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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-18 September 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the killing of a political activist, Nizar Banat, right after his arrest and sever beating by the Palestinian security services, the eruption of widespread demonstrations against the PA demanding justice for Banat, the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel and the capture of four of them (just before the fieldwork began), the continued Egyptian-mediated Hamas-Israeli negotiations to strengthen the ceasefire reached in May and begin the process of reconstruction, the meeting of PA president Mahmoud Abbas with the Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz in Ramallah to talk about Palestinian-Israeli relations and means of improving them while strengthening the PA by implementing various trust-building measures. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2021 show the centrality of domestic issues on shaping public attitudes. Three developments in particular are worth observing: the killing of the political activist Nizar Banat by PA security services, the manner in which PA security services dealt with protests during the last few months, and the residual impact of the last Hamas-Israel war of May 2021. Findings also show the great importance attached by the public to the issue of prisoners in Israeli jails. Impacted by all of the above, findings reflect continued PA loss of status and support.

A large majority rejects that the notion that the killing of Banat was a mistake unintentionally made by security officers. Instead, the public is confident that the death of the political activist was premediated, ordered by the political or security leadership. Because of that, the public is not 

satisfied with the step taken by the PA to ensure justice by putting all security officers involved on trial. The public is also angry with the manner in which the PA cracked down on public protests that demanded justice in the Banat case. In fact, three quarters view the behavior of the security services as a violation of liberties and human rights.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public has been following, on daily basis, the news regarding the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel. The overwhelming majority views the prisoners’ behavior, even after they were captured, as inspiring to the Palestinians to rise and take the initiative to resist the occupation.  Yet, on this issue of public consensus, one in which the PA is not a party, the Palestinian leadership and the security establishment do not come out looking good at all. While the public is easily convinced by Hamas’ proclamations and plans for freeing the prisoners, the PA is distrusted with the majority believes that the PA security services would not defend the prisoners.

The impact of the May 2021 confrontations in Jerusalem and the war between Hamas and Israel is still strongly felt in this poll. An overwhelming majority still thinks Hamas came out the winner and that Hamas goal has been to defend East Jerusalemites and al Aqsa Mosque. Indeed, the largest percentage (but not the majority) believes that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people. The majority calls upon Hamas to relaunch rockets against Israel if East Jerusalemites are expelled from their homes in the city or if restrictions are imposed on Palestinian access to al Aqsa Mosque. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that now, after three months have passed since our last poll, we do see some decline in some of those indicators that measure the ascendance of Hamas. In almost all indicators, we see a small decline ranging between two to eight percentage points.

If new presidential and parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would do relatively well compared to Fatah. This is particularly true for a presidential election, assuming president Abbas is Fatah’s candidate. The outcome would be dramatically different and more beneficial to Fatah if its candidate for the presidency is Marwan Barghouti. Most importantly for Fatah, findings show a significant increase in the demand for Abbas’ resignation, with almost 80% making the demand, an unprecedent PSR finding.

Findings show that in the context of increased Covid-19 infection rates, the majority is in favor of mandatory vaccination; but opposition is slightly more than a third. Yet, even among those who reject making vaccination mandatory to all of the public, a minority favors making it mandatory to those working in the public sector such as schools and ministries.

Findings on the peace process show continued but slow decline in support for the two-state solution. They also show high levels of support for armed struggle as the best means of ending the occupation with almost half of the public endorsing this position. Consistent with that we find a slim majority opposing a resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Despite this, a majority of Palestinians view positively the confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

1) Prisoners escape from the Gilboa prison:

• An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (86%) says that it has heard about and followed on daily basis the news about the escape of the six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel and the capture of some of them while 12% say they did that occasionally and only 2% say they have not heard about or followed the news
• Similarly, 87% say the escape of the six prisoners and the capture of some of them will serve as an inspiration to Palestinians outside the prison to take the initiative and actively work toward the ending of occupation; only 7% think the escape and capture will have the opposite impact of bringing frustration and despair; 5% say it will have no impact.
• 81% believe that Hamas will soon succeed in making a deal with Israel on a prisoners’ exchange that will include the release of the escaped and recaptured prisoners; 14% believe no such exchange will take place soon.
• On the other hand, if the escaped prisoners managed to reach the Palestinian territories, only 24% think the PA security services would in this case protect them while 68% think they would not do so.

2) The death of Nizar Banat:

• A majority of 63% of the public believes that the killing of Nizar Banat soon after his arrest by PA security officials was a deliberate measure ordered by the PA political or security leaders while only 22% believe it was an unintentional mistake by those who arrested him.
• 63% support and 28% oppose the demonstrations that erupted after the death of Banat demanding the departure of the president from office and the removal of his government.
• A large majority of 69% feels the measures take by the PA to ensure justice in the Banat case, including putting on trial all 14 security officials who took part in his arrest, are insufficient; only 20% think they are sufficient.
• Almost three quarters (74%) believe the steps taken by the PA security services in arresting the demonstrators who demanded justice for Banat is a violation of liberties and human rights while only 18% view these measures as a legitimate enforcement of law and order.

3) Three months after the Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

• An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (71%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 3% think Israel came out a winner; 21% say no one came out a winner and 3% think both sides came out winners. Three months ago, 77% thought Hamas came out the winner. Moreover, 63% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 29% think it did not. Three months ago, 65% said Hamas has achieved its declared goal
• 67% think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 10% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 19% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers. Three months ago, 72% thought that Hamas’ decision came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque.
• In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 45% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while only 19% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 28% think neither side deserve such a role. Three months ago, 53% thought Hamas is more deserving of representation and leadership and 14% thought Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is the more deserving.
• If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 60% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 20% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 13% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

4) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 73% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 23% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 82% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 56% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 34% and Haniyeh 56% of the votes (compared to 59% for Haniyeh and 27% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 34% of the votes (compared to 30% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 60% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 33% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 59% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 49% and from among those the former receives 31% and the latter 60%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 26% and Haniyyeh 63%. 
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 33% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 22% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and another 6% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 22% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas six months ago stood at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Moreover, 78% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 19% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 68% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 78% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 37% say they will vote for Hamas and 32% say they will vote for Fatah, 13% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 41% and Fatah at 30%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 27% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 38% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 32% three months ago).

5)  Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 23%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%.
• 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 36% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 15% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 42% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 83%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 61% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 57% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 38% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 18% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 58% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 37% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 43% of Gazans said it was good or very good.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 34% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 35% viewed it as an asset.
• 32% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 41%.
• After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 70% expect failure; only 22% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29%  of the public expect success and 63% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 64% expects failure and 30% expects success.
• We asked the public about its view regarding the demands for a change in the current PA government. A majority of 54% expresses support for comprehensive change leading to the appointment of a new government and a new prime minister, while 26% want only to change some of the ministers, and 14% do not want to make any change and want the government to stay as it is.
• We also asked the public about its views on the recuring internal violence similar to the one witnessed recently in which an incident between two individuals led to widespread family and tribal violence. A majority of 57% expressed the view that such incidents indicate a weak pubic trust in the justice system including law enforcement agencies; but 35% expressed the view that such incidents reflect the traditional nature of Palestinian society that is difficult or impossible to change.
• When asked how should the PA deal with such incidents, 66% expressed the view that first and foremost, the PA should strengthen the law enforcement authorities while 27% expressed the view that the PA should strengthen the tribal reform committees and cooperate with them.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 23%, followed by Palestine TV (14%), al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine Today (11%), Maan (10%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (2%).

6)  The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• With the big rise in the number of Covid infections, we asked the public about the steps it thinks the PA government should take in order to protect people from the pandemic: 39% said it should follow the normal procedures of enforcing social distance, face masks, and payment of fines for violators; a similar percentage (37%) said it should make vaccination mandatory to all those who are allowed to take it; 5% said it should impose a full closure; and 15% said they are in favor of all of the above.
• When asked specifically about mandatory vaccination, a majority of 63% expressed support while 35% expressed opposition.
• Among those who reject mandatory vaccination, 29% are in favor, and 69% are not in favor, of making it mandatory to those who work in the public sector such as those working in schools and ministries.
• 48% (55% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 27% (19% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24 say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.
• 74% (84% in the Gaza Strip and 68% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 24% are dissatisfied.
• 45% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 53% are dissatisfied.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 59% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at only 39%.

7)  The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 36% and opposition stands at 62%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  
• A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 48% chose armed struggle, 28% negotiations, and 19% popular resistance. Three months ago, 49% chose armed struggle and 27% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 39% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 16% selected the loss of the will to fight.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 61% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 54% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 54% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 60% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 47% supported dissolving the PA, and 20% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• 58% are opposed, and 36% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet stands at 39% and 52% are opposed. Moreover, 49% do not believe, and 41% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 56% said it looks positively, while 35% said it looks negatively, at such measures.

8)  American withdrawal from Afghanistan:

• 40% view the events leading to the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan as a victory for Taliban against the US and its Afghani allies. But a third (33%) thinks that the events leading to the US withdrawal were orchestrated ahead of time between the US and Taliban; 27% say they not know.
• The largest percentage of the public (43%) does not expect what happened in Afghanistan to happen in Palestine in case of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a scenario in which such withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the PA and its government and the takeover of armed Islamist groups, such as Hamas; but 36% believe this scenario could indeed happen and 21% do not know.    
• Moreover, 46% believe the Palestinians should learn a lesson from what happened in Afghanistan by strengthening the forces of armed resistance, but not the PA and its government, while 28% think the lesson should lead us to strengthen the PA and its legitimacy so that it would not collapse as the Afghani government did.

