Critical Policy Brief, Number 1/2026

January 2026

After Gaza:

Enduring Consequences of the War and Palestinian Strategy

Khalil Shikaki

The Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, and the devastating two-year war that followed, was not merely another tragic cycle of violence; it was a system-disrupting event that has irrevocably altered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the regional order. Looking toward the next decade, it is clear that the war has shattered the paradigm of “conflict management,” triggered a profound crisis of legitimacy for international law and Western diplomacy, and exacerbated a deep political vacuum within the Palestinian national movement. This Brief distills what is likely to endure from the 2023–25 Gaza war and translates those trend lines into policy. It analyzes the enduring consequences of the war, assesses the deeply flawed Trump Peace Plan, and outlines the strategic options available to a Palestinian leadership grappling with a new and perilous reality. It argues that any path forward must begin not with external plans, but with internal Palestinian political renewal, as the old strategies have been rendered obsolete by a world remade by the trauma of war.

 

(1) Enduring Consequences of the 2023-2025 Gaza War

The Gaza war was not just another round in a familiar cycle; it was a system shock. Like 1948 and 1967, its effects will be measured in institutional and attitudinal shifts that persist beyond any ceasefire or the Trump plan for Gaza. It has unleashed a series of structural shifts whose consequences will define the next decade of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the broader Middle East. These trend lines are not fleeting headlines but fundamental realignments in public opinion, political power, and international norms.

First, the war has triggered a lasting realignment in global public opinion. In the United States, a profound generational and partisan chasm has opened. Polling by Gallup between 2023 and 2025,[1] Pew Research Center  in October 2025[2], and Shibley Telhami July-August 2025 survey[3] consistently shows that while older Americans and Republicans remain staunchly pro-Israel, a majority of Democrats and voters under 35 now express more sympathy for Palestinians. This cohort, whose views are shaped by social media and a social justice framework, increasingly supports conditioning U.S. aid to Israel. Within the MAGA movement, an "America First" isolationism has emerged, questioning the cost of foreign entanglements, including aid to Israel, creating a fracture in the once-monolithic Republican pro-Israel consensus.[4]  It is worth noting that these important shifts in the US are happening at a time when Israel has become much more dependent on the US than ever, as it coincides with heightened Israeli military reliance on the U.S., creating challenges for policymakers and increasing the perception of American support as an "existential" factor for Israel.[5]  According to the New York Times, the Israel's dependence on U.S. political, military, and economic support has become "glaring" during recent conflicts, making the battle for American public opinion crucial for Israel's strategic outlook, according to the New York Times.[6] This trend is mirrored in Europe, where youth-led activism has raised the political cost of unconditional support for Israeli policies.[7] In the Arab world, Arab Barometer Wave VIII[8] shows large majorities opposing normalization absent credible steps toward statehood and sharply unfavorable views of the U.S. These opinion structures will constrain decision making on policy choices regarding Israel-Palestine.

Second, the war has shattered a decade-old paradigm of “conflict management.” In this approach “managing” rather than resolving the conflict—via security coordination, economic inducements, and periodic crisis mitigation—became orthodoxy. It assumed the conflict could be contained indefinitely while bypassing a political solution. The October 7 attack and the subsequent war discredited that doctrine. The violence recentered the Palestinian question, demonstrating that a people under occupation cannot be ignored. It demonstrated that occupation and blockade cannot be indefinitely contained and that bypassing Palestinians (the premise of the Abraham Accords) will not yield stable regional integration. The Palestinian issue was violently re-centered in Arab and global diplomacy; Saudi–Israeli normalization was rendered politically unviable without Palestinian gains. In Israel, this realization does not necessarily mean a turn to conflict resolution, as we will see below. Rather, it could mean that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will now enter a more devastating phase of coercion and violence.

Third, the war has precipitated the terminal decline of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and a profound crisis of representation. Before the war, the PA faced deep illegitimacy. PSR polling showed supermajorities viewing the PA as corrupt and demanding President Abbas’s resignation.[9] The war provided Israel’s extreme right-wing government and settlers an opportunity to further weaken the PA and render it impotent. PA’s passivity and inability to protect its people cemented its irrelevance. Polling during the war consistently shows over 80% of Palestinians view the PA as corrupt and demand President Abbas’s resignation. The PA was absent and powerless; its security forces were unable to protect vulnerable Palestinian communities against settler terrorism; and it had no role in shaping the “day after” debate. Hamas emerged bloodied but politically validated among segments of the public as “steadfast,” even as its governing capacity in Gaza was significantly weakened. The result is not a single address for diplomacy but a vacuum: a weakened PA in the West Bank, residual Hamas influence and armed groups in Gaza.

This has created a leadership vacuum so complete that it has enabled the re-Arabization of the conflict, a fourth enduring consequence. From the late 1960s, “the Palestinian decision is independent” became doctrine. The Gaza war reversed that achievement. An Arab “contact group” (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, UAE) became the primary forum for “day after” planning; Egypt re‑assumed centrality on Gaza borders and security; Qatar and Egypt monopolized hostage and ceasefire mediation; Gulf capitals signaled that reconstruction money would be conditioned on PA reform and a credible political horizon. Arab states—primarily Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—have stepped in as architects of the “day after,” effectively usurping Palestinian political agency. The Israeli September 2025 military strike on Doha gave the major Arab and regional powers an added motivation to step in and take charge of the management of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They are now the primary interlocutors with Washington, setting the terms for reconstruction and future governance in a direct reversion to the pre-PLO era. This development will endure because Palestinian institutions lack legitimacy and capacity, and because the U.S./EU are outsourcing stabilization to Arab partners. Until Palestinians rebuild a representative and legitimate national body, the file will be managed in Arab capitals.

Fifth, the trauma of October 7 has led to a profound and dangerous hardening of Israeli society and the political ascendancy of its extreme and religious Zionist right. October 7 did not produce a broad reckoning with occupation; it hardened threat perceptions and shifted the political center further right. The Israeli increased reliance on a less sympathetic US, as we have seen above, could further heighten Israel's perceived vulnerability and increase dependence on brute force to eliminate potential future threats. By now, the outcome is clear: the peace camp is diminished; two‑state diplomacy is widely viewed as dangerous; annexationist and punitive preferences gained ground. Far‑right ministers and settler movements have translated this into policy: accelerated settlement construction and outpost legalization, budgetary and administrative tools to entrench control, increased impunity for settler violence, and a security discourse that prioritizes domination over accommodation. The dominant Israeli narrative is not one of policy failure but of a failure of will, leading to a widespread rejection of compromise and a political discourse centered on permanent security control. Messianic and religious-nationalist parties, once on the fringe, are now central to Israeli policy, driving an agenda of de facto annexation in the West Bank and entrenching a one-state reality of unequal rights. This shift ensures no Israeli government will have the political mandate for a meaningful peace agreement in the foreseeable future. At the same time, pre‑war civil–military and constitutional conflicts (judicial overhaul, Haredi conscription) are re‑emerging, pitting right‑populist coalitions against centrist and liberal constituencies, including reservist networks. The next decade will see an internal struggle over Israel’s democratic character overlaid on a policy consensus that rejects meaningful concessions.

Sixth, the war provided Iran the opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to shape Middle Eastern outcomes. The behavior of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” during the war, while highly costly for Iran and its allies, has significantly transformed the entire Middle East region increasing the level of instability and the prospects for war. In this environment, war has successfully derailed top-down, U.S.-led normalization efforts, handing a strategic victory to the Axis. The war made it politically impossible for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel, re-linking regional diplomacy to the Palestinian cause. While the cost for Iran and its allies has been devastating, the Axis increased its political capital by demonstrating integrated coercive capacity: calibrated pressure on northern Israel, long‑range fires, and maritime disruption. This raised the costs of U.S.‑led normalization that sidelines Palestinians; Saudi Arabia made normalization conditional on credible steps toward statehood. As importantly, the war made the Middle East more volatile and ensured the conflict remains a flashpoint for a wider regional confrontation. The Middle East is now marked by chronic low‑grade multi‑front instability rather than isolated crises, and the Palestinian issue is embedded in that strategic competition.

Finally, the war has triggered a profound crisis of the international legal and normative order. The proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), combined with the political assault on UNRWA, have solidified a perception across the Global South of Western double standards. Funding suspensions for UNRWA and pressure on humanitarian actors created a chilling precedent. The long‑term effect is clear: Western claims to lead a “rules‑based order” will carry less moral weight where selectivity is perceived. The West’s championing of international law in Ukraine while providing diplomatic and military cover for actions in Gaza has shattered its moral credibility. This has weakened the legitimacy of international institutions and accelerated the shift toward a more fragmented, multipolar world where the “rules-based order” is seen as a tool of power, not a set of universal principles.

 

(2) Israeli Untrustworthiness, Western Loss of Soft Power, and the Trump Plan

The enduring consequences of the Gaza war outlined above have been accompanied by other developments that might not be the direct outcome of that war or that might not be as enduring, but they, nonetheless, have implications to any future Palestinian strategy as they (1) raise questions about the usefulness of any future agreements with Israel; (2) affect the structure and norms of the emerging international system and their possible impact on the long term interests of the Palestinians; and (3) impact the Palestinian short term policy regarding the Gaza Strip and the Trump 20-point plan.

The Perception of Israeli Untrustworthiness: The experience of the Gaza war negotiations has led to a widespread perception among Palestinians and Arabs that Israel does not negotiate in good faith, that it exploits ambiguity, defers core obligations, and has a history of reneging on agreements.  That view will not end bargaining—combatants still need tactical deals and the need for stability will ensure that talks continue. But it could affect the usefulness of such agreements and transform how agreements are designed and sold. While, the era of trust-based, gradualist peace-making, epitomized by the Oslo process, is over, future negotiations will be defined by transactionalism over trust, with every step requiring meticulous verification and enforcement.

For Palestinian, this means demanding front-loaded concessions and robust third-party guarantees. Any future PA leadership, to maintain public legitimacy, will have to abandon interim agreements and demand irreversible steps toward sovereignty upfront. For Arab states, this perception drastically raises the political risk of engaging with Israel. Mediators like Egypt and Qatar will insist on US and broader international backing to guarantee compliance, while potential normalizers like Saudi Arabia will make any deal explicitly contingent on US guarantees and tangible, upfront progress toward a sovereign Palestinian state. The price of normalization has significantly increased. The old model of deferring core issues is seen reckless; it could be replaced by a demand for concrete Israeli deliverables at the beginning of any process, creating a much higher bar for diplomatic success.

The Normative and Structural Change in the International System: Building on the seventh enduring outcome discussed above, the Gaza war has inflicted a deep and lasting wound on the credibility of the United States and Europe in the Arab world and across the Global South. The perception of a profound double standard—contrasting the West's robust, morally-charged defense of Ukraine with its diplomatic and military support for Israel's campaign in Gaza—has shattered the West’s claim to champion a "rules-based international order." This is not a fleeting disagreement but a fundamental crisis of legitimacy.

This credibility vacuum in norms is occurring at a critical moment of global structural change. The emerging normative change creates a strategic opening for non-Western and non-NATO powers like China and Russia. China, in particular, offers a pragmatic and predictable alternative. Its foreign policy, built on the principle of non-interference and transactional economic partnerships, is appealing to regional regimes weary of Western lectures on human rights. China’s credibility stems not from a shared moral vision but from its reliability as an economic and arms-exporting partner and its consistent (if self-serving) rhetoric of state sovereignty and multipolarism. Russia offers a potential source of weapon but it will not be seen as a strategic ally. Constrained by its Ukraine ambition, it finds itself unable to support its allies in the region or elsewhere in any meaningful way, as we have seen in Syria, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba.

The long-term consequences of a multipolar world and the accelerated decline of Western soft power are difficult to predict. The United States will likely remain, at least in the medium term, the region’s primary security guarantor, but its influence is increasingly transactional. Arab states will continue to hedge their bets by diversifying partnerships—relying on the U.S. for security, China for economic engagement and arms development, and Russia for selective military needs. The West’s ability to forge broad international coalitions and act as a moral arbiter has been severely weakened, signaling the definitive arrival of a more fragmented and contested global order moving toward multipolarity. The 1947 partition of Palestine was a product of the post–World War II rules-based international order, yet that partition has remained unfulfilled. The emerging global order promises Palestinians neither independence nor equality; securing either will depend on their own capacity to define their place and shape their future within this new landscape.

The Trump Peace Plan: A Pause, Not a Peace: The Trump 20-Point Plan for the Gaza Strip, which secured a ceasefire and hostage release in its first phase in late 2025 and established a Palestinian technocratic committee-- the “National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG)—and a non-Palestinian “Gaza Executive Board” in preparation for the start of the second phase, is not a viable roadmap to a larger sustainable peace. Instead, it is a transactional arrangement poised to fragment and stall, achieving its immediate goals while failing in its broader strategic ambitions. The plan’s architecture is fundamentally misaligned with the political realities on the ground, creating a pause in the war but not a path to a resolution of the larger Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The plan is unsustainable due to five core challenges. First, its demand for the disarmament of Hamas in the absence of a wider peace and end of occupation is likely to prove unrealistic. Islamist groups are unlikely to accept such total vulnerability to direct Israeli attacks or to attacks by armed domestic groups aligned with Israel. In that, it has public support, including among Gazans who have no trust in Israel or its proxies and continue to fear expulsion and genocide. In this regard, Hamas and its arms remain the sole leverage Gazans feel they have.

Second, the plan’s proposed governance model—a foreign-supervised administrative committee and foreign military force under American command—is a form of neo-colonialism that denies Palestinian agency and lacks any local legitimacy. While in the short term, the administrative committee will undoubtedly enjoy significant support from Gazans, its inability to navigate Israeli constraints or implement US political agenda will render it impotent and unable to significantly change the reality on the ground for more than two million Gazans. 

Third, the plan’s ambiguous "political horizon" is correctly perceived as a deliberate evasion of the core issues of sovereignty, including the fundamental issues of borders and Jerusalem, making it impossible for any Palestinian leader to see it anything other than the discredited 2020 “Deal of the Century.” Fourth, despite the increased US willingness to use leverage to press Israel, the plan remains subject to an Israeli political veto, as any right-wing government will be beholden to extremist parties who oppose Palestinian statehood. Finally, it fails to resolve the crisis of Palestinian representation, bypassing the PA while expecting it to reform and negotiating with Hamas while seeking to sideline it.

Consequently, the plan will not reunify the West Bank and Gaza; it will formalize their separation by creating a separate governance track for the Gaza Strip. Reconstruction will be severely constrained by fears of recurrent experiences of the past decade when repeated military action by Israel destroyed all investments in infrastructure and homes by Egypt, Qatar, UAE and others. Therefore, reconstruction will be slow and heavily conditioned, not a comprehensive redevelopment.

The only way to overcome these challenges is to invert the plan's logic: prioritize inclusive Palestinian elections to produce a legitimate national leadership, define the two-state endgame based on international law first, and make disarmament an outcome of a final political settlement, not a precondition for it. Without these fundamental changes, the plan will simply replicate the failures of the past.

 

(3) Palestinian Options: A New National Strategy

A new Palestinian strategy must internalize the enduring consequences of the post–October 7 era—recognizing new constraints while capitalizing on emerging opportunities including those offered by the Trump 20-point plan. Given the ascendancy of Israel’s national-religious right, the profound crisis of Palestinian leadership, the collapse of the Oslo framework, and the perceived unreliability of Israeli governments as negotiating partners, the Palestinian people are at a strategic crossroads. The old, U.S.-mediated diplomatic strategy is defunct. A fundamental strategic rethink is therefore necessary for national survival, beginning with the core imperative of rebuilding national legitimacy.

The first and most urgent step must be to forge ties with the administrative committee of the Gaza Strip and hold inclusive presidential and legislative elections across the West Bank and Gaza, using all available methods to ensure participation. This is the only path to maintaining links to Gaza and to producing a new, legitimate leadership with a popular mandate. Following elections, a national unity government must be formed with a clear mandate for internal reform. Its priorities should be to restore basic governance and service delivery in health, education, and security for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; ensure full commitment to the Palestinian Basic Law and amend all post-2007 legislation that violates it; reunify public institutions across the West Bank and Gaza; and take credible steps to combat corruption, including the creation of an independent commission.

Concurrently, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) must be restored as a functional and representative institution, not a hollowed-out fiction. This requires holding elections for its governing bodies in the West Bank, Gaza, and the diaspora, using all available technological means to ensure broad participation. A reformed PLO must possess electoral legitimacy, be reconstituted to include all major factions, abide by its own internal regulations, and no longer be subject to the whims of a single individual or a small elite. Only under these conditions can the PLO once again serve as the sole, credible address for international negotiations.

Externally, the new strategy must pivot away from a near-total reliance on the United States and embrace a principled multilateralism. This requires strengthening alliances with supportive countries in the Global South and in Europe that have demonstrated a commitment to international law. It also means engaging with powers like China and Russia not as saviors, but as geopolitical counterweights at the UN Security Council to block initiatives detrimental to Palestinian interests. Furthermore, the systematic use of international legal institutions—the ICJ and the ICC—must be elevated from a tactic to a core strategic pillar. This “lawfare” reframes the conflict as a struggle against an illegal occupation with clear legal consequences, shifting the burden of compliance onto Israel and its international backers.

Finally, the national goal must be redefined to align with shifting global public opinion and the realities on the ground. Given the political trends within Israel, the traditional two-state paradigm is currently unrealistic. While the goal of a sovereign state must not be abandoned, the most viable path forward is to shift the immediate struggle from a specific political configuration to the realization of core, inalienable rights: self-determination, full civil and political equality for all people between the river and the sea, and justice for refugees based on international law.

This rights-based framework is strategically powerful because it builds on the changing landscape of global public opinion and forces the world to choose between supporting equal rights or endorsing a system of ethnic supremacy. It transforms the Palestinian struggle from an intractable territorial dispute into a global anti-apartheid movement—a terrain on which Israel is far more vulnerable. This strategy, grounded in internal unity, global alliances, and a rights-based struggle, offers the most effective path for Palestinians to reclaim their agency. Crucially, a rights-based framework keeps both end states—equality in one state and sovereignty in two states—conceptually open while prioritizing the immediate fight for concrete protections and freedoms.

 

Conclusion:

The 2023-25 Gaza War was a watershed event that shattered the illusions of conflict management and exposed the deep rot in both the international order and the Palestinian political system. The enduring consequences have created a new and more perilous strategic landscape. In this environment, externally imposed frameworks like the Trump Plan, which ignore the core issues of political legitimacy and sovereignty, are destined to fail. They may achieve a temporary pause in hostilities but cannot build a lasting peace.

For the Palestinian people, the path forward is not to be found in the chancelleries of foreign capitals but in the difficult and essential work of national renewal. The profound crisis of leadership is not just a symptom of the conflict's intractability; it is a primary obstacle to its resolution. The only viable strategy is one that begins with rebuilding internal legitimacy through democratic elections and national unity. A revitalized and representative Palestinian leadership can then pivot to a new global strategy: one that moves beyond a failed U.S.-led process and instead builds a broad international coalition grounded in international law and a non-negotiable demand for equal rights. This is a long and arduous path, but it is the only one that offers a chance to break the tragic cycle of violence and finally address the dual crises of occupation and internal legitimacy that continue to plague the Palestinian people.

 

[5] Leon Hadar, “Israel Is Growing More Dependent on a Less Sympathetic United States,” The National Interest, July 1, 2025: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/israel-is-growing-more-dependent-on-a-less-sympathetic-united-states.

[9] PSR polling since the start of the war can be seen here: https://www.pcpsr.org/ and here: https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154

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CPRS Public Opinion Poll 31

Evaluation of the Performance of PLC and other PNA Institutions, Attitudes Regarding Proposed Legislation, and Political Affiliation

 

22-30 December 1997

 

These are the results of opinion poll #31, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 22-30 December 1997. The poll deals with evaluation of the performance of PLC and other PNA institutions, attitudes regarding proposed legislation, and political affiliation.

The total sample size of this poll is 1320 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 831 in the West Bank and 489 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

 

1. Evaluation of the Performance of the PLC and the PNA

  • The findings show a rise in the level of positive (very good and good) evaluation of the PLC performance from 42% in September 1997 to 51% in December 1997. A limited rise in the positive evaluation of the performance of the government, the judicial authority, security and police force has also taken place from 56%, 49%, and 68%, to 61%, 53%, and 72% respectively). A slight decrease in the positive evaluation of the Presidency from 73% to 71% has taken place during the same period.
  • Positive evaluation of the performance of the PLC is specially high among women, those with primary education, housewives, those with limited income of less than JD300 monthly, and supporters of Fateh. It is significantly lower among men, those with BA degrees, professionals, those with high income of more than JD900 per month, and supporters of Hamas and the PFLP. See table (1) below.

