 42% believe the elections will be free and fair and 48% think they will not be free and fair. Moreover, 69% believe that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah will not accept the results and 60% say that if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will not accept that outcome. 

Legislative Elections:

In an open-ended question, we asked the public to name the party or faction it nominates to lead the next PA government: 38% (40% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) nominated Fatah; 22% (15% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) nominated Hamas, 5% nominated an independent list, 2% nominated the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 4% nominated other groups, and 29% did not nominate any party of faction. When asked about its expectations for the winner, 45% expected Fatah to win, 23% Hamas, 18% third or newly created parties.

The poll sought to assess the role played by three prominent individuals associated with Fatah on the likely consequences for the movement if the three decide to run with their own independent lists:

A majority of 57% say they support and 38% say they oppose the formation of a joint Fatah-Hamas list to compete in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Support for a joint Fatah-Hamas list is higher in the West Bank (62%) than in the Gaza Strip (49%), in villages/towns and refugee camps (67% and 64% respectively) compared to cities (54%), among those who finished elementary school only (75%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (49%), among women (59%) compared to men (54%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (53%), among the married (58%) compared to the unmarried (51%), among those with the least income (53%) compared to those with the highest income (42%), among the religious (61%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (39% and 55% respectively), and among supporters of third parties and Hamas (65% and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (49%).    

We asked the public which electoral list it will vote for in the upcoming elections. We sought to ascertain how respondents will vote in four different scenarios: (1) when the electoral lists are identical to those of 2006 elections, (2) when a joint Fatah-Hamas list is formed and Marwan Barghouti forms his own list, (3) when no joint list is created but Marwan Barghouti forms his own independent list, and (4) when no joint list is created and a Naser al Qidwah’s list replaces that of Marwan Barghouti’s. Here are the findings among those who say they intend to vote:

The largest percentage (28%) says that the top priority for Palestinian elections should be to restore unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 23% say it is improving economic conditions; 17% say it is to combat corruption; 12% say it is the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip; 11% say it is the strengthening of resistance to occupation, 4% say it is to increase the prospects for peace, and 2% say it is to create a democratic political system. When asked who is the most able to deliver the top priority selected by the respondents, 31% selected Fatah, 22% Hamas, and 9% third parties. 15% say all the competing parties and factions can equally deliver on their priorities while 19% say none can deliver.  

We asked the public to speculate about the likely consequences of a Hamas victory on six issues: (1) the siege over the Gaza Strip, (2) Gaza-West Bank unity, (3) economic conditions, (4) corruption in the PA, (5) Hamas’s response to the Quartet conditions, and (6) Israel’s response to Hamas’ victory. These are the findings:

Similarly, we asked the public about the consequences of a Fatah victory for two issues: (1) corruption, and (2) West Bank-Gaza Strip unity. These are the findings: 

	Corruption: 16% say corruption in the PA will decrease and 36% think it will increase.
	Unity: 33% think separation will be consolidated while 22% think unity will be consolidated.

Presidential elections:

In an open-ended question, we asked the public to state the name of the person it wants to be the next president of the PA. The largest percentage (22%) says Marwan Barghouti, 14% Ismail Haniyyeh, 9% Mahmoud Abbas, 7% Dahlan, 3% Khalid Mishal, 2% Mohammad Shtayyeh, 2% Mustafa Barghouti, 1% Yahya Sinwar, 6% selected various different names, and a third of the public did not know or declined to mention a name.

If Fatah nominates Abbas as its candidate for the presidential elections, a majority of 57% of the public would view him as the wrong choice believing Fatah has better candidates; only 23% of the public think Abbas is the best Fatah candidate. When asked to name a better candidate, 49% named Marwan Barghouti, 12% Mohammad Dahlan, 5% Mohammad Shtayyeh, and 4% Nasir al Qidwah.  We asked, in a closed-ended question, about potential Abbas’ successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new presidential election, 40% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal and Mustafa Barghouti by 5% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%. 