9)  Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 10% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (36%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 40% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip, 23% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 13% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10%  said it is the spread of corruption, and 6% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 11-14 December 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the announcement by the Palestinian Election Commission and President Abbas that all factions have agreed to the holding of legislative elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But no decree was issued by Abbas during the period of the data collection. The period also witnessed a debate among Palestinians over the decision of the PA Attorney General to ask the court to block public access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites. Hamas allowed the construction of an American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel. Power was cut by the Israeli Electric Corporation to central West Bank for two hours every day in many locations served by the Jerusalem District Electricity Company due to unpaid bills. On the Israeli side, prime minister Netanyahu was indicted for corruption and Israeli political parties failed to form a government coalition leading to a decision to hold a third parliamentary election in a single year. The US government declared a new position regarding Israeli settlements in which it disputed the illegality of these settlements from an international law standpoint. In the meanwhile, the US Congress started an on-going effort to impeach president Trump for the use of the presidency to attain personal gains.  This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2019 show a small majority indicating optimism about the holding of legislative elections in the near future. Moreover, the poll shows that majority is in favor of holding these elections even if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem; in case of Israeli opposition, the public says that East Jerusalemites should vote wherever they can, in Jerusalem and outside it. The bad news however, is that half of the public believes that these upcoming elections will not be free or fair. Furthermore, only half of the public trusts the ability of the Palestinian Election Commission (PEC) to manage the election process with integrity and less than half has confidence in the ability of the police, whether in West Bank and the PA or in the Gaza Strip under Hamas, to provide protection to the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Indeed, a majority believes that Hamas will not be able to conduct its election campaign in the West Bank, and Fatah in the Gaza Strip, without restrictions and interference. These findings indicate a diminished public trust in the entire election process, due probably in part to a distrust in PEC, as indeed supported by the findings, and in the PA public institutions in both areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Worst of all, a large majority believes that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah, in the West Bank, will not accept the outcome and if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas, in the Gaza Strip, will not accept the outcome. This finding demonstrates beyond any doubt the absence of public confidence in the democratic credentials of the two major political parties, Fatah and Hamas, and raise a big question about the extent of the damage and political corruption that have been generated by the absence of democratic life and by the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2007.

On the ability of a newly elected legitimate government to dissolve the armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms, a large majority indicates opposition to such measure. Indeed, the majority believes that protecting or keeping the arms of the armed groups has greater legitimacy than that of the electoral legitimacy of the government. These findings reveal that the public does not take the election and its legitimacy seriously (which might be an outcome of the problems identified above) and that in the absence of a viable peace process, the public puts its trust, first and foremost, in armed struggle. 

Findings show that if elections take place today, Fatah would receive the biggest share of the vote, followed by Hamas, existing third parties, newly created third parties, and finally an electoral list loyal to Mohammad Dahlan. With this range of options, only a small percentage of participating votes remains undecided. Needless to say, the formation of an electoral list loyal to Dahlan will significantly weaken the size of Fatah’s share of the vote and might threaten its ability to emerge as the biggest party. This problem, unique to Fatah, can be exacerbated by its persistent lack of discipline, as demonstrated by the elections of 1996 and 2006, if, for example, other unofficial Fatah lists were formed by disgruntled senior party members who fail to make it to a realistic spot in the party’s election list. This means that Fatah might find itself competing against itself thereby ending up with greater fragmentation and great many lost votes. But the greatest threat to a Fatah electoral victory would be its failure to integrate Marwan Barghouti and his supporters in its electoral list. In such a case, as temporarily happened in the 2006 elections, he might form his own electoral list thereby splitting Fatah’s vote and insuring that Hamas would receive the greatest share of the vote.   

On other domestic political issues, findings indicate that a plurality in the West Bank thinks that Hamas should have participated in the recent exchange of rocket fire between Israel and Islamic Jihad. But the situation in the Gaza Strip is different as a greater plurality thinks that Hamas’ decision of refraining from participation has been the correct decision. We also found a large majority views the decision of the PA Attorney General to seek court authorization to block Palestinian media websites as an attack on freedom of speech and therefore he should not stay in his office because he apparently does not believe in free speech. We also found an overwhelming majority supporting the PA government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years.

Two thirds of the public view the US decision recognizing the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as destructive the two-state solution. A majority views the decision as destructive also to the one-state solution and that one of its outcomes will be to push Israel to annex parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley. This American position led to a significant increase in the percentage of Palestinians, standing today at three quarters, who demand that the Palestinian leadership reject the American peace plan, or the Deal of the Century, out of hand, without even looking at its substance while 70% indicate opposition to a restoration of PA dialogue with the Trump Administration.

Finally, findings show that a majority is opposed to the two-state solution, but support for it remains higher than the support for the one-state solution. They also indicate a slight increase in support for armed struggle or a return to armed intifada. It is noticeable however that a majority of the public thinks that the indictment of Israeli prime minister Netanyahu will soon lead to his removal from power. Similarly, a majority is optimistic about the ability of the US Congress to impeach President Trump and a similar majority is optimistic that he will lose the upcoming US presidential elections. This public betting on the dynamics of domestic Israeli politics and on the workings of the US Congress might be one of the reasons why we still find more public support for the two-state solution compared to other alternative solutions to the conflict with Israel. 

(1) A new legislative election?

• A majority of 52% of the public expects general elections to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 37% believe no elections will take place. Three months ago, only 38% expected that elections will take place soon.
• 44% support the holding of simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose a separation between the two, while 23% say they support the holding of parliamentary elections to be followed few months later by presidential elections, and 22% want simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections but do not oppose separating them by few months.
• A majority of 56% (65% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) says that if Israel prevented Palestinian legislative elections in East Jerusalem, voting should be made possible for the residents in any polling station in the West Bank; 35% disagree and say that no election should take place if Israel prevents it in East Jerusalem.
• Only 50% trust and 44% do not trust the integrity and capacity of the Palestinian Election Commission to successfully manage the election process.
• Moreover, only 48% trust, and 46% do not trust, the ability of the West Bank Palestinian police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Similarly, only 47% trust, and 41% do not trust, the ability of the Gaza Strip police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. 
• A majority of 64% say that it will not be possible, and 29% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Hamas’, to conduct their election campaigns in the West Bank without restrictions or interference from the Palestinian security services. Similarly, a majority of 56% says that it will not be possible, and 37% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Fatah’s, to conduct their election campaigns in the Gaza Strip without restrictions or interference from the Gaza security services.
• Only 42% believe, and 50% do not believe, that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair.
• The public is divided into two equal halves (43% each) in calling for taking away the jurisdiction of Palestinian courts, especially the Constitutional Court, in annulling the outcome of the legislative elections because of the fear that these courts might do so if the opposition to Abbas and Fatah were to win the elections.
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the upcoming elections: 40% (47% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip) expect Fatah to win the upcoming legislative elections while only 25% (19% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) expect Hamas to win.
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 40% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 41% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 31% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 24% (compared to 20% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 43% three months ago). It should be noted that among Fatah voters, as we see in another question, some are loyalists to Mohammad Dahlan, a former senior Fatah official.  If these Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 35%.
• We asked again about the voting intentions, but this time with the assumption that other newly created electoral lists, ones that have not participated in the previous elections in 2006, added to the list of candidates.  In this case, the participation rate would increase from 68% to 72% and the share of the undecided would drop from 20% to only 6%; Fatah share would rise from 40% to 44% (including Dahlan loyalists); Hamas share (32%) would remain unchanged; share of third parties (10%) would also remain unchanged; and 8% would vote for the newly created electoral lists. If Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 39%.
• More than two thirds (68%) believe that if Hamas wins the upcoming elections, Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 25% think Fatah will indeed allow Hamas to do so. Similarly, 59% believe that if Fatah wins the upcoming elections, Hamas will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 34% think Hamas will indeed allow Fatah to do so.
• A majority of 59% say that after the upcoming elections and the formation of a new government, such a government does not have the right to dissolve existing armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms because maintain the arms of these groups is more important than electoral legitimacy; 33% say that the newly elected government does indeed have the legitimacy to do so.  Regardless of the policy of a newly elected government on the armed groups, two-thirds (67%) say that it would be wrong, and 26% say it would correct, to dissolve Gaza’s armed groups and collect their arms.
• If new parties or movements were to be created to take part in the upcoming elections, 13% of the participants say that while they have not yet made up their mind, they will be willing to consider supporting a new party or movement. Also, 12% of committed voters are willing to shift support to a new party or movement. Nonetheless, the largest percentage of participating voters says they will not shift vote to a new party or movement.
• The overwhelming majority (79%) encourages, and 18% discourage, the participation of independent youth lists in the upcoming elections.
• The top priority that should be the aim of the upcoming elections is the unification the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the eyes of 36% of the public while 18% think it is the improvement of economic conditions, 17% say the ending of Gazan blockade and siege, 13% say fighting corruption, 7% say creating a democratic political system, and 6% say strengthening the resistance to occupation and settlements.
• The largest percentage (32%) believes that Fatah is the most able of all factions to succeed in realizing the top priority it has selected; 24% say Hamas is the most able, and 20% believe that none of the existing or newly created factions will be able to succeed in achieving the top priority they have selected. 