Table (1)
Positive Evaluation of the Performance of the PLC

Gender

Women

60%

Men

40%

Education

Primary

60%

BA degrees

41%

Profession

Housewives

59%

Professionals

25%

Income

Low

52%

High

35%

Political affiliation

Fateh Supporters

64%

PFLP Supporters

29%

 
  • Evaluation of the performance of the representatives of each electoral district show a high level of positive evaluation for the performance of the district representatives of Salfit, Jenin, Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho, and Gaza City, and a lower level of positive evaluations for the district representatives of Tulkarm, Deir al-Balah and Jerusalem. See table (2) below.

Table (2)
Positive Evaluation of the Performance of the Representatives of the Electoral Districts *

1

Jenin

62%

9

Jericho

54%

2

Toubas

45%

10

Bethlehem

45%

3

Tulkarm

32%

11

Hebron

46%

4

Qalqilya

47%

12

Jabalia

49%

5

Salfit

76%

13

Gaza City

55%

6

Nablus

58%

14

Khanyounis

50%

7

Ramallah

59%

15

Deir al-Balah

37%

8

Jerusalem

43%

16

Rafah

46%

 

* Margin of error for the electoral districts is higher than the margin for the whole sample

  • Positive evaluation of the performance of the Presidency rises in the Gaza Strip, especially in Rafah, and in the Nablus area in the West Bank, and among women, illiterates, housewives, those with low income, and supporters of Fateh. Positive evaluation of the Presidency drops in the West Bank, especially in the area of Tulkarm and in Gaza City the Gaza Strip, and among men, those with BA degrees, the professionals, low income people, and supporters of the PFLP. See table (3) below.

Table (3)
Positive Evaluation of the Performance of the Presidency

Region

West Bank

69%

Gaza Strip

75%

West Bank

Tulkarm area

52%

Nablus area

83%

Gaza Strip

Gaza City

69%

Rafah

83%

Gender

Men

65%

Women

76%

Education

BA degrees

43%

Illiterates

77%

Profession

Professionals

31%

Housewives

78%

Income

High

35%

Low

73%

Political Affiliation

PFLP Supporters

42%

Fateh Supporters

85%

 
  • The findings indicate that the evaluation of the performance of the government depends on the area of government function under discussion. Positive evaluation is high in regard to education, providing security, and health, and is relatively low in regard to insuring democracy and human rights and the economy. See table (4) below.

Table (4) Positive Evaluation of the Performance of the Government in Various Areas

Providing Security

69%

Education

70%

Health

63%

Economy

28%

Democracy and Human Rights

41%

 
  • As table (5) below, and figure (1) indicate, only minor changes have taken place on the levels of positive evaluation of the various PNA institutions during the period between September 1996 and December 1997, except for the increase in the positive evaluation of the police and security forces in the aftermath of the September 1996 Israeli-Palestinian confrontation in which Palestinian security forces fought alongside civilian demonstrators against the Israeli army.

Table (5) Positive Evaluation of the Performance of PNA Institutions (Sept. 1996-Dec. 1997)

 

Dec. 1997

Sept. 1997

June 1997

April 1997

Dec. 1996

Sept. 1996

PLC

51%

42%

46%

48%

50%

48%

Cabinet

61%

56%

53%

59%

63%

63%

Judicial Authority

53%

49%

51%

55%

-----

50%

Police and Security

72%

68%

69%

77%

72%

62%

Presidency

71%

73%

68%

79%

76%

72%

 

[figure (1)] :Positive Evaluation of the Performance of the PNA Institutions (Sept. 1996-Dec. 1997)

 

Attitudes Regarding Proposed Legislation:

  • Half of the Palestinians (50%) supports the position of the PLC calling for the immediate issuing of the Basic Law, while a little over a third (35%) supports the position of the Presidency calling for the postponement of the promulgation of the law. Support for the PLC position increases in Gaza City, and among men, those with BA degrees, students, and supporters of the PFLP, while support for the position of the Presidency increases in Rafah and among supporters of Fateh. See table (6) below.

Table (6) Position Regarding the Promulgation of the Basic Law

  

Support PLC Position

Support Position of the Presidency

Area

Rafah

37%

54%

 

Gaza City

66%

22%

 

Nablus

48%

37%

 

Hebron

53%

32%

Gender

Men

56%

32%

 

Women

44%

38%

Education

Illiterates

40%

34%

 

BA Holders

58%

28%

Profession

Students

57%

32%

 

Housewives

44%

38%

Income

Low

49%

37%

 

High

40%

28%

Political Affiliation

Fateh Supporters

48%

41%

 

PFLP Supporters

64%

29%

 

Hamas Supporters

49%

40%

 
  • Regarding the proposed political parties' and NGOs' laws, the findings show a large majority of respondents (about three quarters) supporting the view that demands a prior permission form the PNA before political parties or NGOs can be established by individuals or groups. About one fifth of the respondents thought that there was no such need. No significant differences were found among the different demographic groups except an increase in the percentage of those supporting the permission requirement among those with low income (76%) compared to those with high income (60%), and supporters of Fateh (87%) compared to supporters of Hamas (69%) and the PFLP (49%).
  • An overwhelming majority of 87% supports the imposition of compulsory national service, while only 13% oppose it. No significant differences were found among the different demographic groups.
  • A large majority of 73% supports the proposed imposition of a JD10 on each individual Palestinian annually to finance university education in Palestine, thus allowing the universities to keep tuition low. Twenty-six percent oppose the proposal. The level of opposition to the proposal was mostly related to level of income. Opposition in the Gaza Strip was higher (34%) than in the West Bank (21%), in the refugee camps (39%) than in cities (28%), and among men (30%) than women (23%), married (29) vs. non-married (17%), and those with low income (31%) vs. those with high income (8%). See table (7) below.

Table (7) Level of Opposition to the Imposition of a JD 10 Fee to Finanace Higher Education

Area

Gaza Strip

34%

West Bank

21%

Residence

Refugee Camps

39%

Cities

28%

Gender

Men

30%

Women

23%

Profession

Merchants

42%

Students

15%

Marital Status

Married

29%

Single

17%

Income

Low

31%

High

8%

 
  • A similar majority of 73% supported the view thagovand municipal authorities may expropriate parts of privately owned land for the purpose of widening streets and roads. Twenty five percent opposed this view. The level of opposition is higher in the Gaza Strip (34%) than in the West Bank (20%), in refugee camps (42%) than in cities (28%) and villages and towns (16%).

 

Political Affiliation

  • The findings show an increase in the level of support for Islamists, especially Hamas, in December 1997 compared to September 1997. A slight increase in the level of support for Fateh has also taken place during the same period (from 37% to 39%). As a result a decrease occurred in the percentage of independents and non-affiliated from 45% in September to 38% in December 1997. See table (8) and figure (2).

Table (8) Political Affiliation (September 1996-December 1997)

 

Dec. 1997

Sept. 1997

June 1997

April 1997

Dec. 1996

Sept. 1996

Fateh

39%

37%

41%

41%

45%

44%

Islamists

18%

14%

13%

15%

15%

15%

National Opposition

5%

4%

4%

6%

4%

5%

Independents and non-affiliated

38%

45%

42%

38%

36%

36%

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Critical Policy Brief, Number 2/2025

December 2025

Reforming the Palestinian Authority: The Chasm Between International Dictates and Palestinian Aspirations

Khalil Shikaki and Walid Ladadweh

The demand for a comprehensive "reform" of the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been a central and recurring theme in every major diplomatic statement issued since the October 7, 2023, attack. The question of reforming the PA, a low international priority since the Second Intifada, has been thrust to the very heart of all discussions about the "day after" the Gaza war. A sudden, broad consensus has emerged among key actors—the United States, the European Union, and major Arab states—that the PA in its pre-war form is corrupt, ineffective, and lacks the legitimacy to govern Gaza.

The primary motivation for these demands is the international community's desperate search for a viable, non-Hamas entity to assume control of the Gaza Strip. Having invested billions in the PA, Western powers are unwilling to admit the failure of their state-building project. Yet, they are equally unwilling to challenge the hardline Israeli government that is determined to prevent the PA's return. A "reformed" PA has thus become the convenient fiction, a diplomatic construct designed to avoid confronting the harsh political realities on the ground.

This narrative, however, obscures a deeper truth. Long before the international community rediscovered the language of reform, the Palestinian public and its civil society had been demanding fundamental changes to a political system they viewed as illegitimate and unaccountable. While the PA leadership has consistently ignored these domestic demands, it has shown a remarkable willingness to concede to those made by the US and its allies.

Why is the international community raising the reform banner now, and why has the PA president been so quick to comply? More importantly, are the reforms being demanded consistent with those sought by the Palestinian people? This policy Brief addresses these questions, arguing that the current international reform agenda fundamentally misunderstands the crisis of Palestinian governance and that prioritizing genuine, Palestinian-led democratic renewal is the only viable path forward.

 

1. The Road to Reform: From Internal Aspiration to International Prerequisite

The international demand for PA reform is not a new phenomenon, but its character has been completely transformed. Its roots can be traced to the Second Intifada, when a 2002 reform effort, backed by popular Palestinian demand for accountability, led to the creation of the prime minister's office to weaken Yasser Arafat's presidency which until then refused parliamentary oversight. The key difference, however, lies in the driver: while those early efforts were animated by a Palestinian desire for better governance, the post-2023 push has been overwhelmingly defined by external actors.

Following the Gaza war, the U.S. consistently framed the creation of a "revitalized and reformed Palestinian Authority" as the sole pathway for its return to Gaza and for any future political settlement. This position was quickly endorsed by Western allies, with the G7 meeting in April 2024 linking "indispensable reforms" to the PA’s ability to govern a unified West Bank and Gaza as part of a viable two-state solution.

Facing immense pressure and political isolation, PA President Mahmoud Abbas signaled his acquiescence. In a pivotal letter to French President Macron and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in June 2025, Abbas condemned Hamas, endorsed its disarmament, and pledged to hold elections within a year. This capitulation set the stage for a series of international declarations that codified the external reform agenda. The New York Declaration of July 2025 and the Co-Chairs' Statement from the International Conference in September 2025 both welcomed Abbas's commitments, specifically praising reforms already underway, including the abrogation of the prisoners' payment system and curriculum revisions under EU supervision.

By November 2025, this dynamic had devolved into a spectacle of compliance. During a visit to Paris, Abbas affirmed his commitment to excluding from future elections any factions not aligned with the PLO's political platform, effectively barring Hamas. In a move reminiscent of the colonial era, he and Macron even announced a joint committee to draft a future Palestinian constitution. These theatrical gestures demonstrated the extent to which a weakened PA was willing to go to ensure its own survival.

This international consensus was cemented in UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (November 2025). The resolution explicitly stated that a "credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination" was conditional upon the PA "faithfully" completing its reform program, as defined by external frameworks like the Trump Peace Plan. Thus, by the end of 2025, the concept of reform had been completely transformed: what began as a Palestinian demand for democratic accountability had become an externally managed litmus test for Palestinian national aspirations. Freedom was no longer an inalienable right but a privilege to be earned by meeting American and European conditions.

 

2. Three Agendas for Reform: Competing Visions for the PA

The push to reform the PA has intensified, but the term "reform" itself has become a contested space, representing three distinct and often conflicting agendas: the security-first framework demanded by the United States and Israel, the governance-focused model preferred by European and Arab states, and the legitimacy-driven aspirations of the Palestinian public.

The first agenda, driven primarily by the United States and Israel, is fundamentally a security-oriented project aimed at transforming the PA into a more effective counter-terrorism partner. This framework prioritizes the creation of a "revitalized" PA that can prevent Gaza from ever again becoming a platform for attacks. Its core demands are highly controversial among Palestinians and include halting all payments to the families of prisoners and martyrs, which it frames as ending "incitement"; revising the school curriculum to remove anti-Israel content; and demanding the PA adopt an exclusionary stance toward Hamas. In essence, it envisions a PA that aligns its security and foreign policy with Israeli and U.S. interests.

The second agenda, championed by the European Union and key Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, overlaps with the American model but places a stronger emphasis on good governance and institutional capacity. As the primary funders of the PA and future reconstruction, these actors demand a technocratic government of independent experts, robust anti-corruption measures, and fiscal transparency. While they support security reform, their motivation is to build a credible, functioning, and "viable" Palestinian state that can be a stable partner in a future two-state solution. Their demands for a strong prime minister and financial accountability coincide with some Palestinian desires, but their agenda is ultimately a top-down, state-building project designed to create a predictable and responsible governing entity.

The third and most fundamental agenda is that of the Palestinian public and civil society. This vision is driven not by security or technocracy but by the urgent need for political legitimacy and national unity. As extensive polling shows, the overwhelming public priority is the reunification of the Palestinian territories and reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the holding of free and inclusive presidential and legislative elections. Palestinians demand the restoration of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the creation of accountable institutions, beginning with an empowered parliament that can hold the executive branch in check. For the Palestinian public, reform is not about creating a more efficient security subcontractor for the occupation or a more transparent recipient of foreign aid; it is about rebuilding a fractured national movement and restoring a political system that represents the will of the people. This vision often stands in direct opposition to the exclusionary and security-focused demands of the international community.

 

3. Palestinian Perspectives: A Consensus on Internal Priorities

A series of interviews with five prominent Palestinian figures reveals a powerful consensus on the nature of reform, highlighting the deep chasm between externally imposed dictates and genuine internal needs. The speakers—George Giacaman, a political science professor and public intellectual at Muwatin and Birzeit University; Khalil Shaheen, a veteran political analyst and director of research at Masarat; Shawan Jabarin, a leading human rights defender and director of Al-Haq; Ammar Dweik, director of the Independent Commission for Human Rights; and Qaddura Fares, a former minister and the former head of the Palestinian Prisoners' Society—unanimously agree that meaningful reform must be driven by Palestinian priorities, not foreign agendas they view as designed to manage the conflict rather than resolve it.

There is a unified rejection of key external demands, which are seen as Israeli-led initiatives adopted by the international community to undermine the Palestinian national project. The call to halt payments to prisoners and martyrs is uniformly condemned as an attempt to criminalize the national struggle. The demand to revise the educational curriculum is viewed as a direct assault on Palestinian identity and historical narrative. The external pressure to appoint a vice president is dismissed as blatant interference aimed at engineering a controlled succession rather than fostering democratic legitimacy. All interviewees stress that acquiescing to these foreign dictates without a clear and irreversible political horizon toward statehood would only weaken the PA and deepen internal divisions.

In stark contrast, the interviewees identify a clear and urgent internal reform agenda, with one demand standing as the cornerstone for all others: the holding of free and fair general elections. Described as "90% of the reform process" by Qaddura Fares, elections are seen as the only mechanism to restore popular legitimacy, reactivate oversight institutions like the parliament, and create the political will necessary to tackle other critical issues. Fighting corruption, described by Shawan Jabarin as a "pervasive system starting from the top," and ensuring the independence of the judiciary are considered vital goals, but most interviewees believe they are impossible to achieve without the accountability that only an elected legislature can provide.

Furthermore, the idea of imposing political conditions on parties participating in future elections—such as demanding they accept prior agreements like Oslo—is categorically rejected. The speakers argue that such preconditions are undemocratic, illegal under Palestinian Basic Law, and designed to exclude opposition, thereby entrenching authoritarianism. As Qaddura Fares asserts, "Any Palestinian decision must be cooked in the Palestinian, not the Israeli, kitchen." In essence, the interviews reveal a powerful consensus: genuine reform begins with elections. The current international "reform" agenda is seen not as a pathway to an independent state, but as a tool to reshape the Palestinian polity into a more compliant entity, perpetuating the status quo of occupation under a guise of technocratic improvement.

 

4. Conclusion: Is "Reforming" a Hollow PA Meaningless?

The international community is demanding reform from a Palestinian polity that has been systematically de-institutionalized. Following Hamas's takeover of Gaza in 2007 and President Abbas's subsequent consolidation of power, the PA and the PLO have been gutted of any meaningful institutional base. The Palestinian Legislative Council has been defunct for nearly two decades, the judiciary has been subordinated to the executive, and power is concentrated almost entirely in the hands of the president. The external actors making these demands are fully aware of this institutional void; in fact, it appears to be the very reason they expect automatic compliance from a leadership that cannot fall back on public or institutional support. For its own survival, the current Palestinian leadership finds it impossible to resist the encroachment of international powers.

The events of October 7 and its aftermath have only accelerated this loss of Palestinian political agency. Hamas’s gamble destroyed its own capacity to govern, while the PA’s paralysis has robbed all Palestinians of the ability to make their own decisions. The ensuing vacuum has invited regional powers to re-enter as custodians, marking a "re-Arabization" of the conflict unseen for decades. Just as the PLO did in 1993, the current leadership is willing to make deep concessions to ensure its own survival.

In this context, the calls for a "restructured, transparent, technocratically-led authority" to take charge of Gaza appear disconnected from reality. A new social contract is indeed needed, but it cannot be imposed on an empty shell. A PA devoid of institutional structures and public trust is not reformable; it is a captive of a leader who has spent a decade centralizing power. Without the legitimacy that can only be conferred by the people, none of these externally mandated reforms can be truly institutionalized. The unavoidable conclusion is that the PA must regain its institutional structure and legitimacy before it can be meaningfully reformed. This makes the holding of elections not just one priority among many, but the absolute prerequisite for any viable path forward.

Ultimately, the international focus on PA reform serves as a convenient diversion, allowing diplomats and politicians to avoid confronting the elephant in the room: Israeli policies aimed at annexing Palestinian territories and preventing the creation of a Palestinian state. Linking the future of Gaza or the revival of a political process to the "reform" of a hollowed-out PA is a political fiction. The PA will resume control over Gaza only when Israel is either compelled by the international community or decides it is in its own strategic interest. Until then, the international agenda will remain committed to a make-believe issue, ensuring that the cycle of conflict continues unabated.

العربية

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 8 - June 2003

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll

 

MAJORITY SUPPORT AMONG PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS FOR ROADMAP AND FOR A MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS THE STATE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND PALESTINE AS THE STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BUT EACH PUBLIC MISPERCEIVES THE POSITION OF THE OTHER

 

 

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, have conducted a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion. 

This joint poll is the sixth in an ongoing research project into the opinions of the two publics. The first poll was conducted in July 2000 at the wake of the Camp David summit. The current poll was designed to examine attitudes toward the roadmap on its various stages, toward a mutual recognition of the national identity of Israel and a future Palestine and toward reconciliation. In addition the Israeli survey also examined attitudes on the future of the settlements among the general public and among settlers in the West Bank and Gaza. 

The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, professor of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, professor of Political Science and director of PSR. The two surveys included both identical questions as well as specific questions for each public. A representative sample of 1318 Palestinians in 120 locations in the West Bank Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem was interviewed face-to-face with a sampling error of 3%. The interviews were conducted between June 19-22. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with two representative samples: a sample of the general Israeli public with 502 respondents, and a sample of 500 settlers in the West bank and Gaza, (sampling error of 4.5% in each). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between June 22 – 26. 

The following summary highlights the findings of the joint poll. For further details on the Palestinian survey, contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at Tel 02-2964933 or email kshikaki@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at Tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

 

Summary of Results 

(1) The Peace Process and the Roadmap 

A majority support for a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people.

 

  • For the first time the sensitive and disputed issue of national identity has been addressed in a joint Israeli Palestinian survey. Both Israelis and Palestinians were asked whether they agree or disagree that after the establishments of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as a state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian People. 52% of the Palestinians agreed and 46% disagreed to this proposal. Among Israelis, 65% agreed and 33% disagreed to it. Nevertheless both publics are not aware of this mutual level of support which suggests that it is still not in the open and not fully normative. Only 40% of the Palestinians believe, and 53% do not believe, that a majority of Palestinians support such recognition, and only 37% believe that a majority of Israelis supports that recognition. Israelis too find it hard to believe that a majority of Palestinians support such recognition. Only 32% believe and 56% do not believe in a Palestinian majority support on this issue, but 58% believe and 31% do not believe that a majority of Israelis support it.
  • In the same vein a majority of 80% among Israelis and 71% among Palestinians supports reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Here too support in specific reconciliation steps varies. For example, 64% percent of the Israelis and 41% of Palestinians support taking legal measures against incitement against the other side while 53% of the Israelis but only 10% of the Palestinians support adopting a school curriculum that teaches against irredentist aspirations.

