Search

December 2004 - January 2005

PRESS RELEASE

TWO THIRDS AMONG PALESTINIANS, ISRAELI JEWS AND ISRAELI ARABS SUPPORT THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS THE STATE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND PALESTINE AS THE STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between September 7 and 21 , 2005.* 

The poll was designed to explore one of the most difficult issues in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute: the recognition of the Jewish identity of Israel by Palestinians and Israeli Arabs and the recognition of the Palestinian identity in a Palestinian state by Israelis. In addition the poll examined changes in Israelis and Palestinians’ attitudes on a range of issues related to the conflict following the disengagement, both publics’ assessments of future developments and Palestinians’ attitudes on the forthcoming legislative council elections. 

This is the 13th joint poll in an ongoing research project on the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 in the wake of the Camp David summit. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1369 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted September 7-9. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of 499 Israeli Jews and a representative sample of 451 Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample was properly weighted according to the proportion of the respective sectors in the population to produce the overall Israeli estimates (overall sampling error of 3.9%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between September 11 and 19. 

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il 

*This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah. 

Summary of Results

(1) Mutual recognition of identity: Consistent majority support for a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people 
66% of the Israelis and 63% of the Palestinians support a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute. 29% of the Israelis and 35% of the Palestinians oppose such a step. Among Israeli Jews 67% support and 29% oppose this mutual recognition of identity. Even more remarkable is the majority support for this step among Israeli Arabs: 63% support and 34% oppose it. This result indicates that despite their frustration and marginalization as citizens, they are willing to accept the definition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, concurrently with the recognition of a Palestinian identity and a Palestinian state. Similar levels of support among Israelis and Palestinians were obtained in December 2004, suggesting that support for this sensitive and disputed issue of national identity has made inroads in both societies. 55% of the Israelis and 53% of the Palestinians know that a majority in their society supports a mutual recognition of identity. These levels of awareness indicate that this step has acquired normative legitimacy in both societies. However the two publics seem to be less aware of the support for such a mutual recognition in the other public: 50% of the Israelis believe there is majority support for such recognition among Palestinians; and only 43% among Palestinians believe that most Israelis support it. (2) Framing the disengagement Following the completion of the disengagement, 59% of Israelis report that they have supported it compared to 34% who state they opposed it. An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (84%) but also a slim majority among Israelis (51%) see Sharon's plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel. 47% among Israelis and 15% among Palestinians don’t see it as such. In addition, 60% of the Israelis and 73% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Intifada and armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve. Yet, surprisingly, this Palestinian assessment of the role of armed struggle in the context of disengagement and the intifada does not lead to increased support for violence against Israelis. To the contrary, 77% indicate support and 22% indicate opposition for maintaining the current ceasefire; support for the suicide attack that took place in Beer Sheva around the end of August did not exceed 37% while a majority of 56% opposed it. Moreover, 62% oppose and 35% support continued attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip and 60% support and 37% oppose collection of arms from armed factions in Gaza after a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip. Similarly, while 40% of the Palestinians give Hamas most credit for evacuating the Gaza Strip (compared to 32% to Fateh and the PA), it is Fateh, not Hamas that benefits from the greater optimism that prevailed with the Israeli withdrawal: if elections are held today, 47% would vote for Fateh while only 30% would vote for Hamas. Three months ago, 44% said they would vote for Fateh and 33% for Hamas. With the Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian priorities are shifting towards economic conditions, fighting corruption, and enforcing law and order. Here too, Fateh seems to gain indirectly from disengagement. Most Palestinians believe Fateh is more able than Hamas to deliver improved economic conditions (priority # 1 for Palestinians today), reach a peace agreement with Israel, and enforce law and order. Hamas, however is perceived as the most able to fight corruption (priority # 2 for Palestinians today). Palestinian focus on state building, rather than violence, is also seen in the strong support (73%) for the establishment of a Palestinian state with the 1967 lines as its borders that would start first in the Gaza Strip and gradually extend to the West Bank. 25% oppose such a state. (3) Conditions in the Gaza strip following the disengagement Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza strip created mixed expectations for the future among Palestinians. On the optimistic side, 64% of the Palestinians expect economic conditions in the Gaza strip to improve and 57% believe that the peace process with Israel will be enhanced. On the pessimistic side, 57% of the Palestinians fear that the Gaza strip will become a “big prison”. Indeed Israelis are quite reluctant to relax the closure on the strip. 58% of the Israelis oppose the crossing of Palestinian laborers from the Gaza into Israel compared to 40% who support it. 45% oppose the construction of a railroad to connect the Gaza strip and the West Bank while protecting Israel’s security needs, while 49% support it. However, 53% of the Israelis support the opening of the Gaza port for fishing and sailing under the supervision of the Israeli navy while 41% oppose it. Only 5% of Israelis think that Israel should bear responsibility for maintaining orderly living conditions in the Gaza strip following the disengagement. 56% think this is the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority, and 38% think it is the responsibility of both. (4) Impact of the disengagement on attitudes towards settlers and assessments of the future of the settlement project The decisive manner in which the disengagement has been carried out seems to have bolstered somewhat Israeli beliefs that Sharon is planning and capable of carrying out further unilateral disengagements in the West Bank. While 52% of the Israelis thought so in June - two months before the disengagement, 56% of the Israeli public believe so now following the completion of the disengagement. As to the future of the settlements in the longer run, 50% of the Israeli public (compared to 58% in June), believe that in the coming years the number of settlements in the West Bank will decrease. 19% expect the number of settlements to increase (18% in June). In contrast, a majority of the Palestinians (52%) fear that the number of settlements will increase in the future and 39% think it will decline compared to 52% and 33% respectively who thought so in June. The percent of Israelis supporting the dismantling of most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians decreased considerably following the disengagement. While 67% supported such a step in March and 62% supported it in June just before the disengagement, 54% support it now. However Israelis’ assessments of the settlements’ contribution to Israel’s national security did not change following the disengagement. 38% of the Israelis believe that the settlements contribute to Israel’s national security (37% in June), while 36% believe they hurt it (39% in June). 21% think that settlements neither contribute nor hurt (19% in June). If future evacuation of settlements will take place as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, 44% of Israelis believe that Jewish inhabitants of the settlements should be allowed to continue living there under Palestinian rule if they wish to do so, while 53% oppose it. As to the Palestinians, only 26% support allowing settlers wishing to live in the West Bank under Palestinian rule to do so, while 72% oppose it. (5) Focus on Jerusalem: The barrier and the E-1 plan 
In our survey we examined two of the most critical and sensitive areas of contention between Israel and the Palestinians in recent months and in the future: the barrier built by Israel around Jerusalem (“Otef Yerushalaim”) and the E-1 development plan in the corridor between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Edumim. On the first issue, Israelis were told that The security fence surrounding Jerusalem, will eventually bring about 200,000 Palestinians under Israeli rule and will separate other 55,000 Palestinians from the city. They were then asked whether the construction of the fence will strengthen or weaken Israel’s grip over Jerusalem, whether it increases or decreases the level of security in the Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem and whether they support or oppose the construction of the barrier around Jerusalem. 51% believe it will strengthen Israel’s hold on Jerusalem while 39% believe it will weaken it and 3% think it will have no impact. 73% believe the barrier will increase the level of security in the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem compared to 17% who believe security will decrease and 6% feel it will have no impact on the level of security. 62% of the Israelis support and only 30% oppose the construction of the barrier surrounding Jerusalem. On the second issue Israelis were informed that the government has begun infrastructure work in the area located between Ma’ale Edumim and Jerusalem with the intention to join together the two municipalities. If this plan comes through it will substantially impair the territorial contiguity between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank. They were then asked if this plan increases or decreases the likelihood for a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, whether it strengthens or weakens Israel’s grip over Jerusalem and the extent to which they support or oppose the plan. 22% of the Israelis believe the plan will increase the likelihood of a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, 57% believe it will decrease the likelihood for a settlement, and 8% think it will have no impact. 66% believe the plan will strengthen the grip over Jerusalem in the future, compared to 19% who believe it will weaken Israel’s hold on Jerusalem, and 7% who believe it will have no impact. 57% of the Israelis support and 28% oppose the plan. (6) Expectations for future developments and how to proceed from here. 
Both publics were asked to assess the coming developments following the successful implementation of the disengagement and the new date set for the parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Authority in January