(2) Presidential elections:

• 61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 49% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 59%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).
• Only 31% think president Abbas is the best Fatah candidate for the presidency while 41% think that Fatah has better candidates; 29% say they do not know or have no opinion on the matter. 
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 49% and the latter 44% of the vote (compared to 48% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the vote (compared to 39% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 57% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 58% (compared to 56% three months ago) and Haniyeh 34% (compared to 36% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 62% and Haniyeh 34%.
• We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 21% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (2% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 5%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 4% each.  

(3) Blocking websites, the justice system, the electricity crisis, the American field hospital, the Shtayyeh government, and other domestic conditions:

• 60% of the public view the decision by the attorney general to ask the court to block access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites as imposing restrictions on free speech, a right guaranteed by the Basic Law; but 33% think the decision to do so is correct as it seeks to implement the law.
• In light of his decision to block more than 50 media websites, 53% think the attorney general should not stay in his position because he apparently does not believe in free speech. But 38% think that he should stay in his position because he simply implemented the law.
• A majority of 54% (59% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 39% (34% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 55% (60% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary is rules according to whims and interests; 42% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law.
• In light of the current electricity crisis in central West Bank, 61% think that refugee camps should be exempted from paying their electricity bill and the PA should cover the cost; 35% disagree and think that refugee camps should pay their bills like everybody else.
• If refugee camps are indeed exempted from paying for their electricity, 89% want the PA to cover the cost while only 5% think that other paying customers should cover the cost.
• The largest percentage (36%) says that it supports, and 32% say they oppose, the construction of the American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel; 28% say they have not heard about it.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 60%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 65% and in the West Bank at 52%.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 31% and declines in the West Bank to 20%.
• Only 35% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 62% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 51% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 46% say they cannot.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 67%.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 50% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 45% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• With more than eight months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (49%), the economy (39%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (53%), the preparation to hold general elections (47%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (51%). But a percentage ranging between 24% and 45% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 12% and 24% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a slight improvement in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings three months ago.
• Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 58% expects failure; only 33% expects success.
• In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a plurality of 48% expects failure and 44% expect success.
• In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 55% expects failure and 37% expects success.
• An overwhelming majority of 77% supports, and 22% oppose, the government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years. 
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (15%), Palestine TV and Maan TV (13% each), Palestine Today TV (9%), al Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (4% each).   

(4) Reconciliation, Hamas and Islamic Jihad: 

• 36% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at only 30%.
• 44% are optimistic, and 51% are not optimistic, that the upcoming legislative elections will contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• An overwhelming majority (78%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 20% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government.
• A majority of 52% (down to 44% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 10% believe the chances are high.
• Given Hamas’ position during the latest round of fire exchange in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Islamic Jihad, the largest percentage, standing at 39% (43% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), believes that Hamas should have participated in the exchange of rocket fire against Israel while 32% (22% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) think Hamas made the correct decision by not participating, and 16% think that Hamas did in fact participate. 

 (5) US declaration of settlements’ legality, the Trump peace plan, and Trump impeachment:

• 66% view the US declaration of the legality of Israeli settlements according to international law as destructive to the two-state solution while 18% think it will have no impact and 10% think that it will in fact strengthen the two-state solution.
• Similarly, 57% view the same decision as have a weakening impact on the one-state solution while 23% think it will have no impact and 9% think it will in fact strengthen the one-state solution.
• Almost three quarters (74%) think the US decision will lead to an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley, while 20% think it will have no such impact
• We asked the public if Palestinian acceptance of the Trump peace plan would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 85% say no; only 10% say yes it would.
• When asked if the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 75% of the public says it does and only 21% say it does not.
• We asked the public what should the Palestinian leadership do about the US peace plan: 74% indicate that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 16% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 6% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo. Three months ago, 69% said the PA should reject the plan out of hand. 
• A majority of 69% is opposed and 19% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
• A majority of 60% expects US president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 53% expect the US Congress to succeed in impeaching him. 

(6) The peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 42% and opposition at 55%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 42%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 54% believe that the majority opposes it.   
• A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 35% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 24% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 29% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 15% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 32% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 37% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the largest group (47%) chose armed struggle, 26% negotiations, and 20% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 60% support popular non-violent resistance; 52% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 28% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 40% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
• A majority of 58% expects the indictment of Netanyahu in corruption charges to his ouster from leadership in Israel soon while 34% expect him to succeed in staying in power despite the indictment. 

(7) Arab uprisings, Turkish incursion into Syria, and visit of Saudi football team:

• 57% of the public are in favor and 37% are not in favor of the current uprisings in the Arab world, in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
• But 65% do not expect, and only 31% expect, these uprisings to spread to Palestine.
• Similarly, 65% do not wish to see these uprisings spreading to the West Bank and a little more (70%) do not wish to see them spreading to the Gaza Strip.
• Nonetheless, 63% reject, and 26% accept, Hizbollah’s position which is opposed to the Lebanese uprising.
• A majority of 51% (60% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) views the Turkish incursion into the northern border area of Syria as unacceptable aggression while 40% (31% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) view it as a legitimate temporary incursion.
• A majority of 63% say that visits from Arab countries, such as that of the Saudi football team, should be encouraged while 34% say such visits should not be encouraged. 

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment and the spread of corruption in public institutions (26% each); 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 2008  

Israelis strongly oppose cease-fire with Hamas

if agreement does not include release of Gilad Shalit; Palestinians strongly oppose such an agreement if it does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between May 27 and June 7, 2008.  

Assuming that Shalit’s release was part of an agreement, the Israeli public is split in supporting an accord in which Hamas will cease the violent attacks and Kassam launching from the Gaza Strip, and Israel will stop its military operations in the Gaza Strip and remove the closure. The figures were: 50% opposing and 47% supporting such an agreement. If the agreement does not include Shalit, 68% oppose and only 30% support such an agreement. Among Palestinians, 78% support the cease-fire with Israel, but support declines sharply to around 20% if the cease-fire agreement does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt.   

The joint poll also examined Israelis’ and Palestinians’ assessments of the various negotiation tracks including the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Israeli-Syrian track and the Saudi (Arab League) plan.  

The poll indicates a hardening of Israeli opposition to the return of the Golan Heights for full peace with Syria: 67% of Israelis oppose such an agreement, compared to 56% in March 2008. There is also a noticeable decline in Israelis’ support for concessions to the Palestinians as embodied in the Clinton parameters or Taba negotiations. These parameters have been considered to be the most realistic framework for a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. For the first time since December 2003, support for Clinton’s package decreased below 50% (49%), whereas in previous polls, support reached as high as 64%. Among Palestinians, findings show that two-thirds believe that Syrian-Israeli progress or a peace agreement would contribute to successful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations or have no impact on those negotiations. Minority support among Palestinians for a package along the lines of the Taba negotiations or the Clinton Parameters remains stable at 46%.  Recent talks among Palestinians in favor of the one-state solution did not affect their public attitudes, as only 27% support this solution while a majority of 58% prefers the two-state solution.  

The weeks preceding the poll were characterized by significant political events in Israel, including the Talanski testimony and Barak’s demand of Olmert to detach himself from political decisions. Israeli data collection began after the Talanski scandal so it reflects the full impact of the testimony. Barak’s statement however was made midway the poll so it reflects only part of its impact. Israelis’ decline in support for concessions to the Palestinians and Syria can be interpreted as a result of the public’s confusion and disillusion with its leadership and Olmert’s loss of legitimacy to conduct negotiations on such crucial issues while being under police investigation.   

The Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 5 and 7, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1006 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between May 27 and June 5, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).  

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 022964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 036419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS  

