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28-30 March 2013

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 28-30 March 2013. The  period before the poll witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government and a visit by the US president to Israel and Palestine. The period also witnessed the development of a new form of popular resistance against settlements through the establishment of tent encampments in areas threatened by settlement expansion. Reconciliation efforts between Fatah and Hamas failed to make progress despite the fact that the election commission has completed its voter registration campaign in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This press release covers public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today. It also covers issues related to the peace process, Obama’s visit, and Palestinian options in the confrontation against occupation. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2013 indicate a return to pre Gaza war balance between Fatah and Hamas. The popularity of Hamas and Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minister of the dismissed government, drops and Fatah’s popularity and that of president Abbas rises. Last December, the Gaza war gave Hamas and Haniyeh greater credibility and popularity while decreasing that of Fatah and Abbas. Yet, positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip remains higher than positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank. Moreover, perception of safety and security remains higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government is much higher than the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government. Nonetheless, about half of Gazans say they would like to immigrate from the Strip while a little over a quarter of West Bankers say they wish to immigrate.

Findings also indicate a dramatic reversal in the level of optimism regarding the chances for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Indeed, about half of the public believes that a successful reconciliation and reunification requires regime change in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or at least in one of the two areas. Furthermore, two-thirds to three-quarters believe that reconciliation is impossible under current conditions in which restrictions are imposed on the freedoms of supporters of Fatah or Hamas or in which no date is set for new elections.

Finally, findings indicate continued pessimism regarding the chances for reviving the peace process in the aftermath of the Obama visit. An overwhelming majority believes that president Obama will not succeed in pressing Israel to freeze settlement construction. Perhaps due to these conclusions, the percentage of those who say that their feelings toward president Obama have changed to the worse is four times higher than the percentage of those who say their feelings have changed to the better.  Given the promised US financial assistance to the PA, a clear majority believes that this support will not be sufficient to resolve the PA’s financial problem but a majority believes that such support might in fact deter the PA from fighting Israel in the international arena including at the International Criminal Court.

(1) Presidential, Legislative, and Local Elections:

• Abbas defeats Haniyeh in a presidential election by 52% to 41%
• Barghouti wins against Haniyeh, 60% to 33%
• In a three way presidential elections, Barghouti receives 38%, Haniyeh 31%, and Abbas 26%
• In a parliamentary election, Hamas wins 29% Fateh 41%, all others combined 11%, and 20% say they have not decided yet

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive the vote of 52% and Haniyeh 41% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 62%. Three months ago, Abbas received the support of 45% and Haniyeh 48%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 53% and Haniyeh 44% and in the West Bank Abbas receives 52% and Haniyeh 39%. If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 60% and the latter would receive 33% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 69%. In our December poll Barghouti received 51% of the vote and Haniyeh 42%.

If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (38%) followed by Haniyeh (31%), and Abbas (26%). The rate of participation in this case would reach 73%. In our previous poll last September, Barghouti received 29%, Haniyeh 39%, and Abbas 27%.  

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 71% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 41% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 33% and in the West Bank at 27%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 42% and in the West Bank at 40%. These results indicate an increase in Fatah’s popularity compared to our December results when it stood at 36% (38% in the Gaza Strip and 34% in the West Bank). By contrast, Hamas’ popularity dropped six percentage points in the combined West Bank and the Gaza Strip.   

(2) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 32% and in the West Bank 29%
• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 78% and belief that corruption exists in the institutions of the dismissed government in the Gaza Strip stands at 64%
• 21% believe that there is press freedom in the West Bank and 16% believe there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip
• Percentage of safety and security stands at 54% among West Bank residents and 67% among residents of the Gaza Strip
• 49% of Gazans and 27% of West Bankers want to immigrate to other countries
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government stands at 40% and the positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government stands at 25%, and satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 49%

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip drops from 43% three months ago to 32% in this poll while 40% say conditions are bad or very bad. Similarly, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank drops from 35% three months ago to 29% in this poll while 44% say conditions are bad or very bad.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions in the West Bank stands at 78% in this poll compared to 74% three months ago. Perception of corruption in the public institutions of Hamas’ Gaza government stands at 64% compared to 53% three months ago. 

21% say there is, and 44% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 16% say there is, and 35% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  Similarly, 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 25% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. These results indicate a decrease in the perception of freedom to criticize authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip compared to results obtained three months ago.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 54% and in the Gaza Strip at 67%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 70% in the Gaza Strip and 60% in the West Bank. Yet, despite the high level of safety perception in the Gaza Strip, findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 49%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 27%. Last December these percentages stood at 41% and 22% respectively. 

Positive evaluation of the performance of the Haniyeh government drops sharply from 56% three months ago to 40% in this poll and positive evaluation of the performance of the Fayyad government drops also from 34% to 25% during the same period. Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas drops from 54% three months ago to 49% in this poll. Dissatisfaction with the president performance stands today at 49% compared to 44% three months ago.  

(3)Reconciliation:

• Belief that unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be restored soon drops to 18%
• 37% say that ending the split requires regime change in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• About three quarters believe that reconciliation will not succeed under current conditions in which freedoms are restricted for Hamas members in the West Bank and Fatah members in the Gaza Strip

In the absence of visible progress in the Fateh-Hamas reconciliation dialogue, percentage of optimism about the chances for reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip drops sharply from 39% three months ago to 18% in this poll. Moreover, the belief that unity is impossible and that two separate entities will emerge increases from 18% to 33% during the same period. Gazans (34%) and West Bankers (33%) are similar in their expectations that unity will not return. That expectation however increases among men (39%) compared to women (27%), among those who oppose the peace process (46%) compared to those who support the peace process (27%), among supporters of third parties-- parties other than Fatah and Hamas (41%) compared to supporters of Fatah and Hamas (31% and 27% respectively), and among merchants, professionals, employees, and students (45%, 44%, 38%, and 36% respectively) compared to housewives and farmers (23% and 33% respectively).

Findings show that 37% say that ending the split requires regime change in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 12% say it requires regime change in the Gaza Strip only and an identical percentage believes that it requires regime change in the West Bank. Only 34% say that restoring unity does not require regime change in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. The belief than ending the split requires regime change in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is slightly higher among Gazans (39%) compared to West Bankers (36%). It is also higher among residents of refugee camps (48%) compared to residents of villages and cities (36% and 35% respectively), among those who identify themselves as somewhat religious (38%) compared to those who identify themselves as religious (34%), among those who oppose the peace process (44%) compared to those who support the peace process (34%), among supporters of third parties and those who do not support any of the parties (50% and 44% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah and Hamas (29% and 24% respectively), among men (39%) compared to women (34%), among refugees (40%) compared to non-refugees (34%), among professionals, retirees, employees, and students (48%, 41%, 39%, and 37% respectively) compared to farmers, housewives, and laborers (31%, 33%, and 34% respectively).

We asked respondents about conditions under which they believe reconciliation cannot succeed. About three quarters (74%) believes that reconciliation will not succeed without first ending the restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Hamas in the West Bank and a similar percentage (72%) believes that it will not succeed without ending restrictions on freedoms enjoyed by supporters of Fatah in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 66% say it will not succeed without first agreeing on an election date; 61% say it will not succeed if Hamas continues to reject agreements signed by the PLO with Israel; 58% say it will not succeed if security coordination with Israel in the West Bank continues; another 58% say it will not succeed if the PA continues to recognize Israel and the Oslo agreements; and 49% say it will not succeed as along as Hamas insists on keeping its al Qassam armed wing in the Gaza Strip.

The belief that reconciliation cannot succeed if Hamas insists on keeping its armed wing in the Gaza Strip increases in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (43%), in refugee camps (63%) compared to cities and villages (49% and 41% respectively), among the somewhat religious (52%) compared to the religious (44%), among supporters of Fatah and those who support none of the parties (57% and 54% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (35% and 39% respectively), among men (52%) compared to women (47%), among the retirees, merchants, and laborers (64%, 58% and 56% respectively) compared to farmers, students and housewives (37%, 44%, and 46% respectively).

By contrast, the belief that reconciliation cannot succeed if security coordination with the Israeli security services continues increases among Gazans (63%) compared to West Bankers (55%), among residents of refugee camps and cities (62% and 59% respectively) compared to residents of villages (53%), among the religious (60%) compared to the somewhat religious (56%), among those who oppose the peace process (75%) compared to those who support the peace process (50%), among Hamas supporters, supporters of third parties, and those who support none of the parties (67%, 66%, and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (48%), among men (65%) compared to women (51%), among retirees, merchants, and professionals (71%, 68%, and 65% respectively) compared to housewives, farmers, and laborers (50%, 53%, and 58% respectively).

4) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that the most vital Palestinian goal should be the ending of Israeli occupation and the building of a Palestinian state and 31% say it should be to obtain the right of return.
• 28% believe that the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment and 26% say it is the absence of national unity

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% of the public while 26% say it is the absence of national unity due to the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, 22% believe the most serious problem is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities, 15% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 7% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.

5) The Peace Process:

• 55% support the two-state solution but 56% believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction
• 29% support a one-state solution and 70% oppose it
• 71% are worried that they or members of their family would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished and 59% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to expel Arabs from the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River
• 64% believe that the goal of the PA and the PLO is to recover all or part of the land occupied by Israel in 1967
• 63% support popular non-violent resistance, 40% support an armed intifada, and 40% support dissolving the PA

55% support and 44% oppose a two-state solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel. But 56% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion and 41% think that it remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel during the next five years are low or non-existent while 31% believe the chances are medium or high.  Nonetheless, only 29% support a one-state solution based on equality for Arabs and Jews and 70% oppose it. Moreover, 55% support the Saudi (Arab) Peace Initiative but only 42% support and 56% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.

Findings show that 71% are worried and 28% are not worried that they or members of their families would be hurt by Israelis or their land confiscated or homes demolished. Similarly, 59% believe that Israel’s long term goal is to expand its borders to include all territories between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel their Palestinian population, 21% believe that Israel’s aim is to annex all occupied territories while denying Palestinians their political rights. 18% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to withdraw from all or parts of the 1967-occupied territories after ensuring its security.  By contrast, when asked about the long term goal of the PLO and the PA, 64% said that it is to  recover all or some of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, 15% said it is to defeat Israel and recover the 1948 territories, and 11% said it is to defeat Israel and destroy its Jewish population.  

63% support a resort to popular non-violent resistance and 71% believe, and 26% do not believe, that creating facts on the ground, such as the placement of tent encampments in area C, would be an effective means of confronting settlement expansion and protecting land threatened by settlers. By contrast, 40% support a return to an armed intifada and an identical percentage supports the dissolution of the PA.

6) Obama’s Visit:

• 55% believe that the Obama Administration will not succeed in reviving the peace process
• 29% say that their feelings toward president Obama have become worse after his last visit to the region and 8% say their feelings have become better
• 62% believe that the PA is unable to fight Israel in international forums as long as it dependent on the US financial support

In the aftermath of Obama’s visit to Israel and the Palestinian territories, a majority of 55% believes that the US administration will not succeed in reviving the peace process and bringing the two sides to the negotiating table. 42% believe it will succeed in that goal. Moreover, 70% believe that the American administration will not succeed in pressuring Israel to freeze settlement construction and 28% believe it will succeed in that.

The public is split regarding the preferred role for the US in the peace process: 45% want a stronger US role and 46% want to see the US out of the peace process. In June 2010, two thirds (66%) wanted a stronger US role and only 27% wanted the US out of the process. But in March 2011, after the US used its veto power to block a UN Security Council resolution condemning settlements, 69% said they opposed a larger US role in the peace process and only 27% said they supported a larger US role. Moreover, in the aftermath of Obama’s visit to Israel and Palestine, 29% say their feelings for president Obama have changed to the worse while only 8% say their feelings have turned to the better. 61% said their feelings did not change.

Despite the US announcement that it will release US$500 million to the PA, a large majority of 71% does not believe such financial support will end the PA’s financial crisis. However, 62% believe that the PA will now be deterred from confronting Israel at the international arena, including at the International Criminal Court, since it has to rely so much on US financial support.  The perception that the PA will now be deterred from confronting Israel at international forums due to Palestinian high dependence on US financial support increases among West Bankers (66%) compared to Gazans (57%), among residents of cities and villages (63% and 62% respectively) compared to residents of refugee camps (55%), among the religious (66%) compared to the somewhat religious (61%), among those who oppose the peace process (69%) compared to those who support the peace process (59%), among Hamas supporters (72%) compared to Fatah supporters, supporters of third parties and supporters of the none of the parties (54%, 60%, and 61% respectively), among men (66%) compared to women (59%), among non-refugees (66%) compared to refugees (58%), and among farmers, merchants, and laborers (83%, 75%, and 69% respectively) compared to retirees and students (32% and 52% respectively). ...Full Report

10-12 December 2009   

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 10 and 12 December 2009. The poll was conducted after four major developments that affected public perception during the last four months since our last poll in the second week of August 2009: the decision by President Abbas early in this period to postpone a vote on the Goldstone Report and his subsequent decision to reverse it, Hamas’s decision in October not to sign the reconciliation agreement submitted by Egypt and signed by Fateh, the Hamas decision in late October to prevent the election commission from preparing for elections in the Gaza Strip, and finally, the decision by Abbas in November not to run in the next Palestinian presidential elections. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2009 show a limited improvement in the standing of president Mahmud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, but the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas remains as it was four months ago. Moreover, contrary to expectations, the majority of the public does not blame Hamas for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or for the failure to hold national elections. In fact, findings show that a majority of Palestinians blames both Fateh and Hamas together for the continued split and a majority supports Hamas’s decision not to hold elections before securing reconciliation. It is likely that the popularity of Fateh and Abbas has deteriorated considerably right after the eruption of the crisis over the Goldstone Report when a vote on the report was postponed by Abbas. But Hamas’s refusal to sign the proposed reconciliation agreement and its subsequent decision to prevent the election commission from conducting preparations for elections in the Gaza Strip redressed the imbalance caused by the Goldstone Report crisis.  It is also likely that the minor improvement in Abbas’s standing is the result of his decision not to run in the next elections as findings do not show an increase in satisfaction with his actual performance as president. The improvement in Fayyad’s standing might be the result of the increased public perception of safety and security in the West Bank as evidenced by the current findings.

Findings also show widespread support for the two-state solution, reaching about two thirds, while support for the one-state solution does not exceed fifth of the respondents. But the overwhelming majority believes the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are slim or non existent. Perhaps for this reason findings show two-thirds opposed to return to negotiations with Israel before the implementation of a comprehensive freeze on settlement construction including in East Jerusalem despite the fact that the overwhelming majority believes that Israel will never agree to this freeze. In the absence of negotiations, Palestinians are divided on the alternatives, with none receiving a consensus or even a majority support. But a plurality supports a return to armed intifada while smaller percentages select other alternatives such as the resort to non violent resistance, a unilateral declaration of statehood, or going to the UN Security Council.

(1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• 57% support and 36% oppose Abbas’s decision not to run in the next elections, but 58% believe he will withdraw his decision and run
• 25% say Hamas is responsible for the failure to hold elections,11% blame Fateh, 30% blame Israel, and 9% blame the election commission
• 61% believe that Hamas and Fateh together are responsible for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 17% blame Hamas alone and 12% blame Fateh
• 61% see the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the top most important Palestinian goal, while 22% believe the continued quite with Israel and the opening of the Gaza crossings is the top goal, and 16% say the top goal is the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip
• If new presidential elections took place today, Abbas would receive 54% and Ismail Haniyeh 38%. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 67% and the latter 28%.
• The most popular figures as possible vice presidents are Marwan Barghouti (30%), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Mustapha Barghouti and Salam Fayyad (13% each), and Saeb Erekat (7%)
• If new parliamentary elections in which all factions participate were to take place today, Fateh receives 43%, Hamas 27%, all other lists combined 14%, and 17% say they are undecided
• 9% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good while 31% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good
• Perception of personal and family safety and security increases in the West Bank to 63% and in the Gaza Strip to 65%
• Satisfaction with the performance of Haniyeh’s government reaches 34% and with Fayyad’s government 40%

57% support Abbas’s decision not to run in the next presidential elections and 36% oppose it. Findings show that the greater the desire to vote for Abbas in the next elections, the greater the opposition to his decision. About 70% of those who intend to vote for him if he nominates himself oppose his decision not to run in the next elections while 27% of them support it.  Moreover, support for Abbas’s decision increases among those opposed to the peace process (75%) compared to those who support the peace process (50%), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fateh (30%). But differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are minor (58% and 55% respectively). A third of the public believes that Abbas’s decision not to run in the next elections is the result of Israel’s settlement policy and Abbas’s loss of confidence in the US administration. A quarter believes the decision reflected Abbas’s disillusionment with Arab support for him and his policies while 22% believe the decision was taken due to the criticism of Abbas’s handling of the Goldstone affair, and 12% believe it was due to Hamas’s refusal to sign the reconciliation agreement. A majority of 58% believes Abbas will withdraw his decision and will eventually run in the next elections, but 21% believe that he will insist on it and might in fact submit his resignation.

