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While less than a third of the public views the Palestinian Authority as an accomplishment, and while half describes their leadership as a failed one, and while 80% thinks the West Bank-Gaza Strip split is permanent or long term, support for a confederation with Jordan rises; and while the public rejects Kerry’s ideas for return to negotiations without pre-conditions, a large majority supports going to the International Criminal Court in order to stop settlement expansion even if such a step leads to PA collapse 

13-15 June 2013

 This survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-15 June 2013. The period before the poll witnessed the resignation of the government of Salam Fayyad and the appointment of a new government headed by Rami Al Hamdallah, President of Al Najah University. The period also witnessed US Secretary of State John Kerry’s shuttle diplomacy in the hope of renewing Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Earlier, Khalid Mishaal was elected as head of Hamas’s political bureau for a new term, the formation of a Palestinian reconciliation government was postponed by three months, and President Abbas signed an agreement with King Abdullah of Jordan regarding the king’s custodianship of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. This press release covers public evaluation of the general West Bank and Gaza conditions, elections, reconciliation, public evaluation of the performance of the government of Ismail Haniyeh, public satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, the internal balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems Palestinians confront today in addition to Kerry’s efforts and the custodianship agreement. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 Fax:02-2964934  or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2013 show a widespread state of frustration and pessimism. 80% believe that the West Bank-Gaza Strip split is either permanent or long term. Less than one third of the public views the PA, in its two incarnations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as an accomplishment for the Palestinian people. Moreover, less than a third believes that a Palestinian state will be established in the next five years. In fact, a majority, while continuing to support the two-state solution, believes that it has become impractical due to settlement expansion. Perhaps for these reasons half of the public believes that its leadership from the beginnings has been a failed one.  

Furthermore, findings of this poll indicate a significant decrease, about 10 percentage points, in the opposition to a confederation with Jordan compared to the situation several years ago. A larger percentage supports the confederation today than in 2007 and 2008. But they also make it clear that Palestinians oppose the establishment of confederation now before the end of Israeli occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Despite that, findings do indicate that a majority supports the holy places agreement signed last March between President Mahmud Abbas and King Abdullah of Jordan in which the Palestinian side acknowledged the custodianship of the king over al Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem. 

Findings also indicate public opposition to ideas brought by US Secretary of State John Kerry for restarting peace negotiations: without preconditions, with an economic package, and with focus on security and borders. The public is also opposed to several alternatives to negotiations such as return to an armed intifada, dissolution of the PA, and abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of one-state solution. But the public supports going to international organizations, especially to the International Criminal Court (ICC), despite its fears that such a step would bring about financial sanctions and the perhaps the collapse of the PA.

5-9 July 2001

These are the results of opinion poll # 2, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research , between 5-9 July 2001. The poll deals with the Mitchell Report, cease fire, and return to negotiations; intifada and armed confrontations; chances for reconciliation; and, internal Palestinian conditions. The total sample size of this poll is 1318 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 812 in the West Bank and 506 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

MAIN RESULTS:

1. The Mitchell Report, Cease Fire, and Return to Negotiations

    

   • 50% support the PA acceptance of the Mitchell Report and the cease fire, and 46% reject it
   
   
   • 63% support immediate return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and 35% oppose it
   
   
   • 58% support continuing negotiations from where they stopped in Taba in January þ2001, and 33% oppose it
   
   
   • 46% believe that the peace process is dead
   
   
   • 81% believe that a Palestinian-Israeli agreement would have beneficial economic impact

Despite much pessimism regarding the prospects of a peace process, leading to a large increase in support for armed confrontations (as discussed in the next section), the majority of the Palestinians are supportive of the cease fire efforts and of a return to negotiations. The results of the survey show that 50% support the PA decision to accept the Mitchell Report and the cease fire, and that 63% support an immediate return to the negotiating table. They also show that 58% support continuing negotiations from the point reached at Taba in January 2001, and that 81% believe that a peace agreement reached between the two sides would have beneficial economic gains. Despite the support for negotiations however, the public is highly pessimistic about the chances of success, with 46% believing that the peace process is dead and that there is no chance of reaching an agreement in the coming years. In our July 2000 poll, in the aftermath of the Camp David Summit, only 23% believed that the peace process was dead.

Support for the Mitchell report and the cease fire increases in the West Bank (54%) compared to the Gaza Strip (43%), in villages and towns (55%) compared to refugee camps (39%), among women (53%) compared to men (46%), among the illiterates (60%) compared to holders of BA degree (46%), among farmers (61%) compared to students (41%), and among Fateh supporters (65%) compared to the supporters of Hamas (38%).

2. Intifada and Armed Confrontations

    

    

   • If the cease fire agreement collapses, 60% would support return to armed confrontations
   
   
   • 92% support armed confrontations against the Israeli army in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
   
   
   • 58% support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 39% oppose them
   
   
   • 70% believe that armed confrontations have so far achieved Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not, and a similar percentage believe that a return to armed attacks would achieve the same objective
   
   
   • 75% expect the continuation of armed confrontations
   
   
   • 93% believe that the intifada had a negative impact on the Palestinian economy
   
   
   • 91% believe that Arab support for the intifada has been inadequate
   
   
   • 26% believe that the Palestinian media provide a fair and accurate account of the confrontations, 30% believe that the media is mobilized by the PA and/or sometimes call for confrontations, but 33% believe that the media is mobilized by supporters of the peace process and/or call for end to the intifada

Poll results indicate that despite the current support for the cease fire, the majority (60%) would, in case of its total collapse, support a return to armed confrontations. Yet, the public distinguishes between armed attacks against Israeli soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza, which it overwhelmingly supports (92%) and armed attacks on Israeli civilians inside Israel, supported by 58% and opposed by 39%. This widespread support for armed attacks are apparently the result of three factors: most Palestinians, as seen below, place the goal of "ending occupation" at the top of Palestinian priorities, most believe that negotiations will not succeed, and most believe that armed attacks have so far achieved, and will continue to achieve in the case of a return to it, Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not achieve.

The results show that 70% believe that armed confrontations have achieved national goals that negotiations could not achieve, while 71% believe that such confrontations would achieve the same objectives in the future. Consistent with the pessimistic mood in the street, 75% of the public believe that armed confrontations will continue despite the cease fire.

Despite the widespread support for armed confrontations, 93% believe that the intifada had a harmful impact on the Palestinian national economy, and 80% believe that it had harmed its own economic well-being. Moreover, 91% believe that the Arab support for the intifada has been inadequate. Yet, this does not lead the public to reduce its support for armed confrontations. The reason may lie in the fact that the improvement of economic conditions comes third in the hierarchy of Palestinian priorities after "ending occupation" and "fighting corruption and instituting the rule of law."

The results also show that the public does not believe that the Palestinian media is mobilized by the PA or that it calls for armed confrontations. On this issue the public is divided into three groups: 30% believe that the media is indeed playing such a role, but one third believe that it does the opposite in that it is mobilized by supporters of the peace process and that it calls for ending the intifada and the confrontations, while a quarter believes that it provides an accurate description of the confrontations.

Support for return to armed attacks increases in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (56%), in villages and towns (56%) compared to refugee camps (69%), among men (65%) compared to women (56%), and among supporters of Hamas (73%) compared to supporters of Fateh (63%) and the non-affiliated (49%). The results also show that the most religious tend to be more supportive of a return to armed confrontations. For example, support increases among those who read Quran every day (66%) compared to those who never read it (52%). Similarly, it increases among those who observe most of religious rules and traditions (66%) and decreases among those who do not (40%).

Chances for Reconciliation and Lasting Peace in a Scenario of Successful Negotiations:

• 84% support open borders between Palestine and Israel
• 60% support joint Palestinian-Israeli economic institutions and ventures
• 25% support joint political institutions leading to an Israeli-Palestinian confederation
• 31% support taking legal measures against incitement in the state of Palestine
• 7% support adopting school curriculum that recognises Israel and teaches children not to demand retrun of all Palestine to the Palestinians
• 27% would invite an Israeli colleague to visit at home and 28% would visit an Israeli colleague at his home
• 49% believe that reconciliation is possible, and 38% believe that it is not possible
• 50% believe that a majority of Israelis believes that reconciliation is not possible ever and that 35% believe it to be impossible
• 26% believe that a lasting peace is possible, and 24% believe that a majority of Israebelieves that it is possible
• 59% expects conflict and violence between Israelis and Palestinians in the next 5 to 10 years

Given the widespread pessimism and the wide support for armed confrontations indicated by the survey results, the levels of support for reconciliation come as a surprise. This is the second time that these recquestions have been asked. The first time occurred in July 2000 after the end of the Camp David Summit. What has been surprising is the fact that no significant changes have occurred on most of the reconciliation indicators. For example, 73% (compared to 75% in the July 2000 survey) continue to support reconciliation between the two peoples once a peace agreement is reached. A large majority of 84% supports open borders and 60% support joint economic institutions and ventures. Moreover, 31% (compared to 38% in the July 2000 survey) support taking legal measures against incitement in the state of Palestine, 27% (compared to 41% in the July) would invite an Israeli colleague to visit at home, and 49% (compared to 48% in July) believe that reconciliation is possible. Twenty six percent (compared to 35% in July) believe that a lasting peace is possible.

Despite the long term flexibility, pessimism dominates the current thinking with 59% of the public expecting violence and confrontations in the future relations between the two sides during the next five to ten years. One year ago, only 31% expected such future.

Support for reconciliation increases among residents of cities (77%) compared to refugee camps (65%), among the old (86%) compared with the young (64%), among the illiterates (85%) compared to holders of BA degree (67%), among the farmers (82%) compared to students (52%), among those with the least income (73%) compared to those with the highest income (65%), and among supporters of Fateh (85%) compared to supporters of Hamas (65%) and the non-affiliated (70%).

Priorities, Corruption, Democracy, Arafat's Popularity, and Political Affiliation

•  83% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions, and 57% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy stands at 21%, but 39% believe that it will be better when the state is established
• 51% believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear
• Arafat's popularity drops to 33%, compared to 46% in July 2000 in the aftermath of the Camp David Summit
• Support for Fateh drops to 29%, compared to 37% in July 2000, but support for the Islamists increases from 17% to 27% during the same period
• 46% prefer to have an Islamic state, like in Iran, after the establishment of a Palestinian state

"Ending occupation" is the first Palestinian priority according to 50% of the public, followed by "fighting corruption and the institution of the rule of law," "providing jobs and improving living conditions," and finally, the "safeguarding of religious values and traditions." This hierarchy of priorities may have led the majority of the public to support armed confrontations, while at the same time reducing the impact of economic factors. The public does clearly see the negative and harmful impact of the intifada on the Palestinian economy, but the consequences of this knowledge are mitigated by the much stronger desire to end occupation.

