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Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (50)

While half of the public favors negotiations with Israel, three quarters reject a permanent settlement if it includes a 10-year transitional phase during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley; and while fewer people believe that Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and build a state, satisfaction with the performance of Abbas and Hamdallah increases and more people believe that Abbas’ is the best way

19-22 December 2013

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 19-22 December 2013. The period before the poll witnessed continuation of the friction between Egypt and Hamas’ government in Gaza, the continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the release of more prisoners by Israel, an increase in violent incidents, release of reports on Arafat’s poisoning, and talk about the appointment of Marwan Barghouti as vice president to Abbas.  This press release covers public attitudes regarding the peace process, evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Rami al Hamdallah, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, reports on Arafat’s poisoning, and others. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2013 indicate that half of the public remains willing to give negotiations a chance but about 70% are pessimistic about the chances for success. On the other hand, most of the public supports the two-state solution and believes that if Abbas does reach a peace agreement with Netanyahu, a majority of the public will vote in favor of that agreement. The public however insists that the agreement be permanent and more than three quarters reject a permanent agreement that includes a 10-year transitional period during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley.

Findings also indicate a continued decline in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip, presumably as a result of the continued political conflict between Egypt and the Hamas government and the continued closure of tunnels and the Rafah crossing. This decline, which we first noticed in our September poll, is now affecting Hamas’ popularity in the Gaza Strip where it dropped significantly. It is worth mentioning however that Hamas’ popularity in the West Bank has not changed. Similarly, despite the continuation of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remained unchanged compared to the findings of September 2013.

By contrast, satisfaction with the performance of Abbas in the Gaza Strip has significantly increased and positive evaluation of the performance of Prime Minister Al Hamdallah increased in both areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. More importantly, it seems that these changes have affected attitudes regarding whose way is the best to end occupation and build a Palestinian state. Current findings show a significant decrease in the percentage of those who believe that Hamas’ way is the best way and a significant increase in the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way.   It should be noted however that the percentage of those who believe that Hamas’ way is the best way remains higher than the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ is the best.

(1) Peace Process:

• 50% support the current negotiations but 69% expect them to fail; still, if Abbas succeeds in reaching a peace agreement with Israel, 57% believe that a majority of the public will vote in a referendum in favor of that agreement
• 53% support the two-state solution, but 56% believe that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement activities. Nonetheless, two thirds oppose a one-state solution.
• More than three quarters of the public reject a permanent agreement that includes a 10-year transitional period during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley
• A majority believes that settlement activities and the number of checkpoints have increased or remained as they were before the start of the current negotiations and that economic conditions have remained the same or have become worse
• 46% support and 53% oppose a package of compromises along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative, but 50% say they will vote in favor of such package if Abbas presented it in a referendum
• 43% support and 56% oppose a mutual recognition of national identity
• After reaching a peace agreement, 51% support and 47% oppose reconciliation between the two peoples
• A majority of 77% is worried that it might be hurt by Israelis in its daily life and 83% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex all Palestinian territories and expel its population or deny it its political rights 

Findings show that 50% of the public support and 47% oppose the president’s decision to resume direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But 69% expect these negotiations to fail in reaching a peace agreement and only 27% expect them to succeed. If negotiations do succeed and Abbas reaches a peace agreement with Israel, 57% believe that a majority of the Palestinian public will vote in a referendum in favor of the agreement; only 35% expect a majority to vote against it.

A majority of 53% supports the two-state solution and 46% oppose it. But 56% believe that that solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion and 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non-existent. Yet, 66% of the public oppose and 32% support the one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equality in one state. Support for the two-state solution is higher in the West Bank (54%) than in the Gaza Strip (51%), in towns and villages (58%) compared to cities and refugee camps (53% and 43% respectively), among men (56%) compared to women (50%), among  those whose age is over 50 years (65%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 years (48%), among supporters of Fatah and third powers (74% and 54% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (30%), among the somewhat religious (59%) compared to the religious (45%), among supporters of the peace process (68%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (27%), among non-refugees (55%) compared to refugees (50%), and among farmers, retirees, merchants, and employees (69%, 62%, 61%, and 58% respectively) compared to students and laborers (47% and 46% respectively).

A majority of 76% opposes a permanent settlement if it includes a 10-year transitional period during which the Israeli army remains deployed in the Jordan Valley; 21% support it. Opposition to this agreement is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (65%), among supporters of Hamas and third forces (92% and 81% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (62%), and among those who oppose the peace process (90%) compared to those who support the peace process (71%).

Only a small minority believes that conditions have improved since the start of peace talks while a majority believes that conditions have become worse or remained the same. Only 11% believe that economic conditions have improved; 49% believe they have become worse and 37% believe they have remained the same. Only 17% believe that restrictions and checkpoints have decreased; 46% believe they have increased and 32% believe they have remained the same. Only 4% believe that settlement construction has decreased; 78% believe that it has increased and 15% believe it has remained the same. 41% however believe that international support has increased, 19% believe it has decreased, and 35% believe it has remained the same.

Findings show that 46% support and 53% oppose a package of a permanent status agreement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for this package stood at 43% in December 2012. The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost fourteen years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) final borders and territorial exchange; (2) refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) a demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) security arrangements; and (6) end of conflict. We have been addressing these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic stalemate throughout 2012. 

Findings, as the summary table below shows, indicate that the public rejects three items in the package and accepts three. The following is a summary of the items and the attitudes to each:

 (1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 52% support or strongly support and 48% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2012, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 53% and opposition at 45%.

(2) Refugees: 46% support and 52% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2012, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 56% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 32% support and 68% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2012, an identical compromise obtained 29% support and 70% opposition.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2012, 28% support, and opposition reached 71%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

(5) Security Arrangements: 52% support and 48% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2012, 46% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 53% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 63% support and 36% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in December 2012 were 59% support and 39% opposition. 

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement/ Geneva Initiative Framework 2003-2013

If President Abbas presented this package for a vote in a referendum, 50% say they will vote in favor and 49% say they will vote against it. If the package includes an Israeli acknowledgement of responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem, about one quarter of those opposed to the package would change their mind and accept it. Moreover, if the package includes an Israeli acceptance of the Arab Peace Initiative, 18% of those opposed to the package would change their mind and accept it. But if the US Administration intervened in order to pressure the two sides, the Palestinians and the Israelis, to accept and implement this package, a majority of 60% believes that the Palestinian side should reject this American intervention while 37% believe that the Palestinian side should accept the American intervention.  A majority of 65% believes that most Palestinians would reject such American intervention but a similar majority (63%) believes that a majority of Israelis would accept the American intervention.

After reaching a peace agreement, 51% would support reconciliation between the two peoples and 47% would oppose it. But 68% believe that reconciliation will not be possible or that it will be possible only after few generations.  Support for reconciliation between the two peoples is higher in the West Bank (55%) than in the Gaza Strip (44%), among residents of villages and towns (62%) compared to residents of cities and refugee camps (50% and 44% respectively), among supporters of Fatah and third forces (72% and 55% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (29%), among the somewhat religious (56%) compared to the religious (45%), and among supporters of the peace process (66%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (24%).

Findings show that three quarters of the public (77%) are worried and 23% are not worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis or their land confiscated or homes demolished. Moreover, 83% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to expand its borders to include all territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel their Palestinian population or deny them their political rights. When asked about the long term goal of the PLO and the PA, 66% said that it is to recover all or some of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and 26% said it is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 territories or defeat Israel and destroy its Jewish population.

(2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 52% and Haniyeh 42%.
• If the presidential contest was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 61% and the latter 34%.
• If the contest was between Barghouti, Haniyeh, and Abbas, the first receives 40%, the second 31%, and the third 26%.
• 73% support and 20% oppose the appointment of Marwan Barghouti as vice president
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 40%, Hamas 29%, all other electoral lists combined 8%, and 23% are undecided.

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If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 52% and Haniyeh 42% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 62%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 51% and Haniyeh 42%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 50% and Haniyeh 48% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 39%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter would receive 34% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 70%. In our September 2013 poll Barghouti received 58% of the vote and Haniyeh 35%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (40%) followed by Haniyeh (31%), and Abbas (26%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 74%. In our previous poll last September, Barghouti received 35%, Haniyeh 33%, and Abbas 27%. 

73% support and 20% oppose the appointment of Marwan Barghouti as a vice president to Abbas. Support for this appointment stands at 79% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. Support for Barghouti as vice president increases in the Gaza Strip (79%) compared the West Bank (69%), among Fatah supporters and supporters of third forces (91% and 71% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (63%), and among supporters of the peace process (80%) compared those who oppose the peace process (58%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 40% say they would vote for Fatah, 8% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 33% and in the West Bank at 26%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% and in the West Bank at 41%. These results indicate a sharp decrease in support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip from the 39% it had last September. In the West Bank however Hamas’ popularity increased by one percentage point during the same period. Fatah, on the other hand, increased its popularity in the West Bank by two percentage points and in the Gaza Strip by one percentage point during the same period.

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops further to 16% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged at 30%
• 77% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank and 68% believe it exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip
• Only 30% believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear and only 24% believe people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the dismissed Hamas government in the Gaza Strip without fear.
• Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55%  and in the Gaza Strip at 62%
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37% and positive evaluation of the performance of Al Hamdallah government stands at 39%
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas rises to 53% 
• 59% believe that Israel is responsible for poisoning Arafat

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Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip continues to drop reaching 16% in this poll compared to 21% three months ago and 36% six months ago. 65% say conditions in the Gaza Stip are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank remains almost unchanged compared to three months ago standing today at 30%. But the percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad decreases from 44% to 36% during the same period.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 77% in this poll. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 68%.  22% say there is, and 46% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 17% say there is, and 38% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  30% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 24% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 55% and in the Gaza Strip at 62%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 55% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 27%. Last September these percentages stood at 45% and 26% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 37%.Three months ago it stood at 36%. Positive evaluation of the government of Rami al Hamdallah in the West Bank increases from 29% three months ago to 39% today.  Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas rises from 49% three months ago to 53% in this poll. Dissatisfaction with Abbas’ performance stands today at 45%. 

59% believe that Israel is responsible for poisoning former president Yasser Arafat and 21% believe that a Palestinian party or group or a joint Palestinian-Israeli party or group is responsible for Arafat’s death by poisoning. Belief that Israel has poisoned Arafat increases in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (57%), among supporters of Fatah and third forces (69% and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (50%), and among supporters of the peace process (60%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (52%).

(4) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the chances for reconciliation and reunification stands today stands at 16%
• 48% support and 49% oppose holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if separation continues for a long time
• 25% believe that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one and 31% believe that the government of Abbas-Hamdallah is the legitimate one
• 39% believe that Hamas’ way is the best for ending occupation and building a state and 36% believe that Abbas’ way is the best

Given the continued deterioration in relations between Hamas and the Egyptian government and the ups and downs in the Fateh-Hamas reconciliation dialogue, percentage of optimism about the chances for the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip remains low reaching 16%. The belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge drops from 41% three months ago to 37% in this poll. 43% believe that unity will be restored but only after a long time.

The largest percentage (38%) believes that the PA, with its parts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 26% believe that it is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Furthermore, 15% believe that the PA in the West Bank is an accomplishment while the PA in the Gaza Strip is a burden. By contrast, a similar percentage (14%) believes that the PA in the Gaza Strip is an accomplishment while the PA in the West Bank is a burden.

25% believe that the Haniyeh government in the Gaza Strip is the legitimate Palestinian government while 31% believe that the Abbas-Hamdallah government in the West Bank is the legitimate one; 11% believe that the two governments are legitimate. 27% believe that both governments are illegitimate. These findings indicate a drop in the percentage of those who believe that the two governments are illegitimate compared to the situation three years ago when in December 2010 that percentage stood at 34%. Other findings remained unchanged: 23% said at that time that Haniyeh’s government was the legitimate one, 29% said the Abbas-Fayyad government was the legitimate one, and 10% said the two governments were legitimate. But the public is split over the necessity of holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if the current disunity continued for a long time: 48% believe it to be necessary to hold such separate elections and 49% believe it to be unnecessary. 

Compared to the situation a year ago, findings show a drop in the percentage of those who believe that Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and build a Palestinian state and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way. In December 2012, in the aftermath of the Gaza war and the entry of Khalid Mishaal into the Gaza Strip, 60% believed that Hamas’ way and that of the resistance groups was the best to achieve the vital goals of the Palestinians while only 28% said Abbas’ was the best. Today, in the aftermath of the recent developments in Egypt and their ramifications to the Gaza Strip and in the aftermath of the return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and the release of some prisoners, the percentage of those who believe Hamas’ was is the best way drops to 39% while the percentage of those who believe that Abbas’ way is the best way rises to 36%. The current findings show that 25% (compared to 13% a year ago) believe that other ways are better or do not know which way is the best way. It is worth mentioning that the 2012 question refer to “Hamas’ and the resistance groups’ way” while the current question refers to “Hamas’ way.”  Belief that Hamas’ way is the best is higher in the Gaza Strip (42%) compared to the West Bank (36%), in refugee camps and cities (41% and 40% respectively) compared to villages and towns (30%), among those whose age is between 18 and 28 (42%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (36%), among Hamas supporters (92%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third forces (14% and 22% respectively), among the religious (49%) compared to the somewhat religious (31%), and among those opposed to the peace process (67%) compared to supporters of the peace process (27%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be the most vital Palestinian goal and 33% believe that obtaining of the right of return should be the most vital goal.
• 27% view the spread of poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 25% view the continued occupation and settlement construction as the most serious problem.

42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, 45% said ending occupation and building a state was most vital goal and 29% said the most vital goal was the right of return.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the public while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% believe the most serious problem is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 10% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings..... Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-17 March 2018. The poll was conducted after the explosion of a roadside bomb that targeted the convoy of Palestinian Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah during his visit to the Gaza Strip and amid mutual accusations between Fatah and Hamas regarding the responsibility for the stalemate in reconciliation and the Gaza explosion. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed also the publication of leaks concerning alleged substance of the American “Deal of the Century.” Several other developments may have influenced the findings of the poll: reports were published regarding an eavesdropping by PA security services on citizens’ phone calls; public participation in non-violent protests diminished considerably; talks emerged around possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections; and warnings were issued by international agencies concerning the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and various aspects of the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In the first quarter of 2018, PSR’s poll explored various issues and public concerns: (1) the American role in the peace process and reports concerning the “deal of the century,” (2) the Gaza explosion which targeted the Prime Minister’s convey, (3) the great decline in popular participation in non-violent confrontations, (4) the possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections, and (5) other internal matters such as the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, eavesdropping on phone calls of Palestinian citizens, the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights, reconciliation, and the internal balance of power.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians views the American role in the peace process as biased in favor of Israel and refuses the purported American ideas that have been reportedly included in the American “deal of the century,” such as making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state or expanding the southern borders of the Gaza Strip into Sinai. The majority views the American suspension of support for UNRWA as aiming at closing the refugees’ file and deny them their right of return. A large percentage worries that this American position might weaken the ability of the Palestinian side to defend the rights of the refugees. For all of this, about two-thirds are opposed to the renewal of contacts between the PA and the US or the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Despite the fact that a large percentage supports the peace process, more than 90% expect to see no peace between Palestine and Israel in the next five, ten, or even 100 years. The largest percentage views the medium and long term future with a great deal of trepidation, pessimism and frustration.