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% and the latter 46% of the votes (compared to 50% for Haniyeh and 43% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the votes (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 64% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% three months ago). IF the competition was between Abbas, Haniyyeh, and Marwan Barghouti, the first receives 19% of the vote, the second 29%, and the third 48%. In this three-sided competition, the vote for Marwan Barghouti is higher in the West Bank (55%) than in the Gaza Strip (40%), in the districts of Jericho, Bethlehem, Salfit, Nablus, Qalqilia, Tulkarm, Hebron, and Khanyounis (83%, 76%, 73%, 71%, 65%, 64%, 54%, and 53% respectively) compared to the districts of Gaza City, Ramallah, Tobas, and Jenin (22%, 33%, 39%, and 44% respectively), among those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (54%) compared to those whose age is over 40 years (43%), among women (51%) compared to men (45%), among  the somewhat religious (58%) compared to the religious (35%), among supporters of Fatah (60%) compared to supporters of Hamas (14%), and among those who think peace negotiations is the best means to end the occupation (62%) compared to those who prefer armed struggle (35%). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 63% and Haniyeh 33%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% and the latter 44%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 47% and Haniyyeh 47%. 

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 35% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. These figures are similar to those obtained three months ago. 68% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 26% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 66% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip. 

(2) The Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• 43% do not wish to take the coronavirus vaccine
• 62% think there is a lack of fairness and transparency in the distribution of the vaccine
• 55% are dissatisfied with the government’s efforts to secure the vaccine 

A majority of 55% (65% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank) says that it is willing to take the vaccine when available or has already received it; 43% (35% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank) say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available.

A majority of 62% believes that the vaccination process in the West Bank has so far been lacking in transparency and justice while 33% believe the process has been transparent and just.  55% (36% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank) are dissatisfied with the efforts made by the PA to obtain the vaccine and 43% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 30% in the West Bank) are satisfied. Half of the public (50%) are dissatisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 47% are satisfied. Dissatisfaction in the West Bank stands at 61% and in the Gaza Strip at 34%.  The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 60% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 56% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister stands at 45%. 

(3) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 68% in the Gaza Strip and 64% in the West Bank. But the demand for emigration stands at 40% in the Gaza Strip and 23% in the West Bank
• 84% think there is corruption in PA institutions and 70% think there is corruption in the institutions run by Hamas
• 51% view the PA as a burden and 44% as an asset
• Only 34% are optimistic about reconciliation
• The majority does not think the Shtayyeh government will succeed in securing reconciliation, reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or improving economic conditions 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 68% and in the West Bank at 64%. On the other hand, 30% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 40% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 24% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and only 25% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 70% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. 43% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 53% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 58% think they cannot.

The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a slight majority of 51% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 41% viewed the PA as a burden.  34% are optimistic and 61% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.

A majority of 58% oppose and 37% support making payments to the families of martyrs and prisoners based on need assessment and number of family members rather than on the act committed by the martyr or the number of years in jail.

About two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 61% expect failure; only 32% expect success. These results reflect a little increase in public expectations compared to three months ago when only 28% expected success. But when asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, half of the public expects success and 44% expects failure. Three months ago, 61% expected failure in holding elections. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 60% expects failure and 32% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Palestine TV viewership has become the highest standing at 19%, followed by Al Jazeera TV, at 16%, followed by Maan, Al Aqsa TV, and Palestine Today TV at 11% each,  Al Arabiya at 5%, al Manar at 3% and finally al Mayadeen at 1%. 

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process, Israeli elections, and the implications of the recent ICC decision:

• 40% support and 57% oppose the concept of the two-state solution; and 55% think this solution is no longer practical due to settlements’ expansion
• The best means of ending occupation is armed struggle according to 37% of the public while 36% think it is negotiations.
• Support for the one-state solution stands at 33%
• Two thirds do not expect any restraints on the Israeli policy in the occupied Palestinian territories as a result of the ICC decision on jurisdiction over Palestine and the overwhelming majority does not think the court will prosecute any Israeli officials  

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 57%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  A majority of 55% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 38% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 26% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 21% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 38% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 29% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 37% chose armed struggle, 36% negotiations, and 20% popular resistance. Three months ago, 39% chose armed struggle and 35% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 58% opposes and 28% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But only 51% think the PA should not return to peace negotiations with Israel under the sponsorship of the Quartet, made up of the US, Russia, the EU, and the UN; 43% support such return to negotiations.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 66% supported joining more international organizations; 59% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 43% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 42% supported dissolving the PA; and 33% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis.