Findings show that a quarter of the public believes that Hamas is responsible for the failure to hold elections on time and 11% believe Fateh is the one responsible for that. But the largest percentage, 30%, blames Israel and 9% blame the election commission.  A majority of 58% supports Hamas’s position that national elections can only take place after reconciliation and 39% oppose it. Among those who oppose Hamas’s position, 54% support holding elections even if only in the West Bank and 34% oppose that. In any case, 57% believe that the president will lose his legitimacy in January 2010 and an identical percentage believes that the Palestinian Legislative Council will lose its legitimacy at that same time. Support for Hamas’s position that national elections can only take place after reconciliation increases in the West Bank (60%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among women (62%) compared to men (53%), among those who oppose the peace process (74%) compared to those who support the peace process (54%), among Hamas supporters (88%) compared to supporters of Fateh (32%).

Findings show that 61% of the public believe that Fateh and Hamas together are responsible for the continuation of the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 17% believe that Hamas is responsible for the split and 12% believe Fateh is responsible. The largest percentage (61%) views the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the top most important Palestinian priority  today, 22% believe the top priority is the maintenance of calm and the opening of border crossings, and 16% believe the top priority is the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip. In this regard, if Hamas wins the next elections, 48% believe this outcome would consolidate separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 19% believe it would strengthen unity. But if Fateh wins the next elections, only 27% believe this would consolidate separation and 34% believe it would strengthen unity. Moreover, if Hams wins the next elections 65% believe this would lead to the strengthening of the siege and international boycott while 11% only believe this would lead to the lifting of the siege and the ending of the boycott. In contrast, if Fateh wins the next elections 10% say this would lead to the strengthening of the siege and boycott while 55% believe it would lead to the lifting of the siege and the ending of the boycott.

If new presidential elections are held today, Abbas would receive the vote of 54% of the voters (compared to 52% last August) and Haniyeh would receive 38% (the same as in last August). Only 62% of eligible voters would participate in the presidential elections. Abbas’s popularity stands at 55% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip while Haniyeh’s popularity stands at 36% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas remains unchanged as it was four months ago (48%) and dissatisfaction stands at 49%. If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 67% (compared to 62% last August) and the latter would receive 28% (compared to 31% last August). Participation in presidential elections would be much higher, reaching 73%, if Barghouti and Haniyeh, rather than Abbas and Haniyeh, were the contenders. Most popular figures selected by the public as possible vice president are Marwan Barghouti (selected by 30% of the public), Ismail Haniyeh (18%), Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad (13% each), and Saeb Erekat (7%). These findings indicate an improvement in the standing of Mustafa Barghouti, Fayyad, and Erekat compared to our findings four months ago.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 43% say they would vote for Fateh and 27% say they would vote for Hamas. These results are almost the same as those we found four months ago. Fateh’s popularity in the West Bank stands at 41% compared to 46% in the Gaza Strip and Hamas’s popularity stands at 23% in the West Bank compared to 34% in the Gaza Strip. All other factions and lists receive 14% of the vote and 17% remain undecided.

Findings show a gap in public perception of conditions in the West Bank compared to conditions in the Gaza Strip. Only 9% (9% in the West Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip) say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good while 31% (28% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good. Moreover, in the West Bank, perception of personal and family safety and security continues to improve standing today at 63%, compared to 58% four months ago. In the Gaza Strip, perception of safety and security stands today at 65% compared to 63% four months ago. Despite this improvement, 21% of West Bankers and 34% of Gazans say that political, security, and economic conditions force them to seek immigration to other countries.

Satisfaction with the performance of the Haniyeh government reaches 34% (30% in the West Bank and 42% in the Gaza Strip) and satisfaction with the performance of Salam Fayyad’s government stands at 40% (42% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip). 36% give a positive evaluation to the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank under Fayyad’s government and 25% give a positive evaluation to the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip under Haniyeh’s government. Moreover, 30% believe Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one while 26% believe that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one. Four months ago, Fayyad’s government was seen legitimate by 28% and Haniyeh’s by 28%.

(2) Peace Process   

13-15 March 2008   

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13 and 15 March 2008. This period witnessed a limited lull that prevailed between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the Israeli incursion into Gaza in early March that left more than 130 Palestinians dead and after the bombing attack in West Jerusalem that led to the death of 8 Israeli religious students.  The poll examines the following topics: the domestic balance of power, the performance and legitimacy of two governments, that of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad, and the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults , 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings indicate that a major shift, in Hamas’s favor, had occurred during the last three months with about 10% of the population shifting their attitudes and perceptions. The change included increased popularity of Hamas and its leadership, increased support for its positions and legitimacy, and greater satisfaction with its performance. These changes might have been the result of several political developments starting with the breaching of the Rafah border with Egypt during the last week of January and first week of February, followed by the Israeli military incursion into the Gaza Strip leading to a large number of Palestinian causalities and an increase in the number of rockets launched from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns such as Sderot and Ashkelon, the two suicide attacks in Dimona and Jerusalem leading to the death of nine Israelis, and ending with the failure of the Annapolis process in positively affecting daily life of Palestinians in the West Bank, in stopping Israeli settlement activities, or in producing progress in final status negotiations. These developments managed to present Hamas as successful in breaking the siege and as a victim of Israeli attacks. These also presented Palestinian President Abbas and his Fateh faction as impotent, unable to change the bitter reality in the West Bank or ending Israeli occupation through diplomacy.

Findings also show that the increase in the intensity of Palestinian-Israeli confrontations during the last few months has left an important impact on public attitudes regarding the peace process and armed attacks. While support for compromise and a two-state solution remain stable, findings show significant increase in support for armed attacks, particularly suicide attacks against Israelis. Moreover, the failure of diplomatic contacts to change daily life in the West Bank or in stopping settlement activities or making progress in final status issues is pushing Palestinians to pessimism with sweeping lack of confidence in the Annapolis peace process and opposition to Abbas-Olmert talks.

Domestic Balance of Power:

• The gap between the standing of Fateh compared to the standing of Hamas decreases significantly in three months from 18 percentage points to 7. If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 35%, Fateh 42%, other electoral lists combined 12%, and 11% remain undecided. This represents a significant increase in Hamas’s popularity compared to December 2007 when it received 31% compared to 49% to Fateh, 10% to other lists and 11% undecided.
• Hamas is more popular in the Gaza Strip reaching 40% compared to 31% in the West Bank. Fateh’s popularity is slightly greater in the Gaza Strip, reaching 43% compared to 41% in the West Bank.
• The gap between the standing of Abbas compared to the standing of Haniyeh decreases significantly in three months from 19 percentage points to almost zero. If new presidential elections were to take place today, Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh would receive almost equal number of votes, 46% for Abbas and 47% for Haniyeh. Abbas’s popularity stood at 56% and Haniyeh’s at 37% last December.
• However, if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 57% and the latter 38%. Moreover, the percentage of non-participation would decrease from 34% (if the competition was between Abbas and Haniyeh) to 24% (if the competition was between Barghouti and Haniyeh).

Findings show that Hamas has managed to regain the initiative and won back those among public opinion it lost last June after its violent takeover of the Gaza Strip. Our poll last December indicated that Hamas’s popularity has stabilized after six months of continued decline. Our current poll shows that the gap between the standing of Fateh compared to the standing of Hamas decreases significantly in three months from 18 percentage points to 7. If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 35%, Fateh 42%, other electoral lists combined 12%, and 11% remain undecided. This represents a significant increase in Hamas’s popularity compared to December 2007 when it received 31% compared to 49% to Fateh, 10% to other lists and 11% undecided. It is worth noting that Hamas’s popularity increased to 34% during the breaching of the Rafah border with Egyptduring the last week of January while Fateh’s popularity dropped to 46%. PSR conducted a special poll during that period of late January-early February 2008 during the breaching of the Rafah borders with Egypt. 

Hamas is more popular in the Gaza Strip reaching 40% compared to 31% in the West Bank. Fateh’s popularity is slightly greater in the Gaza Strip, reaching 43% compared to 41% in the West Bank. Hamas is also popular among women (37%) compared to men (33%), in refugee camps (43%) and cities (36%) compared to towns and villages (30%), among the religious (42%) compared to the “somewhat religious” (29%), among those opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to those supportive of the peace process (25%), among those who would be strongly opposed to buying a lottery ticket, the most traditional, (55%) compared to those most willing to buy a lottery ticket, the most untraditional, (12%), and among those between the ages of 38 and 47 years (42%) compared to the young, 18-27 years of age, (31%).

The gap between the standing of Abbas compared to the standing of Haniyeh decreases significantly in three months from 19 percentage points to almost zero. If new presidential elections were to take place today, Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh would receive almost equal number of votes, 46% for Abbas and 47% for Haniyeh. Abbas’s popularity stood at 56% and Haniyeh’s at 37% last December. It is worth mentioning that during the breaching of the Rafah border with Egypt, Abbas’s popularity dropped to 51% and Haniyeh’s increased to 43%. Haniyeh’s popularity today is the highest ever registered since Hamas’s electoral victory in January 2006.

Haniyeh’s popularity compared to that of Abbas increases in the Gaza Strip (49% to Haniyeh and 46% to Abbas), among women (50% to 42%), in refugee camps (57% to 38%), among the religious (50% to 42%), among those opposed to the peace process (88% to 7%), among supporters of Hamas (97% compared to 2%) and Islamic Jihad (61% to 28%), PFLP (68% to 29%), and independent Islamists (67% to 13%), among holders of BA degree (48% to 41%) among the unemployed (52% to 39%), among those with least incomde (55% to 36%), and among those between the ages of 38 and 47 years (53% to 41%).

However, if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 57% and the latter 38%. Moreover, the percentage of non-participation would decrease from 34% (if the competition was between Abbas and Haniyeh) to 24% (if the competition was between Barghouti and Haniyeh). Last December, Barghouti’s popularity stood at 63% compared to 32% for Haniyeh; in other words, the gap between Barghouti and Haniyeh has decreased from 31 percentage points to 19 percentage points in three months. During the breaching of the Rafah borders with Egypt, Barghouti’s popularity dropped to 60% and Haniyeh’s increased to 35%.

Performance and Legitimacy of Two Governments:

• Findings show continued decrease in the level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas and a greater positive evaluation for the performance of Haniyeh’s government over the performance of Fayyad’s government.
• Findings show depreciation in the legitimacy of Fayyad’s government and a significant rise in public perception of the legitimacy of Haniyeh’s government. 49% say Haniyeh should stay in office as prime minister while 45% say he should not. Last September only 40% said Haniyeh should stay as prime minister. By contrast, today only 38% say Fayyad’s government should stay in office and 55% say it should not. Support for Fayyad’s government stood at 49% last September.
• Similarly, 34% say Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate Palestinian government and only 29% say Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one. 9% say both governments are legitimate and 24% say both are illegitimate. Last December, belief that Fayyad’s government was legitimate stood at 38% and belief that Haniyeh’s government was legitimate stood at 30%.
• Despite the fact that the majority continues to reject Hamas’s June 2007 violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, only a small minority believes that Hamas alone is responsible for the continued political split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• Perception of personal and family security and safety diminishes considerably in the West Bank declining from 44% last December to 32% in this poll.

Findings show continued decrease in the level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbas and a greater positive evaluation for the performance of Haniyeh’s government over the performance of Fayyad’s government. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas stands today at 41% and dissatisfaction at 56%. Satisfaction with Abbas’s performance stood at 50% last December and 46% during the breaching of the Rafah border with Egypt. Moreover, only 30% say that the performance of the Fayyad government is good or very good and 42% say it is bad or very bad. By contrast, 39% say the performance of the Haniyeh’s government is good or very good and only 34% say it is bad or very bad.

Similarly, findings show depreciation in the legitimacy of Fayyad’s government and a significant rise in public perception of the legitimacy of Haniyeh’s government. 49% say Haniyeh should stay in office as prime minister while 45% say he should not. Last September only 40% said Haniyeh should stay as prime minister. By contrast, today only 38% say Fayyad’s government should stay in office and 55% say it should not. Support for Fayyad’s government stood at 49% last September. Similarly, 34% say Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate Palestinian government and only 29% say Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one. 9% say both governments are legitimate and 24% say both are illegitimate. It is noticeable that Haniyeh’s government receives greater public legitimacy both in the West Bank (32% to Haniyeh’s compared to 26% to Fayyad’s) and the Gaza Strip (37% to Haniyeh’s compared to 34% to Fayyad’s). It is also worth mentioning that this is the first time that Haniyeh’s government has received greater public legitimacy than Fayyad’s. Last December, belief that Fayyad’s government was legitimate stood at 38% and belief that Haniyeh’s government was legitimate stood at 30%.

Belief that the government of Haniyeh is more legitimate than the Fayyad government increases in the Gaza Strip (37% for Haniyeh’s and 34% for Fayyad’s), among women (33% to 25%), in cities (35% to 30%), in refugee camps (38% to 29%), among the religious (38% to 28%), among those opposed to the peace process (65% to 4%), among supporters of Hamas (82% to 2%), among holder of BA degree (36% to 26%), among the unemployed (45% to 29%), among those working in the private sector (35% to 23%), among those with the lowest income (42% to 26%), and among those between the ages of 38 and 47 (41% to 27%).

Despite the fact that the majority continues to reject Hamas’s June 2007 violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, only a small minority believes that Hamas alone is responsible for the continued political split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Rejection of Hamas’s violent takeover stands today at 68% and acceptance of the takeover at 26%. Rejection of the takeover stood at 73% last September. Acceptance of Hamas’s takeover increases in the Gaza Strip reaching 33% compared to 23% in the West Bank. However, only 17% believe that Hamas alone is responsible for the continued split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and in fact 21% say Fateh alone is responsible for the continued split. A majority of 54% believes that both Hamas and Fateh are responsible for the continued split. The tendency to avoid blaming Hamas alone for the continuation of the split reflects a change in public perception regarding the positions of the two factions regarding return to dialogue as an exit from the current crisis. Support for Fateh’s and Abbas’s position, which demands a return to the status quo ante as a precondition to dialogue drops from 46% last September to 39% in this poll. Support for Hamas’s position, which calls for unconditional dialogue, increases from 27% to 37% during the same period.

Perception of personal and family security and safety diminishes considerably in the West Bank declining from 44% last December to 32% in this poll. Perception of security and safety improved greatly in the West Bank in December 2007 compared to September when it stood at 35%. In the Gaza Strip, perceptions of personal and family security and safety diminish somewhat from 52% to 46% between December 2007 and March 2008.

Peace Process:

• 66% support and 32% oppose the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation to Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state.
• 55% support and 44% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement.
• But 80% believe that the negotiations launched by the Annapolis conference will fail while 14% believe it will succeed.
• Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state during the next five years are non-existent or weak and 30% believe chances are fair or high.
• 75% believe that the meetings between Mahmud Abbas and Ehud Olmert are not beneficial and should be stopped while only 21% believe they are beneficial and should be continued.
• 64% support and 33% oppose launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon.
• An overwhelming majority of 84% support and 13% oppose the bombing attack that took place in a religious school in West Jerusalem. Support for this attack increases in the Gaza Strip (91%) compared to the West Bank (79%).

