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01-05 December 2004

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between December 01 and 05, 2004. The poll deals with Palestinian elections, the post Arafat era, support for violence and reconciliation, internal conditions and perceptions of reform, democracy and corruption, and American elections. Total size of the sample is 1319 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (836) and the Gaza Strip (483) in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3 % and rejection rate is 2 %.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa, at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

MAIN RESULTS:

The poll shows an emerging new reality in the Palestinian territories compared to the situation prevailing three months ago when we conducted our September 2004 poll. The most important changes indicate a more optimistic atmosphere with a significant drop in the level of support for Hamas and a big increase in the level of support for Fateh. It is worth remembering that similar trends were observed in December 1995, one month before the first Palestinian elections in January 1996.

The smooth transition of power after the death of Yasir Arafat, the virtual absence of violence despite the gloomy expectations, and the quick preparations for elections may have all been responsible for the new optimism. Hamas’ loss of support may be due to the fact that the Islamist movement had decided to boycott the upcoming presidential elections while the increase in support for Fateh might be explained by the appreciation people have for the way Fateh dealt with the succession issue. A bandwagoning effect may have also helped Fateh as new supporters might be expecting gains from supporting the faction that is most likely to win the upcoming elections.  

Optimism can be seen in the fact that a majority believes that a compromise settlement can be reached with the current Israeli leadership and that both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders are strong enough to convince Israelis and Palestinians to accept such a compromise. Optimism can also be seen in the large increase in the percentage of those who believe that the roadmap can still be implemented and the large decrease in the percentage of those who believe that a political settlement with Israel is impossible. It can also be seen in terms of the greater expectation recorded in this poll regarding the chances for a return to negotiations and an end to the violence in the post Arafat era with Abu Mazin leading the PLO.

(1) Palestinian Elections:

• Mahmud Abbas and Marwan Barghouti in a close race with 40% for the first and 38% for the second
• Abbas is the most able to reach a peace agreement with Israel and Barghouti is the most able to protect the right of return
• If Hamas participates  in the presidential elections, its candidate would receive 28% of the vote
• Barghouti is the person most preferred to lead Fateh, followed by Abbas and then Qaddoumi
• Large increase in the popularity of Fateh and a large decrease in the popularity of Hamas

The poll shows that if presidential elections were to be held today, the results would be close, with Mahmud Abbas receiving 40% of the votes and Marwan Barghouti receiving 38%. Mustafa Barghouti would receive 6% while all the other candidates would receive a total of 3% for all of them combined. 13% have not decided yet. The poll shows Abbas winning in the Gaza Strip (48% vs. 34% for Marwan Barghouti). But Marwan Barghouti wins in the West Bank (40% vs. 35% for Mahmud Abbas). These results represent the voting intentions of those planning to participate in the vote on January 9, 2005. The findings show that the level of non participation is going to be low (10%).

When compared to Mahmud Abbas’, support for Marwan Barghouti increases in West Bank cities (41% compared to 29%) while support for Abbas compared to Barghouti is higher in Gaza towns (57% compared to 31%) and Gaza cities (50% to 29%). But the gap between the two narrows in West Bank refugee camps, with 42% for Abbas and 40% for Barghouti. Men give more support for Abbas (46% compared to 31% for Barghouti) while women give more support for Barghouti (44% compared to 35% for Abbas). Young people between 18 and 22 years of age give more support to Barghouti (47% compared to 35% to Abbas). Older people give more support to Abbas. Illiterates give more support to Abbas (45%) compared to Barghouti (33%). Support for Abbas is higher among holders of BA degree (37% compared to Barghouti  32%). Students give more support to Barghouti (47%) compared to 35% to Abbas while support for Abbas is greater among farmers (50% to 29%), retired people (47% to 18%), unemployed (45% to 30%), and merchants (43% to 26%). Support for Abbas is higher among those working in the public sector (48% to 27%). Abbas receives more votes from those with low income and less votes from those with high income. Among Fateh supporters, 54% go to Abbas and 38% to Barghouti. But among Hamas supporters, 44% go to Barghouti and 24% to Abbas.

The poll shows that Mahmud Abbas is seen as the candidate most capable of reaching a peace agreement with Israel, improving the economic conditions, and enforcing law and order. Marwan Barghouti is viewed as the candidate most capable of protecting the right of return. The public evaluation of the ability of the two candidates to maintain national unity and prevent internal infighting is similar for both. If Hamas nominates Mahmud Zahhar as its candidate in the presidential elections, 28% say they would vote for him. And if the competition for the presidency is between Zahhar, Abbas, and Marwan Barghouti, 34% prefer Barghouti, 29% Abbas, and 24% Zahhar. The overwhelming majority (83%) of those who selected one of the three believes that the person they have chosen would be able to lead the Palestinian people under the current conditions.

In answers to an open question, 30% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti becoming the head of Fateh, while 26% preferred Mahmud Abbas and 7% want Farouq Qaddoumi as head of the movement. In the Gaza Strip, support for Abbas as head of Fateh reaches 31% (compared to 22% in the West Bank) and for Barghouti 28% (compared to 31% in the West Bank), and for Qaddoumi 5% (compared to 9% in the West Bank).

In local elections, 42% believe that Fateh candidates are likely to win, 20% believe Hamas/Islamic Jihad candidates are likely to win, 14% believe independent candidates are likely to win, and 11% believe that family candidates are likely to win. With regard to voting intentions, 37% say they will vote for Fateh candidates, 20% to Hamas/Islamic Jihad candidates, 13% to independents, and 11% to family candidates. Last September, only 21% said they intend to vote for Fateh candidates. In this poll, those intending to vote for Hamas/Islamic Jihad candidates reach 27% in the Gaza Strip compared to 16% in the West Bank.

The poll shows a significant increase in the popularity of Fateh from 29% last September to 40% in this poll. The increase is higher in the Gaza Strip, from 24% to 38%. The popularity of Hamas drops in the total West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 22% last September to 18% in this poll. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ popularity drops from 30% to 22%. The total level of support for all Islamists (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) drops in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from 32% to 24% during the same period.

(2) A Post Arafat Era

• Great public satisfaction with the past performance of Arafat in national causes, medium satisfaction with his performance in ending the occupation and fighting corruption
• After Arafat, things will be better with regard to delivery of basic services, building strong public institutions, and building a democratic PA and will be worse with regard to protection of national rights in negotiations, promoting the Palestinian cause internationally, and fighting corruption
• A majority believes that Arafat died of poison and most think Israel was responsible for his death
• A majority is not worried about internal infighting after Arafat, but 50% expect his death to weaken Fateh

Poll findings show that 88% are satisfied with Arafat’s contribution to promoting the status of the Palestinian cause internationally, 86% with his contribution to protecting Palestinian rights in negotiations with Israel, 86% with his contribution in providing basic services such as health and education, 65% with his contribution to building an authority with democratic governance, 65% with his contribution to building public institutions able to enforce law and order, 54% with his contribution to ending the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 51% with his contribution to fighting corruption in the PA.

In post Arafat period, the percentage of those believing that the situation would be better after Arafat is higher than the percentage of those who believe the situation would be worse in the following areas: provision of basic services such as health and education, building public institutions able to enforce law and order, and building an authority with democratic governance. The percentage of those believing that the situation would be better after Arafat is equal to the percentage of those who believe it will be worse in one area: ending the Israeli occupation. But the percentage of those believing the situation would be worse is higher than the percentage of those believing it would be better when it comes to the areas of protecting Palestinian rights in negotiations with Israel, in promoting the international status of the Palestinian cause, and in fighting corruption in the PA.

About 72% believe that Arafat died of poison and most of those believing in this (64%) believe that Israel is the party responsible for the poisoning while 22% believe that a Palestinian party is responsible.

After Arafat, a majority of 52% believe that there will be no internal infighting but 38% believe some internal infighting will take place but not civil war. Only 7% believe that a civil war will erupt. Half of the Palestinians expect Arafat’s death to weaken Fateh while one quarter expects it to strengthen Fateh.

(3) The Peace Process

• Wide scale support for a ceasefire and a majority believes that it is possible to reach a compromise settlement with Israel
• A majority supports the roadmap but about half believes that it can not be implemented today
• Increased optimism regarding the chances of a peace settlement with Israel and an increase in the percentage of those expecting return to negotiations soon
• A majority opposes continued armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after a complete Israeli withdrawal from the strip
• A majority views the Israeli disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip as victory for armed struggle

Poll findings show that support for a cease fire and for an immediate return to negotiations is very high, reaching 80% for each. The findings also show an increasing optimism regarding the chances for success in the peace process.  A majority of 52% believes that it is possible today to negotiate a compromise settlement with the current Israeli leadership and 48% believe it is not possible. If such a settlement is reached, 58% believe that the Israeli leaders are strong enough to convince the Israelis to accept such a compromise settlement while 37% do not share this belief. Moreover, 56% of the Palestinians believe that Palestinian leaders are strong enough to convince the Palestinian people to accept a compromise settlement with Israel while 41% do not share this belief.

Belief that it is possible to reach a compromise settlement with the current Israeli leadership increases among women (57%) compared to men (46%), among the youngest (61%) compared to the oldest (49%), among non refugees (54%) compared to refugees (49%), among illiterates (68%) compared to holders of BA degree (46%), among students (66%) compared to professionals, the retired, and merchants (29%, 38%, and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh (61%) compared to supporters of Hamas (38%).

With regard to the plan known as the roadmap, findings show that 59% support the plan and 38% oppose it. But 48% believe that the plan cannot be implemented any more while 46% believe it is possible to implement it. In July 2003, support for the roadmap reached 56% and opposition 41%, and last June, only 28% believed that the roadmap could still be implemented. Findings also show that the percentage of those believing that a political settlement with Israel is impossible stands now at 34%.  In July 2001, ten months after the start of the current intifada, 46% said this was the end of the peace process. This finding confirms the sense of optimism mentioned above.

With regard to the post disengagement from Gaza, 59% will oppose and 38% will support the continuation of armed attacks from the strip if the Israeli withdrawal was complete. Opposition to continued attacks from Gaza increases in the Gaza Strip to 67% compared to 55% in the West Bank. Last September, 54% opposed and 42% supported continuation of armed attacks from the Gaza Strip after a complete withdrawal.  The poll shows that 59% are worried about internal Palestinian infighting after the Israelis evacuate the Gaza Strip and only 29% believe the PA has high capacity to control matters in the strip after the Israeli withdrawal.

Three quarters of the Palestinians believe that Sharon’s plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip is a victory for Palestinian armed resistance against Israel and 23% do not see it as victory. 78% believe that most Palestinians view the plan as victory for the armed resistance. Last September, 71% believed that most Palestinians view the plan as victory.

Poll findings show further optimism regarding return to negotiations with a big increase in the percentage of those believing that now (in the aftermath of Arafat’s death and the appointment of Mahmud Abbas as chairman of the PLO) the two sides will return soon to negotiations and that armed confrontations will stop from 17% last September to 30% in this poll. The percentage of those believing that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations drops from 37% last September to 12% in this poll. Indeed, a majority of 53% believe that the death of Arafat will increase the chances for a political settlement with Israel while only 23% believe that it would decrease those chances.

