These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 29 June and 1 July 2017. Internally, the period before the poll witnessed various important developments: the PA instituted a partial deduction, about 30% of the salary, on payments to its public sector in the Gaza Strip; the PA partially stopped covering the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip; Hamas elected Ismail Haniyeh as the head of its Political Bureau and Yahya Sinwar as head of the movement in the Gaza Strip; Hamas engaged in negotiations with the group led by Mohammad Dahlan in an effort to ease conditions in the Gaza Strip; and Hamas also issued a new document reflecting its current principles and positions. Moreover, Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails carried out a hunger strike. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, and national reconciliation. It also covers some aspects of the peace process and intra Arab relations. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2017 show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public rejects the recent PA measures to deduct part of the salaries of its public sector in the Gaza Strip and to stop covering the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip. The largest percentage view these measures as aiming at imposing economic hardships on the population in order to force it to reject Hamas’ rule. Very few people think the PA has taken these measures due to the financial problems it currently faces. Findings also show a semi consensus against the termination of the PA payments to the security prisoners in Israeli jails; 

but half of the public believes that the PA will indeed acquiesce to the external pressure and suspend the payments.

The largest percentage of the public is opposed to any Hamas-Dahlan agreement that would lead the two sides to share the administration of the Gaza Strip, fearing that such an agreement would lead to the complete separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting however, that a majority of Gazans would support such an agreement, if one is indeed reached.

After the Trump’s visit to Palestine and Israel, most of the public remain pessimistic about the future of Palestinian-Israeli relation and the Palestinian-American relation. But it is worth noting that the level of support for a return to an armed intifada has declined significantly during the past three months. Perhaps the decline is due to public perception of the negligible outcome of such attacks, such as knifings and shooting, on the Israeli side. In other words, the public might view them as ineffective and counterproductive given the fact that the last attack has led to the denial of access to Jerusalem and holy places during the month of Ramadan.

Finally, findings show that the overwhelming majority believes that the Arab World has turned away from the Palestine cause and has become an ally of Israel against Iran. On intra-Arab matters, the public stands with Qatar against the measures taken by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE against it.

(1) The Crisis of electricity in Gaza and the reduction in the salaries of PA employees in the Gaza Strip:

• 84% oppose PA measure to stop covering costs of electricity to Gaza
• 88% oppose the reduction of salary payments to PA employees in the Gaza Strip
• Most of the public believe that the aim of the PA is to pressure the Gazans and punish Hamas

An overwhelming majority of 84% are opposed to the measure taken by the PA to stop covering the Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip; only 10% support that measure. Opposition to the measure increases in the West Bank (87%) compared to the Gaza Strip (80%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (93% and 90% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (73%), among the illiterates (87%) compared to those who hold BA degree (83%), and among students (87%) compared to employees (77%).

Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 88% are opposed to the step taken by the PA, reducing the amount of salary payments to its employees in the Gaza Strip; only 8% support the step. 40% believe that the step has been taken by the PA in order to impose economic pressure on the Gazans in order to force them to reject Hamas’ rule; 37% believe the PA aimed at punishing Hamas in order to force it to accept its conditions for reconciliation, and 16% believe that the PA has taken the step due to the difficult financial conditions it faces. The belief that the PA seeks to impose economic difficulties on Gazans is higher in the Gaza Strip (44%) compared to the West Bank (37%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (47% each) compared to supporters of Fatah (32%), among the married (41% compared to the unmarried (37%), and among the holders of BA degree (46%) compared to those who finished elementary school only (34%).

(2) Hamas-Dahlan meetings, the election of Haniyeh and Sinwar, reconciliation, and the reconciliation government:

• 50% believe that a Hamas-Dahlan agreement would lead to the total separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• 48% oppose and 40% support a Hamas-Dahlan agreement
• 78% believe that the PA pressure on Gaza and Hamas will not succeed in achieving PA goals
• 47% want and 38% do not want Hamas to accept PA and Abbas’ conditions for reconciliation
• 64% are pessimistic about the chances for reconciliation
• 61% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government

50% believe that a Hamas-Dahlan agreement to create a joint administration for the Gaza Strip, if true, would lead to the total separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 38% believe that such an agreement would not lead to the total separation between the two areas. The belief that it will lead to the total separation between the two areas stands at 51% in the West Bank and 50% in the Gaza Strip. This percentage rises to 55% among men compared to 46% among women, 56% among Fatah supporters, 50% among supporters of third parties, and 46% among Hamas supporters. It stands at 56% among holders of BA degree compared to 34% among the illiterates, and 60% among the employees compared to 42% among housewives.

48% indicate that they would be opposed to such an agreement between Hamas and Dahlan while 40% indicate that they would be supportive. Support for such an agreement stands at 61% in the Gaza Strip compared to only 29% in the West Bank. Similarly, support is higher among the youth, between the ages of 18 and 22 (38%) compared to those whose age is 50 or above (32%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (64% and 53% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (35%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to illiterates (15%), among refugees (48%) compared to non-refugees (33%), and among those who work in the public sector (45%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (36%).

78% believe that the PA measure that suspended payment to cover the cost of Israeli-supplied electricity to the Gaza Strip, and similar other measures to pressure Hamas, will not succeed in ending the separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; only 13% think such measures can succeed in ending the separation.  Nonetheless, 47% of the public demand that Hamas accept the conditions put forward by the PA and Abbas if such acceptance can lead to improving conditions in the Gaza Strip; 38% demand that Hamas reject such conditions.

31% believe that the election of Ismail Haniyeh and Yahiya Sinwar as Hamas leaders will weaken the chances for reconciliation; 25% believe it will lead to strengthen the chances; and 33% think it will have no impact on the chances for reconciliation.  Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 27% and pessimism at 64%. These findings are similar to those obtained three months ago.

26% say they are satisfied and 61% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 56%.

(3) PA payments to Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails:

• 91% oppose the suspension of PA payments to Palestinian security prisoners
• But 44% expect the PA to stop making the payments to the security prisoners

91% are opposed to the suspension of PA payments to Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails; only 7% support such measure. Nonetheless, 46% believe that the PA will not stop making those payments to Palestinian security prisoners while 44% believe it will stop making them.  The belief that the PA will indeed stop the payments is higher in the Gaza Strip (46%) compared to the West Bank (43%), among men (47%) compared to women (41%), among the youth, between 18-22 years old (50%) compared to those who are 50 years old or higher (38%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (50% and 46% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (39%) among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (35%), and among the employees (46%) compared to housewives (40%).

(4) Prisoners’ hunger strike:

• 57% believe that the prisoners’ hunger strike has been partially successful
• 69% believe that the strike has improved the leadership position of Barghouti

57% believe that the hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails has partially succeeded while 28% believe it fully succeeded; 13% believe it has failed. Nonetheless, 69% believe that the hunger strike has enhanced the leadership status and role of Marwan Barghouti among the Palestinians while only 12% believe it has not done that. In fact, the strike did not improve the standing of Barghouti since the level of support for him in this poll, compared to that of Haniyeh or Abbas, did not change significantly, as we see below.

(5) Hamas’ new document:

• Half of those who have heard about the new Hamas document believes that it deviates from Hamas’ position as reflected in the charter and the other half believes that it maintains the same positions as in the charter
• 30% believe that Hamas’ principle motivation behind the release of the new document is to present itself as a moderate movement

The majority (53%) has not heard about Hamas’ new document; but 21% (of the total sample) believe the new document differs from some of Hamas’ basic principles and positions; 20% (of the total sample) believe it has maintained Hamas’ traditional principles and positions.  30% believe that the primary motivation behind the publication of the new document is Hamas’ desire to present itself to the world as a moderate movement; 18% believe that Hamas sought to reiterate its traditional positions as outlined in its original charter of 1987; and 16% think that Hamas sought to document the recent positions that the movement has adopted since it issued its original charter. 

(6) Presidential and parliamentary elections: 

• 62% want president Abbas to resign
• Satisfaction with the performance of the president stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 61%
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, each receives 45%
• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 59% and the latter 35%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 39%, Hamas 29%, and third parties combined 10% of the vote

62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 64% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago demand for Abbas resignation stood at 61% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 39% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (41% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).

If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 7%; Khalid Mishal and Rami al Hamdallah (5% each), and Salam Fayyad and Mustapha Barghouti (3% each); and Saeb Erekat at 1%. It is worth mentioning that Barghouti was preferred over all others by 33%. It is also worth mentioning that Dahlan (who, in this poll, is preferred over all others by 18% in the Gaza Strip compared to only 1% in the West Bank) has not gained more support in the Strip, in comparison to his standing three months ago, as a result of the agreement he has been reported to have made with Hamas.  

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, each would receive 45% of the vote (compared to 47% each three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 39% of the vote (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 55% (compared to 50% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 50% (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh 40% (compared to 45% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 41% and Haniyeh 32%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 35%. Here too, it is worth mentioning that support for Barghouti against Haniyeh and Abbas stood at 40% three months ago and 59% against Haniyeh alone, figures that are very similar to his current standing.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 64% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 24% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 35% (compared to 34% three months ago) and for Fatah at 36% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 24% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 36% three months ago).

(7) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and in the West Bank at 24%
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 43% and in the West Bank at 53%
• 47% of Gazans and 23% of West Bank seek to emigrate

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 24%. 47% of the public believe that conditions in the Gaza Strip would improve if Hamas accepted PA and Abbas conditions for reconciliation.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 43%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 53%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 38% and in the West Bank at 50%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 47%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 23%.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Maan TV (at 14%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) (at 13%), al Aqsa TV (at 11%), Al Arabiya and al Quds TV at 5% each), and al Mayadeen at 3%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%. Moreover, only 36% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 58% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.

(8) The peace process:  

• Support for a return to an armed intifada drops from 51% three months ago to 39% in this poll
• After Trump’s visit, 51% believe that Palestinian-Israeli relations will worsen
• Similarly, 50% believe that Palestinian-American relations will worsen
• 43% believe that the election of Haniyeh and Sinwar to Hamas leadership will lead to escalation with Israel

In the absence of peace negotiations, 74% support joining more international organizations, 54% support non-violent popular resistance, 39% support a return to an armed intifada, and 44% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 51%. Support for return to armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (35%), among men (44%) compared to women (34%), and among supporters of Hamas (66%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (27% and 42% respectively).

After the visit of the US president, Trump, to Palestine and Israel, 51% believe that Palestinian-Israeli relation will continue to deteriorate, 13% think it will improve, and 33% think it will remain unchanged.  Similarly, 50% think Palestinian-American relation will continue to deteriorate, 11% think it will improve and 34% think it will remain unchanged.

43% believe that the election of Ismail Haniyeh and Yahiya Sinwar to Hamas’ leadership roles will lead to escalation in Hamas-Israel relations; 15% think it will lead to greater calm in the relation, and 30% think it will have no impact on Hamas-Israel relation.

(9) The Arab World and the Qatar crisis:

• 80% of the public think that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own concerns and that Palestinian is no longer its principle cause
• 67% stand against the measure taken against Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE

80% (compared to 76% three months ago) say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 18% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principal cause. Similarly, 68% (compared to 59% three months ago) believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 21% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

Two thirds (67%) of the public is opposed to the steps taken by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE against Qatar and only 12% support them. Support for Qatar is higher in the West Bank (71%) compared to the Gaza Strip (61%), among men (69%) compared to women (65%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (70%) compared to those whose age is 50 or above (65%), and among supporters of Hamas (79%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (60% and 64% respectively).