 

A majority support for the Roadmap in general, varied support in its various elements

  • Support for the Roadmap reaches 56% among Palestinians and 61% among Israelis, and is stable since last April when it stood at 55% and 61% respectively.
  • But support for the different steps required from Palestinians and Israel varies. 70% of the Palestinians support consolidation of the security services into three organizations; 56% for ending incitement against Israel, 41% for restoring pre-intifada Arab links with Israel, 36% for arresting individuals conducting violent attacks on Israelis, 30% for the establishment of a state with provisional borders before settling the refugees and Jerusalem issues, and 25% for cutting off funding for groups engaged in terror and violence against Israelis.

    As to steps required from Israel, 77% of the Israelis support ending incitements against Palestinians, 67% support ceasing acts of deportations demolitions of homes and destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, 65% support IDF withdrawal to pre intifada posts and the deployment of Palestinian security forces in these areas, 54% support reopening of closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem conditional upon their refraining from political activity, 61% support dismantling illegal outposts, 44% support the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders before settling the refugee and Jerusalem issues, 60% support the negotiation for a permanent status solution under the auspices on an international conference.
  • A majority in both publics believe that its leader will stand by his commitments to the roadmap (57% of the Palestinians and 59% of the Israelis), but they suspect the other leader's intentions. Only 15% of the Palestinians believe Sharon will stand by Israel's commitments and only 30% of Israelis think that Abu Mazin will stand by Palestinian commitments. Palestinians also suspect both leaders ability to overcome political opposition to the roadmap. Only 34% think Abu Mazin will overcome Hamas opposition and only 30% believe that Sharon will overcome settlers' opposition. Israelis however have more confidence in Sharon's ability to overcome settlers' opposition (63%) but question Abu Mazin's ability to overcome opposition from Hamas (only 21% believe he will).
  • 36% of the Palestinians believe that Arafat is more able than Abu Mazin to reach a political agreement with Israel while 21% believe that Abu Mazin is more able, and 37% believe the two have the same ability. In contrary 60% of the Israelis believe that Abu Mazin is more able than Arafat to reach a political agreement with Israel, only 12% believe Arafat is more able and 25% believe that both have the same chance.
  • 48% of the Palestinians and 79% of the Israelis believe that the US president is determined to move the peace process forward and to implement the roadmap, but only 40% of the Palestinians and 40% of the Israelis believe that the Roadmap will lead to a political settlement with Israel
  • 43% of the Israelis and 48% of the Palestinians believe that democratic reforms facilitate the peace process, 23% and 21% respectively believe they inhibit it, 29% and 23% respectively believe they do not facilitate or inhibit it.

 

A majority support for cease-fire (Hudna) and for ending the armed intifada

  • A Palestinian majority of 73% supports a "Hudna" with Israel for one year during which no arms would be used against the Israelis while Israel would stop using arms against the Palestinians. But a higher percentage (80%) supports a mutual cessation of violence (that is not limited in time). Last April, only 71% supported a mutual cessation of violence.
  • 58% of the Palestinians support Hamas' refusal to accept a ceasefire (asked before Hamas announced that it accepts the ceasefire), but 67% are concerned that such a position by Hamas and other opposition groups could lead to internal Palestinian conflict
  • If a mutual cessation of violence is arrived at, 50% of the Palestinians support and 47% oppose taking measures by the Palestinian Authority to stop armed attacks against Israelis, and 76% believe that continued armed attacks in such a case would impede return to the peace process
  • A majority of 52% of the Palestinians and 88% of the Israelis believes that now that both sides have accepted the Roadmap, armed intifada and all military activities from both sides must stop. But only 18% of the Palestinians and 6% of the Israelis expect that armed confrontations will completely stop and a return to negotiations will take place. 56% of the Palestinians and 58% of the Israelis believe that some armed confrontations will continue while negotiations resume.
  • 34% of the Israelis and 65% of the Palestinians believe that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not

 

(2) Domestic Israeli Issues: The Future of Settlement 

  • 37% of the settlers chose to live in the settlements mainly because of  a religious or national mission to inhabit the land, 20% say they live their because of the importance of the territories to the security of Israel and 40% live their mainly for quality of life reasons.
  • A majority of the settlers recognize the authority of the democratic institutions to decide on the evacuation of the settlements. 58% recognize the government's authority, 54% the Knesset's authority, 60% the Knesset but by Jewish majority, and 68% a referendum. Only 38% recognize a rabbinical authority to take such a decision while 60% do not recognize it.
  •  In case a decision is made to evacuate authorized settlements, only 24% say they will obey it, 60% say they will resist it by legal means and 13% say they will resist it by all means. 54% believe that in such a struggle it is justified to bring down the government (74% among those who will resist by all means), 15% say that it is justified to endanger oneself and one's family (46% among those who will resist by all means), and 9% believe it is justified to endanger other Jews in such a struggle (35% among those who will resist by all means).
  • If the establishment of a Palestinian state in accord with a peace agreement will necessitate the evacuation of settlements, 57% of the settlers believe that the right option for the government is to pay compensations and allow them to choose a new community within the green line. 3% prefer that the government settle them in other places in Israel, 19% prefer the government to settle them in other settlements in the territories and 9% prefer that the government allows them to continue to live in their present community under Palestinian rule.

 

(3) Domestic Palestinian Issues: 

The popularity of Abu Mazin and his government drops

  • Support for the appointment of Abu Mazin as a prime minister drops from 61% in April to 52% in this poll
  • Trust in Abu Mazin's government reaches 41% with 52% refusing to grant it confidence
  • Drop in the level of confidence in the ability of Abu Mazin's government to carry out political reform from 43% last April to 38% in this poll, to fight corruption from 44% to 41%, to control the security situation from 39% to 35%. But confidence in its ability to return to negotiations with Israel remains the same (69%). Confidence in the government's ability to improve economic conditions increases from 50% to 56% during the same period.

 

Evaluation of performance, Arafat's popularity, support for a vice president, and political affiliation

  • Highest level of positive evaluation of performance goes to the opposition groups (68%) followed by president Yasir Arafat (66%), while only 37% positively evaluate Abu Mazin's performance. Positive evaluation of the PLC stands at 29% and the new government of Abu Mazin at 27%.
  • A large majority of 84% believes that corruption exists in PA institutions and two-thirds of those believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future
  • Arafat's popularity, as a president for the PA, remains unchanged at 35% while support for Ahmad Yasin (for the same office) increases from 15% last April to 18% in this poll

 

 

 

العربية

Critical Policy Brief, Number 4/2023

August  2023

Armed Groups in Northern West Bank:

The Beginning of an Armed Intifada or the Seeds of an Internal Palestinian Conflict?

Alaa Lahlouh

 

Introduction:

Public opinion polls show that a majority of 54% of the public in the West Bank expects an armed intifada to erupt soon, while a majority of 58% of the same public fears internal armed clashes between Palestinian armed groups and the Palestinian security forces. In less than a year, the Jenin and Nablus governorates witnessed several confrontations between armed groups and Palestinian security forces following the arrest of members of these groups by the PA security forces. The question that arises is the following: why have we come to this point and where are we heading?

In 2022, armed groups emerged in the northern West Bank (e.g., in Jenin refugee camp and Nablus city) and engaged in armed confrontations with the Israeli occupation forces. Polls conducted over the past yer have shown wide support among the Palestinian public for these groups. A combination of factors helped the emergence of these groups and their spread to other areas in the northern and central West Bank (e.g., in Aqbat Jaber refugee camp, Nablus, Tulkarm, and Qabatiya, Jaba' and Burqin towns in Jenin), such as the failure of the peace process, the continued policies of the Israeli governments of confiscating land and Judaizing Jerusalem, and the continued attacks by settlers against Palestinian citizens. Internal factors have also contributed to this development. These included the weakness of the Palestinian Authority and the public loss of confidence in it as a result of several reasons, the most important of which is its inability to provide security and safety for Palestinian citizens who face Israeli army incursions and settlers’ terrorism or enforce law and order in areas where tribes and clans have taken the law into their own hands. On top of that, the PA’s political system witnessed highly negative governance developments during the past decade that affected its legitimacy and weakened the protection for human rights.

This paper aims to examine the conditions pushing toward a new armed intifada and those that may increase the possibility of an internal Palestinian conflict. It explores similarities with those witnessed during the second intifada and proposes recommendations that aim at preventing the deterioration toward internal conflict. The analysis and conclusions are based on in-depth conversations with figures from various Palestinian parties who are familiar with the current internal developments. They are also influenced by the findings of public opinion polls conducted in the Palestinian territories during the past two years.

 

Background:

In mid-2021, the first armed group in Jenin camp, the Jenin Brigade, was formed and began to operate openly. It is worth recalling that the Jenin camp provided an incubator and a launching platform for most of the armed and bombing attacks during the second intifada. For this reason, it witnessed fierce battles between armed groups and the Israeli army that lasted for about 13 days in April 2002. During that battler, the occupation forces bombed and destroyed large areas in the camp’s buildings. Moreover, the year 2021 witnessed the daring escape of six prisoners from the Gilboa prison inside Israel; all the prisoners were from the Jenin governorate, five of them from the Islamic Jihad movement and a prisoner from the Fatah movement, Zakaria al-Zubaidi. Al Zubaidi is a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, and one of the most prominent commanders of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades during the second intifada. He witnessed all the battles of Jenin camp.[1] The atmosphere that prevailed in the Jenin governorate in general, and in the Jenin refugee camp and city in particular, helped many young men from other areas in the governorate to join these armed groups. At the end of 2021, small armed groups in Nablus started to target Israeli checkpoints and military vehicles in the vicinity of the city, eventually leading in mid-2022 to the formation of the Lions' Den armed group. The group made the Old City of Nablus its home base. Here too, it is worth mentioning that in April 2002, the Old City of Nablus witnessed fierce battles that lasted for about a week, after which the Israeli army was able to impose its control over the Old City. Throughout most the second intifada, that part of Nablus remained a stronghold of armed groups.

In 2022, several armed attacks inside Israel were carried out by young Palestinians, most of who, came from the Jenin area. These attacks led to the killing of several Israelis. Shooting attacks were also carried out in the vicinity of Jenin governorate against Israeli soldiers and settlers, killing and wounding many soldiers and settlers. The same development was repeated in the Nablus district.

 

Reasons behind the rise of the armed groups:

There are many reasons for the rise of armed groups in the northern West Bank, some of which are related to the daily hardships imposed by the unending Israeli occupation and settlers’ terror attacks against Palestinians. Needless to say, public loss of confidence in the peace process led to despair as more and more people came to the conclusion that diplomacy and negotiations were no longer viable. But other factors were internal. Internal governance failures produced high levels of distrust and loss of confidence in the Palestinian political system and its leadership. The PA was seen as unable to provide protection for the citizens. On top of that, the regime's loss of electoral legitimacy, the existence of widespread popular perception of corruption within the PA, and the repeated violations of human rights contributed greatly to weakening the PA. In a published study[2] by Dr. Omar Rahhal, the author lists eight reasons for the rise of armed groups, the most important of which are the PA’s failure to protect its own citizens, its emphasis on negotiations as the only option for a political solution, the willingness of the Palestinian people to sacrifice, and the PA neglect of the youth and their concerns. Palestinian public opinion polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) during the last five years have often shown that these and other reasons are directly or indirectly linked to the escalation of negative popular attitudes against the PA and the Israeli military occupation.

In addition to these forces, it is worth highlighting the following recent developments as they have contributed to providing a permissive environment that facilitated the rise of the armed groups:

  1. The escalating Israeli land confiscation policy and the measures aiming to Judaize East Jerusalem united the Palestinians in the belief that a Palestinian response should be forthcoming. The spring of 2021 witnessed popular confrontations in the city of Jerusalem and its various neighborhoods as a result of the Israeli government's attempts to expel seven families from Sheikh Jarrah from their homes. These escalating confrontations led to a military confrontation between Israel and Hamas in May 2021 that was accompanied by street confrontations in the West Bank and similar confrontations inside Israel, particularly in mixed Arab-Jewish cities. It should be noted that the rise of the armed groups in the Jenin refugee camp coincided, and was perhaps propelled by this Hamas-Israel war and the accompanying confrontations. These events were followed a month later by the Israeli assassination of one of the commanders of the Al-Quds Brigades in Jenin. This sequence of developments was particularly emphasized by Maher al-Akhras, a spokesman for Islamic Jihad, in an interview conducted with him by the author.[3]
  2. A blocked political horizon and a failed peace process cemented a popular conclusion that peace was no longer viable; that it has reached a dead-end and that Palestinians must look for alternative means to end the Israeli occupation. The formation during the past years of right wing and extreme Israeli coalitions led by Benjamin Netanyahu has been emphasized by interviewees, most prominently by a member of the Palestinian legislative Council (PLC), Jamal Huwail, who is also a member of Fatah's Revolutionary Council and one of the leaders of the April 2002 battle of the Jenin camp.[4] While Israeli measures of settlement expansion continue to tear apart the geographical contiguity of the promised Palestinian state and continue to Judaize the city of Jerusalem, the Palestinian leaders refused, in the past, to return to negotiations unless settlement expansion was stopped.  The US efforts during this period were unsuccessful in producing a sustained progress in peace making throughout President Obama's first term. Despite US Secretary of State John Kerry's efforts and success in holding negotiations between the two sides in 2013 and 2014, these efforts met the same fate of failure. After that, the negotiations entered a state of clinical death. Yet, the Palestinian leadership remained committed to negotiations as the only option for ending the Israeli occupation. Despite its declared advocacy of peaceful resistance, the Palestinian leadership has not succeeded in activating this option. One of the consequences of the failure of diplomacy and the expansion of settlements has been the declining willingness of the Palestinians public to make concessions. For example, polls show a significant decline in public support for the two-state solution in recent years, reaching the lowest level in 2023, standing at 27% and 28% in two successive polls conducted in March and June.  Moreover, these polls show that negotiations are no longer seen as the most effective means of ending Israeli occupation or building a Palestinian state.
  3. One of the reasons for the willingness of Palestinian youth to challenge the PA is the loss of confidence in that authority and due to its mounting weakness. As indicated earlier, this has been the result of the PA’s inability to provide security and safety for its citizens in the face of Israeli incursions, army and settlers, and in the face of clan and tribal conflicts, in addition to various damaging PA practices in recent years. Ayman Daraghmeh, a member of the PLC representing the Change and Reform bloc, highlighted this reason in particular in an interview with the author.[5] Confidence in the PA has also declined as a result of its loss of electoral legitimacy. The president's term expired in 2010 and since then he ruled for 13 years without a popular mandate. During these years, parliamentary and presidential elections have not been held. As a result, public trust in the PA government fell from 68% when it was first elected in 2006 to 27% by the end of 2021. The public's perception in the existence of corruption in PA institutions has reached 86% for most of the past decade. During the same period, the vast majority of Palestinians demanded the resignation of President Abbas, with 80% calling for his resignation today. Palestinians now view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinian people, and the majority sees its continuation in the interest of Israel and its disintegration or collapse in the interest of the Palestinian people.[6]
  4. The formation of armed groups in the West Bank reflects the emergence of a new Palestinian young generation. Those who observe the armed clashes realize that most of the Palestinian fighters are young people, as young as twenty-five years old. This generation was mostly born after the invasion in 2002, or were only several years old. This generation grew up under the harsh conditions of the military occupation and its efforts to control the people and the land. They have witnessed what they perceive as a leadership failure and an Arab abandonment. They lived through Palestinian division and the widening gap between the people and the PA. A weak PA left a political vacuum that the new generation is trying to fill. As Fatah leader Fathi Khazim (also known as “Abu Ra’ad”) said in an interview with the author: “nature does not accept a vacuum."[7]  Faced with disappointment and disillusionment and in an attempt to break away from the resilient status quo, these youths organized themselves in various military formations while putting political divisions and loyalties behind them. This can be seen in the formation of the Lions' Den in Nablus, which included elements from all Palestinian factions (such as Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front) as well as independents and the nonaffiliated. The same can be said about the Jenin groups, where various military wings work together, including the Al-Quds, Al-Aqsa, Al-Qassam, and Abu Ali Mustaf Brigades.

 

The spread to other areas and the potential for a new intifada:

Soon, armed groups spread to new areas. By the end of last year and the beginning of this year new armed formations were created in Tulkarm and Jericho, as well as in the towns inside the Jenin governorate and in the refugee camps in the Nablus area. As mentioned earlier, these groups enjoy great sympathy from the Palestinian street. Public opinion polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in late 2022 and the beginning and mid-2023 showed clear support for the formation of these groups: 72% of the public said that they support the formation of armed groups, such as the Lions’ Den and the Jenin Brigade, that are not operating under PA control and are not part of the official security forces; only 22% say they are against the formation of these groups.  Support for the formation of armed groups increases among young people aged 18-29 years compared to older Palestinians, 75% and 72% respectively.[8] In March 2023, 68% of the public supported the formation of these groups and 25% opposed their formation.[9] Three months later, 71% of the public supported and 23% opposed the formation of these groups.[10] Moreover, a majority of the public (58%) expects these armed groups to spread to other areas in the West Bank.[11]

Three of the factors that have contributed to the formation of the armed groups also push toward the eruption of a third intifada:

  1. Israel's unending occupation of the Palestinian territories is turning into de facto annexation as the campaign to confiscate land, build settlements, and impose Israeli law is widening in the absence of an effective official PA or international response.
  2. The apparent and growing weakness of the PA in an environment in which known organized political factions are also absent thereby generating a vacuum that these armed groups are trying to fill.
  3. The escalation of violence carried out by the Israeli occupation forces and the settlers against armed groups and against peaceful civilians in Palestinian villages and towns, as we have recently witnessed in Hawara, Turmus'ayya, Um Safa and other Palestinian towns.