• 5% of the Israelis and 25% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations between the parties will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 58% of the Israelis and 60% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue; and 32% of the Israelis and 11% of the Palestinians believe that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
• The poll examined Israeli and Palestinian preferences concerning the next steps that should be taken in the course of the peace process. Both publics seem to differ greatly on the specific route they prefer for that purpose. 69% of the Palestinians prefer immediate return to final status negotiations on all issues in dispute at once and 25% prefer a gradual step by step approach. Among Israelis, 59% prefer a gradual a step by step approach and 33% prefer a final status solution of all issues at once.
• If talks on a comprehensive solution begin, only 37% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians believe it is possible to reach these days a compromise settlement with the current leadership of the other side. 59% among Israelis and 68% among Palestinians believe such a settlement is currently impossible.
• When asked to assess how soon will a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians be achieved, 36% of the Palestinians and 22% of the Israelis believe a political settlement is not possible ever, 30% of the Israelis and 38% of the Palestinians believe it will be achieved in the next generation or many generation to come, 39% of the Israelis and 20% of the Palestinians think it will be reached in the next decade or the next few years.
• If a compromise settlement is nevertheless reached, 49% of the Palestinians but only 18% of the Israelis believe Abu Mazin is strong enough to convince his people to accept such as settlement. As to Sharon’s ability to deliver a comprehensive settlement, 59% of the Israelis and 53% of the Palestinians believe he is strong enough to do that.
• In the same context, 57% of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis support the Quartet’s Roadmap plan, compared to 40% among Palestinians and 34% among Israelis who oppose it.
• 47% of the Israelis believe that Israel should negotiate also with the Hamas if it is necessary in order to reach a compromise agreement; 50% oppose it. 
•  

Joint Israeli- Palestinian Public Opinion Poll 

THREATENED ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS DISENCHANTED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS AND SUPPORT FURTHER VIOLENCE

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between March 12 and 17, 2008. 

The weeks preceding the poll were characterized by increased violence between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, with Hamas intensifying its rocket shelling on Israeli civilian communities; an Israeli incursion  into Gaza that left more than 130 Palestinians dead; and a shooting attack in West Jerusalem that led to the death of 8 Israeli religious students. 

The joint poll examined Israelis and Palestinians’ assessments of the negotiations launched by the Annapolis conference and are currently going on between Olmert and Abu Mazin. It further examined Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding a permanent settlement along the lines of the Saudi (Arab league) plan and Israelis’ attitudes towards a full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria. 

The findings indicate that both Israelis and Palestinians do not hold high hopes for the Abu Mazin–Olmert talks,  don’t see them as beneficial and believe they should be stopped. With regard to the Saudi plan, Israelis oppose it while Palestinians support it. A majority of Israelis also oppose the evacuation of the Golan for peace with Syria. At the same time there is considerable support for launching rockets and suicide attacks among Palestinians, and support for retaliatory operations in Gaza among Israelis. This combination looks explosive and may perpetuate further escalation in violence between the two sides. 

The Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 13 and 15, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 597 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between March 12 and 17, 2008. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il. 

*This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ramallah. 

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Peace Process:

• 57% of the Israelis oppose and 40% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. Among Palestinians, 66% support the plan and 32% oppose it
• 44% of the Israelis support and 54% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However a sizeable Israeli majority (62%) support and only 34% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished.
• Similarly, 45% of the Israelis support and 51% oppose the release of Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiation with him, if needed to reach such an agreement.
• 67% of the Israelis support and 29% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Among Palestinians, 55% support and 44% oppose this step.
• 53% of the Israelis believe that the meetings between Mahmud Abbas and Ehud Olmert are not beneficial and should be stopped while 39% believe they should continue. Palestinians show greater disappointment with these talks. Among Palestinians a sizeable majority of 75% believe the talks should come to a halt while only 21% believe they are beneficial and should be continued.
• 66% among Israelis and 68% of the Palestinians believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state during the next five years are non-existent or weak. Only 31% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians believe chances are fair or high.
• 59% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria, and 25% support it.

(B) Threat perceptions and support of violence 

• Following the renewed wave of violence, both Israelis and Palestinians’ threat levels increased significantly compared to our December 2007 poll.
• Among Israelis, 74% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 64% in our December 2007 poll -- an increase of 10 percentage points. Among Palestinians 63% fear that their security and safety and that of their family is not assured compared to 53% three months ago, a similar 10 percentage points increase.
• 13% of the Israelis also fear that Hezbollah will react to the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh by resuming the bombing and shooting of IDF forces along the border, 21% fear that it will retaliate by resuming the rocket launches on Israeli towns, 42% believe it will perform terrorists attacks against Jews and Israelis around the world and only 13% believe it will restrain itself and will not respond. 

Consistent with the gloomy expectations from the peace process and the heightened threat feelings, Palestinians support of violent acts against Israel is staggering while Israeli support for military action in Gaza remains stable.