Findings show that despite the significant shift in the balance of power in favor of Hamas and despite the increased belief in the legitimacy of the Hamas government and its superior performance, public attitude regarding a political settlement based on a two-state solution remained stable during the last three months. Findings show that two thirds of the public support the Saudi peace initiative which calls for Arab recognition of Israel and its right to live in secure borders and normalization of relations with it after it withdraws from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of the refugee problem in a just and agreed upon manner. 32% oppose this initiative. Last December, support for the Saudi initiative stood at 65% and opposition at 32%.

More importantly, findings show an increase in the level of support for a settlement in which there would be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent settlement. Support for such mutual recognition of identity stands today at 55% compared to 49% and opposition at 44% compared to 49% last December.

But the findings show total lack of confidence in diplomacy with 80% saying that negotiations launched by the Annapolis conference will fail while only 14% believe it will succeed. Similarly, findings show that more than two thirds (68%) believe that the chances for the creation of an independent  Palestinian state living next to Israel in the next five years are none-existent or weak while 30% believe chances are medium or high. Belief that chances are none-existent or weak increases in the West Bank (72%) compared to the Gaza Strip (62%), among those opposed to the peace process (85%) compared to supporters of the peace process (61%), and among supporters of Hamas (71%) compared to supporters of Fateh (57%).

This pessimism  regarding the future of the diplomatic process pushes three quarters of the public to believe that the meetings between Abbas and Olmert are not beneficial and should be stopped while only 21% believe they are beneficial and should be continued. Pessimism about diplomacy also leads people to search for alternative means to end the occupation with findings showing about two thirds (64%) supporting the continued launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon while only 33% oppose that. A poll conducted by PSR in December 2006 (#22) found that 48% of the public at that time believed that launching rockets at Israeli towns was useful for Palestinians while an identical percentage believed it was not useful.

Finally, findings show a significant increase in the level of support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel with 67% supportive and 31% opposed. Average support for such attacks on Israeli civilians stood at 40% in 2005 and 55% in 2006. Findings also show wide-spread support for the suicide attack that took place in the Israeli town Dimona and led to the death of one Israeli woman, with support standing at 77% and opposition at 19%. The armed attack on a religious school in West Jerusalem which led to the death of eight Israeli students is supported by 84% and opposed by 13%. Support for similar suicide attacks inside Israel dropped significantly during 2005 with only 29% supporting a suicide attack that took place in Tel Aviv and 37% supporting another one in Beersheba. But support for such attacks increased in mid 2006 as a suicide attack in Tel Aviv at that time received the support of 69% and the opposition of 27%..... Full Report

This joint survey was conducted with the support of  the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah

  5-7 June 2014

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-7 June 2014. The period before the poll witnessed the success of the reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas and the formation of a reconciliation government headed by Rami al Hamdallah. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were suspended for more than two months before the conduct of the poll and the US efforts in this regard came to a halt. This press release covers public perception of the process of internal reconciliation, public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and others. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or emailpcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

Main Findings:

Findings also show that the public does not view the implementation of reconciliation as an impediment to negotiations with Israel. To the contrary, a majority wants the conciliation government to accept existing agreements with Israel and believes that the inclusion of Hamas into the PLO means the indirect acceptance by the Islamist faction of these agreements. In fact, support for the two-state solution has increased. Yet, in light of the suspension of peace talks with Israel, the overwhelming majority supports joining international organizations, including the International Criminal Court, and waging a non-violent resistance campaign against Israeli occupation. Nonetheless, a majority continues to reject a return to armed intifada, the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, or the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

(1) Conciliation government, the future of reconciliation and relations with Israel:

• Optimism about reconciliation: 62% think it will succeed, 61% think the Rafah crossing with Egypt will open, 53% think economic conditions will improve, 51% think conditions of freedoms and liberties will improve, and land 59% think elections will take place as scheduled.
• 52% want to deploy the Presidential Guard at the Rafah crossing with Egypt, but 66% agree that Hamas should continue to have control over police and security in the Gaza Strip.
• One third of the public is opposed to the dissolution of armed groups in the Gaza Strip while the rest support such dissolution under certain conditions.
• 42% believe that Hamas’ way is the best way to end occupation and establish a state while 39% believe Abbas’ way is the best way.

62% believe that reconciliation will succeed and the split will not return while 34% believe the opposite to be true. Optimism is higher in the Gaza Strip, reaching 74%, and lower in the West Bank, standing at 54%. Moreover, reconciliation restores some confidence in the PA: Half of the public believes that the PA is an accomplishment for the Palestinian people while 45% believe that it is a burden on the Palestinian people.  Three months ago, only 25% said that the PA, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, was an accomplishment. At that time an additional 15% said the PA in the West Bank only was an accomplishment while 13% said the PA in the Gaza Strip only was an accomplishment. Optimism is evident in the belief of 61% that the Rafah Crossing with Egypt will reopen, of 53% that economic conditions will improve soon, and of 51% that the status of public liberties will improve and that political detentions will soon be a thing of the past. Moreover, a majority of 59% believes that elections will take place as scheduled, six months from today, and 71% want Hamas to take part in the presidential elections in addition to the legislative and the Palestinian National Council elections.  The belief that reconciliation will succeed can also be seen in the high confidence (61%) the public has in the conciliation government, in the high level of satisfaction (66%) with the speed by which the reconciliation agreement is being implemented by both sides, and the belief of the majority (54%) that Arab States will fulfill their promises to financially support the PA.

A majority of 52% prefers to see the Presidential Guard in charge of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, while 29% prefer the continuation of the status quo. By contrast, 66% favor continued security control by Hamas in the Gaza Strip on temporary basis until the holding of elections in six months and 30% oppose it.  Support for deploying the Presidential Guard at the Rafah crossing is higher in the West Bank (55%) than in the Gaza Strip (48%), among women (55%) compared to men (50%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (76% and 63% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), among the somewhat religious and the un-religious (59% and 60% respectively) compared to the religious (45%), and among supporters of the peace process (62%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (29%).

By contrast, support for continued Hamas control over police and security in the Gaza Strip until the elections is higher among Hamas supporters (90%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (55% and 54% respectively), among the religious (73%) compared to the somewhat religious and the un-religious (62% and 50% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (78%) compared to supporters of the peace process (65%), among holders of BA degree (69%) compared to illiterates (60%), and among the married (69%) compared to the unmarried (59%).

The largest percentage believes that Hamas and Fatah have made just the required concessions in order to facilitate reconciliation (45% and 42% respectively) but 28% believe that Hamas has made fewer concessions than required and 33% believe that Fatah has made fewer concessions than required. By contrast, only 14% believe that Hamas’ concessions were too many, and 11% believe that Fatah’s concessions were too many. It is interesting to note that 64% of Hamas’ likely voters believe that it has made just the required or less than the required concessions, while 71% of Fatah supporters believe the same about Fatah’s concessions. Most interesting, while one third of Hamas’ likely voters believes that it has made too many concessions, only 6% of Fatah’s likely voters believe that Fatah has made too many concessions.

One third of the public is opposed to the disbanding of armed groups in the Gaza Strip under any circumstances, while 19% say they support this measure now that a conciliation government has been formed; 12% say they would support such a measure but only after the upcoming elections; 16% say they support it but only after the ending of the Gaza siege and 15% say they support it but only after reaching a peace agreement with Israel. Support for disbanding armed groups in the Gaza Strip under any conditions increases among Gazans (35%) compared to West Bankers (32%), among men (36%) compared to women (29%), among supporters of Hamas (54%) compared to supporters of Fatah and supporters of third parties (24% and 27% respectively), among the religious (38%) compared to the somewhat religious and the un-religious (28% and 32% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (59%) compared to those who support the peace process (24%), among refugees (37%) compared to the non-refugees (29%), and among holders of BA degree (37%) compared to the illiterates (31%).

Belief that Hamas’ way is the best way to end the occupation and establish a Palestinian state stands at 42%, while belief that Abbas’ way is the best stands at 39%. Three months ago, these findings stood at 39% and 36% respectively.  Support for Hamas’ way is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among supporters of Hamas (88%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (13% and 41% respectively), among the religious (51%) compared to the somewhat religious and the un-religious (35% and 26% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (73%) compared to those who support the peace process (31%), among holders of BA degree (46%) compared to illiterates (33%), and among men (44%) compared to women (41%).

(2) Presidential and Legislative Elections:

• In presidential elections, Mahmoud Abbas wins by 53% of the vote and Haniyeh receives 41% of the vote.
• If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives the support of 58% and the latter 38%.
• 52% support and 39% oppose a proposal to appoint a vice president. Among the prominent candidates: Marwan Barghouti followed by Rami al Hamdallah, Ismail Haniyeh, and Saeb Erikat.
• In new parliamentary elections, Fatah receives the support of 40% and Hamas 32%.

If new presidential elections are held today and only two were nominated, Abbas would receive 53% and Haniyeh 41% of the vote of those participating. The rate of participation in such elections would reach 67%. Three months ago, findings were identical except for the rate of participation which stood then at 60%. In this poll, in the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 52% and Haniyeh 46%, and in the West Bank Abbas receives 54% and Haniyeh 38%.  If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 38% of the participants’ votes. The rate of participation in this case would reach 71%. In our March 2014 poll Barghouti received 60% of the vote and Haniyeh 34%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive the largest percentage (36%) followed by Haniyeh (33%), and Abbas (28%).  The rate of participation in this case would reach 75%.

52% support and 39% oppose the appointment of a vice president to Abbas. Among those who support appointing a vice president, Marwan Barghouti is the favorite, selected by 24% in an open question, followed by Rami al Hamdallah who was selected by 17%, Ismail Haniyeh by 16%, Saeb Erikat, Mohamad Dahlan, and Mustafa Barghouti (6% each), Salam Fayyad by 5%, and Khalid Misha’al and Azzam al Ahmad by 4% each.

If new legislative elections are held today with the participation of all factions, 74% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 40% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 28% and for Fatah at 43%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 35% and in the West Bank at 30%. Vote for Fatah in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 42% and in the West Bank at 39%. These results indicate an increase in the vote for Hamas in the West Bank which stood at 23% last December.  Fatah, on the other hand, increased its popularity in the Gaza Strip by four percentage points while also losing six percentage points in the West Bank.     

(3) Domestic Conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises to 24% and in the West Bank to 33%.
• 40% of Gazans and 27% of West Bankers expect economic conditions to improve in the next few years.
• Belief that corruption exists in the PA stands at 81%; 25% say there is freedom of press in the West Bank and 16% believe there is freedom of press in the Gaza Strip.
• Perception of personal safety and security stands at 64% among residents of the Gaza Strip and 51% among residents of the West Bank.
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas rises from 46% to 50%.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip rises to 24% in this poll compared, to 15% three months ago. 52% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are bad or very bad. Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank rises from 30% three months ago to 33% today.  Percentage of those who believe conditions in the West Bank are bad or very bad deceases from 42% to 37% during the same period.

We asked West Bank and Gaza publics about their expectations regarding economic conditions in their respective areas in the next few years: 27% of the West Bankers expected better conditions, and 40% expected worse conditions. In the Gaza Strip, 57% expected better conditions, and only 9% expected worse conditions. These findings indicate a widespread optimism, particularly in the Gaza Strip, that reconciliation will bring a better economic future; three months ago, only 19% of West Bankers and 28% of Gazans said that their economic conditions will be better in the next few years.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%.  Furthermore, 25% say there is, and 40% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the West Bank. By contrast, 16% say there is, and 36% say there is to some extent, press freedom in the Gaza Strip.  32% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the authority in the West Bank without fear. By contrast, 28% of the public say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear. In our last poll, three months ago, only 22% said people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities without fear.

Perception of safety and security in the West Bank stands at 51% and in the Gaza Strip at 64%. Three months ago these percentages stood at 51% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 41%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 24%. Last March these percentages stood at 44% and 22% respectively. 

Percentage of satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas increases from 46% three months ago to 50% in this poll.

(4) Peace Process:

• A majority of the public sees no contradiction between reconciliation and the peace process
• 59% believe that the conciliation government should accept existing agreements signed by the PLO with Israel
• Support for the two-state solution rises from 51% to 54% but 61% believe that it is no longer practical due to settlements’ expansion.
• 50% support and 46% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative; but only 40% support recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people
•  Now that negotiations have been suspended, 81% support joining additional international organizations and 69% support waging a non-violent campaign against Israeli occupation
• 55% oppose a UN Security Council resolution setting the borders of the Palestinian state and imposing it on the two sides and 52% oppose an international trusteeship over Palestine.
• 81% are worried of being hurt by the Israeli army or seeing their homes demolished or land confiscated.

Findings show that the Palestinian public does not see a contradiction between Fatah-Hamas reconciliation and the peace process; to the contrary, the public views reconciliation as a positive contribution to the peace process. For example, majority of 59% does not view the implementation of reconciliation as closing the door to negotiations with Israel, while 37% believe it puts an end to negotiations. Indeed, an identical percentage (59%) believes that the conciliation government should accept existing agreements signed by the PLO and Israel while 36% oppose that. Similarly, 53% believe that Hamas’ entry into the PLO means an indirect acceptance by the movement of the PLO program and the agreements signed with Israel; 42% reject that. 

The belief that the conciliation government should accept existing agreements with Israel increases in the West Bank (63%) compared to the Gaza Strip (52%), among women (61%) compared to men (57%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (78% and 50% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (38%), among the somewhat religious and the un-religious (64% and 68% respectively) compared to the religious (53%), among supporters of the peace process (70%) compared those who oppose the peace process (34%), and among those who work in the public sector (63%) compared to those who work in the private sector (57%).

Findings also show that reconciliation did not weaken popular support for the two-state solution; to the contrary, support for this solution increased from 51% in March to 54% in this poll. 46% oppose this solution and 61% say that it is no longer practical due to settlements’ expansion; 37% say it is still practical. Furthermore, 71% believe the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non-existent and 28% say the chances are medium or high. Nonetheless, findings show that support for a one-state solution in which Palestinians and Jews enjoy equality does not exceed 31%; 68% oppose the one-state solution.

Support for the Arab Peace Initiative stands at 50% and opposition at 46%. A majority of 59% rejects and 40% accepts recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people.

Findings show that given the suspension of negotiations with Israel, an overwhelming majority of 81% supports joining international organizations and 69% support a popular non-violent resistance campaign against occupation. Findings also show that 58% oppose and 41% support a return to an armed intifada. 60% reject the dissolution of the PA while 38% support it.

In exploring the views on giving international organizations greater role in resolving the conflict with Israel, the poll shows that more than three quarters (76%) support joining the International Criminal Court even if such a step led to the imposition of American and Israeli financial sanctions on the PA. 22% oppose this step. Yet a majority of 55% is opposed to a proposal in which the UN Security Council would set and impose, on the two sides, the borders of the Palestinian state; a substantial minority of 42% supports the proposal. Similarly a majority of 52% opposes and 46% support the idea of placing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under a temporary UN trusteeship. A majority of 65% believes that the international community will not be ready to impose economic sanctions on Israel even if occupation lasts for a long time; 32% believe the international community will indeed impose such sanctions.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 77%. Indeed, a larger percentage (81%) believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and to expel their population or deny them their rights. On the other hand, when asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, almost two thirds (65%) believed that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that end of occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state is the most vital Palestinian priority.
• 32% define unemployment and poverty as the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today; 26% view continuation of occupation as the most serious problem.

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. Three months ago, 42% said ending occupation and building a state was most vital goal, and 34% said the most vital goal was the right of return.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 32% of the public, while 26% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 23% believe the most serious problem is corruption in some public institutions, and 15% believe it is the siege and the closure of the Gaza border crossings.....[Full Report]

10-12 March 2005

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between March 10-12, 2005. The poll deals with the peace process,Sharon’s disengagement plan, Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation, and internal Palestinian matters. Total size of the sample is 1319 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (835) and the Gaza Strip (484) in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3% and rejection rate 2%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

MAIN RESULTS:

The poll finds a significant change in public attitudes regarding violence, particularly suicide attacks. Support for such attacks has dropped sharply to its lowest level in seven years. This public rejection of a return to violence at this time reflects continued and widespread public support for mutual cessation of violence, and a desire to return to normal life and to allow the newly elected president, Abu Mazin, a chance to revive the peace process. But the public is opposed to steps taken by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to crackdown on those who are carrying out attacks against Israelis, such as arrests. This opposition might reflect public perception that the future of the peace process is still uncertain and that Israel might not be serious about or willing to end its occupation and that therefore the PA should maintain the option of returning to violence if the need arise in the future.