In the upcoming Israeli elections, scheduled to take place today, 49% expect the Likud (under the leadership of Netanyahu) and its allies among the extreme right and the religious parties to win the elections while 23% expected victory to go to a coalition of right wing, center and leftist parties under the leadership of Saar, Gantz, Lapid, and others; 28% do not know.

Two thirds (66%) of the public do not expect the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) confirming its jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories to lead to restrictions on Israeli behavior in these territories while a quarter (25%) expects it to impose at least some restrictions.  Similarly, a large majority of 73% believes that there will be no trials at the ICC for any Israeli officials; 21% think one or more Israeli officials might be prosecuted by that court. 

(5) Expectations from the Biden Administration and attitudes regarding resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under its leadership:

• Half of the public expects the return of US economic aid but 51% think the Palestinian-Israeli peace policy of the new US administration will not be different from that of its predecessor
• But 44% support a return to peace talks with Israel under US sponsorship; 48% oppose such a return 

Now that Biden has won the US presidential elections, 50% expect, and 41% do not expect, the US to resume financial support to the PA. But a slight majority of 51% does not expect Biden’s policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be more balanced and less biased in favor of Israel; 41% expect it to be more balanced and less biased compared to the previous US administration. While 48% are opposed to a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the US leadership. 44% are supportive of such return. Support for a return to negotiations under US leadership is higher in the West Bank (45%) than in the Gaza Strip (42%), in cities and refugee camps (45% each) compared to villages/towns (34%), among businessmen and employees (61% and 50% respectively) compared to farmers and professionals (13% and 40% respectively), among the married (44%) compared to the unmarried (39%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (56% and 49% respectively) compared to the religious (36%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (57% and 55% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%), and among those whose age is over 50 years (46%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (42%).   

(6) Ten years after the Arab Spring:

• About two-thirds recall that they felt sympathy with the demonstrators of the Arab Spring when the revolutions were first launched ten years ago, but most think the Arab Spring left a negative impact on Palestinian conditions
• One third of the public thinks the Arab Spring revolutions sought freedom, 28% think they sought a way out of poverty and unemployment, and 20% think they sought to combat corruption 

Ten years after the Arab Spring, 73% say they felt sympathy at the time with the Arab demonstrators while 18% say they did not feel sympathy. The public is divided into three groups in its evaluation of what the Arab demonstrators wanted: 33% say they wanted freedom from regime oppression, 28% say they wanted a way out of poverty and unemployment, and 20% say they wanted to combat corruption. Only 5% say they wanted to replace the existing regimes with Islamists and another 5% say they wanted to express opposition to pro-Western policies of their regimes.

37% believe the Arab Spring has left a negative impact on Palestinian conditions while 18% think it left a positive impact and 37% say it had neither negative nor positive impact.  A majority of 56% indicates that it did not feel at the time that there was a need for similar demonstrations in Palestine while 36% say they felt such need at that time. 

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• The top most vital goal should be the creation of a Palestinian state after ending the occupation according to 43% of the public
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment according to 30% of the public followed by corruption and the continuation of occupation  

Findings show that 43% of the public believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings. Moreover, the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 30%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%,  the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 6%.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 24 September 2016. The period before the poll witnessed the suspension of the process of local elections as a result of a decision by the Palestinian high court. It also witnessed an increase in cases of security breakdown especially in the Nablus area, major disruptions in access to running water throughout the West Bank, continued debate on the French Initiative, an acceptance by President Abbas of a Russian invitation for a meeting in Moscow with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, and others. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers attitudes regarding local elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the increase in cases of security breakdown, water shortages, reconciliation, the peace process, the French Initiative, and the Russian invitation. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In addition to the usual trend issues, this poll focused on three matters: local elections, the water crisis that affected West Bank residents during the summer, and the recent rise in the number of incidents of internal security breakdown. Findings show that a majority of the public is dissatisfied with the decision of the high court to suspend the local election process and views it as a political decision aiming at cancelling the elections. If local elections are held today, the public is certain that Hamas will win in the Gaza Strip but it expects Fatah to win in the West Bank. Findings also indicate that a clear majority of West Bankers have suffered from water shortages during this past summer and that most of those who experienced water shortages had to buy water in tanks. While a large percentage of the public blames Israel for the water crisis, because it reduced water allocation to the Palestinian territories, a larger percentage places the blame on the Palestinian side. With regard to recent internal security breakdowns, the public sees three drivers: weak and inconsistent performance by the PA security services, weak courts and justice system, and a surge in family and societal conflicts.