 

The prospects for internal strife:

Public opinion polls conducted among the Palestinians during the past nine months indicate that a majority of the public, ranging between 52% and 59%, fears that the formation of Palestinian armed groups will lead to internal armed clashes between them and the Palestinian security forces. We noted that while support for the formation of these groups increases, trust in the PA and its institutions drops sharply. When asked about their expectation that the official security services would join forces and participate alongside armed groups in the event of an armed intifada, 62% said they did not expect that.[12] When asked about their views regarding the option for the armed men to surrender to the PA security services in order to obtain protection against Israeli assassination, between 80% and 83% of the public said they are against members of these armed groups surrendering themselves and their weapons to the Palestinian Authority[13]. If the PA were to try to disarm the armed groups, a majority of 59% expects them to resist the PA security services with arms, only 8% expect members of this group to surrender, and only 23% believe that resistance by armed groups to the Palestinian security services would be unarmed.[14] An overwhelming majority (87%) of the public believes that the PA has no right to arrest members of these armed groups to prevent them from carrying out armed attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection.[15]

The in-depth interviews conducted by the author highlighted a number of factors and developments that might increase the prospects for internal Palestinian conflict:

  1. The PA does not condone the existence of these armed groups or support the eruption of a third intifada. The PA leadership, especially President Abbas, supports nonviolence and it is still fully committed to negotiations and a peaceful solution as the only strategic option for ending the occupation. President Abbas rejects the idea of armed resistance in all its forms. By contrast, when the second intifada broke out in 2000, the PA leadership, under Yasser Arafat, believed in preserving all options, including armed resistance if necessary. Arafat did not hesitate to provide support to armed groups, or even allow the security services to participate in the intifada or turn a blind eye to their participation.
  2. The ramifications of the internal political division between the West Bank, under Fatah’s control, and the Gaza Strip, under Hamas’, are still haunting the PA. Needless to say, the split in the Palestinian political system and territories have left a great constraining impact even on all resistance options. The Palestinian Authority and its ruling party, Fatah, have great fears that any increased power and influence of Hamas in the West Bank could turn into a highly destabilizing source in Palestinian politics leading to similar developments as those that happened in the Gaza Stirp in 2007, when Hamas took over control of that area using its own armed wing to achieve a full armed control.
  3. The media exchange between Fatah and Hamas is poisonous. The widespread hate speech in the Palestinian media, especially between Fatah and Hamas, is highly alarming. This has been one of the issues particularly emphasized by Fathi Khazem (Abu Ra’d) who said that this exchange "leads to an aggravation of the internal situation and provides a fertile environment for the occurrence of an internal Palestinian conflict."[16] The observers of this media can easily see the volume of hate speech that is broadcast through satellite channels, websites or social network sites. It spreads accusation of treason against the other thereby creating an atmosphere that helps accelerate the pace towards internal conflict.
  4. The armed groups are not reluctant to target PA forces or openly challenge its monopoly over force. This is evident in the recent cases in the northern West Bank when some of these groups attacked the PA headquarters or organized military parades in the middle of towns thereby posing a direct challenge to Abbas’ assertion that the PA is enforcing the “one arm, one authority” principle.
  5. Concerns about regime security could compel the PA to take coercive measures. The ruling elite's fear of the collapse of the PA, as a result of its inability to confront the armed groups, could increase its willingness to take risks. This has been one of the issues raised by Ayman Daraghmeh who pointed out that the “PA’s imperative of self-preservation might be highly worrying, particularly given its failure to enforce order in the Jenin refugee camp and the old city of Nablus and in light of the regional and international pressure on it to act and confront the armed groups.”[17]
  6. The PA has shown that it is willing and able to occasionally arrest members of the armed groups. Such arrests have normally been followed by armed confrontations with members of these groups. A decision by the PA to mass arrest or disarm members of the armed groups in their home bases could lead to wide spread and prolonged internal violence.
  7. Finally, a highly disruptive, but unseen, lack of societal trust among the Palestinians could add an additional driver of internal strife, particularly when the PA weakness becomes evident to the public to see.  Societal trust expresses the extent to which any society is able to remain intact in the face of serious internal and external threats. In this sense, it is an expression of the societal immunity to disintegration. The greater the internal immunity of the Palestinian society, the lower the prospects for infighting; the greater the societal distrust, the greater the risk of internal conflict in the face of severe shocks or increased internal or external challenges. The results of the Arab Barometer surveys in Palestine indicate a decline in the percentage of societal trust from 39% in 2008 to only 14% in 2019, in the fifth round of the Barometer. The last round of the Barometer, in 2021-22, shows that the percentage has now dropped to only 10%. If this societal flaw is added to the very low level of trust in the PA public, especially toward those responsible for enforcing law and order, as we have indicated above, the challenge facing Palestinian society becomes critical.

 

Recommendations:

The following recommendations are based on the interviews conducted and the positions expressed by the various stakeholders. They are addressed to the PA as well as the armed groups:

To the PA:

The Palestinian leadership fears a third armed intifada and is working, under difficult constraints, to prevent one from erupting. President Mahmoud Abbas has expressed this view in various interviews in recent years. On the other hand, this PA leadership must also work to avoid throwing the Palestinian people into an internal strife, regardless of the motivation. Therefore, the Palestinian leadership must first work to regain the initiative through several steps that aim at regaining public trust, namely:

  1. Prepare for general presidential and legislative elections: This recommendation was emphasized in particular by Fathi Khazem, Jamal Huwail, and Ayman Daraghmeh.  All agreed on the importance of electoral legitimacy as the main barrier to internal strife. This must begin by setting a date for the election. Election can resuscitate the legitimacy of the entire political system and its various public institutions thereby providing the PA with the requested claim to monopoly over coercive force.[18]
  2. Make serious efforts to end the internal division and restore unity between the two parts of the Palestinian territories. Reunification is critical for regaining public trust, restore societal trust, and strengthening the Palestinian negotiating position.
  3. Adopt a national program around which a high level of consensus can be built. In this program, the role and function of the armed groups can be identified and their organizations integrated. Jamal Huwail, from Fatah, believes that this course of action constitutes a safe way out from the current impasse. He proposes various roles that can be assigned to these groups. For example, as long as the PA seeks to avoid direct confrontation with settlers, the protection of Area B from settlers’ terror can be assigned to these armed groups. Similarly, if the PA decides, at one point in the future, to protect its control over Area A against Israeli incursions, but without confronting the Israeli army, it can assign this task to the armed groups.[19]
  4. End all cases of imprisonment for political reasons. This should be a guiding principle in dealing with the armed groups. The PA should refrain from arresting activists from these armed groups. This recommendation has been particularly emphasized by Islamic Jihad’s spokesman Maher al-Akhrass who believes that "the Palestinian security services should stop arresting members of these groups for those legitimate activities entailing resisting the occupation forces. In return, members of these groups are required to respect law and order and refrain completely from attacking PA headquarters in order to preserve the sanctity of Palestinian blood."[20]
  5. Stop the promotion of incitement and hate speech against political opponents in the local media. Political opposition, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whose media attacks are even more provocative, must in return refrain from using inflammatory rhetoric against the PA and its leadership. 

To the armed groups:

  1. Avoid any confrontation with the PA security services and refrain from blocking their entry into Palestinian areas in order to enforce law and order. Armed groups must respect the law and set an example in this in order to send a message to the PA they do not seek to supplant its role or challenge its jurisdiction.
  2. If the PA attempts to arrest members of these groups, they should not confront it; instead, they should withdraw and evade, by all means, confronting it. Ayman Daraghmeh stressed that members of armed groups must redeploy outside their home base in those cases where the PA security forces seek to deploy. This should reduce those instances of armed confrontations between the armed groups and the PA security services.[21]
  3. The armed groups are already very popular with the Palestinian public, but this is not necessarily the kind of relations between the armed groups and the PA. Moreover, the presence of these groups within the society might trigger tension with the public. It is imperative that the groups strife to avoid any conflict with the public. Moreover, as Maher al Akhras pointed out, the groups must also strife to maintain a smooth and amicable relations with the PA: "members of armed groups are required to respect the citizens and avoid all kinds of problems, whether with citizens or the PA”.[22]
  4. Visible militarization by the armed groups is destructive, not only because it makes them easy targets for the Israeli army, but also because it increases the pressure on the PA to take effective measures to arrest and disarm them. Jamal Huwail argues for keeping the armed groups completely underground as one way by which they can assure the PA that they do not seek to replace it in their areas of operation.[23]
  5. Lack of internal coordination between the armed groups could led to internal in-fighting. To avoid this outcome, the armed groups need to create joint institutions and leadership. These joint institutions can help the groups articulate their vision and negotiate with the PA and societal forces in order to reduce any existing threat perception and contribute to wining hearts and minds.
 

[1] All six prisoners were rearrested by the Israeli forces.

[2] Omar Rahhal, “The transformation of Palestinian attitudes in the West Bank regarding the confrontation with the occupation,” Amman: Center for Middle East Studies, 2022 (Arabic)

[3] Phone interview with Maher al Akhras, spokesperson of Islamic Jihad, 15 July 2023.

[4] Interview with Jamal Huwail, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, 15 July 2023.

[5] Interview with Ayman Daraghmeh, PLC member representing Change and Reform bloc in the parliament, 9 August 2023.

[6] Khalil Shikaki, “The Road to Collision: a Weak Palestinian Authority and a New National-Religious Israel,” Critical Policy Brief, Ramallah, PSR, June 2023: https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/942

[7] Interview with Fathi Khazim, leader and activist at the Jenin Refugee Camp, 5 August 2023.

[16] Interview with Khazim.

[17] Interview with Daraghmeh.

[18] Interviews with Khazim, Huwail, and Daraghmeh.

[19] Interview with Huwail.

[20] Interview with al Akhras.

[21] Interview with Daraghmeh.

[22] Interview with al Akhras.

[23] Interview with Huwail.

العربية

Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll 32 , June 2009

Pessimism among Israelis and Palestinians regarding the prospects for a settlement and a Palestinian state in the next few years, but majorities on both sides support a two-state solution.  

Following Obama’s Cairo speech, Israelis’ pessimism decreased somewhat and support for the two-state solution increased slightly  

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between May 21-June 3, 2009. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem. The poll was conducted before Obama’s Cairo speech on June 4. Following the speech, another survey was conducted (June 7-8) which repeated some of the first survey questions on a representative sample of the Israeli public to assess the speech’s impact. We did not conduct a similar poll among Palestinians after the Obama speech.  

  • 67% of the Palestinians and 62% of the Israelis believe that it is impossible to reach these days a final status agreement. Only 30% and 35% respectively believe it is possible. In the same vein, 69% of the Palestinians and 61% among Israelis think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel in the next five years are non-existent or low; 28% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe the chances are medium or high. Nonetheless, a majority of Israelis (59%) and Palestinians (61%) support a two-state solution. 36% of Israelis oppose it; 23% of the Palestinians support a one-state solution.
  • Following Obama’s Cairo speech, Israelis’ support for a two-state solution increased slightly from 59% to 63%. Obama’s speech had greater impact on Israelis’ expectations as to the chances for a final status settlement with the Palestinians and for the establishment of a Palestinian state: Assessment that the chances for a Palestinian state are medium or high increased by 10 percentage points after the speech, and beliefs that it is possible to reach a final status settlement increased by 6 percentage points.
  • Among other findings of the joint Truman PSR poll: 43% of the Palestinians feel that nuclearization of Iran holds positive consequences for the Arab region; 33% see it negatively.   52% of the Israelis support the bombing of the Iranian nuclear facilities if the international efforts to prevent it from obtaining a nuclear device fail.
  • The poll also reveals that 52% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians would support a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and of Palestine as the  state of the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute. While a majority of the publics still supports this mutual recognition of identity, the current figures indicate a decrease in support among both publics compared to past surveys.  

 The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between May 21-23, 2009. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 606 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between May 24 and June 3, 2009. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).  

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il. 

 

MAIN FINDINGS  

(A) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda

The Israeli-Palestinian track

  • 50% of the Israelis support and 48% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. The same figures were obtained in our March 2009 poll. A sizeable Israeli majority (62%) support and only 31% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. In March 2009 these figures were 69% and 27% respectively.
  • 78% of the Palestinians and 51% among Israelis prefer a comprehensive settlement over an interim one where a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza while other issues such as refugees would be postponed. Only 18% of the Palestinians and 33% of the Israelis prefer the interim option.
  • 68% of the Israeli public don’t believe that the new Israeli government will succeed to lead Israel to a final status settlement with the Palestinians, while 25% believe it will succeed. Similarly, among the Palestinians, 70% do not believe it is possible to reach such a settlement with the new Netanyahu government; 27% think it is possible.
  • More generally, 67% of the Palestinians and 62% of the Israelis believe that it is impossible to reach these days a final status agreement; 30% and 35% respectively believe it is possible.
  • 69% of the Palestinians and 61% among Israelis think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel in the next five years are non-existent or low; 28% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe the chances are medium or high.
  • Nevertheless, 59% of the Israelis support and 36% oppose a two-state solution. Among Palestinians, 61% support the two-state solution while 23% support a one-state solution and 9% support other solutions. The two-state solution was presented to the Palestinians as one “based on the establishment of a Palestinian state along side Israel” while the one-state solution was presented as “one in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state whereby Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews would be equal.”
  • Moreover, 52% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians agree that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. 41% and 49% respectively oppose such a proposal. While a majority of the publics still supports this mutual recognition of identity, the current figures indicate a decrease in support among both publics compared to past surveys. Among Palestinians, support peaked at 66% in early 2006, and has since been declining steadily. Among Israelis, support has drastically declined following the 2009 elections.
  • Following Netanyahu’s refusal to accept the two-state solution and Abbas’s condition for resumption of negotiations that Israel accepts this solution and freezes settlements, 46% of the Israelis and 44% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue. 40% of the Israelis and 36% of the Palestinians think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 6% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians think that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop.

 

The Arab League (Saudi) Plan

  • 56% of the Israelis oppose and 36% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In our March 2009 poll 63% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 33% supported it. Among Palestinians, 57% support the plan and 40% oppose it; in March 2009, 58% supported the plan and 39% opposed it.

 

Israeli-Syrian  Track

  • 62% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria, and 26% support it. If in the peace agreement, Syria will commit to disconnect itself from Iran and stop its support of Hizbulla and Hamas, support increases to 34%
  • 69% of the Israeli public do not believe that the new Israeli government will succeed to lead Israel to a peace agreement with Syria, while 22% believe it will succeed.

 

 (B) Conflict Management, Support for Violence, Threat and Conflict Toll Perceptions

  • Among Israelis, 27% suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues; 42% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out; 24% believe that Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps. Among Palestinians, 51% support and 46% oppose launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities like Sderot and Ashkelon.
  • 58% of the Israelis believe that Israel can overthrow the Hamas regime in Gaza; 36% believe that it cannot.
  • Among Israelis, 61% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. Among Palestinians 45% fear that their security and safety and that of their family are not assured.
  • 52% of the Israeli public believe that Israel should bomb the Iranian nuclear reactor if the efforts of the international community to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons fail; 35% oppose it. Among Palestinians, 43% feel that nuclearization of Iran holds positive consequences for the Arab region; 33% see it negatively.  
  • 69% of the Israelis think that the price the Israeli-Palestinian conflict imposed on the Israeli society is high or unbearable; 28% think that it is mid-range or low. However, 60% think the Israeli society can bear this price for decades or forever; 14% think it can bear it another 10 years, and 13% believe that the Israeli society will be able to bear this price another year or two.
  • Only 23% of the Israelis feel that Israel’s condition these days is good or very good; 40% say it is so-so; 35% see it as bad or very bad. 
  • Among Palestinians, only 10% describe the conditions of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as good or very good, 13% say so-so, and 74% say bad or very bad. As to the conditions in the West Bank these days, 31% describe the conditions of the Palestinians in the West Bank as good or very good, 27% say so-so, and 38% say bad or very bad.

 

(C) The Impact of Obama’s Cairo Speech on the Israeli Public

Following Obama’s Cairo speech on June 4th we carried out a second survey which repeated some of the first survey questions on a representative sample of the Israeli public (N=528) to assess the speech’s impact. The interviews took place 3 days after the speech (June 7-8).

  • Before the speech, 50% of the Israelis thought that Israel should accept American pressure if the US under the leadership of Obama pressures Israel to accept the two states for two people solution; 42% thought it should reject such pressure. After the speech, willingness to accept such US pressure increased to 52%, and rejection of it decreased by 4 percentage points to 38%. A similar increase of 4 percentage points is observed in Israelis’ support for the two-state solution (59% support before the speech and 63% thereafter).
  • As to the Saudi plan, before Obama’s speech, 34% of the Israelis thought that Israel should accept American pressure on this issue, and 53% thought it should reject it. After the speech, there was almost no change, and the figures were 33% and 54% respectively. This stability is consistent with Israeli majority opposition to the Saudi plan, which remained steadfast as well following Obama’s speech.
  • Before Obama’s speech, 35% of the Israelis thought that Israel should accept American pressure if the US pressures Israel to join the nuclear non proliferation treaty; 52% thought Israel should reject it. (This question was not asked in the second survey).

Greater differences before and after Obama’s speech were observed in expectations of Israelis with regard to the evolution of the conflict:

  • Expectations with regard to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years increased. 42% thought the chances for it are medium or high after the speech, compared to 32% before.
  • Similarly, Israeli beliefs that it is possible to reach these days a final status settlement with the Palestinians increased from 35% before the speech to 41% after it.
  • Finally, Israeli beliefs in the success of international mediation of the conflict increased following the speech from 49% to 52%, and the percentage disbelieving in such mediation declined from 48% to 42%.
  •  
العربية

CPRS Public Opinion Poll 37

The Peace Process and the Wye Memorandum, Elections for the President and Vice President, and Political Affiliation
 

12-14 November 1998

These are the results of opinion poll #37, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 12-14 November 1998. The poll deals with the peace process and the Wye memorandum, election of the president and vice president, and political sympathy. The total sample size of this poll is 1321 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 828 in the West Bank and 493 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

1. Peace Process

  • A majority of 75% supports the peace process, but only 59% support the Wye agreement while 35% oppose it.
  • A majority of 57% thinks that the Israelis gain more from the agreement while 18% only think that the Palestinians gain more.
  • A majority of 78% thinks that the PA will implement the agreement but only 19% think that the Israeli government will implement it
  • A majority of 54% opposes the security arrangements contained in the agreement and 64% fear that their implementation may lead to internal armed conflict among Palestinians
  • A majority of 51% believe that the Palestinian negotiating team could have obtain a better agreement
  • A majority of 53% opposes and 41% support the resort of the Palestinian opposition to violence against Israelis as a means of resisting the Wye agreement
  • Only a minority of 38% expects the final status talks to succeed
  • Palestinians are split on the unilateral establishment of statehood on May 4, 1999, with 46% supporting, and 47% preferring waiting for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement
  • Only 45% expect the current peace process to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the coming years

The results of this poll, which was conducted two weeks after the signing of the Wye Memorandum in Washington D.C, show an important increase in the percentage of those supporting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process from 66% last month to 75% now. This is the highest percentage recorded by CPRS since December 1996. But the support for the Wye agreement does not exceed 59% while 35% oppose it. A majority of 51% believe that the Palestinian negotiating team could have achieved a better agreement.

Support for the agreement increases in the Gaza Strip reaching 65% compared to 55% in the West Bank. It also increases among non-refugees (62%) compared to refugees (53%), among the illiterates (65%) compared to holders of BA degrees (43%), among farmers (72%), retired persons (71%), and housewives (61%) compared to students (44%) and specialists (30%), and among Fateh supporters (74%) compared to Hamas' (35%). Despite the fact that a majority supports the Wye agreement, only a minority of 18% sees in its more gains for the Palestinians, while a majority of 57% sees in it more gains for the Israelis, and only 12% see in it equal gains for both sides. Moreover, while a large majority of 78% thinks that the Palestinian side is committed to the implementation of the agreement, only a small minority (19%) thinks that the Israeli side is also committed. Furthermore, a majority of 54% opposes the security arrangement clauses in the agreement and alarger majority of 64% fears that their implementation may lead to internal Palestinian violent conflict. Fearing that, only 9% give the opposition the right to resort to violence against the PA as a means of expressing opposition to the agreement. By contrast, a much larger minority of 41% gives the opposition the right to resort to violence to express opposition to the agreement if it was directed against Israeli targets, while a majority of 53% opposes that.

It is noticeable that support for violence against Israelis in general has decreased by 10 percentage points from 51% one month ago to 41% today. Opposition to violence against Israeli targets increased from 44% to 53%.

It is also noticeable that a large percentage of 79% of those opposed to the agreement believe that it serves Israeli interests only while this percentage does not exceed 46% among supporters of the agreement. The percentage of those who believe that Israel will not implement the agreement increases sharply among those who are opposed to it (89%) compared to those who support it (66%). The percentage of those who oppose the security clauses of the agreement is larger (78%) among those opposed to the agreement compared to those who support it (41%). The percentage of those who are concerned that it might lead to internal armed conflict is larger (75%) among those opposed to the agreement compared to those who support it (60%). Also, the percentage of those who think that a better agreement could have been reached increases among its opposition (59%) compared to its supporters (48%). Support for violence against Israelis is higher (56%) among those opposed to the agreement and lower (34%) among its supporters. But the two sides, the opposed and the supportive, agree equally and in large percentage (89%) in their opposition to the use of violence against the PA as a means of expressing opposition to the agreement.

Despite the rise in support for the peace process and the noticeable decline in support for violence, a majority of 54% still does not believe that an agreement on final status issues is feasible. Also, the percentage of those who believe that the peace process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state has decreased from 49% one month ago to 45% in this poll. The results do not show any noticeable change in the percentage of those who support a unilateral establishment of a Palestinian state in May 1999 reaching 46% (compared to 45% one month ago), while the percentage of those preferring to wait until an Israeli-Palestinian agreement about it is concluded reaches 47% compared to 44% one month ago.

It is worth noting that support for the unilateral establishment of statehood rises in the Gaza Strip (53%) compared to the West Bank (40%). The percentage of those who support waiting increases slightly among those who believe that the peace process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the coming years reaching 48% compared to 43% among those who do not think so. These results show that the Palestinian support for the Wye agreement is reserved and cautious, and that it derives from the high level of general support for the peace process and the conviction that there is no alternative to it as means of achieving Palestinian goals. The reserved attitude towards the Wye agreement comes from the belief that it serves Israeli interests rather than addressing Palestinian needs.