(10) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 43% believe that the most vital goal of the Palestinian people should be the ending of occupation and the building of a state
• In the eyes of 28% of the public, the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today is corruption within the PA

43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the Wet Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 28% of the public while 24% believe it is poverty and unemployment; 22% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 September 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a US announcement about an agreement between the UAE and Israel to normalize relations between the two countries. This normalization agreement stipulated an Israeli suspension or delay of the planned annexation of parts of the West Bank. The period also witnessed a rise in the daily number of coronavirus infections and continued stalemate in Palestinian-Israeli relations that followed a PA decision to sever all security and civil links with Israel which led during the past months to a significant financial loss to the PA. This PA decision came in response to an Israeli announcement about the intention to annex about 30% of the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Finding of the September 2020 poll show a great Palestinian public anger with the UAE decision to normalize relations with Israel viewing it as serving only the interests of Israel and as a betrayal or an abandonment of the Palestinian cause and at the same time as a big failure of Palestinian diplomacy. Additionally, the overwhelming majority estimates that the Palestinian leadership has lost its Arab allies as Saudi Arabia will soon follow the UAE in normalizing relations and that Egypt, by endorsing the deal, has in effect abandoned PA president Mahmoud Abbas.  Nonetheless, most believe that the majority of the Arab public is opposed to the normalization deal. Findings show that the public blames the Palestinians 

themselves for this development: the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the fact that they had normalized relations with Israel before many others may have hastened the arrival of this day.

The public does not show an appreciation of the fact that the UAE-Israel deal requires the suspension of the annexation plan. The reason for this is the fact that three quarters think that the suspension is only temporary and will soon take place, the normalization deal notwithstanding. Moreover, based on this assessment, the public is opposed to the restoration of PA-Israel security coordination despite the fact that half of the public wishes to restore civil and fiscal relations between the two sides.

Findings also show a significant decline in support for the two-state solution compared to the situation three months ago. They also show that the consensus in rejecting the Trump plan, the deal of the century, first documented in PSR’s February 2020 poll, remains unchanged. Similarly, the overwhelming majority remains opposed to a resumption of contacts with the Trump administration. Despite the majority expectation that Trump will lose the upcoming US presidential elections, only one fifth expects positive policy change if the Democratic candidate Joe Biden wins.  

Domestically, findings show continued satisfaction with the PA measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus pandemic despite significant decline in the level of satisfaction, especially with the prime minister’s performance. Moreover, a majority is opposed to the severing of coordination and cooperation with Israel in the fight against the spread of the coronavirus.

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas rises in this poll. Parallel to this, satisfaction with the performance of the president has declined. As a result, if elections were held today, Hamas’ Haniyyeh would win a majority of the public vote. This development might have been boosted by the current economic difficulties in the West Bank resulting from the severing of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel and the resulting inability of the PA to pay the public sector in full. Findings also show a drop in the perception of safety and security in the West Bank and an increase in the desire to emigrate. Despite these developments, the popularity of Fatah in the West Bank is not negatively affected; to the contrary, the findings show a little improvement in its popularity.

(1) UAE-Israel normalization agreement:

• A majority of 63% view the normalization agreement between the UAE and Israel as a major event that represents a significant regional shift while 32% view as minor development.
• Findings show a consensus (86%) that the agreement serves only the interests of Israel while 8% think it serves the interests of both the Palestinians and the Israelis and only 1% think it serves the interests of the Palestinians only.
• We asked the public to pick one word that represents its sentiments toward the normalization agreement: the majority (53%) picked “betrayal,” 17% picked “abandonment” 13% “insult,” 9% “indifference,” 6% “sadness,” while only 1% picked words like “satisfaction,” “pride,” and “joy.”
• Most Palestinians (57%) believe that the majority among the Arab public is opposed to the normalization agreement while 20% believe an Arab majority supports it.
• A large majority (70%) believes that other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, and Morocco, will sign similar agreements with Israel while 24% believe they will not do that.
• An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that Saudi Arabia has given the green light to the UAE to sign the normalization agreement and a similar majority (82%) believes that Saudi Arabia too will sign a similar public agreement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the public (78%) believes that the Egyptian position welcoming the agreement represents an abandonment of the Palestinian leadership led by Abbas while 18% do not share this view.
• A majority of 55% believes that Mohammad Dahlan was one of the participants in the making of the UAE-Israel normalization agreement while 24% do not share this view.
• Nonetheless, a majority of 53% believes that the blame for the normalization deal falls on the shoulders of the Palestinians themselves due to their division and due to the fact that they have recognized Israel and normalized relations with it long before the others; 42% disagree with this view.
• Also, a majority of 62% views the UAE defection from the previous declared Arab consensus on Palestine as a great failure for Palestinian diplomacy; 31% do not share this view.

(2) Annexation and the severing of relations with Israel in post UAE-Israel normalization:

• Three quarters of the public (75%) believe that the normalization agreement forces Israel to merely postpone annexation while 19% think it forces it to put an end to it.
• Now, after the normalization agreement, a majority of 62% is opposed to the restoration of security coordination with Israel while 32% are in favor of restoring it.
• But half of the public (50%) supports, and 45% oppose, the restoration of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel.
• If Israel conditioned resumption of civil and fiscal coordination with a resumption of security coordination, a majority of 59% will oppose, and 35% will support, the resumption of relations.
• In response to an actual Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories, the public is divided on how to respond. When asked to choose one of five possible responses, 28% favored resumption of armed struggle, 20% selected stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, another 20% favored return to negotiations with Israel and the US on the basis of a Palestinian peace plan, 19% preferred waging nonviolent resistance, and 6% selected the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• The public indicates great worries about the future in case of continued severing of relations with Israel. For example, 74% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 75% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 77% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 59% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 59% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 70% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 60% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
• It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (63%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 30% believe it indeed did.
• A majority of 61% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (32%) expects Israel to do so.
• A large majority of 75% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 21% say they do prefer that.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 45%.  
• A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 31% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 36% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 38% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 41% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 26% popular resistance. Three months ago, 45% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 92% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Three months ago, 88% expressed opposition to the plan.
• If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 55% think the chances are zero; 26% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
• A majority of 71% is opposed and 19% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Three months ago, 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
• A majority of 61% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 30% expect him to win it. Nonetheless, only 21% expect a positive change if Biden wins while 34% believe US policy will not change and 35% expect it to become worse.

(4) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• A two-third majority (68%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to prevent travel between the various governorates in order to contain the Coronavirus pandemic.
• Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 64% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 57% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 48% today compared to 62% three months ago.
• The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 70% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 52% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
• A majority of 55% say that are dissatisfied with the PA decision during the past several months to stop cooperation and coordination with Israel in the health sector with the aim of combating the coronavirus, 42% are satisfied with that decision.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• 62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 58% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 39% and the latter 52% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh threw months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 41% and the latter 51%.
• We asked in an open-ended question about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 22% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Mohammad Shtayyeh is preferred by 5%, Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad by 2%. 
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 42% three months ago).

(6) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 16%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 57%.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 25% and in the West Bank at 24%. Three months ago, only 18% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. Three months ago, 81% expressed a similar view.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 62% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, only 52% viewed the PA as a burden.
• A year and a half since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 60% expect failure; only 31% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 33% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expects success.
• An overwhelming majority of the public (80%) is opposed to the arrest by the PA security services of activists who were planning to demonstrate or were demonstrating against corruption in the PA while 17% support these arrests. 
• 56% (66% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 36% (23% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.  Six month ago, 42% said it believes it will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 64% (75% in the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 31% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law. Six month ago, 41% said the judiciary and courts rule according to the law.  
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (13%), Maan TV at 12%, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 4% each, and finally al Manar at 2%.  

(7) Reconciliation: 

• 37% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
• Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 45% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 11% believe unity will return soon.

(8) Muslims in China: 

• 80% of the Palestinians believe that if press reports about the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in China are true, Palestinians should condemn the Chines policy towards its Muslim community and 15% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 79% indicates that it does not believe the statement of the Chinese government that the camps built by China to allegedly detain the Uighur Muslims are in fact teaching centers aiming at eradicating extremism; 10% believe the Chinese statement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 83% believes that world Muslims should express solidarity with the Uighur Muslims against the Chinese government while 10% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 80% approves of the Turkish president Erdogan’s decision to transform the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque; 16% disapprove.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; 13% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%,  the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 10%.

These are summary findings from the latest round of the Arab Barometer survey in Palestine, the ninth since these surveys began in the Arab world nearly twenty years ago. The survey was conducted by the institute for Polling and Survey Research West Bank and Gaza Strip during 8–26 October 2025.

The period preceding the survey witnessed several important developments, including the continuation of the war on the Gaza Strip until a ceasefire was reached two days after fieldwork began. In the West Bank, settler violence and terror continued against vulnerable, unprotected Palestinian towns without intervention by either the Palestinian or Israeli police to stop these assaults—indeed with complicity and even encouragement in some cases from the Israeli government and with the army providing protection to settlers only. The Israeli army enforced closures on Palestinian areas and restricted Palestinians’ access to main roads in the West Bank.

The ceasefire in the Gaza Strip came as part of what is known as the 20‑point Trump Plan, which made no reference to the situation in the West Bank. The period before fieldwork also saw a sharp decline in government services due to Israeli punitive measures against the Palestinian Authority (PA), including the seizure of clearance revenues, which forced the PA to pay only a portion of public‑sector salaries and curtailed its ability to provide many basic services. Israel also imposed stringent conditions, demanding “reforms” rejected by Palestinian public opinion—such as amending school curricula and halting payments to the families of prisoners and martyrs.

This first report on the results of the ninth Arab Barometer (AB9) survey in Palestine addresses two important issues: governance and the internal balance of power in the Palestinian territories. Subsequent reports will cover other aspects of the findings, such as conditions in the Gaza Strip, peace, and international relations. Although the focus here is on AB9 findings regarding these two topics, the report compares them to those of the previous AB survey conducted two years earlier.

It should be noted that most governance‑related topics in this report were not asked in the Gaza Strip due to the war conditions; in Gaza the focus was on living and humanitarian conditions and other topics related to the Gaza war.

This first report of AB9 in Palestine examines governance under the PA, as well as the internal balance of power. A comparative analysis of the two Barometer surveys conducted in Palestine—on the eve of the October 7, 2023 attack (AB8) and two years later in October 2025 (AB9)—reveals a society profoundly reshaped by war, trauma, and political disappointment. The results portray a public whose immediate priorities shifted from the economy to survival; whose trust in institutions changed selectively; and whose views on governance, democracy, and leadership hardened in response to a harsh new reality. Comparing AB8 and AB9 provides a data‑driven narrative of a Palestinian society transformed by the shock of war. The period between the eve of October 7, 2023 and October 2025 was a rupture: it accelerated some pre‑existing trends and generated entirely new social and political dynamics. The data point to four key insights into this new reality.