The findings indicate also that the public prefers a see negotiations leading to a permanent agreement rather than a new interim one. This attitude reflects public belief that the Osloprocess has failed in part due to its interim and partial nature. The public seems more willing than any time before to pay the price of a permanent settlement as the findings show greater levels of support for reconciliation between the two peoples once a permanent settlement is reached.

Three quarters of the public view, as the case has been during the past year, the Israeli disengagement plan as a victory for armed struggle. Despite that, two thirds would oppose continued armed attacks against Israelis from the Gaza Strip once the Israelis fully withdraw.

Internally, the findings show a rise in the popularity of Hamas and a decline in the support for Fateh. The public believes that Hamas’ victory in the December 2004 and January 2005 local elections has been due to incorruptibility of its candidates while Fateh and the PA are perceived as corrupt. The public also believes that the unity and discipline within Hamas vs. the fragmentation and lack of discipline within Fateh has been a second reason for Hamas’ victory.

(1) Peace Process

• ·      Support for bombing (or suicide) attacks inside Israel drops from 77% last September to 29% in this poll. But support for arrest of the perpetrators of suicide attacks does not exceed 40%.
• ·      84% support return to negotiations and 59% prefer a permanent, rather than interim agreement. 59% believe that it is possible to reach a compromise agreement with the Israeli leadership.
• ·      59% support the Road Map and 35% oppose it.
• ·      79% support the participation of Hamas in the negotiations with Israel while 79% prefer to see more active American involvement in the search for a peace agreement.
• ·      A majority believes that the Oslo peace process failed because Israel was not forthcoming and continued to build Israeli settlements. Similarly, a majority blames Israel for the failure of the Camp David Summit believing the Israeli offer was insufficient.

Findings show that support for the Tel Aviv night club suicide attack, which took place about three weeks ago, reaches 29% compared to 77% for the Bir Shiba suicide attack in September 2004 and 75% for the Maxim Restaurant suicide attack in Haifa in October 2003. Opposition to the Tel Aviv attack reaches 67%. But support for the steps taken by the PA to punish the perpetrators, such as arrests, does not exceed 40% while 57% oppose them. Public opposition to a crackdown on those who commit violence against Israelis might reflect belief that the peace process has not yet been revived. For example, only 44% view positively the achievements of Sharm al Sheikh summit in reviving the peace process. In other words, the public seeks to maintain the option of returning to violence if diplomacy fails.

Opposition to the Tel Aviv suicide attack increases in the Gaza Strip (70%) compared to the West Bank (65%), among holders of BA degree (71%) compared to illiterates (61%), among retired individuals and among employees (86% and 75% respectively) compared to students (62%), among the eldest (69%) compared to the youngest (61%), among individuals willing to buy lottery tickets (74%) compared to those unwilling to buy them (64%), and among supporters of Fateh (75%) compared to supporters of Hamas (53%).

In the current Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the public organizes its short term priorities as follows: release of prisoners is on top followed by three issues having the same exact importance: freezing settlement construction, stop building the separation barrier inside the West Bank, and return of laborers to work inside Israel. The next priority is the removal of Israeli checkpoints. In the West Bank alone, the list of priorities puts stopping the barrier in second place after release of prisoners, then the freeze of settlement construction, and the removal of checkpoints. In the Gaza Strip, release of prisoners’ is also the top priority but it is followed by return of laborers to work inside Israel.

The poll also examined Palestinian preferences concerning the next steps that should be taken in the course of the peace process. 84% of the Palestinians support a return to negotiations on a comprehensive settlement and 59% prefer immediate return to final status negotiations on all issues in dispute at once, while 31% prefer a gradual step by step approach. Despite these preferences, 51% of the Palestinians say they will support their leadership decision to proceed in the peace process with the approach they prefer less, and 41% will not support their leadership decision in such a case. 

59% of the Palestinians believe that it is possible to reach a compromise settlement with the other side’s current leadership while 41% don’t think it is possible. 62% believe the Palestinian leadership is strong enough to convince its constituency to accept such an agreement. Moreover, 65% of the Palestinians believe that the Israeli leadership is strong enough to convince its public to accept such a compromise.

Palestinians were further asked to assess the reasons for the Oslo process and the Camp David summit failures. A majority of the Palestinians (54%) put the blame mainly on Israel for not being forthcoming enough and continuing to build settlements. Only 5% of the Palestinian believe that the main reason for why the Oslo process failed was because the Palestinians were not forthcoming enough and maintained the use of violence. 33% blame the step by step approach for the failure. As to the Camp David summit, 50% of the Palestinians believe it failed because Barak yielded much less than he claimed he did. Only 5% believe that it failed because Arafat did not seriously intend to reach a final and comprehensive settlement with Israel.  36% of Palestinians think the problems were too numerous and the differences too big to be solved all at once.

59% of the Palestinians support the Quartet’s Roadmap plan compared to 35% among Palestinians who oppose it. Moreover, 79% support the participation of the Hamas in the negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel compared to 19% who oppose it. Despite this, an identical percentage (79%) believe that the US should increase its involvement in trying to solve the Israeli Palestinian conflict, while 15% say it should decrease its involvement.

(2) Sharon’s Disengagement Plan

• ·      Three quarters see Sharon’s disengagement plan as victory for armed struggle against Israeli occupation.
• ·      Only 30% believe the PA has high capacity to control things in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal.
• ·      Two thirds oppose continued armed attacks against Israelis from the Gaza Strip after a full Israeli withdrawal from it.

Three quarters of the Palestinians see Sharon’s plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, while 23% do not see it as such. Despite that, only 29% of the Palestinians support and 68% oppose the continuation of armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip after full Israeli disengagement.  30% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Authority has high capacity to control matters in the Gaza Strip after Israel’s disengagement, 43% of think it has reasonable capacity and 23% think it has low or no capacity.

(3) Reconciliation between the Two Peoples

• ·      81% support reconciliation between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples after reaching a peace agreement with Israel.
• ·      Increase in the levels of support for various reconciliation measures: 89% support open borders between the two states; 73% support joint economic ventures and institutions; 40% support building joint political institutions; 42% support taking legal measures against incitement; and 13% support adopting school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians

With Arafat’s departure from the scene and with the renewed political activity, expectations and support for reconciliation following a comprehensive solution increased in a meaningful way for the first time. 24% of the Palestinians expect full reconciliation to be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years compared to 15% last June. 81% of the Palestinians support reconciliation today compared to 67% last June. 

More important however is the consistent across the board increase in support for a list of specific reconciliation steps 89% of the Palestinians will support open borders to free movement of people and goods after a comprehensive settlement is reached, compared to 82% who said so last June. 73% support joint economic institutions and ventures compared to 66% and 66% respectively last June. 40% will support joint political institutions designed eventually to lead to a confederate system given a comprehensive settlement compared to 26% who said so last June. 42% support taking legal measures against incitement directed towards Israelis compared to 35% who said so in June 2004. 13% of the Palestinians will support adoption of a school curriculum that recognizes the sovereignty of the other state and educates against irredentist aspirations. In June 2004, only 4% of the Palestinians thought so.

 (4) Internal Palestinian Conditions

• ·      Three quarters are satisfied with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas in the peace process and 62% think he is serious about fighting corruption.
• ·      Only 45% give confidence to the new cabinet headed by Abu Ala’.
• ·      80% view success in holding the presidential elections as a step forward toward democracy in Palestine, but only 35% give positive evaluation of the current status of Palestinian democracy.
• ·      Three quarters support a quota system for women whereby they are guaranteed 20% of the seats of the parliament. But the public is divided on the preferred electoral system: a district-based majority system, a proportional representation system, or a mixed system.
• ·      Hamas’ victory in local elections in December 2004 and January 2005 is attributed by the public to incorruptibility of its candidates and to the unity and disciple of its members while Fateh’s loss is attributed to the corruption within the PA and the lack of the discipline within that movement.
• ·      Support for Fateh drops to 36% and increases for Hamas to 25%.

Findings show that 80% of the Palestinians believe that the successful January elections for presidency could be seen as a step forward towards democracy in the PA, while 17% don’t see the elections as such. 35% think there are slim chances that a democratic system will be established in the PA or a future Palestinian State. 44% think there are medium chances for that, and 19% give it high chances. Despite the appreciation of the role of the presidential elections in bringing about a possible democratic transition, only 35% evaluate the current state of democracy in the PA as good or very good, 34% think it is fair and 29% think democracy is in bad or very bad condition.

Three quarters are satisfied with Abu Mazin’s performance with regard to steps taken to revive the peace process, such as the ceasefire and release of prisoners. 70% are satisfied with his dismissal of senior security officers, and 62% believe that Abu Mazin is serious about fighting corruption in the PA.  On the other hand, only 45% give confidence in the new cabinet headed by Abu Ala’. Despite that, 71% believe the new cabinet will be able to return to the peace process; 57% believe it will be able to improve economic conditions; 52% believe it will be able to control the security situation including the enforcement of a ceasefire; a similar percentage believes the new cabinet will be able to fight corruption; and 49% believe it will be able to carry out political reforms.

With regard to the current debate on the election law, 75% support a women quota of 20% guaranteed seats in the legislative council. But the public is split on the electoral system with 39% supporting the current district-based majority system, 26% supporting a proportional representation system, and 25% supporting a mixed system combining elements of the two other systems.

With regard to reform, 91% support internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA, and 87% believe there is corruption in the PA, and 51% believe this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.

Support for Fateh reaches 36% (compared to 40% last December) and for Hamas 25% (compared to 18% last December). The public expects close results for Fateh and Hamas in the upcoming May local elections and a victory for Fateh in the legislative elections scheduled for July 2005. But in the Gaza Strip, the public expects a major victory for Hamas in the local elections and a victory for Fateh in the legislative elections. The public believes that Hamas’ victory in the previous local elections has been due firstly to the integrity and incorruptibility of its candidates and secondly to the unity and discipline within the movement. Fateh’s loss is attributed firstly to the spread of corruption in the PA and Fateh and secondly to divisions and lack of discipline in the movement.

Support for Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (21%), in refugee camps (29%) compared to villages and towns (21%), among women (29%) compared to men (21%), among students and housewives (28% and 31% respectively) compared to employees and merchants (18% and 13% respectively), among those with the lowest income (32%) compared to those with the highest income (23%),  among the youngest (30%) compared to the eldest (20%), among those who would strongly refuse to buy lottery tickets (37%) compared to those who would buy such tickets (14%), and among the most religious (28%) compared to the least religious (6%)..... Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 25 June and 1 July 2018. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed important developments including the convening of the Palestinian National Council in Ramallah, the launch of the Return March in the Gaza Strip, the relocation of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, rising concerns about economic and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip and the potential impact of a reconciliation failure on these conditions. Weeks before the conduct of the poll, President Abbas entered a hospital in Ramallah for treatment fueling concerns about his health and a potential succession crisis. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and the various future directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 2150 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 2.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In light of the hospitalization of president Abbas, about two-thirds of the public express concern that domestic conditions may deteriorate in the absence of the president as long as no clarity or agreement exists on the succession process that should be followed. The public has a clear preference: it wants a full compliance with the relevant articles in the Basic Law even if this means that Aziz Duwaik from Hamas (being the current Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council) would become a temporary president for 60 days. However, a majority would also be happy if Hamas shows flexibility and allows a non-Hamas, non-Fatah speaker to be elected by the parliament thereby allowing a smoother process of succession and the holding of elections after 60 days.

Findings for the second quarter of 2018 also show that Abbas’ standing has improved somewhat. This might be due to his hospitalization. But it could also mean that the public is showing an appreciation for his strong rejection of Trump’s “Deal of the Century.” It is worth mentioning that Fatah’s popularity improved slightly as well. Yet despite this, more than 60% of the public demand Abbas’ resignation and the public stands decisively against Abbas’ domestic policies. An overwhelming majority demands the immediate halt to all measures taken by Abbas against the Gaza Strip and opposes the crackdown on demonstrations demanding an ending to these measures. Moreover, a two-third majority opposes Abbas’ demand for disarming armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip. A majority is also opposed to Abbas’ demand that Hamas hand over the entire responsibility over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including ministries, the security sector, and the “arms.”

The public expresses disappointment over some of the outcomes of the most recent meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) which was held two months ago in Ramallah and indeed, an overwhelming majority indicates that it did not follow the proceedings of the meeting.  Despite the fact that the largest percentage believes that the PNC represents the Palestinians, this percentage is less than half of the public. Perhaps one reason for this is the perception that the PNC’s proceedings and decisions are irrelevant to policy making. Indeed, about 70% believe that president Abbas and his government will not implement the PNC decisions. Moreover, about two thirds of the public are dissatisfied with the way members of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were elected by the Council and 70% expressed dissatisfaction with ability of these members to represent Palestinians at home and in the diaspora. Yet, despite all of this, a majority still views the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In light of the collapse of Palestinian-Israeli peace process, support for alternatives to negotiations varies. About three quarters continue to support PA efforts to internationalize the conflict and join various UN organizations. Moreover, about two thirds support popular non-violent resistance, a large minority supports return to an armed intifada, a similar percentage supports the dissolution of the PA, and a little less than a third  supports abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. These findings indicate a decline in support for an armed intifada and in the demand for dissolving the PA and point to a rise in support for popular resistance. It is worth mentioning that support for armed action and the dissolution of the PA is much higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank while support for popular resistance is high in both areas.

Nonetheless, confidence in the effectiveness of popular resistance is not high. This lack of confidence is demonstrated in public assessment of the effectiveness of the March of Return in the Gaza Strip. Despite popular support for the March in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, about three quarters of the public (80% in the West Bank and two thirds in the Gaza Strip) believe that the March has failed to achieve its goals or achieved very little. It is worth mentioning that the public is evenly divided in its assessment of the main party behind the March between those who think it is Hamas and those who think it is civil society organizations. Gazans however show no hesitancy on this as they strongly believe that it is indeed Hamas that stands behind the initiation and organization of the March of Return. 

(1) Abbas succession and presidential and parliamentary elections:

• About two-thirds are worried that conditions might deteriorate after Abbas
• 60% want the process of succession to follow the rules set in the Basic Law
• But the majority also supports the idea of electing a new Speaker from outside Fatah or Hamas in order to ease the process of succession
• Decrease in the percentage of those demanding the resignation of president Abbas from 68% to 61% and a rise in satisfaction with his performance from 33% to 37%
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 47% of the vote and the latter 46%; if elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 58% and the latter 37%
• In new parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 39% of the vote and Hamas 32%

A large majority (64%) is worried that internal conditions might deteriorate or destabilize during the post-Abbas succession process due to lack of clarity and absence of agreement on the means of selecting the next PA president; 32% say they are not worried. A majority (60%) says that in the case of Abbas’ absence, the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Aziz al Duwaik form Hamas, must become president for two months in implementation of the Basic Law; 29% say they are opposed to such implementation.  Support for the implementing the Basic Law is higher in the Gaza Strip (63%) compared to the West Bank (59%), in cities and villages (61% each) compared to refugee camps (54%), among men (62%) compared to women (59%), among the religious (63%) compared to the somewhat religious and those who are not religious (60% and 46% respectively), among Hamas supporters (77%) compared to those of third parties and Fatah (51% and 49% respectively), among non-refugees (62%) compared to refugees (58%), among holders of BA degree (60%) compared to illiterates (53%), and among those working in the private sector (61%) compared to those who work in the public sector (56%).