(A) Current Negotiation Tracks

• Of all negotiation tracks and options currently under way, 24% of the Israelis believe that the Palestinian track should be most preferred by Israel, 20% believe that the Saudi (Arab League) option which offers a comprehensive peace agreement with all states in return for all the territories occupied in 1967 should be most preferred, and only 12% think that a full peace agreement and normalization with Syria in return for the Golan Heights should be preferred. 32% believe neither track should be preferred and only 2% think that all tracks should be pursued.
• As to which is the most promising track, 25% think it is the Palestinian track, 16% think it is the track with Syria and 17% think so about the Saudi option; 30% of the Israelis think none of the tracks currently underway is promising. These results indicate the depth of Israelis’ disenchantment with the diplomatic venues and options currently on the agenda.
• With regard to support for the main peace initiatives currently underway, our poll indicates noticeable decline among Israelis. Support for the overall package of the Clinton parameters decreased below 50% for the first time since December 2003. 49% of Israelis support the overall package now compared to majority support we found in 4 previous polls in 2005 through 2007. Among Palestinians support remains relatively stable at 46% compared to 47% last December. Opposition among Palestinians for this package stands today at 52% compared to 49% last December.  
• 67% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria, and 22% support it. These figures constitute a significant increase in opposition to the return of the Golan Heights compared to our March poll, where 56% opposed and 25% supported such an agreement. If in the peace agreement, Syria will commit to disconnect itself from Iran and stop its support of Hizbulla and Hamas, support increases only marginally - to 27%. In this regard, 32% of the Palestinians believe that if significant progress is made in the Israeli-Syrian talks, it will contribute to successful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, 26% think that it will represent an impediment to successful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and 35% think that it will have no impact on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• 57% of the Israelis oppose and 39% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. These figures did not change from our March poll. Among Palestinians, 67% support the plan and 28% oppose it
• It seems that the Talanski affair stripped Olmert of his remaining legitimacy to continue with negotiations over peace agreements. Almost two thirds (64%) of the Israelis believe that it is inappropriate for Olmert to continue peace negotiations while being under police investigation; only 32% think he can continue negotiations under these circumstances. Moreover, only 32% of the Israeli public believe that the Talanski affair is an attempt by the Israeli Right to stop Olmert’s negotiations over peace agreements; 54% don’t believe so and 13% don’t know.
• 55% of the Israelis believe that the meetings between Mahmud Abbas and Ehud Olmert are not beneficial and should be stopped while 36% believe they should continue. Palestinians show even greater disappointment with these talks. Among Palestinians a sizeable majority of 68% believe the talks should come to a halt while only 27% believe they are beneficial and should be continued.
• 50% among Israelis oppose a cease fire agreement with Hamas in which Hamas will cease the violent attacks and Kassam launching from the Gaza Strip, and Israel will stop its military operations in the Gaza Strip and remove the closure; 47% support such an agreement. Opposition increases to 68% if such an agreement will not include the release of Gilad Shalit. Among Palestinians, 78% support the ceasefire with Israel but support declines sharply to 23% only if the ceasefire agreement is restricted to the Gaza Strip and does not include the West Bank. Moreover, support declines further to 20% if the agreement does not stipulate an immediate opening of the crossings, especially the Rafah crossing to Egypt.  
• Nevertheless 47% of the Israelis support and 51% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However a sizeable Israeli majority (62%) support and only 35% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. Among Palestinians, if Israel agrees to conduct peace negotiations with Hamas, 60% believe that Hamas should negotiate with Israel and 35% believe it should not.
• Similarly, 43% of the Israelis support and 52% oppose the release of Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiation with him, if needed to reach such an agreement. 28% of the Israelis believe that there is greater likelihood to reach a compromise agreement if negotiated with Marwan Barghouti, while 36% think that negotiations with Abu Mazin have a greater chance to succeed. 4% believe that both have similar chance to succeed, and 26% - that neither of them is likely to succeed. Among Palestinians, 31% believe that Mahmud Abbas is more able than Barghouti to force Israel to make more concessions in negotiations while 28% believe Barghouti is more able than Abu Mazin in doing so. 11% believe both are equally able to force Israel to concede while 25% believe neither one is able to do so.
• 67% of the Israelis support and 29% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Among Palestinians, 56% support and 43% oppose this step. The results in both publics are the same as in our March poll.
• 69% among Israelis and 66% of the Palestinians believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state during the next five years are non-existent or weak. Only 28% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians believe chances are fair or high. Despite the fact that only slightly more Palestinians believe that the one state solution is more difficult to achieve than the two state solution, a much larger percentage (58%) prefers the two-state solution and only 27% support the one state solution. The one state solution was presented to the Palestinians as one in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state whereby Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews would be equal. The two-state solution was presented as one that entails the establishment of a Palestinian state along side Israel.

 (B) Threat perceptions and support of violence  

·        Among Israelis, 63% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 74% three months ago, after the shooting attack in the religious seminary in Jerusalem. Among Palestinians 56% fear that their security and safety and that of their family is not assured compared to 63% three months ago in the aftermath of the Israeli major incursion into the Gaza Strip that left more than 130 Palestinians dead.

• With Palestinian threat perception reduced, Palestinians support of armed attacks against Israeli civilians drops considerably from 67% last March to 55% in this poll. Similarly, support for launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon drops during the same period from 64% to 57%.
• Among Israelis, 29% suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues, just as in our March poll; 43% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out compared to 41% in March. Only 22% compared to 27% three months ago believe that Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps

 21 January 2006 

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a pre election poll during the period between 17-19 January 2006 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The poll aimed at predicting the likely outcome of the legislative elections scheduled for 25 January 2006. The poll was conducted among 4516 potential voters (of which 2974 came from the West Bank and 1542 from the Gaza Strip) in 230 randomly selected population locations (of which 79 came from the Gaza Strip and 151 from the West Bank). The sample was distributed over 16 electoral districts in order to allow the prediction of the likely outcome at the electoral district level. The sample was then re-weighted to reflect the size of each electoral district in the total voter register in order to allow the prediction of the outcome at the national level. Margin of error for the lists at the national level is 2%; at the electoral district level, the margin of error ranges between 4% to 7%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh at 02-296 4933 or email: pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

(1) Results of Lists at the National Level

• 42% will vote for Fateh List while 35% will vote for the List of Change and Reform, and 7% remain undecided. List of Independent Palestine (headed by Mustafa Barghouti) receives 5%, List of Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa receives 3%, List of the Third Way (headed by Salam Fayyad) receives 3%, and List of the Alternative (headed by Qais Abdul Karim) receives 2%. All other lists are not expected to pass the 2% threshold. 

(2) Results for Candidates in the Electoral Districts

• Fateh’s candidates are strong in the following five electoral districts: Jericho, Ramallah, Qalqilia, Khanyounis, and Rafah.
• Change and Reform’s candidates are strong in the following five districts: Gaza City, Deir al Balah, Northern Gaza, Hebron, and Tulkarm.
• The contest is close in the following six districts: Nablus, Bethlehem, Jenin, Jerusalem, Salfit, and Toubas.
• The following candidates have a good chance of winning in their districts:

• This list has 36 names of candidates only from a total of 66 eligible winners. At this time, it is difficult to predict the winning chances of the remaining 30 eligible winners as the results are too close to allow such prediction.
• Party affiliation of the likely 36 winning candidates is as follows: 18 (or 50%) from the List of Change and Reform, 17 (or 47%) from Fateh List, and one candidate (or 3%) is independent.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-16 September 2017. The popular confrontations with the Israeli police in Jerusalem in protest over the installment of metal detectors at the entrance to al Haram al Sharif gates were the most important event during the period in question. During the confrontations, President Abbas announced the suspension of contacts with the Israeli side, including security coordination. Internally, the split and disunity characterized the Palestinian political scene, except during the last two days of data collection when delegates from Hamas and Fatah were called to Cairo for Egyptian sponsored talks.  During this period, President Abbas issued a decree in the form of a Cybercrime Law that was severely criticized by human rights organizations, media outlets, and other civil society organizations. Several journalists were arrested in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It should be pointed out that data collection was completed just one day before Hamas announced the dissolution of its “Administrative Committee” that has served until then as the de facto government in the Gaza Strip. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2017 show that an overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public is worried about the future of liberties in Palestine. This prevailing perception seems to be driven by the recent increase in the incidents in which journalists and activists have been arrested, by the recently announced presidential decree enacting a cybercrime law, and by the government proposed amendments to the Law of the Judiciary. A large majority believes that Palestinians cannot criticize the PA without fear. In fact, half of the public believes that the PA has now become a burden on the Palestinian people.  

This worry about the future of liberties, along with the concerns about the steps taken by the PA against the Gaza Strip, might be responsible for the increase in the demand for the resignation of President Abbas and the decline in his popularity compared to that of Hamas’ presidential candidate, Ismael Haniyeh. Indeed, if presidential elections are held today, Haniyeh would win against Abbas. Findings also indicate a decline in support for Fatah, particularly in the Gaza Strip where Hamas is more popular. In the West Bank however, Fatah remains more popular than Hamas.

Perhaps the most alarming result of this poll is the fundamental shift in the attitudes of Gazans. This shift was first noticed early this year but accelerated during the past nine months. It is probable that the change came as a response to the punitive steps taken by President Abbas against the Gaza Strip. The split that rested essentially on the power struggle between two large political parties in the entire Palestinian territories is in the process of transformation to one between West Bankers and Gazans, a split that did not exist during the first nine years of Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip. Gazans are moving away from Fatah and the Palestinian leadership in an unprecedented way and without a parallel or similar process among West Bankers. President Abbas might have hoped that the sanctions he imposed on the Gaza Strip would force Gazans to reject Hamas and its policies forcing Hamas to dismantle its “Administrative Committee” that has served as a de facto government for the Gaza Strip. Despite the limited decline in Hamas’ popularity in this poll, it is plainly clear that Gazans are directing their greatest anger at Abbas and Fatah, rather than Hamas. Today, 80% of Gazans want Abbas’ resignation, satisfaction with the performance of the president is about 20%, and it is certain that he would lose any presidential elections in the Gaza Strip to Hamas’ Ismael Haniyeh. Moreover, Fatah is fast losing its popularity in the Gaza Strip, standing at 28% today compared to 40% only nine months ago.  Those who still support Fatah in the Gaza Strip are shifting loyalty to Mohammad Dahlan whose popularity among Gazans has more than doubled during the past nine months, from 9% to 23% today, while his popularity among West Bankers did not change, remaining hardly at 1%.

Despite the fact that positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip remains very low, the poll found some positive indicators: the desire to migrate has declined somewhat and the perception of personal and family safety and security has increased. It is also interesting to note the large increase in support for the Hamas-Dahlan deal and the optimism of the majority of Gazans who believe that the deal will be successfully implemented.

It is also worth noting the increase in public confidence in popular non-violent resistance in the aftermath of the success in removing the metal detectors installed by the Israeli police in front of the gates of al Haram al Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary). Support for this model of resistance now reaches two thirds. It should be noted however that the findings also show a rise in support for violence despite the fact that a majority remains opposed to it. One reason for the rise in support for violent and non-violent resistance might be the lack of trust in diplomacy. Findings show that about three quarters believe that the Trump Administration is not serious about Palestinian-Israeli peace making and an even higher percentage believes that the Administration is not an honest broker and that it is biased in favor of Israel. 