• An overwhelming majority of 84% support and 13% oppose the shooting attack that took place in a religious school in West Jerusalem. Support for this attack is greater in the Gaza Strip (91%) compared to theWest Bank (79%).
• 64% support and 33% oppose launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon.
• Among Israelis only 27% believe that if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues, Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps, 29% of the Israelis suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there and 41% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out. Surprisingly these figures did not change from three months ago.

1. The Peace Process

• 71% support the current peace process and 25% oppose it
• 44% support armed attacks against Israelis and 49% oppose them
• Level of confidence in Barak's government continues to drop reaching 13%, and 77% do not trust it
• Only 33% believe that it is possible to reach a mutually acceptable permanent settlement to all issues of final status negotiations and 59% do not believe that it is possible
• 46% expect, and 28% do not expect, the current peace process to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the near future
• 49% support the establishment of a Palestinian state in September 2000 even without an agreement with Israel and 38% prefer to wait until a mutual Israeli-Palestinian agreement is reached
• 53% describe their economic conditions as worse than they were before the peace process and 9% describe them as better
• Optimism about the future remains high at 63% and pessimism at 31%

The overall picture emerging from the values of the peace indicators measured in this poll shows a growing discontent with the peace process among Palestinians. Despite the fact that the percentage of support for the current peace process remains unchanged as in the February 2000 poll (71%), the results show an increase in the percentage of support for armed attacks against Israelis from 39% to 44% during the same period. Confidence in Barak's government continues its slow decrease reaching 13% in this poll. Confidence in Barak's government peaked in July 1999 reaching 29%.

The results also show a decline in the percentage of those who believe that the current peace process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the near future from 50% in December 1999 to 46% in this poll. The percentage of those who describe their economic condition today as being worse than it was before the start of the peace process also rose from 51% to 53%, and the percentage of those who describe their conditions as being better than before declined from 13% to 9% during the same period. A slight increase has also been recorded in the percentage of those who do not believe that it is possible to reach a mutually acceptable solution to issues of final status negotiations reaching 59% in this poll.

Despite the change in the peace indicators during the past few months, the level of optimism regarding Palestinian future remains high at 63%. Also, the percentage of those who support the establishment of a Palestinian state in September 2000 even without an agreement with Israel remains unchanged at 49%.

2.Bir Zeit University Incident:

• 30% supported demonstration and stone throwing by Bir Zeit University students at the French Prime Minister while 38% supported the demonstration and opposed the stone throwing, and 14% opposed both the demonstration and the stone throwing
• 66% opposed the PA step of arresting Bir Zeit University students accused of throwing stones at the French Prime Minister while 14% supported it
• 30% view, and 47% do not view, France as a friend of the Palestinian people

The results show a wide spread support for Bir Zeit University students who were arrested by the Palestinian security services in the aftermath of demonstrations and stone throwing at the French Prime Minister Jospin during his visit to the university. These demonstrations and the stone throwing reflected students' anger at Jospin's characterization of Hizbullah attacks against Israelis as acts of terrorism. Nonetheless, only 30% supported, while 52% opposed, the stone throwing, and 38% supported the demonstrations alone.

Support for the demonstrations and stone throwing increases in Rafah (41%) and Hebron (39%) and decreases in Jabalia and Khanyounis (25% each) and Bethlehem (26%). Support also increases among men (34%) compared to women (26%); among holders of BA degree (35%) compared to those with elementary education (28%); among the unemployed (39%) and students (36%) compared to employees (25%) and housewives (26%); and among supporters of Hamas (44%) and the PFLP (39%) compared to supporters of Fateh (26%).

The results also show that two thirds of the Palestinians opposed the step taken by the Palestinian Authority in arresting Bir Zeit University students who were accused of participating in the stone throwing. The level of opposition to the PA step increases in the West Bank (69%) compared to the Gaza Strip (62%); in Rafah (86%), Ramallah (77%) Jerusalem ( 78%) and Hebron (70%) compared to Jabalia (50%) and Khanyounis (52%). It also increases among men (68%) compared to women (64%); among residents of refugee camps (71%) compared to residents of cities and towns (65%); among holders of BA degree (72%) compared to illiterates (55%); among students (79%) compared to housewives (59%); among those with the highest income (66%) compared to those with the lowest income (61%); and among supporters of Hamas and the PFLP (72% each) compared to supporters of Fateh (61%).

Finally, the results show an unexpectedly high level of belief (47%) that France is not a friend of the Palestinian People, while the percentage of those who believe that it is a friend does not exceed 30%. It is possible that this result may only reflect a Palestinian response to the statement made by Jospin and does not reflect the normal evaluation of the status of France as seen by the Palestinians especially in light of the declared French support for Palestinian rights. The belief that France is a friend increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (28%); in Ramallah (46%) and Khanyounis (43%) compared to Jabalia (20%) and Hebron (24%); among men (35%) compared to women (24%); among residents of cities and towns (31%) compared to residents of refugee camps (23%); among holders of BA degree (36%) compared to illiterates (23%); among professionals (57%) and students (42%) compared to housewives (21%) and craftsmen (23%); among those with the highest income (53%) compared to those with the lowest income (27%); and among supporters of Fateh (42%) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%).

3. Domestic Conditions: Perception of Corruption and Democracy:

• 71% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions
• 66% of those who believe in the existence of corruption believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy drops to 22%
• 65% believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear

The results show negative trends in all indicators of domestic conditions. The percentage of those who believe that corruption exists in PA institutions increased from 60% in the last poll in February 2000 to 71% in this poll. The percentage of those who believe that corruption will increase or remain the same increased from 64% to 66% during the same period. The percentage of the positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy decreased from 28% in February to 22% in this poll. Finally, the percentage of those who believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear increased from 62% to 65% during the same period.

These results, and those in the next section, are the worst to be recorded since 1996. They reflect the frustrating conditions of the Palestinians since the Petition of the Twenty including the events of the past few weeks such as the Bir Zeit university incident, the teachers' strike, and the events at al Deheisha refugee camp in the aftermath of the Pope's visit.

4. Elections for the President and vice-President and Political Affiliation:

• In elections for the presidency, Arafat's popularity drops to 39% for the first time since 1994, while Haider Abdul Shafi receives 12% and Ahmad Yasin 14%
• In elections for the vice-presidency among four candidates, Abdul Shafi receives the largest percentage (37%) followed by Faisal al Husseini (23%), Ahmad Qurie' (13%), and Mahmud Abbas (12%)
• Fateh receives the support of 35%, Hamas 13%, PFLP 3%, Islamic Jihad 4%, and the non-affiliated 39%

The results show a significant decline in the popularity of Yasir Arafat from 47% last February to 39% in this poll. The current percentage is the worst since we began asking about Arafat's popularity in 1994. The lowest percentage recorded in the past was 43%. The popularity of Haidar Abdul Shafi remained unchanged at 12% while that of Ahmad Yasin increased from 10% last February to 14% in this poll.

