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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-19 March 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the announcement of a presidential decree to hold parliamentary elections on 22 May and presidential elections on 31 July 2021. It also witnessed a significant rise in number of coronavirus deaths and infections. The coronavirus vaccine was not made available in large numbers by the PA government during the period before the conduct of the poll. A limited vaccination process did however start using a small quantity that was made available to the PA. The process however was marred by accusations of favoritism and lack of transparency. The ICC issued a statement affirming jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories. Joe Biden assumed his position as the new US president during this period. Israel announced the holding of new parliamentary elections to take place on 23 March. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The focus of our poll for the first quarter of 2021 has been placed on the expected election process. Findings show that the overwhelming majority is still in favor of holding these elections and that the public is much more optimistic that these elections will indeed take place soon. This realization seems to have impacted attitudes and voting intentions, which are now probably more serious and calculated. The poll sought to explore public priorities and expectations in these elections. In particular, we sought to examine the likely consequences of the election results, particularly if Hamas wins and forms a government. The poll sought also to understand the implications of the emergence of rivals to Fatah, from within its own ranks, to the movement’s performance in the elections.

Findings show that the top priorities in these elections for the voters are four: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, improving economic conditions, combating corruption, and the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip. The largest percentage believes that a Hamas electoral victory would most likely have a negative impact on all these priorities except combating corruption where no negative impact is expected. These expectations might have affected voting intentions as the findings indicate a rise in the vote for Fatah and a decline in the willingness to vote for Hamas compared to our findings three months ago.

Fatah does have its own problems, particularly in the Gaza Strip, because of the probable competition over the likely Fatah’s votes from two independent electoral lists of Mohammad Dahlan and Naser al Qidwah. More seriously, if Marwan Barghouti decides to have his own electoral list, Fatah’s vote would split into two equivalent shares. As for other third parties outside Fatah and Hamas, such as those of the left, Salam Fayyad’s, Hasan Khraishah’s, and others, it is probably too early to reach definitive conclusions at this stage regarding the likelihood that most of these lists would pass the 1.5% electoral threshold.  The findings do show that al Mubadarah, led by Mustafa Barghouti, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine would probably succeed in passing that threshold. For the presidency, the findings indicate a limited increase in public demand for Abbas’ resignation despite the fact that he is doing better than he did three months ago in a competition with Hamas’ leader Ismael Haniyyeh. The findings make it clear however that the public prefers to see Marwan Barghouti as the next president of the PA as he is preferred over all other potential candidates including Fatah’s Abbas and Hamas’ Haniyyeh.

In other domestic issues, public attitudes seem stable compared to three months ago. This applies to the perceptions of safety and security as well as corruption within the PA. There is however a limited rise in optimism regarding reconciliation and in the perception that people can criticize the PA without fear.  Slightly less than what we found three months ago, a large segment of the public, almost half, is still reluctant or unwilling to be vaccinated.

On the peace process, findings show that support for the two-state solution remains unchanged. Similarly, public preference for armed struggle vs. negotiations remains almost unchanged. But findings do show that a majority is opposed to a return to an unconditional bi-lateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiation despite the optimism generated by the election of the new Biden Administration. On the other hand, despite its recent decision to assert jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories, the public is not optimistic about the ability of the International Criminal Court, to restrict Israeli behavior in the occupied territories. In fact, a large majority thinks that no Israeli official will ever be prosecuted by the court.   

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• Great increase in public expectations that elections will take place soon from 32% to 61%
• But only 42% expect the elections to be free and fair
• In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the largest percentage wants Fatah to form the next government
• IF Marwan Barghouti forms a separate electoral list, Fatah would split into two equivalent parts and if Dahlan and Qidwah form their own separate electoral lists, Fatah would be weakened
• 57% support the formation of a joint Fatah-Hamas list
• In new legislative elections, Fatah receives 43% of the vote and Hamas 30%; and in an election in which Dahlan and Qidwah participate with two electoral lists, Fatah receives only 32% of the vote
• Top priorities of the voters are four: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, improving economic conditions, combating corruption, and removing the siege on the Gaza Strip
• Hamas is seen less able to remove the siege and improve economic conditions and Fatah is seen as less able to combat corruption
• Most respondents want Marwan Barghouti president of the PA and in a trilateral election between Marwan Barghouti, Mahmoud Abbas, and Ismail Haniyyeh, the first receives 48% of the vote, the second 29% and the third 19% 

76% demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections and 61% expect parliamentary elections to take place soon. Three months ago, only 32% expected the holding of Palestinian elections soon. If Israel refuses to allow elections to take place in the occupied City of East Jerusalem, 65% believe elections should nonetheless take place and that East Jerusalemites should be allowed to vote in places in the Jerusalem district just outside the city limits; 27% oppose that and demand the cancelation of elections if Israel does not allow East Jerusalemites to vote in their city. Three months ago, only 56% supported, and 39% opposed, the holding general elections if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem.  But only 42% believe the elections will be free and fair and 48% think they will not be free and fair. Moreover, 69% believe that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah will not accept the results and 60% say that if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will not accept that outcome. 

Legislative Elections:

In an open-ended question, we asked the public to name the party or faction it nominates to lead the next PA government: 38% (40% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip) nominated Fatah; 22% (15% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) nominated Hamas, 5% nominated an independent list, 2% nominated the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 4% nominated other groups, and 29% did not nominate any party of faction. When asked about its expectations for the winner, 45% expected Fatah to win, 23% Hamas, 18% third or newly created parties.

The poll sought to assess the role played by three prominent individuals associated with Fatah on the likely consequences for the movement if the three decide to run with their own independent lists:

A majority of 57% say they support and 38% say they oppose the formation of a joint Fatah-Hamas list to compete in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Support for a joint Fatah-Hamas list is higher in the West Bank (62%) than in the Gaza Strip (49%), in villages/towns and refugee camps (67% and 64% respectively) compared to cities (54%), among those who finished elementary school only (75%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (49%), among women (59%) compared to men (54%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (53%), among the married (58%) compared to the unmarried (51%), among those with the least income (53%) compared to those with the highest income (42%), among the religious (61%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (39% and 55% respectively), and among supporters of third parties and Hamas (65% and 60% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (49%).    

We asked the public which electoral list it will vote for in the upcoming elections. We sought to ascertain how respondents will vote in four different scenarios: (1) when the electoral lists are identical to those of 2006 elections, (2) when a joint Fatah-Hamas list is formed and Marwan Barghouti forms his own list, (3) when no joint list is created but Marwan Barghouti forms his own independent list, and (4) when no joint list is created and a Naser al Qidwah’s list replaces that of Marwan Barghouti’s. Here are the findings among those who say they intend to vote:

The largest percentage (28%) says that the top priority for Palestinian elections should be to restore unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 23% say it is improving economic conditions; 17% say it is to combat corruption; 12% say it is the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip; 11% say it is the strengthening of resistance to occupation, 4% say it is to increase the prospects for peace, and 2% say it is to create a democratic political system. When asked who is the most able to deliver the top priority selected by the respondents, 31% selected Fatah, 22% Hamas, and 9% third parties. 15% say all the competing parties and factions can equally deliver on their priorities while 19% say none can deliver.  

We asked the public to speculate about the likely consequences of a Hamas victory on six issues: (1) the siege over the Gaza Strip, (2) Gaza-West Bank unity, (3) economic conditions, (4) corruption in the PA, (5) Hamas’s response to the Quartet conditions, and (6) Israel’s response to Hamas’ victory. These are the findings:

Similarly, we asked the public about the consequences of a Fatah victory for two issues: (1) corruption, and (2) West Bank-Gaza Strip unity. These are the findings: 

	Corruption: 16% say corruption in the PA will decrease and 36% think it will increase.
	Unity: 33% think separation will be consolidated while 22% think unity will be consolidated.

Presidential elections:

In an open-ended question, we asked the public to state the name of the person it wants to be the next president of the PA. The largest percentage (22%) says Marwan Barghouti, 14% Ismail Haniyyeh, 9% Mahmoud Abbas, 7% Dahlan, 3% Khalid Mishal, 2% Mohammad Shtayyeh, 2% Mustafa Barghouti, 1% Yahya Sinwar, 6% selected various different names, and a third of the public did not know or declined to mention a name.

If Fatah nominates Abbas as its candidate for the presidential elections, a majority of 57% of the public would view him as the wrong choice believing Fatah has better candidates; only 23% of the public think Abbas is the best Fatah candidate. When asked to name a better candidate, 49% named Marwan Barghouti, 12% Mohammad Dahlan, 5% Mohammad Shtayyeh, and 4% Nasir al Qidwah.  We asked, in a closed-ended question, about potential Abbas’ successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new presidential election, 40% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal and Mustafa Barghouti by 5% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%. 

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% and the latter 46% of the votes (compared to 50% for Haniyeh and 43% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the votes (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 64% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% three months ago). IF the competition was between Abbas, Haniyyeh, and Marwan Barghouti, the first receives 19% of the vote, the second 29%, and the third 48%. In this three-sided competition, the vote for Marwan Barghouti is higher in the West Bank (55%) than in the Gaza Strip (40%), in the districts of Jericho, Bethlehem, Salfit, Nablus, Qalqilia, Tulkarm, Hebron, and Khanyounis (83%, 76%, 73%, 71%, 65%, 64%, 54%, and 53% respectively) compared to the districts of Gaza City, Ramallah, Tobas, and Jenin (22%, 33%, 39%, and 44% respectively), among those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (54%) compared to those whose age is over 40 years (43%), among women (51%) compared to men (45%), among  the somewhat religious (58%) compared to the religious (35%), among supporters of Fatah (60%) compared to supporters of Hamas (14%), and among those who think peace negotiations is the best means to end the occupation (62%) compared to those who prefer armed struggle (35%). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 63% and Haniyeh 33%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% and the latter 44%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 47% and Haniyyeh 47%. 

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 35% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. These figures are similar to those obtained three months ago. 68% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 26% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 66% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip. 

(2) The Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• 43% do not wish to take the coronavirus vaccine
• 62% think there is a lack of fairness and transparency in the distribution of the vaccine
• 55% are dissatisfied with the government’s efforts to secure the vaccine 

A majority of 55% (65% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank) says that it is willing to take the vaccine when available or has already received it; 43% (35% in the Gaza Strip and 49% in the West Bank) say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available.

A majority of 62% believes that the vaccination process in the West Bank has so far been lacking in transparency and justice while 33% believe the process has been transparent and just.  55% (36% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank) are dissatisfied with the efforts made by the PA to obtain the vaccine and 43% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 30% in the West Bank) are satisfied. Half of the public (50%) are dissatisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 47% are satisfied. Dissatisfaction in the West Bank stands at 61% and in the Gaza Strip at 34%.  The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 60% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 56% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister stands at 45%. 

(3) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 68% in the Gaza Strip and 64% in the West Bank. But the demand for emigration stands at 40% in the Gaza Strip and 23% in the West Bank
• 84% think there is corruption in PA institutions and 70% think there is corruption in the institutions run by Hamas
• 51% view the PA as a burden and 44% as an asset
• Only 34% are optimistic about reconciliation
• The majority does not think the Shtayyeh government will succeed in securing reconciliation, reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or improving economic conditions 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 68% and in the West Bank at 64%. On the other hand, 30% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 40% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 24% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and only 25% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 70% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. 43% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 53% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 58% think they cannot.

The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a slight majority of 51% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 41% viewed the PA as a burden.  34% are optimistic and 61% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.

A majority of 58% oppose and 37% support making payments to the families of martyrs and prisoners based on need assessment and number of family members rather than on the act committed by the martyr or the number of years in jail.

About two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 61% expect failure; only 32% expect success. These results reflect a little increase in public expectations compared to three months ago when only 28% expected success. But when asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, half of the public expects success and 44% expects failure. Three months ago, 61% expected failure in holding elections. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 60% expects failure and 32% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Palestine TV viewership has become the highest standing at 19%, followed by Al Jazeera TV, at 16%, followed by Maan, Al Aqsa TV, and Palestine Today TV at 11% each,  Al Arabiya at 5%, al Manar at 3% and finally al Mayadeen at 1%. 

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process, Israeli elections, and the implications of the recent ICC decision:

• 40% support and 57% oppose the concept of the two-state solution; and 55% think this solution is no longer practical due to settlements’ expansion
• The best means of ending occupation is armed struggle according to 37% of the public while 36% think it is negotiations.
• Support for the one-state solution stands at 33%
• Two thirds do not expect any restraints on the Israeli policy in the occupied Palestinian territories as a result of the ICC decision on jurisdiction over Palestine and the overwhelming majority does not think the court will prosecute any Israeli officials  

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 57%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  A majority of 55% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 38% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 26% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 21% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 38% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 29% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 37% chose armed struggle, 36% negotiations, and 20% popular resistance. Three months ago, 39% chose armed struggle and 35% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 58% opposes and 28% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But only 51% think the PA should not return to peace negotiations with Israel under the sponsorship of the Quartet, made up of the US, Russia, the EU, and the UN; 43% support such return to negotiations.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 66% supported joining more international organizations; 59% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 43% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 42% supported dissolving the PA; and 33% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis.

In the upcoming Israeli elections, scheduled to take place today, 49% expect the Likud (under the leadership of Netanyahu) and its allies among the extreme right and the religious parties to win the elections while 23% expected victory to go to a coalition of right wing, center and leftist parties under the leadership of Saar, Gantz, Lapid, and others; 28% do not know.

Two thirds (66%) of the public do not expect the decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) confirming its jurisdiction over the occupied Palestinian territories to lead to restrictions on Israeli behavior in these territories while a quarter (25%) expects it to impose at least some restrictions.  Similarly, a large majority of 73% believes that there will be no trials at the ICC for any Israeli officials; 21% think one or more Israeli officials might be prosecuted by that court. 

(5) Expectations from the Biden Administration and attitudes regarding resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under its leadership:

• Half of the public expects the return of US economic aid but 51% think the Palestinian-Israeli peace policy of the new US administration will not be different from that of its predecessor
• But 44% support a return to peace talks with Israel under US sponsorship; 48% oppose such a return 

Now that Biden has won the US presidential elections, 50% expect, and 41% do not expect, the US to resume financial support to the PA. But a slight majority of 51% does not expect Biden’s policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to be more balanced and less biased in favor of Israel; 41% expect it to be more balanced and less biased compared to the previous US administration. While 48% are opposed to a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the US leadership. 44% are supportive of such return. Support for a return to negotiations under US leadership is higher in the West Bank (45%) than in the Gaza Strip (42%), in cities and refugee camps (45% each) compared to villages/towns (34%), among businessmen and employees (61% and 50% respectively) compared to farmers and professionals (13% and 40% respectively), among the married (44%) compared to the unmarried (39%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (56% and 49% respectively) compared to the religious (36%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (57% and 55% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%), and among those whose age is over 50 years (46%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (42%).   

(6) Ten years after the Arab Spring:

• About two-thirds recall that they felt sympathy with the demonstrators of the Arab Spring when the revolutions were first launched ten years ago, but most think the Arab Spring left a negative impact on Palestinian conditions
• One third of the public thinks the Arab Spring revolutions sought freedom, 28% think they sought a way out of poverty and unemployment, and 20% think they sought to combat corruption 

Ten years after the Arab Spring, 73% say they felt sympathy at the time with the Arab demonstrators while 18% say they did not feel sympathy. The public is divided into three groups in its evaluation of what the Arab demonstrators wanted: 33% say they wanted freedom from regime oppression, 28% say they wanted a way out of poverty and unemployment, and 20% say they wanted to combat corruption. Only 5% say they wanted to replace the existing regimes with Islamists and another 5% say they wanted to express opposition to pro-Western policies of their regimes.

37% believe the Arab Spring has left a negative impact on Palestinian conditions while 18% think it left a positive impact and 37% say it had neither negative nor positive impact.  A majority of 56% indicates that it did not feel at the time that there was a need for similar demonstrations in Palestine while 36% say they felt such need at that time. 