Despite that, Palestinian street seems to support taking risks for the sake of peace by supporting the agreement. But at the same time, it hesitates in preventing the opposition from using violence against Israelis in an attempt to attack the agreement, while showing no tolerance to those who want to oppose the agreement by resorting to violence against the PA.

 

2. Elections for the President and vice-President and Political Affiliation

  • In a three way contest, Arafat receives 45% of the vote, Ahmad Yasin: 10%, and Haidar Abdul Shafi: 7%.
  • Fateh's support reaches 40%, Islamists: 17%, national opposition: 4%, and the non-affiliated: 39%
  • In a contest for the vice-presidency involving 8 candidates: Abdul Shafi: 10%, Faisal Husseini and Sa'eb Erikat: 8% each, Hanan Ashrawi, Farouq Kaddomi (Abu Lutuf), and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin): 7% each, Ahmad Qurai' (Abu Ala'): 6%, and Nabil Sha'ath: 4%
  • In a three-way contest for the vice-presidency: Abu Lutuf: 24%, Abu Mazin and Abu Ala' : 22% each
  • In a two-way contest, Abu Mazin receives 42% and Abu Ala' 38%
  • In another two-way contest, Abu Ala' receives 48% and Abu a-Lutuf 40%
  • In yet another two-way contest, Abu Mazin receives 43% and Abu Lutuf 40%

Arafat's popularity improved slightly compared to the findings of our October poll. In a three-way race for the office of the presidency, Arafat received 45% of the vote, compared to 43% last month. It is noticeable that Arafat's popularity is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (40%). Ahamd Yasin received 10% of the vote with a decrease of three percentage points compared to the October results. Haidar Abdul Shafi received 7% of the vote with a similar decrease of three percentage points during the same period.

In a race for the vice-presidency, involving 8 candidates, Haidar Abdul Shafi received the largest percentage of votes (10% compared to 12% one month ago), followed by Faisal Husseini and Sa'eb Erikat with 8% each, followed by Abu Lutuf, Abu Mazin, and Hanan Ashrawi, with 7% each, followed by Abu Ala' with 6%, and finally, Nabil Sha'ath with 4%. It is noticeable that the popularity of Abu Lutuf, Nabil Sha'ath, and Faisal Husseini differs in the West Bank compared to Gaza. Abu Lutuf received 8% support in the West Bank, but only 5% in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, Faisal Husseini received 8% in the West Bank, but only 4% in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Nabil Sha'ath received 6% in the Gaza Strip compared to 2% in the West Bank. Among Fateh supporters, the results were as follows: Haidar Abdul Shafi: 13%, Faisal Husseini: 12%, Abu Mazin: 11%, Sa'eb Erikat: 10%, Abu Lutuf: 8%, Hanan Ashrawi: 7%, Abu Ala' : 7%, and Nabil Sha'ath: 4%. Supporters of Hamas gave more votes to Haidar Abdul Shafi (10%) and Hanan Ashrawi (9%).

In a three-way race, Abu Lutuf received 24% followed by Abu Mazin and Abu Ala' with 22% each. Abu Ala' s popularity was slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (26%) compared to the West Bank (22%). But Abu Lutuf's popularity was higher in the West Bank (27%) than in the Gaza Strip (19%). Abu Mazin's popularity, on the other hand, was almost equal in both areas. Fateh supporters gave equally to Abu Mazin and Abu Lutuf (24% each) and almost equally to Abu al-Ala; (23%). But Hamas supporters gave more votes to Abu Lutuf (28%).

In a two-way race different combinations were presented. In the first, Abu Mazin received 42% and Abu Ala' 38%. In this case, the West Bank gave Abu Mazin 44% and Abu Ala' 35% while Gaza gave Abu Mazin 38% and Abu Ala' 44%. Fateh supporters gave 48% to Abu Mazin and 37% to Abu Ala' . In the second combination, Abu Ala' received 48% and Abu Lutuf 40%. In this case, the West Bank gave 44% to Abu Lutuf and 42% to Abu Ala' , but the Gaza Strip gave Abu Ala' 58% and only 34% to Abu Lutuf. Fateh supporters gave 48% to Abu Ala' and 40% to Abu Lutuf. In the third combination, Abu Lutuf received 40% and Abu Mazin 43%. The West Bank gave Abu Lutuf 47% and Abu Mazin 39%. Gaza Strip gave Abu Lutuf 30% and Abu Mazin 48%. Fateh supporters gave 45% to Abu Mazin and 39% to Abu Lutuf. These results show that despite his general popularity among Palestinians, Abu Lutuf is weaker than the other two in the Gaza Strip and among Fateh supporters.

Fateh maintained it level of support at 40% (compared to 38% last month). Support for Hamas reached 11% (compared to 12% last month), while support for Islamists in general reached 17%. Support for the national opposition reached 4%, and the level of non-affiliated remained almost as it was last month at 39%...More

 

العربية

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll 39, March 2011

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, March 2011 

In the backdrop of the demonstrations in the Arab world, neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider such demonstrations to be capable of ending occupation in the West Bank 

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.   

Given the dramatic events in the Arab world, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about similar demonstrations in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

48% of Israelis consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the West Bank against Israeli occupation to be medium or high. 40% consider those chances to be low or non-existent;.

Large majorities of both Palestinians (66%) and Israelis (73%) do not consider such demonstration in the West Bank to be capable of ending occupation or stopping settlements. Only 31% among Palestinians and 13% among Israelis think such demonstrations can end occupation and settlement activity.

63% of the Palestinians oppose and 32% support the attack in the Itamar settlement in the West Bank in which a family of five was murdered. 

 

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 17 and 19, 2011. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 601 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between March21 and 28, 2011. The margin of error is 4.0%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

 

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding the uprising in the Arab world

  • 52% of the Palestinians feel a need for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to organize demonstrations similar to those occurring in other Arab countries. 40% do not feel the need for such demonstrations. But Among Gazans, the percentage of those who feel the need to organize demonstrations against the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip rises to 67%. A majority of Israelis (54%) consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the Gaza Strip against the Hamas government low or non-existent; 36% consider those chances to be medium or high.
  • 47% of the Palestinians feel a need for Palestinians in the West Bank to organize demonstrations similar to those occurring in other Arab countries. 50% do not feel the need for such demonstrations. But Among West Bankers,, the percentage of those who feel the need to organize demonstrations against the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank decreases to 36%. A majority of Israelis (51%) consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the West Bank against the PA government low or non-existent; 39% consider those chances to be medium or high. 
  • 40% of Israelis consider the chances of such demonstrations occurring in the West Bank against Israeli occupation to be low or non-existent; 48% consider those chances to be medium or high.
  • Large majorities of both Palestinians (66%) and Israelis (73%) do not consider such demonstration in the West Bank to be capable of ending occupation or stopping settlements. Only 31% among Palestinians and 13% among Israelis think such demonstrations can end occupation and settlement activity.
  • 69% of Israelis think that the chances of such demonstrations to occur among the Israeli-Arab public against the Israeli government are non-existent or low; 22% consider those chances to be medium or high.
  • A majority of the Palestinians (54%), and a plurality among Israelis (42%) believe that the chances of establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years did not change in light of the developments in Egypt and other Arab countries. 21% of the Palestinians and 25% of the Israelis think that the chances have increased; 23% of the Palestinians and 22% of the Israelis think that the chances have decreased. Majorities on both sides consider the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state as low or non-existent (67% among Palestinians and 59% among Israelis.

 

(B) Renewal of violence between Israelis and Palestinians

  • 63% of the Palestinians oppose and 32% support the attack in Itamar in which a family of five was murdered.
  • In light of the attack in Itamar, 59% among Israelis oppose and 33% support the government policy to relax the security measures in the West Bank such as the removal of road blocks.
  • Among Israelis, 74% oppose and 16% support the settlers’ actions which damage Palestinian property and block roads (labeled “price tag”) in response to removal of illegal outposts by the Israeli government.
  • 66% of the Israelis believe that that the settlers’ actions against Israeli soldiers and policemen during the evacuation of the Gilad farm in the West Bank pose a danger or grave danger to democracy. In our November 2002 poll 74% of Israelis believed so and 21% thought they do not pose a danger.
  • 54% of Israelis think the Israeli government is not strict enough in imposing the rule of law in the “territories” while 34% believe it is strict enough. In our November 2002 poll, 53% believed it is not strict enough while 41% of Israelis believed that the government is strict enough.
  • 63% of the Israelis support a tough governmental policy against extreme Israeli elements in the “territories” like those who shoot Palestinian olive pickers even if this can result in a confrontation with settlers; 30% oppose it. In our November 2002 poll, 70% supported such a policy while 24% opposed it. 

 

 (C) Conflict management, peace initiatives and threat perceptions 

  • After the US has used its veto power against the UNSC resolution regarding Israeli settlements, 47% of the Israelis and 57% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will continue. 83%of the Israelis and 52% of the Palestinians expect that some armed attacks will continue as well.
  • 54% of the Israelis support and 41% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However 53% think that the majority of the Israeli public opposes such negotiations and only 31% think a majority supports it.
  • 56% of the Israelis oppose and 31% support the Saudi initiative, while 56% of the Palestinians support the plan and 41% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In our December 2010 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan among both Israelis and Palestinians.
  • In our poll we also examine periodically Israelis’ and Palestinians’ readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 52% of the Israelis, support such a mutual recognition; recognition of identity and 36%oppose it. Among Palestinians, 48% support and 50% oppose it.
  • Among Israelis, 54% are worried and 41% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, just like in our previous poll in December. Among Palestinians 70% are worried and 30% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. In our last poll in December, 75% of the Palestinians said they were worried and 25% said they were not worried.
  • The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend the borders of the state to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens. A plurality of the Israelis (34%) fears that the Palestinians’ aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel.
العربية

Public Opinion Poll No (76) Press-Release

23 June 2020

Two-thirds of the public expect Israel to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the West Bank and the majority expresses support for the PA policy of ceasing to implement the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with Israel. But large majorities express worry about the likely consequences of the PA policy on them and on their daily lives. Findings also show that despite a decrease in the popularity of president Abbas and Fatah movement in this poll, large majorities of the pubic are satisfied with the performance of the government in managing the Corona crisis.

17-20 June 2020

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-20 June 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the spread of the Corona virus throughout the world and in the Palestinian territories leading the Palestinian Authority to impose a lockdown throughout the Palestinian territories which brought to a standstill many economic activities. It also witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government lead by prime minister Netanyahu and the announcement of the government intentions to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank. In response, the PA announced ending its commitment to the Oslo agreement and severed relations with Israel in security and civil realms. This was followed by ending Palestinian-Israeli security coordination and Israel stopped the transfer of Palestinian clearance funds thereby negatively affecting the PA’s ability to pay salaries for the month of May 2020. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

This quarterly poll was conducted during a period in which the spread of the Corona virus was believed to have been brought under control thereby allowing us to conduct face-to-face interviews throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The poll covered various 

Issues, most importantly the intention of the Israeli government to annex Palestinian territories and the Palestinian response to the Israeli plans which amounted to a decision to stop implementation of the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with the Israeli government. We also focused on public perception of the PA government and its performance during the Coronavirus pandemic.

Findings show that two-thirds of the public believe that the new Israeli government led by prime minister Netanyahu will indeed annex Palestinian territories. This realization created a great deal of public concern and worry about the future. Public worry focused on the salary payment to the public sector, access to medical treatment, shortages in water and electricity supplies, eruption of armed clashes, return of security chaos and anarchy, PA collapse, and inability to travel to Jordan.

A large majority supports a Palestinian response to annexation that involves stopping the implementation of the agreements with Israel and severing all relations with it. But the public has doubts about the sincerity of the PA in stopping security coordination with Israel. Despite the fact that a slim majority supports responding to the plan by returning to armed struggle, the findings of this poll in fact show a decrease in supporting armed struggle compared to the findings of our last poll which was conducted four months ago. Moreover, despite the fact that two-thirds are worried about the likely collapse of the PA, only one third thinks that Israel will bring back its military rule and civil administration to the Palestinian territories; three quarters express rejection of such return, if it were to happen.

With regard to the government performance in managing the Coronavirus pandemic, a large majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA and with the various measures taken by the PA government. More than three quarters indicate that they trust that the government has been working to protect the interests of public. But two-thirds say that their income or salary has been reduced and a majority indicates that it has stopped working or has become unemployed during that period. Moreover, more than three quarters express the view that the PA government did not do its best to compensate those who suffered the most due to the closure and lockdown. It is interesting that despite the tense relations between the PA and Israel, two-thirds of the public express agreement with Palestinian-Israeli cooperation and coordination in the health sector that took place during the period of the pandemic.

Findings show a rise in favor of the two-state solution but half of the public remains opposed to this solution. Findings also show a consensus against the Trump plan, or the deal of the century, with a prevailing perception that the plan does not end the Israeli occupation and does not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. Indeed, most of the public believe now that the plan has returned the conflict to its original existential roots. For all of this, a large majority is opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US.

Finally, despite a decline in the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, findings indicate that he would lose a presidential election in which he competes against Ismail Haniyyeh. Findings also show that the gap between Fatah and Hamas, which stood at 6 points four months ago in Fatah’s favor, has now narrowed to 2 points in its favor.   

 

(1) Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories and its potential consequences:

  • Two-thirds (66%) believe that the new Israeli government will indeed annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank while 28% think it will not do so.
  • However, the majority (59%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Hamas; in fact, 56% expect Israel to wage war against the Gaza Strip while 36% do not expect it to do so.
  • Similarly, the majority (57%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach peace arrangements with the PA in the West Bank while the largest percentage (48%) expects, and 43% do not expect, Israel to wage war against the PA to force it to collapse.
  • However, a large majority of 73% expects the new Israeli government to deepen the normalization steps with some of the Arab Gulf countries but 53% do not expect, and only 30% expect, Israel to wage war against Iran.
  • When asked what the PA should do in response to an Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories: (1) the largest majority (71%) said it should, and 21% said it should not, stop implementing the Oslo agreement and should sever all relations with Israel; (2) 61% said Palestinians should resort to peaceful resistance and 35% disagreed with that; (3) 52% said they support and 42% oppose a return to armed struggle; (4) 37% said they support the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution; and (5) 36% said they support, and 53% said they oppose, a return to the negotiation with Israel and the US based on a detailed Palestinian peace plan that can serve as a counter proposal to the Trump plan.
  • When forced to choose only one of these five possible responses, the largest percentage (31%) says that it prefers a return to armed struggle, 23% prefer resumption of negotiations based on a detailed Palestinian counter proposal, 18% prefer non-violent resistance, 15% prefer abandoning the Oslo agreement and the severing of relations with Israel, and 6% prefer to abandon the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution. 
  • We asked the public about its expectations regarding the likely responses of external actors to an Israeli annexation, if one is to actually take place. A majority expresses pessimism with 63% indicating that they do not expect Jordan to abandon its peace agreement with Israel; 70% do not expect Jordan or Egypt to recall their ambassadors from Israel; 78% do not expect European countries to impose sanctions on Israel; and another 78% do not expect Arab countries in the Gulf, or some of them, to end normalization measures with Israel.
  • Twice we asked the public about its support for the PA leadership’s declared policy of stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, stopping security coordination, and severing relations with Israel, once before detailing possible consequences of such a policy and once again after going over these details. The initial response showed that a majority of 59% support and 31% oppose the leadership’s decision.
  • When the questions turns to the details and possible consequences, the public indicates great worries about the future. For example, 81% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 73% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 70% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 65% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 65% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 63% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 62% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
  • Despite all these concerns, in answer to the second question about support/opposition to the PA leadership decision to sever relations with Israel, a larger majority of 63% says it supports the decision and only 29% say they oppose it.  Yet, the level of support for the PA decision in response to both questions is lower than the support the public is willing to grant to the policy itself, which, as we indicated above, stood at 71%.  
  • It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (57%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 32% believe it indeed did.
  • A majority of 55% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (33%) expects Israel to do so.
  • A large majority of 74% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 18% say they do prefer that.
  • 50% of the public believe that the PA will back down and resume relations with Israel if the latter declares its intention to resume its direct military rule over the Palestinian territories while 37% believe the PA will not back down.

  

(2) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

  • Large majorities are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Coronavirus pandemic. But the level of satisfaction differs from one measure to the other. For example, 88% are satisfied with the closure of areas that witnessed the spread of the virus; 80% are satisfied with the closure of schools and universities; 77% are satisfied with the cessation of transportation between the various governorates; 73% are satisfied with the ban on laborers working in Israeli settlements; 60% are satisfied with the closure of mosques and churches; and 57% are satisfied with the ban on Friday prayers and Sunday mass. 
  • Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 82% express satisfaction with the ministry of health; 75% are satisfied with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas; 67% are satisfied with the performance of the “emergency committee” in their area; 65% are satisfied with the performance of the government spokesperson, Mr. Ibrahim Milhem; 64% are satisfied with the performance of the local municipalities or councils; 62% are satisfied with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh; and 61% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area.
  • Similarly, 76% say they have trust, and 22% say they have no trust, that the government, in taking the measures it took, has been working for the interest of the people.
  • We asked about the amount of donations made to the “dignity fund:” 48% are satisfied and 44% are dissatisfied. But an overwhelming majority of 77% says that it is not certain that the donation would reach those who truly need it.
  • Public trust in the government is also evident in the fact that 56% believe the announcements regarding the number of infections and deaths while 36% believe that the government has not been transparent. Similarly, 57% express the belief that the measures taken by the PA have been adequate, while 23% believe them to be inadequate, and 18% believe they were exaggerated.
  • The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 67% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 55% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
  • When asked about its impression about of people’s implementation of social distancing, the largest percentage (45%) say it believes the implementation was medium, 18% say it was high, and 36% say it was low.
  • A majority of 69% indicates that the closure and lockdown did not cause domestic problems within their own families while 29% indicates that they did have such problems.
  • 57% think that remote education has not been useful while 37% think it has been.
  • 65% believe that it was not appropriate to allow laborers to continue to work in Israel during the closure and lockdown while 31% think it was appropriate.
  • A small majority of 54% believes the pandemic is a divine punishment for people and states for their corruption and injustice while 37% believe it is not. However, the largest percentage (45%) thinsk the virus is manmade and not natural while a similar percentage of 43% thinks it is a product of nature.
  • A two-third majority (67%) agrees with the cooperation and coordination in the health sector which took place between the PA and Israel during the period in which the Coronavirus was spreading while 25% say they disagreed with that.
  • 44% say popular social solidarity, such as debt forgiveness, increased during the pandemic while 31% say the level of solidarity did not change and 23% think it decreased.
  • More than three quarters of the public (77%) believe that the government has not done all it could to compensate those who suffered the most from the closure and lockdown, such as laborers, farmers, cattle breeders, and others, and only 16% believe it did all it could.

 

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

  • Support for the concept of the two-state solution rises to 45% and opposition stands at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Four months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 51% believe that the majority opposes it.  
  • A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.
  • The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 38% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 13% prefer to keep the status quo. Four months ago, 22% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 45% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
  • When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 45% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Four months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations.
  • We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 88% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Four months ago, 94% expressed opposition to the plan when presented to them in its full details.
  • Similarly, 87% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 8% believe a majority supports it.  By contrast, 66% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.
  • In light of the terms of the US plan, a majority of 70% believes the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 5% think the plan makes peace more attainable.
  • If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 57% think the chances are zero; 22% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
  • A majority of 69% is opposed and 16% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Four months ago 76% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
  • A majority of 68% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 24% expect him to win it.

 

(4) Legislative and presidential election

  • 58% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Four months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 48% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
  • Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Four months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).
  • If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 44% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh four months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% four months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 63% four months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 54% four months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% four months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 36%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% and the latter 45%.
  • We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 2% each. 
  • We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 36% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Four months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 43% four months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 30% four months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 22% four months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 45% four months ago).

 

(5) Domestic conditions:

  • Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.
  • Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 65%.
  • 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 34% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.
  • Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. Four months ago, 85% expressed a similar view.
  • The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 52% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
  • With more than a year passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 56% expect failure; only 33% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 34% expects success.
  • We asked the public about its reaction to the PA decision not to accept medical supplies sent by the UAE via two planes that landed at Ben Gurion airport. About half (49%) of the public indicated approval of the decision but 41% expressed disapproval.
  • We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last four months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (14%), Maan TV at 13%, Palestine Today TV at 10%, Al Arabiya at 4%, and finally al Mayadeen at 3%.  