The results indicate a persistent negative public perception of governance in Palestine. This may explain the decline in support for both Arafat and Fateh. Eighty three percent (compared to 76% in July 2000) believe that corruption exists in PA institutions, and 57% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future. Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy remains low, at 21%, while the percentage of those who believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear decreased from 63% in July 2000 to 51% in this poll. The intifada and the subsequent weakening of the PA may have contributed to this decrease.

The popularity of Arafat dropped within a year from 46% in July 2000 to 33% now, while Fateh's support dropped from 37% to 29% during the same period. Support for the Islamists increased from 17% to 27%.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 September 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a US announcement about an agreement between the UAE and Israel to normalize relations between the two countries. This normalization agreement stipulated an Israeli suspension or delay of the planned annexation of parts of the West Bank. The period also witnessed a rise in the daily number of coronavirus infections and continued stalemate in Palestinian-Israeli relations that followed a PA decision to sever all security and civil links with Israel which led during the past months to a significant financial loss to the PA. This PA decision came in response to an Israeli announcement about the intention to annex about 30% of the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Finding of the September 2020 poll show a great Palestinian public anger with the UAE decision to normalize relations with Israel viewing it as serving only the interests of Israel and as a betrayal or an abandonment of the Palestinian cause and at the same time as a big failure of Palestinian diplomacy. Additionally, the overwhelming majority estimates that the Palestinian leadership has lost its Arab allies as Saudi Arabia will soon follow the UAE in normalizing relations and that Egypt, by endorsing the deal, has in effect abandoned PA president Mahmoud Abbas.  Nonetheless, most believe that the majority of the Arab public is opposed to the normalization deal. Findings show that the public blames the Palestinians 

themselves for this development: the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the fact that they had normalized relations with Israel before many others may have hastened the arrival of this day.

The public does not show an appreciation of the fact that the UAE-Israel deal requires the suspension of the annexation plan. The reason for this is the fact that three quarters think that the suspension is only temporary and will soon take place, the normalization deal notwithstanding. Moreover, based on this assessment, the public is opposed to the restoration of PA-Israel security coordination despite the fact that half of the public wishes to restore civil and fiscal relations between the two sides.

Findings also show a significant decline in support for the two-state solution compared to the situation three months ago. They also show that the consensus in rejecting the Trump plan, the deal of the century, first documented in PSR’s February 2020 poll, remains unchanged. Similarly, the overwhelming majority remains opposed to a resumption of contacts with the Trump administration. Despite the majority expectation that Trump will lose the upcoming US presidential elections, only one fifth expects positive policy change if the Democratic candidate Joe Biden wins.  

Domestically, findings show continued satisfaction with the PA measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus pandemic despite significant decline in the level of satisfaction, especially with the prime minister’s performance. Moreover, a majority is opposed to the severing of coordination and cooperation with Israel in the fight against the spread of the coronavirus.

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas rises in this poll. Parallel to this, satisfaction with the performance of the president has declined. As a result, if elections were held today, Hamas’ Haniyyeh would win a majority of the public vote. This development might have been boosted by the current economic difficulties in the West Bank resulting from the severing of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel and the resulting inability of the PA to pay the public sector in full. Findings also show a drop in the perception of safety and security in the West Bank and an increase in the desire to emigrate. Despite these developments, the popularity of Fatah in the West Bank is not negatively affected; to the contrary, the findings show a little improvement in its popularity.

(1) UAE-Israel normalization agreement:

• A majority of 63% view the normalization agreement between the UAE and Israel as a major event that represents a significant regional shift while 32% view as minor development.
• Findings show a consensus (86%) that the agreement serves only the interests of Israel while 8% think it serves the interests of both the Palestinians and the Israelis and only 1% think it serves the interests of the Palestinians only.
• We asked the public to pick one word that represents its sentiments toward the normalization agreement: the majority (53%) picked “betrayal,” 17% picked “abandonment” 13% “insult,” 9% “indifference,” 6% “sadness,” while only 1% picked words like “satisfaction,” “pride,” and “joy.”
• Most Palestinians (57%) believe that the majority among the Arab public is opposed to the normalization agreement while 20% believe an Arab majority supports it.
• A large majority (70%) believes that other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, and Morocco, will sign similar agreements with Israel while 24% believe they will not do that.
• An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that Saudi Arabia has given the green light to the UAE to sign the normalization agreement and a similar majority (82%) believes that Saudi Arabia too will sign a similar public agreement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the public (78%) believes that the Egyptian position welcoming the agreement represents an abandonment of the Palestinian leadership led by Abbas while 18% do not share this view.
• A majority of 55% believes that Mohammad Dahlan was one of the participants in the making of the UAE-Israel normalization agreement while 24% do not share this view.
• Nonetheless, a majority of 53% believes that the blame for the normalization deal falls on the shoulders of the Palestinians themselves due to their division and due to the fact that they have recognized Israel and normalized relations with it long before the others; 42% disagree with this view.
• Also, a majority of 62% views the UAE defection from the previous declared Arab consensus on Palestine as a great failure for Palestinian diplomacy; 31% do not share this view.

(2) Annexation and the severing of relations with Israel in post UAE-Israel normalization:

• Three quarters of the public (75%) believe that the normalization agreement forces Israel to merely postpone annexation while 19% think it forces it to put an end to it.
• Now, after the normalization agreement, a majority of 62% is opposed to the restoration of security coordination with Israel while 32% are in favor of restoring it.
• But half of the public (50%) supports, and 45% oppose, the restoration of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel.
• If Israel conditioned resumption of civil and fiscal coordination with a resumption of security coordination, a majority of 59% will oppose, and 35% will support, the resumption of relations.
• In response to an actual Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories, the public is divided on how to respond. When asked to choose one of five possible responses, 28% favored resumption of armed struggle, 20% selected stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, another 20% favored return to negotiations with Israel and the US on the basis of a Palestinian peace plan, 19% preferred waging nonviolent resistance, and 6% selected the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• The public indicates great worries about the future in case of continued severing of relations with Israel. For example, 74% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 75% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 77% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 59% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 59% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 70% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 60% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
• It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (63%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 30% believe it indeed did.
• A majority of 61% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (32%) expects Israel to do so.
• A large majority of 75% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 21% say they do prefer that.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 45%.  
• A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 31% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 36% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 38% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 41% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 26% popular resistance. Three months ago, 45% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 92% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Three months ago, 88% expressed opposition to the plan.
• If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 55% think the chances are zero; 26% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
• A majority of 71% is opposed and 19% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Three months ago, 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
• A majority of 61% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 30% expect him to win it. Nonetheless, only 21% expect a positive change if Biden wins while 34% believe US policy will not change and 35% expect it to become worse.

(4) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• A two-third majority (68%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to prevent travel between the various governorates in order to contain the Coronavirus pandemic.
• Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 64% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 57% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 48% today compared to 62% three months ago.
• The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 70% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 52% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
• A majority of 55% say that are dissatisfied with the PA decision during the past several months to stop cooperation and coordination with Israel in the health sector with the aim of combating the coronavirus, 42% are satisfied with that decision.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• 62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 58% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 39% and the latter 52% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh threw months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 41% and the latter 51%.
• We asked in an open-ended question about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 22% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Mohammad Shtayyeh is preferred by 5%, Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad by 2%. 
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 42% three months ago).

(6) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 16%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 57%.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 25% and in the West Bank at 24%. Three months ago, only 18% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. Three months ago, 81% expressed a similar view.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 62% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, only 52% viewed the PA as a burden.
• A year and a half since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 60% expect failure; only 31% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 33% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expects success.
• An overwhelming majority of the public (80%) is opposed to the arrest by the PA security services of activists who were planning to demonstrate or were demonstrating against corruption in the PA while 17% support these arrests. 
• 56% (66% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 36% (23% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.  Six month ago, 42% said it believes it will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 64% (75% in the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 31% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law. Six month ago, 41% said the judiciary and courts rule according to the law.  
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (13%), Maan TV at 12%, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 4% each, and finally al Manar at 2%.  

(7) Reconciliation: 

• 37% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
• Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 45% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 11% believe unity will return soon.

(8) Muslims in China: 

• 80% of the Palestinians believe that if press reports about the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in China are true, Palestinians should condemn the Chines policy towards its Muslim community and 15% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 79% indicates that it does not believe the statement of the Chinese government that the camps built by China to allegedly detain the Uighur Muslims are in fact teaching centers aiming at eradicating extremism; 10% believe the Chinese statement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 83% believes that world Muslims should express solidarity with the Uighur Muslims against the Chinese government while 10% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 80% approves of the Turkish president Erdogan’s decision to transform the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque; 16% disapprove.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; 13% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%,  the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 10%.

WHILE INDICATING IMPORTANT SHIFTS IN PALESTINIAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE INTIFADA AND THE PEACE PROCESS, PSR POLL SHOWS SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A PRIME MINISTER AND REFUSAL TO GIVE CONFIDENCE IN THE NEW PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT  

14-22 November 2002

These are the results of opinion poll # 6, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 14-20 November 2002. The poll deals with the Peace Process, reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians, political reform and new Palestinian government, corruption, democracy and constitution, Arafat's popularity and political affiliation. The total sample size of this poll is 1319 from Palestinians 18 years and older, in the West Bank (814) and the Gaza Strip (505) Interviewed face-to-face, in 120 locations. The margin of error is 3%.

MAIN RESULTS:

1) The Peace Process:

• 54% support the peace initiative called the "road map," 42% oppose it


• 76% support a mutual cessation of violence by Palestinians and Israelis; last August only 48% supported a gradual ceasefire between the two sides.


• 56% support taking measures by the PA to prevent armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel after reaching an agreement on mutual cessation of violence even though 82% are worried that such measures may lead to internal Palestinian strife. This result is similar to the findings of the March 1996 poll in which 59% supported the measures taken by the PA against the Islamists who organized a series of suicide attacks inside Israel in February and March of that year.


• 73% believe that a return to the peace process would be impeded if the PA failed to take security measures to prevent attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel after reaching an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. This result too is similar to the findings of the March 1996 poll.


• However, 66% continue to believe that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not


• As in our two previous polls in May and August, 53% support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel while 43% oppose them. But support for attacks against soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza reach 91% and against settlers 89%.