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• The top most vital goal should be the creation of a Palestinian state after ending the occupation according to 43% of the public
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is poverty and unemployment according to 30% of the public followed by corruption and the continuation of occupation  

Findings show that 43% of the public believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings. Moreover, the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 30%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%,  the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 6%.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the reversal of PA’s May 2020 decision to end security and civil coordination with Israel and the resumption of that coordination, the election of Joe Biden as president of the US, the signing of a normalization agreement between Sudan and Israel, and the failure of Palestinian reconciliation efforts to reach an agreement on holding Palestinian elections. This report addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2020 show a majority is opposed to the PA leadership decision to resume coordination with Israel. Yet, they also show that this opposition is not strong and that it is in fact closer to a split between support and opposition. Even when it comes to security coordination with Israel, attitudes reflect an almost even split. Nonetheless, the findings paint a dark public assessment of Palestinian conditions in light of the return to coordination with Israel. The majority believes that Israel is the one to came out a winner from this political battle over coordination and that the Palestinian side is the one that paid the heavy price for engaging in it. Moreover, the overwhelming majority believes Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its commitments under signed agreement; indeed, this overwhelming majority thinks Israel has not abandoned its annexation plans for the Jordan Valley and West Bank settlements. On top of all that, the public thinks that the resumption of coordination will lead to greater Arab 

normalization with Israel, greater settlement expansion, and greater chances for annexation while at the same time diminishing the chances for reconciliation and the holding of elections. But the majority does express satisfaction with the resumption of coordination in the health sector; expects Israelis and Palestinians to resume negotiations; and a large minority expects an improvement in economic conditions.

The optimism about a resumption of negotiations seems linked more to public belief that the electoral victory of Joe Biden in the US elections will lead to an improvement in Palestinian-American relations. Similarly, the expectations about improved economic conditions seem to reflect the belief of two thirds of the public that the Biden Administration will resume financial aid to the PA. Despite the fact that the majority of the public does not expect Biden to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century, or reverse the decision to transfer the US embassy to Jerusalem, a clear majority is in favor of resuming dialogue with the new administration.

Yet, despite the optimism generated by the election of Biden, support for the two-state solution remains low, unchanged from September. Moreover, three quarters do not expect the creation of a Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years, and the majority thinks the two-state solution is no longer practical or realistic because of settlement expansion. Nonetheless, we see in this poll an increase in the percentage of those who prefer to reach a peace agreement with Israel compared to three months ago while the percentage of those who prefer waging an armed struggle against occupation declines during the same period. Still, the largest percentage of the public views armed struggle as the most effective means of ending occupation.

On domestic condition, findings show that the percentage of those demanding the resignation of president Abbas has increased to two-thirds despite the fact that the balance between Hamas and Fatah support remains unchanged compared to the previous six months. Findings show that three quarters  of the public demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections but only a third or less expects the PA to hold them. If elections are held under current conditions, findings show a sharp split among Fatah voters: the largest percentage of them is more likely to vote for an independent list formed by Marwan Barghouti than for an official Fatah list formed by Abbas and the Fatah leadership. Moreover, if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, he is more likely to take away from the official Fatah list about one fifth of Fatah voters, particularly in the Gaza Strip.

Finally, findings show that only half of the public is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine, when available, while the other half refuses to take it. 

(1) The resumption of PA coordination with Israel:

• A majority of 53% opposes the resumption of coordination with Israel; the public is divided when transfer of clearance funds is conditioned by return of coordination
• A majority of 53% believes Israel came out a winner from the battle over coordination while 9% think the PA came out a winner; the majority thinks it was the Palestinian side that suffered the consequences of the cessation of coordination
• An overwhelming majority of 87% thinks Israel did not abandon its annexation plan
• 43% expect an improvement in economic conditions now after the resumption of coordination
• 61% believe the resumption of coordination will increase the cases of Arab normalization with Israel
• 57% believe the resumption of coordination diminishes the prospects of reconciliation
• 60% are satisfied with the resumption of coordination in health matters such as those aiming at combating the coronavirus pandemic

A large minority of 44% supports, and 53% oppose the decision by the PA leadership to resume civil and security coordination with Israel. When asked specifically about security coordination, 41% agreed, and 38% disagreed, with the statement that security coordination should be stopped even if it leads Israel to stop the transfer of clearance funds thereby stopping salary payment to PA employees; 18% said they neither agree nor disagree with the statement.  A majority of 56% believes there is little or no chance the PA will reverse its decision and once again suspend security coordination with Israel; 13% think the chances of PA doing so are high or very high.  Support for the PA decision to resume coordination with Israel is higher in the West Bank (54%) compared to the Gaza Strip (29%), in villages/towns (55%) compared to cities and refugee camps (43% and 32% respectively), among non-refugees (51%) compared to refugees (35%), among illiterates (49%) compared to holders of BA degree (39%), among farmers, housewives, laborers, and professionals (52%, 49%, 48%, and 46% respectively) compared to students (33%), among married respondents (45%) compared to the non-married (37%), among those with the highest income (53%) compared to those with the lowest income (40%), among the somewhat religious (48%) compared to the religious (40%), and among supporters of Fatah (66%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (21% and 41% respectively).

A majority of 53% says that Israel came out the winner from the PA decision to stop and then resume coordination with Israel; only 9% think the PA came out a winner; 13% think both sides came out winners; and 22% think neither side came out a winner.  A majority of 60% believes the Palestinians have paid a heavier price for stopping civil and security coordination with Israel while only 12% think Israel paid a heavier price.

The overwhelming majority (82%) says that Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its signed commitments with the PA despite the written letter submitted to the PA; only 14% think Israel has indeed agreed to honor its commitments.  Even if Israel agreed to honor its commitment to signed agreements with the PA, the overwhelming majority (89%) believes Israel will not in fact abide by such commitment; only 8% think Israel will abide by these commitments.  Similarly, 87% believe that Israel has not abandoned its plan for the annexation of the Jordan Valley and the West Bank settlements; 8% think it has.

Now, after the resumption of coordination with Israel, 43% expect, and 55% do not expect, an improvement in economic conditions.  But two thirds (67%) expect, and 28% do not expect, the return of the Palestinian and Israeli sides to the negotiating table.  A majority of 61% expects the resumption of coordination with Israel to lead to an increase in normalization agreements between Arab countries and Israel; 68% expect it to lead to greater settlement expansion; and 54% expect it to lead to greater chances for Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and the settlements in the West Bank.

On the domestic implication of the resumption of coordination with Israel, 57% expect it to diminish the chances for reconciliation and the largest percentage (44%) expects it to diminish the chances for holding general Palestinian elections. But 60% are satisfied, and 36% are dissatisfied, with the resumption of PA coordination with Israel on health issues and the combating of the coronavirus pandemic.

If Israel transfers partial clearance funds to the PA, the largest percentage (35%) thinks the PA should accept it and take Israel to the International Court of Justice to demand the rest of the funds; 28% say the PA should accept the partial transfer; and only 34% say the PA should not accept the partial transfer.

(2) Expectations from the Biden Administration and attitudes regarding resumption of Palestinian-American dialogue:

• The majority expects an improvement in Palestinian-American relation and two thirds expects an American resumption of economic aid to the PA
• A majority of 59% supports a resumption of PA dialogue with the new US administration, but only 44% support the return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership

Now that Joe Biden has won the US presidential elections, a majority of 58% expects, and 36% do not expect, an improvement in Palestinian-American relations.  In fact, two-thirds (68%) expect the new US administration to resume economic aid to the PA and 52% expect it to allow the reopening of PLO diplomatic mission in the US capital.  Yet, only 37% expect the Biden Administration to re-open the US consulate in East Jerusalem; 29% expect it to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century; 26% expect it to relocate the US embassy to Tel Aviv; and 22% expect it to reverse the decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.  At the regional level, a large minority of 42% expects, and 46% do not expect, the new US administration to recommit itself to the nuclear deal with Iran.

A majority of 59% supports and 36% oppose the resumption of Palestinian dialogue with the US under the new administration.  Support for the resumption of dialogue with the US administration is higher in the Gaza Strip (61%) compared to the West Bank (58%), among men (63%) compared to women (55%), among those with the highest income (63%) compared to those with the lowest income (57%), among the somewhat religious (64%) compared to the religious (51%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (70% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (44%).

But only 44% think, and 49% do not think, Palestinians should return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership.  Support for the resumption of negotiations with Israel under US leadership is higher in the West Bank (47%) compared to the Gaza Strip (39%), among those whose age is over 50 years (44%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (38%), among the illiterates (51%) compared to holders of BA degree (40%), among the somewhat religious (50%) compared to the religious (37%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (62% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (19%).

(3) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process:

• 40% support the two-state solution; but 62% think this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion
• When choosing between reaching a peace agreement or waging an armed struggle against occupation, 38% go for the former and 29% for the latter.
• But support for an armed intifada remains high at 48%
• 29% support abandoning the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution

Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 40% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.   A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 34% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 38% of the public while 29% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 19% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 35% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 39% chose armed struggle, 35% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 41% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 68% supported joining more international organizations; 63% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 44% supported dissolving the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis.

(4) Taking the Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• Half of the Palestinian public does not want to be vaccinated against the coronavirus
• Half of the public expresses satisfaction with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus

Only half of the public (50%) is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine when it is available and the other half refuses to take it.  Those unwilling to be vaccinated are divided into those who are certain they will not take it (32%) and those who think they will not take it (18%).  The percentage of those who indicate that they are certain they will not take the vaccine rejecting the vaccine is much higher in the West Bank (50%) compared to the Gaza Strip (5%), in villages/towns (55%) compared to cities and refugee camps (29% and 19% respectively), among non-refugees (43%) compared to refugees (18%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (36%) c0mpared to those who work in the public sector (20%), among those with the highest income (57%) compared to those with the lowest income (12%), among the somewhat religious (40%) compared to the religious (22%), and mong supporters of Fatah (30%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (21% and 24% respectively).  

Half of the public (50%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to contain the spread of coronavirus pandemic and 48% are dissatisfied. The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 53% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 45% today compared to 48% three months ago and 62% six months ago.

The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 73% say their income or salary has been reduced; 62% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 54% say they stopped working or became unemployed.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• Three quarters demand the holding of legislative and presidential elections
• 38% say they will vote for Fatah and 34% for Hamas
• But if Marwan Barghouti forms an independent list, his would receive 25% of the vote of the public while only 19% say they would in this case vote for the official Fatah list
• But if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, his would receive the vote of 7% of the public and 27% would vote in this case for the official Fatah list
• In presidential elections between Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former would receive 43% of the vote and the latter 50%
• 66% demand the resignation of president Mahmoud Abbas
• If presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 61% of the vote and the latter 37%; in elections between Mohammad Shtayyeh and Ismail Haniyyeh, the two receive the same percentage of the vote (47%)

Three quarters demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections; but only 32% expect such elections to be held soon in the Palestinian territories. The demand for elections is higher in the Gaza Strip (76%) compared to the West Bank (70%), among those whose age is over 50 years (74%) compared to the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (67%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (85% and 81% respectively) and supporters of Hamas (78%).

Among those who demand the holding of elections, the majority (55%) says it should be for simultaneous legislative and presidential elections with no separation between them; 22% prefer holding simultaneous legislative and presidential elections but are not opposed to separating the two by holding them at different dates; and 21% prefer holding legislative elections first followed few months later by presidential elections. A majority of 56% supports, and 39% oppose, holding general elections if Israel does not allow holding them in East Jerusalem.

We asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 46% three months ago).  If legislative elections are held today, 38% expect Fatah to win; 25% expect Hamas to win; 23% expect third parties and new lists that are unknow today to win.

If Marwan Barghouti forms an electoral list independent of the official Fatah list formed by Abbas and Fatah leadership, 25% of the entire public say they would vote for this Barghouti list; only 19% say they would in this case vote for Fatah’s official list. The vote for the Barghouti’s electoral list is higher in the West Bank (30%) compared to the Gaza Strip (18%), among men (28%) compared to women (22%), among non-refugees (29%) compared to refugees (20%), among holders of BA degree (27%) compared to illiterates (15%), among those with the highest income (38%) compared to those with the lowest income (18%), among the somewhat religious (31%) compared to the non-religious and the religious (14% and 19% respectively), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (31% and 37% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (10%). 

But if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, only 7% of the entire public (mostly in the Gaza Strip) would vote for his list while 27% would vote for the official Fatah list. The vote for Dahlan is higher in the Gaza Strip (10%) compared to the West Bank (5%), in villages/towns and cities (8% and 7% respectively) compared to refugee camps (3%), among men (10%) compared to women (4%), among the somewhat religious (8%) compared to the religious (3%), and among supporters of Fatah (11%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (6% and 1% respectively). 

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 43% and the latter 50% of the vote (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 39% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 42% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 47% and the latter 47%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 41% and Haniyyeh 51%.  Support for Shtayyeh is higher in the West Bank (54%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), in villages/towns (60%) compared to refugee camps and cities (43% and 45% respectively), among the youth between the ages of 23 and 29 years (53%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 49 years (39%), among the non-refugees (54%) compared to refugees (37%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (55% and 50% respectively) compared to the religious (42%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (90% and 51% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (4%).

66% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 30% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 61% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 37% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).  We asked, in a close-ended question, about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 23% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (2% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Salam Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouti by 3% each. 

If Fatah nominates Abbas as its candidate for the presidential elections, a majority of 52% of the public would view him as the wrong choice believing that Fatah has other better candidates; only 25% of the public think his is the best Fatah candidate. When asked to name a better candidate, 42% selected Marwan Barghouti, 10% selected Mohammad Dahlan, and 7% selected Mohammad Shtayyeh.  

The largest percentage (28%) says that the top priority for Palestinian elections should be to restore unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 24% say it is improving economic conditions; 18% say it is the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip; 15% say it is to fight corruption; 6% say it is to bring back democracy; and another 6% say it is to strengthen resistance to occupation.  52% say if elections are held today under current conditions, they will not be fair and free; 41% do not agree with that.  Moreover, 76% think that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah will not accept the results and 58% think if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will not accept the results.

(6) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• About two thirds are opposed to changing the criteria for payment for the families of martyrs and prisoners
• Perception of safety and security stands at 54% in the West Bank and 72% in the Gaza Strip
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86% and in institutions controlled by Hamas at 63%
• 45% think it is possible to criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear; 54% think it is possible to criticize the institutions of Hamas without fear
• 55% view the PA as a burden and 41% view it as an achievement for the Palestinian people
• Expectations from the Shtayyeh government reflect continued pessimism regarding reconciliation, elections, and economic conditions

31% of the public support and 65% oppose the idea of changing the criterial for payment for the families of martyrs and prisoners so that it would be based on financial needs and family members and not based on the act carried out by the martyr or the year of imprisonment. Support for the idea is higher in the West Bank (33%) compared to the Gaza Strip (29%), among the illiterates (50%) compared to holders of BA degree (26%), among the somewhat religious (34%) compared to the religious (28%), and among supporters of Fatah (40%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (24% and 31% respectively).

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.   Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 72% and in the West Bank at 54%.  28% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 38% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 24% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and only 25% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. Three months ago, 80% expressed a similar view. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, only 63% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions.   45% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 54% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas authorities without fear and 46% think they cannot.  The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 55% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 62% viewed the PA as a burden.

A year and nine months since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 66% expect failure; only 27% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 35% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 22%, followed by Palestine TV, Al Aqsa TV, and Maan TV at 12% each, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 5% each, and finally al Manar at 1%.  

(7) Reconciliation: 

• The majority views the reconciliation efforts as lacking seriousness
• Only 29% are optimistic about reconciliation

An overwhelming majority (77%) thinks the reconciliation efforts are not serious and insufficient.  As a result, only 29% are optimistic and 68% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 37%.