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:  

• 67% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 27% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 60% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip.
• If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 21% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 9% (1% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip); Mustapha Barghouti (5%); and Khalid Mishal and Rami al Hamdallah (4% each).
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 34% (39% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 50% and the latter 42%of the vote (compared to  45% each three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the vote (compared to 39% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 55% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 45% (compared to 50% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 40% three months ago).
• If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 20%, Barghouti 43% and Haniyeh 33%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36%.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 63% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 25% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 31% (compared to 35% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 36% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 24% three months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 40% three months ago). 

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Half of the public is not aware of the debate among the Palestinians surrounding the cybercrime law. Among those who are aware of the debate, 58% express the view that the law imposes restrictions on liberties and 39% believe it does not.
• Similarly, 60% are not aware of the debate surrounding the proposed amendments to the Law of the Judiciary. Among those who are aware of the debate, 55% express the view that the proposed amendments pose a threat to the independence of the judiciary and 38% think the amendments will improve the performance of the judiciary.
• In light of the increase in the incidents of the detention of journalist and activists in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 80% are worried about the future of liberties in Palestine. The level of worry is higher in the West Bank, standing at 85%, than in the Gaza Strip, standing at 71%; 17% are not worried.
• 81% believe that the PA does not have the right to arrest activists, such as Issa Amro from Hebron, just because they criticize the behavior of the PA; 14% belief the PA has the right to arrest its critics.
• Only 38% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 59% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.
• Half of the pubic (50%) view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 44% view it as an asset.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 21%.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 49%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 50%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 43% and in the West Bank at 53%.
• Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago, 47% of Gazans and 23% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate.
• In light of the recent incident in which an armed man, who was attempting to cross the Rafah border with Egypt, exploded a bomb that killed him and a Hamas policeman, 73% indicate that they are worried about the spread of Daesh (ISIS) among the youth in the Gaza Strip and 24% are not worried. Worry is higher in the Gaza Strip (78%) than in the West Bank (70%).
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Maan TV (14%), al Aqsa TV (13%), Palestine TV (12%), Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (11%), Al Arabiya (6%) al Quds TV (4%), and al Mayadeen (3%).  
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.
• 73% support and 23% oppose Abbas’ decision to suspend contacts and security coordination with Israel but two thirds (66%) believe that the PA and its security services did not implement that decision. 

(3) Reconciliation, the reconciliation government, and the Hamas-Dahlan agreement:  

• Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 31% and pessimism at 61%. Three months ago optimism stood at 27% and pessimism at 64%.
• 23% say they are satisfied and 64% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 77% and in the West Bank at 56%.
• Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 15% (9% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip) while 33% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 15% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.
• 47% believe that the Hamas-Dahlan agreement will fail and 43% think it will succeed. In the Gaza Strip, 57% think it will succeed and 39% think it will fail.
• 56% support the Hamas-Dahlan agreement and 35% oppose it. In the Gaza Strip, support for the agreement stands at 73% and opposition at 25%. Three months ago, only 40% supported the agreement and 48% opposed it and support for it in the Gaza Strip stood at 61%.

(4) Confrontations at the gates of al Haram al Sharif  

• An overwhelming majority of 73% believe that the Jerusalem residents who took part in the confrontations that made it possible to force Israel to uninstall the metal detectors played the greatest role in the success of the confrontations. Only 10% attribute the success to the Waqf men; 7% to King Abdullah; 6% to president Abbas, and 1% to King Salman of Saudi Arabia.
• 63% believe that the approach adopted in the confrontations at the gates of al Haram al Sharif provide a successful model to emulate in confrontations with the Israeli occupation; 34% think the model is not effective. 

(5) Convening the Palestinian National Council

• 60% condition the convening of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) to the prior election of its members while 25% want to convene the meeting with the current membership.
• Furthermore, 61% condition the convening of the PNC to the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jehad while 28% think it can be convened without them.
• 50% support holding the meeting of the PNC in Ramallah while 35% support holding it in Cairo or Amman. 

(6) The peace process:  

• 74% believe the US Administration under Donald Trump is not serious in its efforts to reach a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement; 22% think it is serious.
• 55% believe that if the Trump Administration invited the Palestinian leadership to return to negotiations with Israel, it should not accept the invitation; 41% think it should accept it.
• If negotiations are resumed under US sponsorship, the Trump Administration will be biased in favor of Israel according to 83% of the public; 10% think it will be an honest broker and 2% think it will be biased in favor of the Palestinian side.
• 52% support and 47% oppose the two-state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel. Support in the Gaza Strip stands at 56% and in the West Bank at 49%.
• But 57% think the two-state solution is no longer viable or practical due to settlement expansion while 40% think it remains feasible.
• Similarly, 70% think the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 28% think the chances are medium or high.
• 35% think that the most effective means of creating a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel is armed action, 33% think negotiation is the most effective, and 26% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective.
• In the absence of peace negotiations, 71% support joining more international organizations, 67% support non-violent popular resistance, 45% support a return to an armed intifada, and 47% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 39% and 54% supported popular non-violent resistance.
• Support for the one-state solution stands at 31% while 67% are opposed to this solution.
• Furthermore, a majority of 58% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 25% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 16% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.
• The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 78%.
• 77% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 22% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.
• 64% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 25% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state. 

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. 
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 26% of the public while 25% believe it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 23% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absenc

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-19 March 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the announcement of a presidential decree to hold parliamentary elections on 22 May and presidential elections on 31 July 2021. It also witnessed a significant rise in number of coronavirus deaths and infections. The coronavirus vaccine was not made available in large numbers by the PA government during the period before the conduct of the poll. A limited vaccination process did however start using a small quantity that was made available to the PA. The process however was marred by accusations of favoritism and lack of transparency. The ICC issued a statement affirming jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories. Joe Biden assumed his position as the new US president during this period. Israel announced the holding of new parliamentary elections to take place on 23 March. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The focus of our poll for the first quarter of 2021 has been placed on the expected election process. Findings show that the overwhelming majority is still in favor of holding these elections and that the public is much more optimistic that these elections will indeed take place soon. This realization seems to have impacted attitudes and voting intentions, which are now probably more serious and calculated. The poll sought to explore public priorities and expectations in these elections. In particular, we sought to examine the likely consequences of the election results, particularly if Hamas wins and forms a government. The poll sought also to understand the implications of the emergence of rivals to Fatah, from within its own ranks, to the movement’s performance in the elections.

Findings show that the top priorities in these elections for the voters are four: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, improving economic conditions, combating corruption, and the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip. The largest percentage believes that a Hamas electoral victory would most likely have a negative impact on all these priorities except combating corruption where no negative impact is expected. These expectations might have affected voting intentions as the findings indicate a rise in the vote for Fatah and a decline in the willingness to vote for Hamas compared to our findings three months ago.

Fatah does have its own problems, particularly in the Gaza Strip, because of the probable competition over the likely Fatah’s votes from two independent electoral lists of Mohammad Dahlan and Naser al Qidwah. More seriously, if Marwan Barghouti decides to have his own electoral list, Fatah’s vote would split into two equivalent shares. As for other third parties outside Fatah and Hamas, such as those of the left, Salam Fayyad’s, Hasan Khraishah’s, and others, it is probably too early to reach definitive conclusions at this stage regarding the likelihood that most of these lists would pass the 1.5% electoral threshold.  The findings do show that al Mubadarah, led by Mustafa Barghouti, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine would probably succeed in passing that threshold. For the presidency, the findings indicate a limited increase in public demand for Abbas’ resignation despite the fact that he is doing better than he did three months ago in a competition with Hamas’ leader Ismael Haniyyeh. The findings make it clear however that the public prefers to see Marwan Barghouti as the next president of the PA as he is preferred over all other potential candidates including Fatah’s Abbas and Hamas’ Haniyyeh.

In other domestic issues, public attitudes seem stable compared to three months ago. This applies to the perceptions of safety and security as well as corruption within the PA. There is however a limited rise in optimism regarding reconciliation and in the perception that people can criticize the PA without fear.  Slightly less than what we found three months ago, a large segment of the public, almost half, is still reluctant or unwilling to be vaccinated.

On the peace process, findings show that support for the two-state solution remains unchanged. Similarly, public preference for armed struggle vs. negotiations remains almost unchanged. But findings do show that a majority is opposed to a return to an unconditional bi-lateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiation despite the optimism generated by the election of the new Biden Administration. On the other hand, despite its recent decision to assert jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories, the public is not optimistic about the ability of the International Criminal Court, to restrict Israeli behavior in the occupied territories. In fact, a large majority thinks that no Israeli official will ever be prosecuted by the court.   

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 76% demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections and 61% expect parliamentary elections to take place soon. Three months ago, only 32% expected the holding of Palestinian elections soon. If Israel refuses to allow elections to take place in the occupied City of East Jerusalem, 65% believe elections should nonetheless take place and that East Jerusalemites should be allowed to vote in places in the Jerusalem district just outside the city limits; 27% oppose that and demand the cancelation of elections if Israel does not allow East Jerusalemites to vote in their city. Three months ago, only 56% supported, and 39% opposed, the holding general elections if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem.
• But only 42% believe the elections will be free and fair and 48% think they will not be free and fair. Moreover, 69% believe that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah will not accept the results and 60% say that if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will not accept that outcome.