• Only 16% expect a return to negotiations and an end to armed attacks soon

The poll shows that a significant shift has occurred in Palestinian public attitudes regarding the intifada and the peace process. It shows a majority of 54% supporting the "road map" and 42% oppose it. More importantly, it shows that more than three quarters (76%) support a mutual cessation of violence by both sides. Last August, a PSR poll found only 48% supporting a gradual ceasefire. Another significant shift occurred in attitudes regarding a PA crackdown on those who carry out attacks inside Israel. The poll shows that a majority of 56% support taking measures by the PA against those who continue to resort to attacks against Israelis inside Israel after reaching an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. Our May 2002 survey showed that 86% were opposed to PA measures that included arresting those who organized suicide attacks against Israelis inside Israel.

Two additional findings are remarkable. The majority support for a crackdown is evident despite the fact that 82% of the pubic fears that such a crackdown may lead to internal civil strife. Moreover, the poll shows that a large majority of 73% believes that after reaching a mutual cessation of violence, a PA failure to take security measures to prevent armed attacks on Israelis inside Israel, would impede a return to the peace process.

It is noticeable that the results of this poll are similar to those obtained in a March 1996 survey. At that time, we found that 59% of the public supported the measures taken by the PA against those Islamists who organized the suicide attacks inside Israel in February and March of that year. At that time, and despite their support for it, 74% were worried that the crackdown would lead to internal strife. In the 1996 poll, 75% feared that if the PA failed to crackdown on the militants, the peace process would be halted.

The events of the last months may have played a role in causing this shift in Palestinian public attitudes. The reoccupation of the Palestinian cities dashed the hopes of many that the intifada would bring about a quick Palestinian independence. Concern that a war against Iraq might be exploited by Israel created public fears of deportations and forced expulsions. On the other hand, the gradual evolvement of a political horizon, as in the US call for the establishment of a Palestinian state and the development of a "road map" in that direction, may have created hopes for a possible revival of the peace process. The Israeli decision to hold early elections may have created fears that such elections could strengthen the right wing and radical forces in Israel in the absence of a halt to the violence. The reassessment among the PA old guard and mainstream Fateh leaders of the value of the intifada may have finally filtered down to the public.

However, despite the importance of the changes in public attitudes regarding the mutual cessation of violence and the crackdown on militants, the shift remains fragile. A majority still supports attacks on Israelis and views positively the achievements of the armed confrontations. As in our last poll in August, more than half of the public (53%) supports armed attacks against civilians inside Israel and about 90% support attacks against soldiers and settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 66% (compared to 71% last August) believe that the armed confrontations of the intifada had helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not. As in August, only 16% expect an end to the violence and a quick return to negotiations.

The level of support for the "road map" is affected by gender, education, occupation and political affiliation. Support increases among women (58%) compared to men (50%); among illiterates (64%) compared to those holding a BA degree (41%); among housewives (62%) compared to students (46%); and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (48%).

Support for the taking measures against militants who continue to carry out attacks inside Israel is affected by area and place of residence, education, religiosity, income, and political affiliation. Support increases in the West Bank (58%) compared to the Gaza Strip (53%); in Nablus (68%), Jerusalem (65%), Bethlehem (64%) Ramallah (62%) and Gaza city (62%) compared to Rafah (26%), Hebron (50%), and Khanyounis (51%); among those residing in cities (60%) compared to refugee camps (52%); among the illiterates (60%) compared those holding a BA degree (46%); among the most religious (69%) compared to the least religious (50%); among those with the highest income (67%) compared to those with the lowest income (57%) ; and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (40%).

2) Reconciliation Between Israelis and Palestinians:

• 73% support reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement and establishing a Palestinian state. This is similar to our previous findings during the last two years.


• After reaching a peace agreement, 83% would support open borders between Israel and Palestine and 66% would support joint economic institutions and ventures, but only 27% would support joint political institutions, 37% would support taking legal steps to prohibit incitement against Israel, and 8% would support the adoption of school curriculum that recognizes the state of Israel and does not the return of all Palestine to the Palestinians


• 40% believe that Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation is not possible ever, while 50% believe that most Israelis bthat reconciliation is not possible ever


• After peace 37% are ready to invite an Israeli friend to their homes and 37% are willing to visit the home of an Israeli friend


• 28% believe that permanent peace between Palestinians and Israelis is possible while 23% believe that most Israelis believe that permanent peace is possible

The poll findings indicate no changes in public attitude regarding Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation compared to previous polls during the last two years. Within the context of a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, almost three quarters (73%) of the Palestinians would support reconciliation. Moreover, an even larger majority of 83% would support open borders between the two states, while two thirds would support the establishment of joint economic institutions and ventures. However, support for other reconciliation measures decreases when it focuses on social issues, such as inviting an Israeli colleague to one's home or visiting him at his home. Joint political institutions are also unpopular with only 27% supporting the creation of joint political institutions toward a confederation between the two states. Thirty seven percent would support taking legal measures to prevent incitement against Israel and only 8% would support the adoption of school curriculum that recognizes the state of Israel and does not demand the return of all Palestine to the Palestinians.

3) Political Reform and the New Palestinian Government:

• Only 40% give confidence to the new Palestinian government while 51% refuse to give it confidence


• Only 37% believe that the new government will be able to carry out the needed political reform; 37% believe it will be able to fight corruption; 38% believe it will be able to improve the economic conditions; and 26% believe that it will be able to properly manage relations with Israel


• 85% support and 13% oppose internal and external calls for fundamental political reform in the PA


• 73% Support and 24% oppose the appointment or election of a Palestinian prime minister


• 47% support and 49% oppose changing the current Palestinian political system to a parliamentary system in which power would reside in the hands of a prime minister while the position of the president would be ceremonial

The findings indicate that the public refuses to give confidence in the new Palestinian government with 51% opposed and 40% supportive. The reason for the lack of confidence is indicated in the public belief that the new government will not be able to carry out political reforms, fight corruption, improve economic conditions, or properly manage the relationship with Israel with the percentage of confidence in the ability of the new government to carry out these tasks ranging between 26% and 38%.

As in our May and August polls, the findings of this one show that a large majority (85%) supports the internal and external calls for political reforms. Support for the appointment or election of a prime minister has increased from 69% in August to 73% in this poll. Support for changing the political system so that power would reside in the hands of a prime minister while the office of the president would become ceremonial received the support of 47%, compared to 44% last August. Forty nine percent oppose this reform measure.

Willingness to give confidence in the new government increases in villages and towns (43%) compared to refugee camps (35%); among the old (49%) compared to the young (41%); among non-refugees (42%) compared to refugees (37%); among the illiterates (57%) compared to those holding a BA degree (26%); among housewives (46%) compared to employees (31%) and professionals (21%); among those with the lowest income (42%) compared to those with the highest income (24%); and among supporters of Fateh (59%) compared to supporters of Hamas (26%).

 4) Corruption

• 84% believe that there is corruption in the PA; among those, 62% believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future


• Only 25% are convinced that reform measures taken by the Palestinian minister of finance will be sufficient to put an end to financial corruption in the PA

No significant change has been recorded in public perception of corruption compared to the situation during the past 12 months. A large majority of 84% continues to believe that corruption exists in the PA, while only 8% believe that the PA is free of corruption. The percentage of those who believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future increased from 58% last August to 62% in this poll. The percentage of those who are convinced that the reform measures introduced by the new Palestinian minister of finance, Salam Fayyad, will be sufficient to put an end to financial corruption does not exceed 25%, with a drop of five percentage-points compared to our August poll.

5) Democracy and Constitution

• 88% support and 11% oppose a democratic system with the following characteristics: periodic elections, a president with a limited term in office, freedom to form political parties, free press without censorship, an independent judiciary, and respect for human rights


• 94% support holding periodic elections, 78% support the election of a president for a limited term only, 76% support complete freedom to form political parties, 74% support freedom of the press with no government censorship, 75% support an independent judiciary, and 98% support respect for human rights


• Only 19% give PA democracy a positive evaluation and only 17% expect a democratic system in the Palestinian state. But 66% of the Palestinians give a positive evaluation to the status of democracy and human rights in Israel.


• 69% do not agree, and 23% agree, with the statement that democratic states do not fight each other


• 54% believe, and 43% do not believe, that people today can criticize the PA without fear


• 74% support giving priority to freedom of the press and respect for human rights in accordance with the law even if this contradicted with what the PA may see as the national interest


• 61% are in favor, and 36% are not in favor, of having provisions in the Palestinian constitution guaranteeing equality for women in giving Palestinian citizenship to their children when the husband is not Palestinian


• 53% are in favor, and 46% are not in favor, of having provisions in the Palestinian constitution guaranteeing equality between men and women so that a woman could become a president of the Palestinian state


• Only 25% are in favor, and 73% are not in favor, of having provisions in the Palestinian constitution guaranteeing equality for women in divorcing their husbands


• 35% are in favor, and 62% are not in favor, of having provisions in the Palestinian constitution guaranteeing equality for a Christian citizen in becoming a president of the Palestinian state

As in our August poll, support for a democratic system of government is very high. Eighty eight percent support a democratic system with the following characteristics: periodic elections, a president with a limited term in office, freedom to form political parties, free press without censorship, an independent judiciary, and respect for human rights. The poll also shows that each one of those characteristics enjoys the support of at least three quarters of the public with 98% support for the respect for human rights.

But the public attitude towards equality between men and women and towards equal rights for Christian citizens does not receive comparable levels of support and indeed does not receive the support of the majority in some cases. A majority of 61% is in favor of having constitutional provisions guaranteeing equality for women in giving Palestinian citizenship to their children when the husband is not Palestinian. Also, a majority of 53% is in favor of including provisions in the Palestinian constitution guaranteeing equality between men and women so that a woman could become a president of the Palestinian state. But only a quarter is in favor of having coprovisions guaranteeing equality for women in divorcing their husbands. Moreover, only 35% are in favor of having constitutional provisions equality for a Christian citizen in becoming a president of the Palestinian state.

Despite this fragile support for democracy when it comes to equality, the Palestinian public is willing to support some democratic values even if this entailed contradiction with what the PA may consider as the national interest. For example, 74% would support the upholding of the freedom of the press and respect for human rights even if it comes at the expense of what the PA may define as the national interest.

The street, as in previous surveys during the past few years, shows little admiration for the status of democracy under the PA. Positive evaluation for the status of democracy in Palestine does not exceed 19%, while the percentage of those who expect to see democracy in the Palestinian state is even less at 17%. On the other hand, two thirds of the Palestinians give the status of democracy in Israel a positive evaluation. Yet, despite the positive evaluation of Israeli democracy and the high level of support for democratic values among Palestinians, a majority of 69% does not agree with the statement that democracies do not fight each other.