(8) The Arab Peace Initiative, Arab normalization with Israel, and Arab visits to Jerusalem: 

• 75% believe the Arab Peace Initiative is a “thing of the past”
• 57% believe Arab normalization hurts the prospects of peace with Israel
• The majority is opposed to visits to East Jerusalem by Arab tourists, particularly those from the Gulf

Three quarters of the public (75%) believe the Arab Peace Initiative is a thing of the past while 19% think it remains standing.  In fact, 81% expect Saudi Arabic will soon join the Arab normalization train while 15% do not expect that.  Only 11% believe that Arab normalization agreements help in resolving the conflict with Israel while 57% think they cause damage to the efforts to resolve the conflict.  29% say they are for and 69% say they are against visits from Arab countries, particularly from the Gulf, to East Jerusalem and for praying at Al Aqsa Mosque. But a majority of 52% says that these visitors should be allowed to pray at the mosque or should be left alone without interference.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% think the top Palestinian goal should be achieving end of occupation and building a Palestinian state while 29% think it should be obtaining the right of return
• The most serious problem facing the Palestinian people today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 29% while 26% think it is the continuation of occupation

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and an identical percentage (13%) believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 29%, the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 26%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 20%,  the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 11%.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 11 March 2023. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the continuation of the teachers’ strike in public schools, the imposition by the PA of one Shekel added to each telecommunication bill as a donation to an East Jerusalem fund, the holding of student elections at Hebron University in which a Fatah affiliated bloc won against a Hamas affiliated one. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, armed confrontations continued to escalate in the West Bank, the PA announced a suspension of security coordination with Israel, and Israel took punitive measures against the PA including the confiscation and withholding of funds. Settlers attacked the town of Huwara and burned dozens of homes with residents inside as well as shops and cars and killed one civilian in a revenge attack following the killing of two settlers in the town earlier that day. A Palestinian-Israeli meeting took place in Aqaba, in the presence of Egyptian, Jordanian, and American delegations, to discuss means of de-escalation and the ending of unilateral measures. In Israel, tens of thousands demonstrated against the Netanyahu government’s plan to change the judicial system. Regionally, an earthquake hit Turkey and Syria bringing vast destruction and the death of tens of thousands.

This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The findings of the first quarter of 2023 indicate that the internal factional balance of power remains unchanged, with parity between Fatah and Hamas, if new parliamentary elections were to take place today, and a majority vote for Hamas’ candidate, Ismail Haniyyeh, over Mahmud Abbas in presidential elections. Satisfaction with president Abbas drops four percentage points and the demand for resignation increases by two points.

Public evaluation of internal conditions points to a greater deterioration in the standing of the PA and a significant loss of trust in it. Findings show a rise in the belief that the PA is now a burden on the Palestinian people and for the first time in our polls, a majority supports the dissolution of the PA and views its collapse as an interest for the Palestinian people. In fact, a majority thinks that the continued existence of the PA serves the interests of Israel and that its dissolution or collapse would strengthen Palestinian armed groups.

The declining status of the PA can also be seen in the vast public support, standing at 70% in the West Bank, for the strike of the West Bank teachers in public schools and the belief of about 80% or more of the public that the current PA government will fail in conducting elections, reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or improving economic conditions. Loss of trust in the PA can be seen in the overwhelming opposition to the PA’s imposition of a one-Shekel tax on the telecommunication bill to support East Jerusalem. On top of that opposition, about 80% say the money will not really go to East Jerusalemites.

Findings of the current quarter point a significant decline in the support for the two-state solution accompanied by an increase in the percentage of those who think this solution is no longer practical or feasible due to settlement expansion. Furthermore, the public expresses widespread pessimism about the ability of international organizations and the international community, including the US, the EU, and the Arab states, to impose sanctions on the current Israeli government to pressure it to change its settlement policy or its violations of international law.

In light of all that, findings show a rise in the percentage of those who support a return to armed confrontation and intifada. In fact, 70% of West Bankers expect the eruption of a third armed intifada. Moreover, more than 70% declare support for the latest Huwara shooting attack against settlers; two thirds support the formation of armed groups, such as the Jenin Battalion or the Lions’ Den; and almost all express the view that the PA security services should not arrest or disarm members of these groups. More than 60% of the West Bankers believe that members of these armed groups will resist with arms any attempt by the PA security services to disarm or arrest them. Public support for armed resistance is further confirmed by overwhelming opposition to the Palestinian participation in the Aqaba meeting. Almost all Palestinians think Israel will not honor its commitments in that meeting. A large majority, standing at 70%, think Israeli counter measures, which are meant to punish those who commit armed attacks or their families, such as home demolition, expulsion, or the imposition of the death penalty, will only lead to an increase in the intensity of such attacks.  

On the background of the settlers’ attack on Huwara and given the current right wing government in Israel, two thirds of the public expect an increase in these attacks. In light of the call by the Israeli finance minister to wipe out Huwara, a large minority, approaching almost half of the public, expect Israel to commit massacres and force a large-scale mass expulsion. Three quarters of the public view the Huwara settlers’ attack as an expression of the behavior of the Israeli government and army rather than the behavior of the most extreme settlers. 

(1) Armed escalation, security coordination, the Aqaba meeting, and a third intifada: 

• A vast majority of 73% is against and only 21% are in favor of the Palestinian attendance of the Aqaba meeting which took place last month in order to stop the escalation of the armed conflict in the West Bank.
• 84% think Israel will not honor its commitments in the Aqaba meeting; only 12% think Israel will implement its commitments.
• 64% say that now, after the Aqaba meeting, they are less optimistic regarding possible improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations, such as the prospects for the implementation of confidence building measures or the slowing down of settlement expansion next year; only 8% say they are more optimistic and 24% say they are neither more nor less optimistic.
• 68% of the public (71% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 25% are against that.
• Nonetheless, 52% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 44% are not worried.
• 83% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 12% say they are for it.
• The vast majority (87%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 8% say they favor it.
• A majority of 58% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 15% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 14% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups.
• A majority of 61% (69% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) expect security conditions in the West Bank to continue to escalate leading to the eruption of a third armed intifada; 36% say they do not expect a third intifada.
• If security conditions escalate further or if a third intifada were to erupt, a majority of 62% does not expect the PA security services to join forces with the Palestinian armed groups; 33% say they expect them to do so.
• A majority of 56% says they do not expect the PA to deploy its security forces in the Jenin refugee camp or the old city of Nablus and other areas in which armed groups have recently been formed in order to enforce law and order and ensure “one authority-one gun” by disarming these groups and arresting their member in return for concessions that Israel might provide; 37% say they expect the PA to do so.
• If the PA attempted to disarm the newly created armed groups, a majority of 59% thinks that members of these groups will use their arms to resist the PA security services; 8% think they will surrender; and 23% think they will resist the PA but non-violently.
• A majority of 63% says it supports the ending of security coordination with Israel that was announced recently by the PA while 32% say they are opposed to it. But the overwhelming majority (79%) thinks the PA did not actually suspend security coordination with Israel; only 13% think it did.
• The vast majority (77%) thinks Israel will not stop its army incursions into PA territories in order to encourage the PA to return to security coordination; 18% think Israel will do so. 61% think the PA will not return to security coordination if Israel continued its daily incursions while 32% think the PA will resume security coordination even if the Israeli army incursions continue.
• 70% (73% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip) believe the Israel measures aimed at punishing Palestinian attackers and their families, such as demolishing their homes, or expelling them, or imposing the death penalty, will lead to greater armed attacks; 8% think these measures will lead to lesser attacks; and 20% think they will have no impact on armed attacks. 

(2) Whose interest is served by the continued existence or the collapse of the PA?

• The largest percentage (41%) says Israeli punitive measures against the PA aim at weaking it; 27% think Israel aims at forcing a PA collapse; and 27% think Israel does not want to weaken the PA or bring it to collapse.
• When asked to define Israel’s interest regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse, the majority (57%) says the survival of the PA is in Israel’s interest while 39% think Israel’s interest lies in the collapse of the PA.
• When asked to define the interest of the Palestinian people regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse or dissolution, a majority of 52% says the Palestinian people’s interest lies in the collapse or dissolution of the PA while 42% define the continued existence of the PA as a Palestinian interest.
• In the event that the PA becomes weak or collapses, such a development is seen by 57% of the public as leading to the strengthening of the armed groups in the West Bank while 12% think it will weaken them; 27% think it will neither weaken nor strengthen the armed groups.
• If it becomes pretty clear that Israel aims at weakening the PA or even forcing its collapse, 67% of the public thinks the major Arab countries, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, will abandon the PA; 28% think they will stand with the PA. 

(3) The shooting in Huwara, the settler’s terror, and the absence of PA police:

• A large majority of 71% say they support the shooting of two settlers in Huwara while 21% express opposition to this and similar armed attacks.
• Three quarters (75%) believe the settlers’ terror attack on Huwara after the killing of the two settlers is an expression of the policy of the Israeli government and army while 20% think it is an expression of the behavior of the extreme settlers only.
• Two thirds (67%) expect increased settlers’ attacks under the current right wing Israeli government, but 16% say there will less attacks, and 14% think the frequency of settlers’ attacks will remain unchanged.
• When asked why the PA police and other security services were unable to protect the residents of Huwara and other towns located in area B of the West Bank, despite the fact that the PA has jurisdiction over law enforcement in such areas, the public was divided into four groups. One group of 32% thinks the PA leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with Israel over protecting its own people. A second group, of 27%, thinks the PA police and national security forces do not wish to engage the Israeli army in an armed confrontation. A third group, of 24%, thinks the PA police does not have a jurisdiction over the settlers and cannot arrest them. A fourth group, of 11%, thinks the settlers’ attacks occur during the night when the PA police is not present in the targeted areas.
• When asked what should the PA do to protect the residents of Huwara and other towns located in area B of the West Bank, the largest percentage (39%) says it should form civil guards units made up of volunteers from these towns; 27% say it should build police stations or place permanent police units in these areas; 13% say it should complain to the UN and the International Criminal Court; and 9% say it should issue statements of condemnation.
• In light of the call by Smotrich, the Israeli minister of finance, to wipe out the town of Huwara, a large minority of 44% expects the Israeli government to commit massacres and force a mass expulsion of Palestinians if and when Palestinian armed attacks expand; but a majority of 53% says it does not expect that. 

(4) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 68% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 28% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 76% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 69% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 36% and Haniyeh 52% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 36% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 61%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% and Haniyeh 43%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 62% and from among those, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 29% and the latter 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (35%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (18%), Khalid Mish’al (5%), Mohammad Dahlan and Mohammad Shtayyeh (4% each), Yahya al Sinwar (3%), and Hussein al Sheikh (2%); 26% said they do not know or have not decided.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 19% and dissatisfaction at 77%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 17% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 75% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 76% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 33% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 38% three months ago).
• 26% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 24% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 44% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 28% selected Hamas, 25% Fatah under Abbas, and 40% said neither side deserves such a role.
• A majority of 53% thinks that the recent student election results of Hebron University, in which the student bloc affiliated with Fatah won sixty percent of the vote against the Islamic bloc, which received forty percent of the vote, does not necessarily reflect the balance of power between Fatah and Hamas in the larger Palestinian society in the West Bank or in the Hebron district; 19% think it reflects the balance of power in the Palestinian society in the West Bank; and 15% think it reflects the balance of power in the Hebron district. 

(5) Domestic conditions, the “assassination” of Yasir Arafat, independence of the Judiciary, and those responsible for the drowning of Palestinian emigrants:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 9% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 46%. Three months ago, the perception of safety and security in the West Bank stood at 64% and at 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 81% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 51% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (63%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 36% viewed it as an asset.
• 22% are optimistic and 75% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 26%.
• After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 81% expect failure; only 14% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 16% of the public expect success and 79% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 81% expects failure and 16% expects success.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 32% and in the West Bank at 19%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 30% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• A vast majority of 71% says it opposes the imposition of tax of one Shekel on each telecommunication bill to support an East Jerusalem fund and 28% say are in favor. A large majority of 79% thinks the collected funds will not go to the benefit of East Jerusalemites while only 12% think the money will go to the residents of East Jerusalem.
• A majority of 56% says it supports the strike of the public school teachers in the West Bank while 42% say they are against it. Support for the strike in the West Bank rises to 65% and declines to 44% in the Gaza Strip.
• In light of the devastating earthquake in Turkey and Syria last month, a majority of 52% thinks that the chances that a similar one might hit Palestine during this or next year are slim to nonexistent while 36% think they are high or medium. When asked about their impressions about the PA’s capacity to deal with such earthquake if it were to happen in Palestine, the vast majority (81%) thinks it is slight or nonexistent while 18% think it is high or medium.
• We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Palestine Today TV (9%), Maan TV (6%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Mayadeen (2%). 

(6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations, the Peace process, and the decision to go to ICJ:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 27% and opposition stands at 71%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 32%.  
• A majority of 74% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 24% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 74% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 69% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 26%.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 57% supported joining more international organizations; 49% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 58% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 52% supported dissolving the PA; and 28% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 55% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 54% chose armed struggle (55% in the Gaza Strip and 54% in the West Bank), 18% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 51% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations.
• A vast majority of 69% says that international organizations, such as the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice, will not be able to constrain Israeli policies that violate international law and that these organizations will be content with expressions of opposition and condemnation. Only 13% think they will be able to constrain these Israeli policies while 12% think they will have a limited impact.
• The overwhelming majority (84%) thinks the Biden Administration will not impose sanctions on Israel to pressure it to change its settlement policy; only 12% think the US will impose such sanctions.
• Similarly, 82% think the European Union and European countries like France, the UK, and Germany will not impost sanctions on Israel in order to pressure it to change its settlement policy; 14% think they will do so.
• Moreover, 83% think the Arab countries that have recently normalized relations with Israel, such as UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, will not impose sanctions on Israel in order to pressure it to change its settlement policy; only 15% think they will do so.
• In light of the anti-government demonstrations in Israel, half of the public (50%) thinks they could lead to the fall of the Netanyahu government while 44% think they do not expect that to happen.  

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 37% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 15% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 26% (12% in the Gaz Strip and 35% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 21% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 20% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction;  16% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 9% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 11% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 24% said it is corruption, 15% said it is the split or division, 13% said it is unemployment, and 5% said it is the internal violence.

These are the results of opinion poll #35, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 30 July to 1 August. The poll deals with the peace process, domestic situation, economic situation, ability to confront threats, presidential elections and political affiliation. The total sample size of this poll is 1325 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 817 in the West Bank and 508 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%. 

1. Peace Process

• 68% support the peace process and 29% oppose it
• Support for armed attacks declines to 44% and opposition to armed attacks rises to 49%
• Trust in the Israeli government is at 6% and in the Israeli people at 27%

Support for the peace process did not change compared to last month, as 68% continue to do so. But support for armed attacks against Israelis declined to 44% compared to 50% last month, while 49% declared their opposition to it.

The level of trust in the Israeli government remained the same at about 6% only, while the percentage of those who believe that the Israeli people are sincere and serious about the peace process reached 27%. The poll indicates a significant decline in the percentage of those expecting the peace process to lead to the emergence of a Palestinian state in the coming years reaching 37% compared to 48% one month ago and 62% in November 1997.

The results show that a low level of expectation regarding the Palestinian state is evident especially in Bethlehem (26%), Jabalia (29%), Nablus (30%), Hebron and Deir al-Balah (31% each); among men (31%) compared to women (43%), the youngest (27%) compared to the oldest (50%), holders of BA degrees (18%) compared to illiterates (54%), students (18%) compared to housewives (44%), private sector employees (29%) compared to those employed in the public sector (45%), and among supporters of Hamas (31%) compared to supporters of Fateh (46%).

These results indicate that the Palestinian street has little confidence in the peace process despite its continued support for it, and that it sees in the current policies of the Israeli government an obstacle to the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Therefore, Palestinian support for the peace process seems conditional as a large percentage continues to support armed attacks against Israelis.

Support for armed attacks increases especially in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (39%), in Khan Younis (61%), Deir al-Balah (55%), and Hebron (51%) compared to Jerusalem (28%), Ramallah and Bethlehem (36% each), and Tulkarm (35%), in refugee camps (53%) compared to cities and villages (41%), among the youngest (51%) compared to the oldest (45%), holders of BA degrees (52%) compared to illiterates (39%), students (54%) compared to laborers (34%), and among Hamas supporters (65%) compared to Fateh supporters (40%).

2. Domestic Situation

• 56% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions and 61% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future;
• Corruption is seen especially in ministries by 78%, in security and police agencies by 69%, in PLC by 45%, and in the office of the presidency by 36%;
• 83% believe the jobs can only be obtained through wasta (connections);
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy does not exceed 33% compared to Israeli democracy (68%), and Jordanian (34%), and Egyptian (31%).