Legisl Legislative Elections:

• In an open-ended question, we asked the public to name the party or faction it nominates to lead the next PA government: 38% (40% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) nominated Fatah; 22% (15% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) nominated Hamas, 5% nominated an independent list, 2% nominated the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 4% nominated other groups, and 29% did not nominate any party of faction. When asked about its expectations for the winner, 45% expected Fatah to win, 23% Hamas, 18% third or newly created parties.
• The poll sought to assess the role played by three prominent individuals associated with Fatah on the likely consequences for the movement if the three decide to run with their own independent lists:

	If Marwan Barghouti forms his own independent list, 28% of the public say they will vote for his list while 22% say they will vote for the official Fatah list formed by president Abbas.
	If Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, 10% of the public say they will vote for his list while 29% say they will vote for the official Fatah list.
	If Naser al Qidwah forms his own independent list, 7% of the public say they will vote for his list while 30% say they will vote for the official Fatah list. If Marwan Barghouti gives his support to al Qidwah’s list, support for it would rise to 11% and support for Fatah’s would drop to 28%.

• A majority of 57% say they support and 38% say they oppose the formation of a joint Fatah-Hamas list to compete in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
• We asked the public which electoral list it will vote for in the upcoming elections. We sought to ascertain how respondents will vote in four different scenarios: (1) when the electoral lists are identical to those of 2006 elections, (2) when a joint Fatah-Hamas list is formed and Marwan Barghouti forms his own list, (3) when no joint list is created but Marwan Barghouti forms his own independent list, and (4) when no joint list is created and a Naser al Qidwah’s list replaces that of Marwan Barghouti’s. Here are the findings among those who say they intend to vote:

	2006 lists: if new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 75% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they will vote for Hamas and 43% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 36% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 25% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 53% (compared to 45% three months ago).
	Joint Fatah-Hamas list and a list for Marwan Barghouti: in this scenario, 78% indicate they will participate in the elections. Of those participating, 44% (41% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) say they will vote for the joint list, 28% (38% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip) will vote for Marwan Barghouti’s list, 8% (2% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip) will vote for Mohammad Dahlan’s list, 6% will vote for leftist and other lists, and 14% are undecided.
	Independent Marwan Barghouti’s list and no joint list: in this scenario, 79% say they will participate in the elections. Of those who plan to participate, 27% (20% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) say they will vote for Hamas, 24% (27% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) intend to vote for Fatah, and 20% (29% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) intend to vote for the Marwan Barghouti’s list, 7% intend to vote for Dahlan’s, 5% for the National Initiative list (al Mobadarah) led by Mustafa Barghouti, 2% for the PFLP, 1% for Watan led by Hasan Khraisheh, and 1% for a list formed by Salam Fayyad, and 15% say they have not decided yet.
	Independent list for Qidwah, no joint list, and no Marwan Barghouti’s list: In this scenario, 78% say they will participate and of those 32% (39% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip) say they will vote for Fatah, 28% (21% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) say they will vote for Hamas, 6% for Dahlan’s, 5% for the National Initiative’s, 4% for Qidwah’s, 2% for the PFLP, 2% for Salam Fayyad, 1% for Watan led by Hasan Khraisheh, and 21% are undecided.

• The largest percentage (28%) says that the top priority for Palestinian elections should be to restore unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 23% say it is improving economic conditions; 17% say it is to combat corruption; 12% say it is the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip; 11% say it is the strengthening of resistance to occupation, 4% say it is to increase the prospects for peace, and 2% say it is to create a democratic political system. When asked who is the most able to deliver the top priority selected by the respondents, 31% selected Fatah, 22% Hamas, and 9% third parties. 15% say all the competing parties and factions can equally deliver on their priorities while 19% say none can deliver.  
• We asked the public to speculate about the likely consequences of a Hamas victory on six issues: (1) the siege over the Gaza Strip, (2) Gaza-West Bank unity, (3) economic conditions, (4) corruption in the PA, (5) Hamas’s response to the Quartet conditions, and (6) Israel’s response to Hamas’ victory. These are the findings:

	Siege over Gaza: 49% say the siege will be tightened and 14% say it will be relaxed or removed and the rest said current conditions will remain unchanged.
	West Bank-Gaza Strip unity: 36% say the split will be consolidated and 19% say the prospects for unity will increase.
	Economic conditions: 45% say economic conditions will worsen and 17% say they will improve.
	Corruption: 26% say corruption will decrease and 28% say it will increase
	Quartet conditions: 62% say Hamas will not accept the conditions of the Quartet and 26% say it will accept them.
	Israel’s reaction: a majority of 51% thinks that Israel will not allow Hamas to form a government in the West Bank, 28% think Israel will arrest Hamas’ members of the parliament, and only 11% think Israel will allow Hamas to form a government in the West Bank.

• Similarly, we asked the public about the consequences of a Fatah victory for two issues: (1) corruption, and (2) West Bank-Gaza Strip unity. These are the findings: 

	Corruption: 16% say corruption in the PA will decrease and 36% think it will increase.
	Unity: 33% think separation will be consolidated while 22% think unity will be consolidated.

Presl Presidential elections:

• In an open-ended question, we asked the public to state the name of the person it wants to be the next president of the PA. The largest percentage (22%) says Marwan Barghouti, 14% Ismail Haniyyeh, 9% Mahmoud Abbas, 7% Dahlan, 3% Khalid Mishal, 2% Mohammad Shtayyeh, 2% Mustafa Barghouti, and 1% Yahya Sinwar. About half of the public did not know or declined to mention a name.
• If Fatah nominates Abbas as its candidate for the presidential elections, a majority of 57% of the public would view him as the wrong choice believing Fatah has better candidates; only 23% of the public think Abbas is the best Fatah candidate. When asked to name a better candidate, 49% named Marwan Barghouti, 12% Mohammad Dahlan, 5% Mohammad Shtayyeh, and 4% Nasir al Qidwah.  
• We asked, in a closed-ended question, about potential Abbas’ successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new presidential election, 40% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal and Mustafa Barghouti by 5% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%. 
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% and the latter 46% of the votes (compared to 50% for Haniyeh and 43% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the votes (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 64% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 63% and Haniyeh 33%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% and the latter 44%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 47% and Haniyyeh 47%. 
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 35% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. These figures are similar to those obtained three months ago. 68% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 26% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 66% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.

(2) The Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• A majority of 55% (65% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank) says that it is willing to take the vaccine when available or has already received it; 43% (35% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank) say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available.
• 62% believe that the vaccination process in the West Bank has so far been lacking in transparency and justice while 33% believe the process has been transparent and just. 
• 55% (36% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank) are dissatisfied with the efforts made by the PA to obtain the vaccine and 43% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 30% in the West Bank) are satisfied.
• Half of the public (50%) are dissatisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 47% are satisfied. Dissatisfaction in the West Bank stands at 61% and in the Gaza Strip at 34%.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 60% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 56% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister stands at 45%.

(3) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 68% and in the West Bank at 64%.
• 30% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 40% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 24% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and only 25% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 70% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions.
• 43% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 53% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 58% think they cannot.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a slight majority of 51% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 41% viewed the PA as a burden.
• 58% oppose and 37% support making payments to the families of martyrs and prisoners based on need assessment and number of family members rather than on the act committed by the martyr or the number of years in jail.
• 34% are optimistic and 61% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
• About two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 61% expect failure; only 32% expect success. These results reflect a little increase in public expectations compared to three months ago when only 28% expected success. But when asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, half of the public expects success and 44% expects failure. Three months ago, 61% expected failure in holding elections. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 60% expects failure and 32% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Palestine TV viewership has become the highest standing at 19%, followed by Al Jazeera TV, at 16%, followed by Maan, Al Aqsa TV, and Palestine Today TV at 11% each,  Al Arabiya at 5%, al Manar at 3% and finally al Mayadeen at 1%.

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process, Israeli elections, and the implications of the recent ICC decision:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 57%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  
• A majority of 55% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 38% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 26% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 21% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 38% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 29% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 37% chose armed struggle, 36% negotiations, and 20% popular resistance. Three months ago, 39% chose armed struggle and 35% chose negotiations.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 58% opposes and 28% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But only 51% think the PA should not return to peace negotiations with Israel under the sponsorship of the Quartet, made up of the US, Russia, the EU, and the UN; 43% support such return to negotiations.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices, 66% supported joining more international organizations; 59% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 43% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 42% supported dissolving the PA; and 33% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis.
• In the upcoming Israeli elections, scheduled to take place today, 49% expect the Likud (under the leadership of Netanyahu) and its allies among the extreme right and the religious parties to win the elections while 23% expected victory to go to a coalition of right wing, center and leftist parties under the leadership of Saar, Gantz, Lapid, and others; 28% do not know.
• Two thirds (66%) of the public do not expect the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) confirming its jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories to lead to restrictions on Israeli behavior in these territories while a quarter (25%) expects it to impose at least some restrictions.  
• Similarly, a large majority of 73% believes that there will be no trials at the ICC for any Israeli officials; 21% think one or more Israeli officials might be prosecuted by that court.

(5) Expectations from the Biden Administration and attitudes regarding resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under its leadership:

• Now that Biden has won the US presidential elections, 50% expect, and 41% do not expect, the US to resume financial support to the PA.
• But a slight majority of 51% does not expect Biden’s policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be more balanced and less biased in favor of Israel; 41% expect it to be more balanced and less biased compared to the previous US administration.
• 48% are opposed, and 44% are supportive, of a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the US leadership.