Support for the right of a woman to divorce increases in the West Bank (32%) compared to the Gaza Strip (15%); in cities (25%) and towns and villages (27%) compared to refugee camps (20%); among women (31%) compared to men (20%); among the young (29%) compared to the old (22%); among non-refugees (28%) compared to refugees (22%); among those holding a BA degree (26%) compared to illiterates (22%); among the unmarried (29%) compared to the married (24%); and among the least religious (31%) compared to the most religious (21%).

Support for the right of a Christian citizen to become a president of the state increases in the West Bank (41%) compared to the Gaza Strip (26%); among men (39%) compared to women (31%); among the old (47%) compared to the young (25%); among those who hold a BA degree (44%) compared to those who have elementary education only (31%); among the retired (63%) and employees (44%) compared to students (27%); among the least religious (64%) compared to the most religious (32%); among those with the highest income (52%) compared to those with the lowest income (33%); and among supporters of Fateh (34%) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%).

6) Arafat's Popularity and Political Affiliation 

• Compared to last August, Yasir Arafat's popularity remains unchanged at 35%


• Marwan Barghouti receives the second largest support at 21%, followed by Ahmad Yasin (14%), Sa'eb Erikat (9%), Haidar Abdul Shafi (8%), Farouq Qaddoumi (6%), and Hanan Ashrawi (5%)


• Fateh receives the support of 27%, Islamist groups 25%, PFLP 3%, and 43% are non-affiliated

No significant change has been recorded in the popularity of Palestinian leaders and factions. Arafat's popularity remains the highest at 35% (compared to 34% in August and 35% in May), followed by Marwan Barghouti with 21% (compared to 23% in August and 19% in May). Ahmad Yasin comes third with 14% (compared to 10% in August and 13% in May) followed by Saeb Erikat with 9% (compared to 8% in August and 10% in May), and Haidar Abdul Shafi with 8% (compared to 13% in August and 10% in May). Support for Fateh remained stable at 27% (compared to 26% in August), while the Islamists dropped two percentage points, from 27% in August to 25% in this poll. .

These are the results of opinion poll #39, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 28 - 30 January 1999. The poll deals with the peace process, donor community support, domestic affairs, elections for the President and vice-President, internet, and satellite dishes. The total sample size of this poll is 1318 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 823 in the West Bank and 495 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

1. Peace Process

• Support for the peace process rises to 73%
• Support for violence against Israelis declines to 41%
• Support for a unilateral declaration of independence declines to 52%

The results show that support for the peace process has risen to 73% after it had dropped to 66% about one month ago in the aftermath of the Israeli suspension of the Wye River agreement. This change in public attitude is further reinforced by the sharp drop in the level of support for armed attacks against Israeli targets from 53% one month ago to 41% today. Opposition to armed attacks is higher in the Gaza Strip (57%) than in the West Bank (50%). Opposition also increases among the less educated, laborers, merchants, professionals, specialists, the unemployed and supporters of Fateh.

Along the same context, support for a Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence on May 4, 1999, has dropped from 57% one month ago to 52% today. Support for the declaration increases in the Gaza Strip (55%), compared to the West Bank (50%), and among students and the young.

The shift in public attitude regarding these three issues in the last month may be due to Israel’s party and election developments with the rise of the Center Party and the increasing divisions within the right wing parties. These developments may have strengthened the desire to wait for the results of the Israeli elections without the intrusion of violence that might serve the interests of the right wing parties. Furthermore, contradictory Palestinian statements regarding statehood on May 4^th, may have contributed to the relative decline in support for the unilateral declaration.

2. Donor Community Support:

• Donor countries that contribute most to Palestinian economic development are the European Union and its members (25%), Japan (16%), US (14%), and Arab countries (8%)
• About 46% believe that donors’ support has a positive impact on Palestinian economic development while 16% believe that it has a negative impact
• Most important areas of donors’ support are: education (27%) followed by health (26%) and water (17%)
• Least important areas of donors’ support are: women programs (21%) followed by housing (13%), roads (11%), and democracy and human rights (11%)

The results show that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza believe that the European Union and its members contribute most to the development of the Palestinian economy as they have been selected by 25% of the sample. About 16% however, believe that Japan is the one that contributes most, while 14% say that it is the US and 8% say that it is the Arab countries. It is noticeable that a larger percentage in the Gaza Strip selected the EU, while an identical percentage in the West Bank and Gaza selected the US. Within the EU, France has been especially singled out, especially in the Gaza Strip. The EU is singled out more by refugees, refugee camp residents, and the most educated.

The majority of respondents (70%) believe that the donors' support is most important in the three areas of education, health and water. On the other hand, donors’ programs seen as least important were those in the areas of women, housing, security and police, roads, institution building, democracy and human rights, agriculture, and sewage treatment. In the Gaza Strip, interest was highest in the area of health (33%) followed by education (23%), water (10%), sewage treatment (9%), and democracy and human rights (8%). Priorities in the West Bank were similar to those in the Gaza Strip, but education came first (29%) followed by health (21%), water (21%), democracy (6%), and sewage treatment (3%).

Positive evaluation of the impact of the donors’ support on Palestinian economic development reached 46%, while negative evaluation reached 15%. One third of respondents considered the impact to be somewhere in the middle between positive and negative. Positive evaluation was highest in the Jabalia area (58%) and lowest in the Jerusalem and Bethlehem areas (39% and 38% respectively). It decreases also among residents of the refugee camps and the illiterates. It increases slightly among supporters of Fateh (52%) compared to supporters of the PFLP and Hamas (42% and 45% respectively).

Most of these results were predictable. They highlight the particularism of some of the areas such as the Gaza’s relative interest in health more than education and the relatively high interest of Khanyounis in the sewage treatment area which enjoyed the same importance as education. Similarly, Deir al Balah and Rafah have shown high interest in the area of sewage treatment. What was not predictable however, was the lack of interest in water programs in the Gaza Strip despite the very well known concern about water quality and shortage. Similarly, lack of West Bank interest in donors’ support for agriculture is surprising. Little interest in both regions have been shown with regard to donors’ assistance in roads despite the recognition of most experts of the importance of this vital need. Furthermore, the results show little street interest in democracy and human rights issues and demonstrate the relative lack of street interest in women programs and security and police issues. Overall, they reveal the street’s hierarchy of priorities with immediate interest focusing on vital living conditions and the postponement of socio-political concerns for future treatment. On the other hand, it may reveal Palestinian discomfort with donors’ and Western involvement in socio-political questions which they may consider to be outside the realm of foreign intrusion.

3. Domestic Conditions

• 23% believe that their economic conditions today are better than they were during the past three years; but 39% say the opposite and 38% say that they have not changed
• A majority of 56% are optimistic about their economic conditions in the next three years, but 26% are pessimistic
• A majority of 54% believe that corruption exist in the PNA and 58% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future
• Corruption is seen in ministries (79%), police and security services (70%), PLC (47%), and the office of the presidency (37%)
• Only 6% believe that appointments to jobs are possible without wasta (connections) while 59% believe that it is done through wasta to a large extent
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy reaches 36% compared to 64% for Israeli democracy
• 58% believe that people can not criticize the PNA without fear
• 21% say that the situation in the Palestinian areas forces them to seek permanent emigration
• 48% evaluate positively the performance of Palestinian local councils
• 42% support holding local elections immediately while 47% support postponement until after further Israeli redeployment from new Palestinian areas

The results show that people’s perception of their economic situation has shifted slightly to the worse compared to where it was six months ago. While the percentage of those who believe that their economic conditions have remained the same, as it was during the past three years, has not changed, the percentage of those who believe that it was worse went down to 23% compared to 31% in August 1998. In other words, the percentage of those who believe that their economic conditions are better today has dropped compared to where it was few months ago. Those who believe that conditions were better reached 39% in this survey, while those who said that it remained the same reached 3%.

In contrast, expectregarding the future are more optimistic than they were last August. Today, 56% say that they are optimistic about their economic conditions in the next three years compared to 51% six months ago. The level of optimism is relatively high in Ramallah (63%) and low in Jerusalem (50%) and Hebron (47%) as would be expected. Optimism is higher also among the less educated, housewives, farmers and those with the least income. It is lower among the most educated, merchants, specialists, and those with the highest income.

In the political area, street’s positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy increased from 31% to 36% in less than a month. In contrast, the percentage of those who believe that people can not criticize the PNA without fear has increased from 53% to 58% during the same period.

Similarly, the percentage of those who believe that corruption exists in PNA institutions has dropped significantly in one month from 68% to 54%. It is noticeable however, that most of those who changed their views shifted to the categories of “do not know” or “no opinion.”

Despite this change, a large percentage of those who believe in the existence of corruption (79%) still believes that it exists in ministries, while 70% believe that it exists in the security services, 47% believe it exists in the PLC, and 37% believe it exists in the office of the presidency.

The percentage of those who believe that appointment to jobs can not be made without wasta (connections) has increased slightly from 56% six months ago to 59% in this survey.

Under these political and economic conditions, 21% of respondents expressed the desire to emigrate permanently. This percentage is lower than that obtained in August 1998 when it was 26%.

Finally, the results show a limited drop in the positive evaluation of the performance of local councils compared to the situation in April 1997. Today, it reaches 48% compared to 52% in the April 1997 survey. Positive evaluation of performance is higher in the areas of Nablus (64%) and Ramallah (56%) and lower in Jerusalem (23%), Tulkarm (42%), Deir al Balah (43%) and Rafah (45%).

Forty two percent supported the holding of local elections immediately while 47% supported its postponement until after further Israeli redeployment takes place from additional areas in the West Bank. This indicates a drop in support for immediate elections compared to the situation in June 1998 when 48% supported holding the elections immediately while 45% supported postponement. Support for immediate elections is stronger in Bethlehem area (56%) and weaker in the Nablus area (35%) and Gaza City (39%).

Support for immediate elections drops among illiterates (31%) and rises among the holders of BA degrees (56%). Supporters of opposition factions are divided over the issue with higher support for elections among supporters of the PFLP (53%) and relatively lower support among supporters of Hamas (39%). Supporters of Fateh come in the middle with 43% support.