The results show that a large percentage of 56% continues to believe that corruption exists in the PNA institutions, indicating a decrease of 8 percentage points compared to the situation a month ago. But the percentage of those believing that corruption will increase or remain the same increased from 58% one month ago to 61% now.

The results show that those who believe in the existence of corruption tend to see it mostly in ministries (78%), in security and police offices (69%), in the PLC (45%), and in the office of the presidency (36%).

The poll shows that a majority of 83% thinks that one can not find a job without wasta to a large or medium extent. The percentage of those who do not think that wasta is not essential does not exceed 7%.

Similar to previous polls, the results show a low level of positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy not exceeding 33% compared to 35% one month ago. Israeli democracy received a positive evaluation of 68%, the Jordanian 34%, and the Egyptian 31%.

3. Economic Situation

• 26% seek permanent emigration due to current situation
• 38% describe their economic situation during the past three years as better than now, 31% as worse; while 50% are optimistic about their economic future

The unemployment rate for this poll is 26%, 19% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip. Thirty eight percent described their economic condition as being better in the past three years than today, and 31% described it as being worse in the past three years than today, while another 31% said that it had been the same as today. These conditions lead some 50% of respondents to be optimistic about their economic future while 29% remain pessimistic.

Palestinian general conditions lead about 26% of the Palestinians to seek permanent emigration to other countries. The desire for emigration increases in the Gaza Strip (32%) compared to the West Bank (22%), and reaches 30% in Jerusalem. It also increases among residents of refugee camps (33%) compared to residents of villages (22%), men (36%) compared to women (17%), the youngest (33%) compared to the oldest (15%), holders of BA degrees (36%) compared to illiterates (10%), students (47%) and laborers (33%) compared to housewives (15%) and retired persons (16%), the unmarried (40%) compared to the married (23%). The results show no significant differences between supporters of Fateh (24%) and Hamas (27) in the desire to emigrate.

4. Ability to Confront Threats

• 36% only believe that the PA is capable of meeting security threats;
• 29% only believe that the PA is capable of meeting economic threats.

The poll reveals the existence of doubts in the Palestinian street in the ability of the PNA to meet security and economic challenges such as the threat to cut economic aid, embargoes, closures, and preventing workers from working in Israel in the economic side, and military invasion, siege and entrance of Israeli forces into Palestinian-controlled areas in the security side.

In fact, the percentage of those who believe that the PNA is fully capable of meeting security threats is not more than 10%, and those believing that it can fully meet economic threats is not more than 8%. Some 26% think that the PNA has a medium capability to meet security threats and 21% think it has a medium capability to meet economic threats. Some 44% expressed the belief that it has no capability to meet security threats and 50% said it has no capability to meet economic threats.

The percentage of those who believe that the PNA can not meet the security threats increases among men (50%) compared to women (37%), holders of BA degrees (52%) compared to illiterates (42%), and among supporters of Hamas (54%) compared to supporters of Fateh (34%).

5. Presidential Elections and Political Affiliation

• In a three-way race for the presidency: Arafat receives 48%, Ahmad Yassin 12%, and Haider Abdel Shafi 9%;
• In a three-way race for a vice-president: Abu Mazen receives 29%, Abu al-Ala' 23%, and Abu al-Lutuf 19%;
• Fateh declines to 39%, Hamas receives 12, and 38% are nonaffiliated.

In a direct question about voting for the office of the presidentin case of a three-way race, Yasir Arafat received 48% of the votes, the lowest he has received since November 1994. Ahamd Yasin received 12% of the votes, the highest he has received since his release from prison and similar to the percentage he received in October 1995. Haydar Abdul Shafi received 9% of the votes, similar to what he used to receive during 1994-95 before the January 1996 elections.

One month ago, some 61% expressed their readiness to elect Yasir Arafat as president, while Abdul Shafi and Yasin received less than 3 percent each. The difference between the two polls lies in the way the question was presented. Last month, respondents were not given a list of candidates to choose from. Therefore, those who enjoy more name recognition benefited most. Arafat's name is much widely known than either Yasin or Abdul Shafi. In this poll, the respondents were given three names to choose from. In the last poll, some votes went to many other candidates other than Arafat whose name can be easily remembered. This time, those who gave votes to candidates other than Arafat, gave their votes only to Yasin or Abdul Shafi. Nonetheless, the difference between the two percentages in the popularity of Arafat may have also been due to other reasons such as the deadlock in the peace process, the continued existence of corruption and the lack of democracy.

In a race for the post of the vice president, respondents, who were given a list of eight names to choose from, voted to Abdul Shafi first with 12% of the votes, followed by Abu Mazin with 9% of the votes, Abu al-Lutuf with 8% of the votes, Faisal al-Husaini, Hanan Ashrawi, and Sa'eb Erekat with 7% each, and Abu al-Ala with 6% of the vote. But in a three-way race for the post of vice-president, respondents gave Abu Mazin the largest number of votes (29%) followed by Abu al-Ala' (23%) and then Abu al-Lutuf (19%).

Support for Fateh decreased from 43% one month ago to 39% in this poll; Hamas received 12%, and the nonaffiliated received 38%...More

These are the results of opinion poll # 47, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 24-26 February 2000. The poll deals with the peace process, Donors' support, domestic conditions, elections for the President and vice president and political affiliation, and home and mobile phones, computers and Internet, and satellite and TV stations. The total sample size of this poll is 1318 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 823 in the West Bank and 495 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

1. The Peace Process

• 70% support the current peace process and 26% oppose it
• Support for armed attacks against Israeli targets decreases from 43% to 39% and opposition to violence increases to 53%
• Only 31% believe that it is possible to reach a mutually acceptable permanent settlement to all final status negotiations
• Level of confidence in Barak's government continues to drop to reach 14%
• 49% support the establishment of a Palestinian state in September 2000 even without an agreement with Israel, while 37% prefer to wait until a mutual Israeli-Palestinian agreement is reached

The results indicate that support for the current Palestinian-Israeli peace process remains high at 70%, with a drop of 3 percentage points compared to the results of January 2000. Support for the peace process stood at 75% three months ago. On the other hand, support for violence has dropped from 43% last January to 39% in this poll. Support for violence stood at 36% three months ago. In this poll, opposition to violence has increased to 53%.

Confidence in Barak's government continue to deteriorate dropping from 16% to 14%. This percentage stood at 18% three months ago and at 29% last July. Similarly, the percentage of those who believe in the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable settlement to all final status issues dropped from 35% last September to 31% today.

These developments may explain the rise in public support for the unilateral establishment of a Palestinian state at the termination of the interim period in September 2000 from 43% last April to 49% in this poll. The percentage of those who support the postponement of such a declaration until an agreement is reached with Israel reached 37% in this poll compared to 48% in April 1999. Support for the unilateral establishment of the state increases in the areas of Khan Younis (60%) and Bethlehem (56%) compared to the area of Jerusalem, among men (53%) compared to women (45%), among holders of BA degree (50%) compared to illiterates (46%), among students (56%) compared to housewives (44%) and the unemployed (43%), among those with the highest income (57%) compared to those with the lowest income (50%), and among supporters of Fateh (56%) and Hamas (55%) compared to those who are not affiliated with any known factions or groups (41%).

2.Donors' Support:

• The European Community and its member states are seen by most Palestinians as the most contributing to the development of the Palestinian economy in the views of 25%, followed by Japan (13%), the US (11%), International Organizations (10%), and Arab Countries (8%)
• 46% see positive impact for donors' support on Palestinian conditions while 17% see a negative impact
• Most important areas of donors' support in Palestinian eyes are education (26%), health (20%), and water (16%)
• Least important areas of donors' support are women programs, police and security, roads, democracy programs, and institution building

The EU and its member states are seen by more Palestinians (25% in this poll compared to 23% last September) as contributing the most to the Palestinian economy. The second most contributing donor is Japan (13% compared to 15% last September) followed by the US (11% compared to 10% last September).

About 17% of the respondents view donors' support negatively, while 46% believe that it has a positive impact on Palestinian conditions. These results may indicate an improvement in donors' perception among Palestinians as only 42% viewed it positively last September.

The results show that most Palestinians believe that the most important donors' support is the one invested in areas of education, health and water (26%, 20%, and 16% respectively). Areas of least importance to Palestinians are those related to women programs, police and security, roads, democracy, and institution building. No significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza have been detected except in the areas of health, viewed as being important by more Gazans (23%) than West Bankers (17%), and sewage, viewed as being important by more Gazans (9%) than West Bankers (3%).

These results are similar to those obtained last September and early 1999. The priorities are still the same, focusing on major traditional developmental needs, with less interest in socio-political issues such as those related to women and democracy.

3. Domestic Conditions:

• 43% describe their conditions during the past three years as being better than now and 25% describe them as worse than now
• A majority of 56% is optimistic about its future economic conditions during the next three years while 27% are pessimistic
• 26% say that current Palestinian conditions force them to consider permanent emigration
• 60% believe that corruption exits in PA institutions and 33% believe it exists in NGOs
• Among those who believe in the existence of corruption in PA institutions, 64% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future, and 81% believe that it exists in ministries, 73% in police and security services, 53% in the PLC, and 43% in the office of the presidency
• 86% believe that wasta (personal and family connection) is essential for obtaining employment
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy stands at 28% compared to 68% for Israel, 55% for the US, 46% for France, 28% for Jordan, and 25% for Egypt
• 62% believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear
• About one third of the respondents (31%) describes their economic conditions during the past three years as being unchanged, while 43% believe

About one third of the respondents (31%) describes its economic condition during the past three years as being unchanged, while 43% believe that it was better than now. Only 25% describe their economic condition during the past three years as being worse than it is today. In other words, about 74% of the respondents do not see improvement in their economic conditions with the passage of time. Despite this, more than half of the respondents (56%) are optimistic about its future economic condition while the percentage of pessimists does not exceed 27%. Although this percentage is almost identical with the percentage of those who are considering permanent emigration (26%), many optimists (22% of all optimists) are also considering emigration. This result indicates that the desire for emigration is not motivated by economic consideration alone. The desire to emigrate is stronger in the Gaza Strip (29%) than in the West Bank (24%).

The results show that 60% of the respondents (compared to 63% last January) believe that corruption exists in PA institutions. A drop has also occurred in the percentage of those who believe that corruption exists in Palestinian NGOs during the same period from 41% to 33%. But the percentage of those who believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future remained unchanged at 64%. Among those who believe that corruption exists in PA institutions, 81% see it in ministries, 73% in police and security services, 53% in the PLC, and 43% in the office.

The most troubling finding is the continued existence of a consensus among respondents that wasta (personal and family connection) is essential, in one way or another, for obtaining employment. Only 8% believe that wasta is not needed, while 64% believe that it is needed to a large extent and 22% believe that it is needed to some extent. It is worth mentioning that the belief that wasta is needed to a large extent increases especially in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (57%), while the belief that no wasta is needed is almost absent in the Gaza Strip (2%) compared to the West Bank (11%).

Perception of the status of Palestinian democracy has not changed much since the beginning of the year, standing today at 28% (compared to 31% in January). The belief that people can not criticize the PA without fear remained also unchanged during the same period standing today at 62% (compared to 63% in January)

4. Elections for the President, and vice-President and Political Affiliation

• In elections for the presidency, Yassir Arafat receives 47% of the vote, Haidar Abdul Shafi 9%, and Ahmad Yasin 10%
• In elections for the vice-presidency among eight candidates, Abdul Shafi receives the largest percentage (15%) followed by Sa'eb Erikat (7%), Faisal al Husseini (6%), Ahmad Qurie', Mahmud Abbas, and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), Farouq al Qaddumi (4%), and Nabil Sha'ath (3%).
• In elections for the vice-presidency among four candidates only, Abdul Shafi receives the largest percentage (38%) followed by al Husseini (20%), and Ahmad Qurie' and Mahmud Abbas (14% each)
• Fateh receives the support of 36%, Hamas 10%, PFLP 4%, and the non-affiliated 41%

The results indicate that no change has taken place in the popularity of Yassir Arafat compared to the situation last January, standing today at 47%. The popularity of Haidar Abdul Shafi remains also stable at 9% and Ahmad Yasin at 10%. As in previous surveys, Arafat's popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) and decreases in the West Bank (42%). Abdul Shafi's popularity increases also in the Gaza Strip (12%) and decreases in the West Bank (7%). Conversely, Ahmad Yassin's popularity increases in the West Bank (12%) and decreases in the Gaza Strip (7%).

In a competition for the vice-presidency among eight candidates, Abdul Shafi receives the largest percentage of votes (15%) followed by Sa'eb Erikat (7%), Faisal al Husseini (6%), Ahmad Qurie', Mahmud Abbas, and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), Farouq Qaddumi (4%), and Nabil Sha'ath (3%). Abdul Shafi's popularity increases as usual in the Gaza Strip (24%) and decreases in the West Bank (10%).

In a competition for the office of the vice-presidency among four candidates only, Abdul Shafi receives the largest percentage of votes (38%) followed by al Husseini (20%), and Ahmad Qurie' and Mahmud Abbas (14% each). In this competition, Abdul Shafi remains the most popular in the West Bank, followed by al Husseini (26%), Ahmad Qurie' (16%) and Mahmud Abbas (14%).

Fateh's popularity stands today at 36% with a drop of two percentage points from the January 2000 poll. Hamas popularity remains stable at 10%, while Islamic Jihad stands at 3% and the PFLP at 4%.

5. Home and Mobile Phones, Computers and Internet, and Satellites and TV Stations

• Home phone ownership continues to increase from 45% last September to 52% today, and mobile phones from 29% to 39%
• Satellite dish ownership continues to increase from 38% last September to 44% today
• Al Jazeera satellite TV station is watched by 47% of dish owners, followed by MBC TV (17%), Egyptian TV (11%), ART TV (7%), and LBC TV (5%)
• Home computer ownership stands at 13%, home internet subscription at 6%, and office internet subscription at 5%

The results show an increase in the percentage of home phone ownership from 45% last September to 52% in this poll. Home phone ownership stood at 42% in January 1999. Home phones are found mostly in cities (59%) compared to refugee camps (45%) and villages and towns (49%).

Similarly, the results show continued increase in the percentage of mobile phone ownership from 29% last September to 40% in this poll. Mobile phone ownership stood at 21% in January 1999. The percentage of mobile phone ownership increases in the West Bank (50%) compared to the Gaza Strip (24%). This may be due to the difficulties in obtaining home phones in some rural areas of the West Bank thereby forcing people to rely on mobile phones instead. This can be seen in the increased percentage of mobile phone ownership in villages and towns (47%) compared to cities (34%) and refugee camps (30%).

An increase in the percentage of satellite dish ownership has also been recorded in this poll from 38% last September to 44% now. Twenty months ago, this percentage stood at 27%. Dish ownership increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in refugee camps (51%) and cities (49%) compared to villages and towns (39%), and among those with the highest income (67%) compared to those with the lowest income (33%).

Al Jazeera TV is the most watched station among the owners of dishes with 47% viewership (compared to 51% last September) followed by MBC TV (17% compared to 6% last September), Egypt TV (11%, same as last September), ART TV (7% compared to 9 last September), and finally, LBC TV (5% compared to 4% last September).

Home computer ownership remained stable at 13% (compared to 12% last September), while home internet subscription dropped from 14% last September to 6% in this poll. Office internet subscription remained stable at 5%. More

These are the results of opinion poll # 43, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 2-4 September 1999. The poll deals with the peace process, donor community assistance, domestic Palestinian conditions, elections for the president and vice-president and political affiliation, home and mobile phones, computers and Internet, and Satellites and TV Stations. The total sample size of this poll is 1320 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 824 in the West Bank and 496 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

1. The Peace Process

• Support for the peace process remains high at 75% and opposition at 22%.
• Continued drop in support for violence reaching 36% and opposition to violence reaching 57%
• Only 25% expect the actual implementation of the Wye agreement
• Only 35% believe in the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable permanent settlement in final status negotiations
• Before the signing of Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, trust in Barak’s government dropped from 29% two months ago to 21% in this survey
• A large majority of 85% support a Palestinian referendum on a permanent settlement agreement

The results indicate that support for the peace process remains high among the Palestinians at 75% with opposition to it standing at 22%. The level of support for the peace process dropped to 66% at the end of 1998 and began to increase gradually to reach 75% two months ago. The results show also a new drop in support for violence against Israelis to reach 36% today while opposition to violence stands at 57%. The percentage of support for violence increased to 53% at the end of 1998 after the Israeli freezing of the implementation of the Wye River agreement. But it began to drop gradually to reach 39% two months ago.