 

(6) Reconciliation: 

  • Only 29% are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Four months ago, optimism stood at 40%.
  • Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 12% believe unity will return soon.
  • While waiting for reunification, we asked the public if it would meanwhile support some form of confederation between the two areas. A majority of 60% expressed opposition while 31% supported this type of relationship.

 

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

  • 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.
  • The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 33% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (27%); 6% say see lack of national unity as the most serious problem and 5% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.
العربية

The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll, 2022

Support for a two-state solution among Palestinians and Israelis s declines to just one-third on each side, along with growing opposition to the detailed items of a permanent peace agreement for implementing a two-state solution. Slightly more Israeli Jews support one unequal state under Israeli rule than the two-state solution; but both publics still prefer two states to any other democratic framework for resolving the conflict. Pairs of reciprocal incentives can raise support somewhat on both sides, showing some flexibility particularly among the Israelis. But trust is declining to new low points, and a majority of Palestinians reject four proposed confidence building measures while a majority of Israelis accepts half of them.

PressRelease   Table of findings 

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS

 

  • Support for the two-state solution drops significantly among Palestinians and Israeli Jews, from 43% in September 2020 to 33% among the Palestinians and 34% among Israeli Jews.  Among all Israelis, Jews and Arabs, 39% in total support the two-state solution. This is the lowest level of support for this concept among Palestinians, Israeli Jews, and all Israelis, since the beginning of the Pulse, in June 2016. Still, fewer people among Palestinians and Israelis as a whole support two possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights and one state without rights. Among Israeli Jews, however, support for one unequal state under Israeli rule is higher than the two-state solution
  • Support for the alternative of a two state confederation has varied over time, with different dynamics among Israelis and Palestinians. Among the Israeli population, support moved steadily upwards from 2016 through late 2017 and 2018, then fell once again to the same level as 2016, with 28% in total at present. Among Palestinians, support for a confederation plan reflects similar dynamics to other solutions: a mostly consistent downward trajectory from 2016 onwards, and 22% total support at present. The current survey for the first time tested five component aspects of the two state confederation, regarding freedom of movement, citizenship and residency for refugees and settlers, Jerusalem and joint authorities for civic affairs; most did not reach 30 percent support among Israeli Jews or Palestinians. The only exception was half of Israeli Jews who support joint civic institutions. However, a majority Israeli Arabs support both the full package and each item (for just one item, support was slightly below half), consistent with their pattern of support for all frameworks for a democratic resolution of the conflict. 
  •  Palestinians and Israelis were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them in September-2020 and 2018 and representing a modified version of the package we presented to both sides five times between 2016 and 2018. Findings show a slight drop in support among the Palestinians from 27% to 26% in 2022 (compared to 42% in mid-2018). But the drop in support among Israeli Jews is higher, from 36% to 31% during the same period (compared to 45% in mid-2018). But support for this permanent peace agreement package among Israeli Arabs rebounded significantly from a low point of 49% two years ago to 62% today. In total, 37% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic, the bilateral agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states, the US and major Arab countries will ensure full implementation of the agreement by both sides, and the end of the conflict and claims. Fifty four percent of all Israelis (62% of Israeli Jews) and 72% of Palestinians are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package.
  • The survey also tested the likely impact of previously tested reciprocal incentives on the level of support for the peace package. Drawing on seven such incentives, we paired measures that show reciprocal benefits but also costs for each side. This is the third time that we have conducted this experiment. In this experiment, we kept the same pairs that were proven successful in changing attitudes among Palestinians and Israeli Jews in favor of the peace package and replaced those that were less effective. Findings in the previous experiment, in September 2020, showed significant success among Israeli Jews for most of the paired incentives while only half of the pairs were successful among the Palestinians. The current findings show significant potential for success among both publics, but the success among Israeli Jews remains greater: five of the seven pairs generated higher levels of support for the peace package among Israeli Jews while on the Palestinian side only two generated higher levels of support. As a result, two pairs caused a majority of Jewish Israelis to say they were more likely to support the package while none of the paired incentives convinced a majority of Palestinians to say they were more likely to support the detailed two-state package.
  • The survey examined for the first time support for four bi-lateral potential confidence building measures. While none of them received majority support among Palestinians, two – referring Palestinian actions to prevent attacks, and removing incitement in Palestinian textbooks while allowing Palestinians of East Jerusalem to vote in PA elections – received support of about half of Israeli Jews.
  • When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 31% of the Palestinians (29% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), 30% of Israeli Jews choose “reach a peace agreement.” This represents a decrease in support for a peace agreement among Palestinians and Israeli Jews compared to only 34% and 41% respectively who chose this option in 2020.  40% of Palestinians (compared to 37% two years ago) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 26% call for “a definitive war with the Palestinians” compared to 19% in 2022.
  • As in previous surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low: 86% of Palestinians and 85% of Israeli Jews believe the other side is not trustworthy.
  • Each side perceives itself as an exclusive victim (84% of Palestinians and 84% of Israeli Jews), while an overwhelming majority of Palestinians (90%) but only a smaller majority of Israeli Jews (63%) think this suffering grants them with a moral right to do anything they deem as necessary for survival. A vast majority among both groups (93%) see themselves as rightful owners of the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river. While a third of Israeli Jews are willing to accept some ownership right of the Palestinians, only 7% of Palestinians are willing to accept such idea about the Jews.

 

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between 1-4 December, 2022. The margin of error is +/-3%. The Israeli sample includes 900 adult Israelis interviewed through the internet by New Wave Research in Hebrew and Arabic between  6-13 December 2022. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 500, 200 West Bank settlers, and 200 Israeli Arabs. The combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these three groups in the Israeli society, and to reflect current demographic and religious-secular divisions. The margin of error is +/-3.34%.  The survey and the following summary have been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR, Dr. Nimrod Rosler and Dr. Alon Yakter from Tel Aviv

University and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin.

 

 MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provide the respective findings for these sub groups. 

 

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: the two-state solution

 

In the current survey, only 33% of Palestinians and 34% of Israeli Jews support the general concept of the two-state solution before testing the details of the plan; 66% of Palestinians and 53% of Israeli Jews are opposed. Two years ago, 43% of the Palestinians and 42% of Israeli Jews supported this solution. Among Israeli Arabs, support stands at 60%, compared to 59% two years ago, bringing the current total Israeli average to 39% compared to 44% in 2020. As seen in Figure 1, among Jews, support for the two-state principle has seen an incremental but steady decline since June 2016, when it stood at 53%. Among Palestinians support has varied: it fell from June to December 2016, from 51% to 44%, rose to 52% in June 2017, then declined once again to 46% and continued to decline in July 2018, in September 2020, and in the current poll. It is worth noting that the drop in support for the two-state solution during the past two years, by almost a quarter for both sides, is greater than the decline between 2016 and 2018 when support for both sides dropped by only one fifth. Surprisingly, support between 2018 and 2020 did not change. The reason for the current greater drop might be explained by the significant rise in armed clashes between Palestinians and Israelis in 2022 and the electoral success of extreme right-wing forces in Israel.

Unlike previous surveys, support for the general two-state solution among Palestinians is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 40% and 28% respectively (though support has generally been higher in Gaza for the detailed package). Indeed, the decline in support for the two-state solution occurred entirely in the West Bank strengthening the speculation that the drop was triggered by the great rise in armed clashes between Palestinians and Israelis. Support for the two state solution remains higher among Fatah voters and those who define themselves as “not religious” or “somewhat religious.”

Among Israelis, as in the past, the most significant variations are found between Jews and Arabs, and within the Jewish community, between the ideological and demographic groups, particularly by levels of religious observance. Israeli Jews are highly polarized along ideological lines: 83% of those who consider themselves left-wing support the two-state solution in a general question, while only 16% of Jewish right-wingers support it. The findings among the left represents a drop of 8 points in two years but, support among the left rebounded by five points compared to the 2018 findings. Jewish Israelis who define themselves as centrist show support for this solution by 56%, a drop of six points compared to 2020, but still a consistent majority among the Israeli center in favor of this approach.

Demographic differences are found most visibly between levels of religious observance. A firm majority (57%) of secular Jews support the two-state solution, though this represents a 9- point drop in two years. The next “level” of religious observance, traditionalists (masorti), show the opposite trend – only 20% support a two-state solution, a 12-point drop in two years, and 64 percent are opposed (the remainder did not take a position). Only 14 percent and 8 percent of national religious and Haredi Israelis, respectively, support a two-state solution while strong majorities, 76 percent of the religious and 85 percent of Haredi respondents, oppose this approach.

Further, over roughly the last decade, there has been a consistent trend of more right-leaning attitudes among younger Jewish Israelis compared to older groups. Accordingly, just 20 percent of those 18-34 years old support the two-state solution, an 8-point drop in two years, while 68 percent oppose it. The portion of supporters is 17 points higher (37%) among the 35-54 group, while 47% of Israeli Jews over 55 years old support it, over twice as many as the youngest Israelis; 38 percent of older Israeli Jews oppose two states.  One of the main reasons for this trend is the higher levels of religious observance among young Israeli Jews. Among 18–24-year-olds, just 21% identify as secular, compared to 53% among Jews 55 and up. Twice as many of the youngest Israeli Jews are either religious or Haredi, as the oldest group. Therefore, among secular young people, 34% support the two state solution, the same as the total Jewish average (but still less than those over 35); but just 13% of all other young Jews support it (including traditional, religious and Haredi).

Arab Israeli respondents show similar differentiation of support by age, in which younger people are less supportive, although with somewhat less polarization. Among 18-34 year old Arab respondents, half (51%) support the two-state solution, and one-quarter (25%) oppose it – a large portion, 23 percent say they do not know. Among the older age group, from 35 to 50, 71 percent support two states. Significant variation by levels of religiosity is observed among Israeli Arabs: 45 percent support two states among those who are religious, 60 percent among the somewhat religious, and 73 percent among the non-religious support the two-state solution.


 

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 7% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years; 70% of Palestinians say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a large majority of 88 percent believe the chances are low or very low – this is higher than 2020 and 2018 when 78 percent and 81 percent respectively thought that. Among Israeli settlers, 89 percent believe the chances of establishing a Palestinian state are low or very low. Arab respondents in general are somewhat more optimistic, but still a large majority of 68 percent view the chances as low or very low; 20 percent give “medium” chances. Among all Israelis and all sub-populations, only 3 percent give high or very high chances to the creation of a Palestinian state over the next five years. 

As in the past, respondents were asked if they believe that the two-state solution is still possible, in light of recent political developments and the settlement spread. Among Israeli Jews, the findings indicate a rise in the percentage of those who believe it is no longer feasible, from 45 percent two years ago to 53% today. However, among Arab respondents, those who believe the two-state solution is still viable remains stable, 46% today compared to 45% two years ago. As a result, the Israeli total at present has become more pessimistic: 34 percent think the solution is still viable, and 49 percent believe it is not (the remainder don’t know). In September 2020, 43% thought it was viable and the same amount thought it was not.

The change in perceptions of viability is more pronounced among Palestinians. Since June 2017 the portion who believe this solution is no longer viable has been rising fairly steadily, and reaches a peak of 70% in the current survey while a little over a quarter, 27%, of Palestinians now believe the two-state solution is viable, due to political developments and settlement spread.

Notably, among Israeli Jews there is a stark contrast between younger and older respondents, as on many issues related to the two-state solution. Presumably due to growing up during a time when the idea of reaching a negotiated two-state solution has not been prominent on the political agenda, as well as being generally more right-leaning, just 20 percent of Jews aged 18-34 believe this solution is still possible, while 66% believe it is no longer feasible. While this trend is also true among the oldest respondents, the gap between the optimists and the pessimists is narrower: 38% of Jews aged 55+ believe the two-state solution is still viable, while 44 percent believe it is not. Among Arab Israelis only 36% of the youngest, the 18–34-year-old respondents, believe the solution is still viable, while among all other age groups a majority of 59% believe the solution is viable.

Among Palestinians, there is less variation in responses to the question of viability, but in this case the youngest respondents (18-23 years) are slightly more likely to believe the solution is viable – 29%, compared to 26% of the oldest respondents (55+). This is consistent with our previous findings in 2016, 2018, and 2020 and it probably reflects the refusal of the youth to acknowledge the role of settlement expansion in determining the fate of the two-state solution.  

Declining support linked to low perceived feasibility. To understand the division of opinion about the two-state solution, it is useful to consider the findings regarding the feasibility and implementation of a two-state solution. When asked about the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years, among Palestinians, only 7% view the chances as high or very high that such a state will be established in the next five years; 70% of Palestinians say the chances are low or very low.

Among Israeli Jews a large majority of 88 percent believe the chances are low or very low – this is higher than 2020 and 2018 when 78 percent and 81 percent respectively thought that. Among Israeli settlers, 89 percent believe the chances of establishing a Palestinian state are low or very low. Arab respondents in general are somewhat more optimistic, but still a large majority of 68 percent view the chances as low or very low; 20 percent give “medium” chances. Among all Israelis and all sub-populations, only 3 percent give high or very high chances to the creation of a Palestinian state over the next five years. 

As in the past, respondents were asked if they believe that the two-state solution is still possible, in light of recent political developments and the settlement spread. Among Israeli Jews, the findings indicate a rise in the percentage of those who believe it is no longer feasible, from 45 percent two years ago to 53% today. However, among Arab respondents, those who believe the two-state solution is still viable remains stable, 46% today compared to 45% two years ago. As a result, the Israeli total at present has become more pessimistic: 34 percent think the solution is still viable, and 49 percent believe it is not (the remainder don’t know). In September 2020, 43% thought it was viable and the same amount thought it was not.

The change in perceptions of viability is more pronounced among Palestinians. Since June 2017 the portion who believe this solution is no longer viable has been rising fairly steadily, and reaches a peak of 70% in the current survey while a little over a quarter, 27%, of Palestinians now believe the two-state solution is viable, due to political developments and settlement spread.

Notably, among Israeli Jews there is a stark contrast between younger and older respondents, as on many issues related to the two-state solution. Presumably due to growing up during a time when the idea of reaching a negotiated two-state solution has not been prominent on the political agenda, as well as being generally more right-leaning, just 20 percent of Jews aged 18-34 believe this solution is still possible, while 66% believe it is no longer feasible. While this trend is also true among the oldest respondents, the gap between the optimists and the pessimists is narrower: 38% of Jews aged 55+ believe the two-state solution is still viable, while 44 percent believe it is not. Among Arab Israelis only 36% of the youngest, the 18–34-year-old respondents, believe the solution is still viable, while among all other age groups a majority of 59% believe the solution is viable.

Among Palestinians, there is less variation in responses to the question of viability, but in this case the youngest respondents (18-23 years) are slightly more likely to believe the solution is viable – 29%, compared to 26% of the oldest respondents (55+). This is consistent with our previous findings in 2016, 2018, and 2020 and it probably reflects the refusal of the youth to acknowledge the role of settlement expansion in determining the fate of the two-state solution.  

 

(2) Alternatives to the two-state solution:

 

Two competing alternatives to the two-state solution: one democratic and one undemocratic state

The joint poll sought to ascertain the level of support for other solutions to the conflict and in doing so, ascertain the breakdown of Palestinians and Israelis regarding two alternatives to the two-state solution: one democratic state with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians and one state in which one side or the other dominates the entire region and the other side is denied equal rights. In the survey, each respondent was asked each question separately. Among the Palestinians, as shown in the following figure, support for the two-state solution, at 33%, remains higher than the support for the one unequal state, at 30% compared to 36% two years ago, and the one equal or democratic state, at 23%, compared to 27% two years ago. Among all Israelis, support for the two-state solution, at 39%, is higher than the one equal or democratic state at 26% (statistically unchanged from to 27% in 2020). Among Israeli Jews, support for this one equal state stands at 20%, compared to 44% among Israeli Arabs. But, as shown in the following figure, current support of Israeli Jews for one unequal or non-democratic state, at 37%, compared to 35% in 2020, is higher than the current support for the two-state solution. Israeli Arabs were asked the same question as Palestinians, about support and opposition for one unequal and undemocratic state of Palestine in which Jews do not have full citizen rights.: 20% of Israeli Arabs expressed support and 46% opposition; 34% did not know or did not provide an answer. 

Figure 2: Support for the two-state solution and two alternatives among Palestinians and Israeli Jews, in 2020 and 2022

Our next step was to examine the support for the equal and unequal state as alternatives to the two-state solution. In the following analysis, all respondents who support a two-state solution are excluded from the next categories of support (for one equal state, and one unequal or undemocratic state) to avoid overlap, and the remaining public is assigned one alternative after the other, each time eliminating overlap, to ascertain the size of each constituency. As the two pies in Figure 3 show, the largest constituency is the one that supports the two-state solution. Among those who do not support two states, the public splits between the two alternatives (one equal democratic state, or one non-equal non-democratic state. The confederation approach is not included in this analysis as it is rather an alternate version of two states.) The category called “other” refers to respondents who either rejected all options or responded “do not know.”

The findings among the Palestinians differ significantly from those of 2020 as the largest group now are those who did not support any of the three options, standing at 47%, followed by those in favor of the two-state solution, at 33 percent; 12 percent supported a unequal non-democratic state and 8 percent supported one democratic state. In 2020, support for the two-state solution stood at 42%, one unequal non-democratic state at 22%, one democratic state at 10%, and others at 27%.  The fact that this category, others, is the largest among the Palestinians indicates a growing trend in public thought: that there is no political framework, at least from among those options offered by our survey, that is viewed as an acceptable resolution of the conflict.

Israeli Jews show no change in the percentage of those who did not select any of the three options, standing at 27% while those supporting the two-state solution dropped from 43% to 34%. Support for the option of a single democratic state remained essentially unchanged among Israeli Jews, from 9% to 10%, but support for an unequal non-democratic state increased almost two folds, from 15% to 29%.    

On the Palestinian side, as indicated earlier, there is a difference between Gazans and West Bankers in their preferences for the two-state solution. But, as Figure 4 below shows, the two areas are almost identical in the way they view the two proposed alternatives, one democratic state and unequal or non-democratic state, with about 8% for each, which is almost exactly what we found in 2020. Nonetheless, the largest percentage of West Bankers (52%) supports unidentified alternatives or do not know, referred to in the chart below as “other,” while 40% of Gazans selected this “other.”  As the chart also indicates, religiosity affects support for the two-state solution and the “other” solution or solutions. As in the 2020 poll, religious respondents are less likely to support two states (29%) and the “not religious” are more likely to support it (60%). Unlike previous polls, the current one did not find significant variation associated with the various age groups. Support for the two-state solution stands at 31% among the 18-29 years old compared to 33% among those whose age is 30 and above. Similarly, only minor differences are found in the level of support for the two alternatives and “others.”

Figure 4: Support among Palestinians for the two-state solution and two alternative options by region and religiosity, 2022

Gaps also emerge when looking at the Palestinian political affiliation or vote preferences (Figure 5), with likely voters of Fatah and third parties showing majority support for the two-state solution (54% and 53% respectively) while supporters of Hamas standing at 14% and unaffiliated and undecided at 38%.  It is worth noting that the highest support among Hamas voters (61%) goes to “other” solutions followed by an unequal non democratic state. Among likely voters who are Fatah supporters, 34% did not support the options offered and fall into the “other” group. 

Figure 5: Support among Palestinians for the two-state solution and two alternative options by political affiliation

As in all previous surveys, the Israeli public is extremely divided internally over the two-state solution. Compared to other solutions, such as one democratic state or a two-state confederation, the two-state solution still enjoys a higher level of overall support, 39% among all Israelis and 34% for Israeli Jews. However, in the elimination analysis shown in the pie chart (Figure 3), the next largest portion is “unequal nondemocratic state” followed by “others,” referring to those respondents who did not support two states, but declined to choose an answer for any of the other options.

As in 2020, the portion of those who choose an unequal non democratic state (after the implementation of the elimination process that removed all respondents who supported the two-state solution and the those who supported the one-democratic state) is highest among the Haredi and the religious sectors, 57% and 50% respectively. Those who refrain from choosing any solution is highest, at 37%, among the traditionalist Jews. Similarly, as in 2020, secular Israeli Jews were the only community in which a majority, 57%, prefers a two-state solution to any other.