Findings show that about half of the public believes that Israel stands behind the explosion that targeted the convoy of the Palestinian Prime Minister during his visit to the Gaza Strip. About three quarters of the public think that the aim of the explosion was to foil reconciliation efforts. About a quarter of Gazans however believe that the explosion represented a protest against the policies of the PA government toward the Gaza Strip.

Despite great public support for non-violent protests and the great admiration the public has for the Palestinian youth, Ahd Tamimi, viewing her as a role model and a symbol of popular resistance, the largest percentage attributes the significant decrease in public participation in non-violent protests to a weak public confidence in the Palestinian leadership and factions. Many also believe that the public thinks that such protests are ineffective in the confrontation with Israel. Indeed, findings of the poll show that about half of the public is in favor of a return to an armed intifada.

Findings also show that despite concerns about being seen as an acceptance of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, a majority of the public favors the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Jerusalem municipal elections. Participation in the vote is seen as giving East Jerusalemites the ability to influence the municipal policies that affect them. Among all Palestinians, but more significantly among East Jerusalemites, less than a third are opposed to such participation.

Finally, when looking at internal conditions, findings show that:

  Almost all Palestinians view conditions in the Gaza Strip as dire, bad or very bad. Responsibility for this situation is placed first on Israel, then the PA, and finally Hamas. But for Gazans, the blame is placed first on the PA, with Israel and Hamas second and third respectively.

  About two-thirds think that the PA security services do indeed eavesdrop on phone calls of citizens and officials and more than 60% believe that such eavesdropping is done illegally and without any just cause. A majority believes that such behavior benefits the occupation first and foremost and that the Palestinian judiciary is incapable of putting an end to it.

  Those who positively view Palestinian democracy, seeing it as good or very good, are less than a quarter while about two-thirds believe that Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cannot criticize the PA without fear.

  Optimism about the success of reconciliation plummets to less than a third; satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government does not exceed one third; and about half of the public puts the blame for the poor showing of the reconciliation government on the PA and the PA leadership while a small minority puts the blame on Hamas.

 Finally, the domestic balance of power remains relatively unchanged compared to three months ago: more than two-thirds demand the resignation of president Abbas; a Hamas candidate wins against Abbas in presidential elections; but Fatah enjoys more popular support than Hamas, with a five point difference in its favor.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

·         Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 33%; 68% of the public demand the resignation of the president; demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 81% in the Gaza Strip and 62% in the West Bank

• In presidential elections between Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh and Abbas, the former receives 52% and the latter 41% of the popular vote
• In presidential elections between Haniyeh and Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti, the former receives 39% and the latter 55% of the popular vote
•   In parliamentary elections, Fatah wins 36% of the popular vote, Hamas 31%, and the third parties combined 9%
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 40% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).  68% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 27% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 70% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 62% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 64% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 29% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 8% (2% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip), Rami al Hamdallah (7%), Mustafa Barghouti (4%); Khalid Mishal (3%), and Salam Fayyad (2%).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 52% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 53% for Haniyeh and 41% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the vote (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 66% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh 45% (compared to 43% three months ago). If the competition was between President Abbas from Fatah and Mustafa Barghouti from al Mubadara (Initiative), Abbas receives 48% and Mustafa Barghouti receives 43% of the vote.  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 38% and Haniyeh 37%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 25% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 32% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 41% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions, status of democracy, eavesdropping on phone calls, and 3G:

•  Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy does not exceed 23%
• Only 5% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good while 20% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good
•  Perception of safety and security stands at 54% in the Gaza Strip and at 53% in the West Bank
• But 45% of Gazans compared to 19% in the West Bank indicate that they want to emigrate
• A majority believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people
•  62% believe that the PA security services eavesdrop on Palestinian citizens and 62% believe that this eavesdropping is done for illegitimate purposes
• Only 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 63% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear. In a question about the status of democracy in Palestine and other countries, only 23% say Palestinian democracy is good or very good while only 10% say democracy in Egypt is good or very good. By contrast, 64% say democracy in Turkey is good or very good; 57% say democracy in Israel is good or very good, and 55% say democracy in France is good or very good.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%. In an open-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening of conditions in the Gaza Strip: the largest percentage (39%) blames Israel; 25% blame the PA, president Abbas, the reconciliation government, or Fatah; and 18% blame Hamas. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 43% of West Bankers compared to only 30% of Gazans blame Israel; and 16% of West Bankers compared to 43% of Gazans blame the PA, Abbas, the reconciliation government, and Fatah. However, responses of West Bankers and Gazans are almost identical regarding Hamas’ responsibility: 19% of West Bankers and 18% of Gazans blame Hamas.  The belief that the PA and its various constituents are responsible is higher in refugee camps and cities (30% and 27% respectively) compared to villages/towns (18%), among the religious (33%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (19% and 23% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (41%) compared to those who support the peace process (18%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (51% and 34% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (7%), among those with the lowest income (36%) compared to those with the highest income (18%), in the governorates of Khanyounis and Rafah (50% each) compared to the governorates of Jenin, Tulkarm, and Jericho (4%, 8%, and 8% respectively), and among the holders of BA degree (29%) compared to illiterates (21%).

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 54%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 53%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 53% and in the West Bank at 45%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 19%. Three months ago, 41% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 78% and a majority of 52% views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

We asked the public about the media reports regarding a possible eavesdropping by the Palestinian security services on phone calls of Palestinian officials and citizens:

   62% say they believe that the reports are accurate and 29% believe they are inaccurate.

  62% do not think, and 26% think, that the eavesdropping on phones was legal or for legitimate purposes.

 56% think the primary beneficiary of eavesdropping conducted by the Palestinian security services is the Israel occupation while 25% think it is the PA administration and leadership, and only 12% think it is the Palestinian citizen and his or her security.  The percentage of those who believe that occupation is the primary beneficiary increases in the West Bank (58%) compared to the Gaza Strip (51%), among the religious (57%) compared to the non-religious (49%), among those opposed to the peace process (61%) compared to supporters of the peace process (54%), among the youngest, 18-22 years (60%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 49 years (52%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (60% and 58% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (46%), among farmers, retirees, and students (81%, 66%, and 59% respectively) compared to laborers (49%), among private sector workers (55%) compared to those who work in the public sector (43%), and among the illiterates (60%) compared to holders of BA degree (54%).

  Moreover, a majority of 53% think that if a Palestinian citizen (or even a former head of a Palestinian security service) submits a complaint to the Palestinian judiciary, it would be incapable of putting an end to this eavesdropping. Only 37% believe that the judiciary is capable of ending the eavesdropping.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Maan TV (15%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (13% each), al Aqsa TV (12%), Al Arabiya, al Mayadeen, and al Quds TV (5% each).

We asked the public about the rates for 3G service, a newly introduced service by Palestinian providers in the West Bank that allows for faster access to the internet on mobile phones: a majority of West Bankers (57%) describes the rates as high or very high and only 3% describe them as low. 11% think the rates are reasonable or medium. 30% did not know much about the service or the rates.

We asked respondents about giving or donating money to the poor and charities:

Two-thirds believe that the primary motivation behind giving to the poor is to win God’s satisfaction while less than a quarter (23%) think that people give to the poor in order to win the satisfaction of other people.

Three quarters of the respondents say that they give to the poor and 23% say they do not. When asked in an open-ended question about its own motivation for giving, an overwhelming majority (80%) says that it is driven by religious incentive (such winning God’s satisfaction) while 20% say that it is driven by humanistic or social incentives (such as to ease the burden on or help the poor).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• Only 26% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government; optimism regarding the success of reconciliation drops from 50% to 30%
• 45% hold the PA, PA president, and the reconciliation government responsible for the failure of the reconciliation government to carry out its duties; only 15% put the blame on Hamas
•   60% of Gazans, compared to 26% of West Bankers, support contacts between Hamas and Dahlan to establish a joint administration for the Gaza Strip
• 45% believe that Israel stands behind the explosion that targeted the PA Prime Minister in the Gaza Strip and three quarters believe that the aim of the explosion is to insure the failure of reconciliation
• Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 26% are satisfied and 65% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 38%. Similarly, only 30%, compared to 50% three months ago, are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation.

The largest percentage (45%) believes that the PA, president Abbas, and the prime minister are responsible for the poor showing of the reconciliation government. By contrast, only 15% believe that Hamas is responsible for that poor showing; 13% say the government is doing a good job; and 27% do not who is to blame. It is worth noting that the responses of West Bankers are greatly different from those of Gazans: while about one  third (32%) of West Bankers blames the PA, Abbas and the prime minister, 69% of Gazans puts the blame on these three. By contrast, only 12% of West Bankers, compared to 21% of Gazans, blame Hamas. We also asked the public about two claims: the one made by the reconciliation government that Hamas is preventing it from assuming control over the Gaza Strip, particularly in financial and security matters, and the claim made by Hamas that the reconciliation government is failing to carry out its responsibilities and duties in the Strip and that it continues to impose sanction on Gazans. About a third (32%) believes the two claims are baseless while 14% think the two claims are accurate. By contrast, 23% believe Hamas’ claim to be accurate and only 14% believe that the claim of the reconciliation government is accurate. In this context, 37% (60% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) support the Dahlan-Hamas efforts to reach an agreement on creating a joint administration for the Gaza Strip while 45% (36% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank) are opposed to such efforts.

We asked respondents about the Gaza explosion that targeted the convey of the prime minister:

  In an open question, we asked the public about its estimate of the party behind the explosion: the largest percentage (45%) believes it is the occupation; 14% believe it is Hamas and an identical percentage believes it is the PA or one of its agencies; 2% think it is Fatah, 1% think it is Dahlan, and 3% think it is one of the extremist groups.

  About three quarters (74%) believe that the aim of the perpetrators is to foil the reconciliation efforts while 17% (23% in the Gaza Strip and 14% in the West Bank) believe that the aim is to protest against the policies of the reconciliation government toward the Gaza Strip.

(4) The peace process:  

• 48% support and 50% oppose the two-state solution and 57% say that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion
• 28% support the one-state solution
• 48% support a return to an armed intifada
• 39% say that the decline in popular participation in non-violent resistance is caused by the absence of trust between the public and the PA leadership and factions
• The majority supports the decisions adopted by the PLO Central Council but about two-thirds believe that President Abbas will not implement those decisions
• The majority supports the participation of East Jerusalemites in the Jerusalem municipal elections by nomination and voting or just by voting
• Optimism about reaching a peace agreement with Israel in 10 years, and in 100 years, is the same: a dismal 9%
• 48% support the two-state solution and 50% oppose it. Moreover, 46% believe that a Palestinian majority supports the two-state solution and 47% say a majority is opposed to it. Similarly, 50% believe that a majority of Israelis are opposed to the two-state solution and 41% think an Israeli majority supports that solution.  57% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to settlement expansion while only 40% think that it remains feasible because settlements can be evacuated. Similarly, 73% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or nonexistent while 25% think the chances are high or medium.  Despite the above, only 28% support a one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israelis have equal rights and 69% are opposed.

When given three options to choose from, the largest percentage (35%) chose armed resistance as the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 31% chose negotiation and 25% chose non-violent resistance effective. Three months ago, 44% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and 27% sided with negotiation. When the public is asked if it supports each of the following the responses were different: 74% support joining more international organizations; 63% support popular non-violence; 48% support a return to an armed intifada; and 49% support dissolving the PA.  Support for a return to an armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (39%), in cities and refugee camps (51% and 49% respectively) compared to villages/towns (34%), among the religious (55%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (43% each), among those who are opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (34%), among men (52%) compared to women (45%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 (58%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or above (48%), among Hamas supporters (74%) compared to supports of Fatah and third parties (36% and 42% respectively), among students (70%) compared to housewives and laborers (43% and 45% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (54%) compared to holder of elementary education and the illiterates (35% and 48% respectively).

We asked the public about its view on why popular participation in non-violent protests, particularly those related to the American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, has been waning: 39% say it is due to lack of trust between the public on the one hand and the PA leadership and factions on the other; 27% say it is due to the fact that non-violence is ineffective; and 25% say that it is due to the fact that many people think that the responsibility for confronting Israel and the US falls on the shoulders of the PA. 92% indicate that they have heard, and 8% have not heard, of Ahd Tamimi, a Palestinian youth activist being tried by the Israeli occupation on charges that she slapped an Israeli soldier. Among those who have heard about her, 64% say that they want her to be a role model for them and their relatives.  The percentage of those who consider Tamimi a role model is higher in the Gaza Strip (80%) and lower in the West Bank (56%). It is also higher in refugee camps and cities (68% and 65% respectively) compared to villages/towns (56%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (66% and 62% respectively) compared to non-religious (54%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to those who support the peace process (60%), among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (71% each) compared to supporters of third parties (48%), and among the refugees (71%) compared to the non-refugees (58%).

60% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 16% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories. Similarly, 77% say that they are worried that they would be hurt on their daily life by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 22% are not worried.

A majority of 52% indicates that it supports the resolutions made by the recent meeting of the PLO’s Central Council, such as the cancellation of the recognition of Israel, the suspension of the Oslo Agreement, and others, while 18% indicate that they agree with some but not all of them, and 24% oppose them. Nonetheless, about two-thirds (65%) believe that president Abbas will not implement these decisions and only 24% believe he will implement them.   The belief that president Abbas will not implement the Council’s decisions is higher in the Gaza Strip (70%) compared to the West Bank (62%), in cities (66%) compared to refugee camps and villages/towns (60% and 62% respectively), among the religious (66%) compared to the non-religious (47%), among those opposed to the peace process (82%) compared to supporters of the peace process (54%), among men (67%) compared to women (62%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (80% and 65% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (43%), and among those who work in the private sector (70%) compared to those who work in the public sector (59%).

Moreover, 74% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 24% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. In fact, 70% believe that there is already an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 20% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

46% of all the Palestinian public support the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Israeli municipal elections by nomination and voting while 15% support only voting, and 29% say that they are opposed to all kinds of participation. Support for participation, either by nomination or voting, declines to 42% among East Jerusalemites but the opposition to participation among them remains almost identical (30%) to that of the general population. It is worth noting however that a large percentage (28%) did not express any views on the matter, probably out of concern that it might be risky to state its views on the subject or that its answer might not be a popular one.

We asked the public about its expectations regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations after 10 years and after 100 years:

25% believe that after 10 years conditions, or the status quo, will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing with little change; 34% say settlements will expand and there will be one political entity characterized by a system of apartheid that discriminates against the Palestinians; 24% believe that there will be a war or an armed intifada that will end the occupation. Only 9% believe that there will be peace between Israel and the Palestinians and a Palestinian state will be established.

  After 100 years, only 12% believe that things will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing; 30% think settlements will expand and there will be one apartheid state that discriminates against the Palestinians; 29% think there will be a war or an intifada that will end the occupation. The belief that there will be peace between Israel and a Palestinian state remains unchanged at 9%.

(5) Palestinian-American relations and “the deal of the century”:

Two thirds oppose the resumption of contacts with the US administration and a majority of 51% rejects the “deal of the century” regardless of its content

• 88% view the US as biased in favor of Israel
• 94% reject the idea of making Abu Dis the capital of the Palestinian state
• 86% reject the idea of expanding the Gaza Strip into Sinai
• 63% reject the idea of allowing Israeli Jews to live in the state of Palestine as citizens or residents
• 65% are opposed to the resumption of contacts with the American administration that have been suspended last December after the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel; 21% favor a resumption of contacts. Similarly, 68% say that the PA leadership should not return to negotiations with Israel if the US administration asks it to do so while 27% say it should comply with the US request.  If negotiations with Israel resume under US sponsorship, the US will be biased in favor of Israel in the eyes of 88% of the Palestinians while only 7% think the US will be an honest broker and 2% think it will be biased in favor of the Palestinians.