(4) Support for Violence and Reconciliation

• Decrease in the level of support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians to 49%
• About one third believes that the Palestinians have so far come out  winners in the armed confrontations and a larger percentage believes that no one came out winner
• Increase in the level of support for reconciliation between the two peoples, reaching an unprecedented 81%

Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel drops from 54% last September to 49% in this poll. Opposition to such attacks increases from 44% to 48%. A majority of 58% says that it would support and 38% say it would oppose taking measures by the PA to prevent armed attacks against Israelis if an agreement on a mutual cessation of violence is reached. 82% support such an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. Nonetheless, 64% believe, and one third does not believe, that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinians national rights in ways that negotiations could not.

More than one third (35%) believes that Palestinians have come out winners in the ongoing armed conflict (compared to 40% last September) and 14% (compared to 16% last September) believe Israel came out a winner. But the highest percentage (44%) is for those who believe neither side came out a winner. In the Gaza Strip, the percentage of those believing that the Palestinians came out winners reaches 46% compared to 28% in the West Bank. Yet, 43% among all Palestinians (compared to 48% last June) believe that most Palestinians believe they came out winners and 59% (compared to 51%) believe the Israelis think Palestinians came out winners.

Belief that no one so far came out a winner increases in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (37%), among non refugees in the Gaza Strip (44%) compared to refugees in the strip (35%), among holders of BA degree (50%) compared to illiterates (36%), among professionals, students, and the unemployed (71%, 50%, and 50% respectively) compared to farmers, craftsmen and laborers (25%, 35%, and 39% respectively), and among supporters of Fateh (46%) compared to supporters of Hamas (37%).

The level of support for reconciliation has never been higher reaching 81% (compared to 75% last September). But 34% (compared to 47%) believe that reconciliation is not possible ever.

(5) Internal Situation and Perceptions of Reform, Democracy and Corruption

• Evaluation of Palestinian conditions today is negative and 95% believe that there is wide scale suffering and more than three quarters feel a loss of security and safety
• Great majority supports calls for reform, only 30% gives a positive evaluation of democracy in Palestine, and belief in the existence of corruption in the PA remains very high at 87%

About three quarters of the Palestinians assess Palestinian conditions these days as being bad or very bad and 95% believe that Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip suffer much or very much. But only 67% say that they personally suffer much or very much. Moreover, 76% feel that their security and safety and that of their family are not assured while 24% believe they are assured.

With regard to issues of governance, little has changed. An overwhelming majority of 93% support internal and external calls for fundamental reforms within the PA and 30% give Palestinian democracy positive evaluation. Yet, 62% believe that people can criticize the PA without fear while only 34% believe that people can not do that. A large majority of 87% believes that there is corruption in PA institutions and among those 60% believe that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.

(6) American Elections

• About one third views the re election of Bush as increasing the chances for peace while a similar percentage views it as decreasing those chances
• Three quarters believes the second Bush administration will be more supportive of Israel than the first one

Poll findings show that the Palestinians are divided in their evaluation of the impact of the reelection of the US president George Bush on the chances for the peace process. About one third (32%) believes that the reelection of Bush as US president for another four years will increase the chances for a political settlement with Israel but a similar percentage (34%) believes it will decrease those chances. But a clear majority feels pessimistic regarding the ability of the new US administration to play the role of an honest broker with more than three quarters of the Palestinians (76%) believing that the second Bush administration will be more supportive of Israel during the next four years and only 9% believe it will be less supportive..... Full Report

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll 

Overwhelming Majority Among Israelis and Palestinians for Negotiated Rather than Unilateral Further Disengagements 60% of the Israelis support negotiations with Abu Mazin over a final status settlement   

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted March 16-21 jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah 

The joint poll examined Israeli and Palestinian attitudes towards unilateralism in handling the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. These tendencies became prominent on the political agenda in the region following Israel’s disengagement in Gaza and the rise of Hamas to power in the Palestinian Authority (PA). Our results indicate consistent and strong support in both publics for negotiated over unilateral steps in handling the conflict by both sides. Specifically,three quarters of the Palestinians (73%) and Israelis (76%) prefer to see further disengagements in the West Bank negotiated between the PA and Israel. Only 23% of the Palestinians and 17% of the Israelis prefer further disengagements to be unilateral. Moreover, 60% of the Israelis support entering talks with Abu Mazin and the Fateh leadership over a final status settlement. 

The survey further examined the impact of the political turnabout in the PA on both publics’ support for mutual recognition of identity and political recognition. Only 37% of the Palestinians support the recognition of the State of Israel by Hamas, while 59% oppose it. However, under conditions of peace and given an independent Palestinian State, 66% of the Palestinians and 68% of the Israelis support a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. Similar levels of support among Israelis and Palestinians were obtained in September 2005 before Hamas rose to power in the PA. 

The Palestinian sample consists of 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 16 and 18, 2006. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 603 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic, or Russian between March 16 and 21, 2006. The margin of error is 4%.The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il. 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 

(A) Unilateralism vs. negotiations in handling the conflict 

• ·         About three quarters of the Palestinians (73%) and Israelis (76%) prefer to see further disengagements in the West Bank negotiated between the PA and Israel while 23% of the Palestinians and 17% of the Israelis prefer further disengagements to be unilateral.
• ·         A majority in both publics (59% of the Palestinians and 63% of the Israelis) also believe that taking the unilateral path decreases the chances to eventually reach a final status settlement.
• ·         Consequently, a considerable majority among Israelis (60%) support entering talks with Abu-Mazin over for a final status settlement, while only 38% oppose. These results are highly significant given the internal debate in Kadima between Olmert and Peres on whether to take a unilateral or negotiated path in handling the conflict with the Palestinians.
• ·         Despite these levels of support, Israelis are not very optimistic with regard to the results of such talks. 46% believe that it is possible these days to reach such a settlement with Abu Mazin and the Fateh leadership while 51% think it is impossible.
• ·         Given the recent salience of unilateralism on Israel’s political agenda, we examined Palestinians’ attitudes towards unilateral steps that the PA may consider, such as unilateral declaration of an independent state. 59% of the Palestinians would support a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian State while 37% would oppose it. However if such a step were negotiated with Israel, 80% of the Palestinians would support it, and 17% would oppose it. As to Israelis, if an independent state were to be declared by Palestinians, 83% of the Israelis would prefer it to be negotiated with Israel while 14% would prefer it to be unilateral.

(B) Attitudes towards full separation 

• ·         47% of the Palestinians believe it is possible and 51% believe it is not possible to achieve in the future full economic, political, and physical separation from Israel. If such a separation was possible, 75% among Palestinians would support it while 24% would oppose it.
• ·         As to Israelis, they too prefer fuller rather than partial separation from Palestinians. 56% support and 41% oppose the evacuation of both settlements and the army from parts of the West Bank. However only 41% of the Israelis support and 56% oppose the evacuation of civilian settlements in the West Bank without the evacuation of the army their.  17% support and 80% oppose the evacuation of the army without the evacuation of settlements and 38% support and 58% oppose the evacuation of neither. In the same vein, 61% of the Israelis support and 34% oppose the dismantling of most settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

(C) The political turnabout in the PA 

(1) Interpretations of Hamas’ victory 

The survey examined Israelis’ and Palestinians’ explanations of Hamas victory in the PA and attitudes towards the complex policy dilemmas that both sides face following the political turnabout in the PA. 

• ·         Palestinians and Israelis seem to attribute different reasons to Hamas’ victory in the PA. 37% of the Palestinians and 20% of the Israelis believe that Hamas won because Palestinians wanted an Islamic authority that rules according to Sharia and religion. The prevalent explanation among Israelis however (33%) was that Hamas won because Palestinians wanted a fighting Authority that resists Israel by force but only 7% of the Palestinians think so.
• ·         Following Hamas victory in democratic elections there is no change in Palestinians’ evaluations of the status of democracy and human rights in the PA. 34% of the Palestinians believe that the current status of democracy and human rights in the PA is good or very good (35%) thought so in December 2005,  26% think it is fair (28% in December)  and 37% believe it is bad or very bad (36% in December). Among Israelis however, 6% believe the status and democracy in the PA is good or very good, 22% think it is fair and 70% think it is bad or very bad. A year ago in March 2005, 6% of the Israelis evaluated the status of democracy and human rights in the PA as good or very good, 28% thought it was fair and 61% believed it was bad or very bad.

(2) Israelis’ reactions to Hamas’ victory 

• ·         Only 42% of the Israelis think that the threat to Israel’s security increased following Hamas’ rise to power in the PA. 50% of the Israeli public think the level of threat did not change as a result of it and 7% believe the threat rather decreased.
• ·         At the same time, 58% of Israelis believe that the aspirations of the Hamas leadership eventually are to conquer the State of Israel or to conquer it and annihilate a considerable part of the Jewish population in the State. Only 38% believe that these aspirations are to take back part or all of the pre-67 territories.
• ·         On a personal level, 75% of the Israeli Jews are worried and 24% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. This constitutes a marginal increase in their threat perceptions compared to June 2005 when 71% of the Israeli Jews were worried and 27% were not. As to Palestinians, the level of personal threat also increased somewhat. 75% believe their own and their families’ security and safety are not assured these days compared to 64% who felt so in June 2005. 25% feel their security is assured compared to36% who thought so in June 2005.
• ·         The majority of the Israeli public (55%) believes there are low or very low chances that Hamas will moderate over time. 44% of the Israelis think there are medium or high chances for this to happen.
• ·         Nevertheless, 62% think that Israel should talk to Hamas if this is required in order to reach a settlement with the Palestinians while 37% think Israel should not do it. Only 33% of the Israelis however believe that this is the majority position. This suggests that talks with Hamas are not considered normative in the eyes of Israelis.
• ·         Among Palestinians, 75% think Hamas-led PA should negotiate with Israel if it agrees to conduct peace negotiations with it while 22% think a Hamas-led PA should not negotiate with Israel.
• ·         Nevertheless, only about a third among Palestinians (37%) support the recognition of the State of Israel by Hamas. 59% oppose it even under international pressure.

(3) Israeli attitudes towards Abu Mazin and Fateh 

• ·         Israelis seem to be less threatened by the Fateh leadership. Only 37% believe their aspirations eventually are to conquer the State of Israel or to conquer it and annihilate a considerable part of the Jewish population in the State; 58% believe that these aspirations are to take back part or all of the pre-67 territories.  Thus a considerable majority among Israelis (60%) support entering talks for a final status settlement with Abu-Mazin while only 38% oppose it. Nevertheless only 46% among Israelis believe that it is possible these days to reach such a settlement with Abu Mazin and the Fateh leadership compared to 51% who believe it is impossible.
• ·         In this regard 19% of the Israelis believe that Abu Mazin and Fateh have the most say nowadays with regard to the PA policy with regard to the conflict with Israel while only 58% believe that it is Hanyeh and Hamas who have the most say in this regard.
• ·         34% of the Israelis believe that it is Hanyeh and Hamas who represent more faithfully the position of the majority of Palestinians in the PA with regard to Israel compared to 40% who believe it is Abu Mazin and Fateh who represent Palestinian positions more. 4% think both represent them to a similar extent and 10% think that neither does.
• ·         As to the influence that Palestinian public opinion has on its leaders, Israelis don’t see much difference in this regard between Fateh and Hamas’ leaderships. 44% of the Israelis think public opinion has little influence on Abu Mazin and the Fateh leadership, 30% think it has medium influence and 22% think it has much influence. With regard to Hamas, 43% of the Israelis think it has little influence on Hamas leadership 23% think it has medium influence and 29% who think it has much influence.