Despite these positive changes, Palestinian trust and confidence in the peace process is not high. Only 25% expect Israel to implement the Wye agreement. This poll was conducted during the last two days of negotiations over the implementation of the Wye River Momorandum leading in the last day of the poll fieldwork to the signing of Sharm el-Sheikh Momorandum. The lack of confidence in the peace process can be seen also in the large percentage (55%) of those who believe that it is not possible to reach a mutually acceptable permanent status agreement and in the low percentage (21%) of those who trust the intentions of Barak’s government. The percentage of trust in Barak’s government stood at 29% two months ago before it dropped to its current level. The drop may have been caused by Barak’s insistence on revising the Wye agreement and his refusal to release a larger number of security prisoners. It is likely that the level of trust in the Israeli government will increase again as Israel fulfils its commitments under the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement.

Finally, the results show that 85% of the Palestinians support the idea of holding a referendum among the Palestinians in the West Bank-Gaza and diaspora on any permanent status agreement reached between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators. Support for the referendum increases in refugee camps (89%) and among holders of BA degree (93%) and supporters of Fateh (90%) and DFLP (94%).

2. Donor Community Assistance

• The European Union and its member states came first as the most contributing to the development of the Palestinian economy in the views of 23% of the people, followed by Japan with 15%, the US with 10%, and Arab counties with 8%
• Donor community support has a positive impact on the Palestinian conditions in the views of 42% and a negative impact in the views of 15%
• Most important areas of donor support are: education (25%), water (23%) and health (18%)
• Least important areas of donor support are: women programs, police, housing, roads, and democracy and human rights
• Positive evaluation of the performance of Palestinian NGOs reaches 59%

The results show that the Palestinian street sees the European Union and its member states as contributing the most to the development of the Palestinian economy. The EU came first with 27% followed by Japan with 15%, the US with 10% and the Arab countries with 8%.

A large percentage of 42% tends to believe that the donor community support has a positive impact on the Palestinian conditions while 15% tend to believe that it has a negative impact. The belief in the positive contribution of donors’ support increases among residents of Jabalia (55%) and Rafah (57%), holders of BA degree (54%), farmers (54%), retired persons (52%) and supporters of Fateh (51%).

A majority of 66% believe that the most important donors’ support is the one invested in the area of education followed by water and health (separately receiving 25%, 23%, and 18%). Areas identified as being least important are women programs, police, housing, roads, and democracy and human rights.

These results are similar to the ones obtained on our survey of January 1999. Public perception of the role of different donors remained stable except of that of the US, which dropped from 14% to 10%. Areas of priority remain also the same except for an added importance given to water from 17% to 23% in this survey. It is noticeable that the interest of the Gazans in water remained low in comparison to that of the West Bankers (13% vs. 28%) despite the seriousness of the water problem in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Gazans show a special interest in the problem of sewage in comparison with the West Bank (11% vs. 2%). As in the previous survey, however, the two areas show little interest in social issues such as women or democracy programs. This result may reflect the heavy economic burden felt by the two areas.

3. Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• 39% describe their economic conditions during the past three years as better than now and 28% describe them as worse than now
• 50% are optimistic about their economic conditions during the next three years and 28% are pessimistic
• 27% say that current Palestinian conditions force them to consider permanent emigration while 72% do not consider such a move
• 35% believe that corruption exists in Palestinian NGOs while 62% believe that it exists in PA institutions. 60% of those who believe in the existence of corruption in PA institutions think that it will increase or remain the same in the future
• 80% of those who believe in the existence of corruption in PA institutions see it in ministries, 74% see it in police and security services, 48% see it in the PLC, and 40% see it in the president’s office
• A majority of 87% believe that wasta (personal and family connections) is involved to some degree in employment process
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy reaches 30% compared to 69% for Israeli democracy, 58% for American democracy, 50% for French democracy, 32% for Jordanian democracy and 27% for Egyptian democracy
• 60% believe that people can not criticize the PA without fear

Personal economic conditions remain a major source of concern for the man in the street. About one third (32%) describe their economic conditions as being unchanged during the past three years, but 39% believe that their conditions were better than now, and 28% feel they are better off today. This result indicates that some 70% of the Palestinians do not notice any improvement in their economic conditions with the passing of time. Despite this negative perception, half of the Palestinians are optimistic about their future economic conditions, while only 28% are pessimistic.

Economic and other conditions seem to explain why about 27% of the Palestinians are considering permanent emigration. This percentage is higher than the one obtained last January which stood then at 21%. The desire to emigrate increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (23%). The percentage increases especially in areas such as Bethlehem (35%), Jerusalem (30%), and Rafah and Kh(38% each). It increases also among the youngest (44%) compared to the oldest (10%), and among refugees (32%) compared to non-refugees (24%). It also increases among those with secondary education (36%), college graduates (33%), students (55%), craftsmen (39%), and supporters of Hamas (34%), PFLP (49%) and People’s Party (39%). It is likely that the public perception of lack of improvement in many aspects of Palestinian national reconstruction provides the context for the emigration desires.

The results show that while only 35% of the Palestinians believe that corruption exists in Palestinian NGOs, a majority of 62% believes that it exists in PA institutions. Among those who believe that corruption exists in PA institutions, 80% see it in ministries, 74% in police and security services, 48% in the PLC, and 40% in the president’s office. What makes things even worse is the belief of almost every one (except 6%) that wasta (personal and family connections) is essential in one degree or another in any employment. A larger percentage of Gazans compared to West Bankers (76% vs. 58%) tend to believe that wasta is highly prevalent.

No change is noticeable in the public’s positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy which remained stable at 30%, while that of Israel's stood at 69%, the US 58%, and France 50%. Public evaluation of Jordanian democracy dropped from 38% two months ago to 32% today, and Egypt’s from 33% to 27%.

4. Elections for the president and vice-president and political affiliation

• In elections for the presidency, Arafat receives 43% of the vote, Haidar Abdul Shafi 14%, and Ahmad Yasin 11%
• In elections for the vice-presidency Farouq Qaddumi receives the largest percentage of votes (8%), followed by Sa’eb Erikat (5%), Haidar Abdul Shafi (3%), Faisal al-Husseini, Ahmad Qurai’ and Mahmud Abbas (2% each), and Hanan Ashrawi and Nabil Sha’ath (1% each)
• Fateh receives the support of 38% of the people, Hamas 10%, PFLP 4%, Islamic Jihad 3%, and the non-affiliated 38%.

The results show no change in the popularity of Yassir Arafat which stands today at 43%. The same is true with regard to Haidar Abdul Shafi (14%) and Ahmad Yasin (11%). Arafat’s popularity remains higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) than in the West Bank (40%).

In the competition over the office of vice president, the results of this survey differ greatly from those obtained two months ago. The change has been caused by a different methodology employed in this survey. While we normally provide respondents with a list of names to select from, we have asked them this time to select a name from memory. The new methodology revealed that no single Palestinian leader is seen by the public as a natural successor to Arafat. Nonetheless, Farouq Qaddumi received the highest percentage of votes with 8%, followed by Sa’eb Erikat with 5%, Haidar Abdul Shafi with 3%, Ahmad Qurai’, Faisal al Husseini, and Mahmud Abbas with 2% each, and Hanan Ashrawi and Nabil Sha’ath with 1% each. A majority of 55% could not or chose not to give the name of their preference, 15% declared that they do not intend to participate in the elections, and 7% gave their vote to persons who could not reach a 1% threshold.

It is worth mentioning that four of those candidates received a much greater percentage of support in our survey which was conducted two months ago when respondents were provided with a list of four names only. At that time, Abdul Shafi received 37%, Husseini 23%, Abbas and Qurai’ 14% each.

Fateh recovered some of its popularity in this survey increasing its percentage from 35% two months ago to 38% in this survey. The Islamists received 16% of people’s support divided over Hamas (10%), Islamic Jihad (3%) and Independent Islamists (3%). The PFLP dropped slightly from 5% to 4% and the percentage of the non-affiliated remained the same at 38%.

5. Home and Mobile Phones, Computers and Internet, and Satellites and TV Stations

• Increase in home phone ownership from 42% in January 1999 to 45% today and in mobile phones from 21% to 29%
• Increase in satellite dish ownership from 27% in June 1998 to 38% today
• Al Jazeera satellite TV station is watched by 51% of those who own satellite dishes, followed by Egyptian TV (11%), ART TV (9%), and MBC TV (6%)
• Home computer ownership reaches 12% and Internet subscription reaches 14% among those who own computers at home and 5% among those who have computers at work

The results show an increase in the percentage of home phone owners from 42% in early 1999 to 45% today, and a larger increase in the percentage of mobile phone ownership from 21% to 29% during the same period. It is noticeable that home phones are found more in cities (57%) than in refugee camps (40%) or towns and villages (36%). Home phones are equally found in the West Bank (45%) and the Gaza Strip (44%). But they are not equally found in homes of the rich (79%) compared to homes of the poor (35%).

Mobile phones are found more in the West Bank (37%) than in the Gaza Strip (14%) and in rural areas (34%) than in cities (25%).

Similarly, the results show an increase in the percentage of satellite dish ownership from the 27% recorded fifteen months ago to 38% today. Satellite dishes are found more in the Gaza Strip (45%) than in the West Bank (34%), in cities (48%) more than refugee camps (35%) or towns and villages (30%), and among the highest income people (74%) than the lowest income people (28%).

The results show that the most watched satellite TV station is al Jazeera (51%), followed by the Egyptian TV (11%), ART TV (9%), and MBC TV (6%). It is noticeable that more men (67%) watch al Jazeera than women (37%). The station is also popular among the holders of BA degree (76%) compared to illiterates (42%), and among those with the highest income (70%) compared to those with the lowest income (49%).

Home computer ownership remained stable at 12%, of which 14% have Internet connections. Internet connection reaches 5% among those with office computers....More

These are the results of opinion poll #39, conducted by the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, between 28 - 30 January 1999. The poll deals with the peace process, donor community support, domestic affairs, elections for the President and vice-President, internet, and satellite dishes. The total sample size of this poll is 1318 from Palestinians 18 years and older, of which 823 in the West Bank and 495 in the Gaza Strip. The margin of error is + 3% and the non-response rate is 3%.

1. Peace Process

• Support for the peace process rises to 73%
• Support for violence against Israelis declines to 41%
• Support for a unilateral declaration of independence declines to 52%

The results show that support for the peace process has risen to 73% after it had dropped to 66% about one month ago in the aftermath of the Israeli suspension of the Wye River agreement. This change in public attitude is further reinforced by the sharp drop in the level of support for armed attacks against Israeli targets from 53% one month ago to 41% today. Opposition to armed attacks is higher in the Gaza Strip (57%) than in the West Bank (50%). Opposition also increases among the less educated, laborers, merchants, professionals, specialists, the unemployed and supporters of Fateh.

Along the same context, support for a Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence on May 4, 1999, has dropped from 57% one month ago to 52% today. Support for the declaration increases in the Gaza Strip (55%), compared to the West Bank (50%), and among students and the young.

The shift in public attitude regarding these three issues in the last month may be due to Israel’s party and election developments with the rise of the Center Party and the increasing divisions within the right wing parties. These developments may have strengthened the desire to wait for the results of the Israeli elections without the intrusion of violence that might serve the interests of the right wing parties. Furthermore, contradictory Palestinian statements regarding statehood on May 4^th, may have contributed to the relative decline in support for the unilateral declaration.

2. Donor Community Support:

• Donor countries that contribute most to Palestinian economic development are the European Union and its members (25%), Japan (16%), US (14%), and Arab countries (8%)
• About 46% believe that donors’ support has a positive impact on Palestinian economic development while 16% believe that it has a negative impact
• Most important areas of donors’ support are: education (27%) followed by health (26%) and water (17%)
• Least important areas of donors’ support are: women programs (21%) followed by housing (13%), roads (11%), and democracy and human rights (11%)

The results show that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza believe that the European Union and its members contribute most to the development of the Palestinian economy as they have been selected by 25% of the sample. About 16% however, believe that Japan is the one that contributes most, while 14% say that it is the US and 8% say that it is the Arab countries. It is noticeable that a larger percentage in the Gaza Strip selected the EU, while an identical percentage in the West Bank and Gaza selected the US. Within the EU, France has been especially singled out, especially in the Gaza Strip. The EU is singled out more by refugees, refugee camp residents, and the most educated.

The majority of respondents (70%) believe that the donors' support is most important in the three areas of education, health and water. On the other hand, donors’ programs seen as least important were those in the areas of women, housing, security and police, roads, institution building, democracy and human rights, agriculture, and sewage treatment. In the Gaza Strip, interest was highest in the area of health (33%) followed by education (23%), water (10%), sewage treatment (9%), and democracy and human rights (8%). Priorities in the West Bank were similar to those in the Gaza Strip, but education came first (29%) followed by health (21%), water (21%), democracy (6%), and sewage treatment (3%).

Positive evaluation of the impact of the donors’ support on Palestinian economic development reached 46%, while negative evaluation reached 15%. One third of respondents considered the impact to be somewhere in the middle between positive and negative. Positive evaluation was highest in the Jabalia area (58%) and lowest in the Jerusalem and Bethlehem areas (39% and 38% respectively). It decreases also among residents of the refugee camps and the illiterates. It increases slightly among supporters of Fateh (52%) compared to supporters of the PFLP and Hamas (42% and 45% respectively).

Most of these results were predictable. They highlight the particularism of some of the areas such as the Gaza’s relative interest in health more than education and the relatively high interest of Khanyounis in the sewage treatment area which enjoyed the same importance as education. Similarly, Deir al Balah and Rafah have shown high interest in the area of sewage treatment. What was not predictable however, was the lack of interest in water programs in the Gaza Strip despite the very well known concern about water quality and shortage. Similarly, lack of West Bank interest in donors’ support for agriculture is surprising. Little interest in both regions have been shown with regard to donors’ assistance in roads despite the recognition of most experts of the importance of this vital need. Furthermore, the results show little street interest in democracy and human rights issues and demonstrate the relative lack of street interest in women programs and security and police issues. Overall, they reveal the street’s hierarchy of priorities with immediate interest focusing on vital living conditions and the postponement of socio-political concerns for future treatment. On the other hand, it may reveal Palestinian discomfort with donors’ and Western involvement in socio-political questions which they may consider to be outside the realm of foreign intrusion.

3. Domestic Conditions

• 23% believe that their economic conditions today are better than they were during the past three years; but 39% say the opposite and 38% say that they have not changed
• A majority of 56% are optimistic about their economic conditions in the next three years, but 26% are pessimistic
• A majority of 54% believe that corruption exist in the PNA and 58% believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future
• Corruption is seen in ministries (79%), police and security services (70%), PLC (47%), and the office of the presidency (37%)
• Only 6% believe that appointments to jobs are possible without wasta (connections) while 59% believe that it is done through wasta to a large extent
• Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy reaches 36% compared to 64% for Israeli democracy
• 58% believe that people can not criticize the PNA without fear
• 21% say that the situation in the Palestinian areas forces them to seek permanent emigration
• 48% evaluate positively the performance of Palestinian local councils
• 42% support holding local elections immediately while 47% support postponement until after further Israeli redeployment from new Palestinian areas

The results show that people’s perception of their economic situation has shifted slightly to the worse compared to where it was six months ago. While the percentage of those who believe that their economic conditions have remained the same, as it was during the past three years, has not changed, the percentage of those who believe that it was worse went down to 23% compared to 31% in August 1998. In other words, the percentage of those who believe that their economic conditions are better today has dropped compared to where it was few months ago. Those who believe that conditions were better reached 39% in this survey, while those who said that it remained the same reached 3%.