A slim majority of 51% says that if the US submits its peace plan, the so-called “deal of the century,” the PA leadership should reject it regardless of its content because it must be bad for Palestinians while 29% say that the leadership should accept or reject the plan only after reviewing and discussing its content. Only 11% say that the Palestinian leadership should accept the “deal of the century.”   The percentage of those who want the PA to reject the US plan regardless of its content is higher in cities (53%) compared to villages/towns (41%), among the religious (55%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (36% and 49% respectively), among those opposed to the peace process (62%) compared to supporters of the peace process (46%), among men (55%) compared to women (48%), among Hamas supporters (62%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (44% and 47% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (52%) compared to those who work in the public sector (41%), and among the illiterates (58%) compared to holders of BA degree (49%).

A majority of 52% believes that the US administration has suspended its support for UNRWA because it seeks to close the file of the refugees and deny them their right of return while 43% think the US did that in order to pressure President Abbas to force him to return to negotiations with the US over the “deal of the century.”  Moreover, 49% think that the suspension of US support for UNRWA will not weaken the Palestinian negotiating position regarding the rights of the refugees but 45% think it will indeed weaken it.

We asked the public about its views regarding some of the leaked ideas that are allegedly linked to the “deal of the century:”

On Jerusalem, 94% say they are opposed to making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state; 4% support the idea.

  86% are opposed and 10% support the idea of expanding the Gaza Strip to include parts of Sinai in return for an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank.

63% oppose and 31% support the idea of allowing Israeli Jews to live in the Palestinian state as citizens or residents while respecting the Palestinian law and enjoying the same rights and duties as the Palestinians. Support for the idea is higher in the West Bank (32%) compared to the Gaz Strip (28%), in refugee camps (39%) compared to cities and villages/towns (29% and 33% respectively), among the non-religious (46%) compared to the religious (26%), among supporters of the peace process (37%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (21%), among men (36%) compared to women (26%), among Fatah supporters (44%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (16% and 17% respectively), and among those who work in the public sector (38%) compared to those who work in the private sector (32%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% say that the most vital Palestinian goal should be ending occupation and building a Palestinian state; 30% say it is the obtaining of the right of return
• 28% say that the most serious problem facing Palestinians today is occupation and settlements and 25% say it is poverty and unemployment

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; 20% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (38)

In the fourth quarter of 2010:

While demand for holding local elections increases, and while pessimism regarding the chances for reconciliation increases, and while criticism of the PA for suppression of freedoms increases, credibility of the authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip diminishes, support for a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative decreases, and two thirds oppose return to negotiations with Israel before it freezes settlement construction despite the fact that a majority believes Israel would be the first to benefit from no negotiations 

16-18 December 2010    

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16-18 December 2010. Before the conduct of the poll, authorities in the West Bank arrested a Hamas cell and accused it of plotting to assassinate the governor of Nablus and Hamas sentenced three Fateh members to death after convicting them of killing a Gazan mosque preacher.  A meeting in Damascus between Fateh and Hamas representatives failed to reach an agreement on reconciliation. On the peace process front, the US announced that it has ceased to press Israel on the need to freeze settlement construction and urged Palestinians and Israelis to enter into indirect negotiations it promised to sponsor. This poll covers issues related to domestic conditions: the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the future of reconciliation and reunification, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the most serious problems confronting Palestinians today. The poll also covers issues related to the peace process and public attitude toward a permanent settlement as well as Palestinian perception of the views of the Israeli Jewish majority of various calls and proposed legislation that seeks to discriminate against Arabs. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadwehat tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2010 indicate an increase in the level of pessimism regarding the chances for reconciliation and restoration of unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They also indicate an overwhelming rejection of alternative forms of relations between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip such as a confederation or separate elections in each region. Findings also show widespread distrust in the authorities in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip regarding Fateh-Hamas relationship. For example, only a quarter or less believe as true the news about a Hamas plot to assassinate the governor of Nablus or that the three Fateh members sentenced to death in Gaza have received a fair trial. Findings also point out to a significant and continued deterioration in public perception of the level of freedoms enjoyed by citizens in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since the split between these two areas in June 2007. For example, belief that citizens can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear retreated from 56% in September 2007 to 27% in this poll. Similarly a retreat occurred in the belief that citizens can criticize the authorities in the Gaza Strip without fear from 52% to 19% during the same period. It is worth noting that 70% of the public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believe that the government of Salam Fayyad should conduct local elections now that the Palestinian Supreme Court of Justice has annulled a previous decision by the government to cancel local elections that were scheduled to take place last July.

Finally, findings show that the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas has remained almost unchanged compared to the situation during the third quarter of the year. The same is true regarding the popularity of president Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh. Moreover, findings regarding the balance of power in the fourth quarter of this year are very similar to those of the final quarter of 2009 which means that the internal and external developments throughout 2010 has left no impact on this critical issue of internal balance between Fateh and Hamas and Abbas andHaniyeh.

Findings show that two thirds of the public oppose return to US-sponsored indirect negotiations with Israel. But they also show that almost 60% believe that Israel would be the one to benefit from such a step while only 13% believe that Palestinians would benefit from not returning to negotiations. Findings also show that the public is still uncertain about the best alternative to negotiations: two groups support almost equally two options, going to the US Security Council and waging violent confrontations. A third group prefers a non violent resistance and a fourth prefers to dissolve the PA.

(1) Domestic Conditions

• ·      17% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 35% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good
• ·      61% believe corruption exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip and 71% believe corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank
• ·      60% believe that freedom of press exists, or exists to some extent, in the West Bank while 42% believe it exists, or exists to some extent, in the Gaza Strip
• ·      27% believe that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear while 19% believe that people can criticize the authorities in the Gaza Strip without  fear
• ·      Perception of personal safety and security stands at 61% among residents of the West Bank and 58% among residents of the Gaza Strip
• ·      Positive evaluation of the performance of the government of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 36% and Fayyad’s government at 43%, and 23% believe that Haniyeh’s  government is the legitimate one while 29% believe that Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one
• ·      Satisfaction with the performance of president Mahmud Abbas stands at 50% and dissatisfaction at 45%
• ·      If new presidential elections were to take place today, Abbas would receive 56% and Haniyeh 38%, and if the candidates wereMarwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter 31%
• ·      If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 25% of the  vote, Fateh 44%, all other lists combined 11%, and 20% remain undecided
• ·      Pessimism about the chances for reconciliation increases with 39% believing that current separation is permanent
• ·      If Hamas wins the next elections, chances for reconciliation and chances for removing the current siege would decrease while such chances would increase if Fateh wins the next elections
• ·      65% reject alternative forms of association between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as a confederation, and 32% support them; moreover, 76% reject and 22% accept holding separate elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• ·      Less than one quarter believes that Hamas was indeed planning to assassinate the governor of Nablus and only 22% believe the three Fateh members sentenced to death in the Gaza Strip have received a fair trial
• ·      48% believe that the most vital Palestinian goal should be to end occupation and build a state and 21% believe it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, 20% believe it should be the right of return and 11% believe it should be democracy
• ·      70% believe that that the  government of Salam Fayyad should hold local elections and 24% believe it should not

17% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 62% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, in September-October, only 11% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 70% said it was bad or very bad. By contrast, 35% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and only 31% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 33% and 34% respectively. The evaluation of the residents of the West Bank to conditions in Gaza is not different from the evaluation of the residents of the Gaza Strip. But there is a difference between the evaluation of West Bank residents compared to that of the Gazans regarding West Bank conditions: 43% of the Gazans believe these conditions to be good or very good but 31% of West Bankers believe them to be good or very good.

71% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 61% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. Among residents of the West Bank, 72%, compared to 69% among Gazans, believe there is corruption in the PA in the West Bank. By contrast, a higher percentage of Gazans believe there is corruption in the public institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip reaching 66% compared to 57% among residents of the West Bank.

60% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 34% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 42% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 47% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago. Yet, only 27% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, only 19% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. Since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in June 2007, these percentages have witnessed gradual and significant decrease. As the table below shows, belief that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear stood at 56% while 52% believed that people can criticize the authorities without fear in the Gaza Strip. These percentages dropped in August 2008 to 47% for criticizing the authorities in the West Bank and 42% for criticizing the authorities in the Gaza Strip. A further drop occurred last September to 30% and 24% respectively.

Table (1): Gradual decrease in belief about the ability to criticize authorities in the West Bank or Gaza Strip since the spilt between the two areas

Perception of safety and security stands at 61% in the West Bank and 58% in the Gaza Strip. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago.

Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad remains unchanged as it was three months ago standing at 36% for the Haniyeh’s government and 43% for the Fayyad government.  But findings show an increase in the percentage of Gazanswho say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries from 37% three months ago to 45% in this poll. In the West Bank, the percentage of those wishing to immigrate remains unchanged at 24%.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas did not change during the past three months standing today at 50% while 45% say they are not satisfied. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank.

23% say the government of Haniyeh is the legitimate Palestinian government and 29% say the Fayyad government is the legitimate one. 34% say both governments are illegitimate. These results indicate a slight decrease in the percentage of those who view the Haniyeh government as legitimate.  The percentage of those who believe Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one stands at 26% in the Gaza Strip compared to 21% in the West Bank. The percentage of those who believe Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one stands at 31% in the Gaza Strip compared to 28% in the West Bank.

If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 56% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 59%. Three months ago, Abbas received 57% and Haniyeh 36%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 43% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 59% and Haniyeh 34%. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 65% and the latter would receive 31% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 69%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 37% and in the West Bank Barghoutireceives 68% and Haniyeh 27%. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 27% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (18%),Salam Fayyad (16%) Mustafa Barghouti (11%), and Saeb Erekat (5%).

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 25% say they would vote for Hamas and 44% say they would vote for Fateh, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip is 26% and in the West Bank 24%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip is 48% and in the West Bank 42%.

In light of the failure of the latest Damascus meeting between Fateh and Hamas, the public remains pessimistic about the future of reconciliation and the restoration of unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: belief that the split is permanent increases from 30% three months ago to 39% in this poll. Percentage of those who believe that unity will be restored soon drops from 14% to 8% during the same period. 49%, compared to 51% three months ago, say unity will return but only after a long time. Findings show that responsibility for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is placed on Hamas by 15% of the respondents and on Fateh by 13% and on both together by 62%. But when asked about the future of the unity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if Hamas wins new elections, 55% say such a win would consolidate the split. But if Fateh wins, only 31% say its win would consolidate the split. Only 13% say a Hamas electoral victory would consolidate unity while 30% say a Fateh electoral victory would consolidate unity.  Moreover, findings show that 86% believes that if Hamas wins the next presidential and legislative elections such victory would lead to the consolidation of the siege and boycott on the Palestinian government or would keep things as they are today. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 41% believe this would lead to the tightening of the siege and blockade or would keep conditions as they are today. 55% believe that a Fateh victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott but only 10% believe a Hamas victory would lead to the lifting of the siege and boycott.

65% reject and 32% accept an alternative relationship between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip -- other than a full restoration of unity -- such as a confederation even if this alternative is temporary. In the confederate system that was rejected by two thirds, the government of Haniyeh would continue to administer the affairs of the Gaza Strip and the government of Fayyad would continue to administer the affairs of the West Bank, but President Abbas would preside over the two regions. Support for this alternative reaches 26% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank. Similarly, only 22% support and 76% oppose the holding of separate elections, one in the West Bank administered by the Fayyad government and one in the Gaza Strip administered by the Haniyeh government, even if this leads to the election of one legislative council and one president for the two regions. Support for the separate elections reaches 19% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank.

Less than one quarter (24%) believes that Hamas was indeed plotting to assassinate the governor of Nablus and 41% do not believe that while 35% say they do not know or are not certain. Belief that Hamas was indeed plotting to assassinate the governor reaches 30% in the Gaza Strip compared to 21% in the West Bank. Similarly, only 22% believe that the three Fateh members sentenced to death by a court in the Gaza Strip --after being convicted of killing a Gaza Mosque preacher-- have received a fair trial. 46% believe that they did not receive a fair trial and 32% are not sure or do not know. Belief that the trial was fair reaches 28% in the Gaza Strip compared to 19% in the West Bank.

The largest percentage (48%) believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, only 21% believe the first most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and only 20% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return to refuges to their 1948 towns and villages, and only 11% believe that the first most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The largest percentage (39%) believes that the second most vital Palestinian goal should be to obtain the right of return to refuges to their 1948 towns and villages. By contrast, only 24% believe that the second most vital goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, 22% believe the second most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 16% believe that the second and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while 26% believe the most serious problem is the absence of national unity due to the split, 24% believe the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 10% believe it to be the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings, and 10% believe it to be the corruption in some public institutions.

Findings show that 70% of the Palestinian public believe that now in the aftermath of the decision by the Supreme Court of Justice to annul the decision of the government of Salam Fayyad to cancel local elections, the government should hold local elections. 24% believe that the government should not hold local elections. Demand for local elections is higher in the West Bank (79%) than in the Gaza Strip (57%). It is worth noting that last June a majority of 56% of West Bank residents expressed its wish to participate in the local elections scheduled for July and that 51% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip believed at that time that these elections would be fair while 37% believed they would not be fair. Last March, support for holding local elections stood at 54% (60% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip).

(2) Peace Process

• 54% support and 42% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative
•  40% support and 58% oppose a permanent settlement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative; highest level of support (58%) goes to the item on ending the conflict and lowest (24%) to the item on state demilitarization, a state without an army.
•  49% support and 49% oppose recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people in return for a recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian state is established
•  75% are worried and 25% are not worried that they or members of their families will be hurt at the hands of Israelis in their daily life or that their land will be confiscated or homes demolished
• 71% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non existent and 27% believe the chances are medium or high
•  67% oppose and 30% support return to negotiations without a settlement freeze but 59% believe that Israel would benefit more from such a step
•  In the absence of negotiations, 31% prefer to go the US Security Council, 29% prefer return to armed confrontations, 16% prefer non violent confrontations, and 16% prefer to dissolve the PA

Findings show a majority support (54%) for the Arab Peace Initiative while 42% oppose it. But a majority of 58% opposes, and 40% support, a package of a permanent status agreement based on the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. Support for this package stood at 38% in August 2009 and 49% in June 2010.  The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials almost ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) final borders and territorial exchange; (2) refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) a demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) security arrangements; and (6) end of conflict. We have been addressing these issues periodically since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the diplomatic activity of the US with regard to the conflict and the US efforts to revive indirect negotiations.

Findings, as the summary table below shows, indicate that the public rejects all the items in the package with the exception of the one dealing with the end of conflict. The following is a summary of the items and the attitudes to each:

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange: 49% support or strongly support and 50% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in June 2010, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 60% and opposition at 38%.

(2) Refugees: 41% support and 57% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In June 2010, 48% agreed with an identical compromise while 49% opposed it.

(3) Jerusalem: 36% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In June 2010, an identical compromise obtained 37% support and 62% opposition.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State: 24% support and 74% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in June 2010, 28% support, and opposition reached 70%. This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

(5) Security Arrangements: 38% support and 61% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In June 2010, 41% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 57% opposed it.

(6) End of Conflict: 58% support and 41% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The comparable figures in June 2010 were 63% support and 35% opposition. 

 Support for the package is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 49%, than in the West Bank, standing at 35%.

Findings show that the Palestinians are divided into two equal halves in support and opposition to the proposal that calls for mutual recognition of national identity with Palestinians recognizing Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis recognizing Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict have been settled and after a Palestinian state has been established. These figures are similar to those obtained in our last poll, three months ago.