(4) Expectations for future developments 

• ·         Following Hamas victory in the PA elections, 18% of the Palestinians and only 6% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop, 41% of the Palestinians and 39% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue and 34% of the Palestinians and 52% of the Israelis think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
• ·         Following Hamas victory in the PA elections, 59% of the Palestinians and 45% of the Israelis expect negotiations to resume with or without violence continuing. 75% of the Palestinians and 91% of the Israelis expect violence to continue with or without negotiations.
• ·         These expectations mark a sharp decline in hopes for the resumption of negotiations from what they were before the rise of Hamas in the PA. In our December 2005 poll, 75% of the Palestinians and 72% of the Israelis expected negotiations to resume with or without violence continuing. However expectations with regard to continuing violence have not changed:  in December, 77% of the Palestinians and 90% of the Israelis expected violence to continue with or without negotiations.  
   

(D) Long range issues: Reconciliation and mutual recognition of identity 

• ·         68% of the Israelis and 66% of the Palestinians support a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute. 28% of the Israelis and 32% of the Palestinians oppose such a step. Among Israeli Jews 67% support and 28% oppose this mutual recognition of identity. Similar levels of support among Israelis and Palestinians were obtained in September 2005 before the Hamas rose to power in the PA.
• ·         50% of the Israelis and 57% of the Palestinians believe that a majority in their society supports a mutual recognition of identity under conditions of peace and the existence of an independent PalestinianState. These levels of awareness indicate that such a step is acquiring normative legitimacy in both societies.
• ·         Following the rise of Hamas to power in the PA, there is no change in both publics support for reconciliation under conditions of peace and the existence of a Palestinian state. Among Israelis it stands now at 82% percent compared to 85% in December 2005. Similarly among Palestinians, 74% support reconciliation today compared to 75% who supported it in December.
• ·         There is also no change in the two publics’ expectations as to when reconciliation will be achieved. 29% of the Israelis expect now full reconciliation to be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years compared to 30% who thought so in December 2005. 18% of the Palestinians expect full reconciliation to be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years now and in December. 27% of the Israelis and 45% of the Palestinians believe now reconciliation is not possible ever compared to 24% of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians who thought so in December.

(E) Israeli Elections 

• ·         At the time of the survey, 18% have not decided yet whom to vote for in the coming election. The survey was not designed to predict election outcomes, therefore we do not attempt to “crack” the undecided. 7% of Israeli eligible voters claim they will not vote. “Kadima” obtains 20% of the vote, the Labor party headed by Amir Peretz obtains 13% of the vote, and the Likud 7% of the vote.
• ·         24% of the Israelis believe that the security issue will have the most influence on their vote; 10% will be influenced most by the political process with the Palestinians. 34% believe that social economic issues influence their vote most in the current elections, and 10% think they are influenced most by corruption and rule of law issues.
• ·         37% of the Israelis believe that among the major parties, the Likud will stand firm in negotiations over territories and peace. 34% believe that of the major parties, it is Kadima that will lead to true peace with the Arabs. 36% believe that the Likud will know best how to deal with terror,.and 44% think that the Likud will best secure a Jewish majority in the state. 55% think that among the major parties, Labor will decrease social gaps. Finally, among the major parties, 33% choose the Likud as the party with corruption in it.

(F) Palestinian Elections 

• ·         If elections are held today, 47% of the Palestinians would vote for Hamas and 39% for Fateh. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas receives 51% of the vote and Fateh 37%. (In this poll 46% said that on the day of the elections in January 25, they have voted for Hamas and 44% said they have voted for Fateh. The actual official figures of the Palestinian Central Elections commission gave only 44% for Hamas and 41% for Fateh.)

 21 January 2006 

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a pre election poll during the period between 17-19 January 2006 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The poll aimed at predicting the likely outcome of the legislative elections scheduled for 25 January 2006. The poll was conducted among 4516 potential voters (of which 2974 came from the West Bank and 1542 from the Gaza Strip) in 230 randomly selected population locations (of which 79 came from the Gaza Strip and 151 from the West Bank). The sample was distributed over 16 electoral districts in order to allow the prediction of the likely outcome at the electoral district level. The sample was then re-weighted to reflect the size of each electoral district in the total voter register in order to allow the prediction of the outcome at the national level. Margin of error for the lists at the national level is 2%; at the electoral district level, the margin of error ranges between 4% to 7%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh at 02-296 4933 or email: pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

(1) Results of Lists at the National Level

• 42% will vote for Fateh List while 35% will vote for the List of Change and Reform, and 7% remain undecided. List of Independent Palestine (headed by Mustafa Barghouti) receives 5%, List of Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa receives 3%, List of the Third Way (headed by Salam Fayyad) receives 3%, and List of the Alternative (headed by Qais Abdul Karim) receives 2%. All other lists are not expected to pass the 2% threshold. 

(2) Results for Candidates in the Electoral Districts

• Fateh’s candidates are strong in the following five electoral districts: Jericho, Ramallah, Qalqilia, Khanyounis, and Rafah.
• Change and Reform’s candidates are strong in the following five districts: Gaza City, Deir al Balah, Northern Gaza, Hebron, and Tulkarm.
• The contest is close in the following six districts: Nablus, Bethlehem, Jenin, Jerusalem, Salfit, and Toubas.
• The following candidates have a good chance of winning in their districts:

• This list has 36 names of candidates only from a total of 66 eligible winners. At this time, it is difficult to predict the winning chances of the remaining 30 eligible winners as the results are too close to allow such prediction.
• Party affiliation of the likely 36 winning candidates is as follows: 18 (or 50%) from the List of Change and Reform, 17 (or 47%) from Fateh List, and one candidate (or 3%) is independent.

29-31 December 2005 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 6 and 9 September 2023. The period leading up to the poll witnessed a number of important developments, including the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords, the occupation of the Jenin refugee camp by the Israeli army and the killing of 12 Palestinian residents of the camp, and the visit of President Abbas to the camp after the withdrawal of the Israeli army. During this period, Palestinian faction leaders also met in City of El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of President Abbas but failed to agree on a joint statement. During this period, settler terrorist acts in Palestinian areas of the West Bank increased, as did armed attacks by Palestinians against settlers and Israelis. Finally, there have been press reports that there are US-Saudi negotiations to reach an agreement to normalize Saudi-Israeli relations and that Palestinian-Saudi and Palestinian-American meetings have been held to set Palestinian conditions for this normalization agreement. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Oslo Accords, we asked the public a series of questions to gauge their position today on this agreement and its outcome. As we found five years ago, a majority (this time  just under two-thirds) believes that the situation today is worse than it was before the implementation of the Oslo Accords. The vast majority still believes that it was wrong to sign that agreement. Today, a majority wants the PA to abandon the agreement and just over two-thirds believe that the agreement has harmed Palestinian interests. Above all, more than three quarters of the public believe that Israel does not implement this agreement all or most of the time.

In light of recent talk of a possible normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, the poll asked the public what it thinks of the impact of such normalization on the chances of achieving Palestinian-Israeli peace. A majority says it would be detrimental to the chances of peace. However, the results indicate significant differences between the attitudes of residents of the Gaza Strip, some of whom tend to see positive aspects of normalization, and those of West Bankers, who show firm rejection of it. However, the largest percentage in both regions believes that normalization with Israel is not acceptable before the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved. Moreover, a large majority, more than 70%, opposes a Palestinian engagement with the Saudis or the Americans to discuss Palestinian conditions for accepting the Saudi normalization.

We also asked about internal Palestinian reconciliation. The poll found that the vast majority believes that the meeting of the leadership of factions in the Egyptian City of El Alamein, about two months ago, was a failure.  Among those who view the meeting as a failure, the percentage that places the blame on the Fatah leadership is greater than those who blame Hamas. However, one-third of the public places the blame for the failure on other parties.

Despite the failure of the reconciliation meeting in El Alamein and the greater blame placed on the Fatah leadership, Hamas's popularity has not changed compared to three months ago. In fact, Fatah's popularity improved in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Perhaps the reason why Hamas' standing has not improved is the recent marches in the Gaza Strip demanding better living conditions. This may also have contributed to improving Fatah's image. As for President Abbas, although there are signs that his position might have improved slightly, in light of his decision to retire most governors, most of the indicators of improvement, such as the slight rise in his popularity if presidential elections were held between him and Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas, are due to the high percentage of boycott of presidential elections in which only these two candidates were competing.

Finally, we asked about Palestinian-Israeli relations. The findings show a rise, higher than the margin of error, in support for the two-state solution, reaching about a third. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority still believes that this solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion. At the same time, these results indicate an increase in support for unarmed popular resistance, and a similar increase in support for a return to confrontation and armed intifada. Moreover, nearly half of West Bankers believe that the formation of armed groups from the towns and villages subjected to violent attacks by settlers is the most effective solution in combating settler terrorism.

• A large majority of 73% knows the exact year in which the Oslo Accords were signed, but the rest do not know or chose the wrong year.
• 49% believe that the PA does not implement the Oslo agreement today while 44% believe it does that always or most of the time. When asked about the current Israeli government, 76% say it does not implement the Oslo agreement today while only 17% say it implements it all or most of the time.

As shown in the following two figures, Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to think that Israel is currently implementing the Oslo Agreement, while there are no differences in perception in the two areas regarding the PA implementation of that agreement.

• A majority of 64% believes that the situation today is slightly worse or much worse than it was before the Oslo agreement while 20% believe it is much better or slightly better, and 12% believe the situation today is the same as before the Oslo agreement. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords (i.e. September 2018), 73% said the situation today is worse than before the Oslo Agreement while 13% said the situation is better than before the Oslo Agreement.  As shown in figure (3) below, today, in contrast with the situation five years ago, Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to view the Oslo Agreement more positively.

Figure (3): Public assessment of conditions before and after the Oslo Agreement, in 2018 and in 2023

• A majority of 68% believes that the Oslo agreement harmed Palestinian interests while only 11% believe it served Palestinian interests and 17% believe it did not serve and did not harm Palestinian interests. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords, 65% said the agreement harmed Palestinian interests and 16% said it served Palestinian interests.
• A majority of 71% believes it was wrong for the PLO to sign the Oslo agreement while 23% believe it was right to do so.
• A majority of 63% supports the PA abandoning the Oslo agreement while 31% oppose it. As shown in figure (4) below, Gazans are much more likely than West Bankers to oppose the abandonment of the Oslo Agreement.

Figure (4): support or oppose the Palestinian Authority's abandonment of the Oslo Accords

• 46% believe that the most likely scenario if the PA suspends the implementation of the Oslo agreement is the collapse of the PA and possibly the return of the Israeli Civil Administration while 40% believe that the most likely scenario if the PA stops implementing the Oslo agreement is a reversal of Israel’s current policy, perhaps ending its settlement expansion and returning to negotiations.