Arafat's popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (37%); in Nablus (47%) and Khanyounis (46%) compared to Hebron (28%) and Jerusalem (32%); among residents of villages and towns (41%) compared to residents of refugee camps (33%); among illiterates (40%) compared to holders of BA degree (30%); among workers and farmers (40%) and housewives (41%) compared to students (30%) and merchants (31%); and among supporters of Fateh (74%) compared to supporters of Hamas (12%).

In a competition for the office of the vice president among eight candidates, Haidar Abdul Shafi received the largest percentage of votes (17%) followed by Faisal al Husseini and Sa'eb Erikat (8% each), Mahmud Abbas and Farouq al Qaddumi (5% each), Hanan Ashrawi and Ahmad Qurie' (4% each), and Nabil Sha'ath (2%). In a competition among four candidates only, Abdul Shafi receives 37% of the votes followed by al Husseini (23%), Ahmad Qurie' (13%) and Mahmud Abbas (12%). These results are similar to those obtained last February.

Fateh's popularity continued to drop reaching 35% in this poll while Hamas' increased from 10% last February to 13% in this poll.

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

Strong Preference among Palestinians and Israelis for a Comprehensive Settlement over an Interim Political Track 

11-16 December 2006

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between December 11 and 16, 2006. 

The joint poll examined a range of optional tracks for the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian political process including the Roadmap, the Arab League (Saudi) plan, and an interim plan postponing the settlement of the refugees issue to the future. We also examined the Israeli leadership's degrees of freedom to begin negotiations with various configurations of a Palestinian government. 

The findings indicate strong preference in both publics for the comprehensive settlement option with 58% of the Israelis and 81% of the Palestinians supporting this track compared to only 30% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians supporting an interim track. 

The joint poll further examined Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding a permanent settlement (along the lines of the Geneva Initiative and President Clinton’s package for a Palestinian-Israeli final status settlement) against the backdrop of the Israeli- Palestinian cease fire in Gaza. The results document a continuing decrease in support for that permanent status package and its parameters among Israelis throughout 2006, and overall stability among Palestinians. Despite the declining trend, among Israelis there is still a majority of 52% who support these parameters as a combined overall package. Among Palestinians, 48% support the package now, compared to 44% in June 2006 and 46% in December 2005 (see summary table below).  

Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 14 and 16, 2006. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 602 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between December 11 and 14, 2006. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Cease Fire Agreement 

• 59% of the Israelis and 85% of the Palestinians support the recent cease fire agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza. 85% of the Palestinians support and 14% oppose extending the agreement to theWest Bank.
• The Palestinian public is split half with regard to the effects of launching rockets from the Gaza strip at Israeli towns. 48% believe it was beneficial to Palestinian interests while 48% believe it was harmful to their interests.
• 52% of the Israelis believe that neither side came out the winner in the current round of the conflict, 28% believe that the Palestinians won, 5% believe that Israel won and 13% believe that both won. Among Palestinians, 24% believe they won, 27% think Israel won, 29% believe neither won, and 18% believe that both sides won.
• 33% of the Palestinians also believe that they will gain more from the recent cease fire while 29% believe Israel will gain more, 25% believe both will gain and 11% think neither side will gain. As to Israelis, 40% believe Palestinians will gain more from the cease fire, 7% believe Israel will gain more 35% think both sides will gain and 16% think neither side will gain.
• As to the impact of the cease fire on the power struggle in the PA, 21% of the Palestinians think that Abu-Mazin and Fateh will gain more politically from the cease fire, 15% think Haniyeh and Hamas, 34%  think both will gain, and 24% think neither side will gain more politically from the cease fire. Among Israelis, 29% believe the cease fire works more to the advantage of Haniyeh and Hamas, 23% believe Abu-Mazin and Fateh will gain more from it, 20% think both will gain, and 17% think neither side will gain more.
• Following the Gaza cease fire agreement, both sides’ expectations with regard to its longevity are rather low. 6% of the Israelis and 19% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop, 40% of the Israelis and 38% of the Palestinians expect negotiations to resume but some armed attacks will continue, 52% of the Israelis and 37% of the Palestinians believe that confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 

(B) Clinton/Geneva Parameters 

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials exactly six years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative was first made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues in the past, in December 2003, December 2004, December 2005 and June 2006. In the current poll we revisited these crucial issues for the first time after the second war in Lebanon. In December 2003, respondents were explicitly told that the parameters were those of the Geneva Initiative. However, in the subsequent polls, respondents were not told that these were possible compromises in a final status settlement without explicitly naming the packages as those of Clinton or Geneva.

The findings indicate a slight decrease in support among Israelis and some increase in support among Palestinians compared to six months ago. Among Israelis, a majority of 52% support these parameters as a combined overall package, compared to 55% who supported them in June 2006. These results corroborate the declining support for the Clinton package among Israelis throughout 2006, whereas in January and December 2005 the level of support was 64%. Among Palestinians the level of support fluctuated in 2006 between 44% and 48% in the current poll marking a pattern of stability in Palestinians attitudes in this regard in 2006, down from 54% in December 2004.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange 

Among Palestinians 61% support or strongly support and 37% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in June 2006, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 54% and opposition at 44%.

Among Israelis 44% support and 54% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of “Judea, Samaria” and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel.Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In June 2006, 47% of the Israelis supported this component while 47% opposed it.

(2) Refugees 

Among Palestinians, 41% support and 54% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries likeAustralia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In June 2006, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 55% opposed it.

Among Israelis 38% support such an arrangement and 60% oppose it. In June 2006 43% supported it and 53% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem 

In the Palestinian public 39% support and 59% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In June 2006, an identical compromise obtained similar results with 35% supporting it and 63% opposing it.

Among Israelis, 38% agree and 60% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In June 2006, 37% supported this arrangement and 60% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State 

Among Palestinians 28% support and 70% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in June 2006 25% support and opposition reached 74%.

Among Israelis 62% support and 36% oppose this arrangement compared to similar levels of 63% support and 36% opposition obtained in June 2006.

(5) Security Arrangements 

In the Palestinian public 42% support and 55% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In June 2006, 40% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 57% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 51% support and 47% oppose this arrangement compared to 52% who supported it and 44% who opposed it in June 2006.

(6) End of Conflict   

In the Palestinian public 62% support and 34% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in June the support of 58% and the opposition of 40%.

In the Israeli public 68% support and 30% oppose this component in the final status framework. In June 2006, 70% of the Israelis supported it while 27% opposed it.

The Whole Package 

Among Palestinians 48% support and 49% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In June 2006, 44% supported and 52% opposed such a package.