Findings also show that an overwhelming majority (75%) is worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished. Percentage of worry is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (75%). Findings also show an overwhelming majority pessimistic about the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years: 71% believe chances to be slim or non existent and 27% believe them to be medium or high.

Findings also indicate that two thirds of the public oppose entering into US-sponsored indirect negotiations and 30% support it. Despite the clear opposition, a majority of 59% believes that Israel would be the one to benefit from such step in which Palestinians boycott negotiations. Only 13% believe Palestinians would be one to benefit and 16% believe the two sides will not benefit and 9% believe the two sides will benefit from such a step.

Finally, findings indicate that the public is still uncertain about the preferred alternative to negotiations: two alternatives are supported almost equally, going to the UN Security Council receives 31% support and waging armed confrontations against Israel receives 29% support. Two other alternatives receive lesser but equal support: waging a non violent confrontation and dissolving the PA, with each receiving 16%. While going to the UN Security Council receives similar support from residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (32% and 30% respectively), regional differences exist regarding other alternatives. Support for waging armed confrontations stands at 39% among Gazans but only 24% among West Bankers. Support for non violent confrontations stands at 18% among West Bankers but only 13% among Gazans. Support for dissolving the PA receives similar support in the two areas: 15% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank.

(3) Discrimination and racism in Israeli society:

•  71% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the call of Rabbis prohibiting renting apartments to Arabs in the city of Safed.
•  75% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed Israeli law that would allow Israeli villages and towns to reject new non Jewish residents, such as Arabs
• 78% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed Israeli law that would ban the use of head and face cover for women (burqa) in public places
• 71% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed Israeli law that require non Jewish candidates for citizenship to pledge allegiance to Israel as Jewish and democratic

In this poll, we have asked Palestinians to assess the views of the majority of Israeli Jews toward a number of issues that indicate discrimination against non Jews such as the call for a ban on renting homes to Arabs in Safed and a number of proposed laws with a racist bent. Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports such steps. 71% believe a majority of Israeli Jews supports the call by a large number of Rabbis calling for a ban on renting homes and apartments to Arabs. Only 24% believe a majority of Israeli Jews does not support the call of the Rabbis.

We also found that 75% of the public believe that a majority of Israeli Jews support the proposed law that would allow Israeli villages and towns to reject admission on non Jewish residents while only 20% believe a majority of Israeli Jews reject the proposed law. Similarly, findings show that 78% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed law that would ban the wearing of the burqa by women, covering head and face, in public places in Israel while only 17% believe a majority of Israelis does not support the proposed law. We also found that 71% of the Palestinians believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the proposed Israeli law that would require non Jewish candidates for citizenship to pledge allegiance to Israel as Jewish and democratic while only 23% believe a majority of Israeli Jews does not support the proposed law.....Full Report

22-24 March 2007 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during March 22-24, 2007. This poll deals with several issues including the national unity government, the peace process, the domestic balance of power, and the Sunni-Shii strife in Iraq. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults, 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the Palestinian public is satisfied with the make-up of the national unity government which was formed just one week before the conduct of the poll. The success of Fateh and Hamas in forming a unity government has created hope, optimism, and great expectations particularly regarding the ability of the new government to end infighting, enforce law and order, and reduce international financial sanctions and diplomatic boycott.

But the public is divided on the issue of international or Quartet conditions for resumption of financial assistance and diplomatic engagement. Half of the public wants the government to accept the conditions and the other half does not want it to do so. Despite this split, a clear majority supports the recognition of Israel when this recognition is part of a settlement that creates a Palestinians state and resolves all issues of the conflict. Moreover, an overwhelming majority supports the current ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and wants to see it expanded to include the West Bank.

Moreover, it seems that the formation of the national unity government, the majority belief that this development will lead to more moderation regarding Israel inside Hamas, and the increased talk about reaffirming Arab commitment to it in the March 2007 Arab Summit have increased public support for the Saudi Initiative from about 60% last December to about three quarters in this poll. It is worth noting that support for a permanent settlement, such as the Saudi Initiative, does not preclude support for an interim one. Findings show that more than 70% support the conduct of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on an interim settlement that would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the largest part of the occupied territories to be followed by negotiations leading to a comprehensive permanent settlement. 

The formation of the national unity government did not lead to changes in the domestic balance of power between Fateh and Hamas as both have maintained the same levels of popularity as in our poll last December. The same applies to the popularity of PA president Mahmud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh; as in our December poll both receive in this poll almost equal percentage of support.

In this poll, we have examined for the first time public perception of the Shii-Sunni sectarian violence in Iraq. Findings show that a majority of Palestinians view the current violence in Iraq to be partly sectarian in nature. Among those who do see it that way, a majority believes that the PA, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Fateh and Hamas side with the Sunnis while Iran and Hezbollah side with the Shiis. As for Syria, about one third believes it stands with the Sunnis and another third believes it to side with the Shiis. 

(1) National Unity Government  

• 88% are satisfied with the make-up of the national unity government and 11% are dissatisfied.
• In evaluating the Mecca Agreement between Fateh and Hamas, 62% believe that both sides had to compromise a little while 9% believe that Hamas had to accept Fateh’s position and 4% believe that Fateh had to accept Hamas position.
• A small minority not exceeding 13% blames Hamas for the failure of its former government to improve Palestinian conditions
• The largest percentage (43%) wants the enforcement of law and order to be the top priority of the unity government.
• 69% expect the unity government to last at least until the end of the year while 23% expect it to fall before the end of the year.
• 48% want the unity government to accept the conditions of the Quartet and 48% does not want it to accept them.
• In the aftermath of the formation of the national unity government, public expectations are high: a majority ranging between 65% and 71% expect improvements in the ability of the government to pay salaries, the enforcement of law and order, the fight against corruption, the prevention of infighting, the easing of financial sanctions, and the return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (88%) is satisfied with the make-up of the national unity government while 11% say they are dissatisfied with it. Among other things, this near consensus may have been caused by the perception of a large part of the respondents (62%) that the Mecca Agreement that led to the formation of the unity government has been the outcome of modification in the positions of the two sides, Fateh and Hamas, with only 9% believing that Hamas had to acquiesce to Fateh’s demands and 4% believing that Fateh had to acquiesce to Hamas’s demands. 20% said neither side had to change its position.

Findings also show that only a small percentage (13%) holds Hamas responsible for the failure of its former government to improve Palestinian conditions. The largest percentage (37%) blames Israel, 25% blame the international community and the US, and 13% blame other Palestinian parties such as Fateh.

The largest percentage (43%) believes that the top priority for the unity government should be the enforcement of law and order while 26% believe that it should be the ending of the current financial sanctions. 17% believe the top priority should be the conduct of political reforms and 13% believe it should be the return to the peace process. One reason for placing the peace process at a low level of importance might be due to public perception that it is not the role of the unity government to negotiate and that negotiation with Israel is the responsibility of the PA president and the PLO. Alternatively, the public might believe that no progress is possible in negotiations any way.

The public is divided into two equal halves regarding how the unity government should respond to the Quartet conditions: 48% want it to accept them and 48% do not want it to accept them. If Israel recognizes the unity government, 49% say the government should in this case recognize Israel and 47% say it should not. Support for the recognition of Israel increases among men (52%) compared to women (47%), among supporters of Fateh (66%) compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), among retired persons (76%) and employees (57%) compared to students (36%), and among people older than 48 years of age (56%) compared to those between 18-22 years of age (38%).

Findings also show high expectations among the majority of Palestinians with 69% expecting the unity government to continue in office at least until the end of the year while 23% expect it to fall before the end of the year. Moreover, 71% expect improvement in the ability of the government to pay salaries, 69% expect improvement in the government’s ability to enforce law and order, 65% expect improvement in economic conditions, 65% expect improvement in their personal safety and security, and 65% expect improvement in the fight against corruption and the implementation of reform measures. 71% expect the chances for infighting to recede while 67% expect the financial sanctions to ease. Almost two thirds (65%) expect return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in the near future. In fact, 54% expect that formation of the national unity government to lead Hamas to become more flexible and moderate in its position regarding Israel. 18% expect the opposite to happen.  

(2) Domestic Conditions  

• 53% are satisfied with the performance of PA President Mahmud Abbas and 43% are dissatisfied
• Only 6% view conditions of Palestinians in PA areas are good while 82% view them as bad or very bad
• Most important problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty followed by Israeli occupation and its daily practices
• 84% believe that corruption exists in the PA and 49% of those believe that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future
• 27% say that their personal security and safety is assured while 73% say it is not
• 51% evaluate the performance of the “Executive Force” as negative, increasing the level of anarchy and lawlessness, while only 29% see it as positive, contributing to the enforcement of law and order
• In light of the last election experience, 56% see democracy as a viable political system suitable for Palestine while 40% see it as nonviable and unsuitable for Palestine
• 32% say they believe Hamas’s goal is to establish a state that guarantees rights but where Sharia, or Islamic law, is the only source of legislation and 16% say they believe it seeks to establish a Sharia state similar to Saudi Arabia

Findings show significant increase in the level of public satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas compared to findings in our last poll in December 2006: 53% are satisfied now compared to 40% last December. Dissatisfaction in this poll reaches 43%. Despite this improvement and despite the high level of satisfaction with the make-up of the unity government, only 6% describe current condition of the Palestinians in PA areas as good or very good while 82% describe it as bad or very bad. About one third (32%) believe the most important problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty while 24% believe it is the continuation of occupation and its daily measure, 23% believe it is corruption and lack of internal reforms, and 20% believe it is internal anarchy.

Findings also show that 84% believe that corruption exists in the PA and among those 49% believe that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future. About 42% believe it will decrease. It is interesting to note that only 21% believed last December that corruption will decrease in the future. The change might be due to an increase in the level of optimism generated by a high level of expectations from the national unity government.

Only 27% say that their personal safety and security is assured and 73% say it is not. In this regard, it is worth noting that 51% evaluate the performance of the “Executive Force” negatively viewing it as contributing to lawlessness while only 29% evaluate it positively viewing it as contributing to enforcement of law and order. These findings are identical to those we found in our December 2006 poll which means that the formation of the national unity government did not change public views regarding the performance of this force.

But the formation of the unity government might have positively affected, even if slightly, public evaluation of democracy in light of the outcome of the legislative elections in January 2006. Today, 56% view democracy as a viable political system suitable for Palestine (compared to 53% three months ago) while 40% view it as nonviable and unsuitable for Palestine (compared to 43% three months ago).

Finally, the formation of the national unity government did not affect public reading of Hamas’s goals regarding the nature of the Palestinian state it seeks to create. 21% (compared to 23% six months ago) view Hamas’s goal as the creation of a state that guarantees public liberties and in which Sharia would be one of the sources of legislation. By contrast, 32% (compared to 33% six months ago) view Hamas’s goal as the creation of a state that guarantees public liberties and in which Sharia would be the only source of legislation. Moreover, 16% (compared to 13% six months ago) view its goal as the creation of a state based on Sharia like in Saudi Arabia, and 5% (compared to 7% six months ago) view it as the creation of a state based on Sharia like in Afghanistan under the Taliban. 16%, compared to 15% six months ago, believe Hamas’s goal is the creation of a state like other Arab states in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

 (3) Peace Process  

• A majority of 72% supports the Saudi, or Arab, initiative and 26% oppose it.
• 63% support and 35% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict.
• A majority of 54% supports and 43% oppose a permanent settlement in which Israel withdraws from all occupied territories with the exception of settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank which would be subject to territorial exchange
• 43% support and 55% oppose a permanent settlement in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state and Israel annexes Jewish neighborhoods and the Wailing Wall.
• 43% support and 54% oppose a permanent settlement in which the refugee problem is resolved based on UN resolution 194 but with restrictions on refugee return to Israel which would be subject to an Israeli decision.
• A majority of 71% support and 27% oppose the conduct of negotiations with Israel that would aim at establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the Palestinian state and Israel on a permanent settlement.
• A majority of 85% supports the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 84% support the extension of the current ceasefire to include the West Bank.
• 47% believe that Hamas’s goal is to reach a long term Hudna or truce with Israel, 24% believe its goal is to insure the continuation of the conflict and 22% believe its aim is to seek permanent peace with Israel.

Findings show that about three quarters of the Palestinians (72%) support the Saudi Initiative while 26% oppose it. This finding points to a significant increase in support for this initiative compared to the situation three months ago when support stood at 59% and opposition at 38%. The increase in the level of support might have the result of increased Arab and international interest in the initiative and in light of the plan by the Arab Summit in Riyadh to reaffirm Arab commitment to it. Moreover, the Mecca Agreement, the formation of the unity government, and the public expectation that Hamas will show more moderation regarding Israel might have played a role in increasing public support for the initiative. Support for the initiative increases among supporters of Fateh (82%) compared to supporters of Hamas (63%), among non refugees (76%) compared to refugees (66%), among illiterates (81%) compared to holders of BA degree (70%), among retired persons (87%) compared to students (69%), and among those most willing to buy a lottery ticket (86%) compared to the most unwilling (61%).

Findings show that a majority of 63% supports and 35% oppose a mutual recognition in which Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israel recognizes Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict. Support for this mutual recognition stood at 58% and opposition at 40% in our poll last December.

Findings show a majority of 54% supports and 43% oppose a permanent territorial solution in which Israel withdraws from all occupied territories with the exception of settlement areas not exceeding 3% of the size of the West Bank which would be exchanged with an equal territory from Israel. Support for this settlement stood at 61% three months ago. With regard to a permanent settlement in Jerusalem -- in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state but in which Israel would annex Jewish neighborhoods and the Wailing Wall – 43% would support and 55% would oppose the proposed solution. Three months ago, support for this solution stood at 39%. Similarly, 43% would support and 54% would oppose a refugee permanent settlement based on UN resolution 194 but in which actual return to Israel would be restricted and be subject to an Israeli decision. Three months ago, support for this solution stood at 41% and opposition at 54%.

The poll found a high level of support (71%) for entering negotiations whose objective would be the creation of a Palestinian state in all Gaza and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations on permanent issues to be conducted by the state of Palestine and the state of Israel. 27% opposed entering such negotiations. It is worth mentioning that three months ago we found that 58% would support a Palestinian-Israeli agreement that would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state in all Gaza and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by permanent status negotiations on borders, refugees, and holy places.

As in our last poll three months ago, an overwhelming majority (85%) supports the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and a similar percentage (84%) supports extending it to include the West Bank.

Findings show that only 22% consider Hamas’s objective to be the arrival at a permanent settlement with Israel while 47% believe that Hamas aims at reaching a long term Hudna or armistice. About one quarter (24%) believe that Hamas wants to insure the continuation of the conflict with no settlement at all.

(4) Domestic Balance of Power 

• If new legislative elections are held today, 37% would vote for Hamas, 43% for Fateh, 11% for other lists, and 8% remain undecided. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our last poll conducted three months ago in December 2006.
• If new presidential elections are held today and the only two candidates were PA President Mahmud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh, 47% would vote for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh. These results are almost identical with those obtained in our last poll three months ago. But if the only two candidates were Marwan Barghouti and Isma’il Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive 52% and Haniyeh 43%. 

Findings show that the formation of the unity government did not affect the popularity of the various factions. If elections are held today, Hamas would receive 37% of the vote (compared to 36% last December), Fateh 43% (compared to 42% last December), all other factions 11% (compared to 12% last December),  and 8% remain undecided (compared to 10% last December). It is worth noting however that the popularity of Hamas has finally stabilized after continued but slight decline since June 2006.