Figure 6: Support among Israeli Jews for the two-state solution and two alternative options by religiosity, 2022

When looking at the political spectrum, a majority of support for the two-state solution is found among the left and the center but not the right (see Figure 7). Among the “moderate right,” 23% support the two-state solution compared to only 7% among the right, a distinction that has been consistent over time between these two groups of right-wingers. Those who define themselves as “right” support the unequal or non-democratic state by 53% followed by “others” (31%). It is worth noting that the size of the moderate right category in this poll is 31%, the right 31%, the “center” 24%, the moderate left 9%, and the left 4% of the Jewish sample. 

Figure 7: Support among Israeli Jews for the two-state solution and two alternative options by ideology, 2022

Finally, when looking at Israeli Arabs, as the pie in Figure 8 shows, support for the two-state solution, as indicated above, is high, at 59% followed by “other” at 28% and one democratic state at 13%.

Figure 8: Support for the two-state solution and two alternative options among Israeli Arabs, 2022

In the current survey, we asked both sides if they think Palestinians should demand the right to vote in elections for Israeli Knesset and to form their own political parties that compete with Israeli parties if Israel establishes full formal control over the entire West Bank. While the largest percentage of Israeli Arabs, 47%, said they should, only 20% of Israeli Jews gave the same positive answer. Surprisingly, only 29% of the Palestinians said yes. One quarter of Israeli Arabs (25%) said they should not, and over 70% of Jews (71%); two-thirds of Palestinians (66%) opposed Palestinians demanding the right to vote and compete in Israeli elections.

Furthermore, we asked the Palestinians if they would actually vote in the elections if the West Bank comes under full Israeli control and the Palestinians are given equal rights to those of Israeli Jews. Consistent with the responses to the earlier question above, only 19% of the Palestinians said they would indeed participate in these Israeli elections and 78% said they would probably or definitely not. But when we asked Israeli Jews if they think the Palestinians would actually vote in such a scenario, a majority of 58% said yes and 29% said no.

Confederation:

The alternative of a two-state confederation has been tested in the joint survey since December 2016, when it was asked in a general way with minimal explanation, then in later surveys with somewhat more detail. Since testing began, support rose among the Israeli public from 28% in December 2016, to a high of 39% in late 2017. In the 2020 survey, this support reverted back to 30% among Israelis, almost precisely the range of support among Palestinians from December 2017 onwards (28% in December 2017 and 29% in 2020). In 2020, support among Israeli Jews stood at 28% and among Israeli Arabs at 44%. At present, total support among all Israelis is 28% in favor (although support has rebounded to nearly 60 percent among Arabs), and 22% among all Palestinians.

The current survey used a different approach from the previous surveys. In 2022, the questionnaire provided significantly more details of the two-state confederation plan. Indeed, the plan was presented in five main components and we asked the public about support and opposition for each, only then asking about their attitudes regarding the entire plan. The five components and support for each one on both sides is as follows (the findings relate to all Israelis, Jews and Arabs):

  1. Freedom of movement for all within the confederation, while citizens of one country are allowed to live as permanent residents in the territory of the other but each national group votes only in its state for elections: 27% support among the Palestinians and 29% among Israelis.
  2. Jews in the diaspora will have the right of return and will become Israeli citizens, like today. There will be right of return for Palestinian refugees, who will become citizens of Palestine: 20% support among the Palestinians and 32% among Israelis.
  3. Citizens of Israel and Jewish settlers, can remain in Palestine as residents if they accept the law and sovereignty of the Palestinian state. Citizens of Palestine, including 1948 refugees, can reside in Israel as residents, if they accept the law and sovereignty of the Israeli state: 23% among Palestinians and 23% among Israelis.
  4. Jerusalem remains undivided and shared by all, with its western part serving as the capital of Israel and its Eastern part as the capital of Palestine: 14% support among Palestinians and 29% among Israelis.
  5. The states will establish joint authorities for civic issues such as infrastructure and the economy, and will cooperate on security issues similar to the current situation today: 29% support among the Palestinians and 54% among Israelis.

As shown in figure 9, findings indicate that support for the combined confederation package is higher among the total Israelis than among the Palestinians, 28% and 22% respectively. But significant variations emerge among Palestinians and Israelis: while only 15% of West Bankers support the package, 34% of Gazans indicate support. Among Israelis, only 21% of Jews support it while a majority of 59% of Israeli Arabs support it. Opposition to the package among Palestinians stand at 75% and among Israelis at 60% (70% among Israeli Jews).

Figure 9: comparing support for the confederation package, WB, GS, total Israel, Israeli Jews, and Israeli Arabs

As figure 10 below indicates, support among Palestinians, Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs varies based on each component. A majority of Israeli Arabs support four of the five components of the confederation while the highest Israeli Jewish support goes joint authorities to address the civic issues (50%) and the lowest to the proposed idea that each side can live in the other side (18%). The highest Palestinian support (29%) goes to the joint body to address civic matters and the lowest (14%) to the united Jerusalem.  

Figure 10: comparing Palestinian and Israeli Jewish support for five components of a two-state confederation

Among Israeli Jews, ideology and religiosity plays a significant role. The only populations that support the confederation approach with a majority are left-wing Jewish Israelis – among this group, support has been rising steadily since testing began – Palestinian non-religious respondents and Israeli Arabs (These first two are small portions of each population: Left wing Israeli Jews are 12%, non-religious Palestinians  are just 3 percent of the total Palestinian population). However, it is interesting to note a very consistent and robust increase in support for this approach among Israeli left-wing Jews, which rose 10 points over the last two years (to 66% at present) and fully 30 points from 2016.

Figure 11: comparing Israeli Jewish support for the confederation package by ideology, religiosity, and age

Similarly, support among the Palestinians varies based on political affiliation. At 41%, Fatah's support is the highest followed by third parties, or others. Only 10% of Hamas supporters give support to the confederation. Religiosity also plays a role with a majority of the “not religious”  indicating support (58%) followed by the somewhat religious and the religious. Young Palestinians are more likely to support the confederation than older Palestinians, 26% and 19% respectively.

Figure 12: comparing Palestinian support for the confederation package by political affiliation (Fatah, Hamas, third party, undecided), religiosity, and age

Compared to support for two states, support is lower for a confederation; but the overall trend is the same – declining support for both: The support of the Palestinians and Israeli Jews declines from 29%-28% to 22%-21%, respectively.

Since the confederation was not a well-known approach when testing began, support has been erratic and seems to follow the general pessimistic mood regarding political solutions to the conflict.

Support for this plan remains similar to overall support for one democratic equal state and lower than overall support for an unequal nondemocratic state, where one side annexes the whole land and the other side is given only limited rights.

Peace and violence. When given four possible options regarding what should happen next in Palestinian-Israeli relations, findings show similarities between the preferences of Palestinians and Israeli Jews in preferring to “reach a peace agreement,” standing at 31% and 30% respectively. Two years ago, 34% of Palestinians and 41% of Israeli Jews preferred this outcome. Support for this outcome among Israeli Arabs stand at 58%. Palestinian preference went for a second option, “waging an armed struggle,” stands at 40%, compared to 37% in 2020. Among Israeli Arabs, who were asked to respond to the options provided to the Palestinians rather than Israeli Jews, stands at only 4%. Among Israeli Jews, the preference for “waging a definitive war against the Palestinians” stands today at 26%, a 7-point increase compared to 2020. A third option, “waging an unarmed resistance,” was chosen by 16% of the Palestinians and 6% among Israeli Arabs while annexation, which was offered to Israeli Jews was chosen by 10%, compared to 12% in 2020. Finally, 8% of the Palestinians, 7% of Israeli Arabs, and 13% of Israeli Jews chose “maintain the status quo.”

We asked the Palestinians and Israeli Arabs about the extent to which the continuation of armed resistance against Israel harm or not harm Israel and harm or not harm the Palestinians. By contrast, we asked Israeli Jews about the extent to which the continuation of Israeli control over the Palestinians harm or not harm the Palestinians and harm or not harm the Israelis. Among the Palestinians, a majority of 60% said Palestinian armed attacks against Israel do not harm or slightly harm the Palestinians while 39% said they harm the Palestinians. More Israeli Arabs, 53%, thought these Palestinian attacks harm the Palestinians while only 18% said they do not harm or slightly harm the Israelis. By contrast, three quarters of the Palestinians said these attacks harm Israel; only 23% said they do not harm or slightly harm Israel. An Israeli Arab majority of 56% shows similar results to those of the majority of the Palestinians in viewing armed attacks as harm Israel while only 14% think they do no harm or slightly harm Israel.

Among the Israelis, almost half (49%) say Israeli control over the Palestinians in the West Bank does not or slightly harm Israel while 39% say it harms Israel.  Surprisingly, a majority of 52% of Israeli Jews thinks Israeli control over the West Bank does not or slightly harm the Palestinians while 36% think it harms them.

Finally, we asked Palestinians and Israeli to speculate about the future of the current wave of armed attacks by Palestinians on Israeli targets and whether they think this is the beginning of a new Palestinian intifada. Palestinians and Israeli Jews think the answer is yes, 61% and 65% respectively, while only 37% of Israeli Arabs agree with this assessment. Among the Palestinians, the West Bankers, probably due to the significant rise in the number of armed clashes with the Israeli army in their area in 2022, are more likely than Gazans to think the current wave is the begging of a new intifada, 68% and 51% respectively.

Peace and the Abraham Accords: When asked about the impact of the Abrahm Accords, between Israel and several Arab countries, on the chances for solving the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the largest percentage on both sides, 50% of all Israelis (56% among Israeli Jews) and 49% among the Palestinians said the Accords will not affect these changes. However, a larger percentage of Israelis (26%) and Israeli Jews (24%) than the Palestinians (12%) thought these normalization agreements between Israeli and several Arab countries will advance the chances to solve the conflict. By the contrast, more Palestinians than Israeli Jews, 30% and 5% respectively, thought they will harm the chances for solving the conflict.

It is worth noting that those Palestinians and Israelis who think the Accords are good for peace are actually more likely to support the two-state solution while those who think they will harm conflict resolution or will have no impact on the prospects for peace are less likely to support the two-state solution. For example, 56% of the Palestinians and 54% of Israeli Jews who think the Accords will advance peace support the two-state solution. By contrast, 35% of the Palestinians and 38% of Israeli Jews who think they will harm the chances for peace support the two-state solution. Similarly, only 27% of Palestinians and 28% of Israeli Jews who think the Accords will have no effect on the changes for peace support the two-state solution. Findings show the same trend among Israeli Arabs with support for the two-state solution among the three groups standing at 78%, 62% and 55% respectively.

Peace and following the news: When asked about the extent to which they follow the news about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a majority of Israeli Jews (52%) and over one-third (38%) of the Palestinians said they do so to a large or to some extent. Similarly, while only 17% of Israeli Jews said they do not follow the news or do so only to a small extent, the equivalent percentage among the Palestinians was 30%. About one third of the Palestinians (32%) and a similar percentage of Israeli Jews (29%) said they follow the news but they do so neither to a small nor to a large extent.

Here too, we examined the impact of following the news on attitudes regarding the two-state solution. Surprisingly, the findings show a different impact on the Palestinians than on Israeli Jews: Jews who do not follow the news support the two-state solution by the lowest rate while on the Palestinian side the opposite it true, those who do not follow the news support the two-state solution by the highest rate. For example, support for the two-state solution was highest, standing at 38%, among those Israeli Jews who follow the news neither to a small nor to a large extent followed by those who follow the news to a large or some extent (34%) and finally only 27% of those who do not follow the news or follow it to a small extent support the two state solution. By contrast, Palestinian support for the two-state solution is highest (39%) among those who do not follow the news or follow it to a small extent while only 32% support it among those who neither follow the news to a small or large extent and 29% among those who follow the news to a large or some extent. 

 

(3) Detailed permanent status peace package 

 

Detailed peace packages for implementation  

As in all six previous surveys of the current series of joint polls, Palestinians and Israelis were asked in this survey to support or oppose a detailed combined peace package based on the two-state solution, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The package included 11 items addressing all issues of the so-called permanent status negotiations, such as borders, security, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees and several other matters, such as mutual recognition, end of conflict, external guarantees, and the Arab Peace Initiative.

Palestinians and Israelis were asked to respond first to each item separately, as component parts; following the 11 items they were asked if they support or opposed the combined package, and given a short summary of the basic elements.

  • Total Israeli support is almost identical to that of 2020, standing today at 37% compared to 38% two years ago. But support among Israeli Jews dropped by 5 points, from 36% to 31% during that period (see Figure 13 below). The total average remained steady due to a significant recovery of support by Israeli Arabs, which had dropped dramatically in 2020. Jewish Israelis’ support however has declined relative to both the original and enhanced plan examined in July 2018: at that time, the “original” package that did not incorporate the strong incentives received 46% support from all Israelis, while the enhanced detailed two-state agreement – the one tested in the current survey – was supported by a majority of 53% among all Israelis (45% of Israeli Jews). Therefore, support among the Israeli population for the identical plan fell 15 points in 2020 and 20 points in 2022.
  • The decline is seen among the Jewish respondents only: support among Jews fell from 45% in 2018 to 36% in 2020, and 31% today. As noted, among Arabs, support increased dramatically from 49% in 2020 to 62% in the current survey, but these results are much lower than those obtained in mid-2018 when support among Israeli Arabs stood at 91%.
  • Palestinian support for the package, standing at 26%, has remained essentially unchanged, compared to 27% two years ago.  But it is significantly lower than the 2018 findings when support stood at 42%.  Today, a majority of 72% oppose the package.  As the chart below shows, the current level of support for the package is the lowest since it has been first presented to the Palestinians in June 2016.
  • By contrast to general support for the concept of a two-state solution, there has generally been more support in Gaza for the detailed package, than in the West Bank. The dynamic remains consistent in 2022, with 38% of Gazans supporting the package, fully 20 points higher than West Bank respondents. The lower support among West Bankers is probably due to an increase in hardline views generated by the increased number of armed clashes with the Israeli army during 2022. The higher levels of support among Gazans is probably due to desire to find a way out of the current status quo even if the cost is too high.

 

 

Items of an agreement. A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the twelve components of the package follows (non-italicized questions were asked of Israeli Jews and if no other wording appears, also for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Italics refer to the questions worded separately for Palestinians; some of the Palestinian wordings were used for Israeli Arabs).

  • Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis, and no further claims will be made by either side. 63% of Israeli Jews support this item.

 

Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side. 28% of Palestinians support mutual recognition and 62% of Israeli Arabs support mutual recognition.

 

  • The independent Palestinian state which will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be demilitarized (no heavy weaponry). Only 13% of Palestinians support this (11% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip).  Among Israeli Jews, 47% support this item and among Israeli Arabs 37% support it.
  • The future Palestinian state will have a democratic political system based on rule of law, periodic elections, free press, strong parliament, independent judiciary and equal rights for religious and ethnic minorities as well as strong anti-corruption measures. The state of Israel will have a democratic political system whereby Israeli law formally guarantees equality of Arab Israeli citizens, who will have equal rights as Israeli Jews by law.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 33%.  Among Israeli Jews: 60% support this, and 70% of Arab respondents.
  • A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides. Among Palestinians, 34% support this component; Israeli Jews support stands at 53% - a 6-point drop from 2020, and Israeli Arab support at 57%.
  • The Palestinian state will have full sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. 20% of Palestinians support this. Among Israeli Jews 33% support it and among Israeli Arabs, 43% support this item.
  • The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlement which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange of similar size. Israel will evacuate all other settlements. 24% of Palestinians support this (16% among West Bankers and 37% among Gazans). 30% of Israeli Jews and 41% of Arabs support it.
  • West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state. Less than a quarter (19%) of Jews support this item. 

East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of the Israel. 16% of Palestinians support this (12% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip). 51% of Israeli Arabs support this item.

  • In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty. 18% of Israeli Jews support the Old City arrangement.

In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Muslim and Christian quarters and al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty. 16% of Palestinians support the division of the Old City (10% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip). 50% of Israeli Arabs support this.

  • Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated.  43%of Palestinians support this (37% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip). This item receives the lowest support from Israeli Jews out of all the items tested: just 11% of Jews  support the arrangement on refugees, and among Israeli Arabs 63% support it.
  • The agreement will include formal guarantees by the US, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who will create a joint commission to ensure proper implementation on both sides.  Among the Palestinians, support stands at 34% (26% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip). Israeli Jews support this item by 45%. 64% of Israeli Arabs support it this item.
  • The agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states. Among the Palestinians, support stands at 35% (31% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip).  58% of Israeli Jews support this, and 69% of Israeli Arabs support it. 

Perception of social support for package.  After considering all the detailed items included in a two-state peace plan and being asked to support or oppose each one, as well as the total package, each side was asked how they perceive the support of majority of their fellow citizens for the two-state package. On both sides, respondents perceive their own society’s support for the original plan to be low. 

Israelis were asked whether they believe the majority of Israeli Jews support or oppose it – just 14% said they believe the majority of Israeli Jews support it. Settlers living in the West Bank showed a lower rate, with just 6% who believe Jewish Israelis support it. But a much larger minority of Israeli Arabs, 44%, expressed the view that a majority of Israeli Jews support it.  These assessments have declined somewhat from previous surveys since 2016. In 2020, 18% had optimistic impressions compared to 23% in 2018 and 36% before that. However, the perception of majority support is lower than reality; in fact, 31% of Jews support the total two-state package in the current survey – more than double the portion who believe a majority of Jews support it.  In other words, the minority of Israeli Jews who support the package thinks it is much smaller than it is in reality.

When Palestinians were asked if most Palestinians would support the plan, 25% stated that most would support it. This is exactly the same percentage obtained two years ago and it is much closer to the real support in the Palestinian society.

Regional and demographic trends. The internal breakdowns of each population show which sub-groups respond differently to the peace plan. Among Palestinians, there are variations in responses primarily by region, political affiliation and levels of religious observance (see Figure 14 below).

  • As in previous surveys, Gaza respondents are more supportive of the agreement. 38% of all Gazans supported the new plan. Among West Bank respondents, 18% supported the plan. It is worth noting that support for the two-state solution concept among Gazans in the current survey is also higher than it is among West Bankers, as indicated earlier. However, in both regions, support for the concept of the two-state solution is higher than the support they give to the detailed package.
  • Among Fatah supporters, 46% support the package, an 8-point increase compared to our findings in 2020. Support among Hamas voters dropped  from 25% in 2020 to 13% in the current poll.
  • Support for the package is higher among those who are less religious, and lower among those who are more religious. Among Palestinians who define themselves as “not religious” about half (49%) support the package. Support among the religious stands at 23%.
  • Young Palestinians between 18 and 22 years of age, which in past surveys were associated with hardline views, show greater willingness to support the package than older age groups.

 

Among Israelis, as shown in Figure 15, the internal breakdowns of the population show variations similar to those related to the general question about a two-state solution. These patterns are consistent over the years, with higher support among the left, low support on the right; higher support among secular Jews, but only a minority who support it among all other more religious groups. Arabs in general support the detailed two-state package at a higher rate than Jews.

  • A majority of left-wing Israeli Jews (86%) and among centrist Jews (52%) support the total package. Among the Jewish right-wing, just 14% supports the detailed package
  • The religiosity divide remains strong among Jews: Among seculars, a 52% majority support the plan, but just 18% among traditionalists (masortim) and fewer among the religious and ultra-orthodox (12% and 6% respectively).
  • Consistent with attitudes towards the general two state solution, there is a significant age gap: 20% of the youngest Jewish Israelis (18-24) support it, and more than twice as many, 43% of Jewish respondents 65 and above support the detailed package.

 

Figure 15: Israeli support for the combined package based on selected indicators, 2022

Feasibility - doubts. Beyond demographic and political differences that typically characterize those who support or oppose the two-state solution and the detailed package, background attitudes are also clearly linked to support. The perception of viability is important.  Among Israelis who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 67% support the two-state solution; among those who think it is not viable due to political developments and settlement spread, only 20% support it, Similarly, as shown in Figure 16, the perception of viability is also clearly linked to support or opposition to the detailed package for a two-state solution: 63% of Israelis who believe the solution to be feasible, also support the package, but just 14% of those who think this solution is no longer viable.

Among the Palestinians who believe that the two-state solution is still viable, 44% support the package declining to 19% among those who believe it is no longer viable. Nonetheless, the fact that a majority of those who think this solution remains feasible is still opposed to it demonstrates the significant hardening of attitudes among the Palestinians in the current poll.

