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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 7 and 10 December 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a decision by the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, to form a high judicial council under his chairmanship, a new reconciliation agreement reached in Algeria by Palestinian factions, and media outlets reporting various cases of drowning of Palestinian emigrants in the Mediterranean Sea. On the Israeli side, after winning the November parliamentary elections, the Likud and other right wing and extreme right-wing groups agreed to form a governing coalition under Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, a UN agency adopted a decision to seek the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the Israeli occupation. Moreover, various armed groups resisting the Israeli occupation in the northern parts of the West Bank, such as the “Lions’ Den,” which received a wide press coverage, went public during this period. In Qatar, the World Cup football games started and were widely followed by the Palestinians due to a considerable expression of support for and solidarity with Palestine by the fans attending the games.

This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The findings of the last quarter of 2022 point to a limited change in the domestic balance of power favoring Hamas and centering in the West Bank. Moreover, the popularity of president Abbas drops several percentage points, mostly in the West Bank. In other domestic issues, findings indicate that only one quarter of the public thinks that the factional agreement in Algeria will lead to actual reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the level of pessimism about the prospects for reunification exceeds 70%. Findings also show that the public views negatively Abbas’ decree forming a high council for the judiciary under his chairmanship as only one in five Palestinians think it aims to strengthen the judiciary while a vast majority of more than 70% think it aims at weakening the independence of the judiciary.

The findings of the current quarter also indicate a significant decline in the level of support for the two-state solution accompanied by a significant rise in the percentage of those who think this solution is no longer feasible or possible due to settlement expansion. This change is not accompanied by an increase in the percentage of those who support the one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights. To the contrary, support in the current quarter for this one-state solution has also dropped. These findings point to the possibility that the change in attitudes toward the political settlement with Israel reflects a hardening of public attitudes signifying less willingness to compromise. This hardening of attitudes can also be seen in the significant rise in support, in the West Bank, for a return to armed intifada. Furthermore, findings show a significant decrease, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in the percentage of those who view positively Israeli-Palestinian confidence building measures. On top of that, more than 70% of the public support the idea of forming armed groups, such as the “Lions’ Den,” and only one in ten says the PA has the right to arrest members of these groups or disarm them.

These findings come in a context of three major political and security-related developments, during the current quarter, that might have shaped Palestinian public attitudes, particularly in the West Bank:

• Perhaps the single most important development has been the escalating military clashes between Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli army in the northern part of the West Bank. The number of armed clashes and Israeli military incursions and the number of Palestinian casualties have been unprecedented since the end of the second intifada. This particular development sheds light on the fact that the most significant changes in our findings are centered in the West Bank.
• The results of the Israeli elections and the start of negotiations to form a right-wing coalition government, between the Likud, the religious parties, and the extreme right wing in Israeli politics, might have contributed to the increase in the percentage of those who think the two-state solution is no longer practical or possible. This same development might have also contributed to the rise in the belief that armed struggle, not negotiations, is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation. Indeed, the findings indicate that a large Palestinian majority expects the worse from the upcoming Israeli government including high expectation that it will change the status quo in holy places in al Haram al Sharif in East Jerusalem, expel Palestinian families from their homes in East Jerusalem, transfer Bedouin residents, such as Arab al Jahalin, from their villages and encampments in the southeastern parts of Jerusalem to other locations, and annex settlements or the Jordan Valley to Israel.
• Finally, it is clear from the findings that the pro-Palestine scenes at the World Cup in Qatar have contributed to a restoration of the confidence of the Palestinians in the justice of their cause and their right to resist the occupation by all legitimate means. The vast majority of the Palestinians say they have now regained much, or some, of the lost confidence in the Arab peoples in light of the solidarity with Palestine expressed by the fans during the football games. The findings show strong association between the restoration of trust and attitudes regarding the two-state solution and the return to an armed intifada. 

(1) “Lions’ Den” and other armed groups:

• 72% support the formation of armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den”
• 79% stand against the surrender of the members of the armed groups or their arms to the PA
• 87% say the PA does not have the right to arrest members of the armed groups
• 59% expect the armed groups to spread to other areas in the West Bank 

A majority of 72% of the public says they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 22% are against that.  Support for the formation of armed groups is higher in the Gaza Strip (84%) than in the West Bank (65%), in refugee camps and cities (76% and 73% respectively) compared to villages/towns (70%), among women (74%) compared to men (70%), among those whose age is between 18 and 29 (75) compared to those whose age is 30 or above (72%), among refugees (78%) compared to non refugees (68%), among students and professionals (77% and 75% respectively), compared to merchants and employees (60% and 69% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (71%) compared to those who work in the pubic sector (65%), among the religious (77%) compared to the somewhat religious (68%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (87% and 78% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (66%).

Nonetheless, 59% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 39% are not worried. Despite this, 79% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 17% say they are for it. Similarly, the vast majority (87%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 10% say they favor it.

A majority of 59% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 15% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 14% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups.

(2) The formation of a new Israeli government of right wing and extreme right

• 61% expect the policies of the upcoming Israeli government led by Netanyahu to be more extreme than the previous one
• 58% expect the new Israeli government to change the status quo at al Haram al Sharif; 64% expect it to expel Palestinian families in al Sheikh Jarrah; 68% expect it to transfer Arab al Jahalin community; and 69% expect it to annex it to annex Israeli settlements or the Jordan Valley
• 67% are less optimistic today about the prospects for an improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations 

A majority of 61% expects the policies of the upcoming Israeli government, that is currently being formed under the leadership of Netanyahu from the right wing and the extreme right, to be more extreme and aggressive while 30% expect them to be similar to the current policies; 4% expect them to be less extreme.  For example, a majority of 58% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to change the status quo in al Haram al Sharif in East Jerusalem by allowing Jews to pray at the site; 38% do not expect that. Similarly, a majority of 64% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to expel Palestinian families from al Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem; 33% do not expect that. Moreover, a majority of 68% expects the new Israeli government under Netanyahu to transfer the Palestinian Bedouin community currently living in the area between Jerusalem and Jericho, such as Arab al Jahalin, in order to build a big settlement to the east of Abu Din and al Ezariyya; 28% do not expect that. Also, a majority of 69% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to annex settlements or the Jordan Valley to Israel; 27% do not expect that.

A majority of 67% is less optimistic about the prospects of an improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations, such as reaching new agreements on confidence building measures or reducing the expansion of the settlements during next year; 12% say they are more optimistic today; and 20% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.   

(3) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 69% support holding general elections now, but 63% do not expect elections to take place anytime soon
• In a competition between president Abbas and Hamas’ Ismael Haniyyeh, the latter wins by 54% and the former receives 36% of the vote; but Marwan Barghouti, from Fatah, defeats Haniyyeh 61% to 34%
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23%; and 75% demand his resignation
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah and Hamas receive equal percentage of popular vote, 34% each 

A majority of 69% supports the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 29% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 63% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 36% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 53% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 60%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 36% and Haniyeh 46%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 62% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 31% and the latter 60%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (39%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), Mohammad Shtayyeh, Khalid Mish’al and Hussein al Sheikh (3% each), and 22% said they do not know or have not decided.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 74%. Moreover, a vast majority of 75% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 20% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 73% in the West Bank and 79% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 65% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 34% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 44% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 21% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 38% three months ago).

28% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 25% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 40% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 27% selected Hamas, 26% Fatah under Abbas, and 42% said neither side deserves such a role.

(4) Domestic conditions, the “assassination” of Yasir Arafat, independence of the Judiciary, and those responsible for the drowning of Palestinian emigrants:

• 64% believe that a Palestinian actor played a role in the death of Yasser Arafat, either alone (14%) or in cooperation with Israel (50%)
• 72% think the decree by president Abbas to form a high judiciary committee under his chairmanship aims at weakening the independence of the judiciary
• 27% blame Hamas for the drowning of Gazan illegal emigrants; 24% blame Israel; and 18% blame the PA
• 24% say they want to emigrate; 30% in the Gaza Strip and 20% in the West Bank
• 81% think there is corruption in PA institutions; 69% think there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas
• 59% think the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people
• 72% are pessimistic about the prospects for reconciliation
• The vast majority does not expect the Shtayyeh’s government to succeed in holding general elections, delivering reconciliation, or improving economic conditions 

In light of the leaks in the media regarding the investigation into the death of Yasir Arafat, 50% of the public believe a Palestinian party or actor had implemented the plot to get rid of Arafat but that the planning had been done by Israel; 24% think no Palestinian actor or party had been involved in the death of Arafat; and 14% think a Palestinian party or actor had plotted and implemented the killing of Arafat. The belief that a Palestinian actor implemented an Israel plot to get rid of Arafat is higher in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), in villages and refugee camps (55% and 52% respectively) compared to cities (49%), among men (52%) compared to women (48%), among those whose age is 30 and above (52%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 (42%), among holders of BA degree (51%) compared to the illiterates (33%), among farmers and merchants (70% and 68% respectively) compared to laborers and students (44% and 47% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (60% and 54% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (39%).

A large majority of 72% thinks the decree issued by president Abbas to form a high judiciary council under his chairmanship was meant to weaken the independence of the judiciary; 19% think it was meant to strengthen it. The percentage of those who think the decree aims at weakening the independence of the judiciary is higher in villages/towns and cities (75% and 72% respectively) compared to refugee camps (68%), among men (75%) compared to women (68%), among holders of BA degree (76%) compared to the illiterates (31%), among merchants, employees, and professionals (89%, 82%, and 80% respectively) compared to housewives and laborers (64% each), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (86% and 88% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (49%).

We asked the public about the party indirectly responsible for the drowning in the Mediterranean Sea of Palestinian emigrants from the Gaza Strip while attempting to illegally reach Europe. The largest percentage (27%) puts the responsibility on Hamas, 24% on Israel, 18% on the PA, another 18% blame the emigrants themselves, and 3% blame Egypt. The percentage of those putting the blame on Hamas is higher in the Gaza Strip (31%) than in the West Bank (25%), in refugee camps (33%) compared to villages/towns and cities (24% and 27% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (28%) compared to those who work in the public sector (19%), among the unmarried (35%) compared to the married (26%), among those with the least income (33%) compared to those with the highest income (23%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 29% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (3%).

24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 30% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 29% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 77% and in the West Bank at 46%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 86% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 73% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

A large minority of 46% of West Bankers thinks people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 51% think they cannot. In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 57% viewed the PA as a burden and 38% viewed it as an asset.

Only 26% are optimistic and 72% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 25%. When asked about the prospects for the implementation of the agreement reached in factional meetings sponsored by Algeria, only 26% expressed the belief that the agreement would lead to actual reconciliation while 67% expressed the belief that it will not lead to reconciliation.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 78% expect failure; only 18% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 20% of the public expect success and 76% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 79% expects failure and 17% expects success.

We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 31%, followed by Palestine TV (13%), al Aqsa TV (11%), Palestine Today TV (9%), Maan TV (6%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Mayadeen (2%).

(5) Palestinian-Israeli Relations, the Peace process, and the decision to go to ICJ:

• Support for the two-state solution drops from 37% to 32% and 69% think this solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion
• 26% favor a one-state solution with equal rights; 71% are opposed to that solution
• A majority of 55% support the return to an armed intifada
• A majority of 51% believe armed action is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation
• Half of the public believes that going to the International Court of Justice will not benefit the Palestinian people 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 32% and opposition stands at 66%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 37%.  A majority of 69% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 28% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 64% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 26% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 71% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 30%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 59% supported joining more international organizations; 51% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 48% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 46% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.  Support for the return to an armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (61%) than in the West Bank (51%), in refugee camps (58%) compared to villages/towns and cities (50% and 55% respectively), among men (58%) compared to women (52%), and among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (50% and 40% respectively).  

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 51% chose armed struggle, 21% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 41% chose armed struggle and 30% chose negotiations.   The belief that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation is higher in the Gaza Strip (53%) than in the West Bank (50%), in refugee camps and cities (53% each) compared to villages/towns (42%), among men (56%) compared to women (47%) among holders of BA degree (61%) compared to illiterates (48%), and among supporters of Hamas (76%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (50% and 36% respectively).  

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 57% said it looks positively, while 38% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 69% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.

When asked about PA negotiations with the upcoming Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu, 47% said they opposed such negotiations while 25% said they support negotiations with him on a peace agreement and confidence building measures while 11% said they support negotiations if restricted to a peace agreement and 12% said they support negotiations with him if restricted to confidence building measures. In other words, a total of 36% are in favor of negotiations with Netanyahu about a peace agreement and 37% are in favor of negotiations with him about confidence building measures.  

In light of the decision by a UN agency to go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to ask for its consultative opinion on the legality of the Israeli occupation, half of the public (50%) say the decision and any opinion by the ICJ will have no benefits for the Palestinian people; 28% say the benefit will be symbolic but will have no impact on Israeli policies; 16% say the decision will have an impact on constraining Israeli policies on matters such as settlement construction. The belief that going to the ICJ will not be beneficial is higher in the West Bank (56%) than in the Gaza Strip (40%), among men (54%) compared to women (46%), among holders of BA degree (49%) compared to the illiterates (28%), among those who work in the private sector (54%) compared to those who work in the public sector (44%), and among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (42% and 40% respectively). 

(6) World Cup in Qatar:

• Two thirds say they have regained the lost trust in the Arab masses after seeing the solidarity with Palestine during the World Cup
• 68% think the international standing of Qatar has improved as a result of its effective organization of the World Cup 

Two thirds of the public say that they, now after having seen the scenes of solidarity and support for Palestine in the World Cup in Qatar, have regained much of the trust in the Arab peoples after many disappointments stemming from the Arab normalization with Israel; 21% say they have regained some of that trust; 5% say their trust in the Arab peoples has remained small; and 4% say they have no trust at all in the Arab World.

In light of the Qatari organization of the World Cup, 68% of the Palestinians say they think Qatar’s international standing has improved a lot compared to where it was before; 17% say it has improved somewhat; 8% say Qatar’s standing has not changed; and 1% say it has worsened.

We asked the public about its predictions for the winner in the World Cup. When the number of remaining country teams was eight, 48% said it expected Morocco to win; when the number of country teams went down to six, 54% expected Morocco to win. By contrast, 22% expect Argentina to win; and 15% expect France to win.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 39% say the most vital goal of the Palestinians should be the ending of Israeli occupation
• 25% say the spread of corruption is the main problem confronting Palestinian society today
• 38% say the Israeli occupation is the most pressing problem confronting Palestinians today 

A plurality of 39% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 25% (8% in the Gaz Strip and 36% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 21% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 20% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction;  17% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 10% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 15% said it is unemployment, 15% said it is the split or division, and 6% said it is the internal violence.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 11 March 2017. Internally, the period before the poll witnessed the setting of a May 2017 date for holding local elections and Hamas announced its intentions to boycott them. A novel by a Palestinian writer was banned by the PA and the license for the Palestinian Telecommunication Company was renewed without opening the market to competition. The Israeli government announced big plans for more settlement construction and the Palestinian president threatened to suspend security coordination in response to these announcements. Internationally, the Trump Administration took office in January. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and reconciliation. It also covers the peace process and the 50^th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2017 show a high level of dissatisfaction with the performance of President Abbas; in fact, two-thirds demand his resignation. Nonetheless, if new presidential elections take place today, he would receive the same level of support as that of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ candidate.  Findings also show a decline in the level of support for Fatah compared to our findings three months ago when Fatah’s popularity rose a little in light of its successful holding of its 7^th Convention.

On other domestic issues, the public is divided into two halves regarding the banning of a Palestinian novel which the PA claims to contain indecent language. Two-thirds disagree with the renewal of the license of the Palestinian Telecommunication Company (PALTEL) without the opening of the market to competition. We also found that a little over one fifth of the public goes to private, rather than governmental, hospitals because they think that the chances for a medical error in such hospitals are lower. A large minority indicates that they personally or a member of their family and friends had an experience involving a medical error.

On the 50^th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, more than half of the public is optimistic about its end soon or within the next five to ten years; but one third believes that it will last another 50 years. The public places the blame for the continuation of the occupation equally on its leadership and on the Palestinian factions and political parties, but it also places the responsibility on itself. A majority thinks the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was fifty years ago and also worse than it was ten years ago. But despite the belief of the public that most Arab and European countries do not stand with the Palestinian people, an overwhelming majority believes that God stands with the Palestinians.

Findings show a slight increase in the level of support for the two-state solution compared to our findings three months ago, but it is still just below the 50% mark. Strong correlation exists between the belief in the viability of the two-state solution and its support: the more viable the solution, the higher the support. Today, most Palestinians believe that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement construction. Still, most Palestinians have not shifted to supporting the one-state solution; two-thirds continue to oppose it.

The overwhelming majority of the public is dissatisfied with the response of the Palestinian leadership to the new Israeli plans for settlement construction. In this context, a similarly large majority believes that Abbas is not serious about suspending security coordination with Israel. Abbas announced that if settlement construction continues, he would be forced to suspend security coordination. The public believes that the most suitable response to the new Israeli settlement plans should be the suspending of security coordination and the formal submission of a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court.

(1) 50^th anniversary of Israeli occupation:

• 32% believe that the occupation will last for another 50 years
• Only 25% say the Palestinian leadership is doing all it can to end the occupation
• 44% say that the place and status of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago
• 72% believe that Netanyahu does not attach importance to Palestinian reaction to his policies
• Two thirds believe that most of the Arab counties do not stand with the Palestinian people, but 94% believe that God stands with them.

On the 50th anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the public is divided on the future directions: 32% believe the occupation will last for another 50 years, 24% believe it will end soon, and 29% believe it will end after five to ten years or more. The belief that the occupation will end soon or within five to ten years is greater in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (66% and 65% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (49%), among residents of refugee camps and cities (57% and 55% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns (39%), among the religious (59%) compared to the somewhat religious (47%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (67%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (45%), among refugees (59%) compared to non-refugees (48%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to the illiterates (46%), among farmers, students, and employees (68%, 61%, and 56% respectively) compared to the retired and laborers (43% and 46% respectively).