In contrast, expectregarding the future are more optimistic than they were last August. Today, 56% say that they are optimistic about their economic conditions in the next three years compared to 51% six months ago. The level of optimism is relatively high in Ramallah (63%) and low in Jerusalem (50%) and Hebron (47%) as would be expected. Optimism is higher also among the less educated, housewives, farmers and those with the least income. It is lower among the most educated, merchants, specialists, and those with the highest income.

In the political area, street’s positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy increased from 31% to 36% in less than a month. In contrast, the percentage of those who believe that people can not criticize the PNA without fear has increased from 53% to 58% during the same period.

Similarly, the percentage of those who believe that corruption exists in PNA institutions has dropped significantly in one month from 68% to 54%. It is noticeable however, that most of those who changed their views shifted to the categories of “do not know” or “no opinion.”

Despite this change, a large percentage of those who believe in the existence of corruption (79%) still believes that it exists in ministries, while 70% believe that it exists in the security services, 47% believe it exists in the PLC, and 37% believe it exists in the office of the presidency.

The percentage of those who believe that appointment to jobs can not be made without wasta (connections) has increased slightly from 56% six months ago to 59% in this survey.

Under these political and economic conditions, 21% of respondents expressed the desire to emigrate permanently. This percentage is lower than that obtained in August 1998 when it was 26%.

Finally, the results show a limited drop in the positive evaluation of the performance of local councils compared to the situation in April 1997. Today, it reaches 48% compared to 52% in the April 1997 survey. Positive evaluation of performance is higher in the areas of Nablus (64%) and Ramallah (56%) and lower in Jerusalem (23%), Tulkarm (42%), Deir al Balah (43%) and Rafah (45%).

Forty two percent supported the holding of local elections immediately while 47% supported its postponement until after further Israeli redeployment takes place from additional areas in the West Bank. This indicates a drop in support for immediate elections compared to the situation in June 1998 when 48% supported holding the elections immediately while 45% supported postponement. Support for immediate elections is stronger in Bethlehem area (56%) and weaker in the Nablus area (35%) and Gaza City (39%).

Support for immediate elections drops among illiterates (31%) and rises among the holders of BA degrees (56%). Supporters of opposition factions are divided over the issue with higher support for elections among supporters of the PFLP (53%) and relatively lower support among supporters of Hamas (39%). Supporters of Fateh come in the middle with 43% support.

4. Elections for the President and Vice President and Political Affiliation

• Yassir Arafat receives 47% of the vote, Ahmad Yasin 10%, and Haidar Abdul Shafi 9%
• In elections for the vice president: Haidar Abdul Shafi 15%, Sa’eb Erikat 8%, Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Hussieni 7% each, Farouq Qaddoumi and Ahmad Qurai’ 6% each, Mahmud Abbas 4%, and Nabil Sha’ath 3%
• In elections for the vice president between three candidates: Haidar Abdul Shafi 40%, Sa’eb Erikat 26%, and Faisal Hussieni 22%
• Fateh receives 37% of the vote, Hamas 12%, PFLP and Islamic Jihad 3% each, and the non-affiliated 38%

In a race for the presidency, Yassir Arafat’s popularity remained the same at 47% level. Ahmad Yassin received 10% of the vote and Haidar Abdul Shafi received 9%. Arafat’s popularity reached 51% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank.

In the race for the vice presidency, Abdul Shafi received the largest percentage of votes among eight candidates with 15%, followed by Sa’eb Erikat with 8%, Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal Hussieni with 7% each, Ahmad Qurai’ and Farouq Qaddoumi with 6% each, Mahmoud Abbas with 4%, and Nabil Sha’ath with 3%. The popularity of four of the candidates is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank with Abdul Shafi receiving 21% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank, Erikat receiving 10% in Gaza compared to 7% in the West Bank, Abbas receiving 8% in Gaza and 3% in the West Bank, and Sha’ath receiving 5% in the Gaza Strip and 1% in the West Bank. The other four received more support in the West Bank with Hussieni receiving 8% (4% in Gaza), Ashrawi receiving 7% (6% in Gaza), Qurai’ receiving 7% (4% in Gaza) and Qaddoumi receiving 6% (4% in Gaza).

In a contest for the vice presidency between three candidates only, Abdul Shafi received the largest percentage of votes (40%) followed by Erikat (26%) and Hussieni (22%). Abdul Shafi has stronger support in Gaza (46%) than in the West Bank (35%). Hussieni is stonger in the West Bank (27%) than in Gaza (15%). But Erikat has equal support in Gaza and the West Bank (26%). Compared to the situation one month ago, Abdul Shafi and Erikat increased their support slightly while Hussieni’s popularity went down slightly.

Support for Fateh went down from 40% one month ago to 37% in this survey. Hamas received 12% support and the PFLP 3%. The Islamists received an overall support of 19% while the nonaffiliated remained as before at 38%.

5. Telephones, Computers, Internet, and Satellite Dishes at Homes

• 42% have phones at homes
• 21% have mobile phones
• 11% have computers at home
• 5% have Internet subscription at home
• 6% have Internet subscription at work
• 30% have satellite dishes at home

The results indicate an increase in the percentage of those who have Internet subscription at work from 2% last June to 6% today. Similarly, the percentage of those who have satellite dishes at home increased from 27% to 30% during the same period. By contrast, a drop has taken place in the percentage of those who have Internet subscription at home from 7% to 5% and in the percentage of those who have computers at home from 12% to 11%.

Phones are available in 42% of the homes and 21% have mobile phones. The percentage of those who have these facilities is generally higher in the West Bank. For example, mobile phones are available to 29% of West Bankers and to 9% of Gazans. More regular phones are available in the West Bank (44%) than in Gaza (38%). But more Internet access is available in Gazan homes (6%) than in homes in the West Bank (5%). Similarly, more satellite dishes are found in Gazan homes (31%) than in homes in the West Bank (29%)....More

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-17 March 2018. The poll was conducted after the explosion of a roadside bomb that targeted the convoy of Palestinian Prime Minister Rami al Hamdallah during his visit to the Gaza Strip and amid mutual accusations between Fatah and Hamas regarding the responsibility for the stalemate in reconciliation and the Gaza explosion. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed also the publication of leaks concerning alleged substance of the American “Deal of the Century.” Several other developments may have influenced the findings of the poll: reports were published regarding an eavesdropping by PA security services on citizens’ phone calls; public participation in non-violent protests diminished considerably; talks emerged around possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections; and warnings were issued by international agencies concerning the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and various aspects of the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

In the first quarter of 2018, PSR’s poll explored various issues and public concerns: (1) the American role in the peace process and reports concerning the “deal of the century,” (2) the Gaza explosion which targeted the Prime Minister’s convey, (3) the great decline in popular participation in non-violent confrontations, (4) the possible participation of East Jerusalemites in Jerusalem’s municipal elections, and (5) other internal matters such as the worsening living and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip, eavesdropping on phone calls of Palestinian citizens, the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights, reconciliation, and the internal balance of power.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians views the American role in the peace process as biased in favor of Israel and refuses the purported American ideas that have been reportedly included in the American “deal of the century,” such as making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state or expanding the southern borders of the Gaza Strip into Sinai. The majority views the American suspension of support for UNRWA as aiming at closing the refugees’ file and deny them their right of return. A large percentage worries that this American position might weaken the ability of the Palestinian side to defend the rights of the refugees. For all of this, about two-thirds are opposed to the renewal of contacts between the PA and the US or the resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Despite the fact that a large percentage supports the peace process, more than 90% expect to see no peace between Palestine and Israel in the next five, ten, or even 100 years. The largest percentage views the medium and long term future with a great deal of trepidation, pessimism and frustration.

Findings show that about half of the public believes that Israel stands behind the explosion that targeted the convoy of the Palestinian Prime Minister during his visit to the Gaza Strip. About three quarters of the public think that the aim of the explosion was to foil reconciliation efforts. About a quarter of Gazans however believe that the explosion represented a protest against the policies of the PA government toward the Gaza Strip.

Despite great public support for non-violent protests and the great admiration the public has for the Palestinian youth, Ahd Tamimi, viewing her as a role model and a symbol of popular resistance, the largest percentage attributes the significant decrease in public participation in non-violent protests to a weak public confidence in the Palestinian leadership and factions. Many also believe that the public thinks that such protests are ineffective in the confrontation with Israel. Indeed, findings of the poll show that about half of the public is in favor of a return to an armed intifada.

Findings also show that despite concerns about being seen as an acceptance of the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, a majority of the public favors the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Jerusalem municipal elections. Participation in the vote is seen as giving East Jerusalemites the ability to influence the municipal policies that affect them. Among all Palestinians, but more significantly among East Jerusalemites, less than a third are opposed to such participation.

Finally, when looking at internal conditions, findings show that:

  Almost all Palestinians view conditions in the Gaza Strip as dire, bad or very bad. Responsibility for this situation is placed first on Israel, then the PA, and finally Hamas. But for Gazans, the blame is placed first on the PA, with Israel and Hamas second and third respectively.

  About two-thirds think that the PA security services do indeed eavesdrop on phone calls of citizens and officials and more than 60% believe that such eavesdropping is done illegally and without any just cause. A majority believes that such behavior benefits the occupation first and foremost and that the Palestinian judiciary is incapable of putting an end to it.

  Those who positively view Palestinian democracy, seeing it as good or very good, are less than a quarter while about two-thirds believe that Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip cannot criticize the PA without fear.

  Optimism about the success of reconciliation plummets to less than a third; satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government does not exceed one third; and about half of the public puts the blame for the poor showing of the reconciliation government on the PA and the PA leadership while a small minority puts the blame on Hamas.

 Finally, the domestic balance of power remains relatively unchanged compared to three months ago: more than two-thirds demand the resignation of president Abbas; a Hamas candidate wins against Abbas in presidential elections; but Fatah enjoys more popular support than Hamas, with a five point difference in its favor.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

·         Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 33%; 68% of the public demand the resignation of the president; demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 81% in the Gaza Strip and 62% in the West Bank

• In presidential elections between Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh and Abbas, the former receives 52% and the latter 41% of the popular vote
• In presidential elections between Haniyeh and Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti, the former receives 39% and the latter 55% of the popular vote
•   In parliamentary elections, Fatah wins 36% of the popular vote, Hamas 31%, and the third parties combined 9%
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 40% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).  68% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 27% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 70% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 62% in the West Bank and 81% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 64% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 29% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 8% (2% in the West Bank and 20% in the Gaza Strip), Rami al Hamdallah (7%), Mustafa Barghouti (4%); Khalid Mishal (3%), and Salam Fayyad (2%).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 52% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 53% for Haniyeh and 41% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the vote (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 66% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh 45% (compared to 43% three months ago). If the competition was between President Abbas from Fatah and Mustafa Barghouti from al Mubadara (Initiative), Abbas receives 48% and Mustafa Barghouti receives 43% of the vote.  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 38% and Haniyeh 37%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 25% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 32% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 41% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions, status of democracy, eavesdropping on phone calls, and 3G:

•  Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy does not exceed 23%
• Only 5% describe conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good while 20% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good
•  Perception of safety and security stands at 54% in the Gaza Strip and at 53% in the West Bank
• But 45% of Gazans compared to 19% in the West Bank indicate that they want to emigrate
• A majority believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people
•  62% believe that the PA security services eavesdrop on Palestinian citizens and 62% believe that this eavesdropping is done for illegitimate purposes
• Only 33% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 63% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear. In a question about the status of democracy in Palestine and other countries, only 23% say Palestinian democracy is good or very good while only 10% say democracy in Egypt is good or very good. By contrast, 64% say democracy in Turkey is good or very good; 57% say democracy in Israel is good or very good, and 55% say democracy in France is good or very good.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%. In an open-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening of conditions in the Gaza Strip: the largest percentage (39%) blames Israel; 25% blame the PA, president Abbas, the reconciliation government, or Fatah; and 18% blame Hamas. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 43% of West Bankers compared to only 30% of Gazans blame Israel; and 16% of West Bankers compared to 43% of Gazans blame the PA, Abbas, the reconciliation government, and Fatah. However, responses of West Bankers and Gazans are almost identical regarding Hamas’ responsibility: 19% of West Bankers and 18% of Gazans blame Hamas.  The belief that the PA and its various constituents are responsible is higher in refugee camps and cities (30% and 27% respectively) compared to villages/towns (18%), among the religious (33%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (19% and 23% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (41%) compared to those who support the peace process (18%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (51% and 34% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (7%), among those with the lowest income (36%) compared to those with the highest income (18%), in the governorates of Khanyounis and Rafah (50% each) compared to the governorates of Jenin, Tulkarm, and Jericho (4%, 8%, and 8% respectively), and among the holders of BA degree (29%) compared to illiterates (21%).

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 54%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 53%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 53% and in the West Bank at 45%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 19%. Three months ago, 41% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 78% and a majority of 52% views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

We asked the public about the media reports regarding a possible eavesdropping by the Palestinian security services on phone calls of Palestinian officials and citizens:

   62% say they believe that the reports are accurate and 29% believe they are inaccurate.

  62% do not think, and 26% think, that the eavesdropping on phones was legal or for legitimate purposes.

 56% think the primary beneficiary of eavesdropping conducted by the Palestinian security services is the Israel occupation while 25% think it is the PA administration and leadership, and only 12% think it is the Palestinian citizen and his or her security.  The percentage of those who believe that occupation is the primary beneficiary increases in the West Bank (58%) compared to the Gaza Strip (51%), among the religious (57%) compared to the non-religious (49%), among those opposed to the peace process (61%) compared to supporters of the peace process (54%), among the youngest, 18-22 years (60%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 49 years (52%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (60% and 58% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (46%), among farmers, retirees, and students (81%, 66%, and 59% respectively) compared to laborers (49%), among private sector workers (55%) compared to those who work in the public sector (43%), and among the illiterates (60%) compared to holders of BA degree (54%).

  Moreover, a majority of 53% think that if a Palestinian citizen (or even a former head of a Palestinian security service) submits a complaint to the Palestinian judiciary, it would be incapable of putting an end to this eavesdropping. Only 37% believe that the judiciary is capable of ending the eavesdropping.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Maan TV (15%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (13% each), al Aqsa TV (12%), Al Arabiya, al Mayadeen, and al Quds TV (5% each).

We asked the public about the rates for 3G service, a newly introduced service by Palestinian providers in the West Bank that allows for faster access to the internet on mobile phones: a majority of West Bankers (57%) describes the rates as high or very high and only 3% describe them as low. 11% think the rates are reasonable or medium. 30% did not know much about the service or the rates.

We asked respondents about giving or donating money to the poor and charities:

Two-thirds believe that the primary motivation behind giving to the poor is to win God’s satisfaction while less than a quarter (23%) think that people give to the poor in order to win the satisfaction of other people.

Three quarters of the respondents say that they give to the poor and 23% say they do not. When asked in an open-ended question about its own motivation for giving, an overwhelming majority (80%) says that it is driven by religious incentive (such winning God’s satisfaction) while 20% say that it is driven by humanistic or social incentives (such as to ease the burden on or help the poor).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• Only 26% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government; optimism regarding the success of reconciliation drops from 50% to 30%
• 45% hold the PA, PA president, and the reconciliation government responsible for the failure of the reconciliation government to carry out its duties; only 15% put the blame on Hamas
•   60% of Gazans, compared to 26% of West Bankers, support contacts between Hamas and Dahlan to establish a joint administration for the Gaza Strip
• 45% believe that Israel stands behind the explosion that targeted the PA Prime Minister in the Gaza Strip and three quarters believe that the aim of the explosion is to insure the failure of reconciliation
• Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 26% are satisfied and 65% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 38%. Similarly, only 30%, compared to 50% three months ago, are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation.

The largest percentage (45%) believes that the PA, president Abbas, and the prime minister are responsible for the poor showing of the reconciliation government. By contrast, only 15% believe that Hamas is responsible for that poor showing; 13% say the government is doing a good job; and 27% do not who is to blame. It is worth noting that the responses of West Bankers are greatly different from those of Gazans: while about one  third (32%) of West Bankers blames the PA, Abbas and the prime minister, 69% of Gazans puts the blame on these three. By contrast, only 12% of West Bankers, compared to 21% of Gazans, blame Hamas. We also asked the public about two claims: the one made by the reconciliation government that Hamas is preventing it from assuming control over the Gaza Strip, particularly in financial and security matters, and the claim made by Hamas that the reconciliation government is failing to carry out its responsibilities and duties in the Strip and that it continues to impose sanction on Gazans. About a third (32%) believes the two claims are baseless while 14% think the two claims are accurate. By contrast, 23% believe Hamas’ claim to be accurate and only 14% believe that the claim of the reconciliation government is accurate. In this context, 37% (60% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) support the Dahlan-Hamas efforts to reach an agreement on creating a joint administration for the Gaza Strip while 45% (36% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank) are opposed to such efforts.