There is no doubt that a great part of the motivation for the public rejection of the high court decision regarding local elections, despite the fact that these elections will take place under conditions of national and territorial disunity, is related to a democratic impulse. This attitude appears at odd with past findings in which national unity impulses trumped democratic ones. It is clear from the findings that the public believes that a successful holding of local elections throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will significantly improve the chances for holding presidential and parliamentary elections that have not been held for more than a decade. On the other hand, it is clear that the national unity impulse is not totally absent. About one third of the public is unhappy about the fact that local elections, if held, will take place under conditions of disunity. Indeed, a slight majority rejects the idea of holding parliamentary and presidential elections under the same conditions. It is worth noting that there are no significant differences between attitudes of the residents of the West Bank compared to those in the Gaza Strip regarding all the issues mentioned above, indicating perhaps that the motivation for both sides is not related to geography or region. 

Compared to our findings three months ago, current findings indicate a strengthening of three developments found in the second quarter of 2016: (1) support for armed action continues to decline; (2) support for the French Initiative increases slightly; and (3) Fatah’s popularity improves somewhat compared to that of Hamas and demand for Abbas’ resignation decreases. Nonetheless, the current level of support for an armed intifada remains high and a majority opposes the Russian invitation for a meeting between Abbas and Netanyahu in Moscow. Moreover, the public remains highly pessimistic about the French Initiative’s chances of success. Finally, Hamas’ candidate for the presidency, Ismail Haniyeh remains more popular than Abbas.  

(1) Local elections:

• 61% are dissatisfied with the high court’s decision to suspend the local elections process and 60% view it as politically motivated.
• If local elections are held, 50% say that the most important consideration for their vote is the ability of the electoral lists to deliver services; 31% say it is the ability to defend national rights.
• In local elections, 35% say that Fatah lists are the most able to deliver services and 17% say Hamas lists are the most able to do so.
• 28% say that Fatah local election lists, and 26% say Hamas local election lists, are the most able to defend national rights.
• 48% expect the cancelation of the local elections and 40% expect local elections to take place soon.
• The largest percentage expects Hamas to win in the Gaza Strip; in the West Bank, the largest percentage expects Fatah to win

A majority of 61% is displeased with the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice to temporarily suspend the local election process and 29% are pleased. Findings show that 60% believe that the decision was politically motivated and aimed at scuttling the election process while 31% believe that the decision was a legal one and aimed at correcting the election process.  Dissatisfaction with the court’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (63%) than in the West Bank (60%); among t hose whose age is 50 and above (68%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (52%); among Hamas supporters (77%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 61% respectively); among residents of cities (64%) compared to residents of villages and refugee camps (48% and 53% respectively); among men (64%) compared to women (57%); among the religious (64%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (50% and 60% respectively).

54% say that not holding local elections in the occupied East Jerusalem is not a good reason to stop local elections in the rest of the Palestinian territories. Similarly, 57% say that the fact that courts in the Gaza Strip, under Hamas control, ruled on election cases submitted to them in the Strip is not a good reason to stop local elections.  35% believe that Fatah and Hamas together wish to cancel local elections while 23% believe that it is Fatah that wishes to cancel these elections; only 14% believe that it is Hamas who wishes to cancel the elections.

41% say they have not registered to participate in local elections while 50% say they have registered. Among those who have registered, 81% say they intend to participate in the elections if and when they are held.  50% of those who intend to participate in the local elections say that the most important voting consideration is the ability of the electoral list to deliver services such as water, electricity, roads and other matters of daily life; 31% say that the most important consideration is the ability of the list to defend the rights of the Palestinian people and to contribute to the ending of the Israeli occupation; 9% say it is to serve the interests of the family; and 9% say the most important consideration is the support of the political party they are affiliated with. When evaluating the ability of the various electoral lists to meet the various considerations, 35% believe that the list supported by Fatah is the most able to deliver services while 17% believe that the list supported by Hamas is the most able to deliver services; 15% say it is the list of independents and professionals while only 3% say it is the list supported by the Left.  With regard to the ability to defend national rights and contribute to ending occupation, 28% believe that the list supported by Fatah is the most able to do that while 26% believe that the list supported by Hamas is the most able to do that; 11% say it is the list of independents and professionals while only 2% say it is the list supported by the Left.