If new presidential elections are to be held today with only two candidates, PA president Mahmud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh, competing, the two would receive almost identical percentages of the vote: 47% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh. These are almost identical to the results we obtained last December. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Isma’il Haniyeh, Barghouti would win with 52% of the vote against 43% for Haniyeh. In our December 2006 poll, we measured the popularity of Marwan Barghouti against that of Khalid Mish’al: Barghouti received 57% of the vote to Mish’al’s 36%.

(5) Sunni-Shii Strife in Iraq   

• 59% agree and 39% disagree that part of the conflict in Iraq is a sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shiis
• Majorities ranging between 50% to 69% believe that Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority take the side of the Sunni Iraqis in their conflict with Shii Iraqis
• On the other hand, 79% believe Iran takes the side of the Shiis and 74% believe Hezbollah too takes the sides of the Shiis in Iraq.
• 69% believe Fateh stands with the Sunnis and 76% believe that Hamas too stands with the Sunnis.
• 75% of the respondents say they stand with the Sunnis of Iraq in their conflict with the Shiis

Findings show that a majority of Palestinians (59%) believes that part of the armed conflict in Iraq is a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiis while 39% disagree with that. A majority (ranging between 50% and 69%) of those who do believe that a sectarian conflict exists in Iraq believes that the Palestinian Authority and Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia stand on the side of the Sunnis in their conflict with the Shiis. By contrast, 79% believe Iran stands on the side of the Shiis. When asked about Syria, about one third (34%) said it stood on the side of the Sunnis and 31% said it stood on the side of the Shiis.

When asked about the position of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Fateh, findings show that about three quarters believe that Hezbollah stands on the side of the Shiis, but 69% said Fateh stands on the side of the Sunnis and 67% said Hamas too stands on the side of the Sunnis. It is worth mentioning that while only 3% said Fateh stands on the side of the Shiis, 13% said Hamas stands on the side of the Shiis.

Three quarters of those who believe that a sectarian conflict exists in Iraq say they stand with the Sunnis, less that 1% say they stand with the Shiis, 18% say they stand with neither side, and 4% say they stand with both sides. Percentage of those who stand with the Sunnis increases in the Gaza Strip (87%) compared to the West Bank (67%), among those living in refugee camps (84%) compared to those living in villages and towns (71%), and among men (79%) compared to women (71%). But supporters of Fateh and Hamas say equally that they stand with the Sunnis (82% and 80% respectively). .... Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 11 March 2017. Internally, the period before the poll witnessed the setting of a May 2017 date for holding local elections and Hamas announced its intentions to boycott them. A novel by a Palestinian writer was banned by the PA and the license for the Palestinian Telecommunication Company was renewed without opening the market to competition. The Israeli government announced big plans for more settlement construction and the Palestinian president threatened to suspend security coordination in response to these announcements. Internationally, the Trump Administration took office in January. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and reconciliation. It also covers the peace process and the 50^th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2017 show a high level of dissatisfaction with the performance of President Abbas; in fact, two-thirds demand his resignation. Nonetheless, if new presidential elections take place today, he would receive the same level of support as that of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ candidate.  Findings also show a decline in the level of support for Fatah compared to our findings three months ago when Fatah’s popularity rose a little in light of its successful holding of its 7^th Convention.

On other domestic issues, the public is divided into two halves regarding the banning of a Palestinian novel which the PA claims to contain indecent language. Two-thirds disagree with the renewal of the license of the Palestinian Telecommunication Company (PALTEL) without the opening of the market to competition. We also found that a little over one fifth of the public goes to private, rather than governmental, hospitals because they think that the chances for a medical error in such hospitals are lower. A large minority indicates that they personally or a member of their family and friends had an experience involving a medical error.

On the 50^th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, more than half of the public is optimistic about its end soon or within the next five to ten years; but one third believes that it will last another 50 years. The public places the blame for the continuation of the occupation equally on its leadership and on the Palestinian factions and political parties, but it also places the responsibility on itself. A majority thinks the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was fifty years ago and also worse than it was ten years ago. But despite the belief of the public that most Arab and European countries do not stand with the Palestinian people, an overwhelming majority believes that God stands with the Palestinians.

Findings show a slight increase in the level of support for the two-state solution compared to our findings three months ago, but it is still just below the 50% mark. Strong correlation exists between the belief in the viability of the two-state solution and its support: the more viable the solution, the higher the support. Today, most Palestinians believe that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement construction. Still, most Palestinians have not shifted to supporting the one-state solution; two-thirds continue to oppose it.

The overwhelming majority of the public is dissatisfied with the response of the Palestinian leadership to the new Israeli plans for settlement construction. In this context, a similarly large majority believes that Abbas is not serious about suspending security coordination with Israel. Abbas announced that if settlement construction continues, he would be forced to suspend security coordination. The public believes that the most suitable response to the new Israeli settlement plans should be the suspending of security coordination and the formal submission of a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court.

(1) 50^th anniversary of Israeli occupation:

• 32% believe that the occupation will last for another 50 years
• Only 25% say the Palestinian leadership is doing all it can to end the occupation
• 44% say that the place and status of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago
• 72% believe that Netanyahu does not attach importance to Palestinian reaction to his policies
• Two thirds believe that most of the Arab counties do not stand with the Palestinian people, but 94% believe that God stands with them.

On the 50th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the public is divided on the future directions: 32% believe the occupation will last for another 50 years, 24% believe it will end soon, and 29% believe it will end after five to ten years or more. The belief that the occupation will end soon or within five to ten years is greater in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (66% and 65% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (49%), among residents of refugee camps and cities (57% and 55% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns (39%), among the religious (59%) compared to the somewhat religious (47%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (67%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (45%), among refugees (59%) compared to non-refugees (48%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to the illiterates (46%), among farmers, students, and employees (68%, 61%, and 56% respectively) compared to the retired and laborers (43% and 46% respectively).

We asked the public to assess the strength of the role played by four different Palestinian actors in the struggle to end the Israeli occupation: (1) the Palestinian leadership, (2) most political parties and factions, (3) most of the public, and (4) the respondent himself or herself.  Respondents were given three options to choose from: do their best, inadequate, and negligent role. Only 25% said the leadership is doing its best; 41% said its role is inadequate; and 32% said it is negligent. Similarly, 26% said most factions are doing their best; 49% said their role in inadequate; and 23% said they are negligent. On the other hand, 39% said the public is doing its best; 44% said its role is inadequate; and 16% said it is negligent. Finally, 29% assessed their own personal role as doing their best; 40% as inadequate; and 28% said they are negligent.

The belief that the leadership is doing all it can is higher in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (20%), among supporters of Fatah (42%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (17% and 28% respectively), in refugee camps (43%) compared to villages and cities (20% and 24% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (32%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (17%), among the illiterates (32%) compared to holders of BA degree (27%), and among the public sector employees (30%) compared to those employed in the private sector (23%).

The belief that the respondent himself or herself is doing all he or she can do is also higher in the Gaza Strip (38%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among men (31%) compared to women (26%), among the religious (33%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (22% and 25% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (32%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (28%), among the refugees (31%) compared to the non-refugees (27%), among holders of BA degree (33%) compared to the illiterates (28%), among employees (38%) compared to students (26%), and among those employed in the public sector (40%) compared to private sector employees (32%).

44% of the public believe that the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago. By contrast, 39% believe it is better than it was 50 years ago.  Moreover, 43% believe that the place or standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 10 years ago and 36% believe it is better than it was 10 years ago. The belief that the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (47% and 41% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (37%), among residents of cities and refugee camps (48% and 40% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns  (34%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (53%) compared to supporters of the peace process (40%), and among refugees (46%) compared to non-refugees (43%).

A large majority (72%) believes that the Netanyahu government does not take into consideration or attach importance to Palestinian reaction to its policies or actions while 26% believe it does take into consideration Palestinian reaction. Moreover, two thirds (65%) of the public believe that most Arab counties do not stand often enough with the Palestinian people. A similar majority (66%) believes that most European countries do not stand most of the time with the Palestinian people. But 51% believe that most of the Muslim countries do stand most of the time with the Palestinian people and 56% believe that most of the peoples of the world do stand most of the time with the Palestinians.   On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of 94% believes that God stands with the Palestinian people.  Although this figure reflects a consensus, it is worth noting few differences that seem to reflect level of religiosity and political affiliation: while 97% of the religious believe that God stand with the Palestinians, the percentage drops slightly to 94% among the somewhat religious and 77% among the unreligious; similarly, it rises among supporters of Hamas, reaching 99% and drops slightly to 94% among Fatah supporters and 85% among supporters of third parties.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 64% want President Abbas to resign
• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 47%; and if the two candidates are Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 59% and the latter 36%
• In new parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 36% and Hamas 30%

64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 61% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 7%; Khalid Mishal, Rami al Hamdallah and Mustapha Barghouti (5% each); Salam Fayyad 3%, and Saeb Erekat 2%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 41% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 47% (compared to 49% three months ago) and the latter 47% (compared to 45% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 46% of the vote (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 50% (compared to 51% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh 45% (compared to 47% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 26%, Barghouti 40% and Haniyeh 33%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 41%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 40% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 41% three months ago).

(3) Local elections:

• Only 45% say they will participate in the upcoming local elections
• Only 31% believe that Hamas is right to boycott the upcoming local elections

Only 45% (46% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) say they will participate in the local elections which are scheduled to take place in May. 35% say they will not participate and 15% are not sure. 35% believe that the holding of local elections in May will serve the interests of reconciliation while 22% believe it will not serve it and 34% believe it will have no impact on it.  About half (49%) of the public believes that Hamas is making a mistake in its decision to boycott local elections while 31% believe it is not making a mistake.  The belief that Hamas is right in boycotting the local elections is higher in the Gaza Strip (38%) compared to the West Bank (28%), in refugee camps and cities (35% and 32% respectively) compared to villages and towns (27%), among women (33%) compared to men (30%), among the religious (39%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligious (26% and 19% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (47%) compared to supporters of the peace process (23%), among holders of BA degree (34%) compared to illiterates (7%), among those employed in the private sector (35%) compared to those employed in the public sector (27%), and among supporters of Hamas (62%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (16% and 31% respectively).

(4) Domestic conditions: security, Gaza electricity, banned novel, PALTEL, medical errors, and others:

• Only 11% think conditions in the Gaza strip are good; 25% think conditions in the West Bank are good
• 46% of Gazans and 23% of West Bankers say they wish to emigrate
• Gazans place the responsibility for the electricity crisis equally on Fatah and Hamas
• 47% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people
• 46% support and 44% oppose the ban on a Palestinian novel
• Two thirds disapprove the renewal of the license of the telecommunication company PALTEL without opening the market to competition
• 38% say that they or a family member have experienced a medical error in Palestinian hospitals 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 11% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Moreover, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 38%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 50%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 47% and in the West Bank at 56%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to migrate to other countries stands at 46%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 23%. Three months ago 46% of Gazans and 24% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate.

In the West Bank, the largest percentage (44%) places responsibility for the electricity crisis in the Gaza Strip on Israel, 18% place it on the PA and president Abbas; only 13% place it on Hamas’ shoulders. By contrast, Gazans place the responsibility for the crisis on the PA and Hamas equally (31% on the PA and 30% on Hamas); only 20% place it on Israel. 

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Maan TV viewership is the highest, standing at 16%, followed by al Jazeera TV (at 15%), Palestine TV (at 14%), al Aqsa TV (at 13%), Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) at 12 %, Al Arabiya at 7%, and al Quds TV and al Mayadeen at 4% each.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.  Only 38% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear.  47% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 48% view it as an asset.

The public is almost evenly divided concerning the banning by the PA of a Palestinian novel charging that it contains indecent language: 46% approve the ban and 44% do not. Disapproval of the ban is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among supporters of third parties (62%) compared to supporters of Fatah and Hamas (41% and 47% respectively), among residents of refugee camps (61%) compared to residents of villages and cities (41% and 42% respectively), among women (46%) compared to men (42%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 (55%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (39%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (49%) compared to supporters of the peace process (42%), among refugees (47%) compared to non-refugees (42%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to the illiterates (17%), and among students (51%) compared to farmers and housewives (34% and 41% respectively).

Two thirds do not agree with the PA decision to renew the license of the Palestinian Telecommunication Company (PALTEL) without a competitive bidding; only 24% agree with the PA decision.  Disagreement with the PA decision is higher in the West Bank (73%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (70% and 68% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (56%), among residents of villages and cities (70% and 68% respectively) compared to residents of refugee camps (59%), among men (71%) compared to women (63%), among the somewhat religious (71%) compared to the religious (63%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (78%) compared to supporters of the peace process (61%), and among non-refugees (69%) compared to the refugees (63%).

38% say that they personally, or one of their family members or friends, had experienced a case of medical error and 61% say they did not. While 36% believe that such medical errors occur equally in private and governmental hospitals, 22% indicate that they go to private hospitals because they think errors are less likely in them and 23% indicate that despite the danger of medical errors they still go to governmental hospitals because of the cheaper costs.  

(5) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

• 27% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about reconciliation
• Only 26% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government
• Only 18% put the blame on Hamas for the poor performance of the reconciliation government

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 27% and pessimism at 67%. Three months ago optimism stood at 35% and pessimism at 61%. 26% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 56%.  Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 18% (9% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) while 34% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 14% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government. 

(6) New Israeli settlement plans and the peace process:

• Palestinians think the response to Israel’s settlement policy should be the termination of security coordination and the submission of a formal complaint to the ICC
• 77% are dissatisfied with the response of the Palestinian leadership to the new Israeli settlement plans
• 47% support and 51% oppose the two-state solution
• 60% say the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction
• 67% think that the Paris peace conference did not contribute to improving the chances for peace
• Only 9% think the Trump Administration will renew the peace process

We asked the public about the most effective means of responding to the recent Israeli settlement plans: 25% think it is the suspension of security coordination with Israel; 22% think it is the submission of a formal complaint to the International Criminal Court; 19% think it is the resumption of armed attacks; 19% think it is a strong international condemnation of Israel, and 14% think it is the organization of popular non-violent protests.  An overwhelming majority of 77% are dissatisfied, and only 18% are satisfied, with Abbas’ response to the recent Israeli announcement of plans for 6,000 new settlement units. In fact, a large majority of 72% believes that President Abbas is not serious in his threat to suspend security coordination with Israel if settlement construction continues; only 21% believe he is serious.   The belief that President Abbas is serious is higher in the Gaza Strip (24%) compared to the West Bank (19%), in refugee camps and cities (23% and 22% respectively) compared to villages and towns (17%), among supporters of the peace process (29%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (8%), among the illiterates (30%) compared to holders of BA degree (17%), and among Fatah supporters (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (6% and 21% respectively).

On the two-state solution, the public is divided: 47% support and 51% oppose it. Three months ago, 44% supported it. Palestinians are divided into three groups on the most effective means of building a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective; 37% think armed action is the most effective; and 24% think non-violent popular resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 37% said armed action is the most effective means.