Similarly, a majority of 62% indicates that it would welcome a Hamas initiative to allow the election of a non-Hamas/non-Fatah Speaker in order to facilitate the post Abbas succession process; 29% say they are opposed to such initiative. Almost half (48%) believes that the in the post Abbas period, Palestinian factions will succeed in reaching an agreement on a process that would allow for the holding of presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to elect a successor to Abbas; 41% believe the factions will not succeed.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 59%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 33% (40% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip).  61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 33% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 68% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 62% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip.  If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 30% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 23% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 14% in the Gaza Strip). Similarly, Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 6%, Mustafa Barghouti and Khalid Mishal  by 3% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 46% and the latter 47% of the vote (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 41% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 40% of the vote (compared to 35% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 53% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 45% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 31% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 32% three months ago) and for Fatah at 34% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 38% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• 60% believe that people these days cannot criticize the PA without fear
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and in the West Bank at 17%
• Responsibility for the deterioration in Gaza conditions is Israel’s by 38%, PA and Abbas by 26%, and Hamas by 20%
• Perception of security and safety stands today at 51% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank
• Belief that corruption exists in the PA stands at 80% and half of the public views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people

Only 35% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 60% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 17%. In an open-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening of conditions in the Gaza Strip: the largest percentage (34%) blames Israel; 26% blame the PA and president Abbas and 20% blame Hamas. As we found in the previous poll, responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 38% of West Bankers compared to only 28% of Gazans blame Israel; 19% of West Bankers compared to 36% of Gazans blame the PA and Abbas, and 17% of West Bankers compared to 24% of Gazans blame Hamas.

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 51%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 52%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 54% and in the West Bank at 53%. Half of the public (49%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 45% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Maan TV and Palestine TV (15% each), Al Aqsa TV and Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (12% each), Al Arabiya and al Quds TV (5% each), and al Mayadeen (4%).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 30% and only 30% are optimistic about the chances for reconciliation
• 71% support the unification of all PA institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the full control of the reconciliation government including the police force
• But only 32% prefer to keep all existing Gazan police officers in place and 30% want to keep only some of them
• 53% disagree with Abbas demand that Hamas surrenders full control over the Gaza Strip, including the ministries, the security sector, and the arms, to the reconciliation government
• Moreover, 65% oppose the demand to disarm Gaza’s factional armed battalions
• 79% want Abbas to immediately lift all the measures he has take against the Gaza Strip
• 81% are against the action taken by the PA security services to quell demonstrations in the West Bank
• 45% do not believe the narrative of Hamas or Fatah regarding who is responsible for the explosion that targeted PA prime minister’s convoy in the Gaza Strip several months ago; 26% believe Hamas’ and 16% believe the PA narrative

Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 30% are satisfied and 60% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 26%. 30%, compared to 26% three months ago, are optimistic and 65% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. These are the same percentages we obtained three months ago. A majority (71%) supports the unification of all PA institutions throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including the police force, under the control of the reconciliation government while 23% prefer to keep control over the police force in the Gaza Strip as it is now. But the public is divided over the future of the police officers currently serving in the Gaza Strip: 32% want to keep all of them in place, 30% want to replace some of them by new ones while keeping the others, and 27% prefer to replace all of them with new recruits.

The public is also divided in its attitude regarding the demand made by Abbas requesting Hamas to fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” a large minority of 40% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 53% disagrees.  When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, almost two-thirds (65%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 26% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. No differences exist between Gazans and West Bankers regarding this matter, but support for keeping the armed battalions rises in cities (66%) and declines in villages and towns (61%), among men (68%) compared to women (62%), among the religious (67%) compared to the somewhat religious and those who are not religious (64% and 54% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (78%) compared to those who are supportive of the peace process (57%), among Hamas supporters (83%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (62% and 43% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (69%) compared to the illiterates (60%).

Moreover, an overwhelming majority (79%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 17% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 83% in the West Bank but only 72% in the Gaza Strip.  Support for immediate lifting of the measures is also higher among those who are opposed to the peace process (89%) compared to those who support the peace process (74%), and among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (66% each).

The overwhelming majority (81%) opposes the action taken by the PA security services to quell the demonstrations in the West Bank that demand lifting the measures taken by the PA against the Gaza Strip and only 15% support the crackdown on such demonstrations. Similarly, 81% oppose the measures taken by the Hamas police in the Gaza Strip against similar demonstrations while 13% support them.  Opposition to quelling the demonstrations is higher among men (84%) compared to women (78%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (85%) compared to supporters of the peace process (78%), among Hamas supporters (89%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (73% and 72% respectively), among non-refugees (83%) compared to refugees (79%), and among holders of BA degree (81%) compared to illiterates (73%).

Finally, we asked the public about the narrative it believes to be accurate regarding the responsibility of Fatah and Hamas over the Gaza explosion that targeted prime minister Hamdallah convoy several months ago: 26% say they believe in the accuracy of Hamas’ narrative (that the PA intelligence Department had a role in the explosion) and 16% believe in the accuracy of Fatah’s narrative regarding Hamas’ role in that explosion. But the largest percentage (45%) indicates that neither narrative is accurate. It is worth mentioning that those who see Hamas’ narrative or that of the PA as accurate are much higher in the Gaza Strip, with 38% believing in Hamas’ and 27% believing in the PA’s. The percentage of Gazans who believe that neither side is accurate declines to only 28%.

(4) The meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC):  

• The overwhelming majority did not follow the proceedings of the PNC meeting and only 46% say that the PNC represents the Palestinian people; but 58% say the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people
• Two thirds are dissatisfied with the manner in the members of PLO Executive Committee were elected and 71% are dissatisfied with the ability of these members to represent the Palestinians at home and in the diaspora
• 69% believe that Abbas will not implement the decision of the PNC

The overwhelming majority (83%) says that it either did not follow the proceedings or the decisions of the PNC meeting during its most recent session in Ramallah (55%) or followed only little (28%); only 13% say that they did follow all or most of them.  Yet, 46% agree that the PNC represents them or represents the Palestinian people at home and in the diaspora and 35% say that it does not represent them or the Palestinian people. About a fifth (19%) expressed no opinion on the matter.  However, when asked about the PLO, a majority (58%) agreed that the current organization, with its existing institutions and current leadership, remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; only 30% disagree with that. It is worth mentioning that our findings in June 2006, exactly 12 years ago, a larger majority of 69% viewed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Findings show major differences between Gazans and West Bankers regarding the issue of PLO legitimacy: while 64% of West Bankers believe that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, only 47% of Gazans believe that. The belief in the PLO representation is higher in villages and towns (72%) compared to cities and refugee camps (56% and 52% respectively), among men (59%) compared to women (56%), among the somewhat religious (62%) compared to the religious (52%), among supporters of the peace process (69%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (35%), among Fatah supporters (88%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (55% and 28% respectively), among non-refugees (63%) compared to refugees (52%), among the illiterates (68%) compared to the holders of BA degree (52%), and among those who work in the public sector (65%) compared to those who work in the private sector (56%).

Almost two thirds (65%) are dissatisfied with the manner in which the PNC selected, without allowing nomination and direct personal elections, the members of the PLO Executive Committee; only 23% are satisfied with the PNC selection process.  Similarly, a large majority of 71% does not believe that the newly elected members are capable of representing the homeland and the diaspora given their average age and the fact that most came from the West Bank; only 20% say they are satisfied that the new members have that ability.  Moreover, a large majority (69%) says that it has no confidence in the commitment of president Abbas and the PA government to implement the PNC decision; only 20% indicate they has such confidence.  The belief that the decisions will not be implemented rises in the West Bank (72%) compared to the Gaza Strip (65%), among men (72%) compared to women (67%), among the religious (73%) compared to the somewhat religious and those who are not religious (68% and 52% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (87%) compared to those who support the peace process (61%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (90% and 65% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (46%), among the non-refugees (71%) compared to the refugees (68%), among holders of BA degree (70%) compared to the illiterates (56%), and among those who work in the private sector (75%) compared to those who work in the public sector (69%).

(5) The March of Return, the relocation of the US embassy, and future directions in the absence of the peace process:  

• The public is divided over the identity of the party responsible for the initiation and organization of the March of Return: 38% say it is civil society and 37% say it is Hamas
• The majority supports the March of Return but also thinks it has not achieved its goals
• 55% say that the relocation of the American embassy to Jerusalem weakens the Palestinian negotiating position
• 73% of East Jerusalemites say they are not considering participating in the upcoming municipal elections
• 39% say that negotiations is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state
• 58% believe that Israel seeks to annex all Palestinian territories and expel the Palestinians
• Widespread support for the internationalization of the conflict with Israel as well as the launching of non-violent resistance while large minorities support armed action and the dissolution of the PA, and 30% support the one state solution

38% of the public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip say that civil society organizations are behind the initiation and organization of the March of Return in the Gaza Strip. A similar percentage (37%) says that Hamas is responsible for the March, and 14% say that factions other than Hamas are responsible for its initiation and organization. It is worth mentioning that among Gazans, 61% believe that Hamas stands behind the marches. A slim majority (51%) of Gazans supports the participation of family members and friends in the March of Return and 54% of West Bankers indicate their support for this form of resistance. Nonetheless, only a small minority (21%) believes the marches have achieved their goals or most of their goals and 74% believe they have not achieved their goals or achieved a little.

A majority (55%) believes that the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem serves to weaken Palestinian position that East Jerusalem should be the capital of the Palestinian state; 16% think the relocation of the embassy strengthens Palestinian position and 25% believes the relocation has no impact. In this environment of the embassy relocation and the approaching date for the Israeli municipal elections in Jerusalem, we asked East Jerusalemites about their position regarding these elections. 73% of East Jerusalem residents, who carry Blue Israeli IDs, indicate that they do not intend to participate, or have not considered participation, in the Israeli municipal elections in the city but 22% indicate that they are indeed intending to vote or considering voting.

A large minority of 39% thinks that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while a third (34%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means and 21% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 35% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and only 31% sided with negotiation. The belief that negotiation is most effective is higher in the West Bank (41%) compared to the Gaza Strip (35%), in cities and villages (41% and 40% respectively) compared to refugee camps (27%), among women (41%) compared to men (36%), among those who are not religious and the somewhat religious (47% and 44% respectively) compared to the religious (31%), among supporters of the peace process (51%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (16%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (55% and 50% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (22%), and among the non-refugees (44%) compared to refugees (32%).

58% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 21% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 19% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 75% support joining more international organizations; 67% support popular non-violence resistance; 43% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 30% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 43% say the first Palestinian goal should be ending occupation and building a Palestinian state and 29% say it should be the attainment of the right of return
• Continued occupation is the most significant problem confronting Palestinians today in the eyes of 27% and 25% say it is poverty and unemployment

43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 27% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; 21% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 2% say it is the absence of national unity.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 2 and 4 June 2016. The period before the poll witnessed a significant decline in the number of incidents of confrontations and stabbings directed against Israelis. But a bombing attack on an Israeli bus took place in Jerusalem in mid-April. The period also witnessed meetings in Cairo between Hamas leaders and Egyptian officials and in Doha between Fatah and Hamas representatives. Data collection took place while the Paris Peace Conference was in session with the participation of representatives from more than 20 states. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reconciliation, Palestinian-Israeli confrontations, the French Initiative, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Results of the second quarter of 2016 point out to three main findings: (1) half of the public believes that the current Palestinian confrontations, or al habba al sha’biyya, has come to an end, support for stabbing attacks continues to decline, and the public continues to reduce its expectations from the current confrontations; (2)  by contrast, half of the public expresses support for the French Initiative that aims at providing an international backing for a revival of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, but public expectations of success for the initiative are much smaller than the support ; and, (3) there is a limited decline in support for Hamas and its presidential candidate, Ismail Haniyeh, despite continued demand for Abbas’ resignation from two thirds of the public.

Findings show a continued and significant drop, particularly in the West Bank, in support for stabbing attacks. The highest percentage of support for such attacks was registered six months ago before it considerably declined three months ago. Furthermore, findings show a continued decline in public expectations regarding a possible escalation of the current limited popular confrontations to an armed intifada; today, a 

quarter thinks such a development is likely. Similarly, findings show a decline, dropping from more than half to less than a third, in the percentage of those who think that if the current confrontations continue as they are now, they would contribute to achieving national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Decline, particularly in the West Bank, has also been found in the percentage of those who believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it would help Palestinians achieve national rights and in the percentage of those who support ending Palestinian implementation of PA obligations under the Oslo agreement. Nonetheless, a majority continues to believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it will help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Perhaps it is for this reason that a majority continues to support a return to an armed intifada. Indeed, more than two thirds supported the Jerusalem bus bombing attack which took place in mid-April and injured 20 Israelis.

If new presidential elections are held today in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh would do better than Abbas but findings show that the gap between the two narrows from eleven to five percentage points. Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular Palestinian figure. If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah is likely to do a little better than Hamas. It seems that the declining Palestinian-Israeli confrontations and the focus on international diplomacy in recent weeks have influenced the domestic balance of power in a manner that favors Abbas while somewhat weakening Hamas. Moreover, it is possible that the optimism regarding improved relations between Egypt and Hamas, which might have improved Hamas standing in the past, has now somewhat faded as the Rafah border crossing has remained essentially closed during most of the last three months.  Moreover, a majority is convinced that another Gaza war will erupt in the near future. On the other hand, Abbas, Fatah and the PA remain highly vulnerable as two thirds demand Abbas resignation, Fatah has not gained any additional support during the last three months, and a majority of Palestinians believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people.

(1) The French Initiative:

• 50% support and 41% oppose the French Initiative.
• 29% expect the French Initiative to succeed and 59% expect it to fail.

We asked the public about its support for the French Initiative. The initiative we presented to respondents as one that “calls for the formation of an international support group for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the holding of an international peace conference that would seek a settlement based on the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative in accordance with a specific time frame.” 50% of the respondents supported and 41% opposed the initiative. Support reached 46% in the West Bank compared to 56% in the Gaza Strip. Support for the French Initiative is higher also among those who intend to vote for Fatah, third parties, and those who have not yet decided to whom they will vote (68%, 56%, and 55% respectively) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas and those who do not intend to participate in the election (32% and 41% respectively), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (59% and 51% respectively) compared to the religious (47%), among supporters of the peace process (59%) compared those who are opposed to the peace process (30%), among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (46%), among farmers, the unemployed, and employees (62%, 57%, and 53% respectively) compared to students and housewives (46% and 48% respectively), among those working in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private sector (49%).

We also asked respondents to indicate their expectations regarding the success or failure of the French Initiative in assisting the goal of reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace. 29% expected success and 59% expected failure. Here too there was a significant difference between residents of the West Bank compared to residents of the Gaza Strip: 39% of Gazans, compared to only 22% of West Bankers, expected success.

(2) Palestinian-Israeli confrontations:

• Half of the public believes that the current popular confrontation, or Habba Sha’biyya, is over and the other half believes it is still going on.
• Support for knifing attacks continue to decline, but two thirds support the Jerusalem bus bombing.
• Expectations that the current confrontation will develop into an armed intifada continue to diminish.
• 54% support return to armed intifada.

The public is divided into two equal halves regarding the end of the current popular confrontation, or al habba al sha’biyya: 48% believe it has stopped and 48% believe it has not stopped.  In the West Bank, 49% believe it has ended and 46% believe it has not. In the Gaza Strip, 46% say it has ended and 51% say it has not. The percentage of those who think it has ended increases among those between the ages of 40 and 49 years (53%) compared to those between the ages of 18 and 22 (42%), among those who intend to vote for Fatah, third party voters, and the undecided (56%, 53%, and 51% respectively) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas and those who do not intend to participate in the election (36% and 46% respectively), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (66% and 49% respectively) compared to the religious (44%), among supporters of the peace process (54%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (39%), and among merchants and the unemployed (56% and 53% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, laborers, and students (29%, 45%, 45%, and 46% respectively).

Findings also show that support for use of knives in the current confrontations with Israel continues to decline in this poll, dropping from 58% three months ago to 51%. Support for knifing attacks in the Gaza Strip stands at 75% and in the West Bank at 36%. Three months ago, support among West Bankers for knifing attacks stood at 44% and among Gazans at 82%. Nonetheless, support for the Jerusalem bus bombing attack which took place in mid-April and cause more than 20 Israeli injuries stands at 65%; only 31% say they oppose this bombing attack. Support for the bus bombing attack is higher in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (59%), among residents of refugee camps and residents of cities (72% and 67% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns (54%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (76%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (55%), among voters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 62% respectively) compared to Fatah voters (53%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (80%) compared to supporters of the peace process (57%), among refugees (70%) compared to non-refugees (62%), among holders of BA degree (70%) compared to illiterates (49%), among merchants and students (73% and 72% respectively) compared to the retired, laborers, and farmers (34%, 57%, and 60% respectively), among the unmarried (70%) compared to the married (65%).