(6) Ten years after the Arab Spring:

• Ten years after the Arab Spring, 73% say they felt sympathy at the time with the Arab demonstrators while 18% say they did not feel sympathy.
• The public is divided into three groups in its evaluation of what the Arab demonstrators wanted: 33% say they wanted freedom from regime oppression, 28% say they wanted a way out of poverty and unemployment, and 20% say they wanted to combat corruption. Only 5% say they wanted to replace the existing regimes with Islamists and another 5% say they wanted to express opposition to pro-Western policies of their regimes.
• 37% believe the Arab Spring has left a negative impact on Palestinian conditions while 18% think it left a positive impact and 37% say it had neither negative nor positive impact.
• A majority of 56% indicates that it did not feel at the time that there was a need for similar demonstrations in Palestine while 36% say they felt such need at that time.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 30%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%,  the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 6%.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (49)

Palestinian public is spilt regarding the resumption of direct negotiations with Israel and pessimistic regarding the chances for success, but if the talks do lead to a peace agreement, the public believes that a majority of the Palestinians will approve it in a referendum

19-21 September 2013

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 19-21 September 2013. The period before the poll witnessed two major developments: the return to Palestinian-Israeli direct bilateral negotiations and the removal by the Egyptian army of president Morsi, replacing him with a new president and a new government. The army also partially closed the Rafah crossing into Egypt and began to close down tunnels along the Egyptian borders with the Gaza Strip. This press release covers public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Rami al Hamdallah, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, return to negotiations, developments in Egypt, and others. Total size of the sample is 1261 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the Palestinian public is divided almost equally over President’s Abbas’ decision to resume direct bilateral negotiations with Israel. Moreover, despite the vital importance attached by the public to the issue of prisoners’ release, a larger percentage gives greater priority to the two combined issues of the 1967 borders and settlement freeze. Furthermore, the lack of enthusiasm for return to negotiations seems to be driven by the belief of a large majority that the current round of talks will fail just like previous rounds. But if negotiations do succeed and an agreement is reached, the public believes that a majority of the Palestinians will approve it in a referendum.

A majority does not expect to see any positive development during the period of negotiations; only a quarter to a third expects improvement in economic conditions, reduction in settlement activities, or decrease in the number of checkpoints and other Israeli restrictions in the West Bank. Perhaps because of all of this, a majority supports waging popular non-violent resistance, side by side with negotiations. Indeed, two thirds want to go now to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in order to stop settlement construction even if such a step leads to suspension of Israeli transfer of revenues to the PA and a halt to prisoners’ release. It is worth mentioning in this regard that on the 20^thanniversary of the Oslo Agreement, less than a third of the public views it as having served vital national interests of the Palestinian people with a majority believing that the accord has in fact damaged those interests and that the PA should stop implementing it. 

Findings also show that the latest developments in Egypt, including the change of the president and government, increase doubts about the future of reconciliation and reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Stip. Optimism about unity has in fact reached the lowest level since the split in 2007. Findings also show that two thirds of the public believe that the change in Egypt will weaken Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, perhaps due to the partial closure of the Rafah crossing, the Egyptian army’s closure of the tunnels, and Hamas’s reaction to the change in Egypt, the percentage of positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip has decreased significantly. Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Ismail Haniyeh has also dropped. But findings do not show a decrease in the likely vote for Hamas in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip if elections are held today.

We asked the public about its views regarding developments in Egypt and Syria and regarding relations with Jordan. Findings show that about two thirds view change in Egypt negatively while less than a quarter sees it as good for Palestinians. Perhaps this reaction is driven by the fact that change in Egypt has led to the closure of the tunnels and the Rafah crossing leading to substantial hardships. On Syria, we found that despite the belief of the majority that the Assad regime was the one that used the chemical weapons against Syrian civilians, two-thirds oppose an American military strike against the Assad forces. The opposition to the strike might be due to the belief of many Palestinians that the strike would target Syria more than the Assad regime. Finally, with regard to relations with Jordan, findings show a reduction in support for a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation compared to the level of support obtained three months ago. It should be noted that support for the confederation increased last June in the aftermath of the signing of the holy places agreement, an agreement that was supported by a majority of the public at that time.

(1) Presidential and legislative elections:

• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 51% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the presidential contest was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 58% and the latter 35%.
• If the contest was between Barghouti, Haniyeh, and Abbas, the first receives 35%, the second 33%, and the third 27%.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 38%, Hamas 31%, all other electoral lists combined 10%, and 22% are undecided.

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If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 51% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 63%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 49% and Haniyeh 44%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 45% and Haniyeh 50% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 55% and Haniyeh 37%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 35% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 71%. In our June poll Barghouti received 57% of the vote and Haniyeh 36%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (35%) followed by Haniyeh (33%), and Abbas (27%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 75%. In our previous poll last June, the results were identical to the current findings. 

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 38% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% and in the West Bank at 25%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 38% and in the West Bank at 39%. These results indicate a decrease in support for Fatah and stability in the vote for Hamas.    

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops to 21% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains at 29%
• 79% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank and 66% believe it exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip
• Only 31% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear and only 24% believe people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the dismissed Hamas government in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Percentages of safety and security in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are equal, standing at 55%
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 36% and positive evaluation of the performance of Al Hamdallah government stands at 29% 
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 49%.

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Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops dramatically from 36% three months ago to 21% in this poll while 55% say conditions are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged compared to three months ago standing today at 29%. But the percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad increases from 37% to 44% during the same period.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 79% in this poll. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 66%.  Moreover, 20% say there is, and 41% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 16% say there is, and 33% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 24% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip at 55%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 64% in the Gaza Strip and 56% in the West Bank.  But findings also show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 26%. Last June these percentages stood at 42% and 27% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 36%.Three months ago it stood at41%. Positive evaluation of the government of Rami al Hamdallah in the West Bank stands today at 29%.  Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas remains unchanged at 49%. Dissatisfaction with the president performance stands today at 48%.  

(3) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the chances for reconciliation and reunification stands today at its lowest point: 12%
• Majority believes that developments in Egypt weakens the chances for reconciliation and weakens Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip
• Large majorities believe that reconciliation will not succeed as long as restrictions are imposed on Hamas members in the West Bank and Fatah members in the Gaza Strip or without an agreement on the date for elections
• 77% support continued PA payment of salaries for Gaza public sector employees
• 47% support holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if separation continues for a long time

Given the developments in Egypt and the ups and downs in the Fateh-Hamas dialogue, percentage of optimism about the chances for reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip drops to the lowest level since the split in 2007, standing today at 12%. The belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge increases from 36% three months ago to 41% in this poll. 42% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time. 57% believe that the latest development in Egypt reduces the chances for reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 14% believe it increases those chances and 25% believe it makes no difference. 67% believe that the Egyptian developments will weaken Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip while 10% believe they will strengthen it and 20% believe they will leave no impact on that authority.

We asked respondents about conditions under which they believe reconciliation cannot succeed. About three quarters believe that reconciliation will not succeed without first ending the restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Hamas in the West Bank and a similar percentage (75%) believes that it will not succeed without ending restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Fatah in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 67% say it will not succeed without first agreeing on an election date; 65% say it will not succeed if Hamas continues to reject agreements signed by the PLO with Israel; 63% say it will not succeed if security coordination with Israel in the West Bank continues; another 61% say it will not succeed if the PA continues to recognize Israel and the Oslo agreements; and 56% say it will not succeed as along as Hamas insists on keeping its al Qassam armed wing in the Gaza Strip.

The largest percentage (36%) believes that the PA, with its parts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 30% believe that it is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Furthermore, 15% believe that the PA in the West Bank is an accomplishment while the PA in the Gaza Strip is a burden. By contrast, a similar percentage (13%) believes that the PA in the Gaza Strip is an accomplishment while the PA in the West Bank is a burden.

56% regard the Gaza Strip as an Israeli-occupied territory, just like the West Bank. But 19% consider it a liberated area and 25% consider it semi-liberated and semi-occupied. Belief that the Strip is liberated or semi liberated increases in the Gaza Strip, reaching 58%, and decreases in the West Bank, standing at 35%.

More than three quarters of the public (77%) support the continued payment of salaries to Gaza Strip employees who used to work for the PA before the split in 2007. 20% believe that the PA should stop the payment. But the public is split over the necessity of holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the current disunity continued for a long time: 47% believe it to be necessary to hold such separate elections and 50% believe it to be unnecessary.  

(4) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be the most vital Palestinian goal and 29% believe that obtaining of the right of return should be the most vital goal.
• 28% view the spread of poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 23% view the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split as the most serious problem. 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-23 October 2021. The six-month period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several important developments including the indefinite postponement of the parliamentary elections that were planned for May 2021, the eruption of popular confrontations in East Jerusalem in protest against conflict over access to Muslim holy places and the threat of expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in al Shaikh Jarrah which were followed by the fourth Hamas-Israel war that was triggered by these confrontations. The Palestinians were also preoccupied with the killing of a political activist, Nizar Banat, by the Palestinian security services. PA president Mahmoud Abbas met with the Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz in Ramallah to talk about Palestinian-Israeli relations and means of improving them while strengthening the PA by implementing various trust-building measures. The period witnessed the escape and recapture of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel. Finally, the period witnessed the setting of the month of December 2021 as a date for the holding of local elections in villages and small towns with population of less than 11,000. This press release addresses a selected number of domestic issues such as the evaluation of the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights, the internal balance of power, and the results of legislative and presidential elections if they were to take place today. It also covers attitudes regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as the two-state solution, return to negotiations, and the best means to end the Israeli occupation given the current stalemate. Total size of the sample is 1800 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

This poll was conducted six months after the indefinite postponement of legislative elections that were scheduled to take place in May 2021 and two months before the holding of the first phase of local elections, scheduled for December 2021. The past six months witnessed important developments that significantly decreased the popularity of Fatah and president Abbas, most importantly in addition to the postponement of elections, the fourth war between Hamas and Israel and the killing of the opposition activist Nizar Banat by members of a Palestinian security service.