The largest percentage (48%) believes that the local elections will be called off but 40% believe they will take place soon. If local elections do take place soon, the largest percentage (39%) believes they will assist in the process of reconciliation while 32% believe they will weaken the process of reconciliation and 25% think they will have no impact.  If local elections are held soon, a majority of 56% expects Hamas lists or lists supported by Hamas, and 21% expect Fatah lists or lists supported by Fatah, to win in the Gaza Strip. With regard to election outcome in the West Bank, 44% expect Fatah lists or lists supported by Fatah, and 26% expect Hamas lists or lists supported by Hamas, to win. Expectations of election outcome differ in the Gaza Strip compared to the West Bank. For example, while 66% of West Bankers expect Hamas lists would win in the Gaza Strip, the percentage among Gazans drops to 37%.   Moreover, while 36% of Gazans believe Fatah lists are likely to win in the local election in the Gaza Strip, the percentage drops to 14% among West Bankers. These differences diminish somewhat when predicting the outcome of the local elections in the West Bank: 34% of Gazans compared to 22% of West Bankers expect Hamas would win and 34% of Gazans and 49% of West Bankers expect Fatah would win.  More than three quarters of the public (76%) support, and 18% oppose, the participation of West Bank refugee camps in the local elections.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• Demand for Abbas’ resignation decreases from 65% t0 61%.
• In presidential elections between President Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the latter receives 48% and the former 45%.
• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the latter receives 36% and the former 58%.
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 32% and Fatah 37%.
• A majority of 51% rejects holding presidential and parliamentary elections under conditions of disunity identical to those under which local elections might, with public approval, be held.
• 42% believe that Fatah and president Abbas are the ones who impede the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections; only 22% put the blame on Hamas.

61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 33% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 65% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 58% in the West Bank and 65% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh;  Khalid Mishal and Mohammad Dahlan receive 5% each, Rami al Hamdallah receive and Mustapha Barghouti receive 4% each; Salam Fayyad receives 3%, and Saeb Erekat 1%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% today compared to 34% three months ago. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip.  If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 48% (compared to 48% three months ago) and the latter 45% (compared to 43% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 47% of the vote (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 50% (compared to 49% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 43% (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh 46% (compared to 47% three months ago).  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 21%, Barghouti 41% and Haniyeh 33%. And if presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 37% say they would vote for Fatah, 7% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 24% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 31% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and for Fatah at 39% (compared to 35% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 34% three months ago).

Despite supporting the holding of local elections under current conditions in which Hamas has effective control over the Gaza Strip and in which the PA under Abbas and the Reconciliation Government controls the West Bank, a slim majority of 51% opposes, and 42% support, holding presidential and parliamentary elections under identical conditions.  59% believe, and 32% do not believe, that a successful holding of local elections would hasten the holding of parliamentary and presidential election. A plurality of 42% believes that Fatah and president Abbas are the ones who are impeding the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in the Palestinian territories while only 22% believe that Hamas is the real impediment.

(3) Domestic and security conditions, Allenby Bridge terminal, and UNRWA:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 48% in the Gaza Strip and 42% in the West Bank.
• 46% of Gazans and 29% of West Bankers want to immigrate to other countries.
• The belief that there is corruption in the PA institutions stands at 79%; only 16% believe there is press freedom in the West Bank and 14% believe there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip.
• 47% believe that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 46% believe it is an asset.
• 59% oppose and 26% support the return of Mohammad Dahlan to Fatah.
• 57% believe that the recent death of a detainee in Nablus due to beating by the PA security services was deliberate.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 15% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 48%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 42%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 44% and in the West Bank at 44%.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 46%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 29%. Three months ago 45% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Maan TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by al Jazeera TV (at 16%), Hamas’ al Aqsa TV (at 15%), Palestine TV at 14%, Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) at 11%, Al Arabiya at 6%, al Quds TV at 4%, and al Mayadeen at 2%. 

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  16% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 14% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  Only 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority without fear.

47% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 46% view it as an asset. In light of Arab pressure on Abbas to unify Fatah ranks, 59% oppose and 26% support the return of Mohammad Dahlan to Fatah. Support for Dahlan’s return to Fatah is higher in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (19%); among Fatah supporters (46%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (17% and 22% respectively); in refugee camps (37%) compared to cities and villages (25% each); among men (29%) compared to women (23%); among the somewhat religious (30%) compared to the religious (21%); among refugees (30%) compared to non-refugees (24%); and among those working in the public sector (36%) compared to those working in the private sector (28%).

47% believe that the goal of the security campaigns occasionally carried out by the Palestinian security services is to enforce law and order; but 41% believe that these campaigns aim at cracking down on those who are opposed to the PA.  A majority of 57% believes that the recent death of a detainee from Nablus after being beaten by members of the PA security services was intentional while only 25% believe it was unintended mistake.  The public is divided on the main factors behind the recent incidents of security breakdown in the West Bank: 36% of the public believe that the main reason is the weakness of the PA security establishment and its failure to enforce the law on a continuous basis; 30% believe the reason is the rise in family and societal conflicts; and 29% believe that a weak court and justice system is the main reason for it.

33% of the public support the new high school (Tawjihi) system and 25% do not support it; 17% neither support nor oppose it and 22% have not heard about it.  91% of the public would like to see the Allenby Bridge Crossing open on 24-hour basis; however, only 46% expect that to happen.  An overwhelming majority of 79% is worried, and 19% are not worried, that recent reductions in the services provided by UNRWA to Palestinian refugees might lead to a gradual abandonment of its responsibilities to those refugees.

(4) Water Shortages:

• 58% of West Bankers indicate that their areas of residence have been affected by water shortages during this past summer and 64% of those affected indicate that they had to buy water by tanks.
• 45% blame Israel for the water shortages because it reduced the quantities of water made available to Palestinians; but 49% place the blame on the Palestinian side.
• 67% believe that there is no justice in water allocation between the various Palestinian localities and 48% believe there is no justice in water allocation to various neighborhoods in the area where they live.
• 55% believe that the PA should deal with the water crisis by digging more wells even if this measure leads to confrontations with the Israeli army.

46% of the public (58% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip) indicate that the areas where they live have suffered from water shortages during this past summer as a result of a decrease in the quantity of water allocated to them; 50% indicate that their areas did not suffer shortages. Shortages have been reported highest among residents of villages and towns (65%) compared to cities and refugee camps (43% and 45% respectively). Shortages are very high in the governorates of Jenin (79%), Hebron (76%), and Nablus and Salfit (75% each) followed by Ramallah (64%), and Toubas and Bethlehem (59% each). Shortages seem lower in Tulkarm (12%), Qalqilia (18%), Jerusalem (33%), and Jericho (43%).  A majority of 58% of those whose areas suffered from water shortages indicates that water did reach their homes at least once every week; 26% once every month; and 10% said water reached them only rarely.  Moreover, 64% of those who suffered water shortages indicate that they were forced to buy water by the tank to compensate for the decrease in water availability; 34% indicate that they were not forced to buy water by the tank.

While 45% of the public blame Israel for reducing the water quantities allocated to Palestinian territories, 49% place the blame on the Palestinian side (29% say that the water crisis is caused by PA mismanagement; 12% say it is due to crumbling infrastructure; and 8% say that water theft by some Palestinians prevent water from reaching its intended consumers). Two thirds (67%) of the public believe that there is no justice or fairness in the allocation of water to the various areas of the Palestinian territories; 19% believe water allocation is fair. Moreover, 48% of the public believe that there is no justice or fairness in the allocation of water to various neighborhoods in their area of residence while 46% think allocation is fair.  Given Israeli control over Palestinian water resources, a majority of 55% believes that the most effective means of addressing the recurring water crises is to dig more wells even if such a measure leads to confrontations with the Israeli army; 35% believe that water desalination is the most effective solution; and 4% believe that raising water rates on the consumers might reduce demand and help resolve the problem.