4. Elections for the President and Vice President and Political Affiliation

• Yassir Arafat receives 47% of the vote, Ahmad Yasin 10%, and Haidar Abdul Shafi 9%
• In elections for the vice president: Haidar Abdul Shafi 15%, Sa’eb Erikat 8%, Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Hussieni 7% each, Farouq Qaddoumi and Ahmad Qurai’ 6% each, Mahmud Abbas 4%, and Nabil Sha’ath 3%
• In elections for the vice president between three candidates: Haidar Abdul Shafi 40%, Sa’eb Erikat 26%, and Faisal Hussieni 22%
• Fateh receives 37% of the vote, Hamas 12%, PFLP and Islamic Jihad 3% each, and the non-affiliated 38%

In a race for the presidency, Yassir Arafat’s popularity remained the same at 47% level. Ahmad Yassin received 10% of the vote and Haidar Abdul Shafi received 9%. Arafat’s popularity reached 51% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank.

In the race for the vice presidency, Abdul Shafi received the largest percentage of votes among eight candidates with 15%, followed by Sa’eb Erikat with 8%, Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Hussieni with 7% each, Ahmad Qurai’ and Farouq Qaddoumi with 6% each, Mahmoud Abbas with 4%, and Nabil Sha’ath with 3%. The popularity of four of the candidates is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank with Abdul Shafi receiving 21% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank, Erikat receiving 10% in Gaza compared to 7% in the West Bank, Abbas receiving 8% in Gaza and 3% in the West Bank, and Sha’ath receiving 5% in the Gaza Strip and 1% in the West Bank. The other four received more support in the West Bank with Hussieni receiving 8% (4% in Gaza), Ashrawi receiving 7% (6% in Gaza), Qurai’ receiving 7% (4% in Gaza) and Qaddoumi receiving 6% (4% in Gaza).

In a contest for the vice presidency between three candidates only, Abdul Shafi received the largest percentage of votes (40%) followed by Erikat (26%) and Hussieni (22%). Abdul Shafi has stronger support in Gaza (46%) than in the West Bank (35%). Hussieni is stonger in the West Bank (27%) than in Gaza (15%). But Erikat has equal support in Gaza and the West Bank (26%). Compared to the situation one month ago, Abdul Shafi and Erikat increased their support slightly while Hussieni’s popularity went down slightly.

Support for Fateh went down from 40% one month ago to 37% in this survey. Hamas received 12% support and the PFLP 3%. The Islamists received an overall support of 19% while the nonaffiliated remained as before at 38%.

5. Telephones, Computers, Internet, and Satellite Dishes at Homes

• 42% have phones at homes
• 21% have mobile phones
• 11% have computers at home
• 5% have Internet subscription at home
• 6% have Internet subscription at work
• 30% have satellite dishes at home

The results indicate an increase in the percentage of those who have Internet subscription at work from 2% last June to 6% today. Similarly, the percentage of those who have satellite dishes at home increased from 27% to 30% during the same period. By contrast, a drop has taken place in the percentage of those who have Internet subscription at home from 7% to 5% and in the percentage of those who have computers at home from 12% to 11%.

Phones are available in 42% of the homes and 21% have mobile phones. The percentage of those who have these facilities is generally higher in the West Bank. For example, mobile phones are available to 29% of West Bankers and to 9% of Gazans. More regular phones are available in the West Bank (44%) than in Gaza (38%). But more Internet access is available in Gazan homes (6%) than in homes in the West Bank (5%). Similarly, more satellite dishes are found in Gazan homes (31%) than in homes in the West Bank (29%)....More

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, June 2011

Palestinians are determined to go to the UN in September and not to return to negotiations with Netanyahu, in line with Israelis’ expectations

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem. 

65% of the Palestinians believe they should go to the UN in September to obtain recognition for their state, despite President Obama’s statement that it would be a mistake for them to do so. 65% of Israelis believe the Palestinians will indeed go to the UN. 

61% of the Palestinians think they should not accept President Obama’s call to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government, and 60% of Israelis do not expect them to do so. In light of President Obama’s speech, a majority of 88% of the Palestinians think the US position is closer to Israel, while only 8% think it is closer to the Palestinian position. Israelis are split in their assessment: 42% think the US position is closer to Israel and 40% think it is closer to the Palestinians. 

Majorities on both sides, 57% of Palestinians and 51% of Israelis, believe that if the Palestinians turn to the UN General Assembly for recognition of a Palestinian state, they will succeed to obtain a two thirds majority. Majorities on both sides, 76% of the Palestinians and 65% of the Israelis, also believe that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 

Almost 60% of Israelis think Israel should accept the decision if indeed the UN recognizes a Palestinian state, and either start negotiations with the Palestinians about its implementation or not allow any change on the ground by the Palestinians; 20% believe Israel should oppose the decision and intensify the construction in the settlements; 5% think that Israel should annex to Israel the PA territory; and 6% think Israel should  invade the PA and use force in order to prevent the establishment of  a Palestinian state. 

Palestinians are split in the ways they think they can force Israel to withdraw from the territories, if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state. About a third thinks they can do so through armed attacks on army and settlers, and another third thinks peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw; 26% think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw.

The Palestinian sample size was 1196 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in  127 randomly selected locations between June 16 and 18, 2011. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 604  adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between June 12 and 21, 2011. The margin of error is 4.0%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding Obama and Netanyahu’s recent speeches

• A majority of 50% of Palestinians support President Obama’s call for a Palestinian state within the 1967 lines with territorial swaps; 46% oppose it. A majority of 54% of Israelis opposes this plan and 40% support it.
• With regard to the security issues, Israeli opinion is split, while Palestinians oppose Obama’s proposal that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized, it will have no airplanes, tanks, missiles, or any other heavy armaments, and the Israeli army would carry out a full and phased withdrawal from the Palestinian state. 66% of the Palestinians disagree with this principle, and only 31% support it; 46% of Israelis disagree and 48% agree with it.
• President Obama also said that a permanent peace should be based on the principle of two states for two peoples, the state of Israel as a Jewish state and a homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people, each would have the right to self determination, mutual recognition, and peace. 51% of the Palestinians and 67% of Israelis support this principle, while 47% and 29% respectively oppose it.
• President Obama stated that it would be a mistake for the Palestinians to go to the UN in September to obtain recognition for their state. Despite this statement, 65% of the Palestinians believe they should go to the UN in September and 31% believe they should not go. 65% of Israelis believe the Palestinians will go to the UN, while 24% think they will not go.
• President Obama also called upon the Palestinians to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government, even though Prime Minister Netanyahu declared during his stay in Washington DC that Israel will not freeze settlement construction and refuses to accept the principle of returning to the lines of 1967 with swaps. 61% of the Palestinians think they should not accept the call to return to negotiations, and 60% of Israelis do not expect them to do so.
• In light of President Obama’s speech, a majority of 88% of the Palestinians think the US position is closer to the Israeli position, while only 8% think it is closer to the Palestinian position. Israelis are split in their assessment: 42% think the US position is closer to the Israeli position and 40% think it is closer to the Palestinian position.
• Considering the two speeches by Obama and Netanyahu during Netanyahu's visit to the US, we asked Palestinians whom they think decide what the other should do regarding the peace process. 63% said Israel decides what the US should do and 32% said the US decides what Israel should do. 2% said neither decides what the other should do.

(B) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes and expectations towards September

• Majorities on both sides - 57% of Palestinians and 51% of Israelis - believe that if the Palestinians turn to the UN General Assembly for recognition of a Palestinian state, they will succeed to obtain a two thirds majority. 36% of the Palestinians and 41% of the Israelis believe they will not succeed to obtain this majority.
• Majorities on both sides also believe that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 76% of the Palestinians and 65% of the Israelis think so, while 18% and 22% respectively think that the US will not use its veto power.
• Palestinians are split with regard to the question whether a state of Palestine will become a UN member in September, while a majority of Israelis do not think so. 48% of the Palestinians think this will happen while 44% do not believe so. 34% of the Israelis think this will happen while 57% do not believe so.
• A majority of Israelis (52%) believe that if Palestinians appeal for the recognition of the UN, Israel should take diplomatic measures to prevent such a step; 21% think Israel should support this step, and 13% believe Israel should threaten to annex the Palestinian Authority territories in this case.
• If indeed the UN recognizes a Palestinian state, 30% of the Israelis think Israel should accept the decision and start negotiations with the Palestinians about its implementation; 29% think Israel should accept the decision but not allow any change on the ground by the Palestinians; 20% believe Israel should oppose the decision and intensify the construction in the settlements; 5% think that Israel should annex to Israel the PA territory; 6% of the Israelis think Israel should invade the PA and use force in order to prevent the establishment of  a Palestinian state.
• On the Palestinian side, two thirds believe that if the UN recognizes the state of Palestine, Israel will respond by making the occupation worse and by increasing settlement building while 18% think Israel will do nothing and the status quo will prevail. 13% of the Palestinians think conditions in the occupied territories will become a little better.
• We asked Palestinians how they think Palestinians can force Israel to withdraw from the territories, if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state, and Israelis what they think Palestinians will do. A majority of Israelis (54%) thinks the Palestinians will resume the Intifada including armed confrontations, while 18% think they will start non-violent resistance such as peaceful demonstrations. Palestinians however are split between these two options: 34% think armed attacks on army and settlers, and 32% think peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw. 26% of the Palestinians think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw, and 19% of the Israelis think the Palestinians will resume negotiations with Israel.
• We asked Palestinians what they think the PA should do after the UN recognizes the Palestinian state in September. 76% think the PA president and government should enforce Palestinian sovereignty over all the territories of the West Bank, for example by opening roads in area C, start building an airport in  the Jordan valley, and deploy Palestinian security forces in area C even if this leads to confrontations with the Israeli army and settlers. 20% think the PA should not do that. Similarly, 75% think the PA should insist on assuming control over the Allenby Bridge terminal from the Israeli side even if this leads to the closure of the terminal. 20% think the PA should not do that.
• Majorities on both sides, 58% of the Palestinians and 70% of the Israelis, think that most European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September, while 37% of the Palestinians and 23% of the Israelis think that most European countries will not recognize it.
• A majority of Palestinians (56%) think the position of the EU countries regarding the peace process is closer to the Israeli position, while a majority of Israelis (64%) think it is closer to the Palestinian position. 