We asked the public to assess the strength of the role played by four different Palestinian actors in the struggle to end the Israeli occupation: (1) the Palestinian leadership, (2) most political parties and factions, (3) most of the public, and (4) the respondent himself or herself.  Respondents were given three options to choose from: do their best, inadequate, and negligent role. Only 25% said the leadership is doing its best; 41% said its role is inadequate; and 32% said it is negligent. Similarly, 26% said most factions are doing their best; 49% said their role in inadequate; and 23% said they are negligent. On the other hand, 39% said the public is doing its best; 44% said its role is inadequate; and 16% said it is negligent. Finally, 29% assessed their own personal role as doing their best; 40% as inadequate; and 28% said they are negligent.

The belief that the leadership is doing all it can is higher in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (20%), among supporters of Fatah (42%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (17% and 28% respectively), in refugee camps (43%) compared to villages and cities (20% and 24% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (32%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (17%), among the illiterates (32%) compared to holders of BA degree (27%), and among the public sector employees (30%) compared to those employed in the private sector (23%).

The belief that the respondent himself or herself is doing all he or she can do is also higher in the Gaza Strip (38%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among men (31%) compared to women (26%), among the religious (33%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (22% and 25% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (32%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (28%), among the refugees (31%) compared to the non-refugees (27%), among holders of BA degree (33%) compared to the illiterates (28%), among employees (38%) compared to students (26%), and among those employed in the public sector (40%) compared to private sector employees (32%).

44% of the public believe that the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago. By contrast, 39% believe it is better than it was 50 years ago.  Moreover, 43% believe that the place or standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 10 years ago and 36% believe it is better than it was 10 years ago. The belief that the standing of Palestine today is worse than it was 50 years ago is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (47% and 41% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (37%), among residents of cities and refugee camps (48% and 40% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns  (34%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (53%) compared to supporters of the peace process (40%), and among refugees (46%) compared to non-refugees (43%).

A large majority (72%) believes that the Netanyahu government does not take into consideration or attach importance to Palestinian reaction to its policies or actions while 26% believe it does take into consideration Palestinian reaction. Moreover, two thirds (65%) of the public believe that most Arab counties do not stand often enough with the Palestinian people. A similar majority (66%) believes that most European countries do not stand most of the time with the Palestinian people. But 51% believe that most of the Muslim countries do stand most of the time with the Palestinian people and 56% believe that most of the peoples of the world do stand most of the time with the Palestinians.   On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of 94% believes that God stands with the Palestinian people.  Although this figure reflects a consensus, it is worth noting few differences that seem to reflect level of religiosity and political affiliation: while 97% of the religious believe that God stand with the Palestinians, the percentage drops slightly to 94% among the somewhat religious and 77% among the unreligious; similarly, it rises among supporters of Hamas, reaching 99% and drops slightly to 94% among Fatah supporters and 85% among supporters of third parties.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 64% want President Abbas to resign
• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 47%; and if the two candidates are Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 59% and the latter 36%
• In new parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 36% and Hamas 30%

64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 61% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 7%; Khalid Mishal, Rami al Hamdallah and Mustapha Barghouti (5% each); Salam Fayyad 3%, and Saeb Erekat 2%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 41% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 47% (compared to 49% three months ago) and the latter 47% (compared to 45% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 46% of the vote (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 50% (compared to 51% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh 45% (compared to 47% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 26%, Barghouti 40% and Haniyeh 33%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 41%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 40% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 41% three months ago).

(3) Local elections:

• Only 45% say they will participate in the upcoming local elections
• Only 31% believe that Hamas is right to boycott the upcoming local elections

Only 45% (46% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) say they will participate in the local elections which are scheduled to take place in May. 35% say they will not participate and 15% are not sure. 35% believe that the holding of local elections in May will serve the interests of reconciliation while 22% believe it will not serve it and 34% believe it will have no impact on it.  About half (49%) of the public believes that Hamas is making a mistake in its decision to boycott local elections while 31% believe it is not making a mistake.  The belief that Hamas is right in boycotting the local elections is higher in the Gaza Strip (38%) compared to the West Bank (28%), in refugee camps and cities (35% and 32% respectively) compared to villages and towns (27%), among women (33%) compared to men (30%), among the religious (39%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligious (26% and 19% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (47%) compared to supporters of the peace process (23%), among holders of BA degree (34%) compared to illiterates (7%), among those employed in the private sector (35%) compared to those employed in the public sector (27%), and among supporters of Hamas (62%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (16% and 31% respectively).

(4) Domestic conditions: security, Gaza electricity, banned novel, PALTEL, medical errors, and others:

• Only 11% think conditions in the Gaza strip are good; 25% think conditions in the West Bank are good
• 46% of Gazans and 23% of West Bankers say they wish to emigrate
• Gazans place the responsibility for the electricity crisis equally on Fatah and Hamas
• 47% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people
• 46% support and 44% oppose the ban on a Palestinian novel
• Two thirds disapprove the renewal of the license of the telecommunication company PALTEL without opening the market to competition
• 38% say that they or a family member have experienced a medical error in Palestinian hospitals 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 11% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Moreover, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 38%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 50%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 47% and in the West Bank at 56%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to migrate to other countries stands at 46%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 23%. Three months ago 46% of Gazans and 24% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate.

In the West Bank, the largest percentage (44%) places responsibility for the electricity crisis in the Gaza Strip on Israel, 18% place it on the PA and president Abbas; only 13% place it on Hamas’ shoulders. By contrast, Gazans place the responsibility for the crisis on the PA and Hamas equally (31% on the PA and 30% on Hamas); only 20% place it on Israel. 

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Maan TV viewership is the highest, standing at 16%, followed by al Jazeera TV (at 15%), Palestine TV (at 14%), al Aqsa TV (at 13%), Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) at 12 %, Al Arabiya at 7%, and al Quds TV and al Mayadeen at 4% each.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.  Only 38% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear.  47% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 48% view it as an asset.

The public is almost evenly divided concerning the banning by the PA of a Palestinian novel charging that it contains indecent language: 46% approve the ban and 44% do not. Disapproval of the ban is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among supporters of third parties (62%) compared to supporters of Fatah and Hamas (41% and 47% respectively), among residents of refugee camps (61%) compared to residents of villages and cities (41% and 42% respectively), among women (46%) compared to men (42%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 (55%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (39%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (49%) compared to supporters of the peace process (42%), among refugees (47%) compared to non-refugees (42%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to the illiterates (17%), and among students (51%) compared to farmers and housewives (34% and 41% respectively).

Two thirds do not agree with the PA decision to renew the license of the Palestinian Telecommunication Company (PALTEL) without a competitive bidding; only 24% agree with the PA decision.  Disagreement with the PA decision is higher in the West Bank (73%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (70% and 68% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (56%), among residents of villages and cities (70% and 68% respectively) compared to residents of refugee camps (59%), among men (71%) compared to women (63%), among the somewhat religious (71%) compared to the religious (63%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (78%) compared to supporters of the peace process (61%), and among non-refugees (69%) compared to the refugees (63%).

38% say that they personally, or one of their family members or friends, had experienced a case of medical error and 61% say they did not. While 36% believe that such medical errors occur equally in private and governmental hospitals, 22% indicate that they go to private hospitals because they think errors are less likely in them and 23% indicate that despite the danger of medical errors they still go to governmental hospitals because of the cheaper costs.  

(5) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

• 27% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about reconciliation
• Only 26% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government
• Only 18% put the blame on Hamas for the poor performance of the reconciliation government

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 27% and pessimism at 67%. Three months ago optimism stood at 35% and pessimism at 61%. 26% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 56%.  Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 18% (9% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) while 34% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 14% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government. 

(6) New Israeli settlement plans and the peace process:

• Palestinians think the response to Israel’s settlement policy should be the termination of security coordination and the submission of a formal complaint to the ICC
• 77% are dissatisfied with the response of the Palestinian leadership to the new Israeli settlement plans
• 47% support and 51% oppose the two-state solution
• 60% say the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction
• 67% think that the Paris peace conference did not contribute to improving the chances for peace
• Only 9% think the Trump Administration will renew the peace process

We asked the public about the most effective means of responding to the recent Israeli settlement plans: 25% think it is the suspension of security coordination with Israel; 22% think it is the submission of a formal complaint to the International Criminal Court; 19% think it is the resumption of armed attacks; 19% think it is a strong international condemnation of Israel, and 14% think it is the organization of popular non-violent protests.  An overwhelming majority of 77% are dissatisfied, and only 18% are satisfied, with Abbas’ response to the recent Israeli announcement of plans for 6,000 new settlement units. In fact, a large majority of 72% believes that President Abbas is not serious in his threat to suspend security coordination with Israel if settlement construction continues; only 21% believe he is serious.   The belief that President Abbas is serious is higher in the Gaza Strip (24%) compared to the West Bank (19%), in refugee camps and cities (23% and 22% respectively) compared to villages and towns (17%), among supporters of the peace process (29%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (8%), among the illiterates (30%) compared to holders of BA degree (17%), and among Fatah supporters (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (6% and 21% respectively).

On the two-state solution, the public is divided: 47% support and 51% oppose it. Three months ago, 44% supported it. Palestinians are divided into three groups on the most effective means of building a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 34% believe that negotiation is the most effective; 37% think armed action is the most effective; and 24% think non-violent popular resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 37% said armed action is the most effective means.

A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement expansion while 37% believe that it is still viable.  A minority of 32% supports a one-state solution in which Jews and Arabs enjoy equal rights; 67% oppose the one-state solution. Three months ago, support for the one-state solution stood at 36%.  70% believe that the chances for creating an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or non-existent while 29% believe the chances are medium or high.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 71%; 29% are not worried. Furthermore, a majority of 52% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 32% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 14% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  50% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 17% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places. Only 10% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 77% support joining more international organizations, 67% support non-violent popular resistance, 51% support a return to an armed intifada, and 49% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 53%.  Few months after the holding of the Paris peace conference, two thirds (67%) of the public believe that it did not contribute to improving the chances for Palestinian-Israeli peace; only 21% believe it did.  With Trump in the White House, 38% believe that the new American administration will aggravate Palestinian-Israeli tensions leading to escalation in popular and violent confrontations due to the expected settlement build-up; 33% believe conditions will remain as they are now; 11% believe the new administration will provoke diplomatic confrontation; only 9% believe it will lead to a renewal of the peace process.  If the Trump Administration called upon the two side to resume negotiations without  any preconditions, a majority of 58% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the call; only 31% believe it should accept it.

(7) The Arab World, ISIS:

• 76% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own problems and 59% believe that today there is a Sunni Arab alliance with Israel against Iran
• 92% believe that ISIS does not represent true Islam and 80% support the war against it

76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 23% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principal cause.  59% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 29% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

An overwhelming majority of 92% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 4% believe it does represent true Islam. 4% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 5% (compared to 4% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 80% support and 16% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 43% say the most vital Palestinian goal should be the establishment of a state along the 1967 lines and 34% say it should be the attainment of the right of return
• Poverty and unemployment is the main problem confronting Palestinians in the eyes of 27%

43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27% of the pubic; an identical percentage believes it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 24% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 10 December 2016. Internally, the period before the poll witnessed the holding of Fatah’s Seventh Convention and the election of its Central Committee and Revolutionary Council, the dismissal of the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, and the publication of a ruling by the recently appointed Constitutional Court that grants President Abbas the authority to revoke the immunity of the members of the parliament. The period also witnessed Abbas’ participation in the funeral of the former Israeli president Shimon Peres. The Israeli settlement construction accelerated considerably during this period and the Israeli government approved legislation that would legalize the seizure by settlers of private Palestinian land for the purpose of building settlements. The period also witnessed fires breakout across Israel, Netanyahu’s invitation to Abbas to speak in front of the Israeli Knesset, Israeli defense minister Avigdor Lieberman statement that Gazans can reopen their airport and build a seaport if Hamas ceases the digging of tunnels and the launching of rockets. The Israeli Knesset debated a government bill to ban the use of loudspeakers in the mosques’ call for prayer in Israel and the occupied East Jerusalem. At the international level, Donald Trump was elected as the new president of the United States and talks continued about a possible international conference in Paris, part of the French Initiative to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers attitudes regarding Fatah’s convention, judicial matters, reconciliation, and others. It also covers Palestinian-Israeli issues such as the peace process, the Israeli fires, and the French Initiative. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2016 indicate an increase, particularly in the Gaza Strip, in the percentage of those demanding Abbas’ resignation. They also indicate a slight decline in public satisfaction with the performance of the president. If presidential elections were to take place today, Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh would win. But Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular among all nationalist and Islamist leaders. In the domestic balance of power, Hamas remains at the same 

level it attained three months ago and Fatah improves its standing in the West Bank. It should be pointed out that the findings show a significant rise in public perception of safety and security in the West Bank.

Now in the aftermath of Fatah’s Seventh Convention, findings indicate that the newly elected Fatah leadership faces a tough challenge winning the trust and confidence of the public; a majority indicates that it does not have confidence in those elected. In fact, a majority is also dissatisfied with the Convention’s decision to declare Abbas the head of Fatah for five more years and does not believe that the meeting has helped to unify the movement, improve the chances for reconciliation, or facilitate the convening of the Palestinian National Council. It should be noted however, that a majority of the likely Fatah voters does have confidence in the new leadership, is satisfied with the selection of Abbas as the head of the movement, and believes that the convention did indeed help unify Fatah ranks.

Abbas faces an additional challenge as findings clearly indicate that the public rejects the recent ruling by the newly appointed Constitutional Court granting the PA president the authority to revoke the immunity of the members of the Palestinian parliament. Moreover, the public rejects Abbas’ decision to dismiss the head of the Supreme Judicial Council and believes that such dismissal is not part of the mandate of the presidency.

In matters related to the Palestinian-Israeli relations, public perception that the two state solution is no longer viable increases significantly, probably due to the dramatic increase in settlement construction during the period under consideration. Moreover, findings also show an increase in the percentage of those who favor the abandonment of the Oslo agreement. More significantly however, the poll found a majority in favor of armed attacks and a return to armed intifada. During the past nine months, support for violence has been in retreat. The overwhelming majority of the public sees nothing but incitement against Arabs in Netanyahu’s claim that some of the recent fires in Israel were initiated by Palestinians. Moreover, there is almost a consensus among the public that the decision by the Israeli government to ban the use of loudspeakers in the mosques’ call for prayer is tantamount to declaring war against Islam.

(1) Fatah’s Seventh Convention:

• Only one third of the Palestinian public has confidence in the newly elected Fatah leadership
• Only one third of the public is satisfied with the Seventh Convention’s selection of  Abbas as head of Fatah
• Only one third believes that the Seventh Convention will contribute to Fatah’s unity
• Only one quarter believes that the Seventh Convention will help facilitate Fatah-Hamas reconciliation

In the aftermath of Fatah’s Seventh Convention and the election of its new leaders, only one third of the Palestinian public expresses confidence in the ability of the new leadership to attain the goals Palestinians aspire to; 54% do not have confidence in the new leadership.  Distrust in the new Fatah leadership is higher in the Gaza Strip (58%) compared to the West Bank (51%), in cities (55%) compared to villages and refugee camps (50% each), among those opposed to the peace process (73%) compared to supporters of the peace process (40%), among the religious (60%) compared to the somewhat religious (49%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties, the undecided, and those who will not participate in future elections (79%, 61%, 62%, and 58% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (24%), among those who work in the private sector (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (48%), among the retired, merchants, and professionals (74%, 64%, and 62% respectively) compared to housewives, laborers, and students (45%, 54%, and 58% respectively), and among holders of two-year college and BA degrees (62% and 58% respectively) compared to illiterates and holder of the preparatory certificate (35% and 46% respectively).

Similarly, only 33% of the public is satisfied with the choice made by the Seventh Convention in selecting President Abbas as head of Fatah for five more years; 57% of the public is dissatisfied with that choice. Yet, among Fatah’s likely voters, satisfaction with the selection of Abbas stands at 70%. Moreover, only 34% believe, and 52% do not believe, that the Seventh Convention has contributed to the unification of Fatah. Among Fatah’s likely voters, belief that the convention has contributed to Fatah’s unity stands at 62%. Furthermore, only a quarter (26%) believes, and 62% do not believe, that the Convention has increased the chances for reconciliation.

Only one third (34%) of the public believes that success in holding the Seventh Convention will lead to further success in holding the next session of the Palestinian National Council; 48% believe it will not lead to that. Nonetheless, 42% believe, and 48% do not believe, that the selection of Abbas as head of Fatah will help consolidate Abbas’ legitimacy as the president of the PA and chairman of the PLO Executive Committee.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 64% want Abbas’ resignation and 32% want him to stay in office
• In an election involving two candidates, Abbas and Ismail Haniyah, the latter receives 49% of the vote and the former 45%; if the two candidates are Marwan Barghouti and Haniyah, the latter receives 36% and the former 59%.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 41% of the vote, Hamas 32%, and third factions combined 10%

64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation increases in the Gaza Strip (72%) compared to the West Bank (59%), in refugee camps and cities (67% and 66% respectively) compared to villages (53%), among those opposed to the peace process (81%) compared to supporters of the peace process (52%), among the religious (68%) compared to the somewhat religious (61%), among supporters of Hamas and third factions (91% and 81% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (29%), among those who work in the private sector (64%) compared to those who work in the public sector (56%), among the retired, the professionals, and students (82%, 71%, and 68% respectively) compared to housewives (62%), and among holders of BA degree (68%) compared to illiterates and holders of elementary certificate (41% and 51% respectively).

If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 36% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Khalid Mishal receives 6%; Rami al Hamdallah 5%; Mohammad Dahlan 4%; Mustapha Barghouti 3%; Salam Fayyad 2%, and Saeb Erekat 1%. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 35% today compared to 37% three months ago. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 49% (compared to 48% three months ago) and the latter 45% (compared to 45% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 45% of the vote (compared to 47 three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 51% (compared to 50% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 45% (compared to 43% three months ago) and Haniyeh 47% (compared to 46% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 24%, Barghouti 39% and Haniyeh 33%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 41% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 37%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 37% three months ago) and for Fatah at 40% (compared to 39% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 41% (compared to 36% three months ago).