This four percentage point increase in the level of support for the package among Palestinians deserves attention given the official and publicly endorsed Hamas government position toward a permanent peace agreement withIsrael. In this regard it is also important to stress the four percentage point increase in the “end of conflict” component which stands in open contradiction to Hamas refusal to such a clause and its willingness to grant Israel only a long range Hudna.

Among Israelis 52% support and 46% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. This constitutes a noticeable decline in support for the Clinton final status settlement package compared to six months ago when support stood at 55% support with 40% opposition.

36% of the Israelis assume that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package; 53% believe that the majority opposes it. Among Palestinians 46% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 38% believe that the majority opposes it.

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement Framework (2003-2006)

(C) Other Optional tracks for the resumption of a political process

In addition to the Clinton parameters for a final status settlement, we examined in the poll a range of other optional tracks for the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian political process including the Roadmap, the Arab League (Saudi) plan, and an interim plan postponing the settlement of the refugees issue to future negotiations. In addition we examined the degrees of freedom of the Israeli leadership to begin negotiations with various configurations of a Palestinian government.

• 60% of the Israelis and 49% of the Palestinians support the international Quartet’s Roadmap plan. These figures mark a consistent trend of decline in support for this plan in both publics from a peak of 65% support among Israelis and 60% support among Palestinians a year ago in December 2005. While the Roadmap remained the cornerstone of the Israeli government policy with regard to the resumption of a political process, and it still garners majority support among Israelis, it is losing support in the two publics, presumably because of the stalemate it caused in the process.
• As to the Arab League (Arab Saudi) plan, both publics seem to be quite ignorant about it. 47% of the Israelis and 44% of the Palestinians claimed they have never heard of the plan. Only 22% of the Israelis and 25% of the Palestinians said they know some or most of its details. After briefing our respondents on its essential elements, 29% of the Israelis and 59% of the Palestinians support the plan compared to 69% and 38% respectively who oppose it. This sizeable difference in support can be explained by the vague reference in the plan to the refugees issue and UN resolution 194, which is often interpreted by Israelis as allowing return of refugees to proper Israel and compensation.
• Another option examined in the current poll was to conduct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on an interim settlement whereby a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This option was juxtaposed against negotiations over a comprehensive settlement that would lead to permanent peace and end of conflict, with all issues, including refugees, resolved. The results indicate a strong preference in both publics for the comprehensive settlement with 58% of the Israelis and 81% of the Palestinians supporting this track compared to only 30% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians supporting the interim track. Despite the clear preference among Palestinians for a permanent settlement, a majority of 58% would support and 37% would oppose an agreement that would establish a Palestinian state over 80% to 90% of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip to be followed by negotiations between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine to resolve all the other issues such as permanent borders, refugees, holy places in Jerusalem, and others. 
• If in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians, Israel will have to release Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiate with him, 43% of the Israelis support such a step compared to 53% who oppose it.
• 68% of the Israelis support negotiations between Israel and Abu Mazin over a final status settlement. Despite these levels of support only 46% of the Israelis believe that it is possible to reach nowadays a compromise settlement between Abu Mazin and Olmert.
• 66% of the Israelis support negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement.
• Even when a Hamas-led government is concerned, 54% of the Israelis support and 45% oppose talks with it if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. Among Palestinians, 62% support such talks while 34% oppose them.

(D) Other Conflict Resolution Issues 

• A majority of 58% among Palestinians and 63% of the Israelis agrees with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict, there would be mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. 40% and 34% respectively disagree to this step. 52% of the Palestinians and 55% of the Israelis believe that a majority in their public supports such a proposal, and 36% and 33% respectively think the majority opposes it. However both publics are only partly aware of the majority support for such a step in the other side. Only 44% of the Palestinians and 42% of the Israelis think the other side public supports this step.
• Both Israelis and Palestinians are split half with regard to their assessments of the achievements of the Palestinian Intifada. 49% of the Palestinians agree and 49% disagree with the claim that the intifada so far has achieved national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve. Among Israelis too, 48% agree and 51% disagree with this claim.
• As to Palestinians' general outlook regarding the prospects of a peace process with Israel, 21% believe that the peace process is not successful in ending the occupation and should be stopped in favor of resorting to armed action; 36% think the peace process should not be stopped because it still might succeed, 27% think the peace process has not failed and should be given more time and in the meanwhile armed action should be stopped, 11% believe that armed action is responsible for the stagnation of the peace process and if it is stopped the peace process would make progress.

(E) Palestinian Domestic Balance of Power

• A majority of 61% supports the holding of early presidential and parliamentary elections and 37% oppose that. If early parliamentary elections are held today, Hamas would receive 36% of the vote and Fateh would receive 42%. 12% would go to other lists and 10% remain undecided.
• If early presidential elections are held today and only two, Mahmud Abbas for Fateh and Ismail Haniyeh for Hamas, were to compete, Abbas would receive 46% of the vote and Haniyeh would receive 45%. 9% remain undecided. But if the presidential race was between Marwan Barghouti, representing Fateh, and Khalid Mish’al, representing Hamas, Marwan Barghouti would receive 57% of the vote and Khalid Mish’al would receive 36%. 7% remain undecided.

These are the results of opinion poll # 40, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 15-17 April 1999. The poll deals with the Peace Process, evaluation of PA performance, status of democracy, corruption, death penalty, developments in Jordan, elections for the president and vice president, and political affiliation.
The total sample size of this poll is 1315 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 820 in the West Bank and 495 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

1. Peace Process

• Support for the peace process reaches 70% and opposition 26%
• Support for armed attacks against Israelis rises to 45% and opposition reaches 48%
• Support for a declaration of independence on May 4, 1999 drops from 52% two months ago to 43% now, and support for postponement reaches 48%
• 19% believe that Barak is more capable of moving the peace process forward, while only 3% think the same of Netanyahu, and 63% see no difference between the two

Poll results show a high level of support for the peace process (70%) even if it indicates a slight drop from the 73% obtained two months ago. The results show that support for the peace process increases in towns and villages (75%) compared to cities (66%). The level of support is also affected by the level of education, with 78% among the illiterates and 57% among BA degree holders. Support for the peace process is also affected by occupation: it increases among farmers (86%) and housewives (79%) and decreases among students (61%). Support also increases among those with the least income (73%) and decreases among those with the highest income (57%). It increases among supporters of Fateh (84%) and decreases among supporters of Hamas (47%).

Despite the high level of support for the peace process, support for armed attacks against Israelis has risen from 41% two months ago to 45% in this poll. Opposition to armed attacks stands at 48%. This development shows a return to the pre Wye River agreement situation in which large sections of the Palestinian street supported the peace process and armed attacks simultaneously. The consistent support for the peace process and the fluctuation in the support for violence point to the possible conclusion that many Palestinians view the latter as a means of moving the former forward and not as an alternative to it.