• A majority of 56% believes that reaching an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel to normalize relations constitutes a harmful development that would negatively affect the chances of reaching a Palestinian-Israeli peace (this percentage reaches 69% in the West Bank and drops to 38% in the Gaza Strip). By contrast, 17% (29% in the Gaza Strip and 8% in the West Bank) believe such normalization could improve the chances for reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace; 24% believe it is neither harmful nor beneficial.
• We presented the public with five possible conditions related to the Palestinian-Israeli front that Saudi Arabia could demand from Israel in exchange for normalization with it and asked them to choose the condition they prefer the most. A majority of 53% (59% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip) said it rejects all such conditions altogether because normalization with Israel is not permissible before resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. But 12% chose the release of a number of prisoners; 10% chose Israel's recognition of the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders; 8% chose to transfer Area C land to Palestinian control; another 8% chose the release of tax revenues funds withheld by Israel; and 7% chose Israel's commitment not to annex any Palestinian areas in the West Bank.

As shown in figure (5) below, Gazans are more willing than West Bankers to consider Palestinian conditions for Saudi normalization with Israel and that Gazans are interested mainly in the transfer of control over land to the PA and in an Israeli acknowledgement of the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.

Figure (5): If it is up to you, which of the following conditions should Saudi Arabia demand in order to normalize its relations with Israel?

• We asked the public about support for a PA entry into negotiations with Saudia Arabia and the US over the setting of Palestinian conditions for Saudi normalization with Israel, such as Israeli transfer of land or the opening of the PLO representative office in Washington DC. An overwhelming majority (72%) opposes a PA entry into such negotiations (79% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip)  while 24% (38% in the Gaza Strip and 14% in the West Bank) support it.

• If new presidential elections were held today and only two candidates, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the voter turnout would be only 42%, and among those who would participate, Abbas would receive 37% of the vote and Haniyeh 58% (compared to 56% for Haniyeh and 33% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, the vote for Abbas stands at 33% and for Haniyeh at 64%, while in the West Bank Abbas receives 43% and Haniyeh 50%. If the competition is between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, participation would rise to 59% and among those voting, Barghouti receives 60% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition were between Mohammad Shtayyeh and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would drop to only 41%, with Shtayyeh receiving 33% and Haniyeh receiving 62%.
• In a closed question, we asked the public to select the person they prefer to see as President Abbas's successor. The largest percentage (34%) said they prefer Marwan Barghouti; 17% preferred Ismail Haniyeh; 6% preferred Mohammed Dahlan, 5% preferred Khaled Meshaal, 3% preferred Yahya al-Sinwar, Muhammad Shtayyeh, and Hussein al-Sheikh, and 30% said they did not know or chose someone else.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 22% and dissatisfaction at 76%. Satisfaction with Abbas stands at 21% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip.  Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 17% and dissatisfaction at 80%. 78% want Abbas to resign while 19% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 80% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas' resignation stands at 78% in the West Bank and 79% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new parliamentary elections were held today with the participation of all political forces that participated in the 2006 elections, 64% say they would participate in them, and among these participants, Fateh receives 36%, Hamas' Change and Reform 34%, all other lists combined 9%, and 21% say they have not yet decided whom they will vote for. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 33%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 44% (compared to 44% three months ago) and for Fateh at 32% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 24% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 34% three months ago).
• 27% believe that Hamas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people today while 24% believe that Fateh under the leadership of Abbas is more deserving; 44% believe both are unworthy of representation and leadership. Three months ago, 31% said Hamas is the most deserving, 21% said Fateh led by Abbas is the most deserving, and 43% said both are unworthy of representation and leadership.

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 10% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 21%.  Despite this, perception of personal safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 69% and perception of security in the West Bank stands at only 48%. Three months ago, perception of security in the West Bank stood at 46% and in the Gaza Strip at 71%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 87%; 72% believe that there is corruption in Hamas-run institutions in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in the PA institutions and 73% said there is corruption in public institutions run by Hamas.
• 42% of West Bankers believe that people can criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear while a majority of 56% believes it is not possible. Among residents of the Gaza Strip, 39% believe that criticism of the Hamas authority can be made without fear while 59% believe it is not possible.
• A majority of 62% believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people and only 35% believe it is an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, almost identical percentage of 63% said the PA is a burden and 33% said it was an achievement.
• 53% support, and 38% oppose, President Abbas' move to retire 12 governors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; 53% agree that Abbas' move to retire the governors is a step in the right direction to reform the PA and inject new and young blood into it while 38% believe it is not.
• An overwhelming majority (78%) believes that Abbas' visit to Jenin refugee camp after the withdrawal of the Israeli army did not contribute to improving relations between citizens and the Palestinian leadership while 20% believe it did.
• 59% believe that the marches held in the Gaza Strip a month ago to demand better living conditions were a reaction to the difficulties of life while 35% believe they were motivated by foreign political agendas.
• 73% (82% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip) believe that there are political prisoners in PA prisons while 21% believe there are none.
• A majority of 60% of the public (67% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) is concerned that clashes between members of armed groups and Palestinian security forces could lead to clashes and violence that could threaten stability in the PA.
• 39% believe that filing a complaint with the Public Prosecution office against AMAN (the Palestinian independent institution that monitors corruption), for publishing information about suspicions of corruption related to some officials in the case of the whitewashing of settlements’ dates, will scare citizens and institutions from reporting suspicions of corruption while 32% believe it will encourage citizens and institutions to report suspicions of corruption; 20% believe that such a complaint will have no impact on reporting suspicions of corruption.
• When asked why the office of the president has filed a complaint against AMAN, 59% said it was to punish whistleblowers and 22% said it was because the information published was incorrect.
• We asked the participants which TV station they had watched the most over the past three months. Findings show that Al Jazeera TV viewership is the highest at 28%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (11%), Palestine TV (9%), Palestine Today (8%), Ma'an TV (7%), and Al Arabiya and Al Mayadeen (3% each).

• An overwhelming majority of the public (78%; 81% in the West Bank and 72% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the meeting of Palestinian factional leaders in El Alamein in Egypt in the presence of PA president Mahmoud Abbas was a failure while 12% believe it was a success.
• The largest percentage of those who believe that the meeting was a failure (34%; 38% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip) blame the failure on the leadership of other forces and actors (other than Fateh and Hamas) while 29% (40% in the Gaza Strip and 23% in the West Bank) blame the failure on the leadership of Fateh, and 18% (25% in the Gaza Strip and 14% in the West Bank) place the blame on Hamas’ leadership.
• The public is evenly divided in its position regarding Islamic Jihad's boycott of the meeting in El Alamein with 44% saying the movement should have participated while 43% believe the boycott was justified.
• 24% (38% in the Gaza Strip and 15% in the West Bank) are optimistic about the success of reconciliation while 73% are not optimistic. Three months ago, 22% said they were optimistic.

• 32% support and 67% oppose the idea of a two-state solution, which was presented to the public without providing details of the solution. Three months ago, support for this solution in a similar question stood at 28%. Support for the two-state solution is linked to public assessment of the feasibility of such a solution and the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Today, 71% believe the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion but 27% believe it is still practical. Moreover, 76% believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or nonextant, and 23% believe the chances are medium or high. Three months ago, 71% said that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion.
• When asked about public support and opposition to specific policy measures to break the stalemate: 58% supported joining more international organizations; 53% supported resort to unarmed popular resistance; 58% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 52% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and demanding one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 53% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada; 49% supported the dissolution of the PA; and 26% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of one state.

As shown in figure (6) below, Palestinian support for resort to arms increase 10 percentage points since the formation of the current far right Israel government and that support for dissolving the PA has increase five percentage points. 

Figure (6): Comparison between public support and opposition to specific options to break the deadlock, today and a year ago

• When asked about the best way to end occupation and establish an independent state, the public was divided into three groups: a majority of 53% (51% in the Gaza Strip and 54% in the West Bank) said it was armed struggle; 20% said it was negotiations; and 24% said it was popular non-violent resistance. Three months ago, 52% said armed struggle was the best way and 21% said negotiations were the best way.
• An overwhelming majority (82%) believes that the Israeli army did not achieve its goal of arresting or killing fighters from the Jenin Brigade and other groups during its occupation of the camp more than two months ago.
• In light of the increase in settler terrorist attacks against Palestinian towns and villages, we asked the public what means are most effective in combating this terrorism that are also the most feasible. The largest percentage (45%, 47% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip) chose the formation of armed groups by residents of the targeted areas in order to protect their areas; 29% chose to deploy Palestinian police forces in the targeted areas; 13% chose the demand that the Israeli army take measures to prevent settler terrorism; and only 9% chose to form unarmed groups of residents of the targeted areas to protect their areas.

Figure (7) below, show the extent of the public distrust, particularly in the West Bank, in the role of the Israeli army in protecting the vulnerable communities and that the trust of the public in the Palestinian police is much less than the trust it places in the armed groups.

Figure (7): Which one of the following methods do you think is the most effective in combating settlers’ terrorism, such as the attacks on Huwara, Turmusayya and Um, and at the same time the most realistic.

• In light of demonstrations against the Netanyahu government, 39% believe the chances of these demonstrations turning into a civil war inside Israel are low, another 23% say they are nonexistent, and only 35% think they are high. 

• 37% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 18% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 14% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 25% (11% in the Gaz Strip and 35% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 24% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 18% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction;  17% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 10% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 10% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (37%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 15% said it is unemployment; 14% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 7% said it is the internal violence, and 1% said it is the inadequate infrastructure.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 June 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the decision by the PA president to postpone the holding of Palestinian elections that were scheduled to take place on 22 May 2021. It also witnessed the release of various Israeli decisions on an imminent expulsion of several Palestinian families from their homes in al Shaikh Jarrah and the impositions of various restrictions regarding Muslim’s access to al Aqsa Mosque during the month of Ramadan. These developments led to popular non-violent confrontations with the Israeli police and settlers in East Jerusalem that escalated to rocket attacks carried out be Hamas against Israeli cities. Hamas claimed that the attacks came in defense of East Jerusalem. The ensuing war between Hamas and Israel lasted for 11 days and led to the death of more than 250 Palestinians, including 66 children, and more than 10 Israelis, including two children. The period also witnessed a PA campaign to vaccinate Palestinian adults in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip against the coronavirus. The campaign led to a significant reduction in the daily rates of deaths and infections, particularly in the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2021 show significant changes in public attitudes toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leadership, Hamas, and relations with Israel. Two drivers seem to have triggered the change: the popular confrontations in East Jerusalem, the Israel-Hamas war, and their public perception of their outcomes on the one hand and the postponement of elections by the PA leadership on the other. 

The findings show a semi-public consensus that Hamas had won the confrontation with Israel and that Hamas’ launching of rockets at Israeli cities has been motivated by its desire to defend al Aqsa Mosque and the Palestinian families in al Shaikh Jarrah. Findings also show widespread public discontent with the performance of the PA government and leadership as well as Fatah during the confrontations and the war. They also show a two-third majority rejection of Abbas’ decision to postpone the elections. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas has postponed the elections because he was afraid of their outcome, not because Israel has prevented the holding of elections in East Jerusalem.