(3) Domestic conditions and the independence of the judiciary:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 11% and the West Bank at 31%
• Perception of safety and security stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 56% in the West Bank
• 46% of Gazans and 24% of West Bankers wish to emigrate to other countries
• 49% view the PA as a burden and 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people
• 60% reject the decision of the Constitutional Court giving Abbas the authority to revoke the immunity of PLC members
• 57% believe that Abbas does not have the authority to dismiss the head of the Supreme Judicial Council

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 11% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%. Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 47%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 56%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 48% and in the West Bank at 42%.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 46%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 24%. Three months ago 46% of Gazans and 29% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by al Aqsa TV (at 16%), Maan TV (at 15%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) at 12 % each, Al Arabiya at 6%, al Quds TV at 5%, and al Mayadeen at 3%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 76%. Moreover, only 36% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority without fear. This percentage rises to 41% among West Bankers and drops to 27% among Gazans. Furthermore, 49% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 46% view it as an asset.

60% of the public reject and 30% accept the decision of the recently-appointed Constitutional Court that gives president Abbas the authority to revoke the immunity of the members of the parliament. Rejection of the Court’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (64%) compared to the West Bank (57%), in cities (62%) compared to villages and refugee camps (54% and 52% respectively), among men (62%) compared to women (57%), among those who oppose the peace process (81%) compared to supporters of the peace process (48%), among the religious (65%) compared to the somewhat religious (55%), among supporters of the Hamas and third factions (85% and 77% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (39%), among the retired, the professionals, and students (79%, 66%, and 61% respectively) compared to housewives and merchants (55% each), and among holders of BA degree (64%) compared to holders of the elementary and the preparatory certificates and the illiterates (51%, 53%, and 58% respectively).

Commenting on President Abbas’ recent dismissal of the head of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), 57% of the public believe that the president does not have the authority to do so while 31% believe that the president has such authority. Belief that the president does not have the authority to dismiss the head of the SJC rises to 65% in the Gaza Strip and drops to 52% in the West Bank. It is also higher in cities (61%) compared to villages and refugee camps (45% and 49% respectively), among men (59%) compared to women (55%), among those who oppose the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (46%), among the religious (65%) compared to the somewhat religious (51%), among supporters of Hamas and third factions (80% and 71% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (38%), among the retired and the professionals (89% and 66% respectively) compared to housewives (53%), and among holders of BA degree (63%) compared to holders of the elementary certificate and the illiterates (38% and 41% respectively).

(4) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

• Optimism about reconciliation stands at 35%, pessimism at 61%
• Only 28% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government, 63% are dissatisfied
• Only 18% put the blame for the shortcomings of the reconciliation government on Hamas
• 71% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the employees who worked for the former Hamas government and 71% support the integration of the police forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank under the command and jurisdiction of the reconciliation government

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 35% and pessimism at 61%. Three months ago optimism stood at 31% and pessimism at 65%.  28% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 56%.  Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 18% (9% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) while 34% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 13% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

 71% believe that the reconciliation government must be responsible for paying the salaries of the civilian employees of the former Hamas government in the Gaza Strip while 18% believe it is not its responsibility.  Similarly, 67% believe that it is the responsibility of the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of Hamas’ former security sector and police while 21% believe it is not its responsibility.  In return, 61% believe that the reconciliation government, not Hamas, should command and supervise the work of the security sector and police in the Gaza Strip while 25% believe that Hamas should continue to command and supervise this sector.  Similarly, 71% support the unification of the security sectors in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the command and control of the reconciliation government while 22% support maintaining the status quo.

(5) Fires and the bill to ban use of loudspeakers in call for prayers: 

• 50% support and 47% do not support the PA decision to send fire fighting vehicles and men to help put out fires in Israel
• 85% believe that Netanyahu’s claim that Palestinians stand behind some of the fires in Israel is tantamount to incitement against Arabs
• 87% believe that Israeli intent to ban use of loudspeakers to call for prayers is tantamount to waging war against Islam

A majority of 73% believes that the recent wave of fires in Israel has been the result of natural disasters; only 12% think it was initiated by Palestinians, and 9% think they were the outcome of other causes. Palestinians are divided in their position regarding the PA leadership decision to send fire fighting vehicles and men to combat the fires in Israel: 50% think it was a wrong decision and 47% think it was a right decision. Belief that it was the wrong decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (38%), among residents of refugee camps (65%) compared to residents of cities and villages (49% and 41% respectively), among women (51%) compared to men (48%), among those who oppose the peace process (64%) compared to supporters of the peace process (43%), among the religious (61%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among Hamas supporters (74%) compared to supporters of third factions and Fatah (46% and 31% respectively), among the married (51%) compared to non-married (46%), among those who work in the private sector (51%) compared to those who work in the public sector (45%), among holder of BA degree (58%) compared to illiterates (49%), and among refugees (56%) compared to non-refugees (45%).

The overwhelming majority of the public (85%) believes that anti-Arab incitement is what lies behind Israeli Prime Minister’s claim that Palestinians have carried out the fires in Israel; only 12% believe that Netanyahu actually believes what he claims.  Similarly, an overwhelming majority (87%) believes that the Israeli government decision to legislate a law that would ban the use of loudspeakers when calling for prayer at mosques is an indication of a war against Islam waged by the government while only 9% believe that the Israeli government is simply trying to protect the Israeli public.

(6) The peace process:

• 33% believe that negotiation is the most effective means of creating a Palestinian state and 37% think armed resistance is the most effective
• Two thirds of the public believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction
• 83% are unhappy with Abbas’ participation in Peres’ funeral
• 62% support abandoning the Oslo agreement, but 64% believe Abbas is not serious about doing so
• 46% support and 44% oppose the French Initiative; only 26% expect it to succeed
• 83% believe that the Obama Administration did not do all it could to advance Palestinian-Israeli peace and 53% want Trump to keep out of the peace process
• 74% support joining more international organizations; 62% support a non-violent resistance; and 53% support a return to an armed intifada

Palestinians are divided into three groups on the most effective means of building a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 33% believe that negotiation is the most effective; 37% think armed action is the most effective; and 24% think non-violent popular resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 34% said armed action is the most effective means. Findings show a sharp increase in the percentage of those who believe that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement expansion from 56% three months ago to 65% in this poll; today only 31% believe that it is still viable.

An overwhelming majority of 80% believe that Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was not serious when he indicated in a press interview that Israel would allow the rebuilding of the airport and a construction of a seaport in the Gaza Strip if Hamas stopped building tunnels and launching rockets; only 13% believe he is serious.  An almost three quarters (73%) believe that Abbas should reject Israeli Prime Minister’s invitation to speak in front of the Israeli Knesset; 21% believe that Abbas should accept the invitation. An overwhelming majority of the public (83%) is unhappy and 14% are happy with Abbas participation in the funeral of the former Israeli president Shimon Peres.

62% support and 30% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 54% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 36% opposed it. Support for the abandonment of the Oslo agreement stands at 60% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip.  But 64% of the public believe that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 29% think he is serious. Three months ago, 63% expressed the view that the president is not serious. We also asked that public if it thinks Abbas is serious when he announced during Fatah’s Seventh Convention that the PA will withdraw its recognition of Israel if it continues to reject the recognition of the Palestinian state: 30% said he is serious and 61% said he is not.

We asked the public about its support for the French Initiative. The initiative we presented to respondents as one that “calls for the formation of an international support group for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the holding of an international peace conference that would seek a settlement based on the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative in accordance with a specific time frame.” 46% of the respondents supported and 44% opposed the initiative. Three months ago, support for the French initiative stood at 53% and opposition at 38%.  Opposition to the French Initiative is higher in the Gaza Strip (48%) compared to the West Bank (42%), in refugee camps (49%) compared to villages and cities (37% and 45% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (68%) compared to supporters of the peace process (34%), among the religious (52%) compared to the somewhat religious (39%), among Hamas supporters (65%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third factions (26% and 44% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (49%) compared to those who work in the public sector (44%), among merchants and professionals (55% and 51% respectively) compared to housewives and students (42% each), and among holders of a two-year college degree and holders of BA degree (52% and 45% respectively) compared to the illiterates (30%).  We also asked respondents to indicate their expectations regarding the success or failure of the French Initiative in assisting the goal of reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace. 26% expected success and 61% expected failure.

 In evaluating the past eight years of President Obama’s efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an overwhelming majority of 83% said that he did not make serious efforts to resolve the conflict and only 10% said he did.  When asked what they want the newly elected US President Donald Trump to do, a majority of 53% of the respondents said they want him to stay out of the peace process while 30% said they want him to play a strong role in that process and 10% said they want him to play the same role the current administration plays.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 74% support joining more international organizations, 62% support non-violent popular resistance, 53% support a return to an armed intifada, and 48% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 48% and 44% supported the dissolution of the PA.  We asked the respondents if they wish to see the PA continue to seek support from and joint international organizations, like the UN, or to return to the bilateral negotiations with Israel: 58% said they prefer to stay with the international approach while only 24% said they prefer to return to bilateral negotiations.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 73%; 27% are not worried. Furthermore, a majority of 54% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 28% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 16% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  A majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 52% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 15% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places. Only 12% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.

(7) The Arab World, ISIS:

• 80% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own concerns and Palestine is no longer its principle cause
• 54% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran
• 90% view ISIS as an extremist group that does not represent true Islam; 82% support waging war against it

80% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 18% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. 54% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 31% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

An overwhelming majority of 90% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 5% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 9% (compared to 2% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 82% support and 15% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that the first and most vital Palestinian goal should be the creation of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital
• Poverty and unemployment is seen by 31% of the public as the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 31% of the pubic; 28% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 21% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 11-14 September 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a presidential termination of the work of the Supreme Judicial Council and the formation of a transitional one, a presidential statement requiring former ministers, who illegally received salary increases, to return these funds, and a widespread internal debate over “honor killing” in the context of the death of a woman from Bethlehem in suspicious circumstances. In relations with Israel, five main developments occurred during this period: an Israeli demolition of a large built up area in Wadi Hommos which is located in an area under PA zoning control, responding to this incident, Abbas announced his intention to suspend the implementation of agreements with Israel, an explosive device was detonated in an area near the settlement of Dolev, west of Ramallah, killing an Israeli woman, Israeli prime minister Netanyahu announced his intentions to annex the Jordan Valley if he wins the Israeli elections scheduled for 17 September 2019, and finally, Israel transferred to the PA about two billion Shekels from the Palestinian custom revenues which the PA had previously announced it will not accept if it was not transferred in full. On Palestinian-American relations, US ambassador David Friedman stated that the US peace plan does not call for the creation of a Palestinian state but that it allows for Palestinian autonomy. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2019 show an overwhelming majority, reaching about three quarters, dissatisfied with the performance of the PA and the political factions in their response to the Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes in Wadi al Hommos, near Jerusalem. The majority views the response of president Abbas to the demolition—by declaring that the PA is stopping its implementation of the agreements with Israel— as inappropriate. Indeed, an overwhelming majority, exceeding three quarters of the public, believes that Abbas’ decision is merely a media stunt aiming at absorbing public anger with the PA leadership over its failure to prevent Israel from carrying out that demolition. Furthermore, public anger with the PA is probably driven by the belief of more than 80% that the Palestinian leadership will not implement the decision to stop implementing the agreements with Israel.

In domestic matters, findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public views “honor killing” of women as a heinous crime that must be punished severely. Only 10% think that this type of crimes is understandable and punishment should thereby be reduced. By contrast, findings show that almost half of the public, much more in the Gaza Strip, believes human beings can be possessed by Jinn or demons while a slightly smaller percentage believes this to be a superstition.

Findings also show that Shtayyeh’s government has failed so far in winning the trust of the public. Indeed, public trust in the ability of the government to perform better than the previous government has declined compared to the findings three months ago. Similarly, the public is dissatisfied with the performance of the judiciary, particularly the courts, with about two-thirds believing that its functioning is marred by corruption, lack of independence, or that it rules not according to the law but in accordance with whims and personal interests. But the public is evenly divided in its satisfaction with the decisions made by Abbas regarding the judiciary. Moreover, the largest percentage believes that the Transitional Judicial Council will not succeed in the next year or two in reforming the judiciary. Furthermore, trust in the presidency is also low as more than 60% demand the resignation of president Abbas; slightly more than a third wants him to stay in office. If Abbas runs in a presidential election against Ismail Haniyyeh, the votes would be very close.

In foreign affairs, findings show that the largest percentage of the Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, does not view Iran as a friend or an ally of the Palestinians. Yet, a majority, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, believes that if war breaks out between Iran and Israel, the former would be able to defeat the latter, as Iran is believed to have a stronger military force.  

In light of prime minister Netanyahu’s statement announcing his intentions to annex the Jordan Valley, findings show a significant increase in the percentage of those who believe that the two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical. As in the past, feasibility is linked to support for the two-state solution. Findings show a significant decline in support for that solution accompanied by an increased support for armed attacks against Israelis. Moreover, public perception of the Trump peace plan continues to worsen, compared to attitudes two years ago, with two-thirds of the public demanding the Palestinian leadership to reject the plan out of hand even before reading the plan’s content, because it must be bad. More than 80% reject the idea presented by the US ambassador to Israel offering self-rule, rather than sovereign and independent statehood, to the Palestinians. More than 70% oppose resumption of the dialogue with the Trump Administration. 

(1) Home demolition in Wadi al Hommos and Abbas’ response by suspending implementation of agreements with Israel:

• 74% are dissatisfied with the performance of the PA and the various political factions toward the Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes in Wadi al Hommos
• 61% the believe that the decision of president Abbas to stop implementing agreements with Israel was not an appropriate response to the Israeli demolition of homes in Wadi al Hommos
• 76% think Abbas’ decision to stop implementation of agreements with Israel was just a media stunt or show
• 78% think the PA will not stop implementing agreements with Israel

An overwhelming majority of 74% thinks that the PA and the political factions have not done all they could to prevent the Israeli demolition of buildings and homes in Wadi al Hommos near Jerusalem and 19% think they have done their best. Two thirds of the public (66%) believe that it was the duty of the PA and its security services and the police to protect the homes in Wadi al Hommos by serving as a buffer between the buildings and the Israeli bulldozers.  61% say that Abbas’ decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel was not the most appropriate response to the demolition of homes in Wadi al Hommos while 32% think it was the appropriate response.  The belief that the PA and the political factions have not done all they could to prevent the demolition is higher among supporters of Hamas and third parties (83% and 82% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (62%), among those who oppose the peace process (84%) compared to supporters of the peace process (70%), and among those who work in the private sector (75%) compared to those who work in the public sector (65%).

A large majority of 71% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean dissolving the PA and 18% think he does mean that.  Similarly, a majority of 67% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending security coordination with Israel and 24% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 69% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending civil coordination with Israel and 19% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 69% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean annulling the PLO recognition of Israel and 20% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 76% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending negotiations with Israel and returning to armed struggle and 15% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 65% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean returning to Israel those VIP cards issued to senior PA officials and 22% think he does mean that.

We asked the public if it thinks the PA is serious about implementing Abbas’ decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel. An overwhelming majority of 78% says the PA will not do that and only 16% say it will.  Similarly, we asked the public about Abbas’ motivation behind making the decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel. A similar overwhelming majority (76%) indicates that the president’s decision is a media stunt or show and it will not be implemented while only 16% say the decision is serious and will be implemented.  The belief that Abbas’ decision is a media stunt or show and will not be implemented is higher among supporters of Hamas and third parties (87% and 78% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (61%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (90%) compared to those who support the peace process (72%), and among those who work in the private sector (79%) compared to those who work in the public sector (72%).

(2) “Honor killing,” Jinn possession, economic conditions, the performance of the Shtayyeh government, and others:

• 81% view “honor killing” as a dreadful crime
• 48% believe and 44% do not believe in “demon possession”
• Support for the PA decision to reject a partial custom revenue transfer drops from 62% to 54%
• Wish to emigrate stands at 41% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Shtayyeh government worsens rather than improves

An overwhelming majority of 81% say that “honor killing” is an dreadful crime that should be punished severely while 7% say that it is a normal crime that should be punished like any other crime. Only 10% (5% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) say that it is an understandable act that should be punished lightly. The belief that “honor killing” is a dreadful crime is higher in the West Ban (90%) than in the Gaza Strip (66%), in villages/towns and cities (86% and 82% respectively) compared to refugee camps (60%), among women (84%) compared to men (77%), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (76% and 72% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (82%) compared to those who work in the public sector (77%), among the married (82%) compared to the unmarried (72%), and among those with the highest income (87%) compared to those with the lowest income (69%).

The public is divided on the issue of humans being possessed by Jinn or demons: 48% say they believe it is real while 44% (56% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip) believe it is superstition. The belief that demon possession is real is higher in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (37%), in refugee camps and cities (55% and 50% respectively) compared to villages/towns (37%), among supporters of Hamas (57%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (48% and 44% respectively), among the religious (55%) compared to the somewhat religious (43%), among those who work in the public sector (53%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), and among those with the lowest income (68%) compared to those with the highest income (36%).

59% of the public say that their income has declined during the past six months due to the inability of the PA to pay the salary of the public sector in full; 35% say their income did not change and 4% say it has increased. A majority of 54% supports and 37% oppose the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues. However, 43% say that they are worried that this decision could lead to the collapse of the PA while 50% indicate that it could not. Three months ago, 62% said they supported the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues and 52% said they were worried that this decision could lead to PA collapse.

 Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%. But perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 63% and in the West Bank at 52%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%. 31% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 41% and declines in the West Bank to 24%.

Only 36% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 59% say that they cannot. Three months ago, 57% of West Bankers said they could not criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear. In the Gaza Strip, 43% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 53% say they cannot. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 65%. When asked about Abbas decision mandating that ministers of the previous government return illegal pay raise they received, 80% said this measure was not sufficient. The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 49% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than five months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (44%), the economy (37%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (50%), the preparation to hold general elections (49%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (47%). But a percentage ranging between 50% and 32% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 16% and 8% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a drop in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings three months ago. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 61% expects failure; only 27% expects success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 30% expects success. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 60% expects failure and 28% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Al Aqsa TV and Maan TV (13% each), Palestine TV (12%), Palestine Today TV (11%), al Al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).  