In order to analyze the findings, we compared the levels of support for Fatah and Hamas before and during these developments. We also compared public attitudes regarding domestic issues and Palestinian-Israeli relations. Specifically, we compared the results obtained in March 2021 in the areas that will now go to the first phase of the local elections with the current findings for the same exact areas. The number of the relevant areas that were part of our sample in March and are part of the current sample is 27 and the total number of respondents is 270 in March and 405 in the current poll.

The current findings show that Fatah continues to suffer the consequences of the developments of the past six month but they also show that it has managed to narrow the gap with Hamas which gives it the ability to effectively compete in the upcoming first phase of the local elections, which will take place in places that are mainly rural. But it remains unable to win in the second phase of the local elections, which will take place mostly in cities and big towns. The findings show that the overall support for Fatah has increased and it is now higher than that of Hamas. But the gap between the two parties today, five percentage points in favor of Fatah, is smaller that the one that prevailed in March, which stood at 13 percentage points in favor of Fatah. Nonetheless, the current findings represent a huge improvement for Fatah compared to the findings of June 2021 when the gap between the two stood at 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas. The levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of president Abbas and the demand for his resignation remain very high as about three quarters continue to make that demand. Perhaps one reason for the rise in Fatah’s popularity might be the implementation by Israel of some of the confidence building measures that the PA and Israel agreed to recently, such as family unifications and the rise in the number of laborers working in Israel. It is worth mentioning that a month ago, in our September 2021 poll, majority of the Palestinians supported such measures.

The current findings indicate a significant rise in support for the two-state solution compared to our findings during the past six months. Similarly, the current poll shows an increase in public belief in the effectiveness of negotiations. Indeed, for the first time in six months the percentage of those who prefer to change the status quo through negotiations is higher than those who prefer to do so through waging armed struggle. It is possible that this change is driven by the same dynamics that increased the support for Fatah.

1) Domestic conditions: democracy, elections, the performance of the president, and the balance of power:

• We asked Palestinians to evaluate people’s ability to criticize the authority without fear in the area where they live, 71% of West Bankers believe that people in their area cannot criticize the PA without fear. In the Gaza Strip, 62% say people in that area cannot criticize Hamans’ authority without fear; 28% of West Bankers and 38% of Gazans say people in their areas can do that without fear.
• We asked the public to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the areas where they live, under the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and under Hamas’ control in the Gaza Strip: 22% of West Bankers and 29% of Gazans describe these conditions as good or very good, 50% of West Bankers and 35% of Gazans describe them as bad or very bad, and the rest describe the conditions as neither good nor bad.
• As indicated in chart (1) below, positive (good or very good) evaluation of democracy and human rights is higher among those with the highest income (30%) compared to those with the lowest income (18%), among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (33% and 30% respectively) compared to supporters of third or other parties (13%).

• If parliamentary and presidential elections were to take place today, the following should, in the eyes of the public, be the top five priorities that these elections should aim to achieve: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (selected by 29% of the public), followed by improving economic conditions (25%), combating corruption (15%), lifting the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip (14%), and strengthening the resistance to occupation (9%). The percentage of those who selected “improving economic conditions” stands at 35% in the Gaza Strip, making it the top priority for Gazans, while the percentage of selecting “combating corruption” stands at 20% in the West Bank, making it the second priority in that area after the “unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” which is selected by 33% of the West Bankers.
• When asked about the party or faction that is better able to achieve the priority selected by the respondents, 26% selected Hamas while only 18% selected Fatah and 14% selected third or other parties. One third (33%) believe all factions and parties have equal ability to achieve the priorities selected. Hamas is selected as the most able by those who selected the following priorities: strengthen the resistance to occupation (45% selected Hamas as most able), lift the siege and blockade (39%), combat corruption and unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (24% each). Those who select Fatah are more likely to have selected the improvement of economic conditions (25%) and making progress in the peace process (21%). The peace process was not among the top five priorities selected by the Palestinian public. Those who selected the priority of creating a democratic political system with periodic elections, another priority that was not among the top five, selected third parties as the most able faction or political party (30%).
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 71%. About three quarters (74%) want Abbas to resign while 22% want him to stay in the office. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stood at 78% in September 2021.
• If new presidential elections were to take place today with three candidates competing, president Abbas, Ismail Haniyyeh from Hamas, and Marwan Barghouti from Fatah 64% of the public would participate and from among those the first receives 16%, the second 30%, and the third 51%. Vote for Barghouti in this three-way competition is higher in the West Bank (61%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (96% and 57% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), among the somewhat religious (57%) compared to the religious and the not religious (47% and 44% respectively), among those working in the private sector (60%) compared to those who work in the public sector (39%), among those with the highest income (51%) compared to those with the lowest income (45%). Vote for Haniyyeh is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among women (33%) compared to men (28%), among the religious (40%) compared to the not religious and the somewhat religious (7% and 23% respectively), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (1% and 2% respectively). Vote for Abbas is higher in the Gaza Strip (20%) compared to the West Bank (12%), among men (18%) compared to women (13%), and among supporters of Fatah (39%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (1% and 2% respectively).

• If the competition was between two, Abbas and Haniyyeh, only 46% say they would participate and from among those the former receives 39% and the latter 55%. But if the competing two candidates were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, 62% would participate and from among those, the former would receive 65% and the latter 32%.
• If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, 60% would participate and from among those Fatah receives 38%, Hamas 33%, and the third parties combined 10%; 20% are undecided. It is worth mentioning that in September, Hamas received 37% of the vote and Fatah 32%. Voting for Fatah is higher in the West Bank (39%) compared to the Gaza Strip (36%), among men (40%) compared to women (35%), among those with the highest income (40%) compared to those with the lowest income (35%). Vote for Hamas is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (28%), among the religious (42%) compared to the not religious and the somewhat religious (12% and 27% respectively), and among those with the least income (39%) compared to those with the highest income (28%).

• 43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 10% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

2) Comparing attitudes in areas of the first phase of local elections with attitudes in other areas:

• In order to assess attitudes of the residents of the villages and towns in which local elections will take place in December 2021, we divided respondents into three categories: those residing in the areas of the first phase of the local election, residents of cities and other urban areas in which the second phase of the local elections will take place, and residents of refugee camps who will not participate in local elections. Here below are the main attitudinal differences between the three areas:

1. Fatah enjoys more support than Hamas and third parties (41%, 27%, and 7% respectively) in those areas where the first phase of the local election will take place. It is worth mentioning that back in March 2021 Fatah received the support of 56% of respondents in those areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections while Hamas received the support of only 23% in those same areas. These findings are confirmed when looking at the outcome of a three-way presidential elections in which Marwan Barghouti receives 59% compared to Ismael Haniyyeh (23%) and Mahmoud Abbas (14%).  It is worth mentioning that Fatah receives the highest percentage of the vote in the refugee camps followed by the areas participating in the first phase of the local elections and thirdly in cities and other urban areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections: 48%, 41%, and 35% respectively. Hamas receives its highest vote from cities and other urban areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections followed by areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections, and finally in refugee camps (35%, 28%, and 27% respectively). In other words, Hamas and Fatah have exactly the same level of support in the areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections.
2. Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections while standing at 24% in the urban areas that will participate in the second phase and 37% in refugee camps. Demand for Abbas resignation in the areas of the first phase of the local elections stands at 68% compared to 66% in refugee camps and 77% in cities and other urban areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections.
3. Evaluation of the status of democracy and human rights, standing at 25%, is the lowest among the residents of the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections, followed by the urban aeras that will participate in the second phase of the local elections (24%) and refugee camps (28%).
4. Support for the two-state solution is the lowest in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections (40%) compared to urban areas which will participate in the second phase (46%) and finally in refugee camps (50%).
5. Support for waging an armed struggle against the occupation is the lowest in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections, standing at 30% only, compared to 34% in the cities and urban areas and 38% in refugee camps.
6. Support for a return to negotiations under US leadership is the lowest in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections (27%) while standing at 35% in urban areas and 37% in refugee camps.

Comparing attitudes of those residing in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections to other areas

(3) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 46% and opposition stands at 53%. No description or details were provided for the concept. One months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%.  Support for the two-state solution is higher among men (48%) compared to women (43%), among the not-religious and the somewhat religious (54% and 50% respectively) compared to the religious (39%), among supporters of Fatah (64%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (43% and 31% respectively). More than three quarters (76%) believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.

• One third (33%) support return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership but a majority of 64% oppose it. Support is higher in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (32%), among the somewhat religious and the not-religious (37% and 34% respectively) compared to the religious (29%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 38% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (20%).
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 36% negotiations, and 16% popular resistance. One month ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations. Support for armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among men (50%) compared to women (39%), among supporters of Hamas (74%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (28% and 45% respectively). Support for negotiations is higher among women (38%) compared to men (34%), among those whose age in between 40 and 59 years (36%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (29%), and among supporters of Fatah (51%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (16% and 27% respectively).
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 34% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 9% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 19% prefer to keep the status quo. One month ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle. The percentage of those who prefer waging an armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (39%) compared to the West Bank (30%), among men (38%) compared to women (30%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 29 years (37%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 59 years (32%), and among supporters of Hamas (61%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (20% and 35% respectively).

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

10-12 December 2015