 (C) Conflict management, peace initiatives and threat perceptions

• 58% of the Palestinians support the Saudi initiative and 38% oppose it, while 29% of the Israelis support and 61% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our March 2011 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan among both Israelis and Palestinians.
• Palestinians and Israelis have a mirror image perception of the chances that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement they reached. 59% of the Palestinians and 34% of the Israelis believe they will succeed to do so, while 37% of the Palestinians and 59% of the Israelis believe that Fateh and Hamas will not succeed.
• 56% of the Israelis oppose and 39% support talks with the Hamas government if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.
• 45% of the Israelis oppose and 51% support talks with a government of specialists supported by Hamas and Fatah if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.
• Majorities on both sides regard the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years as non-existent or low: 53% on the Israeli side and 62% on the Palestinian side. 29% and 30% respectively regard these chances as medium, and only 14% of Israelis and 6% of Palestinians regard these chances as high.
• Majorities on both sides - 69% of Israelis and 64% of Palestinians - do not think that if a peaceful popular revolt like in Egypt or Tunisia were to erupt against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank it would be capable of ending occupation. Only 19% of Israelis and 34% of Palestinians think it would be capable of ending occupation.
• After the UN recognition of a Palestinian state, if large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in order to break through check points and close army and settlers' roads, 52% of the Palestinians say they think they will participate in them and 46% say they think they will not. A majority of 51% of the Palestinians think that if such large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, they would contribute to speeding the process of ending Israeli occupation.
• Among Palestinians, 70% are worried and 30% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Among Israelis, 59% are worried and 39% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 21% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinians’ aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (37%); 18% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 38% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967.

This is the seventeenth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The following topics are covered in this poll: elections, negotiations, strike, refugee camps, and criticism of the PNA. CPRS has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published for political motives. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. In a broader sense, CPRS strives to promote the status of scientific research in Palestine. SRU disseminates the results of the polls through a number of means, including its community outreach program where the results are shared and discussed with a large number of Palestinians. This poll focused on the Tulkarm refugee camp in an effort to understand the views of the residents concerning the issues and to test the effects of fieldworker appearance on respondent answers. (See Focus on Tulkarm Refugee Camp).

Here are the main findings of this poll:

• -A total of 50% believe that it is possible to criticize the PNA without fear.
• -Palestinian radio is the first choice of West Bank residents, and competes with Israeli radio for first choice in Gaza. Jordanian radio and Monte Carlo radio are competing for third choice.
• -A total of 65% support continuing the negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.
• -Most support abolishing the strike on the ninth of each month or transforming it to a yearly occasion, and only 23% support keeping it as it is.
• -Arafat obtained 55% of the vote and support for Fateh is at 49%.
• -A total of 58% will participate in the elections, if the opposition calls for a boycott.
• -A total of 71% declared themselves ready to elect a qualified woman.
• -Only 28% believe that the general political elections will be fair and 23% believe that they will be somewhat fair.
• -A total of 21.6% want to keep the refugee camps as they are until a final agreement is reached concerning them, while 47.3% support keeping them with improvements in living conditions. Only 25% support transferring residents to new housing projects.

Enclosed are the results of the current public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (see Appendix) and analysis of the results.  

General Background

Among the events preceding this poll was the decision of the Israeli Housing Ministry to confiscate 520 dunams of Palestinian land in Arab Jerusalem to build housing projects, which was the largest land confiscation in East Jerusalem in 15 years. Palestinians, Arab governments, and other governments protested the action on the grounds that it violated international law and the Declaration of Principles since Jerusalem is a final status issue. Palestinians also protested the American stand in the UN concerning the issue. Meanwhile, Palestinian and Israeli talks continued concerning the extension of Palestinian control to the rest of the West Bank. The one-year anniversary of the establishment of the Palestinian Authority was observed during this period. In Sheikh Radwan in the Gaza Strip on April 3, an explosion occurred, killing six people and leading to controversy over the parties responsible. As a result of the explosion, Hamas and Islamic Jihad each carried out an attack on Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip on April 9 and the Palestinian police arrested a number of the supporters of the two factions. The PNA requested that all illegal arms be relinquished by May 12. Military courts were established, resulting in controversy. In Hebron on April 16, three members of Hamas were killed by Israeli military. At the same time, there was talk about the possibility of reconciliation between PNA and Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In this period, a new Palestinian political group was established headed by Hayder Abdel Shafi.

Methodology

The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution. A total of 29 variables and questions are included in this questionnaire. The section on unemployment that was added recently remained in this questionnaire.

Household Sample Selection

SRU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A simple random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists, as shown in Table 1. Fieldworkers and researchers created maps for these localities. These maps indicated the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these localities which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of two hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly...More

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a public opinion poll among Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the period between 27 January and 23 February 2020. The poll sought to explore the reasons that drive Christians to emigrate from their homeland in Palestine to other countries and the various means that could potentially stem the flow. The period during the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the release of Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” and its immediate rejection by the Palestinian leadership. The Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo a few days later and unanimously rejected the plan. A similar rejection followed by representatives of the Islamic countries. Internally, Fatah and Hamas issued conciliatory statements calling for reconciliation, but this was not followed by any concrete measures or efforts to hold Palestinian elections. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, tensions rose significantly during the fieldwork period as popular confrontations developed in various cities and signs of an emerging trade crisis were visible. Total size of the sample is 995 Christian adults interviewed face to face in 98 selected locations in seven Palestinian governorates. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

Summary of Findings:

The findings clearly show that the desire to emigrate is much higher among Palestinian Christians than Palestinian Muslims. Indeed, the percentage among Christians in the West Bank is almost twice as much as that of Muslims. The largest percentage of those wishing to emigrate say that they would like to go to the US, and Canada and Europe placed second and third, respectively. The largest percentage indicate that their desire to emigrate stems from economic reasons, while a smaller percentage indicate a desire to search abroad for educational opportunities, a safer, more stable, and less corrupt place, and a place that allows greater liberties and religious tolerance.

The poll found other reasons for the emigration, some having to do with the conditions of the Israeli occupation and others with the domestic conditions. For example, Christians complain about the impact of occupation measures, such as checkpoints, settlers’ attacks, and land confiscation.

Others complain about the lack of safety and security and a majority believes that the Israeli occupation seeks to expel them from their homeland. Certain domestic conditions are also conducive to a greater demand for emigration. For example, there are complaints and worries about lack of safety, fear of crime and theft, absence of liberties and rule of law, and the spread of corruption. Moreover, there is evidence of worry about the existence of religious Salafist groups in Palestinian society and the presence of armed groups such as Hamas and those that represent political Islam.

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Palestinian Christians indicate that they face no irritation or harassment from their Muslim neighbors, or at schools and workplaces, findings do show that somewhere between a fifth and a quarter complain of hearing swearwords or curses and accusations of blasphemy. Indeed, a very large minority believe that most Muslims do not wish to see them in the country. Similarly, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority indicate that they do not suffer from religious discrimination, findings show that a fifth to a quarter feel discrimination when searching for jobs or when seeking PA services. The overwhelming majority indicate that they feel integrated into Palestinian society. Still, three out of ten do not see themselves integrated or feel hated by the Muslim citizens. About a quarter say that some of their Muslim acquaintances invite them to convert to Islam and seven out of ten say they have, at one time or another, heard a Muslim asserting that Christians will go to hellfire.

Findings also show that Christians, like Muslims, do not trust the Palestinian government or the PA security services and the justice sector. Indeed, the majority tend to have no trust in the Christian religious leaders or civil society organizations. The majority believe that corruption exists in the PA institutions. While the overwhelming majority indicates that the democratic system is the best, only one in ten describe the Palestinian system as democratic. Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Christians believe that one should be careful in his/her dealings with other people while only one in ten believes that it is possible to trust most people.

The poll found more than half of the Christians hope for a political settlement that leads to the creation of a single state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea in which Palestinians and Israelis would have equal rights while three out of 10 prefer a two-state solution. Half of the Christians view the one-state solution as safer than the two-state solution for Palestinian Christians.

The poll also found that one additional reason for the larger Christian emigration is that a large percentage of Palestinian Christians have relatives who have emigrated in the past, and believe that those relatives would help them if they showed interested in emigrating. About half of the sample believe that immigration laws in counties of destination favor Christians. Other external factors, found among two-thirds of the sample, are the regional political developments, which constitute an additional driver pushing people out from Palestine and the entire region.

Finally, when asked about the means of combating the phenomena of Christian emigration, respondents focus on the need for Palestinian policy makers and the leaders of the church to pay more attention to the problem and to develop means to decrease the outflow. Respondents’ suggestions focused on the importance of improving economic conditions, such as creating job opportunities, providing financial assistance to those in need, facilitating greater access to homes and apartments. Other suggestions focused on improving conditions of safety and security, including greater PA capacity to enforce law and order, and promoting values of democracy and tolerance.

Migration Trends Among Palestinians

Official Israeli statistical sources indicate that the total net emigration among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the period between 1967 and 1989 stood at around 300,000, which means 13,000 per year. For the period between 1990 until the end of 1994, while highlighting the return of the PLO and its security forces to these Palestinian territories, Israeli sources indicate a net return of 30,000 Palestinians after subtracting those who emigrated during that period. For the period between 1995 and 2003, the same Israeli sources indicate a net loss of 88,000, an annual average of 11,000 emigrants. Findings of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) pointed out in a survey conducted in 2010 that 33,000 emigrated from the Palestinian Territories during the period between 2005 and 2009, an annual average of 7,000 and that during this same period more than 30,000 immigrants returned home to Palestine. There are no published or credible numbers on the current conditions, but estimates suggest that the annual average of emigration during the past ten years might be more than 10,000. Moreover, the opening of the Rafah Crossing with Egypt in a semi-permanent manner in 2018 might have opened the door, according to unconfirmed reports, of about 24,000 emigrants from the Gaza Strip in that year alone, while Israeli governmental sources believe the number to be 35,000.

Among Palestinian Christians, the historic record indicates that emigration has been greater than that of Palestinian Muslims. With the end of the Ottoman era in Palestine and the beginning of the British Mandate in 1922, Christians constituted 11% of the population of the entire historic Palestine with the number standing at 70,429. In 1946, the percentage declined to 8% as the British Mandate was about to end, despite the fact that the number had increased to 145,063. In 1949, the number of Christians in the West Bank stood at 51,053 and in the Jordanian 1961 census, 45,855. As the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip started in 1967, the percentage of Palestinian Christians in the occupied Palestinian territories stood at 6% with a total number of 42,719. When the first PA census was completed in 1997, three years after the creation of the PA, the number of Palestinian Christians stood at 40,055, constituting 1.5% of the total Palestinian population. The second PA census in 2007 indicated a slight increase in the number, now standing at 42,565 but constituting only 1.2% of the population. In 2017, the third census showed 46,850 Christian citizens making up only 1% of the population.