As a result, support for Hamas, and willingness to vote for it, increases dramatically while support for Fatah drops significantly. Moreover, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyyeh, manages to deliver an unprecedented victory over Abbas in a presidential election, if one is held today. Perhaps most importantly, a majority of the Palestinians think that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while a small percentage thinks Fatah under Abbas’ leadership is the one who deserves to do that.

Findings also show that more than 70% want to hold legislative and presidential elections soon and a similar percentage wants the PA to impose elections in East Jerusalem despite Israeli objection, rather than wait for an Israeli approval. The poll results do not have good news for most of the newly created electoral lists that registered for the legislative elections as only nine out of 36 managed to cross the threshold of 1.5% required to win seats in the parliament.

The confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel did not have an impact on the level of support for the two-state solution, which remained unchanged. But they did greatly impact other matters related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For example, support for a return to armed confrontations and intifada rose sharply to 60%, and support for a resumption of negotiations with Israel and the belief that negotiation is the most effective means of ending occupation dropped.  Moreover, the confrontations within Israel between the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Israeli police seem to have contributed to a significant reduction in support for the one-state solution, which declined from a third to a fifth in three months.

It is worth noticing however that the current findings are not fundamentally different from similar findings we obtained in the past immediately after similar Hamas-Israel confrontations. Therefore, they might be reflecting a temporary emotional reaction that might revert back to where things stood before the confrontations. The change from emotional to normal attitudes usually takes three to six months, as can be seen in our previous polls. But it should be pointed out that a return to “normal” attitudes has in the past been associated with a Hamas failure to maintain its gains and a success on the part of the PA to take measures that helped to pacify the public and win back its trust.

For the new Israeli government led by prime minister Naftali Bennett, about a fifth seems to think that it is better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu. Findings also show that while the largest percentage, but not the majority, is opposed to the participation of the Unified Arab List led by Mansour Abbas in the current coalition government, a similar percentage does support (or does not oppose or support) such participation.

1) Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

• 77% think Hamas has won the last confrontation with Israel and 65% think it has achieved its goals
• 72% think Hamas’ motive was the defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque
• In their evaluation of the performance of various local and regional actors, the public describe as “excellent” that of East Jerusalemites, Israeli Arabs, and Hamas
• 53% say Hamas, not Fatah under Abbas, deserves to represent and lead the Palestinian people; only 14% say Fatah under Abbas, not Hamas, deserves to represent and lead the Palestinians
• If Israel evict or expel the Palestinian families in al Shaikh Jarrah, 68% would support launching rockets at Israeli cities in retaliation
• 94% say they are proud of Gaza for its performance during the war

An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (77%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 1% think Israel came out a winner; 18% say no one came out a winner and 2% think both sides came out winners. Moreover, 65% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 26% think it did not.   72% think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 9% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 17% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers.

In an evaluation of the performance of 10 local and regional actors during the Jerusalem confrontations and the ensuing war between Israel and Hamas, the overwhelming majority describes as “excellent” that of the residents of Jerusalem and its youth (89%) followed by that of Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel (86%), followed by that of Hamas (75%). About one fifth describes as excellent the performance of each of the following governments: Egypt’s (22%), Turkey’s (21%), Jordan’s (21%), and Iran’s (18%). Finally, only 13% describe as excellent the performance of Fatah, 11% the PA government, and 8% Abbas’. The belief that Hamas’ performance was “excellent” is higher in the West Bank (80%) compared to the Gaza Strip (67%), in villages/towns (85%) compared to cities and refugee camps (74% and 71% respectively), among holders of BA degree (69%) compared to illiterates (56%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (78%) compared to those who work in the public sector (67%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (88% and 75% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (64%). t 

A majority of 64% views the residents of East Jerusalem as the group most willing to defend Jerusalem and its holy places, followed by Hamas at 29%, and the PA at 3%. In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, a majority of 53% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 14% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians. The belief that Hamas, not Fatah under Abbas, should represent and lead the Palestinians is higher in cities (54%) compared to villages/towns and refugees (49% each), among holders of BA degree (52%) compared to the illiterates (47%), among farmers and housewives (57% and 56% respectively) compared to merchants and students (47% and48% respectively) among those with the least income (59%) compared to those with the highest income (51%), among the religious (59%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligios (50% and 35% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (93%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (22% and 36% respectively).  

A majority of 60% thinks the participation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel in the recent confrontation was driven, first and foremost, by their desire to defend the holy sites, while 28% think it was driven by their desire to express rejection of integration in the Israeli society and their attachment to their national identity, and only 10% think it came as part of their struggle for equality and rejection of discrimination.

If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 68% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 18% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 9% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC). When asked about their expectations from the PA under Abbas leadership in case Israel expelled the Shaikh Jarrah families, the largest percentage (38%) said the PA will do nothing; 24% said it will write a complaint to the UN and the ICC; 20% think it will end security coordination with Israel, and 14% think it will launch popular non-violent resistance.

Public expectations from Hamas are very different: If Israel expels the Shaikh Jarrah families, 77% think Hamas will respond by launching rockets at Israeli cities; 10% think it will wage a non-violent campaign, 6% think it will issue protest statements, and only 5% think it will do nothing. But a majority of 55% think Israel will not expel the Shaikh Jarrah families and 40% think it will.

Two thirds of the public think there is a high or a medium chance that Hamas and Israel will reach a long-term truce that will ease the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 31% think the chances are slim.

A majority of 52% think that the incident in al Aqsa Mosque in which chants were made against the Jerusalem PA-appointed Mufti during his Friday sermon in the aftermath of the ceasefire between Israel and the “resistance” forces does not reflect its views while 44% think it does reflect them.

94% say they are proud of the performance of the Gaza Strip during the May confrontation with Israel while 6% say they are not. When asked about the main reason for being proud, 39% said they are proud because Gaza has delivered a military and rocket strike in defense of Jerusalem that demonstrated the weakness of the Israeli army; another 39% said they were proud because Gaza has brought the Palestinian cause back to forefront of Arab and international politics; and 13% said the reason they are proud is because Gaza has sacrificed and endured all the death and destruction while expressing patience and dignity in defense of Jerusalem. The percentage of those who are proud of Gaza because it delivered a military and rocket strike to Israel is higher in the West Bank (42%) compared to the Gaza Strip (35%), in villages and refugee camps (51% and 45% respectively) compared to cities (36%), among women (42%) compared to men (35%), among those who hold a BA degree (37%) compared to the illiterates (29%), among those who work in the private and nongovernmental sector (38%) compared to those who work in the public sector (34%), among the religious (47%) compared to the somewhat religious and the unreligious (35% and 25% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (48%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (34% and 39% respectively).  

2) The postponement of the legislative and presidential elections:

• 65% oppose the decision by president Abbas to postpone the elections and two thirds think the postponement came due to his fear of its outcome
• 72% demand the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections soon and 69% do not want a permission from Israel for holding them in East Jerusalem
• Ismail Haniyyeh wins in a presidential elections if held today by 59% against president Abbas who receives only 27%
• If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former wins by 51% and the latter receives 42%
• In a new parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 41% of the popular vote and Fatah 30%
• Most of the new electoral lists that were formed in preparation for holding parliamentary elections in May could not pass the electoral threshold

65% oppose and 25% support the decision of president Abbas to postpone legislative and presidential elections because Israel refuses to allow the holding of elections in East Jerusalem. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas postponed the elections because he was worried about the results while 25% think he postponed the elections because Israel refused to allow them in East Jerusalem. Opposition to the postponement decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (73%) compared to the West Bank (59%), in cities and villages (66% and 63% respectively) compared to refugee camps (57%), among men (67%) compared to women (62%), among refugees (68%) compared to non refugees (62%), among those who carry an AB degree (72%) compared to illiterates (43%), among merchants and professionals (76% and 66% respectively) compared to housewives (62%), among those who work in the private sector (68%) compared to those who work in the public sector (63%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (88% and 75% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (48%). Similarly, the belief that president Abbas postponed the elections because he was afraid of their outcome is higher cities (69%) compared to villages/towns (60%), among holders of BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (41%), among merchants, professionals and students (75%, 73%, and 70% respectively) compared to farmers and housewives (65% and 66% respectively), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (70%) compared to those who work in the public sector (63%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (88% and 70% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (41%).  

The largest percentage (43%) believes that there is no point in protesting Abbas’ decision to postpone the elections and that we should therefore accept it. On the other hand, 31% think that there should be protests but they should be conducted through non-violent demonstrations; 17% think the protests should be expressed through the courts and the judicial system routes.

72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank.  69% say we should not wait for an Israeli approval of elections in East Jerusalem and that we should impose these elections on Israel while 15% say it is better to wait for an Israeli approval. The majority (56%) of those who want the PA to hold elections without an Israeli approval demands holding elections immediately, 24% are in favor of holding the elections within three months, and 13% within a year or more. But about half of the Palestinians (49%) believes there will be no elections in the near future while 44% think elections will take place in the near future.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 27% and the latter 59% of the votes (compared to 46% for Haniyeh and 47% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 30% of the votes (compared to 44% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 60% (compared to 56% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 25% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 59% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 51% and Haniyeh 42%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 26% and the latter 63%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 48% and Haniyyeh 44%. 

In an open-ended question on the preferred president, in case Abbas is not nominated, 29% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 28% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% Dahlan, 3% Yahia Sinwar, and 2% for each of the following: Khalid Mishaal, Mohammad Shtayyeh, Mustafa Barghouti, and Salam Fayyad.  In a closed-ended question, about potential Abbas successors, 29% say they prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 28% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad (3% each), and Khalid Mishal (2%).

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, that participated in the 2006 elections, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 41% say they will vote for Hamas and 30% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 43%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 38% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 32% (compared to 53% three months ago).

We also asked about the vote for the 36 electoral lists that registered to compete in the parliamentary elections that was scheduled for May 2021. Only nine lists managed to pass the threshold of 1.5%: the largest percentage went to Hamas’ list, “Jerusalem is Our Call”  (36%) followed by Fatah’s list with 19%, “the freedom list” led by Nasser al Qidwah (9%), “the Future List” of Dahlan (3%), the “National Initiative” 2%, and the following lists managed to pass the threshold: the PFLP, “Together” led by Salam Fayyad, the “Democratic Change” led by Ibrahim Abu Hijlah, and “Palestine for All” led by Mufeed al Hasayneh. 

(3) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 65% in the Gaza Strip and 60% in the West Bank; but 42% of Gazans, compared to only 15% in the West Bank, say they want to emigrate
• 84% say there is corruption in the institutions of the PA and 57% say there is corruption in the institutions run by Hamas
• 56% say the PA is a burden on the Palestinian people and 35% view is as an asset
• Optimism about the prospects for reconciliation stands at 41% and pessimism at 56%
• The expectations that the Shtayyeh government will succeed in delivering reconciliation holding elections, or improving economic conditions stand at 30% or less

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 24%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 65% and in the West Bank at 60%. 26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 42% and in the West Bank at 15%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 40% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 57% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 70% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.  46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 52% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 19% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 50% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 47% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 46% of Gazans said it was good or very good.  The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a slight majority of 56% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 35% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 51% viewed the PA as a burden and 44% viewed it as an asset.