(5) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

• Optimism about reconciliation decreases from 36% to 31%.
• Only 28% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• 17% say that Hamas is responsible for the poor performance of the reconciliation government but 44% place the blame on the PA, President Abbas, and the prime minister.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 31% and pessimism at 65%. Three months ago optimism stood at 36% and pessimism at 60%.  28% say they are satisfied and 61% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 57%. Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 17% (8% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) while 30% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 14% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

(6) The peace process:

• 49% support and 50% oppose the two-state solution.
• 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state and 34% think armed action is the most effective means.
• 31% support a one-state solution.
• 53% support the French Initiative but only 28% expect it to succeed.
• 55% reject the Russian invitation for a meeting between Abbas and Netanyahu in Moscow.
• 54% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex all lands occupied in 1967 and expel the Palestinian citizens.
• 75% support joining more international organization, 64% support popular non-violent resistance, and 48% support a return to an armed intifada.

On the two-state solution, the public is divided into almost equal halves: 49% support and 50% oppose it. Three months ago, 51% supported it. Palestinians are divided into three groups on the most effective means of building a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective; 34% think armed action is the most effective; and 27% think non-violent popular resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 43% said armed action is the most effective means.  A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement expansion while 40% believe that it is still viable. A minority of 31% supports a one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equal rights; 67% oppose the one-state solution. Three months ago, support for the one-state solution stood at 34%. 73% believe that the chances for creating an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or non-existent while 25% believe the chances are medium or high.

54% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 56% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 36% opposed it. Support for the abandonment of the Oslo agreement stands at 53% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip.  But 63% of the public believe that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 27% think he is serious. Three months ago, 67% expressed the view that the president is not serious.

We asked the public about its support for the French Initiative. The initiative we presented to respondents as one that “calls for the formation of an international support group for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the holding of an international peace conference that would seek a settlement based on the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative in accordance with a specific time frame.” 53% of the respondents supported and 38% opposed the initiative. Support reached 51% in the West Bank compared to 57% in the Gaza Strip.  We also asked respondents to indicate their expectations regarding the success or failure of the French Initiative in assisting the goal of reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace. 28% expected success and 59% expected failure. Here too there was a significant difference between residents of the West Bank compared to residents of the Gaza Strip: 42% of Gazans, compared to only 21% of West Bankers, expected success.  A majority of 55% opposes and 36% support the acceptance of the Russian invitation to hold a meeting between President Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 80%; 20% are not worried. Furthermore, a majority of 54% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 30% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 14% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 64% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967. By contrast, 12% said it is to conquer the state of Israel and 11% said it is to conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.  An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 52% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 17% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places. Only 11% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change. 

44% support and 50% oppose the Saudi or Arab Peace Initiative.  39% support and 60% oppose the proposal that calls for mutual recognition of Israel as the homeland for the Jewish people and Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people in the aftermath of peace and after the establishment of a Palestinian state.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 75% support joining more international organizations, 64% support non-violent popular resistance, 48% support a return to an armed intifada, and 44% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 54%.

(7) The Arab World, Turkey, ISIS, and US elections:

• More than three quarters believe that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s primary cause and 60% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran.
• 39% believe that the Turkish-Israeli reconciliation agreement will contribute to reducing the siege and blockade on the Gaza Strip and 28% believe it will make it worse.
• 89% view ISIS as a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 83% support the war against it.
• 70% see no difference between the two US presidential candidates, Clinton and Trump.

76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 24% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.  60% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 27% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.  A majority of 64% believes that the recent visit of Saudi academics to the Palestinian territories and Jerusalem and their meeting with Israeli officials is a signal of accord between the Saudis and the Israelis; 26% think the visit does not signal that.

39% of the public believe that the recent Turkish-Israeli reconciliation will have a positive impact by reducing the siege and blockade on the Gaza Strip; by contrast, 28% think it will have the opposite effect by intensifying the siege and blockade, and 29% think it will have no impact.

An overwhelming majority of 89% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 5% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 9% (compared to 3% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.  83% support and 14% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

We asked the public about the US elections and which presidential candidate, Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump, is best for the Palestinians. A large majority (70%) believes that there is no difference between the two candidates, while 16% believe Clinton is better and 5% believe Trump is better.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that the most vital national goal should be the establishment of a Palestinian state and the ending of occupation and 30% believe it should be the gaining of the refugees’ right of return.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is occupation, followed by corruption and poverty and unemployment.

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 29% of the pubic; 28% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 22% say it is poverty and unemployment, and 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.