A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement expansion while 37% believe that it is still viable.  A minority of 32% supports a one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equal rights; 67% oppose the one-state solution. Three months ago, support for the one-state solution stood at 36%.  70% believe that the chances for creating an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or non-existent while 29% believe the chances are medium or high.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 71%; 29% are not worried. Furthermore, a majority of 52% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 32% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 14% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  50% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 17% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places. Only 10% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 77% support joining more international organizations, 67% support non-violent popular resistance, 51% support a return to an armed intifada, and 49% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 53%.  Few months after the holding of the Paris peace conference, two thirds (67%) of the public believe that it did not contribute to improving the chances for Palestinian-Israeli peace; only 21% believe it did.  With Trump in the White House, 38% believe that the new American administration will aggravate Palestinian-Israeli tensions leading to escalation in popular and violent confrontations due to the expected settlement build-up; 33% believe conditions will remain as they are now; 11% believe the new administration will provoke diplomatic confrontation; only 9% believe it will lead to a renewal of the peace process.  If the Trump Administration called upon the two side to resume negotiations without  any preconditions, a majority of 58% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the call; only 31% believe it should accept it.

(7) The Arab World, ISIS:

• 76% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own problems and 59% believe that today there is a Sunni Arab alliance with Israel against Iran
• 92% believe that ISIS does not represent true Islam and 80% support the war against it

76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 23% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principal cause.  59% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 29% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

An overwhelming majority of 92% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 4% believe it does represent true Islam. 4% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 5% (compared to 4% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 80% support and 16% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 43% say the most vital Palestinian goal should be the establishment of a state along the 1967 lines and 34% say it should be the attainment of the right of return
• Poverty and unemployment is the main problem confronting Palestinians in the eyes of 27%

43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the pubic; an identical percentage believes it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 24% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16 and 20 March 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several domestic developments including the launching of a second round of the local election campaigns in the West Bank and the holding of a special session for the PLO Central Council in which important decisions relevant to Palestinian-Israeli relations and the filling of several senior positions in the organization’s leadership. It also witnessed increased settlers’ attacks in areas labeled B and C of the West Bank and increased tension in the Shaikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Amnesty International issued a report in which it characterized Israel as an apartheid state. Finally, after weeks of anticipation, war erupted between Russia and Ukraine. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the first quarter of 2022 indicate a return to the internal balance of power between Fatah and Hamas, as the case was before the May 2021 Israel-Hamas war. In other words, ten months after the war, Fatah's popularity returns to outperform Hamas’. It is noticeable that Fatah's popularity is rising equally in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In other words, the rise is unlikely to be associated with the launch of the West Bank’s local election campaigns. The local elections, scheduled to take place on 26 March, will take place only in the West Bank. However, the rise might be linked to two things: 

(1) the success of the so-called "confidence-building steps" between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, and (2) Hamas's inability to translate the gains it made in the May war with Israel to positive change on the ground in the Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem.

However, President Abbas' popularity has not risen. Indeed, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyeh is still able to win presidential elections in which only the two compete. Fatah's competitiveness is also clearly diminished when its name is associated with President Abbas', as Hamas continues to outperform Fatah when the latter is listed as "Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas." For example, when asked about the party most deserving of representing the Palestinian people, Hamas or “Fatah under President Abbas' leadership,” Hamas still beats Fatah, even if just by a little.

The results also indicate that a large majority of the Palestinian public wants the PA to take a neutral stand in the Russian-Ukrainian war, although more people blame Russia for starting that war. The results show a small majority indicating concern about the prospect of war expansion and the entry of other countries in it. Moreover, a large majority says it expects prices to rise sharply in Palestine because of that war. When asked to compare the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to that of the Ukraine and Russia, the majority asserts that the war has demonstrated a western double standards as the US and Europe show no willingness to impose any sanctions on Israel, while showing a great enthusiasm to impose crushing sanctions on Russia. Moreover, more than three quarters of the public believe that the war has also shown European discrimination in the treatment of refugees from Ukraine as opposed to refugees from the Middle Eastern wars.

We also asked the public about the PLO’s Central Council meeting in Ramallah at the beginning of February and the resolutions it made. The findings show that a majority, albeit small, believes that the current PLO remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, a larger majority believes that this particular meeting of the Central Council was illegitimate, although a majority, of more than sixty percent, supports the decisions it took. Perhaps the main reason for delegitimizing this meeting relates to the rejection of the results of the elections that were held during its sessions, with only a quarter or less accepting these election results, and the absence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the meeting. Two-thirds of the public say that Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad's entry into the PLO will make it more representative of the Palestinian people.

On Palestinian-Israeli relations, poll findings show that support for a two-state solution remains almost the same as it was three months ago while support for a one-state solution, with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, rises to about a third during the same period. Despite the increased level of approval for the one-state solution, two thirds of the public support the description of Israel is an apartheid state. Indeed, the public sees the publication of the report of Amnesty International on the subject as an indication of the beginning of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of the Palestinians, as previously happened in the case of South Africa.

The results also show an increase in support for confrontations and an armed uprising and a decrease in the belief in the effectiveness of negotiations. Finally, in this survey, we asked, for the first time, about the belief in a Qur'anic prophecy about the demise of Israel. We found that a vast majority actually believes that such prophesy does indeed exist in the Qur'an. However, the poll found that most of the public does not believe the assessment that 2022 is the precise year of Israel's demise. Even among religious people and the believers of the existence of this prophecy in the Qur'an, only a minority believes the assessment regarding a specific year.

1) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• 43% blame Russia for starting the war; 40% blame Ukraine
• 71% want the PA to stay neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
• 63% expect the war to lead to price increases
• A majority of 57% thinks that Western countries have shown double standard when dealing with the Israeli occupation compared to that of the Russian occupation.

The largest percentage of the public (43%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 40% blame Ukraine.  Putting the blame on Russia is higher in the West Bank (45%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in villages (52%) compared to refugee camps and cities (30% and 43% respectively), among women (45%) compared to men (41%), among non-refugees (46%) compared to refugees (39%), among the religious (49%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (28% and 40% respectively), and among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (47% and 44% respectively) compared to supporters of third parties (36%).

An overwhelming majority (71%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 10% think it should stand with Ukraine.

As for the war’s impact, a majority of 54% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 42% are not worried. The overwhelming majority thinks Palestine will be impacted by the war in the Ukraine while only 5% think the war will have no impact on Palestine. 63% think it will lead to a sharp rise in prices, 26% think Israel will exploit it to expand settlements and annex Palestinian territories, and 1% think it could lead to expansion of armed confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis.

A majority of 57% says the war show the double standard of US and Europe when the conflict is about the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories compared to that of Russia-Ukraine conflict; 28% think the two conflicts are different, and 10% think the Western countries stand against the Israeli occupation just as they stand against the Russian occupation of Ukraine.  Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 76% thinks there is a difference in the manner in which Europe treats refugees from Ukraine compared to its treatment of refugees from the Middle East; refugees from Arab and Islamic countries are treated badly and in a discriminatory manner.

2) PLO Central Council’s meeting and decisions:

• 60% support the decisions taken by the PLO Central Council but 56% say the session lacked legitimacy
• The percentage of support for the election of the various candidates for senior positions in the PLO ranges between 22 and 26.
• A majority of 51% says the PLO is its sole legitimate representative

More than 60% support the decisions made by the PLO Central Council in its latest meeting in February 2022: 67% support the suspension of the PLO recognition of Israel and 61% support the decision to end the implementation of agreements with Israel including security coordination. Support for the decisions is higher among refugees (64%) compared to non-refugees (59%), the unmarried (66%) compared to the married (60%), among those with the highest income (65%) compared to those with the lowest income (59%), and among supporters of Fatah (70%) followed by supporters of Hamas (66%) and third parties (53%).

Despite the fact that a majority of 62% support the Central Council’s decision to defer to the PLO Executive Committee on the setting of a mechanism to implement the Council’s decisions, a majority of 59% thinks the Executive Committee will not implement these decisions while only 31% think it will implement them. Indeed, 56% share the belief expressed by those who boycotted the Council’s meeting in viewing the session as illegitimate; only 29% think the session was legitimate.  The belief the council meeting was illegitimate is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (54%), in cities and villages (57% and 56% respectively) compared to refugee camps (45%), among men (60%) compared to women (52%), among those whose age is 50 and above (60%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 (52%), among refugees (58%) compared to non-refugees (54%), among holders of BA degree (59%) compared to the illiterates (48%), among professionals and students (67% and 63% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (50% and 51% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (57%) compared to those who work in the public sector (49%), among the married (57%) compared to the unmarried (50%), among the religious (58%) compared to the unreligious (49%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 68% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (39%).

The largest percentage is not in favor of the election of the various members of the Central Council to senior positions in the PLO: only 24% support the election of Rouhi Fattouh as the Speaker of the PLO’s National Council; 26% support the election of Hussein al Shaikh to the Executive Committee; and only 22% support the election of Mohammad Mustafa or Ramzi Rihan to that committee.

However, a majority of 51% views the current PLO as its own sole legitimate representative and 53% say the PLO is viewed by the Palestinian people as their sole legitimate representative.  If the PLO is reformed and Hamas and Islamic Jihad become members in that organization, 65% think it would in this case become more representative of the Palestinian people while 12% think that, in this case, it will become less representative of the Palestinian people.  The belief that the PLO would become more representative if Hamas and Islamic Jihad join it is higher among holders of the BA degree (68%) compared to the illiterates (60%), among students and professionals (75% and 74% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, and laborers (26%, 59%, and 63% respectively), among the religious (66%) compared to the unreligious (48%), and among supporters of third parties and Hamas (78% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (67%). 

3) Legislative and presidential elections:

• In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 38% and the latter 54%
• In parliamentary elections, vote for Fatah rises to 42% and vote for Hamas declines to 36%
• But the largest percentage (31%) thinks Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to 29% who chose “Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas.”
• Turnout for the local elections is expected at 55% of eligible voters

A large majority of 72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 26% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 52% (57% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%.

Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 29% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Moreover, 73% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 71% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 35% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 41% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 50% and from among those, the former receives 33% and the latter 60%.  If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 37% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal 3%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad 2% each.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 64% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 42% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 14% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 38% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 47% (compared to 40% three months ago).

The largest percentage (31%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 29% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 33% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 34% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 36% said neither side deserves such a role.

In the areas in which the second stage of local elections are set to take place soon, 55% say they will participate in these elections and 38% say they will not participate.  When asked about the most important consideration that will influence their vote in the upcoming local elections, the largest percentage (42%) select the ability to deliver services to their area of residence; 14% select the political party of the list, another 14% select the closeness of the list to family and friends, and another 14% sat their vote will be influenced by the ability of the list to combat corruption. 9% say that their vote will depend on the extent to which the members of the list are religious, and 7% say it depends on the level of education among the list members.

4) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• 79% express the view that the PA government is not doing enough to limit price increases
• In the Gaza Strip, 37% say they want to emigrate; in the West Bank 20% express the same desire to emigrate
• 84% believe there is corruption in the institutions of the PA and 69% believe there is corruption in the institutions run by Hamas in the Gaza Strip
• Optimism about the success of reconciliation declines to 28%
• A large majority of 70% thinks that the incidents of internal violence reflect the lack of societal trust in the justice and law enforcement sector

A majority of 54% say that the current rise in the cost of living affects them significantly or very significantly, while 45% say it affects them moderately or slightly.  But the vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 19% say it is doing so.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 57%. Similarly, 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 37% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 31% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.  Moreover, 35% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 60% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 42% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 56% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (55%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.  Moreover, only 28% are optimistic and 69% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 39%.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 20% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28% of the public expect success and 67% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 71% expects failure and 25% expects success.

The vast majority (70%) says that domestic violence in which individual killings turn into family and clan confrontations for revenge reflects primarily the society's weak confidence in the justice and law enforcement system, while 27% say it reflects the traditional and tribal nature of Palestinian society.  To stop these incidents of internal violence, the vast majority (72%) says law enforcement services should be strengthened, while 24% say tribal reform committees should be strengthened.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Maan (11% each), Palestine Today (9%), al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).

5) The Coronavirus and PA performance during the pandemic:

• 53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Corona virus
• A two-third majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA Ministry of Health

53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 46% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, 57% expressed satisfaction.  The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 67% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• 40% support the two-state solution and 58% oppose it
• 32% support the one-state solution with equal rights to Jews and Palestinians
• A majority of 63% views positively the confidence building measures undertaken by Israel and the PA
• But the largest percentage (44%) thinks that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation; only 25% think negotiations are the most effective
• 70% are opposed to unconditional return to negotiations with Israel; 64% are opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US
• 73% believe the Qur’an contains a prophecy about the demise of the state of Israel; but only 32% think the year for this demise is 2022
• 64% want the PA security forces to confront the Israeli forces when they enter Palestinian cities
• Two thirds view Israel as an apartheid state

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 32% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 63% expressed opposition.  Support for the position articulated by Abbas in favor of a one-state solution with equal rights is higher in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (30%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to villages and cities (26% and 32% respectively), among those whose age is between 23 and 29 years (36%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (30%), among those with the highest income (35%) compared to those with the lowest income (29%), among the unreligious (62%) compared to the religious (29%), and among supporters of Fatah (46%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (25% and 24% respectively).

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 52% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 52% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 63% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 61% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.

A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 36% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 30% believe the chances to be medium or high.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 25% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 42% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. However, when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 38%; 57% are opposed. Similarly, 64% are opposed, and 30% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  

The vast majority (73%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 22% say it does not.  However, the majority (57%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 32% say they believe it.  The belief in the existence of the prophecy is higher in the West Bank (74%) compared to the Gaza Strip (70%), among students and laborers (77% each) compared to farmers, merchants, and professionals (52%, 57%, and 65% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (76%) compared to those who work in the private sector (69%), among the married (74%) compared to the unmarried (68%), among the religious (79%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (37% and 71% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 73% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (68%).

The belief that the prophecy will be fulfilled this year (2022) is higher in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to the West Bank (29%), in refugee camps (50%) compared to villages and cities (30% and 31% respectively), among refugees (37%) compared to non-refugees (29%), among the married (33%) compared to the unmarried (25%), among the religious (36%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (24% and 30% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (21% and 23% respectively).

Against the backdrop of the assassination of three members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Nablus, a majority of 64% says it is the duty of the Palestinian security forces to confront the Israeli armed forces when they enter areas under the control of the PA: 32% say they do not agree. The main reason for the failure of the Israeli army to stop settlers’ terrorism in the eyes of a majority of 54% is that the settlers are a tool in the hands of the army and it uses them to fight the Palestinian residents in order to expel them from their land; 20% say the reason is that settlers are the decision makers in the Israeli government; 12% say that settlers hide and wear masks, and 10% say that the army does not have the jurisdiction to arrest settlers.  When asked why the Palestinian police and national security forces could not protect the residents from settlers’ terrorism in Area B, the largest percentage (34%) says it is because the Palestinian leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with the Israeli army than to provide protection to the Palestinian population; 29% say it is because the Palestinian police and national security forces do not want to engage in armed conflict with the Israeli army; 20% say it is because the Palestinian police does not have jurisdiction to protect the residents of area B; and 12% say terrorist attacks take place at night when Palestinian security services are not present.

Two-thirds of the public (65%) approve and 27% disapprove of the assessment that Israel is an apartheid state. Moreover, 48% agree and 40% disagree that Amnesty International's report on Israel's racism is an indication of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of Palestinians and against Israel, as it has previously did regarding apartheid in South Africa.  The percentage of those who view Israel as an apartheid state is higher in refugee camps and villages (72% each) compared to cities (64%), among those who work in the public sector (76%) compared to those who work in the private sector (68%), among the married (67%) compared to the unmarried (57%), among those with the lowest income (73%) compared to those with the highest income (65%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (74% and 70% respectively) compared to the religious (59%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (79% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (65%).