70% oppose and 26% support making payments to the families of martyrs and prisoners based on need assessment and number of family members rather than on the act committed by the martyr or the number of years in jail.

41% are optimistic and 56% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 34%. Two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 65% expect failure; only 29% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, one third of the public expects success and 60% expects failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 62% expects failure and 32% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV (13%), Palestine TV (12%), Palestine Today (10%), Maan (7%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (1%).

(4) The Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• Percentage of those who say they have received the coronavirus vaccine stands at 37% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip
• 66% are satisfied with the efforts made by their government to make the vaccine available
• A majority of 57% are satisfied with the PA efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus

23% (28% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 40% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 35% (37% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them. Also, 66% (81% in the Gaza Strip and 57% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 31% (18% in the Gaza Strip and 40% in the West Bank) are dissatisfied.

A majority of 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 41% are dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction in the West Bank stands at 48% and in the Gaza Strip at 30%.  The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at 49%. 

(5) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition at 58%; but a majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion
• 49% believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the occupation while 27% believe in negotiations
• 70% are opposed to a return to negotiations with Israel without conditions
• A drop in support for the one-state solution in three months from 33% to 20%
• 54% are opposed to return to dialogue with the new American administration and 63% are opposed to return to negotiations led by the US
• Only 19% of the public believe the new Israeli government under prime minister Bennett will be better for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations compared to a Netanyahu government

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  Support for the two-state solution increases to 41% and opposition drops to 56% when the borders of the Palestinian state are described as being based on the 1967 lines and its capital as East Jerusalem. When the public is asked to pick a choice from among three, 46% pick the two-state solution based on the 1967 lines, 10% pick a Palestinian-Israeli confederation, and only 6% pick a one-state for Jews and Arabs. We asked the public about its support for the idea of making Jerusalem, both East and West, an open city, whereby the Eastern part would be the capital of the Palestinian state and Western part would be the capital of the state of Israel. Less than a quarter (23%) supported and 73% opposed the idea.

A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 33% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 67% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 29% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 36% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 26% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 49% chose armed struggle, 27% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 37% chose armed struggle and 36% chose negotiations. Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 19% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 66% supported joining more international organizations; 58% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 60% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 20% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 43% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 42% supported dissolving the PA, and 33% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

54% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Moreover, 63% are opposed, and 29% are supportive of a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the US leadership. Support for such negotiations stands at 38% under the leadership of the international Quartet and 55% are opposed. Moreover, 52% do not believe, and 38% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.

The largest percentage (45%) are opposed to the participation of Israeli Arab parties in the Israeli governmental coalitions while 26% say they support Mansour Abbas’ decision to join the current coalition in Israel, and 21% say they neither support or oppose such participation.  About one fifth (19%) thinks that an Israeli government led by Naftali Bennett from the extreme right wing Yamina party will be better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu; a large majority of 69% disagree with that.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 47% view ending the Israeli occupation and building a Palestinian state as the top priority of the Palestinian people
• 24% believe that the Gaza siege is the main problem that confronts Palestinian society today and 21% think it is the spread of corruption

47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 8% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (24%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 20% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip, 21% (27% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the spread of corruption, 20% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 17% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 14% (19% in the Gaza Strip and 10% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 3% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, December 2011  

Increase in Palestinians’ and Israelis’ willingness to compromise amidst climate of feud and mistrust 

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem. 

The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll has been tracking the level of support and opposition to the Clinton permanent settlement framework regularly since 2003. Amidst a turbulent Middle East and the political and diplomatic stalemate between the two sides, our December poll shows an increase in support for the Clinton permanent settlement framework on both sides. 58% of Israelis and 50% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters; 39% of Israelis and 49% of Palestinians oppose such a settlement. These results mark a significant increase in both sides’ willingness to compromise compared to recent years. 

At the same time both Palestinians and Israelis perceive the other side as opposing such a settlement: 61% of the Palestinians and 53% of the Israelis think so. About two thirds on both sides do not believe that it is possible to reach a final status settlement these days and see the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the near future as slim. 

Palestinians and Israelis support their government’s position with regard to return to negotiations. 78% of Palestinians support Abbas’s conditions of an acceptable term of reference or a freeze on settlement construction for returning to negotiations, while 69% of Israelis think that Israel should not accept these conditions.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 15 and 17 , 2011. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 605 adult Israeli Jews interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 11 and 14, 2011. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Attitudes, perceptions and expectations regarding a permanent settlement 

Clinton/Geneva Parameters 

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials eleven years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues regularly since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues, amidst a turbulent Middle East and the political and diplomatic stalemate between the two sides.

• 58% of Israelis and 50% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters; 39% of Israelis and 49% of Palestinians oppose such a settlement.
• The results indicate a significant increase in support for the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement package both sides compared to recent years. In December 2010, the comparable figures were 52% support among Israelis and 40% support among Palestinians.
• Since 2003, we observed only once majority support for such a settlement on both sides: in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat. The level of support then was 64% among Israelis and 54% among Palestinians. Our current poll comes close to the 2003 results, where among Israelis there is 58% support, and among Palestinians – 50%.

Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton / Geneva permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 63% support or strongly support and 36% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2010, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 49% and opposition at 50% - an increase in support of 14 percentage points.

Among Israelis 51% support and 44% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2010, 49% of the Israelis supported this component while 43% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians 45% support and 53% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2010, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 57% opposed it.

Among Israelis 42% support such an arrangement and 51% oppose it. In December 2010, 36% supported it and 52% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 40% support and 59% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2010, an identical compromise obtained 36% support and 63% opposition.

Among Israelis, 38% agree and 60% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2010, similarly, 38% supported this arrangement and 58% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 32% support and 67% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2010, 24% support, and opposition reached 74%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians, as in previous polls, although the current level of support is the highest since 2003. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

Among Israelis 67% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 62% support and 34% opposition obtained in December 2010.

(5) Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 50% support and 49% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. This is a significant increase in support compared to December 2010, when 38% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 61% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 63% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 52% who supported it and 39% who opposed it in December 2010 – s similar increase in support as among Palestinians.

(6) End of Conflict

In the Palestinian public 63% support and 35% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. In December 2010 58% supported and 41% opposed this item.

In the Israeli public 70% support and 27% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2010, similarly, 68% of the Israelis supported it while 25% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 50% support and 49% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2010, 40% supported and 58% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 58% support and 39% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2010 52% supported and 39% opposed such a package. 

It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people’s calculus is compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the undesirable parts. 

• Despite the actual majority support for the final status package in Israel, only 34% of the Israelis estimate that a majority in their society supports this package, while 55% believe that the majority opposes it. These perceptions tap the normative facet of public opinion and indicate that the package has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians, who are split in their support for the package, 51% believe that a majority in their society supports it, and 41% believe that the majority opposes it.
• In terms of mutual perceptions, majorities of both Israelis and Palestinians think that there is no majority support for this permanent status settlement package on the other side. 53% of the Israelis think that a majority of Palestinians opposes such a package, and 61% of the Palestinians think that a majority of Israelis opposes the package.
• Both sides' expectations regarding a final status settlement are grim: 68% among Israelis and 62% among Palestinians think it is impossible to reach such a settlement these days.
• Both publics also consider the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years low. 66% of Israelis and 63% of Palestinians consider these chances to be low or non-existent. ​

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement Framework 2003-2011 

(B) Expectations regarding the recognition by the UN of the Palestinian state

• 52% of Palestinians think that a state of Palestine will become a UN member in 2012, while 42% do not believe so. Among Israelis, 44% think this will happen while 49% do not believe so.
• We asked Palestinians how they think Palestinians can force Israel to withdraw from the territories, if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state, and Israelis what they think Palestinians will do. 47% of Israelis think the Palestinians will resume the Intifada including armed confrontations, while 25% think they will start non-violent resistance such as peaceful demonstrations, and 17% think they will return to negotiations with the Israeli government. Palestinians however are split among these three options: 31% think peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw; 30% think that armed attacks on army and settlers and 32% think that negotiations with Israeli can bring it to withdraw.

(C) Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities

• 47% of Israelis support the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities, 41% oppose it. 56% believe that the majority of the Israeli public supports such a strike, 25% think that a majority opposes it.
• Palestinians are split in their evaluation whether Israel will actually carry out a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities: 48% think it will strike, and 48% do not think so.
• 76% of Israelis think that if Israel were to carry out a military strike against Iran, Hamas and Islamic Jihad would retaliate by carrying out a military strike against Israel; 18% do not think so. 48% of Palestinians support such retaliation by Hamas and Islamic Jihad and 46% oppose it.

(D) Conflict management and threat perceptions 

• Palestinians and Israelis support their government’s position with regard to return to negotiations. 78% of Palestinians support Abbas’s conditions for an acceptable term of reference or a freeze on settlement construction for returning to negotiations, while 20% oppose this policy. 69% of Israelis support Netanyahu’s position that Israel should not accept these conditions; 29% oppose this position.
• Given the stalemate in the negotiations and the admittance of the Palestinians to UNESCO as a member state, 54% of the Israelis and 38% of the Palestinians think that armed attacks will not stop or even increase and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 37% of the Israelis and 28% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will continue but some armed attacks will continue as well. Only 5% of Israelis and 27% of Palestinians believe negotiations will continue and armed confrontations will stop.
• In our poll we also examine periodically Israelis’ and Palestinians’ readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 66% of the Israeli public, support such a mutual recognition; 29% oppose it. Among Palestinians, 52% support and 47% oppose this step. In September 2011, 58% of the Israelis supported and 36% opposed this mutual recognition of identity, among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were 46% supported and 52% opposed.
• Among Israelis, 50% are worried and 48% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 58% who are worried and 42% who are not worried in September 2011. Among Palestinians 70% fear that their security and safety and that of their family are not assured compared to 73% in September.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 22% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinians’ aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (45%); 22% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 29% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967. 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-8 September 2018. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the convening of the PLO Central Council, the launch of an indirect Hamas-Israel negotiations for a long term quiet or tahdia, the resumption of Egyptian efforts to reconcile Fatah and Hamas and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the US decision to stop all financial contributions to UNRWA and to suspend most aid to the PA, the Israeli adoption of a controversial nation-state law, and a leaked statement that President Abbas has reported that the Trump peace team had sought his views on the idea of Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. Moreover, this month of September coincides with the 25^th anniversary of the Oslo agreement. This press release addresses all these issues and covers other matters such as parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The poll examines internal Palestinian conditions and those related to Israeli-Palestinian relations and Palestinian-American relations. Findings of the third quarter indicate a decline in the popularity of both Fatah and Hamas compared to our findings three months ago. The decline might be attributed to the tense power struggle between the two movements that was in clear display during the past two months in the aftermath of the failed reconciliation efforts and a pointless quarrel over who has the right to negotiate a long term quiet, tahdia, or cessation of violence in the Gaza Strip, Hamas or the PA and what comes first, reconciliation or tahdia.  Findings show that more than 60% of the public want president Abbas to resign and that the public disagrees with some of the most important domestic policies of the Palestinian president. An overwhelming majority 

opposes his decision to cut the salaries of PA employees in the Gaza Strip; two-thirds oppose his demand to disarm armed groups in the Strip; and a majority is opposed to his demand that Hamas hand over full control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government. Moreover, a majority opposes Abbas’ position that tahdia between Hamas and Israel is the business of the PA and the PLO rather than that of Hamas. Indeed, a majority of the public supports Hamas’ efforts to reach an agreement with Israel on a long term Tahdia even in the absence of reconciliation. A larger percentage places the blame for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip on the president and the reconciliation government rather than on Hamas. Indeed, about half of the public believes that the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people rather than an asset.