We asked respondents about the Gaza explosion that targeted the convey of the prime minister:

  In an open question, we asked the public about its estimate of the party behind the explosion: the largest percentage (45%) believes it is the occupation; 14% believe it is Hamas and an identical percentage believes it is the PA or one of its agencies; 2% think it is Fatah, 1% think it is Dahlan, and 3% think it is one of the extremist groups.

  About three quarters (74%) believe that the aim of the perpetrators is to foil the reconciliation efforts while 17% (23% in the Gaza Strip and 14% in the West Bank) believe that the aim is to protest against the policies of the reconciliation government toward the Gaza Strip.

(4) The peace process:  

• 48% support and 50% oppose the two-state solution and 57% say that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion
• 28% support the one-state solution
• 48% support a return to an armed intifada
• 39% say that the decline in popular participation in non-violent resistance is caused by the absence of trust between the public and the PA leadership and factions
• The majority supports the decisions adopted by the PLO Central Council but about two-thirds believe that President Abbas will not implement those decisions
• The majority supports the participation of East Jerusalemites in the Jerusalem municipal elections by nomination and voting or just by voting
• Optimism about reaching a peace agreement with Israel in 10 years, and in 100 years, is the same: a dismal 9%
• 48% support the two-state solution and 50% oppose it. Moreover, 46% believe that a Palestinian majority supports the two-state solution and 47% say a majority is opposed to it. Similarly, 50% believe that a majority of Israelis are opposed to the two-state solution and 41% think an Israeli majority supports that solution.  57% say that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to settlement expansion while only 40% think that it remains feasible because settlements can be evacuated. Similarly, 73% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel during the next five years are slim or nonexistent while 25% think the chances are high or medium.  Despite the above, only 28% support a one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israelis have equal rights and 69% are opposed.

When given three options to choose from, the largest percentage (35%) chose armed resistance as the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 31% chose negotiation and 25% chose non-violent resistance effective. Three months ago, 44% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and 27% sided with negotiation. When the public is asked if it supports each of the following the responses were different: 74% support joining more international organizations; 63% support popular non-violence; 48% support a return to an armed intifada; and 49% support dissolving the PA.  Support for a return to an armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (39%), in cities and refugee camps (51% and 49% respectively) compared to villages/towns (34%), among the religious (55%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (43% each), among those who are opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (34%), among men (52%) compared to women (45%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 (58%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or above (48%), among Hamas supporters (74%) compared to supports of Fatah and third parties (36% and 42% respectively), among students (70%) compared to housewives and laborers (43% and 45% respectively), and among holders of BA degree (54%) compared to holder of elementary education and the illiterates (35% and 48% respectively).

We asked the public about its view on why popular participation in non-violent protests, particularly those related to the American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, has been waning: 39% say it is due to lack of trust between the public on the one hand and the PA leadership and factions on the other; 27% say it is due to the fact that non-violence is ineffective; and 25% say that it is due to the fact that many people think that the responsibility for confronting Israel and the US falls on the shoulders of the PA. 92% indicate that they have heard, and 8% have not heard, of Ahd Tamimi, a Palestinian youth activist being tried by the Israeli occupation on charges that she slapped an Israeli soldier. Among those who have heard about her, 64% say that they want her to be a role model for them and their relatives.  The percentage of those who consider Tamimi a role model is higher in the Gaza Strip (80%) and lower in the West Bank (56%). It is also higher in refugee camps and cities (68% and 65% respectively) compared to villages/towns (56%), among the religious and the somewhat religious (66% and 62% respectively) compared to non-religious (54%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to those who support the peace process (60%), among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (71% each) compared to supporters of third parties (48%), and among the refugees (71%) compared to the non-refugees (58%).

60% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 16% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories. Similarly, 77% say that they are worried that they would be hurt on their daily life by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 22% are not worried.

A majority of 52% indicates that it supports the resolutions made by the recent meeting of the PLO’s Central Council, such as the cancellation of the recognition of Israel, the suspension of the Oslo Agreement, and others, while 18% indicate that they agree with some but not all of them, and 24% oppose them. Nonetheless, about two-thirds (65%) believe that president Abbas will not implement these decisions and only 24% believe he will implement them.   The belief that president Abbas will not implement the Council’s decisions is higher in the Gaza Strip (70%) compared to the West Bank (62%), in cities (66%) compared to refugee camps and villages/towns (60% and 62% respectively), among the religious (66%) compared to the non-religious (47%), among those opposed to the peace process (82%) compared to supporters of the peace process (54%), among men (67%) compared to women (62%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (80% and 65% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (43%), and among those who work in the private sector (70%) compared to those who work in the public sector (59%).

Moreover, 74% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 24% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. In fact, 70% believe that there is already an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 20% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

46% of all the Palestinian public support the participation of East Jerusalemites in the next Israeli municipal elections by nomination and voting while 15% support only voting, and 29% say that they are opposed to all kinds of participation. Support for participation, either by nomination or voting, declines to 42% among East Jerusalemites but the opposition to participation among them remains almost identical (30%) to that of the general population. It is worth noting however that a large percentage (28%) did not express any views on the matter, probably out of concern that it might be risky to state its views on the subject or that its answer might not be a popular one.

We asked the public about its expectations regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations after 10 years and after 100 years:

25% believe that after 10 years conditions, or the status quo, will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing with little change; 34% say settlements will expand and there will be one political entity characterized by a system of apartheid that discriminates against the Palestinians; 24% believe that there will be a war or an armed intifada that will end the occupation. Only 9% believe that there will be peace between Israel and the Palestinians and a Palestinian state will be established.

  After 100 years, only 12% believe that things will be as they are now with occupation and settlement expansion continuing; 30% think settlements will expand and there will be one apartheid state that discriminates against the Palestinians; 29% think there will be a war or an intifada that will end the occupation. The belief that there will be peace between Israel and a Palestinian state remains unchanged at 9%.

(5) Palestinian-American relations and “the deal of the century”:

Two thirds oppose the resumption of contacts with the US administration and a majority of 51% rejects the “deal of the century” regardless of its content

• 88% view the US as biased in favor of Israel
• 94% reject the idea of making Abu Dis the capital of the Palestinian state
• 86% reject the idea of expanding the Gaza Strip into Sinai
• 63% reject the idea of allowing Israeli Jews to live in the state of Palestine as citizens or residents
• 65% are opposed to the resumption of contacts with the American administration that have been suspended last December after the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel; 21% favor a resumption of contacts. Similarly, 68% say that the PA leadership should not return to negotiations with Israel if the US administration asks it to do so while 27% say it should comply with the US request.  If negotiations with Israel resume under US sponsorship, the US will be biased in favor of Israel in the eyes of 88% of the Palestinians while only 7% think the US will be an honest broker and 2% think it will be biased in favor of the Palestinians.

A slim majority of 51% says that if the US submits its peace plan, the so-called “deal of the century,” the PA leadership should reject it regardless of its content because it must be bad for Palestinians while 29% say that the leadership should accept or reject the plan only after reviewing and discussing its content. Only 11% say that the Palestinian leadership should accept the “deal of the century.”   The percentage of those who want the PA to reject the US plan regardless of its content is higher in cities (53%) compared to villages/towns (41%), among the religious (55%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (36% and 49% respectively), among those opposed to the peace process (62%) compared to supporters of the peace process (46%), among men (55%) compared to women (48%), among Hamas supporters (62%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (44% and 47% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (52%) compared to those who work in the public sector (41%), and among the illiterates (58%) compared to holders of BA degree (49%).

A majority of 52% believes that the US administration has suspended its support for UNRWA because it seeks to close the file of the refugees and deny them their right of return while 43% think the US did that in order to pressure President Abbas to force him to return to negotiations with the US over the “deal of the century.”  Moreover, 49% think that the suspension of US support for UNRWA will not weaken the Palestinian negotiating position regarding the rights of the refugees but 45% think it will indeed weaken it.

We asked the public about its views regarding some of the leaked ideas that are allegedly linked to the “deal of the century:”

On Jerusalem, 94% say they are opposed to making Abu Dis a capital of the Palestinian state; 4% support the idea.

  86% are opposed and 10% support the idea of expanding the Gaza Strip to include parts of Sinai in return for an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank.

63% oppose and 31% support the idea of allowing Israeli Jews to live in the Palestinian state as citizens or residents while respecting the Palestinian law and enjoying the same rights and duties as the Palestinians. Support for the idea is higher in the West Bank (32%) compared to the Gaz Strip (28%), in refugee camps (39%) compared to cities and villages/towns (29% and 33% respectively), among the non-religious (46%) compared to the religious (26%), among supporters of the peace process (37%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (21%), among men (36%) compared to women (26%), among Fatah supporters (44%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (16% and 17% respectively), and among those who work in the public sector (38%) compared to those who work in the private sector (32%).

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% say that the most vital Palestinian goal should be ending occupation and building a Palestinian state; 30% say it is the obtaining of the right of return
• 28% say that the most serious problem facing Palestinians today is occupation and settlements and 25% say it is poverty and unemployment

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; 20% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 12-16 December 2018. The period before the conduct of the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the intensification of popular opposition to the Social Security Law, the failure of reconciliation efforts, the release of a report indicating that President Abbas intends to dissolve the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the transfer of the Qatari funds to Israel to cover the cost of fuel for the Gaza power station, and the direct Qatari payment to Gazan employees of the former Hamas government. Also, it was revealed during this period that some Palestinians have sold property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other places in the West Bank. Despite the efforts to calm conditions in the Gaza Strip, this period witnessed a serious escalation in violence between Hamas and Israel. The US Administration announced its intention to make public its own plan for Palestinian-Israeli peace. The Israeli prime minister visited Oman and Israeli ministers visited the United Arab Emirates. Finally, a major violent escalation took place in the West Bank during the period of the fieldwork for this poll. This press release addresses all these issues and covers other matters such as parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2018 indicate a significant increase in Hamas’ popularity in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The violent confrontations in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were probably responsible for this change. Moreover, Hamas’ success in insuring Gazan access to fuel and money to pay the salaries of its former government employees probably contributed to this outcome. Support for Fatah remains relatively unchanged. Moreover, support for Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh rises in the Gaza Strip while support for President Mahmoud 

Abbas declines in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections are held today, findings show that Haniyeh would most likely be the winner. If parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah and Hamas are likely to receive the same levels of support.

Findings also show that the public has lost hope for a successful reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and that a large majority is dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. They also show that the public is highly opposed to the policies of president Abbas toward the Gaza Strip including his demand for the full transfer of control over the Strip by Hamas to the reconciliation government and his demand for one gun. Indeed, the public supports the continued presence of armed battalions of the various factions alongside the official PA security services in the Gaza Strip. An overwhelming majority demands the ending of sanctions imposed by President Abbas on the Gaza Strip such as the decrease in salaries and in the amount of electricity provided to Gazans. But it is worth noting that a large percentage supports the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) despite the fact that more than one third believes that such a step is harmful to the reconciliation efforts.

Findings also show a widespread opposition to the Social Security Law reaching almost a consensus among West Bankers who believe that the law applies to them or will have an impact on them or their families. It is evident that the distrust in the government and the belief that the law is unjust are the most important drivers of the opposition to the law.

The majority views the results of the last confrontation between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip as a victory for Hamas. Indeed, an even larger majority than before continues to support Hamas-Israel indirect negotiations for a long term tahdia or truce. The majority also supports the current agreement between Hamas and Israel that allows Qatari-funded Israeli fuel as well as Qatar money to reach the Gaza Strip despite opposition by the PA to this Qatari role. In fact, findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians welcome the Qatari role in the Gaza Strip, both in terms of paying for the fuel needed for the generation of electricity and for the payment of the salaries of the employees of the former Hamas government. Despite all of this, the public tends to believe that the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip will collapse shortly and that such a collapse will lead to a widescale war against the Gaza Strip.

Findings regarding the peace process indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution and a considerable rise in support for an armed intifada. They also show a significant rise in the perception that the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion in the West Bank. Moreover, an overwhelming majority believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about promoting peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians believe that the Trump peace plan, when and if one is ever presented, will not call for any of the following: the establishment of a Palestinian state, East Jerusalem as a capital of the state of Palestine, the June 1967 lines as a basis for setting borders of Palestine, a just solution to the refugee problem, or ending the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. For this reason, three quarters of the Palestinians demand a rejection of the Trump plan. But findings also indicate that a large minority believes that the US mediation is indispensable for any peace negotiations with Israel. Moreover, the public is split in its attitude toward the Trump plan if it does indeed contain all these vital elements that the public currently thinks will be absent.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 35% (42% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 47% for Abbas and 45% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the vote (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 56% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 40%.
• If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 29% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 5%; Khalid Mishal by 4%; Mustafa Barghouti and Saeb Erikat by 2%; and Salam Fayyad by 1% each.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they would vote for Hamas and 35% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 27% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 34% three months ago) and for Fatah at 31% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 21% three months ago) and Fatah at 39% (compared to 38% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 14%.
• In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (43%) blames the PA, president Abbas, and the reconciliation government; 21% blame Hamas, 9% blame Egypt, and 20% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 58% of Gazans, compared to 34% of West Bankers, blame the PA, Abbas and the reconciliation government; and 28% of Gazans, compared to 17% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 55%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 47%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 45% and in the West Bank at 48%.
• One third )32%) of the public says it wants to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 48% and declines in the West Bank to 22%.
• Only 35% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 61% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 50% believe that they cannot.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%.
• A majority of the public (53%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 42% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (14%), Maan TV, Palestine TV, and Palestine Today (at 12% each), al Mayadeen and al Quds TV (5% each), and Al Arabiya (at 4%).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government: 

• 23% are satisfied and 66% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 22%.
• 29% are optimistic and 66% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%.
• The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 34% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 61% disagrees. Three months ago, 31% said they agreed with Abbas.
• When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, more than two-thirds (68%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 25% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans.
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (77%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 18% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 80% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip.
• The largest percentage (47%) supports the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council and 43% are opposed to that. Nonetheless, 37% believe that such a dissolution will harm the prospects of reconciliation while 21% believe it will improve the chances for reconciliation, and 34% believe it will have no impact on the reconciliation.

4) Israel-Hamas confrontations in the Gaza Strip and the long-term tahdia, or truce:   

• A majority of 61% (compared to 55% three months ago) supports and 33% oppose a Hamas-Israel long-term tahdia, or cessation of violence, even in the absence of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The agreement would entail the opening of the border crossing with Egypt and access to a seaport and an airport in a neighboring area in return for a Hamas enforcement of a long-term ceasefire as well as ending the Return Marches and the incendiary kites. Support for this long-term cessation of violence is higher in the Gaza Strip (64%) than in the West Bank (59%).
• Two-thirds (67%) support a limited tahdia (quiet) that would allow the entry into the Gaza Strip of Qatari fuel and money in return for stopping the confrontations along the Gaza-Israel border area including the incendiary balloons. Opposition to this tahdia stands at 28%. Support for this tahdia stands at 72% in the Gaza Strip and 64% in the West Bank.
• But a majority of 62% believes the current ceasefire between Hamas and Israel will not last for long and that it will collapse soon while 32% believe it will last for a long or a medium period.
• If the current ceasefire collapses, a majority of 62% believes it will lead to a widescale war between Hamas and Israel while 31% believe that a collapse of the ceasefire will not lead to a widescale war.
• But the public is split over the chances for reaching a long term Tahdia that would ease the siege and stop the confrontation: 50% believe the chances are high or medium and 48% think the chances are non-existent.
• 62% think that Hamas has come out victorious from the most recent confrontation with Israel while 31% think it has not come out victorious.  By contrast, about two-thirds (66%) are dissatisfied and 25% are satisfied with the position taken by the PA and the PA leadership during the most recent confrontation in the Gaza Strip.