3) Public evaluation of the judiciary and views on the president’s decisions regarding the judiciary:

• Trust in Palestinian judiciary and its integrity is low, especially in the West Bank
• The public is divided in its view on Abbas’ decision to dissolve the Supreme Judicial Council and to form a transitional judicial council
• Half of the public does not expect success in reforming the judiciary in the near future

A majority of 60% (65% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 32% believe that they will receive a fair trial. The belief that one can receive a fair trial is higher in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (26%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to cities and villages/towns (31% and 29% respectively), among supporters of Hamas (43%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (36% and 32% respectively), among the religious (37%) compared to the somewhat religious (29%), among the illiterates (44%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (32%), and among those with the lowest income (37%) compared to those with the highest income (30%).

A majority of 63% thinks that the Palestinian judiciary is marred by corruption, lacks independence, or rules according to whims and interests; 29% disagree and believe that it is has integrity, independence, or rules according to the law. The belief that corruption or other defects exist in the judiciary is higher in the West Bank (72%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), in villages/towns and cities (71% and 63% respectively) compared to refugee camps (54%), among men (66%) compared to women (61%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (65% and 61% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (49%), among the somewhat religious (67%) compared to the religious (57%), among those who work in the private sector (68%) compared to those who work in the public sector (59%), and among those with the highest income (76%) compared to those with the lowest income (52%).

The public makes a similar assessment of Palestinian layers: 66% (74% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) think lawyers’ work is marred by corruption and incompetence and that lawyers are untruthful with clients; 25% think lawyers’ work has integrity, competent, and lawyers are truthful with the clients.

The public is divided in its view of Abbas’ decision to lower the retirement age for judges, to dismiss the Supreme Judicial Council, and to appoint a Transition Supreme Judicial Council: 42% are in favor, 42% are not in favor, and 16% are uncertain. 49% believe that the Transitional Judicial Council will not succeed in the next year or two in reforming the judiciary while 36% believe it will succeed.  A plurality of 47% does not agree and 39% agree, with the view that the judicial matters are not part of jurisdiction of the PA president or that his decisions regarding the judiciary constitute an interference in the affairs of the judiciary.  The public is divided on the view that Abbas’ decision regarding the judiciary was necessary in light of the fact that it has failed to reform itself: 43% agree and an identical percentage disagree with this statement.

(4) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 61% demand Abbas’ resignation and 35% want him to stay in office
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% of the vote and the latter 46%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 38% and Hamas 29%

Only 38% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 49% believe no elections will take place. An overwhelming majority (72%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 12% want parliamentary elections only. 12% do not want any elections. If elections were held for a parliament and a president, 69% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 21% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip. 

61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 57% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 49% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 38% (42% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter 46% of the vote (compared to 48% for Abbas and 42% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 39% of the vote (compared to 43% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 57% (compared to 52% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 56% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 36% (compared to 36% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 62% and Haniyeh 34%. Support for Haniyeh is higher in cities and refugee camps (49% and 47% respectively) compared to villages/towns (30%), among women (49%) compared to men (42%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (95% and 57% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (3%), among the religious (58%) compared to the somewhat religions (37%), among those opposed to the peace process (71%) compared to those who support the peace process (37%), among those who work in the private sector (43%) compared to those who work in the public sector (36%), among the married (47%) compared to the unmarried (34%), and among those of lowest income (50%) compared to those of the highest income (32%).

We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 36% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 8% (2% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 3% each. 

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 38% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 31% (compared to 33% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 20% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 43% three months ago). Support for Fatah is higher in villages/towns (51%) than in cities and refugee camps (36% and 34% respectively), among men (40%) compared to women (35%), among the somewhat religious (43%) compared to the religious (31%), among supporters of the peace process (47%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (20%), among those who work in the public sector (44%) compared to those who work in the private sector (40%), and among those with middle and highest income (44% and 38% respectively) compared to those with the lowest income (33%).

(5) Reconciliation, Hamas and Iran: 

• Optimism about reconciliation continues to drop
• 72% demand the removal of measures taken by the PA against the Gaza Strip
• 48% say that Iran is not an ally to the Palestinians and 40% say it is
• 55% believe that Iran can defeat Israel in war

30% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 33%. Moreover, the overwhelming majority (72%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 23% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government. A majority of 52% (down to 37% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 9% believe the chances are high.

In the context of the visit of a senior Hamas delegation to Iran, we asked the public to tell us how it views Iran: a plurality of 48% says Iran is not a friend or ally to the Palestinians and 40% say it is a friend and ally. The belief that Iran is a Palestinian ally is higher in the Gaza Strip (48%) than in the West Bank (36%), in refugee camps (54%) compared to cities and villages/towns (39% each), among women (43%) compared to men (38%), among those whose age is 50 or higher (43%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 (33%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (66% and 56% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (28%), among the religious (48%) compared to the somewhat religious (35%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (52%) compared to supporters of the peace process (38%), among the illiterates (44%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (38%), among those with the lowest income (52%) compared to those with the highest income (37%).

In the context of the statements by Iran and its allies indicating that the Islamic republic has the military capacity to defeat Israel in war, we asked the public if it believes this to be true: 55% say they believe this to be true and 32% believe it to be untrue. The belief that Iran can defeat Israel in war is higher in the West Bank (57%) than in the Gaza Strip (52%), among supporters of Hamas (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% each), among those opposed to the peace process (60%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (55%), and among those who work in the private sector (53%) compared to those who work in the public sector (48%).

 (6) The Trump peace plan:

• 83% think the “deal of the century” does not end the Israeli occupation and 65% think it allows Israeli annexation of a large part of the West Bank
• 69% want the PA to reject the US plan, 19% want it to accept it with reservation, and 5% want it to accept it without reservation
• 81% reject the proposal made by the US ambassador to Israel in which the Palestinians are offered self-rule, not a state
• 72% reject US plan for refugees’ resettlement in host countries

We asked the public if Palestinian acceptance of the Trump peace plan would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 83% say no; only 9% say yes it would. When asked if the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 65% of the public says it does and only 27% say it does not. Two thirds (67%) believe that in response to a Palestinian rejection of the Trump peace plan, the US will impose further sanctions on the Palestinians; 23% say it will amend its plan in case of Palestinian rejection. 

A large majority of 69% believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan; 19% say it should accept it with reservations; and 5% believe it should accept it without reservation. Three months ago, 75% said the PA leadership should reject the plan.  We asked this same question with a slightly different options: 64% indicate that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 21% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 9% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo. A year ago, only 50% said the PA should reject the plan out of hand. 

An overwhelming majority of 81% reject the proposed self-rule idea that deny Palestinian statehood that was proposed by US ambassador to Israel David Friedman while 9% say they accept it and 10% are uncertain.  Similarly, 72% say that they are against, and 22% for, American ideas proposed to solve the refugee problem in which Palestinian refugees are offered full citizenship and rights in the host countries and in which the host countries receive billions of US dollars in assistance and investments.  A majority of 68% is opposed and 20% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

7) The peace process:

• Support for the two-state solution drops from 47% to 42% in three months
• 44% think armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the occupation and 24% think negotiation is the most effective
• 50% are in favor of a return to an armed intifada, 62% are in favor of non-violent resistance, and 32% support the one-state solution
• 61% support the armed attack that took place few weeks ago in an area west of Ramallah
• 83% support the local and international movement to boycott Israel

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 42% and opposition at 56%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 47%. 37% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 56% believe that the majority opposes it. Support for the two-state solution is higher among those whose age is 50 and above (45%) compared to the youth between 18 and 22 years (35%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (61% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%), among the somewhat religious (45%) compared to the religious (36%), among supporters of the peace process (50%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (20%), among the illiterates (52%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (38%), among farmers (66%) compared to students (32%), and among those who work in the public sector (51%) compared to those who work in the private sector (42%).

A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 34% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 78% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high. The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 32% of the public while 37% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 17% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 36% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 34% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the largest group (44%) chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Three months ago, 38% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.  The percentage of those who view armed struggle as the most effect means is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in refugee camps (56%) compared to cities and villages/towns (45% and 35% respectively), among men (49%) compared to women (40%), among those between the 18 and 22 years (50%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or above (44%), among Hamas’ and third parties’ supporters (69% and 48% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (24%), among the religious (52%) compared to the the somewhat religious (39%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (64%) compared to supporters of the peace process (37%), among those who work in the private sector (47%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), and among those with the lowest income (50%) compared to those with the highest income (41%).

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 62% support popular non-violent resistance; 50% support a return to an armed intifada; 40% support dissolving the PA; and 32% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 47% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 38% said they prefer to dissolve the PA. We asked about the armed attack that took place few weeks ago in an area west of Ramallah, near the settlement of Dolve, in which one Israeli woman was killed: 61% supported it and 33% opposed it. A majority of 54% views this attack as a one-time, lone wolf, event while 39% think it is the beginning of the return to armed struggle. Support for the attack near Dolev is higher in the Gaza Strip (80%) compared to the West Bank (49%), in refugee camps and cities (74% and 62% respectively) compared to villages/towns (50%), among men (63%) compared to women (59%), among those between 18 and 22 years old (63%) compared to those who are 50 or above (56%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (79% and 78% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (52%), among the religious (68%) compared to the somewhat religious (57%), among those who oppose the peace process (75%) compared to those who support the peace process (56%), among students (67%) compared to laborers (59%), among those who work in the public sector (67%) compared to those who work in the private sector (60%), and among those with the least lowest income (86%) compared to those with the highest income (47%).

An overwhelming majority of 83% supports the local and international boycott movement against Israel while 15% are opposed to it. A majority of 52% say that they are currently boycotting non-essential Israeli products and those that have non-Israeli substitutes while 33% say they are not. 57% say the boycott of non-essential Israeli products and those that have non-Israeli substitutes will be effective in contributing to the end of occupation and 42% say it will not. About two-thirds of the public believe that the European countries will not boycott Israel or impose sanctions on it while 26% believe they will.  An overwhelming majority of 74% says that Palestinians should condemn visits of Arab journalists to Israel while 7% say the visits should be encouraged.

A majority of 52% expects the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 19% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections; 29% do not know who is likely to win.  About half of the public (48%) does not encourage the participation of the Joint Arab List in an Israeli government coalition led by the center and the left while 37% encourage such participation and 15% have no opinion. The public is divided in its position regarding the participation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel in the Knesset elections: 46% support and 42% oppose such participation.  Support for the boycott of elections is higher in the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (41%), among supporters of Hamas (56%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (40% and 46% respectively), among the religious (52%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (55%) compared to those who supportive of the peace process (44%), and among those with the lowest income (60%) compared to those with the highest income (35%).

8) Most vital goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% view the end of occupation and the establishment of a state as the first top priority for the Palestinians
• Poverty/unemployment is viewed by 28% as the most serious problem confronting the Palestinians today

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; another 25% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 September 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a US announcement about an agreement between the UAE and Israel to normalize relations between the two countries. This normalization agreement stipulated an Israeli suspension or delay of the planned annexation of parts of the West Bank. The period also witnessed a rise in the daily number of coronavirus infections and continued stalemate in Palestinian-Israeli relations that followed a PA decision to sever all security and civil links with Israel which led during the past months to a significant financial loss to the PA. This PA decision came in response to an Israeli announcement about the intention to annex about 30% of the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

(1) UAE-Israel normalization agreement:

• 86% believe the UAE-Israel normalization agreement benefits Israel only
• 80% describe their feelings toward the agreement as: treason, abandonment, and insult
• 70% think other Arab countries will follow the UAE and 82% think Saudi Arabia will be next as well
• 78% view the Egyptian welcome of the normalization agreement as an abandonment of the PA leadership
• But 57% believe the majority of the Arab public opinion is opposed to the current Arab normalization with Israel
• 53% blame the Palestinians for the agreement and 62% view it as a failure for Palestinian Diplomacy

A majority of 63% view the normalization agreement between the UAE and Israel as a major event that represents a significant regional shift while 32% view as minor development.  Findings show a consensus (86%) that the agreement serves only the interests of Israel while 8% think it serves the interests of both the Palestinians and the Israelis and only 1% think it serves the interests of the Palestinians only.  We asked the public to pick one word that represents its sentiments toward the normalization agreement: the majority (53%) picked “treason” or “betrayal,” 17% picked “abandonment,” 13% “insult,” 9% “indifference,” 6% “sadness,” while only 1% picked words like “satisfaction,” “pride,” and “joy.”  The percentage of those who picked “treason” is higher in the West Bank (57%) compared to the Gaza Strip (47%), in cities and villages (54% and 57% respectively) compared to refugee camps (35%), among men (56%) compared to women (50%), among those whose age is 50 years and above (55%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (45%), among employees (55%) compared to students (44%), and among those with the lowest income (58%) compared to those with the highest income (45%).

Most Palestinians (57%) believe that the majority among the Arab public is opposed to the normalization agreement while 20% believe an Arab majority supports it. A large majority (70%) believes that other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, and Morocco, will sign similar agreements with Israel while 24% believe they will not do that.  An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that Saudi Arabia has given the green light to the UAE to sign the normalization agreement and a similar majority (82%) believes that Saudi Arabia too will sign a similar public agreement.  Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the public (78%) believes that the Egyptian position welcoming the agreement represents an abandonment of the Palestinian leadership led by Abbas while 18% do not share this view.  A majority of 55% believes that Mohammad Dahlan was one of the participants in the making of the UAE-Israel normalization agreement while 24% do not share this view.

Nonetheless, a majority of 53% believes that the blame for the normalization deal falls on the shoulders of the Palestinians themselves due to their division and due to the fact that they have recognized Israel and normalized relations with it long before the others; 42% disagree with this view.  Also, a majority of 62% views the UAE defection from the previous declared Arab consensus on Palestine as a great failure for Palestinian diplomacy; 31% do not share this view. The percentage of those who blame the Palestinians is higher among residents of refugee camps (66%) compared to residents of villages and cities (54% and 52% respectively), among those whose age is 50 years and above (56%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (45%), among farmers, merchants, and professionals (70%, 64% and 63% respectively) compared to laborers and students (45% each), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (57%) compared to those who work in the Palestinian Authority (50%), among those with the highest income (60%) compared to those with the lowest income (51%), and among supporters of Hamas (55%) compared to supporters of Fatah (50%).

(2) Annexation and the severing of relations with Israel in post UAE-Israel normalization:

• Three quarters believe the Israeli annexation has been postponed a little, but that it will take place soon
• 62% are opposed to a Palestinian resumption of security coordination but 50% support resumption of civil/financial coordination
• Findings show great worry about the Israeli failure to transfer Palestinian clearance revenues to the PA; 59% worry about the eruption of violence; and 59% worry about PA collapse
• A majority of 61% does not expect the return of the Israeli military government in case of PA collapse and three quarters do not prefer such a return

Three quarters of the public (75%) believe that the normalization agreement forces Israel to merely postpone annexation while 19% think it forces it to put an end to it. Now, after the normalization agreement, a majority of 62% is opposed to the restoration of security coordination with Israel while 32% are in favor of restoring it. But half of the public (50%) supports, and 45% oppose, the restoration of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel. If Israel conditioned resumption of civil and fiscal coordination with a resumption of security coordination, a majority of 59% will oppose, and 35% will support, the resumption of relations. Support for the resumption of civil and financial coordination is higher in the West Bank (55%) compared to the Gaza Strip (42%), in villages (61%) compared to cities and refugee camps (48% and 49% respectively), among those whose age is 50 years and above (53%) compared those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (43%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (53%) compared to those who work in the PA (40%), among those with the highest income (54%) compared to those with the lowest income (48%), among the somewhat religious (58%) compared to the religious (42%), and among supporters of Fatah (58%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (43% each).

In response to an actual Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories, the public is divided on how to respond. When asked to choose one of five possible responses, 28% favored resumption of armed struggle, 20% selected stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, another 20% favored return to negotiations with Israel and the US on the basis of a Palestinian peace plan, 19% preferred waging nonviolent resistance, and 6% selected the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

The public indicates great worries about the future in case of continued severing of relations with Israel. For example, 74% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 75% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 77% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 59% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 59% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 70% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 60% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.

It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (63%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 30% believe it indeed did. A majority of 61% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (32%) expects Israel to do so.  A large majority of 75% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 21% say they do prefer that.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Decline in support for the two-state solution from 45% three months ago to 39% in this poll
• Most effective means of ending occupation is armed struggle in the eyes of 41% of the public and negotiations in the eyes of 24% of the public
• 92% reject the Trump peace plan, known as the deal of the century
• 71% are opposed to a Palestinian resumption of dialogue with the US administration
• Only 21% expect positive change in US policy toward Palestine if Biden wins the US presidential elections

Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 45%.   A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 31% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 36% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 38% said they prefer waging an armed struggle. When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 41% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 26% popular resistance. Three months ago, 45% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations. The belief that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the occupation is higher in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (32%), among residents of refugee camps (53%) compared to residents of cities and villages (41% and 35% respectively), among men (48%) compared to women (34%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (44%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (39%), among those who have a BA degree (47%) compared to the illiterates (29%), among students (57%) compared to housewives and professionals (29% and 38% respectively), among those who work in the PA (56%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (43%), among those with the lowest income (46%) compared to those with the highest income (32%), among the religious (49%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (34% and 32% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (62%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (36% and 35% respectively).

We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 92% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Three months ago, 88% expressed opposition to the plan.  If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 55% think the chances are zero; 26% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.

A majority of 71% is opposed and 19% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Three months ago, 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.

A majority of 61% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 30% expect him to win it. Nonetheless, only 21% expect a positive change if Biden wins while 34% believe US policy will not change and 35% expect it to become worse.

(4) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• Satisfaction with the performance of the government in dealing with the Coronavirus crisis ranges between 64%, for the performance of the security services, and 48%, for the performance of the prime minister
• A majority between 52% and 70% indicate it has been hurt economically as a result of the pandemic

A two-third majority (68%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to prevent travel between the various governorates in order to contain the Coronavirus pandemic. Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 64% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 57% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 48% today compared to 62% three months ago.

The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 70% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 52% say they stopped working or became unemployed.