The results also reveal a decline in support for the unilateral declaration of statehood in 4 May 1999 standing today at 43% compared to the levels obtained two and three months ago (52% and 57% respectively). The decline may have been influenced by the recent talk by Palestinian officials about a possible postponement of the declaration. Support for postponement has increased from 39% two months ago to 48% today.

The poll shows that the Palestinians do not count much on the results of the Israeli elections. The majority (63%) does not see a difference between the Likud and Labor in terms of their ability to move the peace process forward. Nonetheless, more Palestinians (19%) think that a government led by Barak is better for the peace process, while only 3% believe that a government led by Nehatnyahu is better.

2. Evaluation of the Performance of the Palestinian Political Institutions

• Positive evaluation of the PLC performance reaches 43%
• Positive evaluation of the presidency reaches 53%, security services 52%, cabinet 47%, the judiciary 42%, and opposition parties and factions 33%

The results show a decline in the positive evaluation of the performance of all Palestinian political institutions. The PLC received a positive evaluation of 43%, compared to 49% three months ago. The presidency received a positive evaluation of 53%, compared to 56% three months ago. The security services received a positive evaluation of 52%, compared to 56% three months ago. The cabinet received a positive evaluation of 47% compared to 49% three months ago. Finally, the judiciary received a positive evaluation of 42% compared to 48% three months ago. It is worth mentioning that the highest level of positive evaluation for the PLC performance stood at 51% in December 1997, 63% for the cabinet in December 1996, 55% for the judiciary in April 1997, 77% for the security services in April 1997, and 79% for the presidency in April 1997.

3. Conditions of Democracy and Corruption in the Palestinian areas

• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy reaches 26%, its lowest level since 1996
• Positive evaluation of democracy in Israel reaches 66%, in the US 54%, and in France 45%
• Positive evaluation of democracy in Jordan reaches 30%, and in Egypt 24%
• A majority of 56% believes that people, today, can not criticize the PA without fear (37%)
• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions reaches 71%, its highest level ever, while a majority of 61% believes that it will increase or remain the same in the future
• People believe that corruption exists in ministries and government offices (76%), in the security services (77%), in the PLC (49%), and in the office of the presidency (40%)

The results indicate that the positive evaluation of the state of democracy in Palestine has reached its lowest level ever with a percentage of 26%. Two months ago, that level stood at 36%, while the highest level stood at 50% two years ago. The percentage of those who believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear stands today at 56%.

It is evident from the survey that the majority of the Palestinians views positively the state of democracy in Israel (66%), followed by that of the US (54%), and France (45%). The positive evaluation of democracy in Jordan remained unchanged at 30%.

The results also indicate that the belief in the existence of corruption in PA institutions has reached its highest levels ever, standing at 71%. Two months ago, that level stood at 54%, while the lowest level stood at 49% in September 1996. The percentage of those who believe that corruption will increase in the future or remain as it is today, increased from 58% two months ago to 61% today.

It is worth noticing that the belief in the existence of corruption in the security services has increased from 70% two months ago to 77% today. It has also increased from 37% to 40% with regard to corruption in the office of the presidency, and from 47% to 49% with regard to corruption in the PLC.

Belief in the existence of corruption increases especially in the Gaza Strip (76%) compared to the West Bank (68%), in Gaza City (80%) and refugee camps (78%) compared to towns and villages (65%), among men (79%) compared to women (62%), among the younger ages, between 18-22 years old, (75%) compared to those over 52 years old (66%), among holders of BA degrees (88%) compared to the illiterates (53%), among students (83%) compared to housewives (58%), among those working in the public sector (90%) compared to those in the private sector (78%), among the high income people (86%) compared to low income people (67%), and among supporters of Hamas (78%) compared to supporters of Fateh (70%).

4. The position on the death penalty

• Only 10% support the death penalty in all normal, political, and security cases, while 27% oppose it in all cases
• 65% support the death penalty in cases involving normal crimes only
• 66% oppose the death penalty in political and security cases

The results show that a majority of Palestinians (65%) supports the death penalty for normal crimes and 27% oppose it. A similar majority of 66%, however, opposes the death penalty in political and security cases, and only 10% support it.

Opposition to the death penalty in all normal and political cases increases in the West Bank (32%) compared to the Gaza Strip (18%), in Nablus (41%) compared to Deir al-Balah (13%), in towns and villages (30%) compared to refugee camps (18%), among women (30%) compared to men (23%), among those between 48-52 yeold (38%) compared to thosebetween 18-22 years old (25%), among the illiterates (36%) compared to those with BA degrees (27%), among the middle income people, with monthly earnings of JD 600-900, (36%) compared to high income (23%) and low income people (27%).

5. Recent Developments in Jordan

• 46% view positively the recent developments in Jordan, and 7% view it negatively
• 35% believe that these developments will have no impact on Palestinian-Jordanian relations

While about a third of the respondents believes that the recent changes in Jordan will have no impact on Jordanian-Palestinian relations, a larger percentage (46%) believes that they will have a positive one, and a small percentage (7%) believe they will have a negative one. The level of those who believe that it will have a positive impact increases among holders of BA degrees (50%) compared to the illiterates (40%), among students (50%) compared to laborers (38%), among those who work in the public sector (50%) compared to those working in the private sector (41%), and among those with the lowest income (46%) compared to those with the highest income (34%).

6. Elections and Political Sympathy

• Only 24% support extending the life of the current PLC after May 4, 1999, while 54% support holding new legislative elections
• In presidential elections, Yassir Arafat receives the support of 46%, Ahmad Yasin 11%, and Haidar Abdul Shafi 10%
• In elections for the office of vice president involving three candidates, Haidar Abdul Shafi receives the support of 38%, Sa’eb Erikat 23%, and Faisal al-Husseini 22%
• In elections for the office of vice president involving Husseini and Erikat only, the first receives the support of 39% and the second 34%
• In elections for the office of vice president involving Abdul Shafi and Erikat only, the first receives the support of 48% and the second 36%
• In elections for the office of vice president involving Abdul Shafi and Husseini only, the first receives the support of 51% and the second 33%
• Fateh receives the support of 39%, Hamas 12%, Islamic Jihad 4%, the PFLP 3%, and the nonaffiliated stand at 38%

The results indicate that a majority of 54% supports holding new legislative elections, while about a quarter supports the renewal of the mandate of the current PLC beyond May 4, 1999. A percentage of 14% supports neither choices. Support for holding new legislative elections increases in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (50%), in cities (59%) compared to towns and villages (48%), among men (61%) compared to women (46%), among those between 18-22 years old (64%) compared to those over 52 years old (46%), among holders of BA degree (66%) compared to illiterates (41%), among students (64%) compared to housewives (44%), among those working in the public sector (67%) compared to those working in the private sector (59%), among the high income people (69%) compared to the low income people (50%), and among supporters of Fateh (55%) compared to supporters of Hamas (52%).