5) Social Security Law

• 44% of the public believe that the Social Security Law applies to them or that they will be impacted by its implementation while 46% believe it does not apply to them or will not affect them.
• In its position toward the Social Security Law, the public is divided into three groups: (1) the largest one (51%) is opposed to the implementation of the law now or in the future; (2) only 13% support the implementation of the law now; and (3) 9% support the implementation of the law but only after it is revised. It is noticeable that opposition to the law in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip (65% and 28% respectively). Moreover, Opposition to the implementation of the law now or in the future is higher among those who say that the law applies to them or will affect them, reaching two-thirds (67%); and this is particularly true among West Bankers as opposition to the law stands among them at 84%.
• In an open question, addressed to those who said that they oppose the implementation of the law, we asked about the reasons for the opposition. Three answers were provided: 49% said the law is unjust, 32% said they do not trust the government and fear its corruption, and 14% said that their salaries are already too small and they cannot afford further cuts.
• Even if the law was revised as some demand, only 31% believe that the Social Security Fund or the government will actually make the payment to the retirees; a majority of 56% believes that the Fund and the government will not honor their commitment to pay the retirement wages.

6) Sale of Palestinian property to Israeli Jews

• An overwhelming majority of the public (88%) designate other Palestinians who sell property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other occupied territories as traitors while 9% call them corrupt and unpatriotic.
• Three quarters believe that the current penalties for sale of property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other places do not provide a deterrence against such sales while 14% believe the current penalties provide a sufficient deterrent. When, in an open question, we asked the public to identify a deterrent punishment, about two-thirds (64%) said it is the death penalty while 22% said imprisonment.
• Findings show that more than three quarters (78%) are dissatisfied and 17% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to deter sale of properties by Palestinians to Israeli Jews.

7) Role of Qatar in the Gaza Strip

• More than three quarters (78%) support the Qatari efforts to support the electricity sector in the Gaza Strip despite the fact that the PA is opposed to this Qatari effort; opposition to Qatari efforts does not exceed 19%.
• More significantly, an overwhelming majority of 79% supports the Qatari payment of salaries to the employees of the former Hamas government in the Gaza Strip despite the fact that the PA is opposed to this payment; opposition to the payment does not exceed 19%.
• Generally speaking, a large majority of 73% looks positively, and only 25% looks negatively, at the role played by Qatar on the Palestinian issue, particularly in the Gaza Strip. It is noticeable that there are no differences between the views of Gazans and West Bankers regarding the Qatari role.

8) Decisions of the Palestinian Central Council of the PLO

• Two thirds (67%) support and 29% oppose the Central Council’s decision to suspend Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel until Israel recognizes the state of Palestine.
• Similarly, 72% support and 23% oppose the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel; but more than two-thirds (70%) believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 23% believe it will.

9) The peace process

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 43% and opposition at 55%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 47%. But support for the two-state solution rises to 52% when the borders of the Palestinian state are described as those of the 4^th of June 1967.
• Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 45% said they prefer the two-state solution, 22% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 23% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.” Three months ago, support for the two-state solution stood at 53%, for the one state solution at 24%, and 14% preferred a third undefined alternative.
• A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 35% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel;” according to 34% of the public while an identical percentage prefers waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 16% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 40% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel.
• But a large minority of 44% thinks that armed struggle is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 28% believe that negotiation is the most effective means and 23% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 39% said negotiation is the most effective means and 33% said armed struggle is the most effective means.
• An overwhelming majority of 77% say they are worried that in their daily life they would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 23% say they are worried.
• 59% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 18% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 71% support joining more international organizations; 61% support popular non-violence resistance; 54% support a return to an armed intifada; 47% support dissolving the PA; and 32% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, only 46% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 42% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
• Half of the public (50%) opposes and 47% support in principle the holding of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in order to resolve the conflict.
• If a Palestinian state is established, about two-thirds (68%) want it to be armed with heavy weapons, such as tanks and air force, while 27% want it to have a strong security force but without heavy arms.
• After the establishment of a Palestinian state, a majority of 54% is opposed to the idea of a confederation between that state and Jordan while 40% support the idea.

10) Trump’s Peace Plan:

• An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about launching a new peace plan and 16% believe it is serious.
• If the Trump Administration does nonetheless offer such a peace plan, 73% believe the chances for its success are slim or non-existent and 24% believe the chances are high or medium.
• A large majority of 72% believes that if the US does indeed offer a peace plan, it will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel; 22% believe it will.
• A similar percentage (75%) believes that the plan will not call for a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem; 21% believe it will.
• 67% believe the Trump plan will not call for the borders of the Palestinian state to be based on the lines of June 1967 with minor mutual land swaps; 26% believe it will.
• An overwhelming majority of 80% believes the plan will not call for a just solution to the refugee problem; 16% believe it will.
• Similarly, 77% believe the plan will not call for the ending of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the areas occupied in 1967; 19% believe it will.
• 74% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan, if offered, and 21% believe it should accept it.
• But if the Trump plan does indeed include all such items, such as a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, with borders based on the 1967 lines, a just solution to the refugees’ problem, and an Israeli army withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, the largest percentage (49%) calls for rejecting it and 44% call for accepting it.
• A majority of 59% is opposed and 28% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
• We asked the public if Palestinian-Israeli negotiations can be sustained without the US role as a mediator: A majority of 52% believes that it can while 43% view the US role as indispensable.

11) Israeli relations with Arab countries:

• 78% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its problems and internal conflicts and that Palestine is not its primary cause; 21% believe that Palestine remains the primary cause of the Arab World. Moreover, 72% believe that an alliance already exists between Sunni Arabs and Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation; 21% disagrees with this assessment.
• A majority of 60% believes that the visits by Israeli leaders to Arab countries are harming the prospects for peace while 10% believe they contribute to peace making; 27% believe they neither help nor hinder peace making.
• We asked the public to speculate about the motivation of some of the Arab countries in allowing such Israeli visits to their capitals. A majority of 60% said that they want to win the support of the Trump Administration, 17% said they are seeking to fight Iran, and 12% said they are interested in promoting Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

(12) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 29% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 26% say it is poverty and unemployment; 25% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

(13) The murder of Jamal Khashoggi:

• A majority of 51% believes that Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman is the person responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, while 26% put the blame for the murder on King Salman, and 9% put it on those employees reporting to the two leaders. 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13-16 March 2019. The period before the conduct of the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) by the PA president, the announcement that a new PLC, but not presidential, elections will take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within six months, the selection of Mohammad Shtayyeh to be the next prime minister following the resignation of the Hamdallah government, and the eruption of demonstrations in the Gaza Strip against high cost of living conditions and their violent suppression by Hamas’ police and armed wing . The period also witnessed the implementation of Israel’s decision to deduct a small amount of the Palestinian custom revenues it transfers every month to the PA and the PA response refusing to accept any of these funds, a Palestinian-Israeli escalation in al-Aqsa Mosque in the aftermath of a Waqf decision to re-open Bab al Rahma (Gate of Mercy) area for Muslim prayer and an Israeli ban on prayer in that area, and the formation of a new Israeli electoral list representing the center in preparation for Israeli parliamentary elections which are scheduled to take place next month. Finally, the US Administration announced during this period its intentions to release its peace plan, known as the “Deal of the Century,” after the holding of the Israeli elections. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2019  indicate a rise in support for the two-state solution, but the largest percentage remains opposed to this solution. Support for negotiations, as the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state rises while the belief that armed struggle is the most effective means drops. But distrust in the seriousness of the Trump Administration increases. Similarly, findings show a significant rise in the belief that the Trump plan will not include a Palestinian state, nor will it include a reference to East Jerusalem as a capital for the state, or an emphasis on the 1967 borders, or a call to a just solution to the refugee problem, or a call to end the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army. Given all these doubts about the plan, about 80% demand that the PA leadership reject the American plan when made public.

Findings also show that about three quarters of the public demand the simultaneous holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A similar percentage indicates its rejection of holding parliamentary elections if no presidential elections were held at the same time and if restricted to the West Bank. 60% would oppose elections, even if held in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, if restricted to a parliamentary vote.  If the PA manages to hold parliamentary elections only and only in the West Bank, less than 30% of West Bankers say they will participate in that vote.

Findings also show that if presidential elections are held today, Abbas would win against Hamas’ Haniyyeh. Three months ago, Haniyyeh was able to win against Abbas. Abbas’ recent confrontation with the Israeli government over payment to the families of prisoners and martyrs and the deduction from the Palestinian custom revenues might have contributed to the rise in his popularity. By contrast, Hamas’ violent suppression of the recent popular demonstrations in the Gaza Strip might have contributed to the decline in support for Haniyyeh. If parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah would win the largest share of the vote indicating a significant rise in its popularity compared to our findings three months ago. Support for Hamas on the other hand drops slightly compared to our findings three months ago. Vote for the two factions has probably been affected by the same factors that affected support for Abbas and Haniyyeh.

Findings indicate that the public is evenly divided over the selection of Shtayyeh as the next prime minister, one satisfied and the other dissatisfied with the selection. But the largest percentage believe a government led by Shtayyeh will not succeed in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or in organizing elections, or in improving Palestinian economic conditions. Given the Israeli decision to deduct part of the custom revenues Israel transfers to the PA on monthly basis and the PA response by refusing to accept any of those funds, a large majority expresses pessimism about the ability of the PA to pay salaries to its public sector and a majority says that this development could lead to PA collapse.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• Only 43% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 46% believe no elections will take place.
• An overwhelming majority (72%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 10% want parliamentary elections only. 13% do not want any elections.
• An overwhelming majority (72%) expects Israel to refuse to allow election to take place in East Jerusalem and 15% expect Israel to allow it. Similarly, 53% believe that Hamas will not allow election to take place in the Gaza Strip if such vote was restricted to parliamentary elections and 33% believe it will allow such election.
• If elections were for a parliament and a president, 66% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 26% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip.  But if elections were for a parliament only, 59% say they want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 32% would oppose that.
• About three quarters (74%) oppose and 19% support the holding of parliamentary elections only and only in the West Bank. Similarly, 62% oppose and 31% support the holding of parliamentary elections only even if they are to take place in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• 54% say they will not participate in West Bank-Gaza Strip elections if they were restricted to a parliamentary vote and 41% say they will participate in such elections. Similarly, 61% say they will not participate in elections if they were parliamentary only and if they were to take place in the West Bank only; 29% say they will participate in such elections.
• If elections were parliamentary only and took place only in the West Bank but some of the members of the new parliament were from the Gaza Strip, only 50% say such a parliament would represent both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 34% say it would represent the West Bank only. In the Gaza Strip, the largest percentage (48%) say such a parliament would represent the West Bank only and 45% say it would represent both areas.
• 54% are dissatisfied with the dissolution of the PLC while 37% say they are satisfied. It is worth noting that three months ago, before the actual dissolution of the PLC, 47% said they would support its dissolution and 43% said they would oppose such a step.  Today, 53% view the dissolution of the PLC as illegal and unconstitutional while 33% view it as legal and constitutional.
• 64% are worried and 34% are not worried that domestic conditions would deteriorate in case the position of the president become vacant. But 47% believe that when the position of the president is vacant, Palestinian factions will be able to reach an agreement on conducting presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to elect a successor; 45% believe that the factions will not reach such an agreement
• 60% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 62%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 40% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 32% (38% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 51% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 47% of the vote (compared to 36% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 51% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 55% (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh 33% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 64% and Haniyeh 33%.
• If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (2% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 4%; Khalid Mishal, Saeb Erikat, and Mustafa Barghouti by 3% each, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 8% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 31% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 39% three months ago).
• A majority of 54% view and 42% do not view the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It is worth noting that the belief that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people stood at 58% nine months ago and at 69% thirteen years ago. 

(2) Mohammad Shtayyeh, a new prime minister:

• 38% are satisfied and 40% are dissatisfied with the selection of Mohammad Shtayyeh as the next prime minister. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction reaches 52%.
• The largest percentage (48%) believes that a government led by Shtayyeh will not succeed in achieving reconciliation and unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 35% believe it will succeed.
• Similarly, the largest percentage (44%) believes that a government led by Shtayyeh will not be able to organize legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% think it will succeed.
• Half of the public believes that a Shtayyeh government will not be able to improve economic conditions in the PA while 36% believe it will be able to do that.

(3) Domestic conditions:

• Now after Israel deducted part of the custom revenues it transfers to the PA and after the PA has refused to accept the incomplete transfer, an overwhelming majority (69%) is worried and 25% are not worried that the PA will not be able to pay salaries to its public sector. Moreover 54% are worried and 40% are not worried that the PA’s inability to pay salaries to its public sector will lead to PA collapse
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.
• In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Israel, Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (37%) blames Israel while 25% blame Abbas and the PA, 21% blame Hamas, 4% blame Egypt, and 9% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 41% of Gazans, compared to 16% of West Bankers, blame Abbas and the PA and 27% of Gazans, compared to 17% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 64%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 57%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 55% and in the West Bank at 47%.
• 29% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 43% and declines in the West Bank to 20%.
• Only 32% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 65% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 41% say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 53% believe that they cannot.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82%.
• The public is divided over the assessment of the PA: 47% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 47% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Palestine and Al Aqsa TV (14% each), Maan TV and Palestine Today (at 12% each), Al Arabiya (at 6%) and al Mayadeen (at 5%).

(4) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government: 

• 30% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
• The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 38% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 58% disagrees. Three months ago, 34% said they agreed with Abbas.
• When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, 71% said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 24% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no major differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans.
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (82%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 14% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government.

5) The peace process

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 48% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 43%.
• Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 49% said they prefer the two-state solution, 17% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 23% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.” Three months ago, support for the two-state solution stood at 45%, for the one state solution at 22%, and 23% preferred a third undefined alternative.
• A majority of 58% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 39% of the public while 30% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 17% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 34% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 34% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• The public is divided over the role of negotiations and armed struggle in the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 37% think that negotiation is the most effective means while 36% think armed struggle is the most effective means, while 22% believe that non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 28% said negotiation is the most effective means and 44% said armed struggle is the most effective means.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 55% support popular non-violent resistance; 47% support a return to an armed intifada; 41% support dissolving the PA; and 31% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 47% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
• 65% support and 31% oppose the PLO Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel. But 78% believe that the PA leadership and security services will not stop security coordination with Israel
• More than three quarters (76%) believe that if Israel ban Muslim prayer at al Rahma Gate (Gate of Mercy) area, Palestinian protests will succeed, as the case was with the metal detector gates, in forcing Israel to allow such prayer; 21% believe Palestinian protests will not succeed this time.
• A majority 64% believe that visits of Israeli officials to Arab countries damage the chances for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; 8% believe the visits help to promote peace and 26% believe they neither help nor hurt conflict resolution. 
• A slim majority of 51% expect the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 22% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections. But three quarters believe that even if the center-left win the elections, conditions will stay as they are today or become worse; only 10% expect Palestinian-Israeli conditions to improve in that case. 

6) Trump’s Peace Plan:

• An overwhelming majority (83%) believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about launching a new peace plan and 12% believe it is serious.
• A large majority of 79% believes that if the US does indeed offer a peace plan, it will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel; 15% believe it will.
• A similar percentage (81%) believes that the plan will not call for a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem; 14% believe it will.
• 78% believe the Trump plan will not call for the borders of the Palestinian state to be based on the lines of June 1967 with minor mutual land swaps; 17% believe it will.
• An overwhelming majority of 84% believes the plan will not call for a just solution to the refugee problem; 10% believe it will.
• Similarly, 84% believe the plan will not call for the ending of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the areas occupied in 1967; 11% believe it will.
• 79% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan, if offered, and 14% believe it should accept it.
• But if the Trump plan does indeed include all such items, such as a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, with borders based on the 1967 lines, a just solution to the refugees’ problem, and an Israeli army withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, a majority of 52% calls for rejecting it and 43% call for accepting it. Call for accepting the plan is higher in the Gaza Strip, standing at 55% while the call for rejecting it is higher in the West Bank, standing at 59%.
• A majority of 64% is opposed and 23% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.