A majority of 55% say that are dissatisfied with the PA decision during the past several months to stop cooperation and coordination with Israel in the health sector with the aim of combating the coronavirus, 42% are satisfied with that decision.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• 62% want the resignation of the president and satisfaction with his performance stands at 31%
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 39% of the vote and the latter 52%
• But in a presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 55% of the vote and the latter 39%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 38% of the vote and Hamas 34%

62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 58% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip. Demand for Abbas’ resignation is also higher in cities (65%) compared to refugee camps and villages (61% and 46% respectively), among men (65%) compared to women (60%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (70%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (60%), among holders of BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (44%), among merchants, students, professionals, and employees (73%, 68%, 68%, and 67% respectively) compared to housewives and laborers (58% and 61% respectively), among those with the lowest income (63%) compared to those with the highest income (53%), among the religious (66%) compared to the somewhat religious (58%), and among supporters of Hamas (74%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (56% and 49% respectively).

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 39% and the latter 52% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh threw months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 41% and the latter 51%.

We asked in an open-ended question about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 22% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Mohammad Shtayyeh is preferred by 5%, Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad by 2%. 

We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 42% three months ago).

(6) Domestic conditions:

• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 57%
• Wish to emigrate stands at 25% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank
• A majority of 62% views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people and 33% view it as an asset
• Public expectations do not reflect optimism about the prospects for reconciliation, the holding of elections, or the improvement of economic conditions
• 64% believe the Palestinian judiciary and courts rule according to interests and whims and 31% believe they rule according to the law

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 16%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 57%.  24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 25% and in the West Bank at 24%. Three months ago, only 18% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. Three months ago, 81% expressed a similar view.  The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 62% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, only 52% viewed the PA as a burden.

A year and a half since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 60% expect failure; only 31% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 33% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expects success.  An overwhelming majority of the public (80%) is opposed to the arrest by the PA security services of activists who were planning to demonstrate or were demonstrating against corruption in the PA while 17% support these arrests. 

56% (66% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 36% (23% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.  Six month ago, 42% said it believes it will receive a fair trial.  A majority of 64% (75% in the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 31% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law. Six month ago, 41% said the judiciary and courts rule according to the law. 

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (13%), Maan TV at 12%, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 4% each, and finally al Manar at 2%.  

(7) Reconciliation: 

• A majority of 59% are pessimistic about the prospects for reconciliation
• 41% believe reunification will never be possible

37% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.  Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 45% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 11% believe unity will return soon.

(8) Muslims in China: 

• 83% of the public believe that Palestinians should be in solidarity with the Uighur Muslims against the Chinese government
• 80% support the position of the Turkish president in transforming the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque

80% of the Palestinians believe that if press reports about the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in China are true, Palestinians should condemn the Chines policy towards its Muslim community and 15% disagree with that.  Support for condemning China in such case is a little higher in the West Bank (81%) compared to the Gaza Strip (77%), in villages (90%) compared to cities and refugee camps (79% and 68% respectively), and among supporters of Fatah (83%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (77% and 76% respectively).

An overwhelming majority of 79% indicates that it does not believe the statement of the Chinese government that the camps built by China to allegedly detain the Uighur Muslims are in fact teaching centers aiming at eradicating extremism; 10% believe the Chinese statement.  Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 83% believes that world Muslims should express solidarity with the Uighur Muslims against the Chinese government while 10% disagree with that.

An overwhelming majority of 80% approves of the Turkish president Erdogan’s decision to transform the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque; 16% disapprove. Approval of the Erdogan decision is higher in villages (88%) compared to cities and refugee camps (78% respectively), and among those with the lowest income (79%) compared to those with the highest income (68%).

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the most vital Palestinian goal should be the ending of the Israeli occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state
• 27% think the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment

42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; 13% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%,  the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 10%.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-8 September 2018. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the convening of the PLO Central Council, the launch of an indirect Hamas-Israel negotiations for a long term quiet or tahdia, the resumption of Egyptian efforts to reconcile Fatah and Hamas and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the US decision to stop all financial contributions to UNRWA and to suspend most aid to the PA, the Israeli adoption of a controversial nation-state law, and a leaked statement that President Abbas has reported that the Trump peace team had sought his views on the idea of Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. Moreover, this month of September coincides with the 25^th anniversary of the Oslo agreement. This press release addresses all these issues and covers other matters such as parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The poll examines internal Palestinian conditions and those related to Israeli-Palestinian relations and Palestinian-American relations. Findings of the third quarter indicate a decline in the popularity of both Fatah and Hamas compared to our findings three months ago. The decline might be attributed to the tense power struggle between the two movements that was in clear display during the past two months in the aftermath of the failed reconciliation efforts and a pointless quarrel over who has the right to negotiate a long term quiet, tahdia, or cessation of violence in the Gaza Strip, Hamas or the PA and what comes first, reconciliation or tahdia.  Findings show that more than 60% of the public want president Abbas to resign and that the public disagrees with some of the most important domestic policies of the Palestinian president. An overwhelming majority 

opposes his decision to cut the salaries of PA employees in the Gaza Strip; two-thirds oppose his demand to disarm armed groups in the Strip; and a majority is opposed to his demand that Hamas hand over full control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government. Moreover, a majority opposes Abbas’ position that tahdia between Hamas and Israel is the business of the PA and the PLO rather than that of Hamas. Indeed, a majority of the public supports Hamas’ efforts to reach an agreement with Israel on a long term Tahdia even in the absence of reconciliation. A larger percentage places the blame for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip on the president and the reconciliation government rather than on Hamas. Indeed, about half of the public believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people rather than an asset.

The public shows support for the convening of the PLO Central Council’s session in Ramallah last month and criticizes those factions that boycotted the meeting. Large majorities support the decisions taken by the Central Council regarding the suspension of Palestinian recognition of Israel, ending security coordination with the Israeli security services, and stopping all measures taken against PA employees in the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, the majority has no confidence that the Palestinian leadership will implement any of these decisions.

In exploring attitudes regarding the peace process, we examined issues like public perception of the two-state and the one-state solutions, a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, and attitudes toward the Oslo agreement. Findings show that a majority is opposed to the concept of two-state solution when that solution is presented without any description or details. But a majority supports that solution when it is defined as the creation of a Palestinian state along side the state of Israel on the basis of 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital. Only a quarter prefers a one-state solution, one in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equality in all issues, over a two-state solution. Findings show that two-thirds of the public are opposed to the idea of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation that, according to Abbas, was proposed by the US peace team. Furthermore, a larger majority of three quarters is opposed to a trilateral confederation between Palestine, Jordan and Israel. The great opposition to the Palestinian-Jordanian confederation is probably due to lack of trust in the US team and due to a Palestinian suspicion that the idea aims at preempting the goal of establishing a Palestinian state. Previous PSR findings during the past decade show support for such an idea exceeding 40%. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Oslo agreement, two thirds of the public indicate that the agreement had damaged Palestinian national interests; indeed, almost three quarters of the public believe that the situation today is worse than the pre-Oslo conditions. This of course does not mean that the public wants the return to Israeli occupation; rather, it seems that public is comparing conditions before and after Oslo in several other dimensions such as the multiplication of the size of settlement enterprise, the current split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and conflict between Fatah and Hamas, the ending of the first intifada by Oslo and the absence today of any similar popular movement to end the Israeli occupation, that on-going security coordination with Israel despite the diminished chances for peace, and public belief that the Palestinian political system is becoming more and more authoritarian and lacking any accountability.

Finally, in light of the deterioration in relations between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration, the US termination of most of its aid to the PA, and the US cancelation of its contributions to UNRWA, we asked the public about re-engagement with the US, the views on the “Deal of the Century,” and the chances that the US would succeed in ending UNRWA’s work. Findings show that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US or a return to negotiations with Israel. In fact, 90% expressed the belief that the US is biased in favor of Israel. Half of the public want the Palestinain leadership to reject the US “Deal of the Century” out of hand even before seeing it because it will certainly be bad for Palestinians while only a small minority of 14% thinks that the leadership sould accept the plan because it will certainly be better than the status quo. A majority believes that the Trump Administration will fail in its efforts to end the work of UNRWA but half is worried that if the US does succeed the outcome could contribute to ending the refugee issue.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 62% want president Abbas to resign; 32% want him to stay in office
• 35% are satisfied and 61% are dissatisfied with Abbas’ performance
• In presidential election between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 47% of the vote and the latter 45%; in presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 58% and the latter 37%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 36% of the popular vote and Hamas 27%

62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 54% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 35% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 42% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip). If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% and the latter 45% of the vote (compared to 47% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 40% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%.

If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah and Mustafa Barghouti are selected by 4% each, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad and Saeb Erikat by 2% each.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 27% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 28% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 21% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 43% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Only 5% say conditions in the Gaza Strip are good or very good; 19% say conditions in the West Bank are good or very good
• 43% blame the PA and Abbas for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip; only 24% place the blame on Hamas
• 45% of Gazans and 48% of West Bankers say they feel safe and secure
• 50% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers say they want to emigrate
• 50% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%. And, now that most US aid to the PA has been cut by the US Administration, an overwhelming majority of 77% is worried that the cut in aid could lead to increased unemployment and poverty and a deterioration in daily living conditions while 20% are not worried. In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (43%) blames the PA, president Abbas, and the reconciliation government; 24% blame Hamas, 8% blame Egypt, and 17% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 60% of Gazans, compared to 32% of West Bankers, blame the PA, Abbas and the reconciliation government; and 27% of Gazans, compared to 22% of West Bankers, blame Hamas. Blaming the PA and Abbas is also higher in cities and refugee camps (45% each) compared to villages and towns (32%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (80% and 49% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (13%), among the religious (50%) compared to the somewhat religious (37%), among those who oppose the peace process (60%) compared to supporters of the peace process (35%), among refugees (49%) compared to non-refugees (37%), and among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (30%).

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 45%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 48%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 51% and in the West Bank at 52%. One third of the public says it wants to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to half and declines in the West Bank to 22%.

Only 35% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 59% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%. Half of the public (50%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

In light of repeated reports on finding and destroying narcotics plantations in West Bank areas, we asked the public about the implications of these reports: 57% said that it indicates a recent rise in planting narcotics while 36% believe that it means that the PA security services are becoming more able and more effective in fighting narcotics.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Maan TV (at 14%), Al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (13% each), Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (at 12%), Al Arabiya (at 5%) and al Mayadeen and al Quds TV (4% each).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• 67% are dissatisfied and 22% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government
• Optimism about the success of reconciliation stands at 28% and pessimism at 65%
• The public opposes the principle policies of Abbas regarding reconciliation

Findings show that 22% are satisfied and 67% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 30%. 28% optimistic and 65% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%. The poll examined public view of the principle Abbas policies regarding reconciliation and found widespread opposition against all of them. The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 31% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 62% disagrees. Three months ago, 40% said they agreed with Abbas. When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, two-thirds (66%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 28% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans, with 68% of Gazans and 65% of West Bankers expressing support for keeping the armed groups in place after reconciliation. Support for the continued existence of the armed groups is higher among supporters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 71% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (52%), among the religious (70%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (63% and 60% respectively), and among those who oppose the peace process (74%) compared to those who support the peace process (64%).  Moreover, an overwhelming majority (81%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 16% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 84% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.   

4) Israel-Hamas long-term tahdia, or truce, negotiations 

• 55% support and 38% oppose a long term tahdia agreement between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip even if such an agreement is reached in the absence of reconciliation
• But 46% expect such an agreement to lead to the full separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

A majority of 55% supports and 38% oppose a Hamas-Israel long-term tahdia, or cessation of violence, even in the absence of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The agreement would entail the opening of the border crossing with Egypt and access to a seaport and an airport in a neighboring area in return for a Hamas enforcement of a long-term ceasefire as well as ending the Return Marches and the incendiary kites. Support for this long-term tahdia negotiations is higher in the Gaza Strip (63%) than in the West Bank (50%).  Moreover, support for the tahdia negotiation is higher among residents on refugee camps (58%) compared to residents of villages and towns (51%), among supporters of Hamas (64%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (50% and 51% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (56%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (52%), and among refugees (61%) compared to non-refugees (49%).

The public is divided in its assessment of the probable consequences of such long-term agreement in the absence of reconciliation: 46% believe that it could transform the current split into a permanent separation leading to the establishment of an independent political entity in the Gaza Strip, while 44% believe no such separation would come out of that long-term agreement. Nonetheless, if permanent separation occurs, 40% believe that Hamas will be seen as more responsible for such development than any other Palestinian faction because it negotiated with Israel and agreed to a long-term cessation of violence without the participation of the PA and the Palestinian leadership. A similar percentage (38%) believes that the PA leadership will be seen as more responsible for that development because it imposed sanctions on the Gaza Strip and did not offer the needed concessions to facilitate reconciliation.

5) Decisions of the Palestinian Central Council of the PLO

• 54% express opposition and 30% support to the boycott of the August Central Council meeting
• 66% support the resolution of the Central Council calling for suspending Palestinian recognition of Israel; 68% support the resolution to stop security coordination with Israel; and 76% support the resolution calling for an end to PA measures against the Gaza Strip
• But a majority believes that the PA leadership will not implement any of these decisions

A majority of 54% disagrees with the decision of various factions to boycott the latest meeting of the PLO’s Central Council in Ramallah and believe it was a wrong decision while 30% think it was the right decision.  A similar percentage (53%) believes that the boycott has damaged the legitimacy of the Central Council while a third believes it has not done that. The view that it was wrong to boycott the Council’s meeting rises in the West Bank (60%) and declines in the Gaza Strip (45%). It is also higher in villages and towns (62%) than in refugees camps (48%), among supporters of Fatah (71%) compared to supporters of Hamas (43%), among those who are 50 years or older (58%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (47%), among the somewhat religious (57%) compared to the religious and the non-religious (52% and 47% respectively), among those who support the peace process (58%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (49%), among the non-refugees (58%) c0mpared to the refugees (50%), and among the illiterates (62%) compared to the holders of BA degree (51%).

Two thirds (66%) support and 26% oppose the Central Council’s decision to suspend Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel until Israel recognizes the state of Palestine. But a majority of 52% believes that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and 35% believe it will implement it.  Similarly, 68% support and 25% oppose the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel; but more than two-thirds (69%) believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 21% believe it will.  Moreover, 76% support and 18% oppose the Central Council’s decision to immediately stop all measures taken against PA employees in the Gaza Strip; but 50% of the public believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 37% believe it will.

6) Palestinian-Jordanian confederation

• Two thirds express opposition to a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation
• Three quarters express opposition to a trilateral confederation between Palestine, Jordan, and Israel

We asked the public about the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation in the context of the statement made by president Abbas regarding an offer made by the US peace team and in light of Abbas’ statement that the he favors a trilateral confederation that includes Palestine, Jordan, and Israel. About two-thirds rejected and 29% accepted a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. When asked about the trilateral confederation, Palestine, Jordan, and Israel, 75% rejected it and 18% accepted it. Support for a Palestinian confederation with Jordan is higher in the Gaza Strip (34%) compared to the West Bank (25%), in refugee camps (34%) compared to villages/towns and cities (26% and 28% respectively), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (43% and 35% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (25%), among those who support the peace process (34%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (18%), and among holders of BA degree (30%) compared to the illiterates (18%).

7) 25 years after Oslo

• Three quarters of the public say that conditions today are worse than pre-Oslo conditions
• 36% place the blame for Oslo’s failure on Israel, 35% on the international community, and 27% on the Palestinian side
• Two thirds believe that Oslo has harmed Palestinian national interests

Twenty-five years after the signing of the Oslo agreement, we asked the public to tell us, based on personal experience, or based on what it had heard or read, if conditions today are better or worse than conditions before Oslo. Almost three quarter (73%) said conditions today are worse than those prevailing before Oslo; 13% said conditions today are better; and 10% said conditions today are the same as those before Oslo. The belief that conditions today are worse than the pre-Oslo days is higher in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (72%), in cities (74%) compared to refugee camps and villages/towns (67% and 71% respectively), among supporters of Hamas (77%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (62% and 71% respectively), and among those who oppose the peace process (78%) compared to those who support the peace process (74%).

We also asked the public about the most important reason for the failure of the Oslo agreement. More than one third (36%) said that Israel’s refusal to end its occupation and stop settlement construction was the main reason for the failure; 35% said that the lack of pressure on Israel from the international community was the main reason for the failure; and 27% said that it was the fault of the Palestinians themselves. In particular, the Palestinian contribution to the failure was divided as follows: 11% said the PA did not build strong public institutions that fights corruption and enforce the rule of law; 9% said that Fatah sought an exclusive control over that excluded the other factions; 6% said that Hamas and Islamic Jehad violated the agreement and carried out armed attacks against the Israelis; and 2% put the blame on the second intifada and the bombing attacks that targeted the Israelis.  We asked the public to assess the impact of Oslo on Palestinian national interests: two thirds (65%) said it damaged the national interest, 16% said it served the national interest, and 16% said it neither damaged nor served the national interest.

8) The peace process

• 47% support the two-state solution and 50% oppose it
• 53% support a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as a capital of Palestine while 24% prefer a one-state solution with equality to both sides
• 56% believe that settlement construction has made the two-state solution impractical
• 40% prefer to change the status quo through a peace agreement with Israel while 30% prefer to change it by waging an armed struggle
• 39% believe that negotiation is the most effective means of creating a Palestinian state and 33% believe that armed struggle is the most effective means
• 74% believe that the Israeli Nation-State Law poses a threat to the interests of the Arab citizens of Israel
• 57% believe that Israel’s long-term goal is to expel the Palestinians and 23% think it is to deny them their rights
• 45% believe that peace will improve their own living conditions and 17% believe it will make them worse

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 47% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, 43% supported this concept.  Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 53% said they prefer the two-state solution, 24% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 14% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.”  Support for the one-state solution is higher among those who support third parties and Fatah (37% and 31% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (28% and 26% respectively) compared to the religious (22%), among those who support the peace process (27%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (17%), and among holders of BA degree (30%) compared to the illiterates (21%).