The results indicate that Yassir Arafat’s popularity remains the same (46%) as it was two months ago. The same is true with regard to Ahmad Yassin’s (11%) and Haidar Abdul Shafi (10%). Arafat’s popularity stood at 51% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank. Yassin and Abdul Shafi’s popularity is almost equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In a competition among eight candidates for the position of the vice president, Abdul Shafi received the highest percentage of votes (14%), followed by Sa’eb Erikat (8%), Faisal al-Husseini and Farouq al Qaddoumi (7% each), Ahmad Qurai’ and Hanan Ashrawi (6% each), Mahmoud Abbas (4%), and Nabil Sha’ath (3%).

In a competition among three candidates for the position of the vice president, Abdul Shafi received 38% of the vote, followed by Erikat (23%) and Husseini (22%). Abdul Shafi received more votes in the Gaza Strip (48%) than in the West Bank (31%), while the other two received more votes in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip.

When the competition was among Abdul Shafi and Erikat only, the first received 48% and the second received 36%. When it was among Abdul Shafi and Husseini, the first received 51% and the second 33%. When it was among Husseini and Erikat, the first received 39% and the second 34%.

The results show a slight increase in support for Fateh (39% compared to 37% two months ago. Hamas’ popularity remain the same as it was two months ago) (12%); and so did the PFLP’s (3%). The total support for the Islamists stood at 19%, and the nonaffiliated stood at 38%....More

18-21 August 2002

These are the results of opinion poll # 5, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 18-21 August 2002. The poll deals with the public attitudes toward the peace process and reconciliation, armed confrontations, evaluation of the PA performance, political reform, and the popularity of Arafat, Fateh, and Islamist groups. The total sample size of this poll is 1320 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face, in 120 locations in the West Bank (814) and the Gaza Strip (506). The margin of error is 3%.

MAIN RESULTS:

I. Peace Process and Reconciliation

• 48% support, and 50% oppose, the gradual implementation of a ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal from PA areas


• 43% support, and 53% oppose, internal Palestinian efforts aiming at ending bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel


• 31% support, and 65% oppose, a security role for Egypt and Jordan in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip


• Only 16% expect return to negotiations and an end to violent confrontations


• 70% believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not


• 52% support, and 46% oppose, bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel, but more that 90% support armed attacks against soldiers and settlers


• 73% support reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples after reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state

More than two thirds of the Palestinians (70%) continue to believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not. The impact of this belief is seen in the sharp division within the Palestinian society over the gradual implementation of a ceasefire and an Israel withdrawal from PA areas with 48% supporting and 50% opposing it. It can also be seen in the majority opposition to internal Palestinian efforts that seek to build a consensus around the need to put an end to bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel with 53% opposing and 43% supporting such efforts. The results show also that 52% still support bombing attack

against civilians inside Israel. This result is identical to that of our last poll in May 2002. Support for attacks against Israeli civilians reached 58% in December 2001. Support for attacks against soldiers and settlers remained unchanged at 92% and 91% respectively.

Support for the continuation of armed confrontations can also be seen in the opposition of almost two-thirds (65%) to the deployment of Jordanian and Egyptian security trainers in the Palestinian areas. This large opposition may be due to Palestinian belief that the purpose of the deployment of the trainers is to enforce a ceasefire if the need arise. However, despite the efforts to arrange a ceasefire and to deploy Egyptian and Jordanian trainers, only a small minority of 16% expects to see an end to violence and a return to negotiations soon.

Despite the hard-line attitude regarding the ceasefire and the targeting of civilians and despite the low expectations regarding return to negotiations and cessation of violence, almost three-quarters of the Palestinians are still supportive of reconciliation between the two peoples after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by the state of Israel. However, this commitment to reconciliation, based on a two-state solution, does not mean that all three quarters believe it will actually happen. Indeed, 43% of all Palestinians believe that reconciliation will never happen. Moreover, while support, as in all previous polls, is very high for open borders between the two states (84%) and for joint economic institutions and ventures (68%), only one-third supports taking legal steps to prohibit incitement against Israel (33%). Moreover, only a minority of 22% supports the formation of joint political institutions (aiming at the establishment of a confederation between the two states), and even a smaller minority (8%) supports the adoption of school curriculum that recognizes the state of Israel and does not demand the return of all Palestine to the Palestinians. It is clear that support for reconciliation is motivated by purely cost-benefit calculations.

Support for the gradual ceasefire and Israeli army withdrawal increases in the areas of Jerusalem (60%), Tulkarm (57%), Jenin (56%) and Ramallah (54%) and decreases in Deir al Balah (34%), Bethlehem (41%), Hebron (45%) and Rafah (44%). It also increases in towns and villages (51%) compared to refugee camps (42%); among non-refugees (50%) compared to refugees (45%); among women (53%) compared to men (43%); among illiterates (56%) compared to holders of BA degree (46%); among housewives (54%) compared to professionals (25%); and among supporters of Fateh (57%) and nonaffiliated (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas (40%) and PFLP (30%).

Support for the efforts to create a consensus prohibiting the targeting of Israeli civilians is strongest in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (37%); in the areas of Jenin (55%), Hebron (54%), Ramallah (53%) and Gaza City (53%) compared to areas of Rafah (24%), Deir al Balah (25%), Khan Younis (29%), Jabalia (35%) and Bethlehem (36%). Support also increases in cities (47%) compared to refugee camps (32%); and among supporters of Fateh (50%) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

II. Jordanian Obstacles to Travel and the Desire to Emigrate

• 31% believe that Jordan is right, and 66% believe it is wrong, in putting obstacles making it difficult to travel from the West Bank to Jordan


• 19% say that current conditions forces them to seek permanent emigration from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

The results show a clear rejection of the Jordanian position regarding Palestinian travel across the Allenby bridge. Two-thirds believe that Jordan is wrong in putting obstacles making it difficult for Palestinians to travel to Jordan. The survey question pointed out that Jordan imposes such obstacles for fear of Palestinian mass emigration to Jordan. The opposition to the Jordanian policy may be due to the fact that only a minority of 19% thinks of permanently emigrating from the Palestinian areas. For this reason, the majority sees no justification for the Jordanian move. Previous polls conducted before the intifada, between 1998 and 2000, showed that a percentage between 21% and 26% thought of permanently emigrating from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The belief that Jordan is right in putting obstacles to Palestinian travel across the Allenby Bridge increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (24%); among refugees (36%) compared to non-refugees (27%); among illiterates (37%) compared to holders of BA degree (23%), among retired persons (57%) compared to students (21%) and farmers (20%); and among supporters of Fateh (34%) compared to supporters of PFLP (23%) and Hamas (30%).