The decline in the Christian population has been attributed first and foremost to emigration, particularly among the youth. But other factors have also contributed to this development. For example, population growth has been slower among the Christians compared to Palestinian Muslims. Higher age of marriage among Christians has been another factor. The Palestinian Arab Barometer poll, conducted at the end of 2018, found that 39% of the Christian population in Palestine was over the age of 50, compared to only 21% among the Muslims.

The decline in the Christian population during the past 100 years is evident in the makeup of some of the main Palestinian cities that have traditionally been Christian. For example, the Christian population of Bethlehem declined from 84% in 1922 to only 28% in 2007; in Beit Jala from 99% to 61% and in Beit Sahour from 81% to 65% during the same period.

The Demographic Characteristics of the Christian Poll Sample

PSR selected a sample of 995 Christians from all West Bank and Gaza Strip governorates with a Christian population. The numbers were distributed based on the number of Christians in each governorate with the exception of the Gaza Strip in which 100 people were added and the sample size was reweighted to reflect the proportionate size of Christians in that area. Moreover, 20 Gazan residents presently residing in the West Bank were selected randomly from a list of 100 provided by a Christian source familiar with status of those Gazans. The total number of Christians in the various governorates was obtained from PCBS census data. But PCBS did not provide data on the number of Christians in the various locations in each governorate and therefore fieldwork was conducted in order to assess the distribution in each governorate. Some areas, with a very small number of Christians, were excluded from the sample. With the assistance of local councils and churches, estimates of numbers were made in the various locations. These were cross tabulated with PCBS data to ensure harmony. Maps were developed for all of the locations that were selected, and were drawn and subdivided based on the number of homes in each location. PSR selected 98 locations, and 10 adult Christians were interviewed in each of the selected locations. Using Kish table, one individual was selected in each home. The interviews were conducted face to face by data collectors that were trained for that particular purpose. One focus group was organized by PSR with more than a dozen Christian participants before the conduct of the fieldwork in order to assess the utility of the questionnaire and to gain insights into the best means of gaining the trust of Palestinian Christians and reducing their concerns about the planned survey. The team of data collectors was formed mostly from Christian fieldworkers and each team consisted of two members under the direct supervision of a field coordinator. Data collectors were instructed not to reveal their religion to the respondents by any means including appearance. Interviews were conducted face-to-face using tablets in all cases with the exception of 15 interviews that were conducted over the phone among Gazans residing in the West Bank.

The distribution of the sample in the West Bank stood at 88% of the total, 10% in the Gaza Strip, and 2% were Gazans residing in the West Bank. Bethlehem had the largest percentage of interviews (42%) followed by Ramallah (24%), Jerusalem (15%), Gaza (12%), Jenin (5%), and Nablus and Jericho (1% each). Males constituted 50% and females 50%. Age distribution shows that the biggest group (64%) came from those whose age is over 40 years, followed by those between the ages of 18 and 29 years (19%) and those between 30 and 39 years (17%). The percentage of illiterates stood at 3%, those who completed elementary school (6%), preparatory education (9%), secondary education (33%), two-year college (19%), BA degree (25%), and MA and higher (5%). The percentage of the married respondents stood at 65%, the unmarried 24%, and widowed or divorced 10%. Those who worked in PA institutions represented only 3% of the sample, Church institutions 7%, private sector 29%, NGOs 6%, Israeli institutions 3%, housewives 25%, unemployed 9%, retirees 7%, and students 5%.

Data collectors and their impressions: The team of data collectors included 17 fieldworkers, most females, of whom 15 were Christians and were distributed as follows: 2 in the Gaza Strip, 3 in the northern West Bank, 6 in the south, and 6 in the middle of the West Bank.[1]

Detailed Findings

Joint Israeli- Palestinian Public Opinion Poll 

Skeptical Israelis and Palestinians are Split Half in Support for a Final Status Package along the Clinton Parameters 

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between December 11 and 19, 2007. 

The joint poll examined Israelis and Palestinians’ assessments of the Annapolis conference and their expectations regarding its outcomes. 

The findings indicate considerable disappointment with the Annapolis conference. There is much skepticism both among Israelis and among Palestinians regarding their leaders’ ability to implement their commitments and to stand by their declared time frame. 

The joint poll further examined Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding a permanent settlement along the lines of President Clinton’s package for a Palestinian-Israeli final status settlement and the Geneva Initiative against the backdrop of the resumption of the political process by the Palestinian and Israeli governments. 

The results document overall stability among Palestinians and a decline in support for that permanent status package and its parameters among Israelis since 2005.. Despite the declining trend among Israelis there is still a majority of 53% who support these parameters as a combined overall package. Among Palestinians, 47% support the package now (see summary table below). 

Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 11 and 16, 2007. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 564 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between December 11 and 19, 2007. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) The Annapolis Conference 

• Only 16% of the Israelis and 11% of the Palestinians deem the Annapolis conference a success in pushing the peace process forward, while 74% and 59% respectively see it as a failure.
• Both sides’ expectations with regard to the conference potential to moderate the conflict are rather low. 3% of the Israelis and 18% of the Palestinians believe that in the aftermath of Annapolis, negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop, 39% of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians expect negotiations to resume but some armed attacks will continue, 55% of the Israelis and 32% of the Palestinians believe that confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
• Both publics are also skeptical about their leaders’ ability to implement the commitments they made in the conference’s joint statement. In the statement both leaders stated that the two sides will seek to conclude the permanent status negotiations before the end of 2008. However only 23% of the Palestinians and 8% of the Israelis believe they will indeed succeed in achieving that in the period indicated. 72% and 89% respectively believe they will not succeed.
• In the joint statement, the two leaders also commit to immediately implement their respective obligations under the Quartet’s Roadmap, however only 18% of the Palestinians and 21% of the Israelis believe that the other side’s leadership will indeed implement their roadmap obligations while 79% and 77% respectively do not believe these obligations will be implemented. On the other hand 67% of the Palestinians and 59% of the Israelis think that their own leadership will implement these obligations if the other side implements them.

(B) Clinton/Geneva Parameters  

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials seven years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues several times in the past since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the Annapolis conference and the resumption of the peace talks between the parties. The findings indicate stability in support of the overall package among Israelis compared to 2006, with a slight majority supporting the package (53%). This is a significant decline from close to two thirds support in December 2004 and December 2005. Among Palestinians there is similar stability in the level of support since December 2005, with a minority of 47% supporting the overall package. Since we have been tracking these issues in 2003, there was only once majority support for this package on both sides, in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat which was followed by a surge of optimism and considerable moderation in both publics. Among Israelis there is consistent majority support for the Clinton package since 2004, but this majority has been shrinking. Palestinian support for this permanent status framework package seems to have been affected more by the disengagement and the disappointment from it, than by Hamas' rise to power. Israeli support only fell following the Palestinian political turnabout, and does not seem to have been affected by the disengagement. Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange 

Among Palestinians 56% support or strongly support and 42% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2006, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 61% and opposition at 37%. 

Among Israelis 46% support and 50% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel.Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2006, 44% of the Israelis supported this component while 54% opposed it.

(2) Refugees 

Among Palestinians, 39% support and 57% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries likeAustralia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2006, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 54% opposed it. 

Among Israelis 44% support such an arrangement and 52% oppose it. In December 2006 38% supported it and 60% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem 

In the Palestinian public 36% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2006, an identical compromise obtained 39% support and 59% opposition. 

Among Israelis, 36% agree and 63% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2006, 38% supported this arrangement and 60% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State 

Among Palestinians 23% support and 76% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2006 28% support, and opposition reached 70%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement. 

Among Israelis 61% support and 38% oppose this arrangement compared to similar levels of 62% support and 36% opposition obtained in December 2006.

(5) Security Arrangements 

In the Palestinian public 51% support and 47% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2006, 42% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 55% opposed it. 

In the Israeli public 53% support and 44% oppose this arrangement compared to 51% who supported it and 47% who opposed it in December 2006.

(6) End of Conflict 

In the Palestinian public 66% support and 32% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2006 the support of 62% and the opposition of 34%. 

In the Israeli public 67% support and 30% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2006, 68% of the Israelis supported it while 30% opposed it. 

The Whole Package 

Among Palestinians 47% support and 49% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. This level of support is similar to that obtained in December 2006, when 48% supported and 49% opposed such a package.

This stability in the level of support for the package among Palestinians deserves attention given the official and publicly endorsed Hamas position toward a permanent peace agreement with Israel. In this regard it is also important to stress the four percentage point increase in the “end of conflict” component which stands in open contradiction to Hamas refusal to such a clause and its willingness to grant Israel only a long-range Hudna. 

Among Israelis 53% support and 43% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2006, 52% supported and 46% opposed such a package. 

It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people’s calculus is compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the undesirable parts. 

37% of the Israelis estimate that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package. 51% believe that the majority opposes it. These perceptions tap the normative facet of public opinion and indicate that despite the consistent support in the package over time, it has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 45% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 46% believe that the majority opposes it. In addition a majority among Palestinians incorrectly assumes that the majority of Israelis opposes the package while Israelis accurately estimate that a Palestinian majority opposes the parameters. 

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement Framework  (2003-2007)

(C) Other Conflict and Conflict Resolution Issues 

• 66% of the Israelis support negotiations between Israel and Abu Mazin over a final status settlement. Despite these levels of support only 41% of the Israelis believe that it is possible and 57% think it is impossible to reach nowadays a compromise settlement between Abu Mazin and Olmert. Among Palestinians 32% believe that it is possible and 63% think it is impossible these days to reach a permanent status agreement with Olmerts’ government.
• 58% of the Israelis support negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement.
• Even when a Hamas-led government is concerned, 46% of the Israelis support and 52% oppose talks with it if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.
• 65% of the Israelis and 49% among Palestinians agree with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict, there would be mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. 32% and 49% respectively disagree to this step. This is the first time since June 2003 that this step fails to obtain majority support among Palestinians. Presumably this is a reaction to the Palestinian leaders’ public statements against the recognition of Israel’s Jewish identity which came in response to Israelis’ attempts to raise this issue as a precondition to the resumption of the peace talks. 43% of the Palestinians and 52% of the Israelis believe that a majority of their domestic public supports such a proposal, and 48% and 34% respectively think the majority opposes it.
• 52% of the Israelis estimate that a Palestinian majority opposes this step, and 35% believe that a majority supports it. Among Palestinians, 48% incorrectly believe that the Israeli majority opposes this step, and 40% think the majority supports it.
• 69% of the Palestinians and 74% of the Israelis will support the efforts to reach full reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinian state if a peace agreement is reached, and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel.
• If the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues, 30% of the Israelis think that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there, 40% think Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out, and 25% believe Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps.