The public shows support for the convening of the PLO Central Council’s session in Ramallah last month and criticizes those factions that boycotted the meeting. Large majorities support the decisions taken by the Central Council regarding the suspension of Palestinian recognition of Israel, ending security coordination with the Israeli security services, and stopping all measures taken against PA employees in the Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, the majority has no confidence that the Palestinian leadership will implement any of these decisions.

In exploring attitudes regarding the peace process, we examined issues like public perception of the two-state and the one-state solutions, a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, and attitudes toward the Oslo agreement. Findings show that a majority is opposed to the concept of two-state solution when that solution is presented without any description or details. But a majority supports that solution when it is defined as the creation of a Palestinian state along side the state of Israel on the basis of 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital. Only a quarter prefers a one-state solution, one in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equality in all issues, over a two-state solution. Findings show that two-thirds of the public are opposed to the idea of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation that, according to Abbas, was proposed by the US peace team. Furthermore, a larger majority of three quarters is opposed to a trilateral confederation between Palestine, Jordan and Israel. The great opposition to the Palestinian-Jordanian confederation is probably due to lack of trust in the US team and due to a Palestinian suspicion that the idea aims at preempting the goal of establishing a Palestinian state. Previous PSR findings during the past decade show support for such an idea exceeding 40%. On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Oslo agreement, two thirds of the public indicate that the agreement had damaged Palestinian national interests; indeed, almost three quarters of the public believe that the situation today is worse than the pre-Oslo conditions. This of course does not mean that the public wants the return to Israeli occupation; rather, it seems that public is comparing conditions before and after Oslo in several other dimensions such as the multiplication of the size of settlement enterprise, the current split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and conflict between Fatah and Hamas, the ending of the first intifada by Oslo and the absence today of any similar popular movement to end the Israeli occupation, that on-going security coordination with Israel despite the diminished chances for peace, and public belief that the Palestinian political system is becoming more and more authoritarian and lacking any accountability.

Finally, in light of the deterioration in relations between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration, the US termination of most of its aid to the PA, and the US cancelation of its contributions to UNRWA, we asked the public about re-engagement with the US, the views on the “Deal of the Century,” and the chances that the US would succeed in ending UNRWA’s work. Findings show that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US or a return to negotiations with Israel. In fact, 90% expressed the belief that the US is biased in favor of Israel. Half of the public want the Palestinain leadership to reject the US “Deal of the Century” out of hand even before seeing it because it will certainly be bad for Palestinians while only a small minority of 14% thinks that the leadership sould accept the plan because it will certainly be better than the status quo. A majority believes that the Trump Administration will fail in its efforts to end the work of UNRWA but half is worried that if the US does succeed the outcome could contribute to ending the refugee issue.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 54% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip.
• If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 33% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip). Rami al Hamdallah and Mustafa Barghouti are selected by 4% each, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad and Saeb Erikat by 2% each.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 35% and dissatisfaction at 61%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 42% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 28% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 47% and the latter 45% of the vote (compared to 47% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 41% of the vote (compared to 40% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 41% (compared to 41% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 27% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 28% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 34% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 34% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 21% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 43% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%. And, now that most US aid to the PA has been cut by the US Administration, an overwhelming majority of 77% is worried that the cut in aid could lead to increased unemployment and poverty and a deterioration in daily living conditions while 20% are not worried.
• In a close-ended question, we asked respondents to identify the party or side responsible for the worsening conditions in the Gaza Strip: Hamas, the PA and Abbas, Egypt, or others. The largest percentage (43%) blames the PA, president Abbas, and the reconciliation government; 24% blame Hamas, 8% blame Egypt, and 17% blame others. Responses of West Bankers differ from those of Gazans: 60% of Gazans, compared to 32% of West Bankers, blame the PA, Abbas and the reconciliation government; and 27% of Gazans, compared to 22% of West Bankers, blame Hamas.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 45%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 48%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 51% and in the West Bank at 52%.
• One third of the public says it wants to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to half and declines in the West Bank to 22%.
• Only 35% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 59% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.
• In light of repeated reports on finding and destroying narcotics plantations in West Bank areas, we asked the public about the implications of these reports: 57% said that it indicates a recent rise in planting narcotics while 36% believe that it means that the PA security services are becoming more able and more effective in fighting narcotics.
• Half of the public (50%) views the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 18%, followed by Maan TV (at 14%), Al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (13% each), Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (at 12%), Al Arabiya (at 5%) and al Mayadeen and al Quds TV (4% each).

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• 22% are satisfied and 67% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. Three months ago, satisfaction stood at 30%.
• 28% optimistic and 65% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%.
• The public is opposed to Abbas’ position that Hamas must fully hand over control over the Gaza Strip to the reconciliation government, including the ministries, the security sector, and the “arms:” only 31% agrees with Abbas’ demand but a majority of 62% disagrees. Three months ago, 40% said they agreed with Abbas.
• When the question of “arms” was further clarified by asking the public if it supports or opposes the continued existence of armed factional battalions in the Gaza Strip alongside the official PA security sector forces, two-thirds (66%) said that they prefer to keep the armed battalions in place and only 28% said that they oppose the continued existence of the armed battalions in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that on this matter, there are no differences between the attitudes of the West Bankers and Gazans.
• Moreover, an overwhelming majority (81%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 16% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the reconciliation government. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the immediate lifting of PA measures stands at 84% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.   

4) Israel-Hamas long-term tahdia, or truce, negotiations 

• A majority of 55% supports and 38% oppose a Hamas-Israel long-term tahdia, or cessation of violence, even in the absence of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The agreement would entail the opening of the border crossing with Egypt and access to a seaport and an airport in a neighboring area in return for a Hamas enforcement of a long-term ceasefire as well as ending the Return Marches and the incendiary kites. Support for this long-term cessation of violence is higher in the Gaza Strip (63%) than in the West Bank (50%).
• The public is divided in its assessment of the probable consequences of such long-term agreement in the absence of reconciliation: 46% believe that it could transform the current split into a permanent separation leading to the establishment of an independent political entity in the Gaza Strip, while 44% believe no such separation would come out of that long-term agreement.
• Nonetheless, if permanent separation occurs, 40% believe that Hamas will be seen as more responsible for such development than any other Palestinian faction because it negotiated with Israel and agreed to a long-term cessation of violence without the participation of the PA and the Palestinian leadership. A similar percentage (38%) believes that the PA leadership will be seen as more responsible for that development because it imposed sanctions on the Gaza Strip and did not offer the needed concessions to facilitate reconciliation.

5) Decisions of the Palestinian Central Council of the PLO

• A majority of 54% disagrees with the decision of various factions to boycott the latest meeting of the PLO’s Central Council in Ramallah and believe it was a wrong decision while 30% think it was the right decision.  A similar percentage (53%) believes that the boycott has damaged the legitimacy of the Central Council while a third believes it has not done that.
• Two thirds (66%) support and 26% oppose the Central Council’s decision to suspend Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel until Israel recognizes the state of Palestine. But a majority of 52% believes that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and 35% believe it will implement it.
• Similarly, 68% support and 25% oppose the Central Council’s decision to stop security coordination with Israel; but more than two-thirds (69%) believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 21% believe it will.
• Moreover, 76% support and 18% oppose the Central Council’s decision to immediately stop all measures taken against PA employees in the Gaza Strip; but 50% of the public believe that the Palestinian leadership will not implement that decision and only 37% believe it will.

6) Palestinian-Jordanian confederation

• We asked the public about the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation in the context of the statement made by president Abbas regarding an offer made by the US peace team and in light of Abbas’ statement that the he favors a trilateral confederation that includes Palestine, Jordan, and Israel. About two-thirds rejected and 29% accepted a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.
• When asked about the trilateral confederation, Palestine, Jordan, and Israel, 75% rejected it and 18% accepted it.

7) 25 years after Oslo

• Twenty-five years after the signing of the Oslo agreement, we asked the public to tell us, based on personal experience, or based on what it had heard or read, if conditions today are better or worse than conditions before Oslo. Almost three quarter (73%) said conditions today are worse than those prevailing before Oslo; 13% said conditions today are better; and 10% said conditions today are the same as those before Oslo.
• We also asked the public about the most important reason for the failure of the Oslo agreement. More than one third (36%) said that Israel’s refusal to end its occupation and stop settlement construction was the main reason for the failure; 35% said that the lack of pressure on Israel from the international community was the main reason for the failure; and 27% said that it was the fault of the Palestinians themselves. In particular, the Palestinian contribution to the failure was divided as follows: 11% said the PA did not build strong public institutions that fights corruption and enforce the rule of law; 9% said that Fatah sought an exclusive control over that excluded the other factions; 6% said that Hamas and Islamic Jehad violated the agreement and carried out armed attacks against the Israelis; and 2% put the blame on the second intifada and the bombing attacks that targeted the Israelis.
• We asked the public to assess the impact of Oslo on Palestinian national interests: two thirds (65%) said it damaged the national interest, 16% said it served the national interest, and 16% said it neither damaged nor served the national interest.

8) The peace process

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 47% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, 43% supported this concept.
• Yet, when we asked the public to choose between the two-state solution, the one-state solution, or any other third solution, 53% said they prefer the two-state solution, 24% said they prefer the one-state solution, and 14% preferred some other solution. It should be noted however that in this question we have defined the two-state solution to mean “a Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.” The one-state solution was defined as “a state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights in all matters.”
• A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 41% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 40% of the public while 30% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation” and 12% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance.” A small minority of 14% prefer to keep the status quo.
• A large minority of 39% thinks that negotiation is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while a third (33%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means and 21% think non-violent resistance is the most effective.
• An overwhelming majority of 78% say they are worried that in their daily life they would be hurt by Israelis or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished; 22% say they are worried.
• Three quarter (74%) say that the newly issued Israeli “nation state” law poses a threat to the rights and interests of Israeli Arabs and 84% believe that the passing of this law will lead to an increase in settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
• 80% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its problems and internal conflicts and that Palestine is not its primary cause; 19% believe that Palestine remains the primary cause of the Arab World. Moreover, 69% believe that an alliance already exists between Sunni Arabs and Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation; 22% disagrees with this assessment.
• 57% believe that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to expand the state of Israel to stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and to expel the Palestinian population, and 23% think that Israel aims at annexing the occupied territories and deny the Palestinian citizens their rights. By contrast, only 18% think that Israel’s long-term aspiration is to insure its security and then withdraw from all or parts of the occupied territories.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 76% support joining more international organizations; 65% support popular non-violence resistance; 46% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 29% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis.
• On the occasion of the International Day of Peace we asked the public about its expectations regarding the impact of a Palestinian-Israeli peace, when reached, on their living conditions. The largest percentage (45%) said it will improve its living conditions; 17% said it will worsen their living conditions; and 34% said peace will have no impact on their living conditions.