Desire to emigrate increases among the young (26%) compared to the old (4%); among residents of cities (22%) compared to residents of refugee camps (16%); among men (21%) compared to women (16%); among holders of BA degree (28%) compare to illiterates (5%); among professionals (38%) and craftsmen (30%) compared to farmers (3%); among those who work in the private sector (25%) compared to those working in the public sector (13%); among the unmarried (30%) compared to the married (16%); and among the least religious (38%) compared to the most religious (11%).

III. Palestinian Political Reform

• 84% support, and 14% oppose, fundamental reforms in the PA


• 69% support, and 22% oppose, the appointment or election of a PA prime mini


• 44% support, and 48% oppose, changing the Palestinian political system so that power would reside into the hands of a prime minister making the office of the president ceremonial


• Only 25% have confidence, and 62% have no confidence, in the ability of the new PA government to reform internal political conditions and deal with Israel


• Only 34% believe that the new PA government intends to implement the One-Hundred Day Program of political and financial reform

Support for PA political reform is still very high reaching 84%, but less than it was last May when it stood at 91%. The small drop in support for reform may be due to the belief of some Palestinians that some demands of reform might be motivated by peace and security related factors rather than by the desire for democracy and good governance. It is possible that the speech by the US president in June, with its focus on Palestinian regime change, may have contributed to this drop. The continued US talk about the need to turn the PA presidency into a ceremonial office may have also led to the reduction in support to this particular item in the reform agenda from 48% last May to 44% in this survey. Opposition to this reform measure, making the residency ceremonial, has increased form 44% last May to 48% in this poll.

Despite the sharp division over the need to turn the Palestinian presidency into a ceremonial office, a large majority (69%) supports the appointment or election of a prime minister. Obviously, an overwhelming majority (92%) of those who support turning the presidency into a ceremonial office supports the appointment or election of a prime minister. However, a large part (41%) of those who support the appointment or election of a prime minister does not see in this office a substitute for the office of the Palestinian presidency.

Support for turning the Palestinian presidency into a ceremonial office increases in cities (50%) compared to refugee camps (38%); among men (53%) compared to women (35%); among holders of BA degree (53%) compared to illiterates (39%); among merchants (61%), craftsmen (57%) and professionals (56%) compared to housewives (34%); and among the least religious (57%) compared to the most religious (38%).

Despite the high demand for reform, only a quarter of the Palestinians have confidence in the ability of the new government to implement political reform and deal with Israel. Indeed, only 34% believe that the government has the intention of implementing its own One-Hundred Day Program for political and financial reform.

IV. Perceptions of Corruption and Democratization

• 85% believe there is corruption in PA institutions


• Only 30% are convinced that efforts of the PA finance minister to unify revenue and expenditure operations will lead to the elimination of financial corruption in the PA


• Only 16% give positive evaluation to Palestinian democracy under the PA

The results indicate an increase in the percentage of those who believe there is corruption in the PA from 83% in the last poll, in May 2002, to 85% in this poll. Similarly, positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy dropped from 21% last May to 16% in this poll. This is the lowest level of positive evaluation registered since the establishment of the PA. Despite assurances from the PA minister of finance that progress has been made in unifying revenue and expenditure operations, only 30% are convinced that such progress would eliminate financial corruption. Moreover, a majority of 58% is convinced that corruption in the PA will increase or remain the same in the future.

The confidence in the ability of the finance minister to combat financial corruption increases in the Gaza Strip (34%) compared to the West Bank (27%); among illiterates (36%) compared to holders of BA degree (30%); among those who work in the public sector (37%) compared to those who work in the private sector (28%); among those with the lowest income (32%) compared to those with the highest income (12%) and among supporters of Fateh (36%) compared to supporters of Hamas (28%) and non-affiliated (27%).

V. Elections, Popularity of Arafat and Political Affiliation

• 69% would participate in Palestinian elections when held in January 2003


• For the presidency: 34% would elect Arafat (compared to 35% last May, 36% in July and 46% in July 2000), 15% would elect Ahmad Yasin and 13% Haidar Abdul Shafi


• For the office of a vice president: support for Barghouti increases from 19% last May to 23% in this poll


• Fateh has the support of 26% of the street compared to 32% last May, 28% in December 2001, and 37% in July 2000. Support for the Islamists increases from 25% last May to 27% in this poll

The poll shows that Arafat's popularity has remained almost unchanged since last May standing at 34%. Arafat's popularity stood at 35% last May, 36% in December 2001, 33% in July 2001, and 46% in July 2000. On the other hand, the popularity of Marwan Barghouti increased during the past three months from 19% to 23%. Barghouti's popularity stood at 11% in December 2001 while his name did not show up in PSR polls before the intifada. In a third place came Ahmad Yasin, with 15%, Haidar Abdul Shafi with 13%, Sa'eb Erikat with 8%, Farouq Qaddoumi with 6%, Hanan Ashrawi with 4%, and Mahmud Abbas with 3%.

The poll also shows that 69% would participate in the January 2003 general political elections. It also shows a slight increase in the support for the Islamists and a decrease in the support for Fateh. Support for the Islamists increased from 25% last May to 27% in this poll. Support for the Islamists stood at 25% in December 2001 and 17% in July 2000. Support for Fateh dropped to 26%, which is the lowest level ever registered for that faction. Fateh's popularity stood at 32% in May 2002, 28% in December 2001, and 37% in July 2000. In December 1995, support for Fateh peaked to 55%.

Support for Arafat increases in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to West Bank (32%); in the areas of Ramallah (49%) Gaza City (43%), Khan Younis (41%), Rafah (38%), and Nablus (36%) compared to Jerusalem (18%), Tulkarm (26%), Jenin (29%), and Hebron (28%); among the illiterates (36%) compared to holders of BA degree (26%); among the farmers (45%) and housewives (36%) compared to professionals (25%), students (26%), merchants (28%), and craftsmen (29%); among those with the lowest income (37%) compared to those with the highest income (21%); and among supporters of Fateh (69%) compared to supporters of Hamas (17%) and the nonaffiliated (26%).

Support for Marwan Barghouti increases in Nablus (33%) compared to Jerusalem (13%); among the youngest (34%) compared to the oldest (14%); among the women (27%) compared to men (20%); among students (30%) compared to professionals (6%); and among supporters of Fateh (33%) compared to Hamas (22%).