7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 38% express the view that the most vital Palestinian goal should be ending occupation and building a Palestinian state
• The most pressing problem for Palestinians today is occupation followed by corruption

38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (25%; 17% in the Gaz Strip and 30% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 19% said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 15% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 28% said it is corruption, 14% said it is unemployment, 14% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (40) 

Palestinians want Abbas’ and PLO’s policy to be the platform of the reconciliation government and Fayyad to be its prime minister; an overwhelming majority wants a real state in September, one that exercises sovereignty in area C and at the international crossings with Jordan; and a majority wants to participate in big peaceful demonstrations that would breach checkpoints and block roads of Israeli settlers and army

16-18 June 2011    

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16-18 June 2011. The poll was conducted after the signing of the reconciliation agreement between Fateh and Hamas and during the continued turmoil and revolt in the Arab World including the popular uprisings in Syria, Yemen and Libya. This period witnessed increased PA official statements indicating insistence on going to the UN for recognition of a Palestinian state in September. This press release covers Palestinian domestic conditions, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the future of the reconciliation agreement, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the most serious problems confronting Palestinians today. It also covers issues related to the peace process and the expected September process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2011 show that the reconciliation agreement between Fateh and Hamas has triggered important changes in public attitudes and perceptions. Indeed, the agreement has removed, almost completely, the issue of the split between West Bank and the Gaza Strip from the list of critical problems in the minds of the public. But the fading of the problem of the split led to the emergence of a new problem: the concern that the agreement, once implemented, and a majority believes that it will indeed be implemented, it will bring back international political and financial sanctions and boycott. For this reason, and while findings show that Hamas has benefited considerably from signing the agreement, a clear majority of the public wants the new Palestinian government of specialists, once formed, to implement the president’s and the PLO’s peace program and policy rather than that of Hamas. Most importantly, the largest percentage wants Salam Fayyad, Fateh’s candidate, to be the next prime minister. Indeed, only a small minority wants Jamal Khodari, Hamas’ candidate, to be the next prime minister. Perhaps the public believes that if Fayyad stays as prime minister and if he continues to implement Abbas’ peace agenda and policies, the threat of boycott and sanctions would diminish or disappear.

Findings show a split in public attitude regarding the Obama proposal for terms of reference for the peace process on borders and the national identity of Israel and Palestine, both supported by half of the public. But three quarters of the public oppose Obama’s suggestion that the Palestinian state should be non-militarized and about two thirds reject the US position that going to the UN in September to seek recognition of a Palestinian state would be a mistake.  Findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians support an exercise of sovereignty over the so-called area (C) including the deployment of Palestinian security forces in those areas in the context of the UN recognition of Palestinian statehood. Similarly, three quarters support exercise of Palestinian sovereignty over the Allenby international crossing with Jordan even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing. Findings indicate that a majority wants to participate in big popular peaceful demonstrations that would seek to breach checkpoints and to block roads used by Israeli settlers and army.

(1) The future of the reconciliation agreement:

• A majority of 59% is optimistic about the chances that the reconciliation agreement will be implemented, but a similar majority (55%) expects the return of international financial sanctions after the establishment of a reconciliation government
• A plurality prefers Fayyad as prime minister and a majority wants the new government to follow the policies of the PA president and the PLO rather than the policy of Hamas
• The public is divided over the factors that led to the reconciliation agreement and half believes that both Fateh and Hamas emerged winners from the agreement

A majority of 59% believes that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement and in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 37% believe they will fail. But a majority of 55% expects the return of international boycott and financial sanctions after the formation of a new reconciliation government and 37% do not expect that. Perhaps to reduce the probability of such a development, a plurality prefers Abbas’ candidate for the prime minister position over Hamas’ candidate: In a choice between Salam Fayyad and Jamal Khodari, 45% of the public favors the former and only 22% favor the latter. 12% favor other candidates and 21% remain undecided. Perhaps for the same reason, a majority of 61% wants the new government of reconciliation to follow the peace policies and agendas of President Abbas and the PLO rather than Hamas’. Only 18% want the new government to follow the peace policy and agenda of Hamas.

Belief that the new government should follow the policies of Abbas and the PLO increases among supporters of the peace process (69%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (38%), among those who are “somewhat religious” (65%) compared to those who are “religious” (54%), among supporters of Fateh (89%) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%). Preference for Fayyad as the prime minister of the reconciliation government increases among men (49%) compared to women (41%), among the “somewhat religious” (50%) compared the “religious” (39%), among supporters of the peace process (45%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (17%), among supporters of Fateh (80%) compared to supporters of Hamas (10%) and supporters of third parties and those who remain undecided (51% each), and among holders of preparatory certificate and illiterates (48%) compared to college and university graduates (42%).  Half of the public (50%) says that both Fateh and Hamas came out winners from the reconciliation agreement, 12% say Hamas came out the winner, 11% say Fateh came out the winner, and 20% say neither came out a winner. 29% believe that the reason a reconciliation agreement was signed has to do with the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt while 27% believe it was the youth demonstrations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that was responsible for forcing the two sides to sign the agreement. Moreover, 21% believe the reason was the failure of negotiations with Israel while 12% believe it was the eruption of youth demonstrations against the Syrian regime.

(2) Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, performance of the governments of Fayyad and Haniyeh, and presidential and legislative elections

• Increase in the positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but positive evaluation of West Bank condition remains higher than that of the Gaza Strip
• Positive evaluation of freedom of the press in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip and the same is true in regard to ability of citizens to criticize the government without fear
• But perception of personal safety and security is higher among residents of the Gaza Strip than among residents of the West Bank
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas increases from 46% to 52%
• If new presidential elections where to take place today, Abbas would receive 54% of the popular vote and Haniyeh 38%; but if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter 33%
• If new legislative elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 28% of the participants’ vote and Fateh 42%. All third parties combined would receive 10% and the undecided stands at 19%
• Three quarters support Abbas’ decision annulling articles in the penal code whereby those accused of “family honor” killings are given light sentences
• 70% support Fateh’s decision to expel Dahlan from its ranks

25% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 47% describe them as bad or very bad. In our last poll, three months ago, in March 2011, 21% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 56% said they were bad or very bad. It is worth noting that a year ago, in June 2010, only 9% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good. Today, 37% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good and 29% describe them as bad or very bad. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 33% and 33% respectively. As can be seen in the following table, a year ago, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stood at 35%.

Table (1): Positive evaluation (good or very good) of conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

71% say there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank while only 60% say there is corruption in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip. These percentages are similar to those obtained three months ago. But 61% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank and 34% say there is no such freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 47% say there is, or there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip while 41% say there is no such freedom in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 31% say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 25% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These findings reflect an improvement in the situation in the Gaza Strip and a slight decline in the West Bank compared to where things stood three months ago. Since the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in June 2007, these percentages have witnessed gradual and significant decrease. As the table below shows, belief that people can criticize the authorities in the West Bank without fear stood at 56% while 52% believed that people can criticize the authorities without fear in the Gaza Strip. This is the first time since the split that we have seen an increase in the percentage of those who believe that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities there without fear. The change may be due to changing perceptions of Hamas’ behavior in the Gaza Strip after the signing of the reconciliation agreement.

Table (2): belief that people can criticize authorities in the West Bank or Gaza Strip without fear since the split between the two areas

Perception of safety and security stands at 56% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. This finding indicates a large increase in the perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip compared to March 2011 when it stood at 67%. The difference may reflect a perception change in light of the reconciliation agreement. Positive evaluation of the performance of the governments of Ismail Haniyeh stands at 39% and Salam Fayyad’s at 43%. Three months ago, these percentages stood at 31% and 39% respectively. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries stands at 40%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 26%. Three months ago, these figures stood at 37% and 21% respectively, which means that the signing of the reconciliation agreement, despite the public support, has nonetheless brought back concerns about international sanctions and boycott.

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 52% while 45% say they are dissatisfied with his performance. These percentages reflect an increase in the level of satisfaction with the performance of the president, which stood at 46% three months ago while the level of dissatisfaction stood at 51%. Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 55% in the West Bank. The increase in the percentage of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas may be an outcome of the signing of the reconciliation agreement.  If new presidential elections are held today, and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% and Haniyeh 38% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such election would reach 60%. In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives in this poll 51% and Haniyeh 44% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 56% and Haniyeh 34%. These results are similar to those obtained in our pervious poll three months ago. If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% and the latter would receive 33% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 67%. In the Gaza Strip, Barghouti receives 56% and Haniyeh 40% and in the West Bank Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 29%. These results are similar to those obtained three months ago.  Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice presidents from a list of five provided to respondents are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 27% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (22%), Salam Fayyad (17%) Mustafa Barghouti (9%) and Saeb Erekat (4%).  

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 28% say they would vote for Hamas and 42% say they would vote for Fateh, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. These results indicate an increase of two percentage points to each of Fateh and Hamas compared to our results three months ago. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip in this poll stands at 36 % and in the West Bank 24%. Vote for Fateh in the Gaza Strip is 43% and in the West Bank 42%.

Findings show that an overwhelming majority of 75% supports and 19% oppose PA president decision annulling articles in the penal code whereby those accused of “family honor” killings are given light sentences. 70% support and 21% oppose the decision by Fateh’s Central Committee to expel Mohammad Dahlan from Fateh and transferring his file to the Attorney General’s office. Support for the decision is similar in the West Bank (71%) and the Gaza Strip (68%) but opposition to the decision increases to 28% in the Gaza Strip and drops to 17% in the West Bank. Moreover, support for the decision is higher among supporters of Hamas (90%) compared to supporters of Fateh (58%). 61% believe that differences of opinion within Fateh regarding Dahlan reflect big and serious disagreement within the movement while 33% believe they reflect a minor disagreement.  Differences of opinion that erupted within Hamas after the signing of the reconciliation agreement reflect big and serious disagreement within the movement in the views of 42% of the public while 48% believe that they reflect minor disagreements.  

(3) Palestinian attitudes and expectations towards September

• 65% support going to the UN to seek recognition of Palestinian statehood despite American warning not to do so
• If Palestinians go to the UN General Assembly, 57% believe they will obtain recognition of their state from two thirds of the members, but 76% believe the US will use its veto power in the Security Council
• 48% believe that Palestine will become a UN member in September and 44% do not believe so
• Two thirds expect Israeli occupation to become harsher in response to the UN vote
• The public is split over the best means of forcing Israel to end its occupation: about a third believes in armed attacks, another third believes in peaceful resistance, and 26% believe negotiation is the answer
• 76% want the PA to exercise sovereignty in September including the opening of highways, an airport, and the deployment of security forces in area (C) and 75% want Palestinian sovereignty over the Allenby crossing with Jordan even if such step leads to the closure of the crossing
• 52% say they will participate in peaceful demonstrations that would seek to breach checkpoints and block roads after the UN recognition of the state of Palestine
• A majority of 58% believes that most of the European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September; despite this, a similar percentage believes that the position of the EU member states is closer to the Israeli position

President Obama stated that it would be a mistake for the Palestinians to go to the UN in September to obtain recognition for their state. Despite the Obama statement, 65% of the Palestinians believe the PA should go to the UN in September and 31% believe it should not. Support for going to the UN despite the American warning is higher among supporters of the peace process (71%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (51%), among supporters of Fateh (75%) compared to supporters of Hamas (61%), and among university and college graduates (70%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (58%).

A majority of 57% of the Palestinians believes that if the Palestinians turn to the UN General Assembly for recognition of a Palestinian state, they will succeed in obtaining a two thirds majority; 36% of the Palestinians believe they will not succeed. A majority of Palestinians also believes that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 76% of the Palestinians think so, while 18% think that the US will not use its veto power. Palestinians are split with regard to the question whether a state of Palestine will become a UN member in September: 48% of the Palestinians think this will happen while 44% do not believe so.

Two thirds believe that if the UN recognizes the state of Palestine, Israel will respond by making the occupation worse and by increasing settlement building while 18% think Israel will do nothing and the status quo will prevail. 13% of the Palestinians think conditions in the occupied territories will become a little better.  We asked Palestinians how they think Palestinians can force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state. Palestinians are split: 34% think armed attacks on army and settlers, 32% think peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw, and 26% of the Palestinians think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw.

The preference for peaceful resistance increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (28%). But support for armed resistance is also higher in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (32%). In the West Bank, support for negotiations stands at 30% while in the Gaza Strip it stands at 17%. Support for peaceful resistance increases among men (36%) compared to women (29%), among supporters of third parties (42%) the undecided (38%) and supporters of Fateh (33%) compared to supporters of Hamas (24%). Among supporters of Hamas, preference for armed resistance is high, standing at 55%, while this percentage stands at 27% among supporters of Fateh, 23% among supporters of third parties, and 21% among the undecided. Support for peaceful resistance increases among students (40%) compared to housewives (25%), and among users of the internet (36%) compared to those who do not use the internet (29%).

We asked Palestinians what they think the PA should do after the UN recognizes the Palestinian state in September. 76% think the PA president and government should enforce Palestinian sovereignty over all the territories of the West Bank, for example by opening roads in area C, start building an airport in  the Jordan valley, and deploy Palestinian security forces in area C even if this leads to confrontations with the Israeli army and settlers. 20% think the PA should not do that. Similarly, 75% think the PA should insist on assuming control over the Allenby Bridge terminal from the Israeli side even if this leads to the closure of the terminal. 20% think the PA should not do that. Support for the exercise of sovereignty at the Allenby Bridge crossing even if such a step leads to the closure of the crossing is almost identical in the West Bank (75%) and the Gaza Strip (76%). Similarly, support for the exercise of sovereignty in area (C), including the opening of roads and the deployment of security forces, is almost identical in the West Bank (75%) and the Gaza Strip (77%).

A majority of 58% of the Palestinians think that most European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September, while 37% think that most European countries will not recognize it. A majority of Palestinians (56%) thinks the position of the EU countries regarding the peace process is closer to the Israeli position.

After the UN recognition of a Palestinian state, if large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in order to break through check points and close Israeli army and settlers' roads, 52% of the Palestinians say they think they will participate in them and 46% say they think they will not. Willingness to participate in peaceful demonstrations increases among residents of villages and towns in the West Bank (62%) and refugee camps (55%) compared to cities (48%), among men (59%) compared to women (45%), among supporters of third parties (71%) and supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fateh (58%) and the undecided (54%), among those who intend to participate in future elections (60%) compared to those who do not intend to participate in future elections (36%). It also increases among students (60%) compared to housewives (42%), among college and university graduates (59%) compared to illiterates and those with elementary education (48%), and among those who use the internet (57%) compared to those who do not use it (48%).

A majority of 51% of the Palestinians thinks that if such large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, they would contribute to speeding the process of ending Israeli occupation. But a majority of Palestinians (64%) does not think that if a peaceful popular revolt, like in Egypt or Tunisia, were to erupt against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank it would be capable of ending occupation; 34% of Palestinians think it would be capable of ending occupation. It is worth mentioning that an overwhelming majority of 89% of the Palestinians sympathizes with the demonstrators against the Assad regime in Syria and 90% sympathize with the demonstrators against the regime in Yemen.