With regard to expectations, 25% believe that the current confrontations will develop into a new armed intifada, 17% believe they will develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, and 13% believe they will develop in both directions. By contrast, 29% believe the confrontation will stay as they are now and 13% believe they will gradually dissipate. Three months ago, 29% said that the current confrontations will develop into an armed intifada.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 54% support a return to an armed intifada; 75% support joining more international organizations; 56% support a popular non-violent resistance; 43% support the dissolution of the PA. Three months ago, 56% supported return to armed intifada. In the West Bank, current level of support for an armed intifada stands at 51% (compared to 52% three months ago). 58% of the public (68% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 65% (75% in the Gaza Strip and 59% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Moreover, 41% of the public (52% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 54% said that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Finally, findings indicate that 32% of the public (41% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, they would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 43% (54% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not.

When comparing the level of support of various parties for the current confrontations, Hamas comes on top with 66% of the public believing that it supports them, followed by Fatah (49%). By contrast, only 26% say president Abbas supports the confrontations. 

(3) The future of the Oslo agreement and the future of security coordination:

• 56% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement.
• Only 27% believe that president Abbas is serious about abandoning the Oslo agreement.
• Similarly, only 27% believe that president Abbas is serious about ending security coordination with Israel.
• 46% say that terminating the Oslo agreement would lead to PA collapse and the return of the Israeli “civil administration.”

56% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 63% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 30% opposed it. Support for the abandonment of the Oslo agreement stands at 57% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip. Support for abandoning the Oslo agreement is higher among men (63%) compared to women (50%), among Hamas voters, the undecided, and voters of third parties (63%, 60%, and 58% respectively) compared to Fatah voters (47%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (48%), among holder of BA degree (62%) compared to the illiterates (51%), among farmers, employees, merchants, and the retired (87%, 65%, 61%, and 60% respectively) compared to students and housewives (46% and 49% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (73%) compared to those who work in the private sector (61%).

When asked about the seriousness of the PA leadership regarding abandoning the Oslo agreement, 67% of the public indicated that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 27% think he is serious. Three months ago, 65% expressed the view that the president is not serious.  Similarly, we asked the public about its assessment of the seriousness of the Palestinian leadership regarding its intention to suspend security coordination with Israel in light of the Israeli announcement that the IDF will not stop its incursions into Palestinian cities. More than two-thirds (68%) indicated that the PA leadership is not serious while only 27% indicated it believes the PA leadership is serious.

We told the public that a Palestinian abandonment of the Oslo agreement might lead to one of two outcomes: the collapse of the Palestinian authority and the return of the Israeli “civil administration” or alternatively an Israeli suspension of its settlement activities and return to serious negotiations with the Palestinian side. We asked the public what it thought was the most likely outcome: 46% selected the collapse of the PA while 41% selected the Israeli suspension of its settlement activities.

(4) Palestinian Elections:

• 65% want president Abbas to resign and 31% want him to stay in office.
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 43% and the latter 48%.
• In presidential elections between Abbas, Haniyeh, and Marwan Barghouti, the first receives 20%, the second 35%, and the third 40%.
• If parliamentary elections took place today, Fatah receives 34% of the vote, Hamas 31%, and all other electoral lists combined 9%; 26% say they have not decided yet.

65% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our previous poll three months ago. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 30% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh;  Rami al Hamdallah receive 6%; Khalid Mishal, and Mustapha Barghouti and Mohammad Dahlan receive 5% each; and Saeb Erekat and Salam Fayyad receives 2% each. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% which is similar to the level of satisfaction we obtained three months ago.  Level of satisfaction with Abbas are identical in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 48% (compared to 52% three months ago) and the latter 43% (compared to 41% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 44% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 49% (compared to 54% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 41% (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh 47% (compared to 50% three months ago).  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 20%, Barghouti 40% and Haniyeh 35%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 75% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 34% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 26% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 33% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 35% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 34% three months ago).

(5) Domestic Conditions:

• Perception of security stands at 44% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank.
• In the Gaza Strip, percentage of those wishing to emigrate stands at 45% and in the West Bank at 22%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands today at 80%.
• 52% believe that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 41% believe it is an asset.
• More than three quarters of the public oppose the suspension of PLO financial payment to the PFLP and the DFLP.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 12% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 44%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands also at 44%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 47% and in the West Bank at 39%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago 48% of Gazans and 21% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate. The largest percentage (40%) of those who seek to emigrate indicates that the main motivation is search for jobs; 23% say difficult conditions imposed by Israeli occupation forces them to seek to emigrate; 12% say it is the lack of security and 9% say it is the lack of freedoms and democracy that push them out.

In an open-ended question, we asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al-Jazeera TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Hamas’ al Aqsa Palestine TV at 18%, Palestine TV and Maan-Mix at 17% each, Palestine Today (Filasteen al Youm) at 7%, Al Arabiya at 6%, al Quds TV at 4%, and al Mayadeen at 2%. 

We asked the public about its impressions regarding corruption, freedom of the press, the ability to criticize government and if the PA is a burden or an asset for the Palestinian people: Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%.  17% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 16% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. Finally, a majority of 52% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while only 41% view it as an asset. Percentage of those who think the PA is a burden is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (53%) compared to the West Bank (51%). It is also higher among residents of refugee camps (60%) compared to residents of villages and residents of cities (45% and 52% respectively), among voters of Hamas, third parties, and those who do not intend to participate in the election (79%, 60%, and 60% respectively) compared to votes of Fatah (18%), among the religious (56%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (38% and 49% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to supporters of the peace process (39%), among holders of BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (41%), among farmers, merchants, laborers, and the retired (63%, 59%, 58%, and 57% respectively) compared to professionals and employees (46% and 48% respectively), and among those who work in the private sector (57%) compared to those who work in the public sector (43%).  

An overwhelming majority of 76% indicates that it does not agree with the decision apparently taken by the PA president to withhold financial support from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; only 16% agree with that decision.

(6) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government, and the possibility of another Gaza war:

• Optimism regarding reconciliation stands at 36% and pessimism at 60%.
• 28% are satisfied and 63% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• Only 19% blame Hamas for the bad performance of the reconciliation government
• 71% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the Gaza public sector under the former Hamas government.
• 65% want the reconciliation government to supervise security and police services in the Gaza Strip.
• 55% believe that there is a high probability of a new war against the Gaza Strip in the near future.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 36% and pessimism at 60%. Three months ago optimism stood at 38% and pessimism at 59%.  28% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 66% and in the West Bank at 62%. We asked the public who is responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government. Findings show that belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 19% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) while 35% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 15% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

71% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salaries of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (69%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salaries of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government. In return, 65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; only 26% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  Similarly, 75% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the pervious Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 21% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

We asked the public if it believes that there might be a real chance to open the Rafah Crossing on a normal regular schedule now after the meetings in Cairo between Hamas and the Egyptian officials and in light of the Doha meetings between Fatah and Hamas officials. 55% said there is a chance for that and 39% said there was no real chance for that. In light of recent talk about a possible Gaza war, we asked the public about its expectations: 55% said the prospects for such war in the near future are high or very high and 40% said the prospects are low or very low. A majority of 57% of Gazans believe the prospects for war are high or very high.

(7) The Arab World, war in Syria, ISIS, and US elections:

• 78% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own problems and that Palestine is no longer the Arabs’ principle cause.
• On Syrian, 40% are in favor of the Syrians Free Army, 18% favor Assad, and 5% favor radical Islamists such as ISIS.
• 88% see ISIS as an extreme group that does not represent Islam and 79% support the war against it.
• 70% believe that there is no difference between Clinton and Trump.

78% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 20% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.  In fact, 59% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 30% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

In light of the escalating conflict in Syria and the emergence of three main parties to the conflict, we asked the public for its view on the party it views as the more preferable or the one it views as the least harmful. The largest percentage (40%) chose the Free Syrian army, 18% chose Bashar Asad and his army, and 5% chose the extreme religious opposition, such as ISIS. 23% said they do not like any of the three parties.

An overwhelming majority of 88% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 8% believe it does represent true Islam. 4% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 16% (compared to 3% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 79% support and 18% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

We asked the public about the US elections and which presidential candidate, Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump, it viewed best for the Palestinians. A large majority (70%) said there is no difference between the two candidates, while 12% said Clinton is better and 7% said Trump is better.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% view Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state as the top most important Palestinian goal and 32% think the most vital goal is the right of return.
• 38% view poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 31% think it is occupation and settlement construction.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 38% of the pubic; 31% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and; 10% believe it is the spread of corruption in public institutions.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 7 and 11 June 2023. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several important developments including the passing of 75 years since Nakba and the rocket exchange between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ student body, the Islamic Bloc won student elections at Birzeit University and al Najah University. In a speech at the UN, president Abbas asked for international protection for the Palestinian people. In Israel, widespread demonstrations by the opposition to the Israeli government judicial reforms continued while in the West Bank violent confrontations between Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli army led to increased exposure to violence. Regionally, an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement create shock waves throughout the Middle East. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

This poll examines the 75th anniversary of the Nakba. Findings indicate that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians blame Arab or international parties or the Zionist movement for the Nakba, while internal Palestinian weakness comes at the bottom of the list. Although this outcome was expected, the small percentage that saw Palestinian weakness as responsible for the Nakba indicates the persistence of a huge Palestinian sense of victimhood. However, when asked about the most damaging developments since the Nakba, the largest percentage referred to internal division, the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while the Israeli 1967 occupation came in the second place. When asked about the best thing that happened to the Palestinians since the Nakba, about two-thirds listed two: the establishment of the PLO in the 1960s and the establishment of the PA in the 1990s, while a quarter believed that the formation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their entry into armed struggle in the 1980s was the best development followed by those who selected the formation of Fatah in the 1960s and its launch of armed struggle.

Findings also indicate that about two-thirds of the public do not fear a repeat of the Nakba. To the contrary, two-thirds of the public do not believe that Israel will celebrate its centenary, and a majority, albeit a small one, believes that the Palestinian people will, in the future, be able to recover Palestine and return its refugees to their homes.

The results of the second quarter of 2023 also indicate a decline in the popularity of Fatah and President Abbas in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, accompanied by a decline in satisfaction with the president's performance, especially in light of his recent speech at the United Nations. The increased dissatisfaction led to greater demand for Abbas’ resignation, reaching 80%.  The PA's standing is also worsening, with the percentage of those who believe that its continued existence is in Israel's interest increasing by six percentage points in three months while half of the public says that the collapse or dissolution of the PA serves the Palestinian interest.

We asked about the recent armed confrontations between the Gaza Strip and Israel. Although a small percentage of the Palestinian public believed that Hamas did not participate or participated to a small extent in these confrontations, Hamas's popularity was not damaged in either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.

We explored attitudes on the peace process. Support for the two-state solution remains as low as it was three months ago. So does the support for the one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israeli Jews. We also asked about the most effective way to end the Israeli occupation. Although the majority still sees armed struggle as the best way to achieve this goal, this percentage has fallen by three points compared to three months ago. Expectations of a third intifada have also dropped dramatically in the West Bank, falling by 15 points.

Findings show that a quarter of the public views the pro judiciary protest demonstrations in Israel with admiration, with the largest percentage saying that the Israeli judicial system is independent while the Palestinian judiciary is subordinate to the president or the government. In comparing the two judicial systems, the Palestinian and the Israeli, only one-fifth of the Palestinian public believes that the Palestinian judiciary is independent of the executive branch.

On regional developments, the largest percentage believes that the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation will not have a negative or positive impact on the Palestinian issue in general or on the prospects for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, or on Saudi-Palestinian relations, or on Arab normalization with Israel, or even on stopping the war in Yemen. But between one-fifth and one-third expect the impact on all these issues to be positive. 

• The weak and conspiratorial Arab role and the British Mandate were mainly responsible for the Nakba
• The split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is most damaging development that has happened to the Palestinian people since the Nakba followed by the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
• The best thing that has happened to the Palestinian people since the Nakba is the establishment of Islamic movements, the two intifadas, the establishment of the PLO and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority
• Two-thirds of the public do not fear a repeat of the Nakba
• Steadfastness on the land is the most important lesson of the Nakba
• 66% believe Israel will not celebrate its 100th anniversary and 51% believe that the Palestinian people will be able to recover Palestine in the future

On the occasion of the Nakba, the overwhelming majority places the blame for it on non-Palestinian parties while only 7% believe that the weakness of the Palestinian people is primarily responsible. The "weak and conspiratorial Arab role" comes first with 38%, followed by the British Mandate with 36%, and Zionist organizations and movements with 16%. The largest percentage (35%) believes that the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is the most damaging development that has befallen the Palestinian people during the past seventy-five years; 32% believe that the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 was the most damaging since the Nakba. With 25% selecting it, comes the inability of the refugees to return to their homes and the unresolved nature of the refugee problem; 7% believe that armed conflicts between Palestinians and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon were the most damaging development that happened during the past 75 years. The following figure shows that there are no significant differences in the perceptions of the Palestinian public in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip regarding these four damaging developments.

When asked what has been the most positive or the best thing that has happened to the Palestinian people since the Nakba, the largest percentage (24%) said that it was the establishment of Islamic movements, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their participation in armed struggle; 21% said that it was the eruption of the first and second intifada; 18% said the establishment of the PLO; 14% said the establishment of the PA in the mid-nineties, and 9% said it was the establishment of Fateh in the sixties and the launch of the armed struggle. The following figure shows that there are significant differences in the perceptions of the Palestinian public in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip regarding these positive developments.

About two thirds (64%) say they do not fear a recurrence of the Nakba while 33% say they fear it will happen again.  Belief that the Nakba will not be repeated is higher in the Gaza Strip (71%) compared to the West Bank (59%), among men (67%) compared to women (61%), among holders of BA degree (67%) compared to those with primary education and illiterates (61% and 50% respectively), among students (70%) compared to employees and housewives (62% each), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in the private sector (62%), among the religious (69%) compared to the somewhat religious (60%), among those with the lowest income (64%) compared to those with the highest income (45%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (71% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (65%).

When asked about the most important lesson from the Nakba for the Palestinian people, the largest percentage (44%, of which 54% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the need to remain steadfast on the ground and to remain in the land even in the event of war; 23% believe it is the necessity of self-reliance rather than the reliance on Arab or friendly countries; and only 9% (15% in the Gaza Strip and 5% in the West Bank) believe it is the need to seek political solutions to the conflict with Israel.

We asked about the main reasons for the flight of refugees from their homes in 1948: the largest percentage (43%) said it was the mass displacement by armed Zionist forces; a similar percentage (40%) said it was fear of massacres; and 15% said it was a desire to seek safer places.

In comparing the current Palestinian leadership with the one that led the Palestinian people during the Nakba, the largest percentage (40%) said that neither leadership is better than the other as the performance of the two leaderships is not good; 23% said that the leadership of the Nakba was better than the current leadership while a similar percentage (22%) said the current leadership is the best; 10% said that neither is better than the other because both performed well.

In describing the standing of the State of Israel today, the largest percentage of the public (42%; 51% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip) said Israel is one of the most powerful countries in the world economically and militarily. By contrast, 35% (44% in the Gaza Strip and 28% in the West Bank) believe Israel is a weak and fragmented state on the verge of collapse; and 21% believe it is a normal state like most other small states in the world.

When asked whether Israel will celebrate its 100th anniversary, a majority of two thirds (66%) says it will not do so while 27% say it will; 7% say it does not know. The belief that Israel will not celebrate its centenary is higher among holders of BA degree (71%) compared to those with primary education (62%), among those who work in the private sector (68%) compared to those who work in the public sector (63%), among the religious (68%) compared to the somewhat religious (64%), among those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (68%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 49 years (63%), among those with the lowest income (68%) compared to those with the highest income (51%), and among supporters of Hamas (78%) compared to supporters of Fateh and third parties (62% and 65% respectively).