A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 41% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 40% of the public while 30% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation” and 12% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance.” A small minority of 14% prefer to keep the status quo.  A large minority of 39% thinks that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while a third (33%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means and 21% think non-violent resistance is the most effective.  The preference for reaching a peace agreement with Israel is higher in the West Bank (49%) compared to the Gaza Strip (26%), in villages and towns (48%) compared to cities and refugee camps (39% and 32% respectively), among women (43%) compared to men (37%), among those who support Fatah (57%) compared to those who support Hamas and third parties (19% and 35% respectively), among the somewhat religious (48%) compared to the religious and the non-religious (32% and 33% respectively), among those who support the peace process (53%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (17%), among non-refugees (46%) compared to refugees (33%), among the illiterates (53%) compared to holders of BA degree (33%), and among housewives (49%) compared to students (30%).  

An overwhelming majority of 78% say they are worried that in their daily life they would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 22% say they are worried.  Three quarter (74%) say that the newly issued Israeli “nation state” law poses a threat to the rights and interests of Israeli Arabs and 84% believe that the passing of this law will lead to an increase in settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  57% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 18% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.

80% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its problems and internal conflicts and that Palestine is not its primary cause; 19% believe that Palestine remains the primary cause of the Arab World. Moreover, 69% believe that an alliance already exists between Sunni Arabs and Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation; 22% disagrees with this assessment.

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 76% support joining more international organizations; 65% support popular non-violence resistance; 46% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 29% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis.

On the occasion of the International Day of Peace we asked the public about its expectations regarding the impact of a Palestinian-Israeli peace, when reached, on their living conditions. The largest percentage (45%) said it will improve its living conditions; 17% said it will worsen their living conditions; and 34% said peace will have no impact on their living conditions. The belief that peace is likely to improve one’s own living conditions is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (44%), in cities and villages/towns (46% and 45% respectively) compared to refugee camps (41%), among those who support third parties and Fatah supporters (53% and 50% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (36%), among those who support the peace process (49%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (37%), among the non-refugees (47%) compared to refugees (43%), and among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to the illiterates (41%).

9) American-Palestinian relations, the “Deal of the Century,” and the future of UNRAWA

• 62% oppose and 27% support a resumption of contacts with the Trump Administration
• 50% want the PA to reject the “Deal of the Century” out of hand because it will certainly be bad for Palestinians
• 90% believe the US is biased in favor of Israel
• 62% oppose and 31% support a change in PA policy to allow a resumption of US aid
• 55% believe the US will fail in shutting down UNRWA

A majority of 62% is opposed and 27% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Moreover, 58% want the PA to reject US efforts to make it negotiate with Israel; 37% support the resumption of negotiations with Israel.  Opposition to return to negotiations under US pressure is higher in the West Bank (60%) compared to the Gaza Strip (56%), in refugee camps and villages/towns (69% and 60% respectively) compared to cities (56%), among men (61%) compared to women (56%), among those who support Hamas (76%) compared to those who support Fatah and third parties (48% and 53% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (52%), and among those who work in the private sector (61%) compared to those who work in the public sector (56%).

Half of the public believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 31% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 14% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo.  90% of the public believe that if negotiations with Israel resumed under sponsorship of the Trump Administration, the US will be biased in favor of Israel and 6% think the US will be an honest broker.

In light of US cut of most aid to the PA, we asked the public if it would be better if the PA changed its policy to insure continued US aid: 62% said they want the PA to maintain its current policies and 31% said they want the PA to change its current policies to please the Americans. Support for a change in PA policy in order to restore US aid is higher in the Gaza Strip (39%) compared to the West Bank (27%), among those who support the peace process (36%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (24%), among refugees (37%) compared to non-refugees (26%), and among holders of BA degree (34%) compared to the illiterates (27%).

When we asked the public about its expectations from the PA leadership regarding US pressure, 49% said the PA will indeed change its policy and 43% said it does not expect the PA to change its policy.

We also asked the public about the US cancelation of its aid to UNRWA and what might happen if the US succeeds in shutting down this UN agency: 49% said that if UNRWA is closed down, the refugees’ cause will suffer and 46% said such a development will not end the refugee cause.  When asked about the chances for a US success in shutting down UNRWA, 55% said the US will not succeed and 37% said it will succeed.  The belief that the US will fail in shutting down UNRWA is higher in the Gaza Strip (58%) compared to the West Bank (54%), among men (58%) compared to women (53%), among those who support Fatah and Hamas (55% each) compared to those who support third parties (47%), among those whose age is 50 year or higher (59%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (47%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (63%) compared to supporters of the peace process (52%), among the illiterates (65%) compared to holders of PA degree (58%), and among those who work in the public sector (66%) compared to those who work in the private sector (53%).

When asked to speculate about the reasons that the US had the nerve to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem and to wage a campaign against UNRWA, 48% of the public said it was the weakness of and divisions in the Arab World, 28% said it was the result of the weakness of and divisions among the Palestinians, and 23% said it was due to the personality of Trump himself.

(10) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that ending occupation and building a state is the top most vital Palestinian goal
• 27% believe that poverty and unemployment is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today

42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 27% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 7 and 11 June 2023. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several important developments including the passing of 75 years since Nakba and the rocket exchange between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ student body, the Islamic Bloc won student elections at Birzeit University and al Najah University. In a speech at the UN, president Abbas asked for international protection for the Palestinian people. In Israel, widespread demonstrations by the opposition to the Israeli government judicial reforms continued while in the West Bank violent confrontations between Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli army led to increased exposure to violence. Regionally, an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement create shock waves throughout the Middle East. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

This poll examines the 75th anniversary of the Nakba. Findings indicate that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians blame Arab or international parties or the Zionist movement for the Nakba, while internal Palestinian weakness comes at the bottom of the list. Although this outcome was expected, the small percentage that saw Palestinian weakness as responsible for the Nakba indicates the persistence of a huge Palestinian sense of victimhood. However, when asked about the most damaging developments since the Nakba, the largest percentage referred to internal division, the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while the Israeli 1967 occupation came in the second place. When asked about the best thing that happened to the Palestinians since the Nakba, about two-thirds listed two: the establishment of the PLO in the 1960s and the establishment of the PA in the 1990s, while a quarter believed that the formation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their entry into armed struggle in the 1980s was the best development followed by those who selected the formation of Fatah in the 1960s and its launch of armed struggle.

Findings also indicate that about two-thirds of the public do not fear a repeat of the Nakba. To the contrary, two-thirds of the public do not believe that Israel will celebrate its centenary, and a majority, albeit a small one, believes that the Palestinian people will, in the future, be able to recover Palestine and return its refugees to their homes.

The results of the second quarter of 2023 also indicate a decline in the popularity of Fatah and President Abbas in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, accompanied by a decline in satisfaction with the president's performance, especially in light of his recent speech at the United Nations. The increased dissatisfaction led to greater demand for Abbas’ resignation, reaching 80%.  The PA's standing is also worsening, with the percentage of those who believe that its continued existence is in Israel's interest increasing by six percentage points in three months while half of the public says that the collapse or dissolution of the PA serves the Palestinian interest.

We asked about the recent armed confrontations between the Gaza Strip and Israel. Although a small percentage of the Palestinian public believed that Hamas did not participate or participated to a small extent in these confrontations, Hamas's popularity was not damaged in either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.

We explored attitudes on the peace process. Support for the two-state solution remains as low as it was three months ago. So does the support for the one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israeli Jews. We also asked about the most effective way to end the Israeli occupation. Although the majority still sees armed struggle as the best way to achieve this goal, this percentage has fallen by three points compared to three months ago. Expectations of a third intifada have also dropped dramatically in the West Bank, falling by 15 points.

Findings show that a quarter of the public views the pro judiciary protest demonstrations in Israel with admiration, with the largest percentage saying that the Israeli judicial system is independent while the Palestinian judiciary is subordinate to the president or the government. In comparing the two judicial systems, the Palestinian and the Israeli, only one-fifth of the Palestinian public believes that the Palestinian judiciary is independent of the executive branch.

On regional developments, the largest percentage believes that the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation will not have a negative or positive impact on the Palestinian issue in general or on the prospects for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, or on Saudi-Palestinian relations, or on Arab normalization with Israel, or even on stopping the war in Yemen. But between one-fifth and one-third expect the impact on all these issues to be positive. 

• The weak and conspiratorial Arab role and the British Mandate were mainly responsible for the Nakba
• The split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is most damaging development that has happened to the Palestinian people since the Nakba followed by the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
• The best thing that has happened to the Palestinian people since the Nakba is the establishment of Islamic movements, the two intifadas, the establishment of the PLO and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority
• Two-thirds of the public do not fear a repeat of the Nakba
• Steadfastness on the land is the most important lesson of the Nakba
• 66% believe Israel will not celebrate its 100th anniversary and 51% believe that the Palestinian people will be able to recover Palestine in the future

On the occasion of the Nakba, the overwhelming majority places the blame for it on non-Palestinian parties while only 7% believe that the weakness of the Palestinian people is primarily responsible. The "weak and conspiratorial Arab role" comes first with 38%, followed by the British Mandate with 36%, and Zionist organizations and movements with 16%. The largest percentage (35%) believes that the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is the most damaging development that has befallen the Palestinian people during the past seventy-five years; 32% believe that the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 was the most damaging since the Nakba. With 25% selecting it, comes the inability of the refugees to return to their homes and the unresolved nature of the refugee problem; 7% believe that armed conflicts between Palestinians and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon were the most damaging development that happened during the past 75 years. The following figure shows that there are no significant differences in the perceptions of the Palestinian public in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip regarding these four damaging developments.

When asked what has been the most positive or the best thing that has happened to the Palestinian people since the Nakba, the largest percentage (24%) said that it was the establishment of Islamic movements, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their participation in armed struggle; 21% said that it was the eruption of the first and second intifada; 18% said the establishment of the PLO; 14% said the establishment of the PA in the mid-nineties, and 9% said it was the establishment of Fateh in the sixties and the launch of the armed struggle. The following figure shows that there are significant differences in the perceptions of the Palestinian public in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip regarding these positive developments.

About two thirds (64%) say they do not fear a recurrence of the Nakba while 33% say they fear it will happen again.  Belief that the Nakba will not be repeated is higher in the Gaza Strip (71%) compared to the West Bank (59%), among men (67%) compared to women (61%), among holders of BA degree (67%) compared to those with primary education and illiterates (61% and 50% respectively), among students (70%) compared to employees and housewives (62% each), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in the private sector (62%), among the religious (69%) compared to the somewhat religious (60%), among those with the lowest income (64%) compared to those with the highest income (45%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (71% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (65%).

When asked about the most important lesson from the Nakba for the Palestinian people, the largest percentage (44%, of which 54% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the need to remain steadfast on the ground and to remain in the land even in the event of war; 23% believe it is the necessity of self-reliance rather than the reliance on Arab or friendly countries; and only 9% (15% in the Gaza Strip and 5% in the West Bank) believe it is the need to seek political solutions to the conflict with Israel.

We asked about the main reasons for the flight of refugees from their homes in 1948: the largest percentage (43%) said it was the mass displacement by armed Zionist forces; a similar percentage (40%) said it was fear of massacres; and 15% said it was a desire to seek safer places.

In comparing the current Palestinian leadership with the one that led the Palestinian people during the Nakba, the largest percentage (40%) said that neither leadership is better than the other as the performance of the two leaderships is not good; 23% said that the leadership of the Nakba was better than the current leadership while a similar percentage (22%) said the current leadership is the best; 10% said that neither is better than the other because both performed well.

In describing the standing of the State of Israel today, the largest percentage of the public (42%; 51% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip) said Israel is one of the most powerful countries in the world economically and militarily. By contrast, 35% (44% in the Gaza Strip and 28% in the West Bank) believe Israel is a weak and fragmented state on the verge of collapse; and 21% believe it is a normal state like most other small states in the world.

When asked whether Israel will celebrate its 100th anniversary, a majority of two thirds (66%) says it will not do so while 27% say it will; 7% say it does not know. The belief that Israel will not celebrate its centenary is higher among holders of BA degree (71%) compared to those with primary education (62%), among those who work in the private sector (68%) compared to those who work in the public sector (63%), among the religious (68%) compared to the somewhat religious (64%), among those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (68%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 49 years (63%), among those with the lowest income (68%) compared to those with the highest income (51%), and among supporters of Hamas (78%) compared to supporters of Fateh and third parties (62% and 65% respectively).

When asked whether the Palestinian people will be able in the future to regain Palestine and repatriate the refugees, a slim majority of 51% says that this will indeed happen while 45% believe that this will not happen. Belief that the Palestinian people are capable of recovering Palestine in the future is higher in the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (49%), among refugees (54%) compared to non-refugees (50%), among students (56%) compared to employees (48%) among those who work in the private sector (51%) compared to those who work in the public sector (46%), among the religious (56%) compared to the somewhat religious (49%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (64%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and higher (50%), and among supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fateh and third parties (51% and 44% respectively).

• 32% believe that no one has won the recent rocket confrontations between the Gaza Strip and Israel
• 41% say Hamas did not participate in that rocket confrontation

The largest percentage of the Palestinian public, 32% (41% in the West Bank and only 18% in the Gaza Strip), believes that no side has won the recent rocket confrontations between Israel and the Gaza Strip. One quarter believes that all armed resistance groups in the Gaza Strip have emerged victorious. Additionally, 19% believe that Islamic Jihad has emerged victorious while 6% believe Hamas has won, i.e. 50% of the public believe that the Palestinian side emerged victorious. By contrast, 14% (23% in the Gaza Strip and 9% in the West Bank) believe that Israel has won.

We asked the public what it thinks of Hamas's role in the most recent rocket confrontation between the Gaza Strip and Israel. The largest percentage (41%) said Hamas did not participate and that Islamic Jihad fought alone, while only 13% said Hamas participated fully in the confrontation alongside Islamic Jihad. 37% (46% in the Gaza Strip and 31% in the West Bank) said Hamas participated in the fighting but not with all its weight.

• 71% support the formation of armed groups
• 86% say the PA does not have the right to arrest members of these armed groups
• 58% believe that armed groups will spread to the rest of the West Bank
• 51% expect a third intifada

71% of the public (79% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den” and the “Jenin Battalion,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 23% are against that.  Support for the formation of armed groups increases in the Gaza Strip (79%) compared to the West Bank (66%), in refugee camps and cities (85% and 72% respectively) compared to villages (61%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (77%) compared to those whose age is 40 years and above (69%), among refugees (78%) compared to non-refugees (66%), among holders of BA degree (77%) compared to those with primary education (70%), among students (80%) compared to merchants (50%), among the unmarried (76%) compared to the married (70%) among the religious (76%) compared to the somewhat religious (68%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (86% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (65%).

A majority of 55% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 41% are not worried.  Nonetheless, 80% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 16% say they are for it. The vast majority (86%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 11% say they favor it.

A majority of 58% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 14% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 16% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups. A majority of 51% (54% in the West Bank and 47% in the Gaza Strip) expect security conditions in the West Bank to continue to escalate leading to the eruption of a third armed intifada; 36% say they do not expect a third intifada. It is worth noting that three months ago, 61% (69% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) expected the current escalation to lead to a third intifada.

• 43% say that Israel's punitive measures against the PA are aimed at weakening it and not pushing it to collapse
• 63% say that Israel's interest lies in the continued existence of the PA
• Half of the public says that the interest of the Palestinian people lies in the dissolution or collapse of the PA

The largest percentage (43%) says Israeli punitive measures against the PA aim at weaking it; 25% think Israel aims at forcing a PA collapse; and 28% think Israel does not want to weaken the PA or bring it to collapse. When asked to define Israel’s interest regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse, the majority (63%) says the survival of the PA is in Israel’s interest while 34% think Israel’s interest lies in the collapse of the PA. Three months ago, 57% said the continued existence of the PA is an Israeli interest. The belief that Israel's interest lies in the survival of the PA is higher in the West Bank (72%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), among men (67%) compared to women (58%), among those whose age is 50 years and over (66%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (56%), among non-refugees (69%) compared to refugees (55%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (75% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (54%).

When asked to define the interest of the Palestinian people regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse or dissolution, half (50%) says the Palestinian people’s interest lies in the collapse or dissolution of the PA while 46% define the continued existence of the PA as a Palestinian interest. Three months ago, 52% said the interest of the Palestinian people lies in the PA dissolution or collapse.

In the event that the PA becomes weak or collapses, such a development is seen by 50% of the public as leading to the strengthening of the armed groups in the West Bank while 13% think it will weaken them; 33% think it will neither weaken nor strengthen the armed groups.

• 69% want elections to take place but 67% do not expect that to happen
• In elections between president Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, Haniyeh wins 56% and Abbas 33%
• Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 17% and 80% want him to resign
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 34% of the popular vote and Fateh 31%
• 31% say Hamas deserve to represent the Palestinian people and 21% say Fateh led by Abbas deserves to do that 
• 46% believe that Hamas' victory in student elections at Birzeit and An-Najah universities reflects public attitudes Palestinian in the West Bank

A majority of 69% say it supports the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 28% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 77% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 67% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 56% of the votes (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 36% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 30% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 65%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 61% and from among those, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 28% and the latter 61%.

In an open-ended question, where no names were provided to respondents, we asked the public to select a successor to president Abbas. The largest percentage (27%) selected Marwan Barghouti, 16% went to Haniyyeh, followed by Shtayyeh and Mohammad Dahlan (4% each), Khalid Mishal and Yahya al Sinwar (3% each), Hussein al Shaykh (2%), and 1% selected Mustafa Barghouti. A total of 41% said they do not know or do not support anyone.  When the same question was asked in a close-ended format, with names provided, the public expressed preference to Marwan Barghouti to succeed Abbas by 35,, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Khalid Mish’al, Mohammad Dahlan, and Mohammad Shtayyeh and Yahya al Sinwar (4% each), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%); 28% said they do not know or have not decided.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 17% and dissatisfaction at 80%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 17% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 19% and dissatisfaction at 77%. Moreover, a vast majority of 80% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 16% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 77% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 78% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip. The demand for the resignation of president Abbas is higher in the Gaza Strip (85%) compared to the West Bank (78%), in refugee camps and cities (84% and 82% respectively) compared to villages (74%), among women (83%) compared to men (79%), among holders of BA degree (87%) compared to those with primary education and the illiterates (75% and 49% respectively), among students (84%) compared to laborers (72%), among those with the lowest income (84%) compared to those with the highest income (75%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (94% and 86% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (57%).