(4) The Peace Process

• 50% support and 46% oppose the Obama proposal to consider the 1967 borders with mutually agreed swaps to be the basis for setting borders of Palestine, but two thirds oppose Obama’s proposal to the have the state non militarized
• 51% support and 47% oppose Obama’s proposal calling for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as a Palestinian state
• A majority of 61% opposes Obama’s call for the Palestinians to return to direct negotiations without a settlement freeze or an Israeli acceptance of the principle of the 1967 borders with swaps
• 88% believe the US position as outlined in the Obama speech is closer to the Israeli position while 8% see it closer to the Palestinian position
• 63% believe that it is Israel that determines US policy regarding the peace process and 32% believe it is the US that determines the Israeli position
• 58% support and 38% oppose the Saudi Initiative
• 62% believe the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years to be low or non existence and 37% believe it to be high or medium
• Perception of threat among Palestinians is very high: 81% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to annex the West Bank and expel its inhabitants or deny them their political rights. Moreover, 70% are worried that they or members of their family would be hurt by Israelis

A majority of 50% of Palestinians supports President Obama’s call for a Palestinian state within the 1967 lines with territorial swaps; 46% oppose it. With regard to the security issues, Palestinians oppose Obama’s proposal that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized, it will have no airplanes, tanks, missiles, or any other heavy armaments, and the Israeli army would carry out a full and phased withdrawal from the Palestinian state. 66% of the Palestinians disagree with this principle, and only 31% support it.  President Obama also said that a permanent peace should be based on the principle of two states for two peoples, the state of Israel as a Jewish state and a homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people, each would have the right to self determination, mutual recognition, and peace. 51% of the Palestinians support this principle, while 47% oppose it.

Support for Obama’s call for the 1967 borders with swaps to be the terms of reference for setting the borders of the Palestinian state increases in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among city residents (53%) compared to residents of villages and towns (40%), among men (52%) compared to women (48%), among the “somewhat religious” (52%) compared to the “religious” (47%), among supporters of the peace process (55%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (34%), among supporters of Fateh (63%) compared to supporters of Hamas (39%), and among those whose age is 40 or higher (53%) compared to those whose age is between 18-28 (49%).

President Obama also called upon the Palestinians to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government, even though Prime Minister Netanyahu declared during his stay in Washington DC that Israel will not freeze settlement construction and refuses to accept the principle of returning to the lines of 1967 with swaps. 61% of the Palestinians think they should not accept the call to return to negotiations.  In light of President Obama’s speech, a majority of 88% of the Palestinians thinks the US position is closer to the Israeli position, while only 8% think it is closer to the Palestinian position.  Considering the two speeches by Obama and Netanyahu during Netanyahu's visit to the US, we asked Palestinians whom they think decide what the other should do regarding the peace process. 63% said Israel decides what the US should do and 32% said the US decides what Israel should do. 2% said neither decides what the other should do.

58% of the Palestinians support the Saudi initiative and 38% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. Inreturn, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our March 2011 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan.

A majority of 62% of Palestinians regards the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years as non-existent or low, 30% regard these chances as medium, and only 6% regard these chances as high. Moreover, 70% are worried and 30% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.  The level of perceived threat regarding the aspirations of Israel in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 21% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital is the most vital Palestinian goal in the eyes of 48% of the public while 26% believe that the most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return
• The primary problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty followed by the continuation of the Israeli occupation and settlement construction, corruption, and the continued siege over the Gaza Strip

The largest percentage (48%) believes that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 26% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The largest percentage (40%) believes that the second most vital Palestinian goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages. 25% believe that the second goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, 19% believe that the second goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 16% believe the second most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 36% of the public while 30% believe that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 18% believe it to be the corruption in some public institutions, and 11% believe it to be the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings. Only 2% mentioned the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split which was mentioned by 28% in our previous poll in March 2011. It is clear that the signing of the reconciliation agreement and the belief of the majority that the agreement will indeed be implemented has removed this issue from among the list of main problems as perceived by the public......Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-8 September 2018. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the convening of the PLO Central Council, the launch of an indirect Hamas-Israel negotiations for a long term quiet or tahdia, the resumption of Egyptian efforts to reconcile Fatah and Hamas and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the US decision to stop all financial contributions to UNRWA and to suspend most aid to the PA, the Israeli adoption of a controversial nation-state law, and a leaked statement that President Abbas has reported that the Trump peace team had sought his views on the idea of Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. Moreover, this month of September coincides with the 25^th anniversary of the Oslo agreement. This press release addresses all these issues and covers other matters such as parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The poll examines internal Palestinian conditions and those related to Israeli-Palestinian relations and Palestinian-American relations. Findings of the third quarter indicate a decline in the popularity of both Fatah and Hamas compared to our findings three months ago. The decline might be attributed to the tense power struggle between the two movements that was in clear display during the past two months in the aftermath of the failed reconciliation efforts and a pointless quarrel over who has the right to negotiate a long term quiet, tahdia, or cessation of violence in the Gaza Strip, Hamas or the PA and what comes first, reconciliation or tahdia.  Findings show that more than 60% of the public want president Abbas to resign and that the public disagrees with some of the most important domestic policies of the Palestinian president. An overwhelming majority 

opposes his decision to cut the salaries of PA employees in the Gaza Strip; two-thirds oppose his demand to disarm armed groups in the Strip; and a majority is opposed to his demand that Hamas hand over full control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government. Moreover, a majority opposes Abbas’ position that tahdia between Hamas and Israel is the business of the PA and the PLO rather than that of Hamas. Indeed, a majority of the public supports Hamas’ efforts to reach an agreement with Israel on a long term Tahdia even in the absence of reconciliation. A larger percentage places the blame for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip on the president and the reconciliation government rather than on Hamas. Indeed, about half of the public believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people rather than an asset.

The public shows support for the convening of the PLO Central Council’s session in Ramallah last month and criticizes those factions that boycotted the meeting. Large majorities support the decisions taken by the Central Council regarding the suspension of Palestinian recognition of Israel, ending security coordination with the Israeli security services, and stopping all measures taken against PA employees in the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, the majority has no confidence that the Palestinian leadership will implement any of these decisions.

In exploring attitudes regarding the peace process, we examined issues like public perception of the two-state and the one-state solutions, a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, and attitudes toward the Oslo agreement. Findings show that a majority is opposed to the concept of two-state solution when that solution is presented without any description or details. But a majority supports that solution when it is defined as the creation of a Palestinian state along side the state of Israel on the basis of 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital. Only a quarter prefers a one-state solution, one in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equality in all issues, over a two-state solution. Findings show that two-thirds of the public are opposed to the idea of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation that, according to Abbas, was proposed by the US peace team. Furthermore, a larger majority of three quarters is opposed to a trilateral confederation between Palestine, Jordan and Israel. The great opposition to the Palestinian-Jordanian confederation is probably due to lack of trust in the US team and due to a Palestinian suspicion that the idea aims at preempting the goal of establishing a Palestinian state. Previous PSR findings during the past decade show support for such an idea exceeding 40%. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Oslo agreement, two thirds of the public indicate that the agreement had damaged Palestinian national interests; indeed, almost three quarters of the public believe that the situation today is worse than the pre-Oslo conditions. This of course does not mean that the public wants the return to Israeli occupation; rather, it seems that public is comparing conditions before and after Oslo in several other dimensions such as the multiplication of the size of settlement enterprise, the current split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and conflict between Fatah and Hamas, the ending of the first intifada by Oslo and the absence today of any similar popular movement to end the Israeli occupation, that on-going security coordination with Israel despite the diminished chances for peace, and public belief that the Palestinian political system is becoming more and more authoritarian and lacking any accountability.

Finally, in light of the deterioration in relations between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration, the US termination of most of its aid to the PA, and the US cancelation of its contributions to UNRWA, we asked the public about re-engagement with the US, the views on the “Deal of the Century,” and the chances that the US would succeed in ending UNRWA’s work. Findings show that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US or a return to negotiations with Israel. In fact, 90% expressed the belief that the US is biased in favor of Israel. Half of the public want the Palestinain leadership to reject the US “Deal of the Century” out of hand even before seeing it because it will certainly be bad for Palestinians while only a small minority of 14% thinks that the leadership sould accept the plan because it will certainly be better than the status quo. A majority believes that the Trump Administration will fail in its efforts to end the work of UNRWA but half is worried that if the US does succeed the outcome could contribute to ending the refugee issue.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 54% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip.
• If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah and Mustafa Barghouti are selected by 4% each, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad and Saeb Erikat by 2% each.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 35% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 42% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% and the latter 45% of the vote (compared to 47% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 40% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 27% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 28% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 21% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 43% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%. And, now that most US aid to the PA has been cut by the US Administration, an overwhelming majority of 77% is worried that the cut in aid could lead to increased unemployment and poverty and a deterioration in daily living conditions while 20% are not worried.
• In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (43%) blames the PA, president Abbas, and the reconciliation government; 24% blame Hamas, 8% blame Egypt, and 17% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 60% of Gazans, compared to 32% of West Bankers, blame the PA, Abbas and the reconciliation government; and 27% of Gazans, compared to 22% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 45%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 48%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 51% and in the West Bank at 52%.
• One third of the public says it wants to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to half and declines in the West Bank to 22%.
• Only 35% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 59% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.
• In light of repeated reports on finding and destroying narcotics plantations in West Bank areas, we asked the public about the implications of these reports: 57% said that it indicates a recent rise in planting narcotics while 36% believe that it means that the PA security services are becoming more able and more effective in fighting narcotics.
• Half of the public (50%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Maan TV (at 14%), Al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (13% each), Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (at 12%), Al Arabiya (at 5%) and al Mayadeen and al Quds TV (4% each).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• 22% are satisfied and 67% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 30%.
• 28% optimistic and 65% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%.
• The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 31% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 62% disagrees. Three months ago, 40% said they agreed with Abbas.
• When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, two-thirds (66%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 28% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans.
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (81%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 16% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 84% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.   

4) Israel-Hamas long-term tahdia, or truce, negotiations 

• A majority of 55% supports and 38% oppose a Hamas-Israel long-term tahdia, or cessation of violence, even in the absence of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The agreement would entail the opening of the border crossing with Egypt and access to a seaport and an airport in a neighboring area in return for a Hamas enforcement of a long-term ceasefire as well as ending the Return Marches and the incendiary kites. Support for this long-term cessation of violence is higher in the Gaza Strip (63%) than in the West Bank (50%).
• The public is divided in its assessment of the probable consequences of such long-term agreement in the absence of reconciliation: 46% believe that it could transform the current split into a permanent separation leading to the establishment of an independent political entity in the Gaza Strip, while 44% believe no such separation would come out of that long-term agreement.
• Nonetheless, if permanent separation occurs, 40% believe that Hamas will be seen as more responsible for such development than any other Palestinian faction because it negotiated with Israel and agreed to a long-term cessation of violence without the participation of the PA and the Palestinian leadership. A similar percentage (38%) believes that the PA leadership will be seen as more responsible for that development because it imposed sanctions on the Gaza Strip and did not offer the needed concessions to facilitate reconciliation.

5) Decisions of the Palestinian Central Council of the PLO

• A majority of 54% disagrees with the decision of various factions to boycott the latest meeting of the PLO’s Central Council in Ramallah and believe it was a wrong decision while 30% think it was the right decision.  A similar percentage (53%) believes that the boycott has damaged the legitimacy of the Central Council while a third believes it has not done that.
• Two thirds (66%) support and 26% oppose the Central Council’s decision to suspend Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel until Israel recognizes the state of Palestine. But a majority of 52% believes that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and 35% believe it will implement it.
• Similarly, 68% support and 25% oppose the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel; but more than two-thirds (69%) believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 21% believe it will.
• Moreover, 76% support and 18% oppose the Central Council’s decision to immediately stop all measures taken against PA employees in the Gaza Strip; but 50% of the public believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 37% believe it will.

6) Palestinian-Jordanian confederation

• We asked the public about the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation in the context of the statement made by president Abbas regarding an offer made by the US peace team and in light of Abbas’ statement that the he favors a trilateral confederation that includes Palestine, Jordan, and Israel. About two-thirds rejected and 29% accepted a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.
• When asked about the trilateral confederation, Palestine, Jordan, and Israel, 75% rejected it and 18% accepted it.

7) 25 years after Oslo

• Twenty-five years after the signing of the Oslo agreement, we asked the public to tell us, based on personal experience, or based on what it had heard or read, if conditions today are better or worse than conditions before Oslo. Almost three quarter (73%) said conditions today are worse than those prevailing before Oslo; 13% said conditions today are better; and 10% said conditions today are the same as those before Oslo.
• We also asked the public about the most important reason for the failure of the Oslo agreement. More than one third (36%) said that Israel’s refusal to end its occupation and stop settlement construction was the main reason for the failure; 35% said that the lack of pressure on Israel from the international community was the main reason for the failure; and 27% said that it was the fault of the Palestinians themselves. In particular, the Palestinian contribution to the failure was divided as follows: 11% said the PA did not build strong public institutions that fights corruption and enforce the rule of law; 9% said that Fatah sought an exclusive control over that excluded the other factions; 6% said that Hamas and Islamic Jehad violated the agreement and carried out armed attacks against the Israelis; and 2% put the blame on the second intifada and the bombing attacks that targeted the Israelis.
• We asked the public to assess the impact of Oslo on Palestinian national interests: two thirds (65%) said it damaged the national interest, 16% said it served the national interest, and 16% said it neither damaged nor served the national interest.

8) The peace process

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 47% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, 43% supported this concept.
• Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 53% said they prefer the two-state solution, 24% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 14% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.”
• A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 41% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 40% of the public while 30% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation” and 12% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance.” A small minority of 14% prefer to keep the status quo.
• A large minority of 39% thinks that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while a third (33%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means and 21% think non-violent resistance is the most effective.
• An overwhelming majority of 78% say they are worried that in their daily life they would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 22% say they are worried.
• Three quarter (74%) say that the newly issued Israeli “nation state” law poses a threat to the rights and interests of Israeli Arabs and 84% believe that the passing of this law will lead to an increase in settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
• 80% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its problems and internal conflicts and that Palestine is not its primary cause; 19% believe that Palestine remains the primary cause of the Arab World. Moreover, 69% believe that an alliance already exists between Sunni Arabs and Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation; 22% disagrees with this assessment.
• 57% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 18% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 76% support joining more international organizations; 65% support popular non-violence resistance; 46% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 29% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis.
• On the occasion of the International Day of Peace we asked the public about its expectations regarding the impact of a Palestinian-Israeli peace, when reached, on their living conditions. The largest percentage (45%) said it will improve its living conditions; 17% said it will worsen their living conditions; and 34% said peace will have no impact on their living conditions.

9) American-Palestinian relations, the “Deal of the Century,” and the future of UNRAWA

• A majority of 62% is opposed and 27% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Moreover, 58% want the PA to reject US efforts to make it negotiate with Israel; 37% support the resumption of negotiations with Israel.
• Half of the public believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 31% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 14% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo.
• 90% of the public believe that if negotiations with Israel resumed under sponsorship of the Trump Administration, the US will be biased in favor of Israel and 6% think the US will be an honest broker.
• In light of US cut of most aid to the PA, we asked the public if it would be better if the PA changed its policy to insure continued US aid: 62% said they want the PA to maintain its current policies and 31% said they want the PA to change its current policies to please the Americans.
• When we asked the public about its expectations from the PA leadership regarding US pressure, 49% said the PA will indeed change its policy and 43% said it does not expect the PA to change its policy.
• We also asked the public about the US cancelation of its aid to UNRWA and what might happen if the US succeeds in shutting down this UN agency: 49% said that if UNRWA is closed down, the refugees’ cause will suffer and 46% said such a development will not end the refugee cause.
• When asked about the chances for a US success in shutting down UNRWA, 55% said the US will not succeed and 37% said it will succeed.
• When asked to speculate about the reasons that the US had the nerve to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem and to wage a campaign against UNRWA, 48% of the public said it was the weakness of and divisions in the Arab World, 28% said it was the result of the weakness of and divisions among the Palestinians, and 23% said it was due to the personality of Trump himself.

(10) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 27% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.