First, the war reshaped public priorities: The Gaza war changed Palestinian public priorities, not only in the Gaza Strip—as a later report will show—but also in the West Bank. Before the war, Palestinians, like many publics, prioritized long‑term economic development. AB8 data showed the economy as the dominant concern. AB9 reveals a notable shift: as life itself came under threat, the public re‑prioritized basic needs—education and health. In the West Bank, demand for education and health care rose while concern with economic development receded: the percentage of those prioritizing education increased from 25% to 30%. This is not merely a change of opinion; it reflects a society grappling with existential fears—an indicator of a population in survival mode, where the building blocks of a functioning future take precedence over abstract economic growth. This foundational shift explains why, despite a rise in trust in some institutions, satisfaction with government performance collapsed precisely in these sectors. Public demand for basic services has become existential, and the PA is failing to meet it. While trust in some government institutions rose slightly, satisfaction with government performance actually fell—particularly in the vital education and health sectors. The public remains highly pessimistic about the PA’s ability to address core challenges like unemployment, price inflation, and security. Meanwhile, the desire to emigrate is growing, driven by a potent mix of economic despair, security fears, and political hopelessness.

Second, the public sits in a deep governance paradox: it yearns for democracy yet is increasingly willing to accept authoritarianism in exchange for stability. Politically, the Gaza war sparked a large increase in public interest in politics—from 29% to 39%—as Palestinians confront existential questions about their future. Yet this heightened interest is accompanied by a bleak assessment of civil liberties: beliefs that freedom of expression and the right to protest are guaranteed collapsed, with only 16% and 13% respectively feeling these rights are protected. This has fueled a desire for faster, more decisive reform, even as a cautious majority still prefers gradualism. Despite these pressures, baseline attitudes toward democracy remain surprisingly stable: both waves show strong, steady, and principled support for democracy as the best system of governance—60% still hold this view. However, the war exposed a deep pragmatism born of despair. While Palestinians value democracy in principle, an increasing majority now prioritizes a strong leader (51%, up from 41%) who can deliver economic stability and impose order, even at democracy’s expense. This shift is reflected in the public’s deteriorating view of Western democracies, with a sharp drop in confidence in the American and German models. Although the principled preference remains, lived experience since October 7—of chaos, violence, and institutional collapse—has severely eroded confidence in democratic practice. The sharp rise in support for a “strong leader” and the prevalent belief that order and economic stability outweigh the type of political system are the clearest indicators. Palestinians have not abandoned democratic rights—as evidenced by anger over declining civil liberties—but they have lost faith in any democratic process’s capacity to rescue them from the current crisis. This has opened a dangerous window for a form of “authoritarian pragmatism.”

Third, the internal political map has been redrawn—but not in the way many outside observers might expect: the immediate outcome is not increased support for Hamas, but rather a catastrophic collapse of Fatah and PA legitimacy in the West Bank. Fatah’s voter base has nearly halved, an indictment of its inaction and loss of initiative during the war. Fatah’s support in the West Bank has collapsed—from 23% to 14%—while Hamas’s support remained relatively stable and even dipped slightly in Gaza, where it maintained its core base, leaving it a permanent actor that cannot be ignored in any future political arrangement. The real “winner,” however, is deep, broad political alienation: over half of the population refuses to align with or identify with any faction. In a hypothetical presidential election, imprisoned Fatah figure Marwan Barghouti remains the frontrunner, clearly outpacing both Hamas’s Khaled Mishal and the incumbent President Mahmoud Abbas. Barghouti’s sustained popularity is crucial: he is not merely a Fatah leader; he symbolizes a different politics—combining resistance with a vision of unity and clean governance. His continued lead in presidential polling across both waves confirms that the public seeks a leader who can transcend the failed models of both the PA and Hamas.

Fourth, the war appears to have triggered a social retrenchment toward more conservative, traditional norms, especially regarding gender roles: Along with religiosity remaining high, there is a notable increase in support for traditional gender roles: 75% now agree that men are better suited as political leaders—up sharply from 63% two years ago. This suggests societal retrenchment in response to instability and deep crisis. The sharp rise in the belief that men are better political leaders is a significant, troubling development. In times of acute crisis and social collapse, societies often revert to traditional hierarchies and patriarchal structures as imagined sources of order and stability. This finding indicates that the shock of war has not only reshaped Palestinian politics but has also begun to undo some social progress achieved in previous years, with long‑term implications for women’s rights and participation in public life.

In short, Palestine in late 2025 is a society scarred by loss, defined by disappointment, grappling with fundamental questions about its future. The public is more politically engaged but feels less free; desires democracy but longs for stability; and is deeply alienated from its current political leadership. These Arab Barometer findings do not point to an imminent solution or a clear path forward, but they paint a vivid portrait of a people at a historic crossroads, forced to navigate a landscape in which many old certainties have been swept away.

The war reshaped media consumption habits. While social media remains a primary news source for 60% of Palestinians, its dominance has fallen from 74% in 2023. Television, by contrast, has made a dramatic comeback, with 35% now relying on it as a main news source, up from just 17%—likely due to the war in Gaza and daily TV coverage. Al Jazeera remains overwhelmingly the dominant and most trusted news outlet, cited by 85% of respondents as their top source of news.

Priorities: The Gaza war altered some public priorities in the West Bank. Before the conflict, economic concerns were paramount: in AB8, 25% of West Bankers cited economic development as their top priority. By AB9, economic development is no longer the top priority, standing today at 23%, as it is overtaken by a rise in the prioritization of education (up from 25% to 30%) and health (from 13% to 15%). This shift reflects a society grappling with disruption and anxiety, in which the core pillars of social well‑being take precedence over long‑term economic growth.

Trust in government: Paradoxically, even as daily life became more dangerous, trust in some public institutions—including the government—saw increases, albeit modest in some cases. This may reflect a “rally around the flag” effect during a national crisis. Seventy‑one percent say they distrust or trust the Palestinian government only a little, while just 25% say they have trust or great trust—an eight‑point increase from 17% two years earlier (AB8).

When West Bank residents were asked about trust in the PA government in the West Bank, 23% said they trust it and 76% said they do not (vs. 19% and 76% respectively two years earlier). When Gaza Strip residents in AB9 were asked about trust in the Gaza government (i.e., Hamas’s government), 32% said they trust it and 67% said they do not.

Trust in the PA president: In the West Bank, distrust of the PA president rose by five points to 77%, while trust fell from 22% in AB8 to 19% in AB9.

Trust in the police and National Security Forces: In the West Bank, trust in the Palestinian police rose to 47% (from 38% two years ago), while distrust stands at 53% (down from 58%). Notably, distrust of the National Security Forces is higher than distrust of the police—an unusual change from two years ago, when distrust levels were identical. The likely reason is the heightened sense of threat from Israeli settlers and the public perception that the National Security Forces are not protecting them from this threat, despite the forces’ raison d’être and the significant resources allocated to them—compared to the police, which are responsible for crime prevention. Nonetheless, perhaps due to growing fear of external threats, trust in the National Security Forces in the West Bank is 39% (up five points), and distrust is 58% (unchanged from AB8). Two years ago, trust stood at 34%.

Perception of safety: AB9 shows a clear rise in feelings of insecurity. In AB8, when West Bankers were asked about safety in their area or neighborhood, 74% said their area was very or somewhat safe, while only 26% said it was unsafe. AB9 found that the sense of safety has dropped to 58%, while the sense of insecurity has risen to 42%.

Trust in the courts and judiciary: Sixty‑three percent of Palestinians express distrust in the courts and judiciary, while 34% express trust. Two years earlier, just 27% said they trusted the courts and legal system. 

Trust in civil society: Trust in civil society organizations rose to 38% in AB9, up from 27% in AB8 (2023). Fifty‑nine percent say they do not trust CSOs.

Trust in religious leaders: Trust in religious leaders stands at 25%, a six‑point increase over AB8 (2023). In AB9, 71% express distrust in religious leaders.

Trust in Hamas: AB9 indicates a huge increase in trust in Hamas—from 18% in AB8 to 46% in AB9. Forty‑three percent say they do not trust Hamas.

Trust in aid and service institutions in Gaza: We asked Gaza residents about their trust in three institutions: UNRWA, the Red Crescent, and the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. Trust in UNRWA stands at 75%; in the Red Cross at 66%; and in the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation at 22%.

Satisfaction with government performance: We asked the Palestinian public in the West Bank about satisfaction with overall government performance and with specific sectors such as the education system, health care, garbage collection, electricity provision, and water supply. Despite nominal increases in trust in public institutions, AB9 found a decline in overall satisfaction. Satisfaction with government performance fell slightly from 32% to 29%, with a catastrophic collapse in satisfaction with the education system (from 44% to 21%). The public remains highly pessimistic about the PA’s ability to address core challenges such as unemployment (13% satisfied), narrowing the gap between rich and poor (14%), or reducing prices (11%).
• Overall satisfaction with government performance is 29%, and dissatisfaction 69%—a three‑point decline in satisfaction compared to AB8.

• Satisfaction with the education system is 21%, dissatisfaction 78%—a 23‑point drop in satisfaction compared to AB8 (2023).

• Satisfaction with the health care system is 47%, dissatisfaction 53%—a six‑point decline in satisfaction from AB8.

• Satisfaction with garbage collection is 70%, dissatisfaction 30%—an 18‑point increase in satisfaction compared to AB8.

• Satisfaction with electricity provision is 76% (dissatisfaction 24%); satisfaction with water availability is 47% (dissatisfaction 52%).

Assessment of government performance: We asked West Bank Palestinians to assess government performance in three areas: providing security, narrowing the rich‑poor gap, and keeping prices low:
• Positive assessment (“good” or “very good”) for providing security is 31%; negative assessment (“bad” or “very bad”) is 67%—a two‑point drop in positive assessment compared to AB8 (2023).

• Positive assessment for narrowing the gap between rich and poor is 14%; negative 80%—a two‑point increase in positive assessment from AB8 (2023).

• Positive assessment for “keeping prices low” is 11%; negative 89%—a four‑point rise in positive assessment compared to AB7.

Government responsiveness: We asked West Bank residents how responsive the government is to people’s demands. Only 17% believe the government is very or largely responsive; 81% say it is not very or not at all responsive. These views are similar to AB8 when 16% said the government was responsive and 83% said it was not.

An overwhelming majority of West Bank Palestinians (87%) believe there is corruption in PA institutions—either to a great extent (62%) or to some extent (24%). Five percent say it exists to a small extent, and 4% say it does not exist at all. These results are lower than in AB8, when 94% of West Bank Palestinians believed there was corruption in PA institutions—either to a great extent (67%) or to some extent (27%)—and slightly lower than AB7 (2021).

We also asked about the extent of government efforts to combat corruption. Sixty‑nine percent believe the government is not fighting corruption at all or is doing so only to a small extent (44% “not at all,” 25% “to a small extent”). By contrast, 29% believe it is fighting corruption (5% “to a great extent,” 24% “to a moderate extent”). In 2023, 64% believed the government was not fighting corruption or only to a small extent, and 35% believed it was (12% “great extent,” 23% “moderate”)—a six‑point decline in the percentage of those who think the PA is combating corruption.

The war on the Gaza Strip led to a notable increase in public interest in politics—from 28% to 39%. Yet this increased interest is accompanied by a bleak assessment of civil liberties under the PA: the share believing freedom of expression is guaranteed fell from 27% to 16%, and the share believing the right to participate in demonstrations is guaranteed fell from 25% to 13%. This has fueled a desire for faster, more decisive reform, with the share preferring immediate, one‑off reforms rather than gradual reforms rising from 32% to 38%.