51% say they heard and 47% say they did not hear Abbas' recent speech at the UN in which he demanded international protection for the Palestinian people. But 82% of those who heard the speech say they are dissatisfied with what the president said in his speech while only17% of those who heard the speech say they are satisfied with it. Dissatisfaction with Abbas' speech increases in the West Bank (85%) compared to the Gaza Strip (78%), in cities and villages (84% and 80% respectively) compared to refugee camps (72%), among women (85%) compared to men (80%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (92%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (79%), among holders of BA degree (86%) compared to those with primary education (73%), among those who work in the private sector (84%) compared to those who work in the public sector (72%); and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (96% and 79% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (59%).

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that p articipated in the 2006 elections, 66% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 31% say they will vote for Fatah, 11% will vote for all third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 44% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 25% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago).

31% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 21% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 43% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 26% selected Hamas, 24% Fatah under Abbas, and 44% said neither side deserves such a role.

A majority of 51% thinks that the recent student election results of Birzeit and al Najah universities, in which the student bloc affiliated with Hamas won over the student bloc affiliated with Fatah, does not reflect the balance of power in the Palestinian society in the West Bank or among the students in general; 46% think these results do reflect the positions of the total public in the West Bank. The belief that the victory of Hamas-affiliated students at Birzeit and Al-Najah universities reflects general attitudes in the West Bank as a whole increases in the Gaza Strip (63%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (49%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (44%), among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (38%), among holders of BA degree (50%) compared to those with primary education and the illiterates (34% and 33% respectively), among students (49%) compared to merchants (26%), among those who work in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private sector (45%), among the religious (53%) compared to the somewhat religious (40%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (76% and 55% respectively) compared to supporters of Fateh (29%).

• 84% believe there is corruption in PA institutions and 73% believe there is corruption in Hamas-run institutions in the Gaza Strip
• 63% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people
• 25% want to emigrate, 29% in the Gaza Strip and 22% in the West Bank

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 46%. Three months ago, the perception of safety and security in the West Bank stood at 46% and at 73% in the Gaza Strip.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 73% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 82% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 71% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas. 40% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 55% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (63%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, the findings were exactly the same: 63% viewed the PA as a burden and 33% viewed it as an asset.

23% are optimistic and 74% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 22%.

After more than four years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 81% expect failure; only 15% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 16% of the public expect success and 79% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 81% expects failure and 16% expects success. The following figure shows that the trend, which started four years ago with a little optimistic expectation to begin with, have declined significantly over the last two years.

25% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 29% and in the West Bank at 22%. Three months ago, 19% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 32% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 33%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Palestine Today TV (9% each), Maan TV (5%), al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (at 3% each), and al Manar at 1%.

• Only 28% support the two-state solution
• 53% support a return to an armed intifada, 47% support waging peaceful resistance, and 26% support a one-state solution
• 52% believe that armed action is the best way to end occupation
• 46% expect the fall of the Netanyahu government due to the protest demonstrations
• A quarter look with admiration at the protest demonstrations against Netanyahu

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 70%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 27%.  Support for the two-state solution is correlated with perception of feasibility and the prospects for the creation of a Palestinian state. A vast majority of 71% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 28% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 78% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 74% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion. The following figure shows the significance of the correlation between support for the two-state solution and the perception of feasibility.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 21% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 76% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 22%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 47% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 53% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 58% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 52% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 52% chose armed struggle (55% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank), 21% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Three months ago, 54% chose armed struggle and 18% chose negotiations.

In light of the anti-government demonstrations in Israel, 46% think they could lead to the fall of the Netanyahu government while 49% think they do not expect that to happen. Three months ago, 50% expected the fall of the Netanyahu government.

When asked whether the public views the Israeli demonstrations against the Netanyahu government with admiration, a quarter (33% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip) said these mass protests do indeed deserve admiration. But a larger percentage, standing at 35% (56% in the Gaza Strip and 21% in the West Bank) said they do not see in these demonstrations anything worth admiration and 38% (43% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) said the protest are of no concern for the Palestinian people.

When comparing the Israeli and Palestinian judiciaries, the largest percentage of the Palestinians, standing at 36% (40% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip), said that the Israeli judiciary is independent but the Palestinian judiciary is subordinate to the president or the government; 31% believe that the two judicial systems are not independent; 13% believe the Palestinian judiciary is independent and the Israeli judiciary is not; and 9% believe that the two judiciaries are independent.

• 60% do not expect the Iranian-Saudi reconciliation to reflect positively on the Palestinian issue
• 35% expect the Iranian-Saudi reconciliation to lead to further normalization with Israel and 19% expect the opposite

A majority of 60% believes that reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia will not leave a positive impact on the Palestinian issue while 30% believe it will reflect positively on it. Moreover, 36% believe that the impact of such reconciliation on Palestinian-Saudi relations will not be negative or positive, while 28% believe it will have a positive impact and 26% believe it will have a negative impact. 38% believe that the impact of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement on reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas will be neither negative nor positive; 27% believe it will have a negative impact, and 25% believe it will be positive.

Moreover, 37% believe that reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran will have neither negative nor positive impact on chances of stopping Arab normalization with Israel. But 35% believe that the effect will be negative and lead to further normalization and 19% believe it will be positive and stop or decrease normalization. The largest percentage (39%) believes that the impact of the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement will be neither negative nor positive on stopping or reducing the intensity of the war in Yemen while 27% believe that it will have a positive impact and stop or reduce the war intensity, and 18% believe the impact will be negative and increase the intensity of that war.

• 38% say that the establishment of a Palestinian state should be the first goal of the Palestinian people
• Corruption is the first problem facing Palestinian society today in the eyes of 25% of the public
• The most pressing problem for Palestinians today is the continuation of occupation in the eyes of 38% of the public

38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 14% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 25% (9% in the Gaz Strip and 35% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 22% (30% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 19% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction;  18% (30% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 10% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 3% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  Not surprisingly, the following figure shows significant differences in the assessments of the West Bankers of the main problems compared to that of Gazans.

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 18% said it is unemployment; 13% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 5% said it is the internal violence, and 1% said it is the inadequate infrastructure. The following figure shows that West Bankers and Gazans agree that the Israeli occupation is the most pressing problem, but differ in their assessment of the rest of the problems.

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This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13 and 17 September 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli army without the participation of Hamas, the visit of the US president Joe Biden to Bethlehem and his meeting with president Abbas, the appointment of Yair Lapid as a prime minister replacing Bennet and the setting of a date for new Israeli elections, an announcement by the United Arab Emirates of $25  millions in support to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem, talk about opening the Israeli Ramon airport to Palestinian travel, an Israeli decision to increase the number of Gazan laborers working in Israel, an attempted assassination against the former deputy prime minister in Hamas’ government, Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir, near Nablus, a PA announcement that salaries of Palestinian laborers working in Israel would be paid via Palestinian banks, plans by the PA to reduce the number of employees working in the public sector, and Abbas talk during his visit to Germany of 50 Holocausts.  This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The results of the third quarter of 2022 show a limited change in the domestic balance of power as the gap between Fatah and Hamas is now two percentage points in favor of Fatah while, three months ago, it was one point in favor of Hamas. Similarly, the gap in the 

popularity of president Abbas vs. Ismail Haniyyeh has now narrowed to 15 percentage points in favor of Haniyyeh while, three months ago, it was 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh. It seems there are two main reasons for this limited change: the disapproval of Hamas, especially in the West Bank, regarding its non-involvement in the armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel in August and the rise of Abbas popularity, also especially in the West Bank, in light of the Israeli and German criticism of his reference to the “Holocaust” when describing the Israeli massacres against the Palestinians.

Among the findings on the domestic side, three in particular stand out and should raise an alarm:

1. There is a widespread worry among all Palestinian sectors, reaching about 70% in the West Bank, who view the attempted assassination of Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir as an indication that an internal armed strife might erupt in the West Bank when conditions are ripe, as happened in the past in the Gaza Strip.
2. The narrative of the PA government, regarding the transfer of salary payments to Palestinian laborers who work in Israel, has no credibility among the public as the poll finds only one in ten Palestinians trusting the PA statements regarding this matter while the vast majority stand with the laborers and sympathize with their fears.
3. There is a widespread rejection, reaching about 80%, of the PA government plans to cut down the number of the public sector employees. In case the PA goes ahead with its plans, a large majority wants the cuts to take place in the security sector only which reveals existing concerns among the public regarding the justification for having such a large security sector to begin with.

On Israeli- Palestinian relations, support for the two-state solution and for the one-state solution rises in this poll. It now resembles the support that existed about 6 months ago. This development is accompanied, as expected, with a decline in the percentage of those who think the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion. The findings also show a continued rise in the positive view of the public regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures, reaching 70% for the first time, with an even greater appreciation of the measure in which a larger number of work permits are issued by Israel for laborers from the Gaza Strip.

Perhaps because of the above, but also due to the negative public assessment of the last armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel, the findings indicate a significant decline in support for armed attacks or a return to an armed intifada and a significant rise in support for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. 

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• In presidential elections between president Abbas and Hamas leader Haniyyeh the former receives 38% and the latter 53%
• But in presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 63% and the latter 33%
• Satisfaction with president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71% and 74% demand Abbas' resignation
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 32% of the vote and Fatah 34%
• 27% believe that Hamas is most deserving to lead the Palestinian people while 26% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving 

69% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 29% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 78% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 57%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 53% of the votes (compared to 55% for Haniyeh and 33% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 59%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 40% and Haniyeh 46%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 63% and Haniyeh 33%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 45% and from among those, the former receives 32% and the latter 60%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (41%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), Mohammad Shtayyeh (3%), Hussein al Sheikh (2%), and 22% said they do not know or have not decided.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 26% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, a vast majority of 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 77% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 34% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 44% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 21% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 37% three months ago).

27% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 26% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 42% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 33% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 38% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%; in the Gaza Strip, 29% want to emigrate and in the West Bank, 23% want to emigrate
• 86% say there is corruption in the PA institutions and 73% say there is corruption in the institutions under Hamas’ control in the Gaza Strip
• 57% say the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and 38% say it is an asset
• 27% accuse the PA security services or armed men from Fatah of the responsibility over the attempted assassination against Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir and 63% are worried that this incident might signal possible future internal armed strife
• 79% are opposed to PA plans to reduce the size of the public sector
• Only 12% trust PA statements regarding the transfer of salary payments of laborers, who work inside Israel, to Palestinian banks
• 73% believe the PA government is not doing enough to reduce prices 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 76% and in the West Bank at 54%. Moreover, 25% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 29% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 26% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 27% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 73% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 86% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 71% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas. On free speech, 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 46% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 54% think they cannot. Moreover, in its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (57%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 38% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 36% viewed it as an asset. On the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 25% are optimistic and 73% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 26%.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 25% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 73% expects failure and 22% expects success. But the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 67% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 49%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 41%.

We asked the public about its expectations regarding the identity of the perpetrators of the attempted assassination against Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir near Nablus two months ago. The responses did not indicate a clear trend but about 27% pointed the figure at the Palestinian security services and Fatah: 14% said the security services and 13% said armed men from Fatah. Additionally, about 14% said the assassination attempt came as a result of a struggle within al Najah university, where Dr. al Sha’ir works, while an identical percentage accused the Israeli army, 9% thought it resulted from personal or family conflict, and 6% thought it resulted from conflict within Hamas. A large majority of 63% is worried that this assassination attempt might lead to internal armed confrontations when conditions are ripe as had happened in the past in the Gaza Strip; 28% say they are not worried. The level of worry is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 69% and 53% respectively. Worry is also higher in villages/towns (72%) compared to cities and refugee camps (61% and 66% respectively), among the less educated (64%) compared to the more educated (60%), among the somewhat religious (67%) compared to the religious (59%) and among supporters of Fatah (69%) compared to supporters of Hamas (57%).

A majority of 61% is opposed the lawyers’ strike which was waged to protest the decisions of the PA president to amend legislation affecting the judiciary; 26% stand in favor.

An overwhelming majority of 79% says it opposes PA plans to cut down the size of the public sector while only 19% say they are in favor.  When asked about the sector whose size should be cut, the majority (62%) selected the security sector, 15% selected education, 10% selected health, and 6% selected social affairs. The percentage of those who selected the security sector for downsizing is higher in the West Bank (73%) compared to the Gaza Strip (46%), in villages/towns (68%) compared to refugee camps and cities (51% and 63% respectively), among men (67%) compared to women (56%), among those whose age is 30 years of higher (64%) compared to those whose age is less than 30 years (54%), among the less educated (68%) compared to the more educated (54%), among non-refugees (73%) compared to refugees (49%), and among supporters of Fatah (66%) compared to supporters of Hamas (55%).

The overwhelming majority (85%) expresses solidarity with Palestinian laborers who work in Israel in rejecting the PA announcement that the salaries of these laborers will be paid to them via Palestinian banks while only 12% say they trust the government assurances to the laborers that this measure will help protect their interests, allowing them to benefit from the banking services, and that no new taxes will be imposed on those salaries. Trust in the PA assurances stands at 6% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Trust in PA assurances is also higher in refugee camps (25%) compared to cities and villages/towns (11% each), among refugees (16%) compared to non-refugees (10%), among those who work in the public sector (23%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (12%), and among supporters of Fatah (24%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (14% each).  

The vast majority (73%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 25% say it is doing so. We asked the public about the burden imposed on their households due to the rise in prices and asked them to tell us which sector or sectors were the most affected: 48% selected the food sector; 27% selected energy such as electricity, solar, and gasoline, 14% said rent, 6% said education, 3% said transportation, and 3% said health.   

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 29%, followed by al Aqsa TV (11%), Maan, Palestine Today TV, and Palestine TV (10% each), al Arabiya (4%), al Mayadeen (3%), and al Manar (1%).

(3) Islamic Jihad-Israel armed confrontation:

• Only 12% think Islamic Jihad came out a winner in its last battle with Israel
• 50% think Hamas’ decision not to be directly involved in Islamic Jihad’s battle with Israel was the right one and 37% think it was the wrong decision 

The largest percentage (42%) thinks that neither Israel nor Islamic Jihad won the last armed confrontations between the two sides last month. But 27% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank) think Israel came out a winner while only 12% think Islamic Jihad came out a winner. Surprisingly, 11% think Hamas, who did not participate in the confrontation, came out a winner. The belief that Islamic Jihad won is higher in the West Bank (13%) compared to the Gaza Strip (11%), in cities and villages/towns (13% and 12% respectively) compared to refugee camps (8%), among supporters of third parties (15%) compared to supporters of Hamas and Fatah (12% each).

  Half of the public (50%) says that Hamas’ decision not to become directly involved in the armed exchange between Islamic Jihad and the Israeli army was the correct decision while 37% say it was the wrong decision.  The view that Hamas did the right thing is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (68%) compared to the West Bank (38%), in refugee camps and cities (54% and 53% respectively) compared to villages/towns (35%), among men (54%) compared to women (47%), among the more educated (57%) compared to the less educated (47%), among refugees (59%) compared to non-refugees (43%), among those who work in the public sector (58%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (50%), among the religious (57%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (45% each), and among supporters of Hamas (74%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 57% respectively).

But only 27% expect Hamas’ decision to lead to an improvement in economic conditions in the Gaza Strip while the largest percentage (42%) thinks economic conditions will remain unchanged and 22% think they will worsen. In the Gaza Strip, 34% expect conditions to improve while only 23% of West Bankers think that.

(4) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the two-state solution rises from 28% to 37%
• Support for a one-state solution with equal rights rises from 22% to 30%
• Support for a return to armed confrontations and an armed intifada drops from 55% to 48%
• Support for negotiations rises from 22% to 30%
• 69% look positively at confidence building measures
• 41% are willing to travel via Ramon airport and 55% are unwilling
• 42% support negotiations with Israel under Arab and international sponsorship and 56% are opposed
• 58% are less optimistic about an improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations after the Biden visit to Bethlehem 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 37% and opposition stands at 60%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 28%.   When few details were added, such as “two states for two peoples” along the lines of 1967 with small and equal border modifications, support rose slightly to 38% and opposition dropped to 57%.  But a majority of 64% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 76% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 18% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 70% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 30% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 67% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 22%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 55% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 46% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 55% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 41% chose armed struggle (50% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank), 30% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 22% chose negotiations.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 69% said it looks positively, while 27% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 65% of the public said it viewed these measures positively. A vast majority of 78% looks positively at the Israeli decision to increase the number of laborers from the Gaza Strip who work in Israel; only 20% look at that decision negatively.

We asked the public about its willingness to use the Israeli Ramon airport, located near Elate, instead of the Amman or Cairo airports: 41% expressed willingness to do so while a majority of 55% said it is not willing to do so.  But when we asked the public if it looks positively or negatively about the possibility of allowing Gaza residents to use that airport, the majority (58%) said it looks at such a step positively and only 37% said it looks at it negatively. Willingness to travel via the Ramon airport is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (39%), among those whose age is less than 30 years (48%) compared to those whose age is 30 years or higher (40%), among the somewhat religious (45%) compared to the religious (36%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (59% and 52% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (24%).

Under current conditions, a majority of 68% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about support and opposition to negotiations with Israel under Arab and international sponsorship, 42% were in favor and 56% against. Support for a return to negotiations with Israel under Arab and international sponsorship is higher in refugee camps (57%) compared to villages/towns and cities (45% and 40% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (47%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (39%), among those with the lowest income (45%) compared to those with the highest income (36%), among the somewhat religious (44%) compared to the religious (40%), and among supporters of Fatah (65%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (20% and 46% respectively).

Similarly, when asked about PA negotiations with the current Israeli prime minister, Yair Lapid, only 35% said they opposed such negotiations while 30% said they support negotiations with him on a peace agreement and confidence building measures while 13% said they support negotiations if restricted to a peace agreement and an identical percentage said they support negotiations with him if restricted to confidence building measures. In other words, a total of 43% are in favor of negotiations with Lapid about a peace agreement and an identical percentage is in favor of negotiations with him about confidence building measures.  