These are the results of opinion poll # 47, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 24-26 February 2000. The poll deals with the peace process, Donors' support, domestic conditions, elections for the President and vice president and political affiliation, and home and mobile phones, computers and Internet, and satellite and TV stations. The total sample size of this poll is 1318 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 823 in the West Bank and 495 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

1. The Peace Process

• 70% support the current peace process and 26% oppose it
• Support for armed attacks against Israeli targets decreases from 43% to 39% and opposition to violence increases to 53%
• Only 31% believe that it is possible to reach a mutually acceptable permanent settlement to all final status negotiations
• Level of confidence in Barak's government continues to drop to reach 14%
• 49% support the establishment of a Palestinian state in September 2000 even without an agreement with Israel, while 37% prefer to wait until a mutual Israeli-Palestinian agreement is reached

The results indicate that support for the current Palestinian-Israeli peace process remains high at 70%, with a drop of 3 percentage points compared to the results of January 2000. Support for the peace process stood at 75% three months ago. On the other hand, support for violence has dropped from 43% last January to 39% in this poll. Support for violence stood at 36% three months ago. In this poll, opposition to violence has increased to 53%.

Confidence in Barak's government continue to deteriorate dropping from 16% to 14%. This percentage stood at 18% three months ago and at 29% last July. Similarly, the percentage of those who believe in the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable settlement to all final status issues dropped from 35% last September to 31% today.

These developments may explain the rise in public support for the unilateral establishment of a Palestinian state at the termination of the interim period in September 2000 from 43% last April to 49% in this poll. The percentage of those who support the postponement of such a declaration until an agreement is reached with Israel reached 37% in this poll compared to 48% in April 1999. Support for the unilateral establishment of the state increases in the areas of Khan Younis (60%) and Bethlehem (56%) compared to the area of Jerusalem, among men (53%) compared to women (45%), among holders of BA degree (50%) compared to illiterates (46%), among students (56%) compared to housewives (44%) and the unemployed (43%), among those with the highest income (57%) compared to those with the lowest income (50%), and among supporters of Fateh (56%) and Hamas (55%) compared to those who are not affiliated with any known factions or groups (41%).

2.Donors' Support:

• The European Community and its member states are seen by most Palestinians as the most contributing to the development of the Palestinian economy in the views of 25%, followed by Japan (13%), the US (11%), International Organizations (10%), and Arab Countries (8%)
• 46% see positive impact for donors' support on Palestinian conditions while 17% see a negative impact
• Most important areas of donors' support in Palestinian eyes are education (26%), health (20%), and water (16%)
• Least important areas of donors' support are women programs, police and security, roads, democracy programs, and institution building

The EU and its member states are seen by more Palestinians (25% in this poll compared to 23% last September) as contributing the most to the Palestinian economy. The second most contributing donor is Japan (13% compared to 15% last September) followed by the US (11% compared to 10% last September).

About 17% of the respondents view donors' support negatively, while 46% believe that it has a positive impact on Palestinian conditions. These results may indicate an improvement in donors' perception among Palestinians as only 42% viewed it positively last September.

The results show that most Palestinians believe that the most important donors' support is the one invested in areas of education, health and water (26%, 20%, and 16% respectively). Areas of least importance to Palestinians are those related to women programs, police and security, roads, democracy, and institution building. No significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza have been detected except in the areas of health, viewed as being important by more Gazans (23%) than West Bankers (17%), and sewage, viewed as being important by more Gazans (9%) than West Bankers (3%).

These results are similar to those obtained last September and early 1999. The priorities are still the same, focusing on major traditional developmental needs, with less interest in socio-political issues such as those related to women and democracy.

3. Domestic Conditions:

• 43% describe their conditions during the past three years as being better than now and 25% describe them as worse than now
• A majority of 56% is optimistic about its future economic conditions during the next three years while 27% are pessimistic
• 26% say that current Palestinian conditions force them to consider permanent emigration
• 60% believe that corruption exits in PA institutions and 33% believe it exists in NGOs
• Among those who believe in the existence of corruption in PA institutions, 64% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future, and 81% believe that it exists in ministries, 73% in police and security services, 53% in the PLC, and 43% in the office of the presidency
• 86% believe that wasta (personal and family connection) is essential for obtaining employment
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy stands at 28% compared to 68% for Israel, 55% for the US, 46% for France, 28% for Jordan, and 25% for Egypt
• 62% believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear
• About one third of the respondents (31%) describes their economic conditions during the past three years as being unchanged, while 43% believe

About one third of the respondents (31%) describes its economic condition during the past three years as being unchanged, while 43% believe that it was better than now. Only 25% describe their economic condition during the past three years as being worse than it is today. In other words, about 74% of the respondents do not see improvement in their economic conditions with the passage of time. Despite this, more than half of the respondents (56%) are optimistic about its future economic condition while the percentage of pessimists does not exceed 27%. Although this percentage is almost identical with the percentage of those who are considering permanent emigration (26%), many optimists (22% of all optimists) are also considering emigration. This result indicates that the desire for emigration is not motivated by economic consideration alone. The desire to emigrate is stronger in the Gaza Strip (29%) than in the West Bank (24%).

The results show that 60% of the respondents (compared to 63% last January) believe that corruption exists in PA institutions. A drop has also occurred in the percentage of those who believe that corruption exists in Palestinian NGOs during the same period from 41% to 33%. But the percentage of those who believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future remained unchanged at 64%. Among those who believe that corruption exists in PA institutions, 81% see it in ministries, 73% in police and security services, 53% in the PLC, and 43% in the office.

The most troubling finding is the continued existence of a consensus among respondents that wasta (personal and family connection) is essential, in one way or another, for obtaining employment. Only 8% believe that wasta is not needed, while 64% believe that it is needed to a large extent and 22% believe that it is needed to some extent. It is worth mentioning that the belief that wasta is needed to a large extent increases especially in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (57%), while the belief that no wasta is needed is almost absent in the Gaza Strip (2%) compared to the West Bank (11%).

Perception of the status of Palestinian democracy has not changed much since the beginning of the year, standing today at 28% (compared to 31% in January). The belief that people can not criticize the PA without fear remained also unchanged during the same period standing today at 62% (compared to 63% in January)

4. Elections for the President, and vice-President and Political Affiliation

• In elections for the presidency, Yassir Arafat receives 47% of the vote, Haidar Abdul Shafi 9%, and Ahmad Yasin 10%
• In elections for the vice-presidency among eight candidates, Abdul Shafi receives the largest percentage (15%) followed by Sa'eb Erikat (7%), Faisal al Husseini (6%), Ahmad Qurie', Mahmud Abbas, and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), Farouq al Qaddumi (4%), and Nabil Sha'ath (3%).
• In elections for the vice-presidency among four candidates only, Abdul Shafi receives the largest percentage (38%) followed by al Husseini (20%), and Ahmad Qurie' and Mahmud Abbas (14% each)
• Fateh receives the support of 36%, Hamas 10%, PFLP 4%, and the non-affiliated 41%

The results indicate that no change has taken place in the popularity of Yassir Arafat compared to the situation last January, standing today at 47%. The popularity of Haidar Abdul Shafi remains also stable at 9% and Ahmad Yasin at 10%. As in previous surveys, Arafat's popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) and decreases in the West Bank (42%). Abdul Shafi's popularity increases also in the Gaza Strip (12%) and decreases in the West Bank (7%). Conversely, Ahmad Yassin's popularity increases in the West Bank (12%) and decreases in the Gaza Strip (7%).

In a competition for the vice-presidency among eight candidates, Abdul Shafi receives the largest percentage of votes (15%) followed by Sa'eb Erikat (7%), Faisal al Husseini (6%), Ahmad Qurie', Mahmud Abbas, and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), Farouq Qaddumi (4%), and Nabil Sha'ath (3%). Abdul Shafi's popularity increases as usual in the Gaza Strip (24%) and decreases in the West Bank (10%).

In a competition for the office of the vice-presidency among four candidates only, Abdul Shafi receives the largest percentage of votes (38%) followed by al Husseini (20%), and Ahmad Qurie' and Mahmud Abbas (14% each). In this competition, Abdul Shafi remains the most popular in the West Bank, followed by al Husseini (26%), Ahmad Qurie' (16%) and Mahmud Abbas (14%).

Fateh's popularity stands today at 36% with a drop of two percentage points from the January 2000 poll. Hamas popularity remains stable at 10%, while Islamic Jihad stands at 3% and the PFLP at 4%.

5. Home and Mobile Phones, Computers and Internet, and Satellites and TV Stations

• Home phone ownership continues to increase from 45% last September to 52% today, and mobile phones from 29% to 39%
• Satellite dish ownership continues to increase from 38% last September to 44% today
• Al Jazeera satellite TV station is watched by 47% of dish owners, followed by MBC TV (17%), Egyptian TV (11%), ART TV (7%), and LBC TV (5%)
• Home computer ownership stands at 13%, home internet subscription at 6%, and office internet subscription at 5%

The results show an increase in the percentage of home phone ownership from 45% last September to 52% in this poll. Home phone ownership stood at 42% in January 1999. Home phones are found mostly in cities (59%) compared to refugee camps (45%) and villages and towns (49%).

Similarly, the results show continued increase in the percentage of mobile phone ownership from 29% last September to 40% in this poll. Mobile phone ownership stood at 21% in January 1999. The percentage of mobile phone ownership increases in the West Bank (50%) compared to the Gaza Strip (24%). This may be due to the difficulties in obtaining home phones in some rural areas of the West Bank thereby forcing people to rely on mobile phones instead. This can be seen in the increased percentage of mobile phone ownership in villages and towns (47%) compared to cities (34%) and refugee camps (30%).

An increase in the percentage of satellite dish ownership has also been recorded in this poll from 38% last September to 44% now. Twenty months ago, this percentage stood at 27%. Dish ownership increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in refugee camps (51%) and cities (49%) compared to villages and towns (39%), and among those with the highest income (67%) compared to those with the lowest income (33%).

Al Jazeera TV is the most watched station among the owners of dishes with 47% viewership (compared to 51% last September) followed by MBC TV (17% compared to 6% last September), Egypt TV (11%, same as last September), ART TV (7% compared to 9 last September), and finally, LBC TV (5% compared to 4% last September).

Home computer ownership remained stable at 13% (compared to 12% last September), while home internet subscription dropped from 14% last September to 6% in this poll. Office internet subscription remained stable at 5%. More