 

Figure 16: Support for the peace package linked to feasibility of the two-state solution (TSS)  

 

INCENTIVE PAIRS

As in our 2020 joint poll, the current survey includes an experiment that aimed at testing the value of incentives. We separately paired some of the reciprocal incentives in order to determine their benefits as well as the harm they might inflict on the support for the peace package.  For the third time, we considered a new mode of testing incentives. In the first four surveys of the Pulse, most of the incentives proposed were developed specifically for one side or the other. To offset the possibility that an incentive for one side, such as the zero-sum, or one-sided measures, might alienate the other side, in the June 2018 and September 2020 surveys, and in the current one we paired incentives to show reciprocal benefits to each side. The incentives were paired based in part on the priorities attached to them by the two publics, drawing on seven items, representing some of the top-ranked incentives from the previous surveys of the Pulse.  Three of the current pairs were tested in 2020 and were relatively successful among Palestinians and Israelis. Four new pairs replaced the three pairs that were less successful in generating greater support for the peace package.

Respondents were asked directly if these pairs – an incentive to their own side coupled with a benefit to the other side – raised or lowered their support for an agreement. All respondents were asked these questions, not only those who rejected the agreement. The goal was to see whether, in a real situation where people are likely to learn of all benefits/incentives offered to all sides, respondents of either disposition would switch: would supporters defect and oppose an agreement, would rejectionists possibly switch towards support? And for those who had not made up their mind, could the mutual incentives convince them to support an agreement, or push them to oppose it?

The following is the list of pairs tested:

1. Security cooperation and Israeli military presence: The Palestinian government will commit to ongoing security cooperation with Israeli security forces, and Israel in return will agree to end its military presence in the territories of the Palestinian state

2. Combat incitement: The state of Palestine and the state of Israel will agree to combat incitement against the other and if necessary make changes in school textbooks to remove any such incitement, and to call for tolerance and reconciliation and to fight against violence

3. Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories: Israel will allow an agreed number of Palestinian laborers to continue to work in Israel if they wish to do so, and Palestine will allow Israeli factories to continue operating in its territory if they wish to do so

4. Historic links, character, and equal rights: State of Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine and recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people while affirming equal rights for the Arab citizens of Israel

5. Jews from Arab countries and homes and lands to refugees: Jews who had to leave Arab countries following the establishment of the state of Israel will receive monetary compensation; Palestinian refugees in camps and in the Palestinian state will receive monetary compensation as well as homes and land in their country of residence that will allow them to be settled and rehabilitated

6. Palestinian prisoners and one security force: Israel will commit to releasing all Palestinian prisoners after the full implementation of the agreement, and Palestinian leadership will commit to consolidating all armed factions into one single security force while disarming any other faction

7. Settlers and refugees: Jewish settlers will be allowed to stay in their homes with dual Israeli-Palestinian citizenship, while the same number of Palestinian refugees will be allowed to receive dual citizenship and live in Israel

 

Since all respondents, both those who supported the package and those who opposed it, received these questions, those who said the item raised their support but who already supported the initial agreement were set aside, and the same for those who were initially opposed and remained opposed following the incentive question. Focusing on those who switched sides, we then calculated new levels of predicted support following each pair.

Comparing just those who opposed the plan in the current survey, the average responses for the paired, mutual incentives is as follows:

Among Israeli Jews, respondents displayed wide variation in their assessment of the incentive pairs. Broadly speaking, those who opposed the detailed two-state peace package at the start reacted in similar ways to those who supported the two-state peace package: The strongest incentive pairs, those that were most successful in convincing the opposition camp, were also the least likely to cause supporters of the initial plan to defect.

As seen in the table below, the incentive of combatting incitement and changing textbooks if needed – in both the Palestinian and Israeli state – was the most attractive to the opposition respondents: nearly six-in-ten said this made them more likely to support the two-state package agreement. Just a small segment of the initial supporters would defect based on this condition (5%).

From a measure viewed as highly symbolic, the next most successful incentive pair was allowing Israeli factories to remain inside the West Bank, while allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel – a very pragmatic, concrete policy item. A significant minority of 46% of those originally opposed said this would make them more likely to support a two-state package agreement, while just a small minority of supporters said it made them less likely to do so (13%). 

 

Those who Supported the 2- state peace package

Those who Opposed the 2-state peace package

 

Now, less likely to support it

Now, more likely to support it

 

25%

33%

1. Security cooperation and Israeli military presence

5%

56%

2. Combat incitement

13%

46%

3. Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories

19%

30%

4. Historic links, character, and equal rights:

35%

21%

5. Jews from Arab countries and homes and lands to refugees

71%

10%

6. Palestinian prisoners and one security force

62%

14%

7. Settlers and refugees

 

Thus overall, an average of 30% of Israeli Jews, compared to 45% in 2020, changed their minds from rejection of the full package to support based on the incentive pairs, but this average contains wide deviation among the different items offered.

 

Among Palestinians, the average portion of those who changed from rejection to support is just 12%, with significantly less variation in response to the different incentives. In 2020, 21% made the switch from rejection to support based on incentive pairs.  

The following table summarizes the change generated by the incentive pairs for those who opposed the peace package and those who supported that package:

 

Those who Supported the 2- state peace package

Those who Opposed the 2-state peace package

 

Now, less likely to support it

Now, more likely to support it

 

36%

13%

1. Security cooperation and Israeli military presence

47%

9%

2. Combat incitement

35%

20%

3. Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories

48%

7%

4. Historic links, character, and equal rights:

44%

12%

5. Jews from Arab countries and homes and lands to refugees

40%

16%

6. Palestinian prisoners and one security force

62%

5%

7. Settlers and refugees

 

This finding reflects the fact that each side is offered a benefit but it comes packaged together with an item for the other side, which apparently dampens enthusiasm compared to the original incentives. At the same time, the fact that on both sides and for each incentive-pair, some portion of opposition switched to support means that there is some potential.

Therefore, the next valuable comparison is the original level of support in the current survey, or baseline support and opposition, for the permanent status package, among the two societies, compared to the new levels of support following each pair. In other words, the analysis below calculated all defections from support to opposition, along with switchers from opposition to support, to determine the new levels of support or opposition. The graphs in Figure 17 show the findings for the Israeli Jewish side.

On the Israeli side, as in the 2020 experiment, the shift to more support among the opposition and defections among supporters based on the pairs ultimately shows a fairly successful set of incentives. This relative success of the pairs is seen in the fact that five of the seven pairs generated higher levels of support (those who said the item raised their support for the current plan) than the initial level for the comprehensive plan, among Israeli Jews. While support for the detailed plan stood at 31% for the, even the least successful pair caused 34% to say the incentive (coupled with an incentive for the Palestinians side) made them more likely to support the plan. Furthermore, two paired incentives increased the level of support for the package to a large majority. On the other hand, two paired incentives brought the level of support way below the baseline.

Ending incitement on both sides was the most effective of all incentive pair, consistent with findings from the previous two experiments in 2020 and 2018. At that time, the net shift led to 74% support for the plan; at present, out of all respondents, fully 69% said it made them more likely to support the two-state detailed package.

As in 2020, the second most effective pair was the notion that Israeli owned factories could remain in the new Palestinian state, while Palestinian workers would be allowed to continue coming to Israel – this caused fully 60% of all Israeli Jews to say it made them more likely to support the plan. In 2020, 71% said this paired incentive made them more likely to support the peace package.

The pair containing symbolic and non-symbolic incentives, involving Israeli recognition of Palestinian historic and religious attachment to the land, Palestinian recognition of Israel’s Jewish character, and assertion of equal rights for Israeli Arabs received significant support but could not bring about a majority support for the package. Similarly, the pair that ensured continued security cooperation but called for the Israeli army’s withdrawal from the Palestinian state met the same limited success, as only 46% were willing to support the peace package when this pair was added to it.

One pair was met with a slight acceptance, increasing support to 34% only, was the one in which Israeli Jews from Arab countries were compensated for lost property while Palestinian refugees were provided with financial compensation as well as homes and lands in the country of their permanent residence. Two pairs led to a significant decline in the level of support, lowering it to 21%, in the case of the pair that allowed settlers to stay in their current homes while allowing an equal number of Palestinian refugees to live in Israel, and to 15%, in the case of the pair that required Israel to release Palestinian security prisoners while requiring the Palestinian side to have monopoly over force in the future state.

Among Palestinians, the pairs were significantly less successful than they were among the Israelis as only two out of the seven paired incentives proved effective in increasing support for the package from the baseline of 26%. This outcome indicates significant hardening of Palestinian attitudes as the three pairs that were tested in 2020 and in the current experiment produced less success compared to two years ago: mutually combating incitement, Palestinian laborers and Israeli factories, and security cooperation and Israeli army withdrawal. As indicated earlier, total support for the package stood at 26%. While all three repeat pairs produced tangible gains in 2020 beyond the baseline, only one, laborers and factories, added more support beyond the baseline, adding 5-points to the baseline (compared to 18-points in 2020). The second successful pair proposed, Palestinian prisoners and Palestinian unification of armed forces, raised the baseline by 1-point only. All other pairs failed to increase support. In fact, four did the opposite, diminishing support to the package to 13%, a 13-point drop, in the least successful pair, the one linking settlers to Palestinian refugees

 

It is worth pointing out that the most successful pair for the Palestinians, laborers and factories, is the second most successful for the Israelis as can be seen in the comparative figure below. The same figure also shows that both sides view highly negatively the linkage between settlers and refugees. The greatest level of polarization is produced by the pair on combating incitement, as it increases the gab in support between the two sides from 5-points, in the baseline, to 49-points. 

 

(4) Confidence building measures

 

We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about their support for a list containing confidence building measures that the Palestinian and the Israeli sides can jointly take to improve the Palestinian-Israeli environment and promote healthy conditions for a resumption of viable peace negotiations:

  1. ICC and area C: Palestinians will stop going to the International Criminal Court and Israel will allow the PA to build new cities in area C of the West Bank
  2. Payments to prisoners and release of prisoners: Palestinians will replace the current system of payments to security prisoners and families of those killed in conflict with a social security system based on family needs and Israel will release to the Palestinian Authority hundreds of Palestinian prisoners among those who are sick, those that have already spent most of their prison terms, female prisoners, and others who do not pose a security threat
  3. Textbooks and PA elections: Palestinians will revise their current school textbooks to remove any incitement against Jews and Israeli will allow Palestinians in East Jerusalem to participate in the PA elections in accordance with the terms of the Oslo agreement
  4. PA security deployment and Israeli incursions: Palestinian security services will enter all areas under the PA control to arrest and disarm any armed Palestinians and those planning to carry out attacks against Israelis and the Israeli army to stop its incursions into area A of the Palestinian territories

Among Palestinians, none of the measures examined has received significant support. On the other hand, among Israeli Jews, two measures were found that received great support: Textbooks and PA elections (54%) and PA security deployment and Israeli incursions (51%).  

Figure 20: support for confidence building measures among Palestinians and Israeli Jews

Among Palestinians, the support for CBMs in general is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, among Fatah voters, non-religious and 18–39-year-old. The two items that received higher support are "ICC and Area C" and "Payments to prisoners and release of prisoners ".

Among Israeli Jews, "Textbooks and PA elections" is the measure with the highest support across all groups. Among Israeli Arabs all CBMs get high support without significance difference between them.

(5) Conflict experiences:  

 

Worry and Fear: Most Palestinians (60%) expressed worry and fear that they or a member of their family will be hurt by Israelis or that their land will be confiscated or home demolished or that they would be expelled or prevented from reaching their land behind the separation barrier or wall; 40% are not worried. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of 79% indicated that they are worried or very much worried about the future of the Palestinian people.  These percentages are almost identical to those obtained two years ago.

In the current survey, 61% of Israeli Jews said they “greatly or very greatly” agree with a statement that “I fear being harmed by a Palestinian terror attack, rocket fire or war.” 38% responded that they share this concern only a little or not at all. These findings show significant increase in Israeli worry compared to 2020 when only 42% said they were worried.

Moreover, 56% of Israeli Jews indicated that they are worried or very much worried about losing the Jewish majority in Israel and losing the Jewish character of the state; 44% are not worried. The anxiety about losing Jewish majority is compatible with the significance that Jewish Israelis attach to this value, as seen later in our findings. 

Experiencing conflict-related violence: A majority among Palestinian participants (63%) said they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the conflict once (16%) or more than once (47%).

We asked the Jewish-Israeli side about witnessing of casualties related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are considerable differences between Jewish settlers and non-settlers regarding the question of being hurt in such incidents. As shown in Figure 21, 35% of non-settler Jews reported they have witnessed injuries or deaths related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict once (17%) or more than once (17%), while more than half (53%) of settlers have witnessed such casualties once (11%) or more than once (42%).  Compared to Palestinians, fewer non-settler Jews were exposed to conflict-related violence, while settlers – who are the immediate neighbors of Palestinians – report similar levels to those of Palestinians. It is worth noting that while the percentage of Palestinians who witnessed injuries and deaths many times is 27%, the equivalent percentage among the settlers is 7%, and among Israeli non-settler Jews 3%.

Figure (21): Palestinians, settlers, and non-settler Jews who witnessed injuries or deaths related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

(6) How Israelis and Palestinians view each other and trust levels:

We asked the two sides about perceptions of the other, and themselves: whether they want peace or believe the other side does, whether they trust the other side. We probed the extent of zero-sum beliefs. The overall findings show a marked decline in perceptions of the other side’s commitment to peace and in the level of trust.

Does the other side want peace?

Among Palestinians, 17% agree that most Israeli Jews want peace, almost the same as the September 2020 finding but a significant decrease from 39% in June 2018 and much less than our findings in June 2017 when 44% of Palestinians gave this response. In this poll, 82%, compared to 76% in 2020, expressed the view that they do not think most Israeli Jews want peace. Among Israeli Jews just 12% agree that Palestinians want peace, a significant drop from 19% in September 2020 and from 35% in July 2018. In December 2016, 41% thought this way, then just 33% in June 2017, making the current survey among the poorest results in terms of Israeli perceptions that Palestinians want peace.

What does the other side want?

The expectations of both sides are that the other side will start a "definitive war" or “armed struggle.” As the figure below indicates, the largest percentage of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, 44% and 52% respectively think the majority on the other side prefers to use force. Only one fifth on each side thinks the other side wants to reach a peace agreement. But findings show that the assessment of the two sides is mostly incorrect. For example, while 44% of the Palestinians believe that a majority of Israelis prefers a "definitive war," in practice, only 26% of Israeli Jews prefer it. Similarly, while a majority of Israeli Jews think the majority of the Palestinians prefer “armed struggle,” only 44% of the Palestinians prefer it.

Is the other side a partner for peace?

A majority on Israeli Jews and Palestinians, 84% and 61% respectively, think it has no partner on the other side. This represents a 14-point increase among Israeli Jews and 11-point decrease among Palestinians compared to our findings in September 2020.  Similarly, 82% of Israeli Jews and three quarters of the Palestinians think the other side will never accept the existence of an independent Palestinian/Israeli State. Both sides agree, 87% among Israeli Jews and 75% among the Palestinians, that the Palestinian Authority does not have the capacity to reach and implement a peace agreement with Israel. Indeed, only 12% on each side believes that in case of a peace agreement, the other side will honor the agreement. When asked to speculate about the conditions that will most likely prevail after PA president Mahmud Abbas, the largest percentage among both sides, 69% among Israelis and 46% among Palestinians, expect armed clashes between Palestinian factions. Only a quarter of Palestinians and 13% of Israelis expect Fatah and Hamas to agree on holding elections to elect a new president.

Trust and Zero-Sum Conflict:

As in previous recent surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low and distrust is overriding. Among Palestinians, a solid majority feels Israeli Jews are untrustworthy (86% - a 4-point drop from the 2020 finding); only 14% thinks Israeli Jews are trust-worthy.  Among Israeli Jews, 85% disagree with a statement “Palestinians can be trusted,” the worst results obtained by the Pulse, and an 6-point rise from September 2020 (when 79% believed that). As shown in the figure below, only 11% of Israeli Jews think the Palestinians are trust-worthy. Israeli Arabs are much more willing to trust Israeli Jews than Palestinians: 50% agree that Israeli Jews can be trusted, but 31% disagree.

Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 65% of Israeli Jews currently agree, a 7-point rise from September 2020 (when 58% of Israeli Jews agreed), 46% of Israeli Arabs agree (identical to the 2020 findings), and 71% of Palestinians (compared to 74% in 2020) agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization. Only 28% of the Palestinians and 25% of Israeli Jews think the conflict is not zero sum.

Who owns the land:

 We asked both publics who they think owns the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river (i.e., the whole land of Israel/Palestine). Participants could respond that they see the land as belonging to one side more than the other by giving it a higher score on the scale of 1 to 6, or giving both a high score thus indicating it belongs to both equally. Our findings indicate that both Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians see the entire land as belonging to their group through high and identical scores (93%). Israeli Arabs however are less certain: only 44% thinks it does not belong the Jews and only 56% thinks it belongs to the Palestinians. The majority among the Jewish and Palestinian publics negate the idea that the land belongs to the other side as well, thus perceiving the territory as exclusive to them. However, while the excluding perceptions are almost consensual among Palestinians (94%), they are less so among Israeli Jews (68%).

 

When did the conflict begin?

There is no consensus among Palestinians or Israeli Jews about the starting point of the conflict. Yet a majority of Israeli Jews and Palestinians believe the conflict began at some point even before 1948 (52% of Jews and 60% of Palestinians). The largest group of Palestinians mentions the 1917 Balfour declaration as the beginning (37%), about a third of Jewish Israelis mark the 1948 war. In both publics, only a small minority perceives the 1967 as the starting point. However, among Israeli Arabs, there is a majority (51%) that believes the conflict started with the 1948 war, which makes sense since that was the point of time when this group became a distinct one.

Figure (25): " People differ in their assessment of when the Arab-Israeli or Arab-Jewish conflict originated or started? What do you think? Did it start with:"

Victimhood: Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians perceive their people’s suffering as unique in human history, 80%, 69% and 84% respectively. Similarly, all three groups believe that their victimization is the worst compared to other people that suffered from persecution and injustice, 84%, 66%, and 84% respectively. As shown in figure 26 below, the three groups think that their victimization grants them with moral entitlement to take any action in order to survive, 63%, 68%, and 90% respectively.

 

Figure (26): " To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements regarding the experiences of Jews /Palestinians generally?" (% Agree) 

I believe that the suffering of Palestinians/Jews is unique throughout the human history

Since Palestinians/Jews are the victims of ongoing suffering, it is their moral right to do anything in order to survive

 

 

Willingness to promote peace between the two people: When asking about willingness to take reconciliatory actions, Israeli Arabs express the highest agreement to promote good relations between the two people (70%) and to participate in a workshop that bring them together (65%). A majority among Jewish Israelis are willing to take the first measure (56%) but not the second one (44%), while Palestinians reject these two actions (22% and 20% agreement respectively) which probably symbolize “normalization” for them.

 

(7) Values and Goals

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve.

Jews were asked about the values of: (1) a Jewish majority, (2) Greater Israel, (3) Democracy, (4) Peace. Among Israeli Jews, a Jewish majority and democracy are seen as the most important values (44% and 29% respectively; see Figure 28). This reflects a similar trend to what we saw in 2020 in the increased percentages of those who selected the Jewish majority and decreased percentages of those who selected Greater Israel. However, the Israeli Jewish public seems more concerned this time about democracy, which increased by 11 points, given the outcome of the Israeli elections in November 2022 and decreased interest in peace, a drop of 12 points. At present, 7% chose greater Israel. Among settlers, the percentage of those who selected Greater Israel declined further to 16%, and is now in second place, while the portion who chose a Jewish majority increased from 45% to 56%, Democracy was cited by 16% of settlers, and just 10% of settlers cited peace.

Among the Palestinians, we asked about the following goals: (1) Israeli withdrawal and establishing a Palestinian state, (2) Obtaining right of return for refugees to ’48 Israel, (3) Establishing a democratic political system, (4) Building a pious or moral individual and religious society. For Palestinians, the ranking has been relatively stable, with little change over the course of the past four years. The top priority for Palestinian goals remains Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem (36%, compared to 34% in 2020) chose this, followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (35%, compared to 28% in 2020), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (19%, a 4 point decrease from 2020), and building a democratic political system (9%, compared to 13% in 2020; see Figure 29).

 

Figure 29: Palestinian perception of their own vital goals, 2022

 

 

 

With funding from the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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