The largest percentage (36%) expects Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and form the next government while 21% expect Lapid to win the elections; 26% say neither will win.

61% are opposed, and 34% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the US administration under president Joe Biden.  In light of the visit to Bethlehem by the US president Joe Biden, 53% say they are less optimistic about the prospects for improvement in economic conditions after the visit and the meeting with Abbas while only 16% express optimism and 26% say they are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Similarly, 53% are less optimistic that internal conditions, such as reconciliation or the holding of elections, will improve now after the visit by Biden; 17% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Moreover, 58% are less optimistic that Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as agreement on more confidence building measures or reduction in settlement construction, will see improvement now after the Biden visit; only 13% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Despite the overall lack of optimism, 43% say they now, after the Biden visit, expect the US to increase its aid to the PA while 53% say the do not expect that.

Two-thirds think it was right for Abbas to use the “Holocaust” in reference to Israeli massacres against Palestinians during his visit to Germany; 26% think it was wrong for him to use that term.

(5) Support from the UAE to East Jerusalem hospital:

• 61% think aid from the UAE to al Makasid Hospital helps the steadfastness of the Palestinians
• But only 31% say they welcome aid to residents of East Jerusalem or the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from Arab countries that recently normalized relations with Israel 

We asked about the support provided by the United Arab Emirates to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem: 61% said the support helps the steadfastness of the Palestinians while 36% said it does not help.  We then asked about expectations that other Arab countries, that recently normalized relations with Israel, such as Bahrain and Morocco, would also provide similar support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank: a majority of 54% said it does not expect that while 42% said they expect that.

We then asked the public if it welcomes or does not welcome support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip from these countries that recently normalized relations with Israel: two thirds said the do not and 31% said they do. The percentage of those who welcome aid from these Arab countries is higher in the Gaza Strip (33%) than in the West Bank (30%), in refugee camps (52%) compared to cities and villages/towns (29% and 32% respectively), among men (33%) compared to women (29%), among those whose age is below 30 years (35%) compared to those whose age is 30 and above (30%), among the more educated (34%) compared to the less educated (30%), among those with the highest income (35%) compared to those with the lowest income (29%), among the somewhat religious (34%) compared to the religious (27%), and among supporters of Fatah (46%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (22% and 27% respectively).

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 40% believe that the most vital goal for the Palestinians should be the ending of Israeli occupation and the building of a Palestinian state
• Poverty and unemployment followed by corruption are the two most important problems confronting the Palestinians today while the largest percentage (32%) says the Israeli occupation is the most pressing problem 

40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 17% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 27% (28% in the Gaz Strip and 26% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; another 27% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% (34% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 11% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 8% (11% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (36%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the split or division, and 9% said it is the internal violence.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 27-30 June 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the formation of a new government led by Mohammad Shtayyeh, the intensification of the PA financial crisis as the PA was unable to provide full salary payment to its public sector, and the leaking of documents indicating illegal salary hikes for ministers by the previous government. It also witnessed the continued failure of reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas and the inability of Israel and Hamas to reach a long term hudna or cessation of violence. Jifna, a predominantly Christian town in the West Bank, came under attack from some Palestinian Muslims who had quarreled earlier with one of its residents. Despite the personal nature of the attack, it nonetheless generated concerns about Muslim-Christian tensions. In Israel, the right wing won the elections but could not form a government leading to the dissolution of the new parliament with new snap elections called for in September. This Israeli development led the Trump Administration to postpone the release of its long-awaited peace deal, the so-call “Deal of the Century.” This was followed by the holding of an economic workshop in Bahrain in which the US Administration unveiled the economic side of its peace plan. Finally, tensions escalated in the region after Iran downed a US unmanned drone, a further threat to the region as concerns grow about a possible war. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2019 show a widespread rejection of the US Administration, the “Deal of the Century,” and the Bahrain workshop: Ninety percent say that they do not believe or trust the US administration; about 80% supported the PA decision to boycott the Bahrain workshop; three quarters want the PA to reject the Trump peace plan when released; and more than three quarters believe that the US economic plan will not bring them economic prosperity. Similarly, an overwhelming majority reject the participation of Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, in the Bahrain workshop and 80% view that participation as an abandonment of the Palestinian cause. 

Findings also show that half of the public continues to oppose the two-state solution, a solution which is viewed by the majority as impractical or infeasible due to West Bank settlement expansion. The public is divided into three groups in its assessment of the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation: armed action comes first followed by negotiations and then popular nonviolent resistance. Findings show that the majority expects the future Israeli government, that will be formed after the upcoming elections, to annex settlement areas in the West Bank, wage war against the Gaza Strip, and take measures that would bring about PA collapse.

On internal matters, the public is not yet willing to give the Shtayyeh government a passing grade, as most view its performance similar or worse than that of the previous government while a small number views positively that performance. Similarly, findings show that despite public support for the PA decision to refuse to accept the Israeli transfer of partial custom revenues, the majority is worried that this decision could lead to PA collapse. A large majority, more than two-thirds, views the sudden discovery that the former government has illegally increased the salaries of its ministers as an indication that PA corruption is deep rooted while only a quarter believes that PA corruption is limited and subject to accountability.

The majority of the public remains pessimistic about the prospects for reconciliation. A majority is opposed to those preconditions imposed on reconciliation by Fatah, i.e., the “one gun” demand, and Hamas, i.e., the demand to keep the “resistance arms.” Nonetheless, two thirds of those who oppose these two preconditions reject Abbas’s demand to disarm Hamas. Those who support preconditions are divided equally: one half sides with Hamas’s and the other with Fatah’s. As we found in previous polls, the overwhelming majority demands the immediate removal of sanctions imposed previously by Abbas against Hamas and the Gaza Strip.

Finally, findings show that the domestic balance of power remains largely stable compared to the first quarter. Fatah did manage to increase the gap in its popularity with Hamas slightly in its favor. But the gap in the vote for Abbas vs. Ismail Haniyyeh, in a presidential election, narrowed slightly in Haniyyeh’s favor. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’s resignation continues to decline despite the fact that it remains very high. The overwhelming majority of the public demands the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose elections restricted to the parliament.

(1) The Bahrain economic workshop and Trump peace plan:

• 79% support the PA decision to boycott the Bahrain workshop
• 76% do not expect, and 17% expect, the US economic plan to lead to economic prosperity
• 90% do not trust the US Administration; 6% trust it
• 80% view the Arab participation in the Bahrain workshop as an abandonment of the Palestinians
• In choosing between independence and economic prosperity, 83% select independence and 15% prosperity
• 85% think the Deal of the Century will not lead to end of occupation
• 75% want the Palestinian leadership to reject the Deal of the Century

An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (79%) supports the PA decision to boycott the Bahrain economic workshop while 15% are opposed. Support for the boycott is higher in the West Bank (81%) compared to the Gaza Strip (74%), in villages/towns (89%) compared to refugee camps and cities (66% and 79% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (85%) compared to those who support the peace process (78%), among holders of the BA degree (83%) compared to the illiterates (64%), and among supporters of Hamas (84%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (78% and 75% respectively).

After describing the details of the economic part of the US peace plan, we asked public if it thinks the US Administration will succeed in implementing it: two thirds (68%) say it will not succeed and 22% say it will.  Similarly, the overwhelming majority of the public (76%) says that based on what it has heard about the outcome of the Bahrain workshop, it does not expect the US economic plan to lead to Palestinian prosperity; 17% do expect it to do that.  Moreover, an overwhelming majority of 90% indicates that it does not trust the US Administration when it says that the goal of the Bahrain workshop is to improve Palestinian economic conditions; only 6% trust the US Administration. Similarly, 80% say that the participation of Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, in the Bahrain workshop signifies an Arab abandonment of the Palestinians while 12% believe the participation of these countries signifies support for the Palestinians.

When asked if it believes that the PA leadership will show willingness to accept the Trump peace plan in order to benefit from its economic dimension, about two thirds (65%) say it will not while 27% say it will.  When asked to choose between economic prosperity and independence, the overwhelming majority (83%) opts for independence; only 15% chose economic prosperity.  Can economic prosperity be achieved under Israeli occupation? 73% say it cannot, as restrictions imposed by the occupation impede prosperity, while 24% say that it is possible to have prosperity while still under occupation. 

When we shift to the political dimension of the Trump peace plan, the overwhelming majority (86%) says that based on what it has heard so far about the plan, it feels pessimistic about its content while only 9% express optimism.  We asked the public if it thinks acceptance of the Trump peace plan by the PA would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 85% say no; only 10% say yes it would. When asked if it thinks the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 72% says it does and only 22% say it does not.  Almost three quarters (73%) believe that in response to Palestinian rejection of the Trump peace plan, the US will impose further sanctions on the Palestinians; 18% say it will amend its plan in case of Palestinian rejection. 

Nonetheless, three quarters believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan; 15% say it should accept it with reservations; and 4% believe it should accept it without reservation.  Moreover, a majority of 66% is opposed and 24% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.  The demand for the rejection of the Trump peace plan is higher in the West Bank (78%) compared to the Gaza Strip (71%), in villages/towns and cities (81% and 76% respectively) compared to refugee camps (63%), among males (78%) compared to females (72%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (78% and 76% respectively) compared to the unreligious (54%), among those opposed to the peace process (84%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (73%), among those whose age is 50 years and higher (79%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (66%), among the non-refugees (78%) compared to refugees (71%), among the married (76%) compared to the unmarried (70%), and among Hamas supporters (82%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (73% each).

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 57% want the president to resign and 35% want him to stay in office
• In a contest between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% of the vote and the latter 42%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 39% of the vote, Hamas 30%, and all others combined 10%

Only 41% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 47% believe no elections will take place.  An overwhelming majority (71%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 11% want parliamentary elections only. 13% do not want any elections. If elections were held for a parliament and a president, 73% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 21% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip. 

57% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 60% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 49% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 58%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 42% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 34% (40% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).  If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter 42% of the vote (compared to 51% for Abbas and 41% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 43% of the vote (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 52% (compared to 51% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 55% three months ago) and Haniyeh 36% (compared to 33% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 34%. 

In an open-ended question, we ask about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 27% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 4% (1% in the West Bank and 11% in the Gaza Strip) and Khalid Mishal, Salam Fayyad, and Mustafa Barghouti are selected after him by 2% each.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 67% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 33% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 25% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 45% three months ago). 

(3) A new government led by Mohammad Shtayyeh:

• So far, evaluation of the performance of the Shtayyeh government is negative
• The majority expects the Shtayyeh government to fail in achieving reconciliation, conducting elections, and improving economic conditions

With more than two months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (53%), the economy (44%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (53%), the preparation to hold general elections (55%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (54%). But a percentage ranging between 45% and 24% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 7% and 12% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government.

Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 59% expects failure; only 28% expects success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expects success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 30% expects success.  The belief that the performance of the Shtayyeh government in the preparation for holding elections is worse than that of the previous government is higher  in the Gaza Strip (26%) compared to the West Bank (23%), in cities (26%) compared to villages/towns and refugee camps (18% and 22% respectively), among males (26%) compared to females (22%), among laborers (32%) compared to employees (20%), and among Hamas supporters (34%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (19% and 18% respectively).   

Expectations that the Shtayyeh government will succeed in conducting parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are equal in the two areas (34% each) but higher in villages/towns (40%) compared to cities (32%), among supporters of the peace process (41%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (21%), among non-refugees (36%) compared to refugees (31%), among holders of BA degree (36%) compared to illiterates (26%), among students (42%) compared to laborers (31%), among those who work in the public sector (38%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (33%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 40% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (25%).  

(4) Domestic conditions:

• 62% support, and 29% oppose, PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues
• 52% are worried, and 39% are not worried, that this decision could lead to PA collapse
• 80% believe there is corruption in the PA and 67% believe this corruption is deep-rooted in it
• 26% want to emigrate: 42% in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank

A majority of 62% supports and 29% oppose the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues. However, a majority of 52% says that it is worried that this decision could lead to the collapse of the PA while 39% indicate that it could not. A majority of 65% believes that the new Israeli government that will be formed after the upcoming elections will continue to deduct money from the Palestinian custom revenues while 25% expect it to stop this practice. Support for the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of revenues is higher in the Gaza Strip (65%) compared to the West Bank (60%), among holders of BA degree (66%) compared to the illiterates (61%), among the professionals (73%) compared to laborers (53%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (60%), and among Fatah supporters (68%) compared to Hamas and third parties supporters (63% and 59% respectively).

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%. Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 67%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 59%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 64% and in the West Bank at 57%.  26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 42% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.  Only 40% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 57% say that they cannot. Three months ago, 65% of West Bankers said they could not criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear. The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 48% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. When asked about the measures taken by the previous government in illegally raising the salaries of its ministers, 67% indicate that they believe that this kind of corruption is deep rooted in the PA while only 25% think it is partial and subject to accountability; 4% think that there is no corruption in the PA.  The belief that PA corruption is deep-rooted is higher in the West Bank (70%) compared to the Gaza Strip (60%), in villages/towns (72%) compared to cities and refugee camps (66% and 67% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (78%) compared to those who support the peace process (63%), among the illiterates (80%) compared to the holders of the BA degree (67%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (69%) compared to those who work in the public sector (56%), and among Hamas supporters (79%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (52% and 47% respectively).

Asked about the implications of the incident in the predominantly Christian town of Jifna in the West Bank, in which a group of Palestinians attacked the town, 69% indicated that they believe Palestinian Christian-Muslim relations are normal, as one would expect from the people who belong to one nation; but 24% thought relations between the two communities might be heading to greater tensions.  The percentage of those who believe that the relationship between Christians and Muslims are becoming more tense is greater in the Gaza Strip (27%) compared to the West Bank (22%), in cities (25%) compared to villages/towns (19%), among the unreligious (40%) compared to the religious and the somewhat religious (25% and 20% respectively), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (27%) compared to those whose is age is 50 years and above (20%), among the illiterates (29%) compared to the holders of BA degree (23%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (26%) compared to those who work in the public sector (17%), and among those third parties and Hamas supporters (35% and 28% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (23%).  

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 21%, followed by Palestine TV (14%), Maan TV (13%), Al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV (9%), and al Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (4% each).  

(5) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government: 

• Only one third is optimistic about the chances for reconciliation
• A majority of 53% opposes the imposition of any preconditions to reconciliation
• 79% demand the removal of all sanctions imposed by the PA on Hamas and the Gaza Strip

33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%. When asked about the preconditions imposed by Fatah (the demand for “one arm”) and Hamas (the demand for the preservation of the “arms of the resistance,”) on reconciliation and reunification, a majority of 53% of the public indicates that it opposes such preconditions and 38% indicate support. Among those who support the imposition of preconditions (i.e., the 38% of the public), the respondents are divided evenly between those who support Hamas’s precondition (42%) and those who supported Fatah’s (41%). However, among those who oppose the imposition of preconditions (i.e., the 53% of the public), the majority of the respondents (67%) indicates its opposition to disarming Hamas while only 29% express opposition to preserving party-affiliated armed groups alongside the PA security forces. From among those who are opposed to preconditions, opposition to disarming Gazan armed groups is higher in the West Bank (68%) compared to the Gaza Strip (62%), among those opposed to the peace process (76%) compared to those who support the peace process (63%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (71%) compared to those whose age is 50 year and above (65%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (79% and 69% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (56%).

Moreover, the overwhelming majority (79%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 17% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government. A majority of 51% (down to 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 8% believe the chances are high.

6) The peace process

• 47% support and 50% oppose the concept of the two-state solution
• To end occupation, 38% see armed action as most effective, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular non-violent resistance
• 62% support popular non-violent resistance, 47% support an armed intifada, 38% support dissolution of the PA, and 31% support an abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution
• 57% expect the right wing to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 59% expect the next Israeli government to annex settlements in the West Bank

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 47% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 48%. 44% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 48% believe that the majority opposes it.  Similarly, 48% support and 45% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative (API). Support for API is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (47%), in refugee camps and cities (55% and 50% respectively) compared to villages/towns (39%), among females (53%) compared to males (44%), among the somewhat religious (51%) compared to the religious (45%), among supporters of the peace process (58%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (26%), among those whose age is 50 years and above (51%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (39%), among the illiterates (57%) compared to the holders of BA degree (44%), among housewives, professionals, and employees (54%, 48%, and 48%) compared to students (37%), among those who work in the public sector (56%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (43%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (62% and 61% respectively) compared to Hamas supporters (33%).  

A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 40% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 71% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 34% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 10% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 39% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 30% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  The public is divided over the role of negotiations and armed struggle in the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 38% think armed struggle is the most effective means; 35% think that negotiation is the most effective means; and 23% believe that non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 37% said negotiation is the most effective means and 36% said armed struggle is the most effective means.  Similarly, when asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public splits into three groups: 38% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance.  The belief that armed action is more effective than negotiations or popular non-violent resistance in ending the Israeli occupation is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) than the West Bank (33%), in refugee camps (43%) compared to villages/towns and cities (38% and 37% respectively), among males (43%) compared to females (33%), among the religious (43%) compared to the somewhat religious (34%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (66%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (28%), among the holders of the BA degree (40%) compared to the illiterates (35%), and among Hamas supporters (71%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (24% and 26% respectively).

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 62% support popular non-violent resistance; 47% support a return to an armed intifada; 38% support dissolving the PA; and 31% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 47% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 41% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.

A majority of 57% expects the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 18% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections.  A majority of 59% expects the future Israeli government, that will be formed after the upcoming Israeli elections, to annex some West Bank settlements while 30% think the Israeli talk of annexation is merely an election campaign slogan. Similarly, 52% expect the future Israeli government to force the PA to collapse while 38% believe it will seek to maintain the PA. A majority of 56% believes the future Israeli government will wage a war against the Gaza Strip while 33% expects it to seek a long term hudna of cessation of violence with Hamas.

7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% think that the most vital goal should be the end of occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state
• 32% think unemployment and poverty is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today; 29% think it is occupation and settlements

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 32% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 29% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 19% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 16% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings....Full report