When asked whether the Palestinian people will be able in the future to regain Palestine and repatriate the refugees, a slim majority of 51% says that this will indeed happen while 45% believe that this will not happen. Belief that the Palestinian people are capable of recovering Palestine in the future is higher in the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (49%), among refugees (54%) compared to non-refugees (50%), among students (56%) compared to employees (48%) among those who work in the private sector (51%) compared to those who work in the public sector (46%), among the religious (56%) compared to the somewhat religious (49%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (64%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and higher (50%), and among supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fateh and third parties (51% and 44% respectively).

• 32% believe that no one has won the recent rocket confrontations between the Gaza Strip and Israel
• 41% say Hamas did not participate in that rocket confrontation

The largest percentage of the Palestinian public, 32% (41% in the West Bank and only 18% in the Gaza Strip), believes that no side has won the recent rocket confrontations between Israel and the Gaza Strip. One quarter believes that all armed resistance groups in the Gaza Strip have emerged victorious. Additionally, 19% believe that Islamic Jihad has emerged victorious while 6% believe Hamas has won, i.e. 50% of the public believe that the Palestinian side emerged victorious. By contrast, 14% (23% in the Gaza Strip and 9% in the West Bank) believe that Israel has won.

We asked the public what it thinks of Hamas's role in the most recent rocket confrontation between the Gaza Strip and Israel. The largest percentage (41%) said Hamas did not participate and that Islamic Jihad fought alone, while only 13% said Hamas participated fully in the confrontation alongside Islamic Jihad. 37% (46% in the Gaza Strip and 31% in the West Bank) said Hamas participated in the fighting but not with all its weight.

• 71% support the formation of armed groups
• 86% say the PA does not have the right to arrest members of these armed groups
• 58% believe that armed groups will spread to the rest of the West Bank
• 51% expect a third intifada

71% of the public (79% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den” and the “Jenin Battalion,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 23% are against that.  Support for the formation of armed groups increases in the Gaza Strip (79%) compared to the West Bank (66%), in refugee camps and cities (85% and 72% respectively) compared to villages (61%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (77%) compared to those whose age is 40 years and above (69%), among refugees (78%) compared to non-refugees (66%), among holders of BA degree (77%) compared to those with primary education (70%), among students (80%) compared to merchants (50%), among the unmarried (76%) compared to the married (70%) among the religious (76%) compared to the somewhat religious (68%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (86% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (65%).

A majority of 55% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 41% are not worried.  Nonetheless, 80% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 16% say they are for it. The vast majority (86%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 11% say they favor it.

A majority of 58% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 14% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 16% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups. A majority of 51% (54% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) expect security conditions in the West Bank to continue to escalate leading to the eruption of a third armed intifada; 36% say they do not expect a third intifada. It is worth noting that three months ago, 61% (69% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) expected the current escalation to lead to a third intifada.

• 43% say that Israel's punitive measures against the PA are aimed at weakening it and not pushing it to collapse
• 63% say that Israel's interest lies in the continued existence of the PA
• Half of the public says that the interest of the Palestinian people lies in the dissolution or collapse of the PA

The largest percentage (43%) says Israeli punitive measures against the PA aim at weaking it; 25% think Israel aims at forcing a PA collapse; and 28% think Israel does not want to weaken the PA or bring it to collapse. When asked to define Israel’s interest regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse, the majority (63%) says the survival of the PA is in Israel’s interest while 34% think Israel’s interest lies in the collapse of the PA. Three months ago, 57% said the continued existence of the PA is an Israeli interest. The belief that Israel's interest lies in the survival of the PA is higher in the West Bank (72%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), among men (67%) compared to women (58%), among those whose age is 50 years and over (66%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (56%), among non-refugees (69%) compared to refugees (55%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (75% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (54%).

When asked to define the interest of the Palestinian people regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse or dissolution, half (50%) says the Palestinian people’s interest lies in the collapse or dissolution of the PA while 46% define the continued existence of the PA as a Palestinian interest. Three months ago, 52% said the interest of the Palestinian people lies in the PA dissolution or collapse.

In the event that the PA becomes weak or collapses, such a development is seen by 50% of the public as leading to the strengthening of the armed groups in the West Bank while 13% think it will weaken them; 33% think it will neither weaken nor strengthen the armed groups.

• 69% want elections to take place but 67% do not expect that to happen
• In elections between president Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, Haniyeh wins 56% and Abbas 33%
• Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 17% and 80% want him to resign
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 34% of the popular vote and Fateh 31%
• 31% say Hamas deserve to represent the Palestinian people and 21% say Fateh led by Abbas deserves to do that 
• 46% believe that Hamas' victory in student elections at Birzeit and An-Najah universities reflects public attitudes Palestinian in the West Bank

A majority of 69% say it supports the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 28% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 77% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 67% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 56% of the votes (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 36% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 30% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 65%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 61% and from among those, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 28% and the latter 61%.

In an open-ended question, where no names were provided to respondents, we asked the public to select a successor to president Abbas. The largest percentage (27%) selected Marwan Barghouti, 16% went to Haniyyeh, followed by Shtayyeh and Mohammad Dahlan (4% each), Khalid Mishal and Yahya al Sinwar (3% each), Hussein al Shaykh (2%), and 1% selected Mustafa Barghouti. A total of 41% said they do not know or do not support anyone.  When the same question was asked in a close-ended format, with names provided, the public expressed preference to Marwan Barghouti to succeed Abbas by 35,, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Khalid Mish’al, Mohammad Dahlan, and Mohammad Shtayyeh and Yahya al Sinwar (4% each), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%); 28% said they do not know or have not decided.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 17% and dissatisfaction at 80%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 17% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 19% and dissatisfaction at 77%. Moreover, a vast majority of 80% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 16% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 77% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 78% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip. The demand for the resignation of president Abbas is higher in the Gaza Strip (85%) compared to the West Bank (78%), in refugee camps and cities (84% and 82% respectively) compared to villages (74%), among women (83%) compared to men (79%), among holders of BA degree (87%) compared to those with primary education and the illiterates (75% and 49% respectively), among students (84%) compared to laborers (72%), among those with the lowest income (84%) compared to those with the highest income (75%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (94% and 86% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (57%).

51% say they heard and 47% say they did not hear Abbas' recent speech at the UN in which he demanded international protection for the Palestinian people. But 82% of those who heard the speech say they are dissatisfied with what the president said in his speech while only17% of those who heard the speech say they are satisfied with it. Dissatisfaction with Abbas' speech increases in the West Bank (85%) compared to the Gaza Strip (78%), in cities and villages (84% and 80% respectively) compared to refugee camps (72%), among women (85%) compared to men (80%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (92%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (79%), among holders of BA degree (86%) compared to those with primary education (73%), among those who work in the private sector (84%) compared to those who work in the public sector (72%); and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (96% and 79% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (59%).

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that p articipated in the 2006 elections, 66% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 31% say they will vote for Fatah, 11% will vote for all third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 44% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 25% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago).

31% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 21% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 43% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 26% selected Hamas, 24% Fatah under Abbas, and 44% said neither side deserves such a role.

A majority of 51% thinks that the recent student election results of Birzeit and al Najah universities, in which the student bloc affiliated with Hamas won over the student bloc affiliated with Fatah, does not reflect the balance of power in the Palestinian society in the West Bank or among the students in general; 46% think these results do reflect the positions of the total public in the West Bank. The belief that the victory of Hamas-affiliated students at Birzeit and Al-Najah universities reflects general attitudes in the West Bank as a whole increases in the Gaza Strip (63%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (49%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (44%), among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (38%), among holders of BA degree (50%) compared to those with primary education and the illiterates (34% and 33% respectively), among students (49%) compared to merchants (26%), among those who work in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private sector (45%), among the religious (53%) compared to the somewhat religious (40%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (76% and 55% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (29%).

• 84% believe there is corruption in PA institutions and 73% believe there is corruption in Hamas-run institutions in the Gaza Strip
• 63% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people
• 25% want to emigrate, 29% in the Gaza Strip and 22% in the West Bank

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 46%. Three months ago, the perception of safety and security in the West Bank stood at 46% and at 73% in the Gaza Strip.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 73% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 82% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 71% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas. 40% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 55% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (63%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, the findings were exactly the same: 63% viewed the PA as a burden and 33% viewed it as an asset.

23% are optimistic and 74% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 22%.

After more than four years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 81% expect failure; only 15% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 16% of the public expect success and 79% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 81% expects failure and 16% expects success. The following figure shows that the trend, which started four years ago with a little optimistic expectation to begin with, have declined significantly over the last two years.

25% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 29% and in the West Bank at 22%. Three months ago, 19% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 32% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 33%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Palestine Today TV (9% each), Maan TV (5%), al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (at 3% each), and al Manar at 1%.

• Only 28% support the two-state solution
• 53% support a return to an armed intifada, 47% support waging peaceful resistance, and 26% support a one-state solution
• 52% believe that armed action is the best way to end occupation
• 46% expect the fall of the Netanyahu government due to the protest demonstrations
• A quarter look with admiration at the protest demonstrations against Netanyahu

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 70%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 27%.  Support for the two-state solution is correlated with perception of feasibility and the prospects for the creation of a Palestinian state. A vast majority of 71% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 28% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 78% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 74% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion. The following figure shows the significance of the correlation between support for the two-state solution and the perception of feasibility.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 21% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 76% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 22%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 47% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 53% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 58% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 52% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 52% chose armed struggle (55% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank), 21% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Three months ago, 54% chose armed struggle and 18% chose negotiations.

In light of the anti-government demonstrations in Israel, 46% think they could lead to the fall of the Netanyahu government while 49% think they do not expect that to happen. Three months ago, 50% expected the fall of the Netanyahu government.

When asked whether the public views the Israeli demonstrations against the Netanyahu government with admiration, a quarter (33% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip) said these mass protests do indeed deserve admiration. But a larger percentage, standing at 35% (56% in the Gaza Strip and 21% in the West Bank) said they do not see in these demonstrations anything worth admiration and 38% (43% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) said the protest are of no concern for the Palestinian people.

When comparing the Israeli and Palestinian judiciaries, the largest percentage of the Palestinians, standing at 36% (40% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip), said that the Israeli judiciary is independent but the Palestinian judiciary is subordinate to the president or the government; 31% believe that the two judicial systems are not independent; 13% believe the Palestinian judiciary is independent and the Israeli judiciary is not; and 9% believe that the two judiciaries are independent.

• 60% do not expect the Iranian-Saudi reconciliation to reflect positively on the Palestinian issue
• 35% expect the Iranian-Saudi reconciliation to lead to further normalization with Israel and 19% expect the opposite

A majority of 60% believes that reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia will not leave a positive impact on the Palestinian issue while 30% believe it will reflect positively on it. Moreover, 36% believe that the impact of such reconciliation on Palestinian-Saudi relations will not be negative or positive, while 28% believe it will have a positive impact and 26% believe it will have a negative impact. 38% believe that the impact of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement on reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas will be neither negative nor positive; 27% believe it will have a negative impact, and 25% believe it will be positive.

Moreover, 37% believe that reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran will have neither negative nor positive impact on chances of stopping Arab normalization with Israel. But 35% believe that the effect will be negative and lead to further normalization and 19% believe it will be positive and stop or decrease normalization. The largest percentage (39%) believes that the impact of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement will be neither negative nor positive on stopping or reducing the intensity of the war in Yemen while 27% believe that it will have a positive impact and stop or reduce the war intensity, and 18% believe the impact will be negative and increase the intensity of that war.

• 38% say that the establishment of a Palestinian state should be the first goal of the Palestinian people
• Corruption is the first problem facing Palestinian society today in the eyes of 25% of the public
• The most pressing problem for Palestinians today is the continuation of occupation in the eyes of 38% of the public

38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 14% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 25% (9% in the Gaz Strip and 35% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 22% (30% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 19% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction;  18% (30% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 10% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 3% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  Not surprisingly, the following figure shows significant differences in the assessments of the West Bankers of the main problems compared to that of Gazans.

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 18% said it is unemployment; 13% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 5% said it is the internal violence, and 1% said it is the inadequate infrastructure. The following figure shows that West Bankers and Gazans agree that the Israeli occupation is the most pressing problem, but differ in their assessment of the rest of the problems.

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This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the preparation for the holding of the first phase of local elections in rural areas and small towns in the West Bank but without a confirmation of the date for holding the second phase of local elections in cities and big towns. Hamas prevented the holding of the local elections in the Gaza Strip. The first phase of local elections was held in the West Bank on 11 December, the last day of the field work, in 154 localities and the participation rate stood at 66% according the Palestinian Central Elections Commission. The number of participants stood at 262,827 voters. This period witnessed also various violent incidents in Palestinian universities and the death of one student. Israel classified 6 Palestinian human rights NGOs as terrorist organizations. The UK labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization. This press release addresses some of these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2021 show that while the public is pessimistic about the prospects of holding parliamentary or presidential elections in the near future, it is optimistic that the second phase of local elections will take place soon. The second phase of local elections is now set to take place in cities and big towns on 26 March 2022. The findings show that Fatah is more popular than Hamas in West Bank cities that will participate in the second phase of the local elections while Hamas is more popular in the Gazan cities that might participate in the second phase of the local elections.  Nonetheless, the findings show that the overall domestic balance of power between Fatah and Hamas has not changed compared to our findings of September 2021. Hamas is more popular than Fatah, and Ismail Haniyyeh easily wins against president Abba and prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in one to one competitions. But Marwan Barghouti, also from Fatah, wins against Haniyyeh with two-thirds voting for him. Three quarters of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas.

What is noticeable however is that despite the stability in the domestic balance of power, there is a clear disappointment in Hamas’ leadership indirectly expressed by the public compared to the situation six and even three months ago. The findings show that the percentage of those who choose Hamas to represent and lead the Palestinian people has declined significantly and the gap between those who choose Hamas compared to those who choose Fatah, under Abbas’ leadership, has now narrowed to 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas; in September, the gap stood at 26 points in favor of Hamas and in June, a month after the Hamas-Israel May 2021 war, the gap stood at 39% in favor of Hamas. The percentage of those who believe that neither Fatah, under Abbas, nor Hamas deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people has now increased considerably.

In this poll, we have asked about various political solutions to the conflict with Israel and about the confidence building measures that seek to improve the daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The findings show the following:

• The majority is still opposed to the two-state solution. But support for this solution has increased compared to the September 2021 findings and decreased compared to the October 2021 findings.  
• The two-state solution remains the one with the largest percentage of support compared to other solutions, including that of the one-state solution in which the two sides, Palestinians and Israeli Jews, enjoy equal rights; support for the one-state solution is higher than one quarter and less than one third.
• There is a clear majority, higher than 60%, in favor confidence building measures that improves Palestinian daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the current level of support is higher than that of September 2021 when we first asked about the issue.

Findings also show that despite a two-third opposition to a resumption of unconditional bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, a large minority approaching about half of the public is in favor of a resumption of such negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Moreover, despite the opposition of the majority to the resumption of dialogue between the US and PA, a large minority approaching half of the public believes that the US is the most effective in influencing the decisions of the Palestinians and the Israelis on the matter of the renewal of the peace process. Also on the peace process, findings show a decrease in the percentage of those who believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that negotiation is the most effective. Nonetheless, armed struggle is viewed as more effective than negotiations.

Findings also show that the largest percentage of respondents believes the main Israeli motivation behind the labeling of six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations is to weaken the ability of these organizations to document Israeli violations of human rights and to weaken the PA efforts to take Israelis to the International Criminal Court.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 70% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 27% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 52% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Nonetheless, a majority of 59% (68% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) expect the holding of the second stage of local elections in cities and big towns in the near future; 34% do not expect that.
• Fatah is more popular than Hamas (38% to 30%) in West Bank cities which will participate in the second phase of local elections while Hamas is more popular than Fatah (47% to 29%) in the cities in the Gaza Strip that might participate in the second phase of local elections.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 35% and Haniyeh 58% of the votes (compared to 56% for Haniyeh and 34% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 33% of the votes (compared to 34% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 52% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 65% and from among those Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 52% and from among those the former receives 33% and the latter 59%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received 31% and Haniyyeh 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 35% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 5% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 27% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 21% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 38% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 37% and Fatah at 32%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 27% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 38% three months ago).
• In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 34% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 36% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 45% selected Hamas, 19% Fatah under Abbas, and 28% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and in the West Bank at 51%.
• 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 31% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 21% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 36% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 83% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 61% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (56%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 34% viewed it as an asset.
• 33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 32%.
• After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 71% expect failure; only 23% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29% of the public expect success and 65% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 69% expects failure and 27% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 27%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Maan (10%), Palestine Today (9%), al Mayadeen (4%), and al Arabiya (3%).