This has likely contributed to a growing sense of despair. Despair is evident in the desire to emigrate: a quarter of West Bank residents (24%) now consider leaving Palestine, driven primarily by economic reasons (71%), security (38%), and politics (37%)—all notably more prominent since 2023 when only 21% expressed a desire to emigrate.

Despite these pressures, baseline attitudes toward democracy remain surprisingly stable: 60% still see it as the best system of governance. However, the war has revealed a deep‑seated pragmatism born of despair. While Palestinians value democracy in principle, a slim majority now supports a strong leader (51%, up from 41%) who can deliver stability and order, even at the expense of democratic practice. This is reinforced by the belief of 68% that the nature of the political system does not matter so long as the government is able to solve economic problems. The war has also worsened views of Western democracies, with positive evaluations of American democracy falling from 57% to 42% and of German democracy from 56% to 42%.

The war has also left its mark on socio‑religious attitudes. While overall religiosity remains high and largely stable, there is a marked shift toward more conservative gender norms. The percentage of those who agree that men are better suited as political leaders rose from 63% to 75%. Similarly, the share who believe men should have the final say in family matters rose from 44% to 57%. This signals a societal shift toward traditional patriarchal structures in response to instability and deep crisis.

We examined the domestic balance of power among Palestinian political parties in three ways: support for different political leaders, party support, and parliamentary voting behavior.

Presidential elections: To gauge the popularity of Palestinian figures, we asked about voting intentions in a hypothetical race among the incumbent President Mahmoud Abbas and the two most popular and well‑known rivals: Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti and Hamas’s Khaled Mishal. The question on leaders’ popularity was restricted to the Gaza Strip and was not asked in the West Bank, which typically tends to support Marwan Barghouti and reject President Abbas. In a hypothetical presidential election, Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti remains the frontrunner in the Gaza Strip, with 30% of the vote, followed by Hamas’s Khaled Mishal (22%), while the incumbent Mahmoud Abbas trails far behind at 13%. These figures do not differ significantly from 2023, indicating that Barghouti’s standing as a symbol of resistance and unity transcends the immediate political aftershocks of the war—even though he, like Abbas, is a Fatah leader at a time when Fatah’s popularity has collapsed, as discussed below. Thirty‑four percent say they would not participate in such an election. In AB8, the results were 32% for Barghouti, 24% for Hamas’s then‑candidate Ismail Haniyeh, and 12% for Abbas.

Factional support: The party support question was restricted to the West Bank and not asked in Gaza. When asked “Which party is closest to you?”, respondents chose Fatah at 18% (vs. 30% before the war in AB8), Hamas at 24% (vs. 17% before the war), third powers at 7% (vs. 6% before), while a slim majority of 51% (vs. 47% before) chose “none of the above.”

Two years of war reshaped the internal political scene. Fatah’s support in the West Bank collapsed, with its electoral base falling from 23% in the eighth wave to just 14% in the ninth. By contrast, Hamas’s support in the West Bank increased, with 17% of voters now backing it (up from 9%). Notably, support for Hamas in the Gaza Strip saw a slight decline from 24% to 22%. A slim majority of Palestinians (51%) do not identify with any party, indicating deep alienation from the established political factions.

Parliamentary elections: AB9 examined voting behavior in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—how respondents would vote in new legislative elections in each area. The results show that the Fatah vote share is 16% (14% in the West Bank, 19% in the Gaza Strip), compared to 24% in AB8 two years earlier; the “Change and Reform” list (Hamas) stands at just 19% (17% in the West Bank, 22% in Gaza). Ten percent would vote for third parties that competed in the last legislative elections in 2006, and 14% would vote for none of the competing parties.

The reason the Fatah and Hamas vote shares are lower than the simple party support figures cited above is that a large number of respondents refuse to participate in elections. Non‑participation in this survey stands at 41% (47% in the West Bank and 32% in Gaza). In other words, the survey found that 55% of the overall public either refused to vote or chose “none of the above.” When voting is limited to those who would actually participate, Fatah’s share rises to 27% (25% in the West Bank, 28% in Gaza), Hamas’s to 33% (33% in the West Bank, 32% in Gaza), and the undecided—or those who chose “none of the above”—to 24%.

Notably, among likely voters, Hamas’s vote share in AB9 is higher among those aged 30 and above (35%) compared to just 25% among 18–29‑year‑olds. By contrast, the undecided share among youth reaches 27%, while among older voters the third party and undecided shares are 15% and 23% respectively. Religiosity is a better indicator of intended voting patterns: Hamas support is 34% among the religious, 32% among the moderately religious, and 9% among the non‑religious. Fatah’s support is 25% among the religious, 28% among the moderately religious, and 43% among the non‑religious. Third party support is 21% among the religious, 12% among the moderately religious, and 18% among the non‑religious. The undecided are drawn primarily from the non‑religious and moderately religious, and lastly from the religious.

AB9: Demographic variables affecting electoral behavior.

These are the results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer (AB) poll in Palestine, the 8th to be conducted since the start of these polls in the Arab World. This report is restricted to findings related to Palestinian perception of migration. The poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip essentially during the period immediately before the start of the October the 7th war in the Gaza Strip and its envelop on the Israeli side.

The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords. The period saw a rise in the number of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, particularly in the northern parts of the West Bank. During this period, Palestinian factional leaders met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement.

This report is the fourth in a series covering the results of the current eighth wave of the Arab Barometer in Palestine (AB8). The first report reviewed the findings regarding the internal balance of power and Palestinian-Israeli relations before and after October 7. The second report reviewed Palestinian perceptions and beliefs regarding various international and regional actors and other international issues. The Third report addressed Palestinian perception of governance. The current report is focus on perception of emigration. While the focus is placed on the findings of AB8 regarding this topic, the report sets to compare these findings with those obtained by PSR in AB7, conducted two years earlier.

This fourth report of the eighth round of the Arab Barometer in Palestine, which was conducted in the last few days of September 2023 and the first week of October 2023 and was completed in the Gaza Strip just one day before October 7, addresses five issues, all related to migration:

Demand for emigration: On the eve of October 7, 2023, a quarter of Palestinians, 31% in the Gaza Strip and 21% in the West Bank, said they were considering emigrating from Palestine. Among those considering emigrating, 30% say they would do so even if they don't have the required papers.

Reasons driving emigration: When asked about the reasons for migration, the largest percentage said that they were economic reasons, while the second and third reasons are "political" reasons or educational opportunities. The fourth reason is security, and the fifth is corruption.

Top five destinations for emigration: The most preferred destination for immigration is Turkey, followed by Germany, Canada, the United States and Qatar

Remittances from family members living abroad: The vast majority of Palestinians reported receiving no remittances from relatives in the diaspora, while a small percentage said they received remittances monthly or annually.

Support for the rights of foreign domestic workers in Palestine: The poll found that more than three quarters of Palestinians strongly support or somewhat support a law that guarantees the right of foreign domestic workers in Palestine to always have their passports, and an even larger percentage supports the right of foreign domestic workers in Palestine to a day off a week, and the right of these workers to a bank account in which they receive their salaries.

A quarter of Palestinians say they have thought about emigrating. For obvious reasons related to economic and political conditions, demand for emigration is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 31% and 21% respectively. The total findings are identical to those recorded in AB7 in 2021 despite minor differences when looking at the West Bank and the Gaza Strip separately, as shown in the figure below.

As we found in previous waves, demand for emigration is highest among men and the youth. It is worth noting that while the gap between the totals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip stands at 10 percentage points, it grows considerably when looking at specific groups in the two areas

Table (1): Demand for emigration in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip based on selected indicators

As shown in the following figure, the current finding indicates a slight decline compared to the period between 2012 and 2019 but it is higher than the demand for emigration in the first and second waves of the Arab Barometer in 2006 and 2010 respectively.

Among those who have considered emigrating, 30% say they would do so even if they did not have the required papers. Here too, the percentage is much higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 43% and 16% respectively. The current total figure is identical to the one we found two years ago in AB7.

When asked about the reasons for wanting to emigrate, the largest percentage (45%) indicated economic reasons, with a majority of Gazans (54%) compared to only 37% of West Bankers providing that answer. The second and third responses received the same percentage (13% each) mentioned “political” reasons or education opportunities. The second reason for West Bankers were political, indicated by 19%. But only 5% of Gazans indicated the same reason. The education opportunities was stated by Gazans more than West Bankers, 18% and 9% respectively.  The fourth reason stated is security, indicated by 12% of all Palestinians, but with a higher percentage in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 16% and 7% respectively. The West Bankers at the time of the survey were suffering from Israeli settler violence that gained significant momentum in 2023 after the formation of one of Israel’s most extreme and nationalist religious governments in its entire history. The fifth reason indicated by 10% of people was corruption, with West Bankers stating it more often than Gazans, 12% and 7% respectively.

It is worth noting that in AB7, in November 2021, a majority of 56% stated that they were thinking about emigration for economic reasons followed by 14% stating “political” reasons. Only 9% gave educational reasons, 8% gave security reasons, and 4% referred to concerns about corruption.  

When asked about the most preferred destination for emigration, the top country selected was Turkey, as was the case in AB7, followed by Germany, Canada, the US, and Qatar. Two years earlier, the US came second followed by Canada, the UAE, and Qatar. Other countries selected in the current wave included the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Australia, and several West European countries. It is worth noting, as indicated in the figure below, that Gazans were more likely than West Bankers to select Turkey and Germany while West Bakers were more likely to select the US.

When asked if their family receive remittances from any immediate or extended family member living abroad, the vast majority of Palestinians, 88%, exactly as the case was in 2021, reported that they receive none. All other 2023 findings are almost identical to those reported in 2021: 3% reported receiving remittances on monthly basis, 5% few times a year, and 4% once a year. Findings show that in total, Gazans are more likely to receive remittances than West Bankers, 20% and 6% respectively.

We asked the respondents about the rights of foreign domestic workers in Palestine. More than three quarters of Palestinians strongly support or somewhat support a law that would guarantee the right of foreign domestic workers in Palestine to always have possession of their passports; 20% somewhat oppose or strongly oppose that. Support for such law is a little higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, 80% to 74% respectively.

Similarly, 90% of the public somewhat support or strongly support a law that would guarantee the right of foreign domestic workers in Palestine to have one day off per week; 8% are opposed. West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to strongly support such a law, 64% and 45% respectively.

A similar percentage (88%) somewhat or strongly support a law that would guarantee the right of these workers to have a bank account where they can receive their salaries; 9% are opposed. Here too, West Bankers are more likely than Gazans to strongly support this law, 61% and 47% respectively.

 4-6 June 2015

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 4 and 6 June 2015. The period before the poll witnessed the failure of the reconciliation government efforts to reunify the institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a debate among Palestinians over the decision to drop the demand for expelling Israel from FIFA, the formation of a right wing government in Israel under prime minister Netanyahu, the publication of the corruption court decision asserting as unconstitutional Abbas decision to lift the immunity of  Mohammad Dahlan and the publication of news reports indicating that Hamas and Israel have indirectly been negotiating a long term ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. This press release covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reconciliation, the Gaza war, the peace process, FIFA, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2015 indicate a high level of frustration among Gazans, with half of the respondents stating that they are considering emigration from the Gaza Strip. This is the highest percentage ever recorded in our polls. Findings also show an additional decline (particularly in the Gaza Strip) in satisfaction with the achievements of the latest Gaza war. Despite this, Hamas does better than Fatah in hypothetical elections in the Gaza Strip and Ismail Haniyeh wins against Abbas in a presidential election in the Strip. In the West Bank Abbas and Fatah are more popular than Haniyeh and Hamas.  It is worth mentioning that the public is divided equally on the significance of the electionvictory of Hamas’ student bloc at Birzeit University. Half of the respondents believes that the outcome of this election reflects the trend among the overall public while the other half believes that it reflects the trend among students only.

Given the internal dispute within Fatah regarding Mohammad Dahlan, our findings show that his popularity in the Gaza Strip is relatively high, coming in third place after Ismail Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti in hypothetical elections in which Abbas does not participate. Dahlan’s popularity in the West Bank however is much lower, almost non-existent. In this context, we found that Abbas’ decision to lift Dahlan’s immunity and bring him to trial for corruption finds significant support in the West Bank while opposition to the decision is widespread in the Gaza Strip.

Findings show that the public is unhappy with the outcome of the FIFA battle over Israel’s membership. The largest percentage, around one third, believes that Israel came out a winner while a little over a fifth believes that the Palestinian side came out a winner in that battle.

Finally, findings show that a slight majority continues to support the two-state solution but that no more than a third believes that a Palestinian state alongside Israel can be established through negotiations. Instead, an overwhelming majority supports submitting a complaint against Israel to the ICC and joining more international organizations. Two thirds believe that a popular non-violent resistance is the most effective means of changing the status quo.

(1) Palestinian Elections:                                  

• In presidential elections, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 46%.
• Satisfaction with Abbas rises from 40% to 44%.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 39%, Hamas 35%, third parties combined 11%, and 16% are undecided.
• 66% want legislative and presidential elections in few to six months.
• 47% think that the victory of Hamas’ student bloc at Birzeit University reflects the general trend among the Palestinian public.

If new presidential elections are held today and only two candidates were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% (compared to 48% three months ago) and the latter 46% (compared to 47% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 46% and Haniyeh 50%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 47% and Haniyeh 44%. Meanwhile, the level of satisfaction with the performance of Abbasrises to 44% (compared to 40% three months ago). Satisfaction with Abbas stood at 50% in June 2014 in the aftermath of the Shati reconciliation declaration but before the Gaza war.  Satisfaction with Abbas increases in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (34%), in villages and towns (59%) compared to refugee camps and cities (39% and 41% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (54%) compared to those between 18 and 28 years old (43%), among non-refugees (48%) compared to refugees (38%), among the illiterates (55%) compared to holders of BA degree (41%), andamong supporters of Fatah (77%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (13% and 41% respectively).

If presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 58% and the latter would receive 36% of the participants’ votes. Three months ago, Barghouti received 58% and Haniyeh 38%. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 25%, Barghouti 38%, and Haniyeh 34%. In an open question, 26% said they prefer to see Marwan Barghouti president after Abbas and 20% said they prefer to see Ismail Haniyeh, 4% said they prefer Dahlan, 3% said they prefer Rami al Hamdallah, another 3% selected Mustapha Barghouti, and 2% said they prefer Khalid Misha’al.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 72% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 35% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 16% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. In June 2014, just before the Gaza war, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands in this poll at 39% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 44% (compared to 36% three months ago). In the West Bank vote for Hamas stands at 32% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 36% (compared to 41% three months ago). A majority of 66% wants elections to take place within few to six months from today, 10% want them to take place after a year or more, and 21% do not want elections.

47% believe that the outcome of the latest student elections at Birzeit University, in which Hamas’ student bloc won, only reflects the trend among university students, while an identical percentage believes that it reflects a trend among the general public. In explaining the outcome of those elections at Birzeit University, 14% said Fatah’s student bloc lost because Fatah, the movement, lacks credibility and is rife with corruption. 23% said the loss was due to internal disputes within Fatah’s student body or due to its mismanagement of its internal affairs or bad performance inside the university. 12% said it was due to rising Hamas popularity due to the war on Gaza or because the performance of Hamas’ student body was satisfactory. The belief that the outcome of Birzeit elections reflects a trend among the general public is higher in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (45%), among those between the ages of 18 and 28 (50%) compared to those over 50 years of age (42%), among holders of BA degree (47%) compared to illiterates (31%), among the religious (52%) compared to the somewhat religious and non-religious (45% and 24% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (78%) compared to supporters of Fatah (26%).

(2) Domestic Conditions, salary payment crisis, and ISIS:

• Positive evaluation of West Bank conditions stands at 30% and Gaza Strip conditions at 14%; perception of security stands at 54% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip.
• 50% of Gazans and 25% of West Bankers say they seek immigration.
• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions stands at 79%.
• Belief that there is press freedom in the West Bank stands at 23% and belief that there is press freedom in the Gaza Strip stands at 18%.
• 39% support the decision of the Corruption Court to refuse to try Dahlan for corruption but 46% support the decision of president Abbas to lift his immunity and try him.
• 84% see ISIS as a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 10% believe it does represent true Islam.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 14% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 30%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 46%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 54%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek immigration to other countries stands at 50%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 25%. Desire to emigrate is higher in refugee camps and cities (35% each) compared to villages and towns (26%), among those between the ages of 18 and 28 (45%) compared to those over 50 years (13%), among holders of BA degree (41%) compared to illiterates (17%), and among students (52%) compared to merchants and farmers (17% and 18% respectively). Desire to emigrate is specially high among Gazan youth between the ages of 18 and 28 (60%), Gazan students (66%), and among unmarried Gazans (68%).

Al Jazeera viewership is the highest, standing at 23%; Al Arabiyya stands at 8%. Viewership of PA’s Palestine TV stands at 20% and Hamas’al Aqsa TV at 12%. Maan-Mix viewership stands at 18%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  Furthermore, only 23% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 18% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip. 32% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. 30% say people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities in Gaza without fear.

In light of the recent decision of the Corruption Court to reject the decision of PA president Abbas to lift the immunity of Mohammad Dahlan and to try him for corruption, 39% said they support the court’s decision and 46% said they support the decision of the president to lift the immunity. When asked about the corruption charges against Dahlan, 58% said they thought the charges were true and 19% said they were untrue. 23% said they do not know. Support for the court’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (36%), among men (44%) compared to women (35%), among those whose age is over 50 (41%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 28 (37%), and among supporters of Hamas (45%) compared to supporters of Fatah (33%).

An overwhelming majority of 84% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 10% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 14% (compared to 8% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.

(3) The reconciliation government and its role in Gaza:

• Pessimism about the chances for a successful reconciliation continues to rise reaching today 59%; optimism stands at 38%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 35% and dissatisfaction at 59%.
• 52% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip but only 24% believe that Hamas is responsible for the weak performance of the reconciliation government.
• More than 70% say that the reconciliation government should pay the salaries of the civil and security sectors that worked for the previous Hamas government.
• 65% say that the reconciliation government, not Hamas, should be in charge of the security and police sector in the Gaza Strip and 76% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the full command of the reconciliation government.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 38% and pessimism at 59%. Three months ago optimism stood at 42% and pessimism at 54%.Moreover, satisfaction with the implementation of the reconciliation agreement stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Similarly, a year after its establishment, satisfaction with the performance of the reconciliation government stands at 35%; dissatisfaction stands at 59%.Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 28%. It is worth mentioning thata year ago, right after its establishment, 61% had confidence in the reconciliation government.

47% (56% in the Gaza Strip) want to place the reconciliation government in charge of the Rafah crossing, but 36% (26% in the Gaza Strip) prefer to keep it under Hamas’ control. The same applies to the crossings with Israel with 48% (56% in the Gaza Strip) wishing to place them under the control of the reconciliation government. 43% want the reconciliation government to be in charge of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and 33% want it placed in the hands of Hamas.

52% believe that Hamas has established a shadow government in the Gaza Strip and 35% reject this claim. But the belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 24% while 32% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 13% blame the head of the reconciliation government. When asked who was responsible for the return of the ministers of the reconciliation government from the Gaza Strip without being able to assume their responsibilities over their ministries, 46% said it was the reconciliation government and the president and 35% said it was Hamas.

75% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salary of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (72%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salary of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government.65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; 28% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  76% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the previous Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 20% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

48% believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 46% believe it is an achievement. A year ago, right after the formation of the reconciliation government, 50% said the PA was an achievement and 45% said it was a burden. The drop in the level of optimism regarding the future of reconciliation is probably one of the reasons for the drop in the belief that the PA is a Palestinian achievement.

(4) Gaza War:

• 63% support Hamas’ indirect negotiations with Israel for a long term hudna.
• 59% believe that Hamas has won the last Gaza War but satisfaction of the war achievements drops to 35%.
• 63% support continued rocket launch for Gaza if the siege and blockade continue.

63% support indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel to reach a long term hudna, or truce, in the Gaza Strip in return for lifting the siege and 32% oppose such negotiations. Support for such negotiations rises in the Gaza Strip (68%) compared to the West Bank (61%), and among supporters of Hamas (74%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (57% each).

Belief that Hamas has won the Gaza War stands at 59%; 25% believe the two sides were losers. Among Gazans, only 47% say Hamas came out a winner.Nine months ago, 69% of all Palestinians said Hamas came out a winner. By contrast, the percentage of satisfaction with war achievements compared to the human and material losses sustained by the Gaza Strip does not exceed 35% and dissatisfaction at 63%.Despite that, a majority of 63% supports the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip at Israel if the siege and blockade are not ended.

(5) The peace process

• 51% support the two-state solution and 48% oppose it.
• 34% support the one-state solution and 64% oppose it.
• 54% oppose and 44% support a mutual recognition of national identity of the states of Israel and Palestine.
• 86% support submitting a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court.
• 67% support popular non-violent resistance and 49% support return to an armed intifada.

Findings show that a slight majority of 51% supports and 48% oppose the two-state solution. A larger majority of 55% believes that this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion. Similarly, 72% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent. Despite this, only 34% support, and 64% oppose, a one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights. Findings also show that 52% support the Arab Peace Initiative and 44% oppose it. But a majority of 54% opposes a mutual recognition of national identity of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people; 44% support it.

Palestinian views on the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state vary: 36% think that armed action is the most effective, 32% think negotiations is the most effective, and 26% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective.

In the absence of a peace negotiation, 82% support joining more international organizations. 86% support the submission of a complaint against Israel to the International Criminal Court. Moreover, two thirds (67%) support a popular non-violent resistance. A slight majority of 52% opposes, and 46% support, the dissolution of the PA. 51% opposes and 49% support a return to an armed intifada.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 78%. 21% are not worried. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of 81% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 69% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 23% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 50% believe that Israel intends to destroy al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 18% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 9% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 13% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.  More than half of the public (52%) believes that Israel will indeed succeed in implementing its plans for al Haram al Sharif and 44% believe it will not succeed.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the establishment of a Palestinian state is the first most vital Palestinian goal and 30% believe the first goal is to obtain the right of return for the refugees.
• 29% say that the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and an identical percentage says that it is poverty and unemployment.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end the Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of the occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 29% of the pubic; an identical percentage believes it is poverty and unemployment. 22% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; and 15% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

(7) Other issues: FIFA, boycott, Israeli right wing government, and the nuclear agreement with Iran

• Israel won more than the Palestinians in the FIFA battle.
• An overwhelming majority supports the campaign to boycott Israel.
• After the formation of right wing government in Israel, 79% are pessimistic about the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
• The nuclear deal with Iran is good for Israel but bad for the Arabs.

FIFA: in the FIFA battle over Israeli membership in the international football federation, 33% believe that Israel came out as the winner and 22% believe the Palestinian side came out as the winner. 10% believe both sides were winners, 4% believe both sides were losers, 15% believe neither side won or lost, and 17% did not know or did not express an opinion.

Boycott of Israeli products: 86% support the campaign to boycott Israel and impose sanctions on it and 88% say they have stopped buying Israeli products, such as those manufactured by Tnuva or Strauss, and 64% believe that the boycott of Israeli products will be effective in helping to end the Israeli occupation.

Israeli right wing government: in the wake of the formation of a new right wing government led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, 79% of the public feel pessimistic about the future of Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Nuclear agreement with Iran: 36% of the public believe that the framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, signed between the US and Iran, is a bad agreement for the Arabs and 25% believe it is a good agreement for the Arabs. 25% believe it is neither good nor bad. When asked if the agreement is good or bad for Israel, 50% said it was good and 24% said it was bad; 12% said it was neither good nor bad.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 June 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the decision by the PA president to postpone the holding of Palestinian elections that were scheduled to take place on 22 May 2021. It also witnessed the release of various Israeli decisions on an imminent expulsion of several Palestinian families from their homes in al Shaikh Jarrah and the impositions of various restrictions regarding Muslim’s access to al Aqsa Mosque during the month of Ramadan. These developments led to popular non-violent confrontations with the Israeli police and settlers in East Jerusalem that escalated to rocket attacks carried out be Hamas against Israeli cities. Hamas claimed that the attacks came in defense of East Jerusalem. The ensuing war between Hamas and Israel lasted for 11 days and led to the death of more than 250 Palestinians, including 66 children, and more than 10 Israelis, including two children. The period also witnessed a PA campaign to vaccinate Palestinian adults in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip against the coronavirus. The campaign led to a significant reduction in the daily rates of deaths and infections, particularly in the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2021 show significant changes in public attitudes toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leadership, Hamas, and relations with Israel. Two drivers seem to have triggered the change: the popular confrontations in East Jerusalem, the Israel-Hamas war, and their public perception of their outcomes on the one hand and the postponement of elections by the PA leadership on the other. 

The findings show a semi-public consensus that Hamas had won the confrontation with Israel and that Hamas’ launching of rockets at Israeli cities has been motivated by its desire to defend al Aqsa Mosque and the Palestinian families in al Shaikh Jarrah. Findings also show widespread public discontent with the performance of the PA government and leadership as well as Fatah during the confrontations and the war. They also show a two-third majority rejection of Abbas’ decision to postpone the elections. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas has postponed the elections because he was afraid of their outcome, not because Israel has prevented the holding of elections in East Jerusalem.

As a result, support for Hamas, and willingness to vote for it, increases dramatically while support for Fatah drops significantly. Moreover, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyyeh, manages to deliver an unprecedented victory over Abbas in a presidential election, if one is held today. Perhaps most importantly, a majority of the Palestinians think that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while a small percentage thinks Fatah under Abbas’ leadership is the one who deserves to do that.

Findings also show that more than 70% want to hold legislative and presidential elections soon and a similar percentage wants the PA to impose elections in East Jerusalem despite Israeli objection, rather than wait for an Israeli approval. The poll results do not have good news for most of the newly created electoral lists that registered for the legislative elections as only nine out of 36 managed to cross the threshold of 1.5% required to win seats in the parliament.

The confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel did not have an impact on the level of support for the two-state solution, which remained unchanged. But they did greatly impact other matters related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For example, support for a return to armed confrontations and intifada rose sharply to 60%, and support for a resumption of negotiations with Israel and the belief that negotiation is the most effective means of ending occupation dropped.  Moreover, the confrontations within Israel between the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Israeli police seem to have contributed to a significant reduction in support for the one-state solution, which declined from a third to a fifth in three months.

It is worth noticing however that the current findings are not fundamentally different from similar findings we obtained in the past immediately after similar Hamas-Israel confrontations. Therefore, they might be reflecting a temporary emotional reaction that might revert back to where things stood before the confrontations. The change from emotional to normal attitudes usually takes three to six months, as can be seen in our previous polls. But it should be pointed out that a return to “normal” attitudes has in the past been associated with a Hamas failure to maintain its gains and a success on the part of the PA to take measures that helped to pacify the public and win back its trust.

For the new Israeli government led by prime minister Naftali Bennett, about a fifth seems to think that it is better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu. Findings also show that while the largest percentage, but not the majority, is opposed to the participation of the Unified Arab List led by Mansour Abbas in the current coalition government, a similar percentage does support (or does not oppose or support) such participation.

1) Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

• 77% think Hamas has won the last confrontation with Israel and 65% think it has achieved its goals
• 72% think Hamas’ motive was the defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque
• In their evaluation of the performance of various local and regional actors, the public describe as “excellent” that of East Jerusalemites, Israeli Arabs, and Hamas
• 53% say Hamas, not Fatah under Abbas, deserves to represent and lead the Palestinian people; only 14% say Fatah under Abbas, not Hamas, deserves to represent and lead the Palestinians
• If Israel evict or expel the Palestinian families in al Shaikh Jarrah, 68% would support launching rockets at Israeli cities in retaliation
• 94% say they are proud of Gaza for its performance during the war

An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (77%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 1% think Israel came out a winner; 18% say no one came out a winner and 2% think both sides came out winners. Moreover, 65% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 26% think it did not.   72% think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 9% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 17% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers.

In an evaluation of the performance of 10 local and regional actors during the Jerusalem confrontations and the ensuing war between Israel and Hamas, the overwhelming majority describes as “excellent” that of the residents of Jerusalem and its youth (89%) followed by that of Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel (86%), followed by that of Hamas (75%). About one fifth describes as excellent the performance of each of the following governments: Egypt’s (22%), Turkey’s (21%), Jordan’s (21%), and Iran’s (18%). Finally, only 13% describe as excellent the performance of Fatah, 11% the PA government, and 8% Abbas’. The belief that Hamas’ performance was “excellent” is higher in the West Bank (80%) compared to the Gaza Strip (67%), in villages/towns (85%) compared to cities and refugee camps (74% and 71% respectively), among holders of BA degree (69%) compared to illiterates (56%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (78%) compared to those who work in the public sector (67%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (88% and 75% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (64%). t 

A majority of 64% views the residents of East Jerusalem as the group most willing to defend Jerusalem and its holy places, followed by Hamas at 29%, and the PA at 3%. In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, a majority of 53% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 14% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians. The belief that Hamas, not Fatah under Abbas, should represent and lead the Palestinians is higher in cities (54%) compared to villages/towns and refugees (49% each), among holders of BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (47%), among farmers and housewives (57% and 56% respectively) compared to merchants and students (47% and48% respectively) among those with the least income (59%) compared to those with the highest income (51%), among the religious (59%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligios (50% and 35% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (93%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (22% and 36% respectively).  

A majority of 60% thinks the participation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel in the recent confrontation was driven, first and foremost, by their desire to defend the holy sites, while 28% think it was driven by their desire to express rejection of integration in the Israeli society and their attachment to their national identity, and only 10% think it came as part of their struggle for equality and rejection of discrimination.

If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 68% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 18% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 9% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC). When asked about their expectations from the PA under Abbas leadership in case Israel expelled the Shaikh Jarrah families, the largest percentage (38%) said the PA will do nothing; 24% said it will write a complaint to the UN and the ICC; 20% think it will end security coordination with Israel, and 14% think it will launch popular non-violent resistance.

Public expectations from Hamas are very different: If Israel expels the Shaikh Jarrah families, 77% think Hamas will respond by launching rockets at Israeli cities; 10% think it will wage a non-violent campaign, 6% think it will issue protest statements, and only 5% think it will do nothing. But a majority of 55% think Israel will not expel the Shaikh Jarrah families and 40% think it will.

Two thirds of the public think there is a high or a medium chance that Hamas and Israel will reach a long-term truce that will ease the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 31% think the chances are slim.

A majority of 52% think that the incident in al Aqsa Mosque in which chants were made against the Jerusalem PA-appointed Mufti during his Friday sermon in the aftermath of the ceasefire between Israel and the “resistance” forces does not reflect its views while 44% think it does reflect them.

94% say they are proud of the performance of the Gaza Strip during the May confrontation with Israel while 6% say they are not. When asked about the main reason for being proud, 39% said they are proud because Gaza has delivered a military and rocket strike in defense of Jerusalem that demonstrated the weakness of the Israeli army; another 39% said they were proud because Gaza has brought the Palestinian cause back to forefront of Arab and international politics; and 13% said the reason they are proud is because Gaza has sacrificed and endured all the death and destruction while expressing patience and dignity in defense of Jerusalem. The percentage of those who are proud of Gaza because it delivered a military and rocket strike to Israel is higher in the West Bank (42%) compared to the Gaza Strip (35%), in villages and refugee camps (51% and 45% respectively) compared to cities (36%), among women (42%) compared to men (35%), among those who hold a BA degree (37%) compared to the illiterates (29%), among those who work in the private and nongovernmental sector (38%) compared to those who work in the public sector (34%), among the religious (47%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligious (35% and 25% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (48%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (34% and 39% respectively).  

2) The postponement of the legislative and presidential elections:

• 65% oppose the decision by president Abbas to postpone the elections and two thirds think the postponement came due to his fear of its outcome
• 72% demand the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections soon and 69% do not want a permission from Israel for holding them in East Jerusalem
• Ismail Haniyyeh wins in a presidential elections if held today by 59% against president Abbas who receives only 27%
• If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former wins by 51% and the latter receives 42%
• In a new parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 41% of the popular vote and Fatah 30%
• Most of the new electoral lists that were formed in preparation for holding parliamentary elections in May could not pass the electoral threshold

65% oppose and 25% support the decision of president Abbas to postpone legislative and presidential elections because Israel refuses to allow the holding of elections in East Jerusalem. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas postponed the elections because he was worried about the results while 25% think he postponed the elections because Israel refused to allow them in East Jerusalem. Opposition to the postponement decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (73%) compared to the West Bank (59%), in cities and villages (66% and 63% respectively) compared to refugee camps (57%), among men (67%) compared to women (62%), among refugees (68%) compared to non refugees (62%), among those who carry an AB degree (72%) compared to illiterates (43%), among merchants and professionals (76% and 66% respectively) compared to housewives (62%), among those who work in the private sector (68%) compared to those who work in the public sector (63%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (88% and 75% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (48%). Similarly, the belief that president Abbas postponed the elections because he was afraid of their outcome is higher cities (69%) compared to villages/towns (60%), among holders of BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (41%), among merchants, professionals and students (75%, 73%, and 70% respectively) compared to farmers and housewives (65% and 66% respectively), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (70%) compared to those who work in the public sector (63%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (88% and 70% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (41%).  

The largest percentage (43%) believes that there is no point in protesting Abbas’ decision to postpone the elections and that we should therefore accept it. On the other hand, 31% think that there should be protests but they should be conducted through non-violent demonstrations; 17% think the protests should be expressed through the courts and the judicial system routes.

72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank.  69% say we should not wait for an Israeli approval of elections in East Jerusalem and that we should impose these elections on Israel while 15% say it is better to wait for an Israeli approval. The majority (56%) of those who want the PA to hold elections without an Israeli approval demands holding elections immediately, 24% are in favor of holding the elections within three months, and 13% within a year or more. But about half of the Palestinians (49%) believes there will be no elections in the near future while 44% think elections will take place in the near future.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 27% and the latter 59% of the votes (compared to 46% for Haniyeh and 47% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 30% of the votes (compared to 44% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 60% (compared to 56% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 25% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 59% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 51% and Haniyeh 42%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 26% and the latter 63%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 48% and Haniyyeh 44%. 

In an open-ended question on the preferred president, in case Abbas is not nominated, 29% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 28% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% Dahlan, 3% Yahia Sinwar, and 2% for each of the following: Khalid Mishaal, Mohammad Shtayyeh, Mustafa Barghouti, and Salam Fayyad.  In a closed-ended question, about potential Abbas successors, 29% say they prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 28% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad (3% each), and Khalid Mishal (2%).

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, that participated in the 2006 elections, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 41% say they will vote for Hamas and 30% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 43%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 38% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 32% (compared to 53% three months ago).

We also asked about the vote for the 36 electoral lists that registered to compete in the parliamentary elections that was scheduled for May 2021. Only nine lists managed to pass the threshold of 1.5%: the largest percentage went to Hamas’ list, “Jerusalem is Our Call”  (36%) followed by Fatah’s list with 19%, “the freedom list” led by Nasser al Qidwah (9%), “the Future List” of Dahlan (3%), the “National Initiative” 2%, and the following lists managed to pass the threshold: the PFLP, “Together” led by Salam Fayyad, the “Democratic Change” led by Ibrahim Abu Hijlah, and “Palestine for All” led by Mufeed al Hasayneh. 

(3) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 65% in the Gaza Strip and 60% in the West Bank; but 42% of Gazans, compared to only 15% in the West Bank, say they want to emigrate
• 84% say there is corruption in the institutions of the PA and 57% say there is corruption in the institutions run by Hamas
• 56% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 35% view is as an asset
• Optimism about the prospects for reconciliation stands at 41% and pessimism at 56%
• The expectations that the Shtayyeh government will succeed in delivering reconciliation holding elections, or improving economic conditions stand at 30% or less

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 24%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 65% and in the West Bank at 60%. 26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 42% and in the West Bank at 15%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 40% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 57% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 70% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.  46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 52% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 19% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 50% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 47% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 46% of Gazans said it was good or very good.  The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a slight majority of 56% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 35% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 51% viewed the PA as a burden and 44% viewed it as an asset.

70% oppose and 26% support making payments to the families of martyrs and prisoners based on need assessment and number of family members rather than on the act committed by the martyr or the number of years in jail.

41% are optimistic and 56% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 34%. Two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 65% expect failure; only 29% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, one third of the public expects success and 60% expects failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 62% expects failure and 32% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV (13%), Palestine TV (12%), Palestine Today (10%), Maan (7%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (1%).

(4) The Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• Percentage of those who say they have received the coronavirus vaccine stands at 37% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip
• 66% are satisfied with the efforts made by their government to make the vaccine available
• A majority of 57% are satisfied with the PA efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus

23% (28% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 40% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 35% (37% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them. Also, 66% (81% in the Gaza Strip and 57% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 31% (18% in the Gaza Strip and 40% in the West Bank) are dissatisfied.

A majority of 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 41% are dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction in the West Bank stands at 48% and in the Gaza Strip at 30%.  The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at 49%. 

(5) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition at 58%; but a majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion
• 49% believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the occupation while 27% believe in negotiations
• 70% are opposed to a return to negotiations with Israel without conditions
• A drop in support for the one-state solution in three months from 33% to 20%
• 54% are opposed to return to dialogue with the new American administration and 63% are opposed to return to negotiations led by the US
• Only 19% of the public believe the new Israeli government under prime minister Bennett will be better for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations compared to a Netanyahu government

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  Support for the two-state solution increases to 41% and opposition drops to 56% when the borders of the Palestinian state are described as being based on the 1967 lines and its capital as East Jerusalem. When the public is asked to pick a choice from among three, 46% pick the two-state solution based on the 1967 lines, 10% pick a Palestinian-Israeli confederation, and only 6% pick a one-state for Jews and Arabs. We asked the public about its support for the idea of making Jerusalem, both East and West, an open city, whereby the Eastern part would be the capital of the Palestinian state and Western part would be the capital of the state of Israel. Less than a quarter (23%) supported and 73% opposed the idea.

A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 33% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 67% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 29% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 36% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 26% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 49% chose armed struggle, 27% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 37% chose armed struggle and 36% chose negotiations. Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 19% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 66% supported joining more international organizations; 58% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 60% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 20% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 43% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 42% supported dissolving the PA, and 33% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

54% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Moreover, 63% are opposed, and 29% are supportive of a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the US leadership. Support for such negotiations stands at 38% under the leadership of the international Quartet and 55% are opposed. Moreover, 52% do not believe, and 38% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.

The largest percentage (45%) are opposed to the participation of Israeli Arab parties in the Israeli governmental coalitions while 26% say they support Mansour Abbas’ decision to join the current coalition in Israel, and 21% say they neither support or oppose such participation.  About one fifth (19%) thinks that an Israeli government led by Naftali Bennett from the extreme right wing Yamina party will be better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu; a large majority of 69% disagree with that.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 47% view ending the Israeli occupation and building a Palestinian state as the top priority of the Palestinian people
• 24% believe that the Gaza siege is the main problem that confronts Palestinian society today and 21% think it is the spread of corruption

47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 8% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (24%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 20% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip, 21% (27% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the spread of corruption, 20% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 17% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 14% (19% in the Gaza Strip and 10% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 3% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the preparation for the holding of the first phase of local elections in rural areas and small towns in the West Bank but without a confirmation of the date for holding the second phase of local elections in cities and big towns. Hamas prevented the holding of the local elections in the Gaza Strip. The first phase of local elections was held in the West Bank on 11 December, the last day of the field work, in 154 localities and the participation rate stood at 66% according the Palestinian Central Elections Commission. The number of participants stood at 262,827 voters. This period witnessed also various violent incidents in Palestinian universities and the death of one student. Israel classified 6 Palestinian human rights NGOs as terrorist organizations. The UK labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization. This press release addresses some of these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2021 show that while the public is pessimistic about the prospects of holding parliamentary or presidential elections in the near future, it is optimistic that the second phase of local elections will take place soon. The second phase of local elections is now set to take place in cities and big towns on 26 March 2022. The findings show that Fatah is more popular than Hamas in West Bank cities that will participate in the second phase of the local elections while Hamas is more popular in the Gazan cities that might participate in the second phase of the local elections.  Nonetheless, the findings show that the overall domestic balance of power between Fatah and Hamas has not changed compared to our findings of September 2021. Hamas is more popular than Fatah, and Ismail Haniyyeh easily wins against president Abba and prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in one to one competitions. But Marwan Barghouti, also from Fatah, wins against Haniyyeh with two-thirds voting for him. Three quarters of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas.

What is noticeable however is that despite the stability in the domestic balance of power, there is a clear disappointment in Hamas’ leadership indirectly expressed by the public compared to the situation six and even three months ago. The findings show that the percentage of those who choose Hamas to represent and lead the Palestinian people has declined significantly and the gap between those who choose Hamas compared to those who choose Fatah, under Abbas’ leadership, has now narrowed to 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas; in September, the gap stood at 26 points in favor of Hamas and in June, a month after the Hamas-Israel May 2021 war, the gap stood at 39% in favor of Hamas. The percentage of those who believe that neither Fatah, under Abbas, nor Hamas deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people has now increased considerably.

In this poll, we have asked about various political solutions to the conflict with Israel and about the confidence building measures that seek to improve the daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The findings show the following:

• The majority is still opposed to the two-state solution. But support for this solution has increased compared to the September 2021 findings and decreased compared to the October 2021 findings.  
• The two-state solution remains the one with the largest percentage of support compared to other solutions, including that of the one-state solution in which the two sides, Palestinians and Israeli Jews, enjoy equal rights; support for the one-state solution is higher than one quarter and less than one third.
• There is a clear majority, higher than 60%, in favor confidence building measures that improves Palestinian daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the current level of support is higher than that of September 2021 when we first asked about the issue.

Findings also show that despite a two-third opposition to a resumption of unconditional bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, a large minority approaching about half of the public is in favor of a resumption of such negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Moreover, despite the opposition of the majority to the resumption of dialogue between the US and PA, a large minority approaching half of the public believes that the US is the most effective in influencing the decisions of the Palestinians and the Israelis on the matter of the renewal of the peace process. Also on the peace process, findings show a decrease in the percentage of those who believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that negotiation is the most effective. Nonetheless, armed struggle is viewed as more effective than negotiations.

Findings also show that the largest percentage of respondents believes the main Israeli motivation behind the labeling of six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations is to weaken the ability of these organizations to document Israeli violations of human rights and to weaken the PA efforts to take Israelis to the International Criminal Court.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 70% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 27% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 52% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Nonetheless, a majority of 59% (68% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) expect the holding of the second stage of local elections in cities and big towns in the near future; 34% do not expect that.
• Fatah is more popular than Hamas (38% to 30%) in West Bank cities which will participate in the second phase of local elections while Hamas is more popular than Fatah (47% to 29%) in the cities in the Gaza Strip that might participate in the second phase of local elections.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 35% and Haniyeh 58% of the votes (compared to 56% for Haniyeh and 34% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 33% of the votes (compared to 34% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 52% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 65% and from among those Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 52% and from among those the former receives 33% and the latter 59%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received 31% and Haniyyeh 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 35% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 5% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 27% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 21% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 38% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 37% and Fatah at 32%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 27% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 38% three months ago).
• In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 34% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 36% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 45% selected Hamas, 19% Fatah under Abbas, and 28% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and in the West Bank at 51%.
• 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 31% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 21% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 36% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 83% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 61% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (56%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 34% viewed it as an asset.
• 33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 32%.
• After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 71% expect failure; only 23% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29% of the public expect success and 65% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 69% expects failure and 27% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 27%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Maan (10%), Palestine Today (9%), al Mayadeen (4%), and al Arabiya (3%).

(3) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• 58% (68% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 18% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24% say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.
• 77% (87% in the Gaza Strip and 71% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 21% are dissatisfied.
• 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 42% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, only 45% expressed satisfaction.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 69% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 69% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 39%.

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%.  
• When asked about their preferences regarding a political solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from among three specific solutions, one third (33%) preferred the “two state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel,” 16% preferred a “one state solution, from the River to the Sea, with equal rights to Jews and Arabs,” and 11% preferred a one state solution in which the status of the Palestinians would be “the same as the status of the inside Palestinians,” and 32% preferred other solutions, such as “historic Palestine,” or “full Palestine,” or “independent Palestine,” and others.
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 29% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 65% expressed opposition.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 56% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 50% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 61% said it looks positively, while 33% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 56% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
• A majority of 59% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 42% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations.
• A majority of 61% thinks that current international, regional, and local conditions does not make possible a resumption of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis while 35% think that these conditions make a resumption of negotiations possible.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 66% opposes and 26% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 46%; 49% are opposed.
• 56% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Yet, when asked about the country or party that is most influential in convincing the Palestinian and Israeli sides to return to the peace process, 46% said the US, 33% said Arab countries such as Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, or Qatar, 10% said Europe, and 3% said Russia.
• We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 38% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 19% selected the loss of the will to fight.
• When asked about the country or party most responsible for derailing the peace process in the region, 65% said it is Israel, 15% said it is the US, 15% said it is Arab countries, and 3% said Palestine.
• We asked the public about its views on the reason Israel labelled six Palestinian human rights NGOs, such as Al Haq and Addameer, as terrorists organizations. The largest percentage (40%) said the Israeli decision aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights; 20% said it aimed at weakening the PA-led campaign to try Israelis at the International Criminal Court; 17% said it aimed at weaking the ability of these NGOs to document PA violations of human rights in the West Bank; 11% said it aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Hamas’ violations of human rights in the Gaza Strip, and another 11% said it aimed at weakening the PFLP.   
• In reaction to the UK government decision to label Hamas as a terrorist organization and the idea of boycotting British products, 49% expressed the belief that such a boycott would be effective in forcing the UK government to rescind its decision while 45% think the boycott would not be effective.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (26%; 15% in the Gaz Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 22% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 20% said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 5%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 26% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the internal violence, and 10% said it is the split or division.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13 and 17 September 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli army without the participation of Hamas, the visit of the US president Joe Biden to Bethlehem and his meeting with president Abbas, the appointment of Yair Lapid as a prime minister replacing Bennet and the setting of a date for new Israeli elections, an announcement by the United Arab Emirates of $25  millions in support to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem, talk about opening the Israeli Ramon airport to Palestinian travel, an Israeli decision to increase the number of Gazan laborers working in Israel, an attempted assassination against the former deputy prime minister in Hamas’ government, Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir, near Nablus, a PA announcement that salaries of Palestinian laborers working in Israel would be paid via Palestinian banks, plans by the PA to reduce the number of employees working in the public sector, and Abbas talk during his visit to Germany of 50 Holocausts.  This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The results of the third quarter of 2022 show a limited change in the domestic balance of power as the gap between Fatah and Hamas is now two percentage points in favor of Fatah while, three months ago, it was one point in favor of Hamas. Similarly, the gap in the 

popularity of president Abbas vs. Ismail Haniyyeh has now narrowed to 15 percentage points in favor of Haniyyeh while, three months ago, it was 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh. It seems there are two main reasons for this limited change: the disapproval of Hamas, especially in the West Bank, regarding its non-involvement in the armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel in August and the rise of Abbas popularity, also especially in the West Bank, in light of the Israeli and German criticism of his reference to the “Holocaust” when describing the Israeli massacres against the Palestinians.

Among the findings on the domestic side, three in particular stand out and should raise an alarm:

1. There is a widespread worry among all Palestinian sectors, reaching about 70% in the West Bank, who view the attempted assassination of Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir as an indication that an internal armed strife might erupt in the West Bank when conditions are ripe, as happened in the past in the Gaza Strip.
2. The narrative of the PA government, regarding the transfer of salary payments to Palestinian laborers who work in Israel, has no credibility among the public as the poll finds only one in ten Palestinians trusting the PA statements regarding this matter while the vast majority stand with the laborers and sympathize with their fears.
3. There is a widespread rejection, reaching about 80%, of the PA government plans to cut down the number of the public sector employees. In case the PA goes ahead with its plans, a large majority wants the cuts to take place in the security sector only which reveals existing concerns among the public regarding the justification for having such a large security sector to begin with.

On Israeli- Palestinian relations, support for the two-state solution and for the one-state solution rises in this poll. It now resembles the support that existed about 6 months ago. This development is accompanied, as expected, with a decline in the percentage of those who think the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion. The findings also show a continued rise in the positive view of the public regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures, reaching 70% for the first time, with an even greater appreciation of the measure in which a larger number of work permits are issued by Israel for laborers from the Gaza Strip.

Perhaps because of the above, but also due to the negative public assessment of the last armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel, the findings indicate a significant decline in support for armed attacks or a return to an armed intifada and a significant rise in support for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 69% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 29% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 78% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 57%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 53% of the votes (compared to 55% for Haniyeh and 33% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 59%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 40% and Haniyeh 46%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 63% and Haniyeh 33%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 45% and from among those, the former receives 32% and the latter 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (41%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), Mohammad Shtayyeh (3%), Hussein al Sheikh (2%), and 22% said they do not know or have not decided.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 26% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, a vast majority of 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 77% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 34% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 44% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 21% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 37% three months ago).
• 27% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 26% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 42% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 33% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 38% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 76% and in the West Bank at 54%.
• 25% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 29% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 26% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 27% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 73% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 86% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 71% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 46% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 54% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (57%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 38% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 36% viewed it as an asset.
• 25% are optimistic and 73% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 26%.
• After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 25% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 73% expects failure and 22% expects success.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 67% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 49%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 41%.
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding the identity of the perpetrators of the attempted assassination against Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir near Nablus two months ago. The responses did not indicate a clear trend but about 27% pointed the figure at the Palestinian security services and Fatah: 14% said the security services and 13% said armed men from Fatah. Additionally, about 14% said the assassination attempt came as a result of a struggle within al Najah university, where Dr. al Sha’ir works, while an identical percentage accused the Israeli army, 9% thought it resulted from personal or family conflict, and 6% thought it resulted from conflict within Hamas.
• A large majority of 63% is worried that this assassination attempt might lead to internal armed confrontations when conditions are ripe as had happened in the past in the Gaza Strip; 28% say they are not worried. The level of worry is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 69% and 53% respectively.
• A majority of 61% is opposed the lawyers’ strike which was waged to protest the decisions of the PA president to amend legislation affecting the judiciary; 26% stand in favor.
• An overwhelming majority of 79% says it opposes PA plans to cut down the size of the public sector while only 19% say they are in favor.  When asked about the sector whose size should be cut, the majority (62%) selected the security sector, 15% selected education, 10% selected health, and 6% selected social affairs.
• The overwhelming majority (85%) expresses solidarity with Palestinian laborers who work in Israel in rejecting the PA announcement that the salaries of these laborers will be paid to them via Palestinian banks while only 12% say they trust the government assurances to the laborers that this measure will help protect their interests, allowing them to benefit from the banking services, and that no new taxes will be imposed on those salaries. Trust in the PA assurances stands at 6% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip.
• The vast majority (73%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 25% say it is doing so.
• We asked the public about the burden imposed on their households due to the rise in prices and asked them to tell us which sector or sectors were the most affected: 48% selected the food sector; 27% selected energy such as electricity, solar, and gasoline, 14% said rent, 6% said education, 3% said transportation, and 3% said health.   
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 29%, followed by al Aqsa TV (11%), Maan, Palestine Today TV, and Palestine TV (10% each), al Arabiya (4%), al Mayadeen (3%), and al Manar (1%).

(3) Islamic Jihad-Israel armed confrontation:

• The largest percentage (42%) thinks that neither Israel nor Islamic Jihad won the last armed confrontations between the two sides last month. But 27% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank) think Israel came out a winner while only 12% think Islamic Jihad came out a winner. Surprisingly, 11% think Hamas, who did not participate in the confrontation, came out a winner.
• Half of the public (50%) says that Hamas’ decision not to become directly involved in the armed exchange between Islamic Jihad and the Israeli army was the correct decision while 37% say it was the wrong decision. The percentage of those who think it was the correct decision is much higher in the Gaza Strip (68%) than in the West Bank (38%).
• But only 27% expect Hamas’ decision to lead to an improvement in economic conditions in the Gaza Strip while the largest percentage (42%) thinks economic conditions will remain unchanged and 22% think they will worsen. In the Gaza Strip, 34% expect conditions to improve while only 23% of West Bankers think that.

(4) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 37% and opposition stands at 60%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 28%.   When few details were added, such as “two states for two peoples” along the lines of 1967 with small and equal border modifications, support rose slightly to 38% and opposition dropped to 57%.
• A majority of 64% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 76% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 18% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 70% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 30% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 67% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 22%.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 55% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 46% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 55% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 41% chose armed struggle (50% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank), 30% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 22% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 69% said it looks positively, while 27% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 65% of the public said it viewed these measures positively. A vast majority of 78% looks positively at the Israeli decision to increase the number of laborers from the Gaza Strip who work in Israel; only 20% look at that decision negatively.
• We asked the public about its willingness to use the Israeli Ramon airport, located near Elate, instead of the Amman or Cairo airports: 41% expressed willingness to do so while a majority of 55% said it is not willing to do so.  But when we asked the public if it looks positively or negatively about the possibility of allowing Gaza residents to use that airport, the majority (58%) said it looks at such a step positively and only 37% said it looks at it negatively.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 68% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about support and opposition to negotiations with Israel under Arab and international sponsorship, 42% were in favor and 56% against.
• Similarly, when asked about PA negotiations with the current Israeli prime minister, Yair Lapid, only 35% said they opposed such negotiations while 30% said they support negotiations with him on a peace agreement and confidence building measures while 13% said they support negotiations if restricted to a peace agreement and an identical percentage said they support negotiations with him if restricted to confidence building measures. In other words, a total of 43% are in favor of negotiations with Lapid about a peace agreement and an identical percentage is in favor of negotiations with him about confidence building measures.  
• The largest percentage (36%) expects Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and form the next government while 21% expect Lapid to win the elections; 26% say neither will win.
• 61% are opposed, and 34% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the US administration under president Joe Biden.  
• In light of the visit to Bethlehem by the US president Joe Biden, 53% say they are less optimistic about the prospects for improvement in economic conditions after the visit and the meeting with Abbas while only 16% express optimism and 26% say they are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
• Similarly, 53% are less optimistic that internal conditions, such as reconciliation or the holding of elections, will improve now after the visit by Biden; 17% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
• Moreover, 58% are less optimistic that Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as agreement on more confidence building measures or reduction in settlement construction, will see improvement now after the Biden visit; only 13% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
• Despite the overall lack of optimism, 43% say they now, after the Biden visit, expect the US to increase its aid to the PA while 53% say the do not expect that.
• Two-thirds think it was right for Abbas to use the “Holocaust” in reference to Israeli massacres against Palestinians during his visit to Germany; 26% think it was wrong for him to use that term.

(5) Support from the UAE to East Jerusalem hospital:

• We asked about the support provided by the United Arab Emirates to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem: 61% said the support helps the steadfastness of the Palestinians while 36% said it does not help.
• We then asked about expectations that other Arab countries, that recently normalized relations with Israel, such as Bahrain and Morocco, would also provide similar support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank: a majority of 54% said it does not expect that while 42% said they expect that.
• We then asked the public if it welcomes or does not welcome support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip from these countries that recently normalized relations with Israel: two thirds said the do not and 31% said they do.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 17% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 27% (28% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; another 27% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% (34% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 11% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 8% (11% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (36%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the split or division, and 9% said it is the internal violence.