9) American-Palestinian relations, the “Deal of the Century,” and the future of UNRAWA

• A majority of 62% is opposed and 27% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Moreover, 58% want the PA to reject US efforts to make it negotiate with Israel; 37% support the resumption of negotiations with Israel.
• Half of the public believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 31% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 14% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo.
• 90% of the public believe that if negotiations with Israel resumed under sponsorship of the Trump Administration, the US will be biased in favor of Israel and 6% think the US will be an honest broker.
• In light of US cut of most aid to the PA, we asked the public if it would be better if the PA changed its policy to insure continued US aid: 62% said they want the PA to maintain its current policies and 31% said they want the PA to change its current policies to please the Americans.
• When we asked the public about its expectations from the PA leadership regarding US pressure, 49% said the PA will indeed change its policy and 43% said it does not expect the PA to change its policy.
• We also asked the public about the US cancelation of its aid to UNRWA and what might happen if the US succeeds in shutting down this UN agency: 49% said that if UNRWA is closed down, the refugees’ cause will suffer and 46% said such a development will not end the refugee cause.
• When asked about the chances for a US success in shutting down UNRWA, 55% said the US will not succeed and 37% said it will succeed.
• When asked to speculate about the reasons that the US had the nerve to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem and to wage a campaign against UNRWA, 48% of the public said it was the weakness of and divisions in the Arab World, 28% said it was the result of the weakness of and divisions among the Palestinians, and 23% said it was due to the personality of Trump himself.

(10) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 27% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 20% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll  17 - 23 June 2012

 Israelis are split and Palestinians oppose a new Israeli unilateral plan designed to encourage settlers to move back to Israel in order to bolster the two-state solution and the Israeli government’s ability to reach a peace solution with the Palestinians. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians think that the plan is likely to be implemented by the Netanyahu government

These are the results of the most recent Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. The poll was conducted in the backdrop of the recent round of violent clashes in Southern Israel and the Gaza Strip. The poll was supported by the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

Recently a new plan was published in the Israeli media about an Israeli plan for unilateral steps in the West Bank. The plan was designed to bolster two-state solution and the government’s ability to reach a peace solution with the Palestinians. These are the features of the plan:

The Israeli government will declare that it is willing to return to negotiations anytime and that it has no claims of sovereignty on areas east of the existing separation wall/fence

Israel will end all settlement construction east of the wall/fence and in the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem

At the same time, Israel will prepare to bring back settlers living outside the separation wall/fence and will establish a fair compensation plan for them.

IDF will remain in the Palestinian territories until a final status agreement is reached

The proposed plan will take place either unilaterally or with Palestinian cooperation.

·         Among Israelis, 44% support the plan and 46% oppose it. Among Palestinians 35% view it as good for Palestinians and 59% view it as bad for Palestinians.

·         27% of the Israelis and 24% among Palestinians think that there are high or medium chances that this plan will be implemented by the Netanyahu government; 38% of the Israelis and 34% of Palestinians think the chances are low,  and 30% of the Israelis and 36% of the Palestinians think that there are no chances.

The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between June 21 and 23, 2012. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 602 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between June 17 and 21, 2012. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.  

MAIN FINDINGS

 (A) Attitudes and expectations regarding the peace process:  

• Majorities among Israelis (71%) and Palestinians (68%) view the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to Israel in the next five years as low or non-existent. A majority of Israelis (56%) supports a two-state solution while 40% oppose it; Palestinians are split 49% to 49% on this issue. But majorities on both sides, 58% of Israelis and 55% of Palestinians, think that the two-state solution is bound to fail because of the settlements. At the same time, majorities among Israelis (60%) and among Palestinians (65%) oppose the one state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equality; 36% of Israelis and 31% of Palestinians support this solution.
• 51% of the Palestinians support the Saudi plan and 45% oppose it, while 36% of the Israelis support and 59% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. These results are similar to those obtained in our recent polls.
• As we do periodically in our joint polls, we have asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 53% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 43% oppose it. Among Palestinians, 43% support and 55% oppose this step. In March 2012, 55% of the Israelis supported and 39% opposed this mutual recognition of identity; among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll.

(B) Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities:  

• 51% of Israelis support the cooperation between the US and Israel in bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, 19% support a strike by Israel alone without the cooperation of the US. 26% oppose any strike.
• 72 % of Israelis think that if Israel were to carry out a military strike against Iran, a major regional war will erupt; 22% of Israelis do not think so.

 (C) Conflict management and threat perceptions:  

• Given the expansion of the Likud government with Kadima, 50% of the Israelis think that armed attacks will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 36% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will continue but some armed attacks will continue as well. Only 6% of Israelis believe negotiations will continue and armed confrontations will stop. Among the Palestinians, 19% think that some armed attacks will take place and the two sides will not return to negotiations, 18% think the two sides will soon return to negotiations and 32% think the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed attacks will take place. Finally, 21% think the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.
• 73% of Israelis oppose an Israeli intervention in the events in Syria; 19% support humanitarian assistance and granting political asylum to rebels, 2% support supply of weapons and ammunition, and 4% support active intervention of the Israeli army.
• Among Israelis, 51% are worried and 48% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, as they were in March 2012. Among Palestinians, 74% are worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. In March 2012, perception of worry among Palestinians was similar.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 62% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 19% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (41%); 15% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 38% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967.
• Recently a new unilateral plan was published in the Israeli media, designed to bolster the two-state solution and the Israeli government’s ability to reach a peace solution with the Palestinians. These are the features of the plan:

-          The Israeli government will declare that it is willing to return to negotiations anytime and that it has no claims of sovereignty on areas east of the existing separation wall/fence

-          Israel will end all settlement construction east of the wall/fence and in the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem

-          At the same time, Israel will prepare to bring back settlers living outside the separation wall/fence and will establish a fair compensation plan for them

-          IDF will remain in the Palestinian territories until a final status agreement is reached

-          The proposed plan will take place either unilaterally or with Palestinian cooperation.

Among Israelis 44% support the plan and 46% oppose it. Among Palestinians 35% viewed it as good for Palestinians and 59% viewed it as bad for Palestinians. 27% of the Israelis and 24% among Palestinians think that there are high or medium chances that this plan will be implemented by the Netanyahu government; 38% of the Israelis and 34% of Palestinians think the chances are low, and 30% of the Israelis and 36% of Palestinians think that the chances are non-existent.

 (D) Domestic affairs:  

• When asked to choose among four basic values: regarding the identity of Israel: a Jewish state, Greater Israel, a democratic state (with equal political rights to all), and peace (low probability for war), 38% of Israeli Jews choose a Jewish state as the most desired value; 26% choose peace, and Democracy is most highly ranked by 23%. Only 12% chose Greater Israel as their most preferred value.
• On the Palestinian side, when asked to chose among four vital goals for the Palestinian people, 47% selected end of Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, 30% selected obtaining right of return of refugees, 15% selected building a pious or moral individual and a religious society, and 8% selected the establishment of a democratic political system.
• As in other opinion polls carried out recently, the Likud leads by far the other parties in terms of vote intention of Israelis if the elections for the Knesset were to be held now. In March 2012, when we added to the list of political parties a party of the social protest movement, it came out a close second to the Likud with 14% to the Likud’s 16%. In the current poll, when we add to the list of political parties a party of the social protest movement, only 8% indicate they would vote for it. Since such a party has not been actually proclaimed, this prognosis is premature; however these results are noteworthy since they were obtained in the backdrop of the recent violent clashes with the Palestinians in the South while security and not social and economic issues were high on the political agenda.
• On the Palestinian side, if presidential and parliamentary elections were to take place today, Abbas receives 49% of the vote and Ismail Haniyeh 44% of those participating in the presidential elections, while Fateh wins 40% and Hamas 29% of the popular vote of those participating in the parliamentary elections; all other parties combined receive 12% of the vote and 19% say they have not decided yet to whom they will vote.
•  

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.

This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

• Given the halt in Israeli Palestinian negotiations, 14% of the Israelis and 36% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will soon return to negotiations. 38% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed attacks will take place. By contrast, 28% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and some armed attacks will take place.  7% of the Israelis and 13% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.
• At the same time, each side perceives the other side as constituting a threat to its very existence. 55% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals in the long run are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens. 26% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 31% of the Israelis think that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 20% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel.
•  Regarding conflict resolution: Consistent with previous results: 62% of Israelis and 54% of Palestinians support a two-state solution 

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 5 and 7, 2014. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 605 adult Israelis interviewed in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between June 8 and 15, 2014. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Ifat Maoz, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, and the Department of Communication, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki, at email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Ifat Maoz at email msifat@mscc.huji.ac.il.

 MAIN FINDINGS

 (A) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• Given the halt in Israeli Palestinian negotiations, we asked both sides about their expectations for the future: 14% of the Israelis and 36% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will soon return to negotiations. 38% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed attacks will take place. 28% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians think that some armed attacks will take place and the two sides will not return to negotiations. Finally, 7% of the Israelis and 13% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.
• Among Israelis, 51% are worried and 47% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. Among Palestinians, 77% are worried and 23% are not worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 55% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 26% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (31%); 20% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 18% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part (11%) or all (7%) of the territories occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security. 41% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain all (23%) or some (18%) of the territories conquered in 1967.
• At the same time: 14% of the Israelis say the aspirations of Israel are to withdraw to the 1967 borders after guaranteeing Israel’s security. 35% say they are to withdraw from parts of the territories after guaranteeing Israel’s security. 15% say they are to annex the West Bank without granting political rights to the Palestinians living there. 13% say they are to annex the West Bank and expel the Palestinians living there.
• Among the Palestinians 40% say that the aspirations of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO are to regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war. 25% say they are to regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war. 16% say they are to conquer the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine. 12% say they are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel.

 (B) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda

The Saudi Plan

• 29% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians support the Saudi peace plan, 64% of the Israelis and 46% of the Palestinians oppose it. In December 2013, 47% of the Palestinians supported the Saudi plan and 50% opposed it, while 33% of the Israelis supported and 64% opposed it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations.

The Israeli-Palestinian Track

• Dismantling settlements - 44% of the Israelis support and 51% oppose the dismantling of most of the settlements in the West Bank as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
• Mutual Recognition - As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 52% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 38% opposes it. Among Palestinians, 40% support and 59% oppose this step. In December 2013, 58% of the Israelis supported and 34% opposed this mutual recognition; among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll (43% support and 56% oppose).
• 62% of Israelis and 54% of Palestinians support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution and 34% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians oppose it. In December 2013, 63% of Israelis and 53% of Palestinians supported a two-state solution and 32% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians opposed it.