(3) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• 58% (68% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 18% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24% say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.
• 77% (87% in the Gaza Strip and 71% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 21% are dissatisfied.
• 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 42% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, only 45% expressed satisfaction.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 69% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 69% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 39%.

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%.  
• When asked about their preferences regarding a political solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from among three specific solutions, one third (33%) preferred the “two state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel,” 16% preferred a “one state solution, from the River to the Sea, with equal rights to Jews and Arabs,” and 11% preferred a one state solution in which the status of the Palestinians would be “the same as the status of the inside Palestinians,” and 32% preferred other solutions, such as “historic Palestine,” or “full Palestine,” or “independent Palestine,” and others.
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 29% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 65% expressed opposition.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 56% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 50% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 61% said it looks positively, while 33% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 56% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
• A majority of 59% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 42% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations.
• A majority of 61% thinks that current international, regional, and local conditions does not make possible a resumption of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis while 35% think that these conditions make a resumption of negotiations possible.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 66% opposes and 26% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 46%; 49% are opposed.
• 56% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Yet, when asked about the country or party that is most influential in convincing the Palestinian and Israeli sides to return to the peace process, 46% said the US, 33% said Arab countries such as Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, or Qatar, 10% said Europe, and 3% said Russia.
• We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 38% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 19% selected the loss of the will to fight.
• When asked about the country or party most responsible for derailing the peace process in the region, 65% said it is Israel, 15% said it is the US, 15% said it is Arab countries, and 3% said Palestine.
• We asked the public about its views on the reason Israel labelled six Palestinian human rights NGOs, such as Al Haq and Addameer, as terrorists organizations. The largest percentage (40%) said the Israeli decision aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights; 20% said it aimed at weakening the PA-led campaign to try Israelis at the International Criminal Court; 17% said it aimed at weaking the ability of these NGOs to document PA violations of human rights in the West Bank; 11% said it aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Hamas’ violations of human rights in the Gaza Strip, and another 11% said it aimed at weakening the PFLP.   
• In reaction to the UK government decision to label Hamas as a terrorist organization and the idea of boycotting British products, 49% expressed the belief that such a boycott would be effective in forcing the UK government to rescind its decision while 45% think the boycott would not be effective.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (26%; 15% in the Gaz Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 22% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 20% said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 5%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 26% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the internal violence, and 10% said it is the split or division.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-16 September 2017. The popular confrontations with the Israeli police in Jerusalem in protest over the installment of metal detectors at the entrance to al Haram al Sharif gates were the most important event during the period in question. During the confrontations, President Abbas announced the suspension of contacts with the Israeli side, including security coordination. Internally, the split and disunity characterized the Palestinian political scene, except during the last two days of data collection when delegates from Hamas and Fatah were called to Cairo for Egyptian sponsored talks.  During this period, President Abbas issued a decree in the form of a Cybercrime Law that was severely criticized by human rights organizations, media outlets, and other civil society organizations. Several journalists were arrested in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It should be pointed out that data collection was completed just one day before Hamas announced the dissolution of its “Administrative Committee” that has served until then as the de facto government in the Gaza Strip. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2017 show that an overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public is worried about the future of liberties in Palestine. This prevailing perception seems to be driven by the recent increase in the incidents in which journalists and activists have been arrested, by the recently announced presidential decree enacting a cybercrime law, and by the government proposed amendments to the Law of the Judiciary. A large majority believes that Palestinians cannot criticize the PA without fear. In fact, half of the public believes that the PA has now become a burden on the Palestinian people.  

This worry about the future of liberties, along with the concerns about the steps taken by the PA against the Gaza Strip, might be responsible for the increase in the demand for the resignation of President Abbas and the decline in his popularity compared to that of Hamas’ presidential candidate, Ismael Haniyeh. Indeed, if presidential elections are held today, Haniyeh would win against Abbas. Findings also indicate a decline in support for Fatah, particularly in the Gaza Strip where Hamas is more popular. In the West Bank however, Fatah remains more popular than Hamas.

Perhaps the most alarming result of this poll is the fundamental shift in the attitudes of Gazans. This shift was first noticed early this year but accelerated during the past nine months. It is probable that the change came as a response to the punitive steps taken by President Abbas against the Gaza Strip. The split that rested essentially on the power struggle between two large political parties in the entire Palestinian territories is in the process of transformation to one between West Bankers and Gazans, a split that did not exist during the first nine years of Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip. Gazans are moving away from Fatah and the Palestinian leadership in an unprecedented way and without a parallel or similar process among West Bankers. President Abbas might have hoped that the sanctions he imposed on the Gaza Strip would force Gazans to reject Hamas and its policies forcing Hamas to dismantle its “Administrative Committee” that has served as a de facto government for the Gaza Strip. Despite the limited decline in Hamas’ popularity in this poll, it is plainly clear that Gazans are directing their greatest anger at Abbas and Fatah, rather than Hamas. Today, 80% of Gazans want Abbas’ resignation, satisfaction with the performance of the president is about 20%, and it is certain that he would lose any presidential elections in the Gaza Strip to Hamas’ Ismael Haniyeh. Moreover, Fatah is fast losing its popularity in the Gaza Strip, standing at 28% today compared to 40% only nine months ago.  Those who still support Fatah in the Gaza Strip are shifting loyalty to Mohammad Dahlan whose popularity among Gazans has more than doubled during the past nine months, from 9% to 23% today, while his popularity among West Bankers did not change, remaining hardly at 1%.

Despite the fact that positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip remains very low, the poll found some positive indicators: the desire to migrate has declined somewhat and the perception of personal and family safety and security has increased. It is also interesting to note the large increase in support for the Hamas-Dahlan deal and the optimism of the majority of Gazans who believe that the deal will be successfully implemented.

It is also worth noting the increase in public confidence in popular non-violent resistance in the aftermath of the success in removing the metal detectors installed by the Israeli police in front of the gates of al Haram al Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary). Support for this model of resistance now reaches two thirds. It should be noted however that the findings also show a rise in support for violence despite the fact that a majority remains opposed to it. One reason for the rise in support for violent and non-violent resistance might be the lack of trust in diplomacy. Findings show that about three quarters believe that the Trump Administration is not serious about Palestinian-Israeli peace making and an even higher percentage believes that the Administration is not an honest broker and that it is biased in favor of Israel.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 67% want president Abbas to resign and only 31% are satisfied with his performance.
• In presidential elections between Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former receives 50% and the latter 42%.
• In presidential elections between Ismail Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, the former receives 36% and the latter 59%.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 36% of the vote, Hamas 29%, and third parties combined 10%.

67% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 27% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 60% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip. Demand for Abbas’ resignation is higher in cities and refugee camps (70% and 69% respectively) compared to villages and towns (52%), among the religious (73%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (63% and 52% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (84%) compared to those who support the peace process (56%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (94% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (34%), among those between the ages of 18 and 22 (69%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (59%), among the refugees (73%) compared to non-refugees (62%), among holder of BA degree (68%) compared to illiterates (48%), and among students (73%) compared to the retirees (55%). If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 21% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 9% (1% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip); Mustapha Barghouti (5%); and Khalid Mishal and Rami al Hamdallah (4% each). Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 34% (39% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 50% and the latter 42%of the vote (compared to  45% each three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the vote (compared to 39% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 55% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 45% (compared to 50% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 40% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 20%, Barghouti 43% and Haniyeh 33%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 63% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 25% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 31% (compared to 35% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 36% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 24% three months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 40% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• 58% of those who are aware of the debate on the Cybercrime Law believe that it imposes restrictions on liberties and among those who are aware of the debate on the proposed amendments to the Law of the Judiciary, 55% believe the amendments are a threat to the independence of the judiciary.
• 80% are worried about the future of liberties in Palestine.
• 50% believe the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people.
• Perception of personal safety and security stands at 49% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank.
• 73% support Abbas’ decision to suspend contacts and security coordination with Israel but two-thirds believe that the PA does not in fact implement that decision. 

Half of the public is not aware of the debate among the Palestinians surrounding the Cybercrime Law. Among those who are aware of the debate, 58% express the view that the law imposes restrictions on liberties and 39% believe it does not. The belief among those who are aware of the debate that the Law restrict liberties is higher in cities and refugee camps (59% and 58% respectively) compared to villages and towns (48%), among women (60%) compared to men (56%), among supporters of Hamas and the third parties (62% and 57% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (50%), among the holders of BA degree (54%) compared to the illiterates (43%), and among students (59%) compared to farmers and professionals (41% and 47% respectively).

Similarly, 60% are not aware of the debate surrounding the proposed amendments to the Law of the Judiciary. Among those who are aware of the debate, 55% express the view that the proposed amendments pose a threat to the independence of the judiciary and 38% think the amendments will improve the performance of the judiciary.  In light of the increase in the incidents of the detention of journalist and activists in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 80% are worried about the future of liberties in Palestine. The level of worry is higher in the West Bank, standing at 85%, than in the Gaza Strip, standing at 71%; 17% are not worried.  81% believe that the PA does not have the right to arrest activists, such as Issa Amro from Hebron, just because they criticize the behavior of the PA; 14% belief the PA has the right to arrest its critics. Worry about the future of liberties in Palestine is higher among supporters of Hamas (85%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (72% and 69% respectively).

Only 38% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 59% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.  Half of the pubic (50%) view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 44% view it as an asset. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 21%. Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 49%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 50%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 43% and in the West Bank at 53%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 43%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago, 47% of Gazans and 23% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate.

In light of the recent incident in which an armed man, who was attempting to cross the Rafah border with Egypt, exploded a bomb that killed him and a Hamas policeman, 73% indicate that they are worried about the spread of Daesh (ISIS) among the youth in the Gaza Strip and 24% are not worried. Worry is higher in the Gaza Strip (78%) than in the West Bank (70%).

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Maan TV (14%), al Aqsa TV (13%), Palestine TV (12%), Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (11%), Al Arabiya (6%) al Quds TV (4%), and al Mayadeen (3%).  

73% support and 23% oppose Abbas’ decision to suspend contacts and security coordination with Israel but two thirds (66%) believe that the PA and its security services did not implement that decision. The belief that the PA and its security services have not implemented Abbas decision is higher in the West Bank (68%) compared to the Gaza Strip (63%), among men (69%) compared to women (63%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (80%) compared to supporters of the peace process (59%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (84% and 71% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (46%), and among students (69%) compared to employees (61%).

(3) Reconciliation, the reconciliation government, and the Hamas-Dahlan agreement:  

• Only 31% are optimistic and 61% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation.
• 23% are satisfied and 64% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• Only 15% say Hamas is responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government and 48% believe the responsibility for that goes to the PA, president Abbas, and the prime minister.
• 56% support the Hamas-Dahlan agreement and 47% think it will succeed.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 31% and pessimism at 61%. Three months ago optimism stood at 27% and pessimism at 64%. 23% say they are satisfied and 64% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 77% and in the West Bank at 56%. Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 15% (9% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip) while 33% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 15% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

47% believe that the Hamas-Dahlan agreement will fail and 43% think it will succeed. In the Gaza Strip, 57% think it will succeed and 39% think it will fail.  56% support the Hamas-Dahlan agreement and 35% oppose it. In the Gaza Strip, support for the agreement stands at 73% and opposition at 25%. Three months ago, only 40% supported the agreement and 48% opposed it and support for it in the Gaza Strip stood at 61%. Support for the agreement is higher in cities and refugee camps (58% and 57% respectively) compared to villages and towns (44%), among women (61%) compared to men (50%), among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (52% and 38% respectively), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (66% and 61%) compared to supporters of Fatah (48%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (58%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (49%), among refugees (64%) compared to non-refugees (49%), among holders of BA degree (64%) compared to the illiterates (44%), among employees and students (63% and 60% respectively) compared to the retirees, farmers, and professionals (29%, 37%, and 45% respectively), and among those who work in the public sector (59%) compared to those who work in the private sector (50%).

(4) Confrontations at the gates of al Haram al Sharif  

• 73% believe it was the residents of Jerusalem who forced Israel to remove the metal detectors.
• 63% view popular peaceful confrontations as an effective means of resistance.

An overwhelming majority of 73% believe that the Jerusalem residents who took part in the confrontations that made it possible to force Israel to uninstall the metal detectors played the greatest role in the success of the confrontations. Only 10% attribute the success to the Waqf men; 7% to King Abdullah; 6% to president Abbas, and 1% to King Salman of Saudi Arabia. 63% believe that the approach adopted in the confrontations at the gates of al Haram al Sharif provide a successful model to emulate in confrontations with the Israeli occupation; 34% think the model is not effective.

(5) Convening the Palestinian National Council (PNC)

• 60% want an elected National Council and 61% condition convening it to the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jehad.
• 50% support holding the PNC in Ramallah and 35% support holding it in Amman or Cairo.

60% condition the convening of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) to the prior election of its members while 25% want to convene the meeting with the current membership.  Furthermore, 61% condition the convening of the PNC to the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jehad while 28% think it can be convened without them.  Conditioning the holding of the PNC session to the participation of Hamas and Islamic Jehad is higher in the West Bank (68%) compared to the Gaza Strip (49%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to supporters of the peace process (55%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (89% and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (41%), among non-refugees (65%) compared to refugees (56%), and among those who work in the private sector (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (55%).

50% support holding the meeting of the PNC in Ramallah while 35% support holding it in Cairo or Amman.  Support for holding the meeting in Ramallah is higher in the West Bank (55%) compared to the Gaza Strip (43%), in villages and towns (58%) compared to cities and refugee camps (50% and 43% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (40%), among Fatah supporters (63%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (34% and 46% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (51%) compared to the illiterates (44%);.

(6) The peace process:  

• 74% say President Donald Trump is not serious about the peace process.
• 83% believe that Trump Administration is biased in favor of Israel.
• 52% support and 47% oppose the two-state solution
• But 57% think the two-state solution is no longer practical.
• 71% support joining more international organizations, 67% support popular non-violent resistance, 45% support a return to an armed intifada, and 47% support the dissolution of the PA.
• 31% support and 67% oppose the one-state solution.

74% believe the US Administration under Donald Trump is not serious in its efforts to reach a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement; 22% think it is serious.  The belief that Trump is not serious is higher in the West Bank (83%) compared to the Gaza Strip (59%), in refugee camps and villages and towns (80% each) compared to cities (72%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (82%) compared to supporters of the peace process (69%), among supporters of Hamas (84%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (60% and 67% respectively), and among non-refugees (78%) compared to refugees (69%).

55% believe that if the Trump Administration invited the Palestinian leadership to return to negotiations with Israel, it should not accept the invitation; 41% think it should accept it.  If negotiations are resumed under US sponsorship, the Trump Administration will be biased in favor of Israel according to 83% of the public; 10% think it will be an honest broker and 2% think it will be biased in favor of the Palestinian side.

52% support and 47% oppose the two-state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel. Support in the Gaza Strip stands at 56% and in the West Bank at 49%.  But 57% think the two-state solution is no longer viable or practical due to settlement expansion while 40% think it remains feasible.  Similarly, 70% think the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 28% think the chances are medium or high.

35% think that the most effective means of creating a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel is armed action, 33% think negotiation is the most effective, and 26% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective.  In the absence of peace negotiations, 71% support joining more international organizations, 67% support non-violent popular resistance, 45% support a return to an armed intifada, and 47% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 39% and 54% supported popular non-violent resistance. Support for the one-state solution stands at 31% while 67% are opposed to this solution.

Furthermore, a majority of 58% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 25% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 16% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 78%.

77% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 22% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.  64% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 25% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be the end of occupation and the establishment of a state
• The most serious problem today is the spread of poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 26% of the public.

40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians. The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 26% of the public while 25% believe it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 23% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah