Search

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a public opinion poll among Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the period between 27 January and 23 February 2020. The poll sought to explore the reasons that drive Christians to emigrate from their homeland in Palestine to other countries and the various means that could potentially stem the flow. The period during the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the release of Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” and its immediate rejection by the Palestinian leadership. The Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo a few days later and unanimously rejected the plan. A similar rejection followed by representatives of the Islamic countries. Internally, Fatah and Hamas issued conciliatory statements calling for reconciliation, but this was not followed by any concrete measures or efforts to hold Palestinian elections. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, tensions rose significantly during the fieldwork period as popular confrontations developed in various cities and signs of an emerging trade crisis were visible. Total size of the sample is 995 Christian adults interviewed face to face in 98 selected locations in seven Palestinian governorates. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

Summary of Findings:

The findings clearly show that the desire to emigrate is much higher among Palestinian Christians than Palestinian Muslims. Indeed, the percentage among Christians in the West Bank is almost twice as much as that of Muslims. The largest percentage of those wishing to emigrate say that they would like to go to the US, and Canada and Europe placed second and third, respectively. The largest percentage indicate that their desire to emigrate stems from economic reasons, while a smaller percentage indicate a desire to search abroad for educational opportunities, a safer, more stable, and less corrupt place, and a place that allows greater liberties and religious tolerance.

The poll found other reasons for the emigration, some having to do with the conditions of the Israeli occupation and others with the domestic conditions. For example, Christians complain about the impact of occupation measures, such as checkpoints, settlers’ attacks, and land confiscation.

Others complain about the lack of safety and security and a majority believes that the Israeli occupation seeks to expel them from their homeland. Certain domestic conditions are also conducive to a greater demand for emigration. For example, there are complaints and worries about lack of safety, fear of crime and theft, absence of liberties and rule of law, and the spread of corruption. Moreover, there is evidence of worry about the existence of religious Salafist groups in Palestinian society and the presence of armed groups such as Hamas and those that represent political Islam.

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Palestinian Christians indicate that they face no irritation or harassment from their Muslim neighbors, or at schools and workplaces, findings do show that somewhere between a fifth and a quarter complain of hearing swearwords or curses and accusations of blasphemy. Indeed, a very large minority believe that most Muslims do not wish to see them in the country. Similarly, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority indicate that they do not suffer from religious discrimination, findings show that a fifth to a quarter feel discrimination when searching for jobs or when seeking PA services. The overwhelming majority indicate that they feel integrated into Palestinian society. Still, three out of ten do not see themselves integrated or feel hated by the Muslim citizens. About a quarter say that some of their Muslim acquaintances invite them to convert to Islam and seven out of ten say they have, at one time or another, heard a Muslim asserting that Christians will go to hellfire.

Findings also show that Christians, like Muslims, do not trust the Palestinian government or the PA security services and the justice sector. Indeed, the majority tend to have no trust in the Christian religious leaders or civil society organizations. The majority believe that corruption exists in the PA institutions. While the overwhelming majority indicates that the democratic system is the best, only one in ten describe the Palestinian system as democratic. Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Christians believe that one should be careful in his/her dealings with other people while only one in ten believes that it is possible to trust most people.

The poll found more than half of the Christians hope for a political settlement that leads to the creation of a single state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea in which Palestinians and Israelis would have equal rights while three out of 10 prefer a two-state solution. Half of the Christians view the one-state solution as safer than the two-state solution for Palestinian Christians.

The poll also found that one additional reason for the larger Christian emigration is that a large percentage of Palestinian Christians have relatives who have emigrated in the past, and believe that those relatives would help them if they showed interested in emigrating. About half of the sample believe that immigration laws in counties of destination favor Christians. Other external factors, found among two-thirds of the sample, are the regional political developments, which constitute an additional driver pushing people out from Palestine and the entire region.

Finally, when asked about the means of combating the phenomena of Christian emigration, respondents focus on the need for Palestinian policy makers and the leaders of the church to pay more attention to the problem and to develop means to decrease the outflow. Respondents’ suggestions focused on the importance of improving economic conditions, such as creating job opportunities, providing financial assistance to those in need, facilitating greater access to homes and apartments. Other suggestions focused on improving conditions of safety and security, including greater PA capacity to enforce law and order, and promoting values of democracy and tolerance.

Migration Trends Among Palestinians

Official Israeli statistical sources indicate that the total net emigration among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the period between 1967 and 1989 stood at around 300,000, which means 13,000 per year. For the period between 1990 until the end of 1994, while highlighting the return of the PLO and its security forces to these Palestinian territories, Israeli sources indicate a net return of 30,000 Palestinians after subtracting those who emigrated during that period. For the period between 1995 and 2003, the same Israeli sources indicate a net loss of 88,000, an annual average of 11,000 emigrants. Findings of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) pointed out in a survey conducted in 2010 that 33,000 emigrated from the Palestinian Territories during the period between 2005 and 2009, an annual average of 7,000 and that during this same period more than 30,000 immigrants returned home to Palestine. There are no published or credible numbers on the current conditions, but estimates suggest that the annual average of emigration during the past ten years might be more than 10,000. Moreover, the opening of the Rafah Crossing with Egypt in a semi-permanent manner in 2018 might have opened the door, according to unconfirmed reports, of about 24,000 emigrants from the Gaza Strip in that year alone, while Israeli governmental sources believe the number to be 35,000.

Among Palestinian Christians, the historic record indicates that emigration has been greater than that of Palestinian Muslims. With the end of the Ottoman era in Palestine and the beginning of the British Mandate in 1922, Christians constituted 11% of the population of the entire historic Palestine with the number standing at 70,429. In 1946, the percentage declined to 8% as the British Mandate was about to end, despite the fact that the number had increased to 145,063. In 1949, the number of Christians in the West Bank stood at 51,053 and in the Jordanian 1961 census, 45,855. As the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip started in 1967, the percentage of Palestinian Christians in the occupied Palestinian territories stood at 6% with a total number of 42,719. When the first PA census was completed in 1997, three years after the creation of the PA, the number of Palestinian Christians stood at 40,055, constituting 1.5% of the total Palestinian population. The second PA census in 2007 indicated a slight increase in the number, now standing at 42,565 but constituting only 1.2% of the population. In 2017, the third census showed 46,850 Christian citizens making up only 1% of the population.

The decline in the Christian population has been attributed first and foremost to emigration, particularly among the youth. But other factors have also contributed to this development. For example, population growth has been slower among the Christians compared to Palestinian Muslims. Higher age of marriage among Christians has been another factor. The Palestinian Arab Barometer poll, conducted at the end of 2018, found that 39% of the Christian population in Palestine was over the age of 50, compared to only 21% among the Muslims.

The decline in the Christian population during the past 100 years is evident in the makeup of some of the main Palestinian cities that have traditionally been Christian. For example, the Christian population of Bethlehem declined from 84% in 1922 to only 28% in 2007; in Beit Jala from 99% to 61% and in Beit Sahour from 81% to 65% during the same period.

The Demographic Characteristics of the Christian Poll Sample

PSR selected a sample of 995 Christians from all West Bank and Gaza Strip governorates with a Christian population. The numbers were distributed based on the number of Christians in each governorate with the exception of the Gaza Strip in which 100 people were added and the sample size was reweighted to reflect the proportionate size of Christians in that area. Moreover, 20 Gazan residents presently residing in the West Bank were selected randomly from a list of 100 provided by a Christian source familiar with status of those Gazans. The total number of Christians in the various governorates was obtained from PCBS census data. But PCBS did not provide data on the number of Christians in the various locations in each governorate and therefore fieldwork was conducted in order to assess the distribution in each governorate. Some areas, with a very small number of Christians, were excluded from the sample. With the assistance of local councils and churches, estimates of numbers were made in the various locations. These were cross tabulated with PCBS data to ensure harmony. Maps were developed for all of the locations that were selected, and were drawn and subdivided based on the number of homes in each location. PSR selected 98 locations, and 10 adult Christians were interviewed in each of the selected locations. Using Kish table, one individual was selected in each home. The interviews were conducted face to face by data collectors that were trained for that particular purpose. One focus group was organized by PSR with more than a dozen Christian participants before the conduct of the fieldwork in order to assess the utility of the questionnaire and to gain insights into the best means of gaining the trust of Palestinian Christians and reducing their concerns about the planned survey. The team of data collectors was formed mostly from Christian fieldworkers and each team consisted of two members under the direct supervision of a field coordinator. Data collectors were instructed not to reveal their religion to the respondents by any means including appearance. Interviews were conducted face-to-face using tablets in all cases with the exception of 15 interviews that were conducted over the phone among Gazans residing in the West Bank.

The distribution of the sample in the West Bank stood at 88% of the total, 10% in the Gaza Strip, and 2% were Gazans residing in the West Bank. Bethlehem had the largest percentage of interviews (42%) followed by Ramallah (24%), Jerusalem (15%), Gaza (12%), Jenin (5%), and Nablus and Jericho (1% each). Males constituted 50% and females 50%. Age distribution shows that the biggest group (64%) came from those whose age is over 40 years, followed by those between the ages of 18 and 29 years (19%) and those between 30 and 39 years (17%). The percentage of illiterates stood at 3%, those who completed elementary school (6%), preparatory education (9%), secondary education (33%), two-year college (19%), BA degree (25%), and MA and higher (5%). The percentage of the married respondents stood at 65%, the unmarried 24%, and widowed or divorced 10%. Those who worked in PA institutions represented only 3% of the sample, Church institutions 7%, private sector 29%, NGOs 6%, Israeli institutions 3%, housewives 25%, unemployed 9%, retirees 7%, and students 5%.

Data collectors and their impressions: The team of data collectors included 17 fieldworkers, most females, of whom 15 were Christians and were distributed as follows: 2 in the Gaza Strip, 3 in the northern West Bank, 6 in the south, and 6 in the middle of the West Bank.[1]

Detailed Findings

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

10-12 December 2015

18-21 August 2002

These are the results of opinion poll # 5, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 18-21 August 2002. The poll deals with the public attitudes toward the peace process and reconciliation, armed confrontations, evaluation of the PA performance, political reform, and the popularity of Arafat, Fateh, and Islamist groups. The total sample size of this poll is 1320 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face, in 120 locations in the West Bank (814) and the Gaza Strip (506). The margin of error is 3%.

MAIN RESULTS:

I. Peace Process and Reconciliation

• 48% support, and 50% oppose, the gradual implementation of a ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal from PA areas


• 43% support, and 53% oppose, internal Palestinian efforts aiming at ending bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel


• 31% support, and 65% oppose, a security role for Egypt and Jordan in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip


• Only 16% expect return to negotiations and an end to violent confrontations


• 70% believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not


• 52% support, and 46% oppose, bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel, but more that 90% support armed attacks against soldiers and settlers


• 73% support reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples after reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state

More than two thirds of the Palestinians (70%) continue to believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not. The impact of this belief is seen in the sharp division within the Palestinian society over the gradual implementation of a ceasefire and an Israel withdrawal from PA areas with 48% supporting and 50% opposing it. It can also be seen in the majority opposition to internal Palestinian efforts that seek to build a consensus around the need to put an end to bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel with 53% opposing and 43% supporting such efforts. The results show also that 52% still support bombing attack

against civilians inside Israel. This result is identical to that of our last poll in May 2002. Support for attacks against Israeli civilians reached 58% in December 2001. Support for attacks against soldiers and settlers remained unchanged at 92% and 91% respectively.

Support for the continuation of armed confrontations can also be seen in the opposition of almost two-thirds (65%) to the deployment of Jordanian and Egyptian security trainers in the Palestinian areas. This large opposition may be due to Palestinian belief that the purpose of the deployment of the trainers is to enforce a ceasefire if the need arise. However, despite the efforts to arrange a ceasefire and to deploy Egyptian and Jordanian trainers, only a small minority of 16% expects to see an end to violence and a return to negotiations soon.

Despite the hard-line attitude regarding the ceasefire and the targeting of civilians and despite the low expectations regarding return to negotiations and cessation of violence, almost three-quarters of the Palestinians are still supportive of reconciliation between the two peoples after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by the state of Israel. However, this commitment to reconciliation, based on a two-state solution, does not mean that all three quarters believe it will actually happen. Indeed, 43% of all Palestinians believe that reconciliation will never happen. Moreover, while support, as in all previous polls, is very high for open borders between the two states (84%) and for joint economic institutions and ventures (68%), only one-third supports taking legal steps to prohibit incitement against Israel (33%). Moreover, only a minority of 22% supports the formation of joint political institutions (aiming at the establishment of a confederation between the two states), and even a smaller minority (8%) supports the adoption of school curriculum that recognizes the state of Israel and does not demand the return of all Palestine to the Palestinians. It is clear that support for reconciliation is motivated by purely cost-benefit calculations.

Support for the gradual ceasefire and Israeli army withdrawal increases in the areas of Jerusalem (60%), Tulkarm (57%), Jenin (56%) and Ramallah (54%) and decreases in Deir al Balah (34%), Bethlehem (41%), Hebron (45%) and Rafah (44%). It also increases in towns and villages (51%) compared to refugee camps (42%); among non-refugees (50%) compared to refugees (45%); among women (53%) compared to men (43%); among illiterates (56%) compared to holders of BA degree (46%); among housewives (54%) compared to professionals (25%); and among supporters of Fateh (57%) and nonaffiliated (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas (40%) and PFLP (30%).

Support for the efforts to create a consensus prohibiting the targeting of Israeli civilians is strongest in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (37%); in the areas of Jenin (55%), Hebron (54%), Ramallah (53%) and Gaza City (53%) compared to areas of Rafah (24%), Deir al Balah (25%), Khan Younis (29%), Jabalia (35%) and Bethlehem (36%). Support also increases in cities (47%) compared to refugee camps (32%); and among supporters of Fateh (50%) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

II. Jordanian Obstacles to Travel and the Desire to Emigrate

• 31% believe that Jordan is right, and 66% believe it is wrong, in putting obstacles making it difficult to travel from the West Bank to Jordan


• 19% say that current conditions forces them to seek permanent emigration from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

The results show a clear rejection of the Jordanian position regarding Palestinian travel across the Allenby bridge. Two-thirds believe that Jordan is wrong in putting obstacles making it difficult for Palestinians to travel to Jordan. The survey question pointed out that Jordan imposes such obstacles for fear of Palestinian mass emigration to Jordan. The opposition to the Jordanian policy may be due to the fact that only a minority of 19% thinks of permanently emigrating from the Palestinian areas. For this reason, the majority sees no justification for the Jordanian move. Previous polls conducted before the intifada, between 1998 and 2000, showed that a percentage between 21% and 26% thought of permanently emigrating from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The belief that Jordan is right in putting obstacles to Palestinian travel across the Allenby Bridge increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (24%); among refugees (36%) compared to non-refugees (27%); among illiterates (37%) compared to holders of BA degree (23%), among retired persons (57%) compared to students (21%) and farmers (20%); and among supporters of Fateh (34%) compared to supporters of PFLP (23%) and Hamas (30%).

Desire to emigrate increases among the young (26%) compared to the old (4%); among residents of cities (22%) compared to residents of refugee camps (16%); among men (21%) compared to women (16%); among holders of BA degree (28%) compare to illiterates (5%); among professionals (38%) and craftsmen (30%) compared to farmers (3%); among those who work in the private sector (25%) compared to those working in the public sector (13%); among the unmarried (30%) compared to the married (16%); and among the least religious (38%) compared to the most religious (11%).

III. Palestinian Political Reform

• 84% support, and 14% oppose, fundamental reforms in the PA


• 69% support, and 22% oppose, the appointment or election of a PA prime mini


• 44% support, and 48% oppose, changing the Palestinian political system so that power would reside into the hands of a prime minister making the office of the president ceremonial


• Only 25% have confidence, and 62% have no confidence, in the ability of the new PA government to reform internal political conditions and deal with Israel


• Only 34% believe that the new PA government intends to implement the One-Hundred Day Program of political and financial reform

Support for PA political reform is still very high reaching 84%, but less than it was last May when it stood at 91%. The small drop in support for reform may be due to the belief of some Palestinians that some demands of reform might be motivated by peace and security related factors rather than by the desire for democracy and good governance. It is possible that the speech by the US president in June, with its focus on Palestinian regime change, may have contributed to this drop. The continued US talk about the need to turn the PA presidency into a ceremonial office may have also led to the reduction in support to this particular item in the reform agenda from 48% last May to 44% in this survey. Opposition to this reform measure, making the residency ceremonial, has increased form 44% last May to 48% in this poll.

Despite the sharp division over the need to turn the Palestinian presidency into a ceremonial office, a large majority (69%) supports the appointment or election of a prime minister. Obviously, an overwhelming majority (92%) of those who support turning the presidency into a ceremonial office supports the appointment or election of a prime minister. However, a large part (41%) of those who support the appointment or election of a prime minister does not see in this office a substitute for the office of the Palestinian presidency.

Support for turning the Palestinian presidency into a ceremonial office increases in cities (50%) compared to refugee camps (38%); among men (53%) compared to women (35%); among holders of BA degree (53%) compared to illiterates (39%); among merchants (61%), craftsmen (57%) and professionals (56%) compared to housewives (34%); and among the least religious (57%) compared to the most religious (38%).

Despite the high demand for reform, only a quarter of the Palestinians have confidence in the ability of the new government to implement political reform and deal with Israel. Indeed, only 34% believe that the government has the intention of implementing its own One-Hundred Day Program for political and financial reform.

IV. Perceptions of Corruption and Democratization

• 85% believe there is corruption in PA institutions


• Only 30% are convinced that efforts of the PA finance minister to unify revenue and expenditure operations will lead to the elimination of financial corruption in the PA


• Only 16% give positive evaluation to Palestinian democracy under the PA

The results indicate an increase in the percentage of those who believe there is corruption in the PA from 83% in the last poll, in May 2002, to 85% in this poll. Similarly, positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy dropped from 21% last May to 16% in this poll. This is the lowest level of positive evaluation registered since the establishment of the PA. Despite assurances from the PA minister of finance that progress has been made in unifying revenue and expenditure operations, only 30% are convinced that such progress would eliminate financial corruption. Moreover, a majority of 58% is convinced that corruption in the PA will increase or remain the same in the future.

The confidence in the ability of the finance minister to combat financial corruption increases in the Gaza Strip (34%) compared to the West Bank (27%); among illiterates (36%) compared to holders of BA degree (30%); among those who work in the public sector (37%) compared to those who work in the private sector (28%); among those with the lowest income (32%) compared to those with the highest income (12%) and among supporters of Fateh (36%) compared to supporters of Hamas (28%) and non-affiliated (27%).

V. Elections, Popularity of Arafat and Political Affiliation

• 69% would participate in Palestinian elections when held in January 2003


• For the presidency: 34% would elect Arafat (compared to 35% last May, 36% in July and 46% in July 2000), 15% would elect Ahmad Yasin and 13% Haidar Abdul Shafi


• For the office of a vice president: support for Barghouti increases from 19% last May to 23% in this poll


• Fateh has the support of 26% of the street compared to 32% last May, 28% in December 2001, and 37% in July 2000. Support for the Islamists increases from 25% last May to 27% in this poll

The poll shows that Arafat's popularity has remained almost unchanged since last May standing at 34%. Arafat's popularity stood at 35% last May, 36% in December 2001, 33% in July 2001, and 46% in July 2000. On the other hand, the popularity of Marwan Barghouti increased during the past three months from 19% to 23%. Barghouti's popularity stood at 11% in December 2001 while his name did not show up in PSR polls before the intifada. In a third place came Ahmad Yasin, with 15%, Haidar Abdul Shafi with 13%, Sa'eb Erikat with 8%, Farouq Qaddoumi with 6%, Hanan Ashrawi with 4%, and Mahmud Abbas with 3%.

The poll also shows that 69% would participate in the January 2003 general political elections. It also shows a slight increase in the support for the Islamists and a decrease in the support for Fateh. Support for the Islamists increased from 25% last May to 27% in this poll. Support for the Islamists stood at 25% in December 2001 and 17% in July 2000. Support for Fateh dropped to 26%, which is the lowest level ever registered for that faction. Fateh's popularity stood at 32% in May 2002, 28% in December 2001, and 37% in July 2000. In December 1995, support for Fateh peaked to 55%.

Support for Arafat increases in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to West Bank (32%); in the areas of Ramallah (49%) Gaza City (43%), Khan Younis (41%), Rafah (38%), and Nablus (36%) compared to Jerusalem (18%), Tulkarm (26%), Jenin (29%), and Hebron (28%); among the illiterates (36%) compared to holders of BA degree (26%); among the farmers (45%) and housewives (36%) compared to professionals (25%), students (26%), merchants (28%), and craftsmen (29%); among those with the lowest income (37%) compared to those with the highest income (21%); and among supporters of Fateh (69%) compared to supporters of Hamas (17%) and the nonaffiliated (26%).

Support for Marwan Barghouti increases in Nablus (33%) compared to Jerusalem (13%); among the youngest (34%) compared to the oldest (14%); among the women (27%) compared to men (20%); among students (30%) compared to professionals (6%); and among supporters of Fateh (33%) compared to Hamas (22%).

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17 and 19 March 2016. The period before the poll witnessed continued limited Palestinian-Israeli confrontations with a number of stabbings by young Palestinians in the West Bank and in Israel and stone throwing at checkpoints and other areas of friction.  It also witnessed efforts to move forward Hamas-Fatah reconciliation efforts with a meeting held in Doha. The fieldwork started few days after the government and the teachers reached an agreement that ended a strike that was declared by the teachers in order to increase their wages and improve their work conditions. This press release addresses many of those issues and covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, teachers’ strike, reconciliation, Palestinian-Israeli confrontations, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the first quarter of 2016 indicate significant changes in some of the findings obtained in the second half of 2015. A majority now backs a two-state solution and support for stabbing attacks against Israelis has dropped, particularly among West Bankers. Nonetheless, a majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continues to support an armed intifada and continues to believe that such an intifada would help Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Demand for Abbas’ resignation remains unchanged with about two thirds supporting it. As we found in our previous two polls, in September and December 2015, the “Oslo generation” of youth between the ages of 18 and 22 are the least supportive of the two-state solution, the most supportive of stabbing attacks, and the most likely to think that an armed intifada would help Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Findings show a significant drop in the support for stabbing attacks compared to our December 2015 poll. This is particularly true in the West Bank where a majority is opposed to such attacks. Indeed, only a little over one third believes that if the current confrontations continue as they are now they would help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not; the majority does not believe that. By contrast, a majority in the West Bank, reaching about 60% (and 75% in the Gaza Strip), believes that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada it would help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Nonetheless, this West Bank percentage is four percentage points fewer than what we found in the West Bank three months ago. In other words, there is a notable drop in the West Bank in the support for knifing attacks due, it seems, to a rising perception in its inefficacy, and a large majority continues to view an armed intifada as more effective than these attacks. We also see a drop in the level of support for abandoning the Oslo agreement, but a large majority continues nonetheless to support such an abandonment.  

Support for the two-state solution is on the rise in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it remains higher in the former than in the latter. Findings also show that the public rejects the proposed idea of separation advanced recently by the head of the Israeli opposition Labor party which calls for separation between Palestinians and Israelis in East Jerusalem and the West Bank within a context of temporary unilateral interim arrangements.

If new presidential elections are held today in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh would win against Mahmud Abbas with a margin of 11 percentage points. But if the competition is between Marwan Barghouti, for Fatah, and Haniyeh, the former would win by a margin of 18 percentage points. If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah and Hamas are likely to obtain almost identical results. Nonetheless, findings show a small increase in support for Fatah and a small decrease in support for Hamas in the West Bank; in the Gaza Strip we see the reverse: a small decrease for Fatah and a small increase for Hamas. It is possible that reaching an agreement with the striking teachers have contributed to the slight improvement of Fatah standing in the West Bank.  Yet, it is clear that this development did not have an impact on Abbas’ standing (despite a minor improvement in the West Bank) as a majority in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continues to demand his resignation. It should be noted that an overwhelming majority of the public sympathizes with the teachers and their demands and rejects the government policy regarding the teachers’ strike. If the poll was conducted before reaching an agreement to end the strike, it is likely that support for Fatah and Abbas would have been less than what today’s findings show.  It is also possible that the talk about negotiations to build a seaport in the Gaza Strip and the recent reconciliation talks between Hamas and Egypt have contributed to the improvement of Hamas’ standing in the Gaza Strip. It should be noted that an overwhelming majority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip looks positively at the idea of Hamas-Israeli negotiations under Turkish sponsorship to establish a seaport for Gaza.

(1) Popular Palestinian-Israeli confrontations:

• Support for stabbing attacks declines from 67% to 58%.
• 56% support return to an armed intifada and 65% think that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it would serve Palestinian national interests.
• 65% oppose and 30% support measures taken by PA security services to prevent attacks on Israel.
• 70% believe Hamas supports the current confrontations, 55% believe Fatah supports them, and 29% believe Abbas supports them.

Findings show that support for use of knives in the current confrontations with Israel drops from 67% three months ago to 58% in this poll. Support for knifing attacks in the Gaza Strip stands at 82% and in the West Bank at 44%. Three months ago, support among West Bankers for knifing attacks stood at 57% and among Gazans at 85%. Support for knifing attacks is also higher among men (60%) compared to women (57%), in cities and refugee camps (62% and 58% respectively) compared to villages (40%), among those whose is age is between 18 and 22 (62%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (55%), among refugees (66%) compared to non-refugees (52%), among those who work in the public sector (63%) compared to those who work in the private sector (53%), among those who hold a BA degree (59%) compared to illiterates (53%), among the religious (65%) compared to the somewhat religious (51%), among supporters of Hamas and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in new elections (82% and 64% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah, third parties, and those who will not participate in new elections (49%, 48%, and 45% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (47%), and among those who use social media on daily basis (61%) compared to those who do not use social media (53%).

Findings also show that 29% believe that the current confrontations will develop into a new armed intifada, 15% believe they will develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, and 17% believe they will develop in both directions. By contrast, 22% believe the confrontation will stay as they are now and 14% believe they will gradually dissipate. Three months ago, 37% said that the current confrontations will develop into an armed intifada.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 56% support a return to an armed intifada; 77% support joining more international organizations; 64% support a popular non-violent resistance; 46% support the dissolution of the PA. Three months ago, 60% supported return to armed intifada. In the West Bank, current level of support for an armed intifada stands at 52% (compared to 60% three months ago).

About two thirds (65%) of the public believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 66% (71% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. The belief that if the current confrontations developed into an armed intifada it would serve Palestinian national interests in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (59%), in cities and refugee camps (69% and 65% respectively) compared to  villages (51%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 (73%) compared to those whose age is over 50 years (61%), among holders of BA degree (67%) compared to illiterates (59%), among the religious (71%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (61% and 58% respectively) among Hamas supporters (86%) compared to those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections, those who will not participate in the next elections, supporters of third parties, and supporters of Fatah (70%, 60%, 58%, and 51% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (57%), and among those who use social media on daily basis (67%) compared to those who do not use social media (61%).

A majority of 54% of the public (68% in the Gaza Strip and 46% in the West Bank) believes that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 50% said that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not.  Moreover, 43% of the public (54% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, they would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 51% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not.

We asked the public about the efforts made by the PA security services during the current confrontations to contain the violence, leading, according to a statement by PA head of intelligence Majid Faraj, to the prevention of 200 attacks against Israelis. 30% of the public indicated its support for the action taken by the PA security services while 65% indicated opposition. Support for the action in the West Bank stands at 34% and opposition at 59% and support in the Gaza Strip stands at 22% and opposition at 74%.  Opposition to the action taken by the PA security services is also higher in cities (68%) compared to refugee camps and villages (62% and 52% respectively), among refugees (68%) compared to non-refugees (62%), among holders of BA degree (69%) compared to illiterates (61%), among the religious (71%) compared to the somewhat religious (59%), among Hamas supporters, supporters so third parties and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections (85%, 68%, and 68% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in the next elections and supporters of Fatah (62% and 45% respectively), and among those who are opposed to the peace process (80%) compared to supporters of the peace process (53%).

When comparing the level of support of various parties for the current confrontations, Hamas comes on top with 70% of the public believing that it supports them, followed by the PFLP, receiving 62%, Fatah (55%), and al Mubadara or the Initiative (52%). By contrast, only 29% say president Abbas supports the confrontations, 23% say Jordan supports them, and only 13% say Egypt supports them.  After Iran announced that it intends to provide financial assistance to the families of martyrs and the families whose homes are destroyed by Israel in the current confrontations, 69% say that their impression of Iran is now positive and only 24% say their impression of Iran is negative.

(2) The future of the Oslo agreement:

• 63% support and 30% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement.
• 65% believe that Abbas is not serious about abandoning the Oslo agreement.

An overwhelming majority of 91% of the public believes that Israel does not abide by the Oslo agreement and 5% believe it does. Findings also show that 63% support and 30% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 68% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 25% opposed it.  But 65% of the public believe that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 26% think he is serious. Three months ago, 67% expressed the view that the president is not serious.  Support for abandonment of the Oslo agreement is higher in the West Bank (64%) compared to the Gaza Strip (62%), among men (68%) compared to women (58%), in cities (66%) compared to villages and refugee camps (56% and 53% respectively), among holders of BA degree (70%) compared to illiterates (39%), among those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections, supporters of Hamas, and supporters of third parties (71%, 70%, and 65% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in new elections and supporters of Fatah (59% and 56% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (53%), and among those who use the social media on daily basis (68%) compared to those who do not use social media (56%).

(3) Palestinian Elections:

• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36%, and 64% demand his resignation.
• In presidential elections, Ismail Haniyeh receives 52% of the vote and Abbas 41%.
• In presidential elections between Haniyeh and Marwan Barghouti, the former receives 39% and the latter 57%.
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 33% of the vote and Fatah 34%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% which is similar to the level of satisfaction we obtained three months ago.  Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, 64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our previous poll three months ago. Demand for Abbas’ resignation is higher in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (63%), among men (66%) compared to women (63%), in cities (66%) compared to refugee camps and villages (63% and 57% respectively), among the Oslo generation, those between 18 and 22, (69%) compared to those whose age is over 50 (60%), among holders of BA degree (68%) compared to the illiterates (62%), among the non-religious (57%) compared the religious (66%), among Hamas supporters, supporters of third parties, and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections, and those who will not participate in the next elections (90%, 74%, 69%, and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (28%), and among those who are opposed to the peace process (85%) compared to supporters of the peace process (51%).

If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh;  Ramil al Hamdallah, Khalid Mishal, and Mustapha Barghouti receive 5% each; Mohammad Dahlan receives 4%; and Salam Fayyad receives 3%. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would win 52% (compared to 51% three months ago) and the latter 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 54% (compared to 48% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 41% (compared to 37% three months ago and Haniyeh 50% (compared to 53% three months ago).    If the presidential elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 57% and the latter would receive 39% of the participants’ votes. If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 22%, Barghouti 37% and Haniyeh 39%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 33% say they would vote for Hamas and 34% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 33%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 35% three months ago) and for Fatah at 34% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 32% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 30% three months ago).

(4) Domestic Conditions:

• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 47% and in the West Bank at 39%.
• 48% of Gazans and 21% of West Bankers say they want to emigrate.
• Viewership of Hamas’ al Aqsa TV station is highest at 21% followed by PA’s Palestine TV at 20%.
• Belief that there is corruption in PA institutions stands at 79% and belief that there is free press in the West Bank stands at 17%.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 14% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 47%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 39%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 50% and in the West Bank at 29%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 48%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 21%. Three months ago 41% of Gazans and 24% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate. The largest percentage (37%) of those who seek to emigrate indicates that the main motivation is search for jobs; 22% say difficult conditions imposed by Israeli occupation forces them to seek to emigrate; 15% say it is the lack of security and 10% say it is the lack of freedoms and democracy that push them out.

Hamas’ al Aqsa TV viewership is the highest, standing at 21%, followed by Palestine TV (20%), Maan-Mix at 19%, Al-Jazeera at 17%, and Al Arabiya at 6%.  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 79%.  17% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 20% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  29% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear.

(5) Reconciliation, the National Reconciliation government and Gaza seaport negotiation:

• Optimism about reconciliation stands at 38% and pessimism at 59%.
• 26% are satisfied and 65% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• Only 20% believe that Hamas is responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government; 51% believe that the PA, Abbas, and head of the reconciliation government are responsible for the bad performance.
• 72% believe that the reconciliation government must pay the salaries of the Gazan public sector that worked for the former Hamas government.
• 65% believe that the reconciliation government, not Hamas, must be in charge of the security sector in the Gaza Strip.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 38% and pessimism at 59%. Three months ago optimism stood at 30% and pessimism at 66%.  26% say they are satisfied and 65% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 62%.  Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 20% (12% in the West Bank and 33% in the Gaza Strip) while 34% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 17% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

72% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salary of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (70%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salary of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government.  In return, 65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; only 25% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  Similarly, 75% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the pervious Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 21% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

We presented the public with the news that negotiations between Israel and Hamas, with Turkish mediation, were underway to build a Gaza seaport in return for a long term truce between Hamas and Israel and asked if respondents supported or opposed such a deal: 70% of the public indicated support and 27% indicated opposition for such a deal.

(6) Teachers’ strike:

• 73% believe that the teachers’ wages are not fair.
• Three quarters blame government policy, not teachers’ strike, for the closure of schools and the interruption of teaching.

Almost three quarters (73%) of the public believe that the teachers’ wages are not fair and 23% think they are fair. Moreover, three quarters of the public believes that it was the government policy that was responsible for the closure of the schools and the interruption of teaching during the teachers’ strike; only 22% blame the teachers. Belief that the government policy, not the teachers, is responsible for the closure and interruption is higher in the West Bank (77%) compared to the Gaza Strip (73%), among those who work in the public sector (78%) compared to those who work in the private sector (75%), among holders of BA degree (77%) compared to the illiterates (69%), among the married (77%) compared to the unmarried (73%), among those who will not participate in the next elections, supporters of Hamas, supporters of third parties, and those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections (86%, 82%, 75%, and 73% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (60%), and among those who oppose the peace process (84%) compared to supporters of the peace process (71%).

An overwhelming majority of 84% indicates that it views as unacceptable the behavior of the PA security services in establishing checkpoints to prevent striking teachers from reaching the government headquarter in Ramallah; only 14% find that behavior acceptable.  Now after an agreement has been reached between the government and the teachers to end the strike, only 32% express the view that the teachers have gained most of their demands; 63% believe the teachers did not gain most of their demands.

(7) Peace Process and Israel’s long term aspirations:

• 51% support and 48% oppose the two-state solution.
• 47% support and 50% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative.
• 61% believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction.
• 82% are worried that they would hurt by Israelis.
• An overwhelming majority believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex all Palestinian territories.
• An overwhelming majority believes that Israel plans to change the status quo in al Haram al Sharif.

A slim majority of 51% supports and 48% oppose the two-state solution. Three months ago, 45% supported and 54% opposed this solution. Support for the two-state solution is higher in the West Bank (53%) compared to the Gaza Strip (49%), among men (53%) compared to women (50%), in villages (60%) compared to cities and villages (50% and 47% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (61%) compared to the Oslo generation, 18 to 22 years, (42%), among non-refugees (54%) compared to refugees (48%) among those who work in the private sector (56%) compared to those who work in the public sector (53%), among the illiterates (60%) compared to those who hold a BA degree ( 50%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (73% and 56% respectively) compared to the religious (44%), among supporters of Fatah, supporters of third parties, and those who did not decide to whom they will vote in the next elections (71%, 64%, and 53% respectively) compared to those who will not participate in the next elections and Hamas supporters (49% and 30% respectively), among supporters of the peace process (65%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (28%), and among those who do not use the social media (56%) compared to those who use social media on daily basis (51%).

Findings also show that 47% support the Arab Peace Initiative and 50% oppose it. Similarly, only 39% support a mutual recognition of national identity of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people and 60% oppose it.  We also asked the public about the separation plan proposed by the head of the Israeli opposition Labor party, Isaac Herzog, which talks about a temporary interim arrangement that would lead to separation from the Palestinians along the following lines: (1) place 28 Palestinian villages and towns currently inside Jerusalem under the control of the PA; (2) cessation of settlement construction in the West Bank with the exception of building inside the large settlements; (3) removal of setters’ outposts in the West Bank; (4) transfer civil jurisdiction over most of the West Bank to the PA with the exception of the large settlement blocs which Israel wants to annex in the final status agreement; and (5) the Israeli army stays in its current deployment in the West Bank until a final status agreement is reached. Only 30% of the public said they are in favor of the plan and 66% indicated opposition.

Palestinian views on the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel vary: 42% think that armed action is the most effective, 29% think negotiation is the most effective, and 24% think popular non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 46% said armed action was the most effective and 26% said negotiation was the most effective.  Findings also show that majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion while 37% say it is still practical.  Moreover, 74% believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 24% believe the chances are high or medium. Despite this, only 29% support, and 70% oppose, a one-state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equal rights.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 82%; 18% are not worried.  Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of 82% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population or deny them their rights. 17% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  When asked about the long term aspiration of the PA and the PLO, 61% said that it is to recover all or parts of the land occupied in 1967 while 25% said it was to conquer the state of Israel or conquer the state of Israel and kill most of the Jews.

An overwhelming majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 52% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 20% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places; and 9% believe that Israel intends to change the status quo prevailing in the plateau since 1967 by allowing Jews to pray there. Only 9% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change. 

(8) Hezbollah, the Arab World and ISIS:

• 33% support and 60% oppose the resolution of Arab League labeling Hezbollah a terrorist organization.
• 76% believe that the Arab World no longer cares about Palestine and that Palestine is no longer its principle cause.
• 88% see the Islamic State (Daesh) as a radical group that does not represent true Islam.

60% disagree and 33% agree with the resolution of the Council of the Arab League labeling Hezbollah a terrorist organization. Opposition to the Arab League resolution is higher in the West Bank (68%) compared to the Gaza Strip (46%), in villages (75%) compared to cities and refugee camps (57% and 53% respectively), among those whose age is over 50 years (63%) compared to the Oslo generation, 18 to 22 years, (54%), among non-refugees (64%) compared to refugees (54%), among those who work in the private sector (62%) compared to those who work in the public sector (57%), among the illiterates (62%) compared to holders of BA degree (57%), among the married (62%) compared to the unmarried (56%), among supporters of third parties, those who will not participate in the next elections, and Hamas supporters (77%, 62%, and 61% respectively) compared to those who have not decided to whom they will vote in the next elections and supporters of Fatah (56% and 54% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (62%) compared to supporters of the peace process (59%), and among those who do not use the social media (72%) compared to those who use social media on daily basis (54%).

Moreover, 76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. 23% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. In fact, 64% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 28% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

An overwhelming majority of 88% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 7% believe it does represent true Islam. 5% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 13% (compared to 4% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam.  80% support and 17% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 48% believe that the first Palestinian priority should be to end occupation and build a state.
• Settlements and occupation is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today followed by unemployment and poverty.

48% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 30% of the pubic; 25% say it is poverty and unemployment; 23% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; 17% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 2 and 4 June 2016. The period before the poll witnessed a significant decline in the number of incidents of confrontations and stabbings directed against Israelis. But a bombing attack on an Israeli bus took place in Jerusalem in mid-April. The period also witnessed meetings in Cairo between Hamas leaders and Egyptian officials and in Doha between Fatah and Hamas representatives. Data collection took place while the Paris Peace Conference was in session with the participation of representatives from more than 20 states. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers attitudes regarding Palestinian elections, conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reconciliation, Palestinian-Israeli confrontations, the French Initiative, and other internal and international issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Results of the second quarter of 2016 point out to three main findings: (1) half of the public believes that the current Palestinian confrontations, or al habba al sha’biyya, has come to an end, support for stabbing attacks continues to decline, and the public continues to reduce its expectations from the current confrontations; (2)  by contrast, half of the public expresses support for the French Initiative that aims at providing an international backing for a revival of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, but public expectations of success for the initiative are much smaller than the support ; and, (3) there is a limited decline in support for Hamas and its presidential candidate, Ismail Haniyeh, despite continued demand for Abbas’ resignation from two thirds of the public.

Findings show a continued and significant drop, particularly in the West Bank, in support for stabbing attacks. The highest percentage of support for such attacks was registered six months ago before it considerably declined three months ago. Furthermore, findings show a continued decline in public expectations regarding a possible escalation of the current limited popular confrontations to an armed intifada; today, a 

quarter thinks such a development is likely. Similarly, findings show a decline, dropping from more than half to less than a third, in the percentage of those who think that if the current confrontations continue as they are now, they would contribute to achieving national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Decline, particularly in the West Bank, has also been found in the percentage of those who believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it would help Palestinians achieve national rights and in the percentage of those who support ending Palestinian implementation of PA obligations under the Oslo agreement. Nonetheless, a majority continues to believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, it will help achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. Perhaps it is for this reason that a majority continues to support a return to an armed intifada. Indeed, more than two thirds supported the Jerusalem bus bombing attack which took place in mid-April and injured 20 Israelis.

If new presidential elections are held today in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh would do better than Abbas but findings show that the gap between the two narrows from eleven to five percentage points. Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular Palestinian figure. If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah is likely to do a little better than Hamas. It seems that the declining Palestinian-Israeli confrontations and the focus on international diplomacy in recent weeks have influenced the domestic balance of power in a manner that favors Abbas while somewhat weakening Hamas. Moreover, it is possible that the optimism regarding improved relations between Egypt and Hamas, which might have improved Hamas standing in the past, has now somewhat faded as the Rafah border crossing has remained essentially closed during most of the last three months.  Moreover, a majority is convinced that another Gaza war will erupt in the near future. On the other hand, Abbas, Fatah and the PA remain highly vulnerable as two thirds demand Abbas resignation, Fatah has not gained any additional support during the last three months, and a majority of Palestinians believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people.

(1) The French Initiative:

• 50% support and 41% oppose the French Initiative.
• 29% expect the French Initiative to succeed and 59% expect it to fail.

We asked the public about its support for the French Initiative. The initiative we presented to respondents as one that “calls for the formation of an international support group for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the holding of an international peace conference that would seek a settlement based on the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative in accordance with a specific time frame.” 50% of the respondents supported and 41% opposed the initiative. Support reached 46% in the West Bank compared to 56% in the Gaza Strip. Support for the French Initiative is higher also among those who intend to vote for Fatah, third parties, and those who have not yet decided to whom they will vote (68%, 56%, and 55% respectively) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas and those who do not intend to participate in the election (32% and 41% respectively), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (59% and 51% respectively) compared to the religious (47%), among supporters of the peace process (59%) compared those who are opposed to the peace process (30%), among refugees (55%) compared to non-refugees (46%), among farmers, the unemployed, and employees (62%, 57%, and 53% respectively) compared to students and housewives (46% and 48% respectively), among those working in the public sector (54%) compared to those who work in the private sector (49%).

We also asked respondents to indicate their expectations regarding the success or failure of the French Initiative in assisting the goal of reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace. 29% expected success and 59% expected failure. Here too there was a significant difference between residents of the West Bank compared to residents of the Gaza Strip: 39% of Gazans, compared to only 22% of West Bankers, expected success.

(2) Palestinian-Israeli confrontations:

• Half of the public believes that the current popular confrontation, or Habba Sha’biyya, is over and the other half believes it is still going on.
• Support for knifing attacks continue to decline, but two thirds support the Jerusalem bus bombing.
• Expectations that the current confrontation will develop into an armed intifada continue to diminish.
• 54% support return to armed intifada.

The public is divided into two equal halves regarding the end of the current popular confrontation, or al habba al sha’biyya: 48% believe it has stopped and 48% believe it has not stopped.  In the West Bank, 49% believe it has ended and 46% believe it has not. In the Gaza Strip, 46% say it has ended and 51% say it has not. The percentage of those who think it has ended increases among those between the ages of 40 and 49 years (53%) compared to those between the ages of 18 and 22 (42%), among those who intend to vote for Fatah, third party voters, and the undecided (56%, 53%, and 51% respectively) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas and those who do not intend to participate in the election (36% and 46% respectively), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (66% and 49% respectively) compared to the religious (44%), among supporters of the peace process (54%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (39%), and among merchants and the unemployed (56% and 53% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, laborers, and students (29%, 45%, 45%, and 46% respectively).

Findings also show that support for use of knives in the current confrontations with Israel continues to decline in this poll, dropping from 58% three months ago to 51%. Support for knifing attacks in the Gaza Strip stands at 75% and in the West Bank at 36%. Three months ago, support among West Bankers for knifing attacks stood at 44% and among Gazans at 82%. Nonetheless, support for the Jerusalem bus bombing attack which took place in mid-April and cause more than 20 Israeli injuries stands at 65%; only 31% say they oppose this bombing attack. Support for the bus bombing attack is higher in the Gaza Strip (75%) compared to the West Bank (59%), among residents of refugee camps and residents of cities (72% and 67% respectively) compared to residents of villages and towns (54%), among those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (76%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (55%), among voters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 62% respectively) compared to Fatah voters (53%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (80%) compared to supporters of the peace process (57%), among refugees (70%) compared to non-refugees (62%), among holders of BA degree (70%) compared to illiterates (49%), among merchants and students (73% and 72% respectively) compared to the retired, laborers, and farmers (34%, 57%, and 60% respectively), among the unmarried (70%) compared to the married (65%).

With regard to expectations, 25% believe that the current confrontations will develop into a new armed intifada, 17% believe they will develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, and 13% believe they will develop in both directions. By contrast, 29% believe the confrontation will stay as they are now and 13% believe they will gradually dissipate. Three months ago, 29% said that the current confrontations will develop into an armed intifada.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 54% support a return to an armed intifada; 75% support joining more international organizations; 56% support a popular non-violent resistance; 43% support the dissolution of the PA. Three months ago, 56% supported return to armed intifada. In the West Bank, current level of support for an armed intifada stands at 51% (compared to 52% three months ago). 58% of the public (68% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 65% (75% in the Gaza Strip and 59% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations develop into an armed intifada, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Moreover, 41% of the public (52% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 54% said that if the current confrontations develop into wide scale peaceful popular confrontations, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Finally, findings indicate that 32% of the public (41% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) believe that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, they would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. Three months ago, 43% (54% in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank) said that if the current confrontations stay as they are now, such a development would serve Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not.

When comparing the level of support of various parties for the current confrontations, Hamas comes on top with 66% of the public believing that it supports them, followed by Fatah (49%). By contrast, only 26% say president Abbas supports the confrontations. 

(3) The future of the Oslo agreement and the future of security coordination:

• 56% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement.
• Only 27% believe that president Abbas is serious about abandoning the Oslo agreement.
• Similarly, only 27% believe that president Abbas is serious about ending security coordination with Israel.
• 46% say that terminating the Oslo agreement would lead to PA collapse and the return of the Israeli “civil administration.”

56% support and 36% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 63% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 30% opposed it. Support for the abandonment of the Oslo agreement stands at 57% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip. Support for abandoning the Oslo agreement is higher among men (63%) compared to women (50%), among Hamas voters, the undecided, and voters of third parties (63%, 60%, and 58% respectively) compared to Fatah voters (47%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (72%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (48%), among holder of BA degree (62%) compared to the illiterates (51%), among farmers, employees, merchants, and the retired (87%, 65%, 61%, and 60% respectively) compared to students and housewives (46% and 49% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (73%) compared to those who work in the private sector (61%).

When asked about the seriousness of the PA leadership regarding abandoning the Oslo agreement, 67% of the public indicated that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 27% think he is serious. Three months ago, 65% expressed the view that the president is not serious.  Similarly, we asked the public about its assessment of the seriousness of the Palestinian leadership regarding its intention to suspend security coordination with Israel in light of the Israeli announcement that the IDF will not stop its incursions into Palestinian cities. More than two-thirds (68%) indicated that the PA leadership is not serious while only 27% indicated it believes the PA leadership is serious.

We told the public that a Palestinian abandonment of the Oslo agreement might lead to one of two outcomes: the collapse of the Palestinian authority and the return of the Israeli “civil administration” or alternatively an Israeli suspension of its settlement activities and return to serious negotiations with the Palestinian side. We asked the public what it thought was the most likely outcome: 46% selected the collapse of the PA while 41% selected the Israeli suspension of its settlement activities.

(4) Palestinian Elections:

• 65% want president Abbas to resign and 31% want him to stay in office.
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 43% and the latter 48%.
• In presidential elections between Abbas, Haniyeh, and Marwan Barghouti, the first receives 20%, the second 35%, and the third 40%.
• If parliamentary elections took place today, Fatah receives 34% of the vote, Hamas 31%, and all other electoral lists combined 9%; 26% say they have not decided yet.

65% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our previous poll three months ago. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip. If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 30% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh;  Rami al Hamdallah receive 6%; Khalid Mishal, and Mustapha Barghouti and Mohammad Dahlan receive 5% each; and Saeb Erekat and Salam Fayyad receives 2% each. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 34% which is similar to the level of satisfaction we obtained three months ago.  Level of satisfaction with Abbas are identical in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 48% (compared to 52% three months ago) and the latter 43% (compared to 41% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 44% three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 49% (compared to 54% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 41% (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh 47% (compared to 50% three months ago).  If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 20%, Barghouti 40% and Haniyeh 35%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 75% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 31% say they would vote for Hamas and 34% say they would vote for Fatah, 9% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 26% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 33% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 33% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 35% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 34% (compared to 34% three months ago).

(5) Domestic Conditions:

• Perception of security stands at 44% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank.
• In the Gaza Strip, percentage of those wishing to emigrate stands at 45% and in the West Bank at 22%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands today at 80%.
• 52% believe that the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 41% believe it is an asset.
• More than three quarters of the public oppose the suspension of PLO financial payment to the PFLP and the DFLP.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 12% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 44%.  In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands also at 44%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 47% and in the West Bank at 39%. Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 45%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago 48% of Gazans and 21% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate. The largest percentage (40%) of those who seek to emigrate indicates that the main motivation is search for jobs; 23% say difficult conditions imposed by Israeli occupation forces them to seek to emigrate; 12% say it is the lack of security and 9% say it is the lack of freedoms and democracy that push them out.

In an open-ended question, we asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al-Jazeera TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Hamas’ al Aqsa Palestine TV at 18%, Palestine TV and Maan-Mix at 17% each, Palestine Today (Filasteen al Youm) at 7%, Al Arabiya at 6%, al Quds TV at 4%, and al Mayadeen at 2%. 

We asked the public about its impressions regarding corruption, freedom of the press, the ability to criticize government and if the PA is a burden or an asset for the Palestinian people: Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%.  17% say there is press freedom in the West Bank and 16% say the same about the status of the press in the Gaza Strip.  31% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority in the West Bank without fear. Finally, a majority of 52% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while only 41% view it as an asset. Percentage of those who think the PA is a burden is slightly higher in the Gaza Strip (53%) compared to the West Bank (51%). It is also higher among residents of refugee camps (60%) compared to residents of villages and residents of cities (45% and 52% respectively), among voters of Hamas, third parties, and those who do not intend to participate in the election (79%, 60%, and 60% respectively) compared to votes of Fatah (18%), among the religious (56%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (38% and 49% respectively), among those who are opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to supporters of the peace process (39%), among holders of BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (41%), among farmers, merchants, laborers, and the retired (63%, 59%, 58%, and 57% respectively) compared to professionals and employees (46% and 48% respectively), and among those who work in the private sector (57%) compared to those who work in the public sector (43%).  

An overwhelming majority of 76% indicates that it does not agree with the decision apparently taken by the PA president to withhold financial support from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; only 16% agree with that decision.

(6) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government, and the possibility of another Gaza war:

• Optimism regarding reconciliation stands at 36% and pessimism at 60%.
• 28% are satisfied and 63% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• Only 19% blame Hamas for the bad performance of the reconciliation government
• 71% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the Gaza public sector under the former Hamas government.
• 65% want the reconciliation government to supervise security and police services in the Gaza Strip.
• 55% believe that there is a high probability of a new war against the Gaza Strip in the near future.

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 36% and pessimism at 60%. Three months ago optimism stood at 38% and pessimism at 59%.  28% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 66% and in the West Bank at 62%. We asked the public who is responsible for the bad performance of the reconciliation government. Findings show that belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 19% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) while 35% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 15% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

71% believe that the reconciliation government should be responsible for paying the salaries of the Gazan civil public sector that used to work for the previous Hamas government. A similar percentage (69%) believes that the reconciliation government is also responsible for paying the salaries of the Gaza police and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government. In return, 65% want the reconciliation government, not Hamas, to be in charge of the Gaza police force and security personnel who used to work for the previous Hamas government; only 26% believe Hamas should be the one in charge.  Similarly, 75% support the unification of the police forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including those who used to work for the pervious Hamas government, under the full command and control of the reconciliation government. But 21% prefer to maintain the current status quo in the Gaza Strip, i.e., continued Hamas control of the police in the Gaza Strip.

We asked the public if it believes that there might be a real chance to open the Rafah Crossing on a normal regular schedule now after the meetings in Cairo between Hamas and the Egyptian officials and in light of the Doha meetings between Fatah and Hamas officials. 55% said there is a chance for that and 39% said there was no real chance for that. In light of recent talk about a possible Gaza war, we asked the public about its expectations: 55% said the prospects for such war in the near future are high or very high and 40% said the prospects are low or very low. A majority of 57% of Gazans believe the prospects for war are high or very high.

(7) The Arab World, war in Syria, ISIS, and US elections:

• 78% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own problems and that Palestine is no longer the Arabs’ principle cause.
• On Syrian, 40% are in favor of the Syrians Free Army, 18% favor Assad, and 5% favor radical Islamists such as ISIS.
• 88% see ISIS as an extreme group that does not represent Islam and 79% support the war against it.
• 70% believe that there is no difference between Clinton and Trump.

78% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 20% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.  In fact, 59% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 30% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

In light of the escalating conflict in Syria and the emergence of three main parties to the conflict, we asked the public for its view on the party it views as the more preferable or the one it views as the least harmful. The largest percentage (40%) chose the Free Syrian army, 18% chose Bashar Asad and his army, and 5% chose the extreme religious opposition, such as ISIS. 23% said they do not like any of the three parties.

An overwhelming majority of 88% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 8% believe it does represent true Islam. 4% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 16% (compared to 3% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 79% support and 18% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

We asked the public about the US elections and which presidential candidate, Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump, it viewed best for the Palestinians. A large majority (70%) said there is no difference between the two candidates, while 12% said Clinton is better and 7% said Trump is better.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% view Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state as the top most important Palestinian goal and 32% think the most vital goal is the right of return.
• 38% view poverty and unemployment as the most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today and 31% think it is occupation and settlement construction.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 38% of the pubic; 31% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and; 10% believe it is the spread of corruption in public institutions.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the preparation for the holding of the first phase of local elections in rural areas and small towns in the West Bank but without a confirmation of the date for holding the second phase of local elections in cities and big towns. Hamas prevented the holding of the local elections in the Gaza Strip. The first phase of local elections was held in the West Bank on 11 December, the last day of the field work, in 154 localities and the participation rate stood at 66% according the Palestinian Central Elections Commission. The number of participants stood at 262,827 voters. This period witnessed also various violent incidents in Palestinian universities and the death of one student. Israel classified 6 Palestinian human rights NGOs as terrorist organizations. The UK labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization. This press release addresses some of these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2021 show that while the public is pessimistic about the prospects of holding parliamentary or presidential elections in the near future, it is optimistic that the second phase of local elections will take place soon. The second phase of local elections is now set to take place in cities and big towns on 26 March 2022. The findings show that Fatah is more popular than Hamas in West Bank cities that will participate in the second phase of the local elections while Hamas is more popular in the Gazan cities that might participate in the second phase of the local elections.  Nonetheless, the findings show that the overall domestic balance of power between Fatah and Hamas has not changed compared to 

our findings of September 2021. Hamas is more popular than Fatah, and Ismail Haniyyeh easily wins against president Abba and prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in one to one competitions. But Marwan Barghouti, also from Fatah, wins against Haniyyeh with two-thirds voting for him. Three quarters of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas.

What is noticeable however is that despite the stability in the domestic balance of power, there is a clear disappointment in Hamas’ leadership indirectly expressed by the public compared to the situation six and even three months ago. The findings show that the percentage of those who choose Hamas to represent and lead the Palestinian people has declined significantly and the gap between those who choose Hamas compared to those who choose Fatah, under Abbas’ leadership, has now narrowed to 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas; in September, the gap stood at 26 points in favor of Hamas and in June, a month after the Hamas-Israel May 2021 war, the gap stood at 39% in favor of Hamas. The percentage of those who believe that neither Fatah, under Abbas, nor Hamas deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people has now increased considerably.

In this poll, we have asked about various political solutions to the conflict with Israel and about the confidence building measures that seek to improve the daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The findings show the following:

• The majority is still opposed to the two-state solution. But support for this solution has increased compared to the September 2021 findings and decreased compared to the October 2021 findings.  
• The two-state solution remains the one with the largest percentage of support compared to other solutions, including that of the one-state solution in which the two sides, Palestinians and Israeli Jews, enjoy equal rights; support for the one-state solution is higher than one quarter and less than one third.
• There is a clear majority, higher than 60%, in favor confidence building measures that improves Palestinian daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the current level of support is higher than that of September 2021 when we first asked about the issue.

Findings also show that despite a two-third opposition to a resumption of unconditional bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, a large minority approaching about half of the public is in favor of a resumption of such negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Moreover, despite the opposition of the majority to the resumption of dialogue between the US and PA, a large minority approaching half of the public believes that the US is the most effective in influencing the decisions of the Palestinians and the Israelis on the matter of the renewal of the peace process. Also on the peace process, findings show a decrease in the percentage of those who believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that negotiation is the most effective. Nonetheless, armed struggle is viewed as more effective than negotiations.

Findings also show that the largest percentage of respondents believes the main Israeli motivation behind the labeling of six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations is to weaken the ability of these organizations to document Israeli violations of human rights and to weaken the PA efforts to take Israelis to the International Criminal Court.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• Pessimism about holding national elections and optimism about holding local elections
• Fatah wins against Hamas in West Bank cities and Hamas wins in Gaza Strip cities
• In presidential elections, Ismail Haniyyeh wins against president Abbas and prime minister Shtayyeh but loses against Marwan Barghouti
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas wins 38% of the vote and Fatah 35%
• 34% see Hamas, and 23% see Fatah, more deserving to represent and lead the Palestinians 

70% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 27% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 52% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Nonetheless, a majority of 59% (68% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) expect the holding of the second stage of local elections in cities and big towns in the near future; 34% do not expect that.

Fatah is more popular than Hamas (38% to 30%) in West Bank cities which will participate in the second phase of local elections while Hamas is more popular than Fatah (47% to 29%) in the cities in the Gaza Strip that might participate in the second phase of local elections.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 35% and Haniyeh 58% of the votes (compared to 56% for Haniyeh and 34% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 33% of the votes (compared to 34% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 52% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 65% and from among those Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 52% and from among those the former receives 33% and the latter 59%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received 31% and Haniyyeh 60%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 35% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 5% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 27% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 21% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 38% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 37% and Fatah at 32%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 27% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 38% three months ago).

In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 34% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 36% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 45% selected Hamas, 19% Fatah under Abbas, and 28% said neither side deserves such a role. In this poll, the percentage of those selecting Hamas for representation and leadership is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (30%), among those whose age is 50 years and above (35%) compared to the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (30%), among Hamas supporters (89%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (6% and 15% respectively), in refugee camps and cities (39% and 34% respectively) compared to villages (28%), among professionals and students (43% and 36% respectively) compared to laborers (30%), among those who work in the public sector (36%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (31%), among those with the lowest income (37%) compared to those with the highest income (24%), among the religious (47%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (18% and 24% respectively).  

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31% and in the Gaza Strip at 5%; but perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and the West Bank at 51%.
• 27% want to emigrate; the percentage stands at 31% in the Gaza Strip and 23% in the West Bank.
• 84% say there is corruption in the institutions of the PA and 69% say there is corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip
• Only one third is optimistic about the prospects of reconciliation; and 56%  view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and in the West Bank at 51%. 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 31% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 21% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 36% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 83% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 61% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

A minority of 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (56%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 34% viewed it as an asset.  Looking at the prospects of reconciliation, 33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic. Three months ago, optimism stood at 32%.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 71% expect failure; only 23% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29% of the public expect success and 65% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 69% expects failure and 27% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 27%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Maan (10%), Palestine Today (9%), al Mayadeen (4%), and al Arabiya (3%).

(3) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• A majority in the West Bank says it has already received the Covid-19 vaccination and about one quarter in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip does not want to take the vaccine.
• 77% are satisfied with the efforts of the PA government to make the vaccine available but only 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the virus.

 58% (68% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 18% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24% say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.  An overwhelming majority of 77% (87% in the Gaza Strip and 71% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 21% are dissatisfied.  But only 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 42% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, only 45% expressed satisfaction.

The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 69% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 69% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 39%.

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• 39% support the two-state solution and 59% are opposed; support for a one-state solution reaches up to 29%.
• To break the deadlock, 56% support popular non-violent resistance, 50% support a return to armed intifada, and 48% support dissolving the PA
• 61% view positively the confidence building measures between the PA and Israel that aim at improving livening conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• The largest percentage (42%) views armed struggle as the most effective means of ending the occupation
• 61% say the international, regional, and local conditions does not make it possible to resume peace negotiations, but 46% support a resumption of negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet
• The largest percentage believes that the Israeli classification of Palestinian human rights organizations as terrorist aims at weaking the efforts of these organizations to document Israeli violations 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%.   When asked about their preferences regarding a political solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from among three specific solutions, one third (33%) preferred the “two state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel,” 16% preferred a “one state solution, from the River to the Sea, with equal rights to Jews and Arabs,” and 11% preferred a one state solution in which the status of the Palestinians would be “the same as the status of the inside Palestinians,” and 32% preferred other solutions, such as “historic Palestine,” or “full Palestine,” or “independent Palestine,” and others. In this context, reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 29% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 65% expressed opposition. Support for the one-state with equal rights in the West Bank (30%) compared to the Gaza Strip (27%), among youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (32%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (29%), among supporters of Fatah (45%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (17% and 30% respectively), in villages and small towns (44%) compared to refugee camps and cities (26% and 27% respectively), among women (30%) compared to men (27%), and among laborers and students (36% and 33% respectively) compared to employees and professionals (24% each).

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 56% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 50% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 61% said it looks positively, while 33% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 56% of the public said it viewed these measures positively. Support for confidence building measures is higher in the West Bank (66%) compared to the Gaza Strip (54%), among those whose age is 50 years or higher (62%) compared to the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (52%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (74% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (51%), in villages and cities (66% and 61% respectively) compared to refugee camps (56%), among women (64%) compared to men (59%), among businessmen (67%) compared to students (55%), among those who work in the private sector and the non-governmental institutions (64%) compared to those who work in the public sector (47%), among the married (62%) compared to the unmarried (56%), and among those whose has the highest income (68%) compared to those with the lowest income (52%).  

A majority of 59% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 42% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations.

A majority of 61% thinks that current international, regional, and local conditions does not make possible a resumption of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis while 35% think that these conditions make a resumption of negotiations possible.  Under current conditions, a majority of 66% opposes and 26% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 46%; 49% are opposed. Support for a return to negotiations under a Quartet sponsorship is higher in the West Bank (47%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (69% and 68% respectively), compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), in villages (50%) compared to refugee camps and cities (45% and 46% respectively), among students and businessmen (53% and 52% respectively) compared to professionals and employees (38% and 44% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (49%) compared to those who work in the private and nongovernmental sectors (45%), among those with the highest income (55%) compared to those with the lowest income (40%), and among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (59% and 48% respectively) compared to the religious (43%).  

56% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Yet, when asked about the country or party that is most influential in convincing the Palestinian and Israeli sides to return to the peace process, 46% said the US, 33% said Arab countries such as Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, or Qatar, 10% said Europe, and 3% said Russia.

We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 38% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 19% selected the loss of the will to fight.

When asked about the country or party most responsible for derailing the peace process in the region, 65% said it is Israel, 15% said it is the US, 15% said it is Arab countries, and 3% said Palestine.

We asked the public about its views on the reason Israel labelled six Palestinian human rights NGOs, such as Al Haq and Addameer, as terrorists organizations. The largest percentage (40%) said the Israeli decision aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights; 20% said it aimed at weakening the PA-led campaign to try Israelis at the International Criminal Court; 17% said it aimed at weaking the ability of these NGOs to document PA violations of human rights in the West Bank; 11% said it aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Hamas’ violations of human rights in the Gaza Strip, and another 11% said it aimed at weakening the PFLP.   

In reaction to the UK government decision to label Hamas as a terrorist organization and the idea of boycotting British products, 49% expressed the belief that such a boycott would be effective in forcing the UK government to rescind its decision while 45% think the boycott would not be effective. The belief in the efficacy of the boycott of British products is higher in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (45%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (54%) compared to those whose age is 50 or higher (45%), in villages (57%) compared to refugee camps and cities (46% and 48% respectively), and among women (52%) compared to men (47%).  

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 41% view ending the occupation and building a Palestinian state as the most vital national goal
• The largest percentage (33%) view Israeli occupation as the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today 

41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (26%; 15% in the Gaz Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 22% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 20% said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 5%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 26% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the internal violence, and 10% said it is the split or division.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16 and 20 March 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several domestic developments including the launching of a second round of the local election campaigns in the West Bank and the holding of a special session for the PLO Central Council in which important decisions relevant to Palestinian-Israeli relations and the filling of several senior positions in the organization’s leadership. It also witnessed increased settlers’ attacks in areas labeled B and C of the West Bank and increased tension in the Shaikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Amnesty International issued a report in which it characterized Israel as an apartheid state. Finally, after weeks of anticipation, war erupted between Russia and Ukraine. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the first quarter of 2022 indicate a return to the internal balance of power between Fatah and Hamas, as the case was before the May 2021 Israel-Hamas war. In other words, ten months after the war, Fatah's popularity returns to outperform Hamas’. It is noticeable that Fatah's popularity is rising equally in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In other words, the rise is unlikely to be associated with the launch of the West Bank’s local election campaigns. The local elections, scheduled to take place on 26 March, will take place only in the West Bank. However, the rise might be linked to two things: 

(1) the success of the so-called "confidence-building steps" between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, and (2) Hamas's inability to translate the gains it made in the May war with Israel to positive change on the ground in the Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem.

However, President Abbas' popularity has not risen. Indeed, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyeh is still able to win presidential elections in which only the two compete. Fatah's competitiveness is also clearly diminished when its name is associated with President Abbas', as Hamas continues to outperform Fatah when the latter is listed as "Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas." For example, when asked about the party most deserving of representing the Palestinian people, Hamas or “Fatah under President Abbas' leadership,” Hamas still beats Fatah, even if just by a little.

The results also indicate that a large majority of the Palestinian public wants the PA to take a neutral stand in the Russian-Ukrainian war, although more people blame Russia for starting that war. The results show a small majority indicating concern about the prospect of war expansion and the entry of other countries in it. Moreover, a large majority says it expects prices to rise sharply in Palestine because of that war. When asked to compare the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to that of the Ukraine and Russia, the majority asserts that the war has demonstrated a western double standards as the US and Europe show no willingness to impose any sanctions on Israel, while showing a great enthusiasm to impose crushing sanctions on Russia. Moreover, more than three quarters of the public believe that the war has also shown European discrimination in the treatment of refugees from Ukraine as opposed to refugees from the Middle Eastern wars.

We also asked the public about the PLO’s Central Council meeting in Ramallah at the beginning of February and the resolutions it made. The findings show that a majority, albeit small, believes that the current PLO remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, a larger majority believes that this particular meeting of the Central Council was illegitimate, although a majority, of more than sixty percent, supports the decisions it took. Perhaps the main reason for delegitimizing this meeting relates to the rejection of the results of the elections that were held during its sessions, with only a quarter or less accepting these election results, and the absence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the meeting. Two-thirds of the public say that Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad's entry into the PLO will make it more representative of the Palestinian people.

On Palestinian-Israeli relations, poll findings show that support for a two-state solution remains almost the same as it was three months ago while support for a one-state solution, with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, rises to about a third during the same period. Despite the increased level of approval for the one-state solution, two thirds of the public support the description of Israel is an apartheid state. Indeed, the public sees the publication of the report of Amnesty International on the subject as an indication of the beginning of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of the Palestinians, as previously happened in the case of South Africa.

The results also show an increase in support for confrontations and an armed uprising and a decrease in the belief in the effectiveness of negotiations. Finally, in this survey, we asked, for the first time, about the belief in a Qur'anic prophecy about the demise of Israel. We found that a vast majority actually believes that such prophesy does indeed exist in the Qur'an. However, the poll found that most of the public does not believe the assessment that 2022 is the precise year of Israel's demise. Even among religious people and the believers of the existence of this prophecy in the Qur'an, only a minority believes the assessment regarding a specific year.

1) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• 43% blame Russia for starting the war; 40% blame Ukraine
• 71% want the PA to stay neutral in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
• 63% expect the war to lead to price increases
• A majority of 57% thinks that Western countries have shown double standard when dealing with the Israeli occupation compared to that of the Russian occupation.

The largest percentage of the public (43%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 40% blame Ukraine.  Putting the blame on Russia is higher in the West Bank (45%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in villages (52%) compared to refugee camps and cities (30% and 43% respectively), among women (45%) compared to men (41%), among non-refugees (46%) compared to refugees (39%), among the religious (49%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (28% and 40% respectively), and among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (47% and 44% respectively) compared to supporters of third parties (36%).

An overwhelming majority (71%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 10% think it should stand with Ukraine.

As for the war’s impact, a majority of 54% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 42% are not worried. The overwhelming majority thinks Palestine will be impacted by the war in the Ukraine while only 5% think the war will have no impact on Palestine. 63% think it will lead to a sharp rise in prices, 26% think Israel will exploit it to expand settlements and annex Palestinian territories, and 1% think it could lead to expansion of armed confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis.

A majority of 57% says the war show the double standard of US and Europe when the conflict is about the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories compared to that of Russia-Ukraine conflict; 28% think the two conflicts are different, and 10% think the Western countries stand against the Israeli occupation just as they stand against the Russian occupation of Ukraine.  Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 76% thinks there is a difference in the manner in which Europe treats refugees from Ukraine compared to its treatment of refugees from the Middle East; refugees from Arab and Islamic countries are treated badly and in a discriminatory manner.

2) PLO Central Council’s meeting and decisions:

• 60% support the decisions taken by the PLO Central Council but 56% say the session lacked legitimacy
• The percentage of support for the election of the various candidates for senior positions in the PLO ranges between 22 and 26.
• A majority of 51% says the PLO is its sole legitimate representative

More than 60% support the decisions made by the PLO Central Council in its latest meeting in February 2022: 67% support the suspension of the PLO recognition of Israel and 61% support the decision to end the implementation of agreements with Israel including security coordination. Support for the decisions is higher among refugees (64%) compared to non-refugees (59%), the unmarried (66%) compared to the married (60%), among those with the highest income (65%) compared to those with the lowest income (59%), and among supporters of Fatah (70%) followed by supporters of Hamas (66%) and third parties (53%).

Despite the fact that a majority of 62% support the Central Council’s decision to defer to the PLO Executive Committee on the setting of a mechanism to implement the Council’s decisions, a majority of 59% thinks the Executive Committee will not implement these decisions while only 31% think it will implement them. Indeed, 56% share the belief expressed by those who boycotted the Council’s meeting in viewing the session as illegitimate; only 29% think the session was legitimate.  The belief the council meeting was illegitimate is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (54%), in cities and villages (57% and 56% respectively) compared to refugee camps (45%), among men (60%) compared to women (52%), among those whose age is 50 and above (60%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 (52%), among refugees (58%) compared to non-refugees (54%), among holders of BA degree (59%) compared to the illiterates (48%), among professionals and students (67% and 63% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (50% and 51% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (57%) compared to those who work in the public sector (49%), among the married (57%) compared to the unmarried (50%), among the religious (58%) compared to the unreligious (49%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 68% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (39%).

The largest percentage is not in favor of the election of the various members of the Central Council to senior positions in the PLO: only 24% support the election of Rouhi Fattouh as the Speaker of the PLO’s National Council; 26% support the election of Hussein al Shaikh to the Executive Committee; and only 22% support the election of Mohammad Mustafa or Ramzi Rihan to that committee.

However, a majority of 51% views the current PLO as its own sole legitimate representative and 53% say the PLO is viewed by the Palestinian people as their sole legitimate representative.  If the PLO is reformed and Hamas and Islamic Jihad become members in that organization, 65% think it would in this case become more representative of the Palestinian people while 12% think that, in this case, it will become less representative of the Palestinian people.  The belief that the PLO would become more representative if Hamas and Islamic Jihad join it is higher among holders of the BA degree (68%) compared to the illiterates (60%), among students and professionals (75% and 74% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, and laborers (26%, 59%, and 63% respectively), among the religious (66%) compared to the unreligious (48%), and among supporters of third parties and Hamas (78% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (67%). 

3) Legislative and presidential elections:

• In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 38% and the latter 54%
• In parliamentary elections, vote for Fatah rises to 42% and vote for Hamas declines to 36%
• But the largest percentage (31%) thinks Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to 29% who chose “Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas.”
• Turnout for the local elections is expected at 55% of eligible voters

A large majority of 72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 26% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 52% (57% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%.

Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 29% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Moreover, 73% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 71% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 35% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 41% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 50% and from among those, the former receives 33% and the latter 60%.  If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 37% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal 3%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad 2% each.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 64% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 42% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 14% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 38% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 47% (compared to 40% three months ago).

The largest percentage (31%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 29% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 33% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 34% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 36% said neither side deserves such a role.

In the areas in which the second stage of local elections are set to take place soon, 55% say they will participate in these elections and 38% say they will not participate.  When asked about the most important consideration that will influence their vote in the upcoming local elections, the largest percentage (42%) select the ability to deliver services to their area of residence; 14% select the political party of the list, another 14% select the closeness of the list to family and friends, and another 14% sat their vote will be influenced by the ability of the list to combat corruption. 9% say that their vote will depend on the extent to which the members of the list are religious, and 7% say it depends on the level of education among the list members.

4) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• 79% express the view that the PA government is not doing enough to limit price increases
• In the Gaza Strip, 37% say they want to emigrate; in the West Bank 20% express the same desire to emigrate
• 84% believe there is corruption in the institutions of the PA and 69% believe there is corruption in the institutions run by Hamas in the Gaza Strip
• Optimism about the success of reconciliation declines to 28%
• A large majority of 70% thinks that the incidents of internal violence reflect the lack of societal trust in the justice and law enforcement sector

A majority of 54% say that the current rise in the cost of living affects them significantly or very significantly, while 45% say it affects them moderately or slightly.  But the vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 19% say it is doing so.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 57%. Similarly, 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 37% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 31% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.  Moreover, 35% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 60% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 42% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 56% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (55%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.  Moreover, only 28% are optimistic and 69% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 39%.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 20% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28% of the public expect success and 67% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 71% expects failure and 25% expects success.

The vast majority (70%) says that domestic violence in which individual killings turn into family and clan confrontations for revenge reflects primarily the society's weak confidence in the justice and law enforcement system, while 27% say it reflects the traditional and tribal nature of Palestinian society.  To stop these incidents of internal violence, the vast majority (72%) says law enforcement services should be strengthened, while 24% say tribal reform committees should be strengthened.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Maan (11% each), Palestine Today (9%), al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).

5) The Coronavirus and PA performance during the pandemic:

• 53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Corona virus
• A two-third majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA Ministry of Health

53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 46% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, 57% expressed satisfaction.  The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 67% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• 40% support the two-state solution and 58% oppose it
• 32% support the one-state solution with equal rights to Jews and Palestinians
• A majority of 63% views positively the confidence building measures undertaken by Israel and the PA
• But the largest percentage (44%) thinks that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation; only 25% think negotiations are the most effective
• 70% are opposed to unconditional return to negotiations with Israel; 64% are opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US
• 73% believe the Qur’an contains a prophecy about the demise of the state of Israel; but only 32% think the year for this demise is 2022
• 64% want the PA security forces to confront the Israeli forces when they enter Palestinian cities
• Two thirds view Israel as an apartheid state

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 32% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 63% expressed opposition.  Support for the position articulated by Abbas in favor of a one-state solution with equal rights is higher in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (30%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to villages and cities (26% and 32% respectively), among those whose age is between 23 and 29 years (36%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (30%), among those with the highest income (35%) compared to those with the lowest income (29%), among the unreligious (62%) compared to the religious (29%), and among supporters of Fatah (46%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (25% and 24% respectively).

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 52% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 52% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 63% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 61% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.

A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 36% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 30% believe the chances to be medium or high.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 25% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 42% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. However, when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 38%; 57% are opposed. Similarly, 64% are opposed, and 30% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  

The vast majority (73%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 22% say it does not.  However, the majority (57%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 32% say they believe it.  The belief in the existence of the prophecy is higher in the West Bank (74%) compared to the Gaza Strip (70%), among students and laborers (77% each) compared to farmers, merchants, and professionals (52%, 57%, and 65% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (76%) compared to those who work in the private sector (69%), among the married (74%) compared to the unmarried (68%), among the religious (79%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (37% and 71% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (82% and 73% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (68%).

The belief that the prophecy will be fulfilled this year (2022) is higher in the Gaza Strip (37%) compared to the West Bank (29%), in refugee camps (50%) compared to villages and cities (30% and 31% respectively), among refugees (37%) compared to non-refugees (29%), among the married (33%) compared to the unmarried (25%), among the religious (36%) compared to the unreligious and the somewhat religious (24% and 30% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (52%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (21% and 23% respectively).

Against the backdrop of the assassination of three members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Nablus, a majority of 64% says it is the duty of the Palestinian security forces to confront the Israeli armed forces when they enter areas under the control of the PA: 32% say they do not agree. The main reason for the failure of the Israeli army to stop settlers’ terrorism in the eyes of a majority of 54% is that the settlers are a tool in the hands of the army and it uses them to fight the Palestinian residents in order to expel them from their land; 20% say the reason is that settlers are the decision makers in the Israeli government; 12% say that settlers hide and wear masks, and 10% say that the army does not have the jurisdiction to arrest settlers.  When asked why the Palestinian police and national security forces could not protect the residents from settlers’ terrorism in Area B, the largest percentage (34%) says it is because the Palestinian leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with the Israeli army than to provide protection to the Palestinian population; 29% say it is because the Palestinian police and national security forces do not want to engage in armed conflict with the Israeli army; 20% say it is because the Palestinian police does not have jurisdiction to protect the residents of area B; and 12% say terrorist attacks take place at night when Palestinian security services are not present.

Two-thirds of the public (65%) approve and 27% disapprove of the assessment that Israel is an apartheid state. Moreover, 48% agree and 40% disagree that Amnesty International's report on Israel's racism is an indication of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of Palestinians and against Israel, as it has previously did regarding apartheid in South Africa.  The percentage of those who view Israel as an apartheid state is higher in refugee camps and villages (72% each) compared to cities (64%), among those who work in the public sector (76%) compared to those who work in the private sector (68%), among the married (67%) compared to the unmarried (57%), among those with the lowest income (73%) compared to those with the highest income (65%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (74% and 70% respectively) compared to the religious (59%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (79% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (65%).

7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 38% express the view that the most vital Palestinian goal should be ending occupation and building a Palestinian state
• The most pressing problem for Palestinians today is occupation followed by corruption

38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (25%; 17% in the Gaz Strip and 30% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 19% said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 15% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 28% said it is corruption, 14% said it is unemployment, 14% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 25 June 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including several armed attacks by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel, the Israeli army incursions into Jenin’s refugee camp, and the killing of al Jazeera journalists Shireen Abu Akleh by Israeli gunfire in one of the Jenin incursions.  Other developments included the organization of the Flag March by the Israeli right wing inside the Old City of East Jerusalem without ending up in an armed confrontation between Hamas and Israel as many had expected. Internally, a student body associated with Hamas was able to win the majority of seats in the Birzeit University student council elections, President Abbas transferred control of the secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council, and assigned to the PLO Executive Committee member from Fatah, Hussien al Sheikh, the responsibilities of the Committee’s secretariate. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the second quarter of 2022 show a significant change in the domestic balance of power in favor of Hamas and its leadership only three months after Fatah had managed to restore some of the popularity it had lost in the aftermath of the April 2021 cancellation of the legislative and presidential elections, the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel, and the killing of the opposition figure Nizar Banat at the hands of the Palestinian security services.

Today, Hamas and Fatah enjoy almost the same level of public support, with the gap narrowing to one percentage point in favor of Hamas after it was six points in favor of Fatah in March 2022. It is noticeable that the drop in Fatah’s popularity has occurred in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, though the drop has been greater in the latter. Fatah’s declining popularity is evident in two other ways. For one, the gap in popularity between the head of Fatah, President Abbas, and the head of Hamas, Ismail Haniyyeh, has now reached 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh after it was only 16 points three months ago. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’ resignation, from the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), has risen to over three quarters while those still in favor of Abbas have dwindled in size to less than one fifth of the public. Another indicator of Fatah’s decline can be seen when looking at the widening gap between those who think Hamas is the more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to those who think “Fatah under Abbas” is more deserving than Hamas. Today, the gap stands at 10 percentage points in favor of Hamas compared to just two points in favor of Hamas three months ago.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the shift in the internal balance of power has been the rise of Hamas' role over the past few months in defending Jerusalem. Other reasons might have been the release by the PA of those Preventive Security men accused of killing Nizar Banat on bail, or because the vast majority of the public believes that the Palestinian government does not make an effort to mitigate the consequences of the rise in prices, or the objection of the majority of the public to President Abbas's internal decisions, such as the transfer of powers over the Secretariat of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council or the appointment  of PLO Executive Committee member Hussein al-Sheikh to serve as the head of the Secretariat of that Committee,.

In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results for the second quarter indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution.  The results show one of the likely reasons for the decline: a significant increase in the belief that a two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion, rising to 70%. But the findings also indicate a similar decline in support for a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, indicating a hardening of public attitudes similar to what we saw in mid-2021 in the aftermath of the Hamas-Israel war. Support for a return to an armed uprising is also rising to form a clear majority, reinforced by a broad support for the recent shootings inside Israel by individual Palestinians who did not belong to known forces and movements.  However, there are significant differences in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers, where the largest percentage of the latter remains opposed to armed attacks.

Increased Palestinian-Israeli clashes over the past three months may have contributed to this attitudinal shift regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, starting with the Israeli Flag March, the repeated incursions into the Jenin camp, the killing of the very well-known and liked Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, the crackdown by the Israeli police on the raising of the Palestinian flag, and the frequent confrontations between the Israeli police and the Palestinian worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque; all might have led to a hardening of the Palestinian public attitudes.

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of those viewing positively the recent "confidence-building" measures between the PA and Israel has risen to about two-thirds. Moreover, despite the rising tension over al Aqsa Mosque, the majority continues to view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a national conflict, over land and sovereignty, rather than a religious conflict. 

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 33% of the popular vote and the latter 55%
• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 61% and the latter 34%
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%; 77% demand the resignation of Abbas
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 36% of the popular vote and Fatah 35%
• 33% say Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people and only 23% say “Fatah under Abbas’ is more deserving

A majority of 71%  supports the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 54%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 49% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 55% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 31% and Haniyeh 50%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 47% and from among those, the former receives 26% and the latter 61%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (30%) selected him in an open-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (16%), Mohammad Dahlan (6%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%), and 34% said they do not know or have not decided. It is worth noting that this is the first time that al Sheikh’s name has been mentioned by the respondents in an open-ended question. This means that we will continue to ask about his standing as a successor in the next four quarterly poll. In an closed ended questions about succession, Marwan Barghouti is preferred by 39%, Haniyyeh by 19%, Dahlan by 6%, Sinwar by 5%, Khalid Mishal by 2%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 1% each. Al Sheikh’s name was not among those listed in the closed ended question.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 73% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 72% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 69% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 7% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 37% (compared to 47% three months ago).

The largest percentage (33%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 38% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 31% selected Hamas, 29% Fatah under Abbas, and 33% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• 57% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the PLC’s secretariate to the Speaker of PLO National Council; 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to appoint Hussein al Sheikh as the Secretary General of the PLO Executive Committee
• 59% believe the electoral  victory of Hamas’ student body at Birzeit University is an expression of protest against the performance of the PA
• 79% say the PA is not doing enough to mitigate the consequences of high prices
• 26% want to emigrate from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• 86% believe there is corruption in the PA
• 59% believe the PA has now become a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset
• Only one quarter is optimistic about the future of reconciliation
• A large majority does not expect the Shtayyeh government to succeed in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the holding of general elections, or the improvement of economic conditions

A majority of 57% is opposed to President Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the Secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council; only 27% support Abbas’ decision.  The opposition the president’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (54%), among the holders of BA degree (64%) compared to the illiterates (36%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 83% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (36%).

Similarly, a majority of 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to ask the PLO’s Executive Committee member from Fatah, Husein al Sheikh, to assume the responsibility over the secretariate of that Committee; only 23% support Abbas’ decision.

In explaining the reasons for the electoral victory of the Hamas-affiliated student body at Birzeit University, the majority (59%) attributed it to students’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the PA while about one third (32%) said the victory came as a result in a shift in public opinion in favor of Hamas. The belief that there is a shift in public attitudes in favor of Hamas is higher in the Gaza strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (26%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (37%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (33%), among refugees (36%) compared to non-refugees (29%), among merchants and students (47% and 40% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (25% and 32% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (38%) compared to those who work in the private sector (32%), among the lowest income group (38%) compared to the highest income group (34%), among the religious (40%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (27% and 17% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (61%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (22% and 16% respectively).

The majority (57%) of the public says it was supportive of the teachers’ strike who were demanding better representational and associational rights from the government and led to a partial halt to the educational process in public schools; 31% say they were opposed. Support for the strike is higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 63% and 48% respectively.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 48%. The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 18% say it is doing so.

26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 27% and in the West Bank at 26%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 37% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

42% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 54% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 38% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 62% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 55% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.

26% are optimistic and 70% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 28%.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 73% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 23% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 75% expects failure and 19% expects success.

The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 41%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (11% each), Palestine TV (10%), Maan (6%), al Arabiya (3%), al Mayadeen (2%), and al Manar (1%). 

(3) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the two-state solution declines from 40% to 28%
• Support for the one-state with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis declines from 32% to 22%
• 55% support a return to confrontations and armed intifada and 47% support dissolving the PA
• 59% view armed attacks against Israelis inside Israel as serving the national interest in ending the occupation and 56% support these attacks
• 65% view positively Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures
• 78% think the versus of the Quran contain a prophecy regarding the demise of the state of Israel; but 63% do not believe that this demise will take place in the year 2022
• A semi consensus that the killing of the journalist Shireen Abu Akleh was a deliberate assassination
• A majority of 53% believes the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains national, over land and sovereignty and 45% believe it has become a religious conflict   
• Half of the public welcomes the resumption of US aid to the PA

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 69%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  A majority of 70% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 60% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 32%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 48% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 51% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

A majority of 59% says that the armed attack inside Israel carried out by Palestinians unaffiliated with known armed groups contributes to the national interest of ending the occupation; 37% believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest. The belief that armed attacks contribute to the national interest is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (46%), in cities and refugee camps (59% respectively) compared to villages/towns (50%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (69%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or older (57%), among refugees (68%) compared to non-refugees (51%), among students (66%) compared to professionals (51%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in  the private sector (55%), among the lowest income group (71%) compared to the highest income group (55%), and among supporters of Hamas (86%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third powers (51% and 55% respectively).

Similarly, a majority of 56% (73% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) supports armed attacks similar to those carried out lately by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel; 39% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) say they are opposed to such armed attacks.

A majority of 56% expects the acts of armed resistance in the Jenin refugee camp to spread to other parts of the West Bank. However, a large minority of 41% expects the acts of armed resistance to remain restricted to the Jenin camp.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 65% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 63% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 50% chose armed struggle (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank), 22% negotiations, and 21% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 25% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 69% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

65% are opposed, and 29% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  

The vast majority (78%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 17% say it does not.  However, the majority (63%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 25% say they believe it.

When asked why they think Hamas did not launch rockets against Israel on the day of the Flag March throughout East Jerusalem, the largest percentage (35%) said that the movement did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for; one third said that Hamas was willing to comply with the advice and mediation of Arab and international actors. Only 13% said it was afraid of the Israeli reaction against it and the Gaza Strip. One tenth (11%) said that Hamas did not threaten to launch rockets against Israel if he Flag March took place in the Old City of East Jerusalem. The belief that Hamas did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (28%), in refugee camps (43%) compared to villages and cities (30% and 35% respectively), among women (37%) compared to men (33%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (44%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (31%), among the holders of BA degree (38%) compared to the illiterates (19%), among students (39%) compared to employees and laborers (33% each), among the lowest income group (44%) compared to the highest income group (29%), among the religious (37%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (34% and 28% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (48%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (28% and 31% respectively).

The largest percentage (40%) believes that Hamas’ unwillingness to launch rockets against Israel during the Flag March will encourage Israeli to take more measures against Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque. By contrast, 26% said that Hamas’ decision will deter Israel in the future, and 28% said it will neither encourage nor deter Israel.

A consensus is emerging regarding the killing of the al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh: 92% believe Israel has deliberately sought to kill her while only 5% think the killing by the Israeli army was accidental.

A majority of 61% believes that the reasons the Israeli police attacked the funeral procession of Abu Akleh in Jerusalem had to do with the fac that the funeral demonstrated the unity of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. On the other hand, one third thinks that the police attack was prompted by the raising of the Palestinian flag during the funeral.

When asked why Israel insists on preventing the raising of the Palestinian flag in Jerusalem and other occupied territories and in areas inside Israel, the public was split evenly, 49% said the reason has to do with Israeli rejection of the Palestinian national identity while an identical percentage said it has to do with Israeli fear of the Palestinian national identity.

A majority of 53% (56% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) says that despite the repeated incidents of attacks by the Israeli police against Palestinian worshipers at al Aqsa Mosque, the conflict remains first and foremost over land and sovereignty while 45% say the conflict has now become first and foremost a religious one. The percentage of those who believe the conflict has now become religious is higher in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (41%), in cities and refugee camps (46% and 45% respectively) compared to villages/towns (39%), among the illiterates (58%) compared to the holders of BA degree (45%), among those who work in the private sector (50%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), among the highest income group (51%) compared to  the lowest income group (43%), among the religious (50%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (42% and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (58%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 41% respectively). 

We asked the public about the expectations that the US aid to the PA will soon resume and asked if they welcome or do not welcome aid resumption. The public is evenly split on US aid: 48% welcome it and 49% do not. It is worth noting that Gazans are more likely to welcome US aid, by 59%, while the percentage drops to 40% in the West Bank.  The percentage of those welcoming the resumption of US aid is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in cities and refugee camps (49%) compared to villages/towns (41%), among refugees (53%) compared to non-refugees (44%), among employees and professionals (57% and 55% respectively) compared to farmers and merchants (33% and 36%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), among the highest income group (57%) compared to the lowest income group (52%), and among supporters of Fatah (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (44% and 48% respectively). 

(4) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• 42% blame Russia for starting the war in Ukraine and 35% blame the Ukraine
• Three quarters want the PA to remain neutral in the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine

The largest percentage of the public (42%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 35% blame Ukraine. An overwhelming majority (75%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 6% think it should stand with Ukraine. A majority of 43% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 53% are not worried. Three months ago, the percentage of those expressing worry that the war would expand stood at 54%.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe the ending of occupation to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state should be the top priority of the Palestinian people
• Unemployment and poverty followed by corruption are the two most important problems confronting the Palestinian society today; but the largest percentage (32%) view the ending of the Israeli occupation as the most urgent problem.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 9% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 26% (29% in the Gaz Strip and 23% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; 25% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 17% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 12% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 13% (17% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 23% said it is corruption, 17% said it is unemployment, 16% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2021 show the centrality of domestic issues on shaping public attitudes. Three developments in particular are worth observing: the killing of the political activist Nizar Banat by PA security services, the manner in which PA security services dealt with protests during the last few months, and the residual impact of the last Hamas-Israel war of May 2021. Findings also show the great importance attached by the public to the issue of prisoners in Israeli jails. Impacted by all of the above, findings reflect continued PA loss of status and support.

A large majority rejects that the notion that the killing of Banat was a mistake unintentionally made by security officers. Instead, the public is confident that the death of the political activist was premediated, ordered by the political or security leadership. Because of that, the public is not 

satisfied with the step taken by the PA to ensure justice by putting all security officers involved on trial. The public is also angry with the manner in which the PA cracked down on public protests that demanded justice in the Banat case. In fact, three quarters view the behavior of the security services as a violation of liberties and human rights.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public has been following, on daily basis, the news regarding the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel. The overwhelming majority views the prisoners’ behavior, even after they were captured, as inspiring to the Palestinians to rise and take the initiative to resist the occupation.  Yet, on this issue of public consensus, one in which the PA is not a party, the Palestinian leadership and the security establishment do not come out looking good at all. While the public is easily convinced by Hamas’ proclamations and plans for freeing the prisoners, the PA is distrusted with the majority believes that the PA security services would not defend the prisoners.

The impact of the May 2021 confrontations in Jerusalem and the war between Hamas and Israel is still strongly felt in this poll. An overwhelming majority still thinks Hamas came out the winner and that Hamas goal has been to defend East Jerusalemites and al Aqsa Mosque. Indeed, the largest percentage (but not the majority) believes that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people. The majority calls upon Hamas to relaunch rockets against Israel if East Jerusalemites are expelled from their homes in the city or if restrictions are imposed on Palestinian access to al Aqsa Mosque. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that now, after three months have passed since our last poll, we do see some decline in some of those indicators that measure the ascendance of Hamas. In almost all indicators, we see a small decline ranging between two to eight percentage points.

If new presidential and parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would do relatively well compared to Fatah. This is particularly true for a presidential election, assuming president Abbas is Fatah’s candidate. The outcome would be dramatically different and more beneficial to Fatah if its candidate for the presidency is Marwan Barghouti. Most importantly for Fatah, findings show a significant increase in the demand for Abbas’ resignation, with almost 80% making the demand, an unprecedent PSR finding.

Findings show that in the context of increased Covid-19 infection rates, the majority is in favor of mandatory vaccination; but opposition is slightly more than a third. Yet, even among those who reject making vaccination mandatory to all of the public, a minority favors making it mandatory to those working in the public sector such as schools and ministries.

Findings on the peace process show continued but slow decline in support for the two-state solution. They also show high levels of support for armed struggle as the best means of ending the occupation with almost half of the public endorsing this position. Consistent with that we find a slim majority opposing a resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Despite this, a majority of Palestinians view positively the confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

(1) Prisoners escape from the Gilboa prison:

• 86% followed up the news of the six Palestinian prisoners who escaped from the Gilboa prison; 87% think the event will serve as an inspiration to the Palestinians
• 81% think that Hamas will succeed in freeing the six prisoners in a prison exchange deal with Israel
• But 68% think the Palestinian Authority would not have protect the prisoners if they had succeeded in entering the West Bank

An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (86%) says that it has heard about and followed on daily basis the news about the escape of the six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel and the capture of some of them while 12% say they did that occasionally and only 2% say they have not heard about or followed the news. Similarly, 87% say the escape of the six prisoners and the capture of some of them will serve as an inspiration to Palestinians outside the prison to take the initiative and actively work toward the ending of occupation; only 7% think the escape and capture will have the opposite impact of bringing frustration and despair; 5% say it will have no impact.

81% believe that Hamas will soon succeed in making a deal with Israel on a prisoners’ exchange that will include the release of the escaped and recaptured prisoners; 14% believe no such exchange will take place soon. The belief that Hamas will soon reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Israel which would include the release of the six prisoners is higher in the West Bank (83%) compared to the Gaza Strip (77%), among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (76% and 78% respectively), and among the religious and the somewhat religious (85% and 80% respectively) compared to the non-religious (55%).

On the other hand, if the escaped prisoners managed to reach the Palestinian territories, only 24% think the PA security services would in this case protect them while 68% think they would not do so. The belief that the PA security services would not protect the escaped prisoners is higher in the West Bank (70%) compared to the Gaza Strip (66%), among the holders of BA degree (75%) compared to the illiterates (57%), among professionals, merchants, and laborers (76%, 75%, and 69% respectively) compared to farmers and students (58% and 60% respectively), among those working in the private sector (73%) compared to those who work in the public sector (57%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (90% and 69% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (46%), and among the religious and the somewhat religious (70% and 68% respectively) compared to the non-religious (51%).

(2) The death of Nizar Banat:

• 63% believe the death of Nizar Banat was a deliberate measure ordered by the PA political or security leaders, not an intentional mistake
• 69% believe the PA measures taken to ensure justice in the Banat case are not sufficient
• 74% believe that the arrest of demonstrators is a violation of liberties and human rights

A majority of 63% of the public believes that the killing of Nizar Banat soon after his arrest by PA security officials was a deliberate measure ordered by the PA political or security leaders while only 22% believe it was an unintentional mistake by those who arrested him. The belief that the killing of Nizar Banat was a deliberate act of PA leadership is higher in the West Bank (64%) compared to the Gaza Strip (61%), among men (65%) compared to women (61%), among professionals and students (72% and 68% respectively) compared to merchants, farmers, and employees (53%, 58%, and 60% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (65%) compared to those who work in the public sector (53%), among supporters of Hamas (93%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 61% respectively), and among the religious (67%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (61% and 52% respectively).

A large majority of 69% feels the measures taken by the PA to ensure justice in the Banat case, including putting on trial all 14 security officials who took part in his arrest, are insufficient; only 20% think they are sufficient. Moreover, a majority of 63% support and 28% oppose the demonstrations that erupted after the death of Banat demanding the departure of the president from office and the removal of his government. Almost three quarters (74%) believe the steps taken by the PA security services in arresting the demonstrators who demanded justice for Banat is a violation of liberties and human rights while only 18% view these measures as a legitimate enforcement of law and order.

(3) Three months after the Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

• 71% believe that Hamas came out a winner in its last war with Israel
• Two thirds believe that the launching of rockets by Hamas at Jerusalem and Tel Aviv came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque
• 45% believe that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people; only 19% believe Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving

An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (71%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 3% think Israel came out a winner; 21% say no one came out a winner and 3% think both sides came out winners. Three months ago, 77% thought Hamas came out the winner. Moreover, 63% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 29% think it did not. Three months ago, 65% said Hamas has achieved its declared goal

Two thirds think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 10% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 19% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers. Three months ago, 72% thought that Hamas’ decision came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque.

In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 45% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while only 19% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 28% think neither side deserve such a role. Three months ago, 53% thought Hamas is more deserving of representation and leadership and 14% thought Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is the more deserving.

If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 60% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 20% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 13% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

(4) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 73% demand the holding of presidential and legislative elections, but 56% do not think such elections will take place soon
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 34% of the vote and the later 56%; if the elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 55% and the latter 39%
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 24% and demand for his resignation stands at 78%
• If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 37% of the popular vote and Fatah 32%

Almost three quarters (73%) say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 23% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 82% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 56% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 34% and Haniyeh 56% of the votes (compared to 59% for Haniyeh and 27% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 34% of the votes (compared to 30% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 60% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 33% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 59% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 49% and from among those the former receives 31% and the latter 60%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 26% and Haniyyeh 63%. 

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 33% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 22% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and another 6% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 22% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas six months ago stood at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Moreover, 78% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 19% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 68% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 78% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 37% say they will vote for Hamas and 32% say they will vote for Fatah, 13% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 41% and Fatah at 30%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 27% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 38% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 32% three months ago).

(5) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• 27% want to emigrate; 36% in the Gaza Strip and 21% in the West Bank
• 83% believe there is corruption in the PA institutions
• 59% view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people; 34% view it as an asset
• Public expectations from the Shtayyeh government remains negative in three areas: reconciliation, the holding of elections, and improvement of economic conditions
• 54% favors the formation of a new government under a new prime minister
• 57% view societal violence that erupts from time to time as an indication of public distrust in the justice and law enforcement system

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 23%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%. When asked about interest in emigrating from Palestine, 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 36% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 15% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 42% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 83%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 61% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 57% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

On free speech, 38% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 18% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 58% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 37% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 43% of Gazans said it was good or very good.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 34% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 35% viewed it as an asset.

After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 70% expect failure; only 22% expect success. When asked about the prospects for reconciliation, 32% expressed optimism and 63% expressed pessimism. Three months ago, optimism stood at 41%. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29%  of the public expect success and 63% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 64% expects failure and 30% expects success.

We asked the public about its view regarding the demands for a change in the current PA government. A majority of 54% expresses support for comprehensive change leading to the appointment of a new government and a new prime minister, while 26% want only to change some of the ministers, and 14% do not want to make any change and want the government to stay as it is. Support for a comprehensive change in which the government and the prime minister are replaced is higher in refugee camps and cities (59% and 54% respectively) compared to villages/towns (48%), among men (60%) compared to women (47%), among those whose age is 30 years or higher (55%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (50%), among holders of BA degree (62%) compared to the illiterates (27%), among those who work in the private sector (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (49%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (74% and 52% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (34%).

We also asked the public about its views on the recuring internal violence similar to the one witnessed recently in which an incident between two individuals led to widespread family and tribal violence. A majority of 57% expressed the view that such incidents indicate a weak pubic trust in the justice system including law enforcement agencies; but 35% expressed the view that such incidents reflect the traditional nature of Palestinian society that is difficult or impossible to change. When asked how should the PA deal with such incidents, 66% expressed the view that first and foremost, the PA should strengthen the law enforcement authorities while 27% expressed the view that the PA should strengthen the tribal reform committees and cooperate with them. Findings show that the percentage of those who think the PA should strengthen the law enforcement agencies in order to address societal violence is higher in the West Bank (69%) compared to the Gaza Strip (63%), among men (69%) compared to women (64%), among holders of BA degree (75%) compared to the illiterates (58%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (72% and 70% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (64%), and among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (71% and 67% respectively) compared to the religious (61%).

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 23%, followed by Palestine TV (14%), al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine Today (11%), Maan (10%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (2%).

(6) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• A majority of 63% support making the Covid-19 vaccination mandatory
• 74% are satisfied with the PA efforts to ensure the availability of the Covid-19 vaccine
• But only 45% are satisfied with the PA efforts to contain the spread of the virus

With the big rise in the number of Covid infections, we asked the public about the steps it thinks the PA government should take in order to protect people from the pandemic: 39% said it should follow the normal procedures of enforcing social distance, face masks, and payment of fines for violators; a similar percentage (37%) said it should make vaccination mandatory to all those who are allowed to take it; 5% said it should impose a full closure; and 15% said they are in favor of all of the above. When then asked specifically about mandatory vaccination, a majority of 63% expressed support while 35% expressed opposition. Support for mandatory vaccination is higher in the Gaza Strip (66%) compared to the West Bank (62%), in refugee camps and villages (70% and 67% respectively) compared to cities (62%), among men (65%) compared to women (62%), among students and laborers (72% and 66% respectively) compared to farmers, employees, and housewives (57%, 61%, and 62% respectively), among supporters of Fatah (74%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (64% and 55% respectively), and among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (72% and 65% respectively) compared to the religious (61%). Among those who reject mandatory vaccination, 29% are in favor, and 69% are not in favor, of making it mandatory to those who work in the public sector such as those working in schools and ministries.

48% (55% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 27% (19% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24 say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.

Almost three quarters (74%, 84% in the Gaza Strip and 68% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 24% are dissatisfied. But only 45% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 53% are dissatisfied. The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 59% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at only 39%. 

(7) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the two-state solution drops to 36% and opposition rises to 62%
• 73% do not believe that a Palestinian state will be created alongside Israel during the next five years
• About half of the public believe that armed struggle is the most effective means for ending the occupation; only 28% think negotiations are the most effective means
• 44% attribute the low levels of popular participation in none violent confrontations to the absence of public trust in the PA leadership and the political parties
• 54% are in favor of a return to an armed intifada, 27% are in favor of abandoning the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution
• 39% are in favor of resuming negotiations with Israel under the sponsorship of the Quartet
• A majority of 56% looks positively at confidence building measures that aim at improving living conditions

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 36% and opposition stands at 62%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle. When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 48% chose armed struggle, 28% negotiations, and 19% popular resistance. Three months ago, 49% chose armed struggle and 27% chose negotiations.

We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 39% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 16% selected the loss of the will to fight.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 54% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 54% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 60% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 47% supported dissolving the PA, and 20% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

Under current conditions, a majority of 61% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. 58% are opposed, and 36% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet stands at 39% and 52% are opposed. Moreover, 49% do not believe, and 41% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 56% said it looks positively, while 35% said it looks negatively, at such measures. The percentage of those who view positively such confidence building measures is higher in the West Bank (57%) compared to the Gaza Strip (53%), in villages and cities (58% and 56% respectively) compared to refugee camps (46%), among supporters of Fatah (73%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (42% and 51% respectively), and among the non-religious (62%) compared to the religious and the somewhat religious (54% and 56% respectively).

(8) American withdrawal from Afghanistan:

• 43% do not expect, and 36% think expect, the Afghanistan scenario to happen in Palestine in the event of an Israeli withdrawal
• 46% believe the main lesson for the Palestinians in the Afghanistan example is the need to strengthen Palestinian armed groups while 28% think it is the need to strengthen the PA and its legitimacy

We asked the public about the meaning of the developments leading to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan: 40% viewed the events as a victory for Taliban against the US and its Afghani allies. But a third (33%) thought that the events leading to the US withdrawal were orchestrated ahead of time between the US and Taliban; 27% say they not know.

The largest percentage of the public (43%) does not expect what happened in Afghanistan to happen in Palestine in case of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a scenario in which such withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the PA and its government and the takeover of armed Islamist groups, such as Hamas; but 36% believe this scenario could indeed happen and 21% do not know.  The belief that what happened in Afghanistan could happen in Palestine in the event of an Israeli withdrawal, leading to PA collapse, is higher in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (25%), in refugee camps and cities (40% and 38% respectively) compared to villages/towns (28%), among refugees (47%) compared to non-refugees (28%), among holders of PA degree (39%) compared to illiterates (17%), among students, employees, and professionals (43%, 41%, and 40% respectively) compared to farmers and laborers (15% and 30% respectively), among laborers in the public sector (40%) compared to laborers in the private sector (35%), among supporters of Hamas (66%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (21% and 36% respectively), and among the religious (40%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (29% and 34% respectively).

Moreover, 46% believe the Palestinians should learn a lesson from what happened in Afghanistan by strengthening the forces of armed resistance, but not the PA and its government, while 28% think the lesson should lead us to strengthen the PA and its legitimacy so that it would not collapse as the Afghani government did. The belief that the lesson should be to strengthen the armed groups is higher in  the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in refugee camps (55%) compared to villages and cities (42% and 46% respectively), among men (51%) compared to women (40%), among those whose age is 30 years or higher (47%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 29 years (40%), among refugees (50%) compared to non-refugees (42%), among the holders of BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (17%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (80% and 49% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (23%), and among the religious (50%) compare to the somewhat religious and the non-religions (43% each).

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% view the ending of occupation and building of the state as the most vital goal for the Palestinians
• Continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip and unemployment and poverty as the two most important problems confronting Palestinian society today

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 10% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (36%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 40% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip, 23% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 13% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10%  said it is the spread of corruption, and 6% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 12-16 December 2018. The period before the conduct of the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the intensification of popular opposition to the Social Security Law, the failure of reconciliation efforts, the release of a report indicating that President Abbas intends to dissolve the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the transfer of the Qatari funds to Israel to cover the cost of fuel for the Gaza power station, and the direct Qatari payment to Gazan employees of the former Hamas government. Also, it was revealed during this period that some Palestinians have sold property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other places in the West Bank. Despite the efforts to calm conditions in the Gaza Strip, this period witnessed a serious escalation in violence between Hamas and Israel. The US Administration announced its intention to make public its own plan for Palestinian-Israeli peace. The Israeli prime minister visited Oman and Israeli ministers visited the United Arab Emirates. Finally, a major violent escalation took place in the West Bank during the period of the fieldwork for this poll. This press release addresses all these issues and covers other matters such as parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2018 indicate a significant increase in Hamas’ popularity in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The violent confrontations in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were probably responsible for this change. Moreover, Hamas’ success in insuring Gazan access to fuel and money to pay the salaries of its former government employees probably contributed to this outcome. Support for Fatah remains relatively unchanged. Moreover, support for Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh rises in the Gaza Strip while support for President Mahmoud 

Abbas declines in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections are held today, findings show that Haniyeh would most likely be the winner. If parliamentary elections are held today, Fatah and Hamas are likely to receive the same levels of support.

Findings also show that the public has lost hope for a successful reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and that a large majority is dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. They also show that the public is highly opposed to the policies of president Abbas toward the Gaza Strip including his demand for the full transfer of control over the Strip by Hamas to the reconciliation government and his demand for one gun. Indeed, the public supports the continued presence of armed battalions of the various factions alongside the official PA security services in the Gaza Strip. An overwhelming majority demands the ending of sanctions imposed by President Abbas on the Gaza Strip such as the decrease in salaries and in the amount of electricity provided to Gazans. But it is worth noting that a large percentage supports the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) despite the fact that more than one third believes that such a step is harmful to the reconciliation efforts.

Findings also show a widespread opposition to the Social Security Law reaching almost a consensus among West Bankers who believe that the law applies to them or will have an impact on them or their families. It is evident that the distrust in the government and the belief that the law is unjust are the most important drivers of the opposition to the law.

The majority views the results of the last confrontation between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip as a victory for Hamas. Indeed, an even larger majority than before continues to support Hamas-Israel indirect negotiations for a long term tahdia or truce. The majority also supports the current agreement between Hamas and Israel that allows Qatari-funded Israeli fuel as well as Qatar money to reach the Gaza Strip despite opposition by the PA to this Qatari role. In fact, findings show that three quarters of the Palestinians welcome the Qatari role in the Gaza Strip, both in terms of paying for the fuel needed for the generation of electricity and for the payment of the salaries of the employees of the former Hamas government. Despite all of this, the public tends to believe that the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip will collapse shortly and that such a collapse will lead to a widescale war against the Gaza Strip.

Findings regarding the peace process indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution and a considerable rise in support for an armed intifada. They also show a significant rise in the perception that the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion in the West Bank. Moreover, an overwhelming majority believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about promoting peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Palestinians believe that the Trump peace plan, when and if one is ever presented, will not call for any of the following: the establishment of a Palestinian state, East Jerusalem as a capital of the state of Palestine, the June 1967 lines as a basis for setting borders of Palestine, a just solution to the refugee problem, or ending the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. For this reason, three quarters of the Palestinians demand a rejection of the Trump plan. But findings also indicate that a large minority believes that the US mediation is indispensable for any peace negotiations with Israel. Moreover, the public is split in its attitude toward the Trump plan if it does indeed contain all these vital elements that the public currently thinks will be absent.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 64% want Abbas to resign and 32% want him to remain in office
• In new presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 42% and the latter 49% of the public vote; if the elections were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former receives 55% of the vote and the latter 40%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 35% and Hamas 34% of the popular vote.

A majority of 64% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 35% (42% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 47% for Abbas and 45% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the vote (compared to 41% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 56% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 40%.  If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 29% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah is selected by 5%; Khalid Mishal by 4%; Mustafa Barghouti and Saeb Erikat by 2%; and Salam Fayyad by 1% each.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they would vote for Hamas and 35% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 27% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 34% three months ago) and for Fatah at 31% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 21% three months ago) and Fatah at 39% (compared to 38% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• 4% think conditions in Gaza are good and 14% think conditions in the West Bank are good
• 43% blame Abbas and the PA and 21% blame Hamas for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip
• 55% of Gazans and 47% of West Bankers feel safe and secure
• 48% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers want to emigrate
• Belief that PA institutions are corrupt stands at 80%
• 53% believe that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 4% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 14%. In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (43%) blames the PA, president Abbas, and the reconciliation government; 21% blame Hamas, 9% blame Egypt, and 20% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 58% of Gazans, compared to 34% of West Bankers, blame the PA, Abbas and the reconciliation government; and 28% of Gazans, compared to 17% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.

Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 55%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 47%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 45% and in the West Bank at 48%.  One third )32%) of the public says it wants to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 48% and declines in the West Bank to 22%.  Only 35% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 61% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 50% believe that they cannot.  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%.  A majority of the public (53%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 42% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (14%), Ma’an TV, Palestine TV, and Palestine Today (at 12% each), al Mayadeen and al Quds TV (5% each), and Al Arabiya (at 4%).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government: 

• 66% are dissatisfied and 23% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government
• Optimism about the success of reconciliation stands at 29% and pessimism at 66%
• Large majorities are opposed to Abbas policies toward the Gaza Strip and Hamas and 77% demand the removal of the sanctions imposed against the Gaza Strip and Hamas
• 47% support and 43% oppose the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council

Less than a quarter (23%) is satisfied and 66% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 22%.  29% are optimistic and 66% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%.

The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 34% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 61% disagrees. Three months ago, 31% said they agreed with Abbas.  When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, more than two-thirds (68%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 25% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans.  Moreover, an overwhelming majority (77%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 18% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 80% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip.

The largest percentage (47%) supports the dissolution of the Palestinian Legislative Council and 43% are opposed to that. Nonetheless, 37% believe that such a dissolution will harm the prospects of reconciliation while 21% believe it will improve the chances for reconciliation, and 34% believe it will have no impact on the reconciliation.  Support for dissolving the PLC is higher in the West Bank (52%) than in the Gaza Strip (38%), among men (51%) compared to women (42%), among holders of BA degree (45%) compared to the illiterates (38%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (62% and 50% respectively) compared to the religious (39%), and among supporters of Fatah (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas (38%).

4) Israel-Hamas confrontations in the Gaza Strip and the long-term tahdia, or truce:   

• 61% support and 33% oppose a long term tahdia agreement between Hamas and Israel even if it was arrived at in the absence of reconciliation
• Two thirds of the public support the current arrangement between Hamas and Israel that allows the entry of Qatari fuel and money into the Gaza Strip
• But the majority expects the current ceasefire to collapse soon and worries that it would lead to widescale war

A majority of 61% (compared to 55% three months ago) supports and 33% oppose a Hamas-Israel long-term tahdia, or cessation of violence, even in the absence of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The agreement would entail the opening of the border crossing with Egypt and access to a seaport and an airport in a neighboring area in return for a Hamas enforcement of a long-term ceasefire as well as ending the Return Marches and the incendiary kites. Support for this long-term cessation of violence is higher in the Gaza Strip (64%) than in the West Bank (59%).  Two-thirds (67%) support a limited tahdia (quiet) that would allow the entry into the Gaza Strip of Qatari fuel and money in return for stopping the confrontations along the Gaza-Israel border area including the incendiary balloons. Opposition to this tahdia stands at 28%. Support for this tahdia stands at 72% in the Gaza Strip and 64% in the West Bank.

But a majority of 62% believes the current ceasefire between Hamas and Israel will not last for long and that it will collapse soon while 32% believe it will last for a long or a medium period.  If the current ceasefire collapses, a majority of 62% believes it will lead to a widescale war between Hamas and Israel while 31% believe that a collapse of the ceasefire will not lead to a widescale war. But the public is split over the chances for reaching a long term Tahdia that would ease the siege and stop the confrontation: 50% believe the chances are high or medium and 48% think the chances are non-existent.

A majority of 62% thinks that Hamas has come out victorious from the most recent confrontation with Israel while 31% think it has not come out victorious.  By contrast, about two-thirds (66%) are dissatisfied and 25% are satisfied with the position taken by the PA and the PA leadership during the most recent confrontation in the Gaza Strip.

5) Social Security Law

• 51% are opposed to the implementation of the Social Security Law, 13% support implementing it, and 9% want it revised
• The main reasons for opposing the law are the belief that it is unjust (49%) and the distrust in the government (32%)

Only 44% of the public believe that the Social Security Law applies to them or that they will be impacted by its implementation while 46% believe it does not apply to them or will not affect them.  In its position toward the Social Security Law, the public is divided into three groups: (1) the largest one (51%) is opposed to the implementation of the law now or in the future; (2) only 13% support the implementation of the law now; and (3) 9% support the implementation of the law but only after it is revised. It is noticeable that opposition to the law in the West Bank is higher than it is in the Gaza Strip (65% and 28% respectively). Moreover, Opposition to the implementation of the law now or in the future is higher among those who say that the law applies to them or will affect them, reaching two-thirds (67%); and this is particularly true among West Bankers as opposition to the law stands among them at 84%. Opposition to the law is also higher among the illiterates (55%) compared to the holders of BA degree (51%), among those whose age is 50 years or above (56%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (44%), and among laborers and employees (62% and 54% respectively) compared to students and the retirees (36% and 35% respectively).

In an open question, addressed to those who said that they oppose the implementation of the law, we asked about the reasons for the opposition. Three answers were provided: 49% said the law is unjust, 32% said they do not trust the government and fear its corruption, and 14% said that their salaries are already too small and they cannot afford further cuts. Even if the law was revised as some demand, only 31% believe that the Social Security Fund or the government will actually make the payment to the retirees; a majority of 56% believes that the Fund and the government will not honor their commitment to pay the retirement wages.

6) Sale of Palestinian property to Israeli Jews

• 88% call Palestinians who sell property to Israeli Jews as traitors
• 64% believe that the deterrent punishment for sale of property to Israeli Jews is the death penalty

An overwhelming majority of the public (88%) designates other Palestinians who sell property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other occupied territories as traitors while 9% call them corrupt and unpatriotic. Three quarters believe that the current penalties for sale of property to Israeli Jews in East Jerusalem and other places do not provide a deterrence against such sales while 14% believe the current penalties provide a sufficient deterrent. When, in an open question, we asked the public to identify a deterrent punishment, about two-thirds (64%) said it is the death penalty while 22% said imprisonment. Findings show that more than three quarters (78%) are dissatisfied and 17% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to deter sale of properties by Palestinians to Israeli Jews.

7) Role of Qatar in the Gaza Strip

• Three quarters back the Qatari efforts to support the Gazan electricity sector
• 79% support the Qatari payment of salaries of the former Hamas government employees

More than three quarters (78%) support the Qatari efforts to support the electricity sector in the Gaza Strip despite the fact that the PA is opposed to this Qatari effort; opposition to Qatari efforts does not exceed 19%.  More significantly, an overwhelming majority of 79% supports the Qatari payment of salaries to the employees of the former Hamas government in the Gaza Strip despite the fact that the PA is opposed to this payment; opposition to the payment does not exceed 19%.  Generally speaking, a large majority of 73% looks positively, and only 25% looks negatively, at the role played by Qatar on the Palestinian issue, particularly in the Gaza Strip. It is noticeable that there are no differences between the views of Gazans and West Bankers (73% and 72% respectively) regarding the Qatari role. But support is higher among the youth whose age is between 18 and 22 years (77%) compared to those whose age is 50 years and above (69%), among the illiterates (73%) compared to the holders of BA degree (66%), among women (76%) compared to men (69%), among the religious (82%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligious (68% and 50% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (88%) compared to supporters of Fatah (53%).

8) Decisions of the Palestinian Central Council of the PLO

• 67% support the Central Council’s decision to suspend recognition of Israel
• 72% support the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel

Two thirds (67%) support and 29% oppose the Central Council’s decision to suspend Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel until Israel recognizes the state of Palestine. Similarly, 72% support and 23% oppose the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel; but more than two-thirds (70%) believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 23% believe it will.

9) The peace process

• 43% support the two-state solution; 52% support it when borders are identified as 1967 lines
• In choosing between a two-state solution and a one-state solution, 45% support the former and 22% the latter
• 63% believe the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion
• 44% believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state
• 59% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to annex Palestinian land and expel its population
• 54% oppose and 40% support a confederation between Jordan and the state of Palestine

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 43% and opposition at 55%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 47%. But support for the two-state solution rises to 52% when the borders of the Palestinian state are described as those of the 4th of June 1967.  Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 45% said they prefer the two-state solution, 22% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 23% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.” Three months ago, support for the two-state solution stood at 53%, for the one state solution at 24%, and 14% preferred a third undefined alternative.

A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 35% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel;” according to 34% of the public while an identical percentage prefers waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 16% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 40% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel.  But a large minority of 44% thinks that armed struggle is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 28% believe that negotiation is the most effective means and 23% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 39% said negotiation is the most effective means and 33% said armed struggle is the most effective means.

An overwhelming majority of 77% says they are worried that in their daily life they would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 23% say they are not worried.  59% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 18% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 71% support joining more international organizations; 61% support popular non-violence resistance; 54% support a return to an armed intifada; 47% support dissolving the PA; and 32% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, only 46% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 42% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.

Support for an armed intifada is higher in the Gaza Strip (60%) than in the West Bank (51%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (65%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (55%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to the illiterates (44%), among men (57%) compared to women (52%), among students (63%) compared to laborers (47%), among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious (49%), among those who oppose the peace process (81%) compared to those who support the peace process (41%), and among supporters of Hamas (76%) compared to supporters of Fatah (36%).

Support for abandoning the two-state solution and adopting the one-state solution is higher in the Gaza Strip (36%) compared to the West Bank (29%), among men (35%) compared to women (28%), among students (34%) compared to housewives (28%), among the unreligious and the somewhat religious (44% and 33% respectively) compared to the religious (29%), among supporters of the peace process (35%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (24%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (42% and 32% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (25%).

Half of the public (50%) opposes and 47% support in principle the holding of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in order to resolve the conflict. If a Palestinian state is established, about two-thirds (68%) want it to be armed with heavy weapons, such as tanks and air force, while 27% want it to have a strong security force but without heavy arms.  After the establishment of a Palestinian state, a majority of 54% is opposed to the idea of a confederation between that state and Jordan while 40% support the idea. Support for the confederation with Jordan is higher in the Gaza Strip (49%) compared to the West Bank (34%), among students (47%) compared to merchants (29%), among the religious (43%) compared to the somewhat religious (38%), among supporters of the peace process (46%) compared to those who oppose the peace process (31%), and among Fatah suppoers (54%) compared to supporters of Hamas (41%).

10) Trump’s Peace Plan:

• 73% believe that the chances for the success of Trump’s peace plan are slim or non-existent
• 72% believe the Trump plan will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state
• 74% believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the Trump peace plan
• 59% are opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the Trump Administration
• But 43% believe that the US role is indispensable in any Palestinian-Israeli negotiations

An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that the Trump Administration is not serious about launching a new peace plan and 16% believe it is serious.  If the Trump Administration does nonetheless offer such a peace plan, 73% believe the chances for its success are slim or non-existent and 24% believe the chances are high or medium.  A large majority of 72% believes that if the US does indeed offer a peace plan, it will not call for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel; 22% believe it will.  A similar percentage (75%) believes that the plan will not call for a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem; 21% believe it will.  67% believe the Trump plan will not call for the borders of the Palestinian state to be based on the lines of June 1967 with minor mutual land swaps; 26% believe it will.  An overwhelming majority of 80% believes the plan will not call for a just solution to the refugee problem; 16% believe it will.  Similarly, 77% believe the plan will not call for the ending of the Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the areas occupied in 1967; 19% believe it will.

An overwhelming majority of 74% believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject the Trump peace plan, if offered, and 21% believe it should accept it. The demand for rejecting the US plan is higher in the West Bank (83%) compared to the Gaza Strip (59%), among holders of BA degree (76%) compared to the illiterates (71%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (82%) compared to supporters of the peace process (68%), and among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fatah (60%).

But if the Trump plan does indeed include all such items, a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, with borders based on the 1967 lines, a just solution to the refugees’ problem, and an Israeli army withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, the largest percentage (49%) calls for rejecting it and 44% call for accepting it. Support for such a plan that includes all these items is higher in the Gaza Strip (57%) compared to the West Bank (36%), among men (48%) compared to women (41%), among holders of BA degree (44%) compared to the illiterates (39%), among the somewhat religious (46%) compared to the religious (41%), among supporters of the peace process (49%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (33%), and among supporters of Fatah (62%) compared to supporters of Hamas (34%).

A majority of 59% is opposed and 28% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. We asked the public if Palestinian-Israeli negotiations can be sustained without the US role as a mediator: A majority of 52% believes that it can while 43% view the US role as indispensable. The belief that the US role is dispensable is higher among the youth between 18 and 22 years (55%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (47%), among the religious (57%) compared to the somewhat religious (48%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (58%) compared to supporters of the peace process (51%), among holders of BA degree (55%) compared to the illiterates (50%), and among supporters of Hamas (56%) compared to supporters of Fatah (47%).

11) Israeli relations with Arab countries:

• 78% think Palestine in no longer the Arab’s primary cause
• 60% view Israeli leaders’ visits to Arab countries as harming to the efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and 60% believe that Arab countries that invite Israeli leaders do so in order to win the support of the Trump Administration

An overwhelming majority (78%) believes that the Arab World is preoccupied with its problems and internal conflicts and that Palestine is not its primary cause; 21% believe that Palestine remains the primary cause of the Arab World. Moreover, 72% believe that an alliance already exists between Sunni Arabs and Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation; 21% disagrees with this assessment. A majority of 60% believes that the visits by Israeli leaders to Arab countries are harming the prospects for peace while 10% believe they contribute to peace making; 27% believe they neither help nor hinder peace making. We asked the public to speculate about the motivation of some of the Arab countries in allowing such Israeli visits to their capitals. A majority of 60% said that they want to win the support of the Trump Administration, 17% said they are seeking to fight Iran, and 12% said they are interested in promoting Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

(12) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% say that ending occupation and building a state should be the most vital Palestinian national goal
• 29% view continued occupation and settlement construction as the most serious problem confronting Palestinians

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 29% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 26% say it is poverty and unemployment; 25% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

(13) The murder of Jamal Khashoggi:

• 51% believe that the Saudi Crown Prince is responsible for the murder of Khashoggi 

A majority of 51% believes that Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman is the person responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, while 26% put the blame for the murder on King Salman, and 9% put it on those employees reporting to the two leaders.