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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-8 February 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the release of the Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and its immediate rejection by the Palestinian leadership. The Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo few days later and unanimously rejected the plan. A similar rejection followed by representatives of the Islamic countries. Despite the consensus, some Arab countries expressed timid welcome of US efforts and three Arab countries sent their ambassadors to the event in the White House in which the plan was announced. Internally, Fatah and Hamas issued conciliatory statements calling for reconciliation but this was not followed by any concrete measures and efforts to hold Palestinian elections witnessed some serious setbacks. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, tensions rose significantly during the fieldwork period as popular confrontations developed in various cities and signs of an emerging trade crisis were visible. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%. 

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings: 

This quarterly poll was conducted one month earlier than planned in order to measure, in a timely manner, the immediate public response to the American plan known as the “Deal of the Century.” Findings show a Palestinian consensus against the plan as a package and against each of its components, including the economic part if linked to acceptance of the political section of the plan. Moreover, more than 80% of the public believe that the plan has returned the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to its existential roots. The majority speculates that the Trump plan has been deliberately designed to ensure a Palestinian rejection in order for the US to allow Israel to unilaterally annex the Jordan valley and the Jewish settlements. 

Findings also show that two-thirds of the public support president Abbas’ policy against the plan. But the majority, ranging between two-thirds and three quarters, does not trust the president’s word, as it believes he will not implement his own decision to end relations with Israel and the US. In response to the Trump plan, the overwhelming majority wants the president to end the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to withdraw PA recognition of Israel, to end security coordination, to stop the implementation of the Oslo agreement, and to even resort to armed struggle.

Findings also show unprecedented decline in support for the two-state solution to less than 40%, the lowest reported by PSR since the signing of the Oslo agreement. They also show a rise in the percentage of those who think that the most effective means of ending the occupation is armed struggle; they also show a decline in the percentage of those who think negotiation is the most effective means.

In domestic matters, finding show a decline in Abbas’ popularity and that of Fatah compared to our findings two-months ago. They also show a rise in the popularity of Hamas’ Ismael Haniyyeh during the same period. If presidential elections were to take place today, 50% would vote for Haniyyeh. Findings also show a drop in the level of optimism regarding the prospects of holding of parliamentary elections soon. But optimism about the prospects for reconciliation increases a little compared to two months ago and about half of the public indicates that if elections were to take place today, they would contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 

(1) US “Deal of the Century”:

• 94% oppose and 4% support the “deal of the century”
• Two-thirds support Abbas’ position in opposing the American deal, but between 68% and 73% believe that Abbas will not implement his own declared policy against the plan
• The overwhelming majority does not believe the US plan puts an end to the Israeli occupation
• 77% support ending security coordination, 69% support ending the implementation of the Oslo agreement, and 64% support resort to armed struggle as the means to fight against the US plan
• 69% are optimistic that the US plan will fail
• 83% believe that the Palestinians must rely on themselves while 14% think it is possible to rely on the Arab countries
• 76% oppose and 11% support resumption of Palestinian contacts with the US Administration 

We presented to the respondents the various components of the American plan, known as the “Deal of the Century,” one component after the other, and asked them if they support or oppose each. We then asked the public about the entire plan as one package. Opposition to the package stood at 94% and support at 4%. Opposition to the components ranged between 91%, for the item on the billions in economic support conditioned on accepting the political plan, and 95%, for the item on Jerusalem and the Palestinian capital and the one on holy places.  Similarly, 94% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 3% believe a majority supports it.  By contrast, 70% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews support the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.

A majority of 65% expresses support and 27% express opposition for the policy outlined by president Abbas against the Trump plan in which he stated that he is ending relations with Israel and the US including security relations. But a majority of 68% believes that the PA president will not implement his decision to end security coordination with Israel and 73% believe that he will not actually turn conditions to where they were before the Oslo agreement. This seems to be the reason why despite supporting his policy, a majority of 58% is dissatisfied with the actual response of the PA leadership to the American plan; 38% are satisfied.

In light of the terms of the US plan, an overwhelming majority of 82% believe the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 7% think the plan makes peace more attainable. If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 58% think the chances are zero; 21% think the chances are less than 50%; and 7% think that the chances are more than 50%.

We proposed to the public 10 possible responses to the American plan and asked it about its support and opposition to each response; expectation regarding what the PA will adopt or allow as a response; and its expectations regarding what will actually happen on the ground: 

Nonetheless, a majority of 69% believes the “Deal of the Century” will fail due to Palestinian opposition while 26% think it will succeed despite that opposition.  We asked the public about its view on why the Trump Administration designed this its plan in the manner it did: a majority of 60% said the Administration deliberately wanted the Palestinians to reject the plan so that Israel can annex the Jordan Valley and the settlements while 34% thought the US actually expected the Palestinian weakness to force them to accept the plan.  We also asked the public to speculate about the motivation of the three Arab countries (UAE, Bahrain, and Oman) that participated in the event in the White House in which the Trump plan was revealed: 83% said they wanted to demonstrate their support for Israel; 6% said they wanted to demonstrate support to Israel and the Palestinians, and only 3% said they wanted to demonstrate support for the Palestinians alone.  The Arab League’s unanimous decision to reject the Trump plan notwithstanding, 83% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinians must nonetheless rely only on themselves while 14% believe they can rely on the Arab countries.

A majority of 76% is opposed and 11% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Two months ago 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.  A majority of 59% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 35% expect him to win it. Similarly, a majority of 53% expects the indictment of Netanyahu in corruption charges to lead to his ouster from leadership in Israel soon while 41% expect him to succeed in staying in power despite the indictment. Two months ago, 58% expected Netanyahu to be removed from power.

(2) The peace process:

• Support for the two-state solution drops in two months from 42% to 39%
• Support for armed struggle, as the means to change the status quo, rises in two months from 39% to 45%
• 50% believe that the best means to end the Israeli occupation is armed struggle, 21% say it is negotiations, and 23% pick non-violent popular resistance 

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Two months ago, support for the concept stood at 42%. 36% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 57% believe that the majority opposes it.  A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 33% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 76% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 22% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 22% of the public while 45% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Two months ago, 29% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, half of the public (50%) chose armed struggle, 21% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Two months ago, 47% chose armed struggle and 26% chose negotiations.

(3) Legislative and presidential election

• 62% demand Abbas’ resignation and in presidential elections between Ismail Haniyyeh and Abbas, 49% vote for the former and 44% for the latter
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 38% of the vote and Hamas 32%
• Optimism about the holding of elections declines in two months from 52% to 45%
• Support for holding elections if Israel prevents holding them in East Jerusalem drops in two months from 56% to 46%
• Trust in the integrity of the election commission stands at 51% and only 45% believe that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair
• 70% believe that Fatah will not accept a Hamas electoral victory and 60% think that Hamas will not accept a Fatah electoral victory 

62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 33% want him to remain in office. Two months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip. Two months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 52% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Two months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip).  Only 33% think president Abbas is the best Fatah candidate for the presidency while 43% think that Fatah has better candidates; 25% say they do not know or have no opinion on the matter. 

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 44% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 49% for Abbas and 44% for Haniyeh two months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 37% two months ago) and Haniyeh receives 63% (compared to 56% two months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 54% (compared to 58% two months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 34% two months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%.  We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 36% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 3% each. 

We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Two months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 41% two months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 32% two months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 22% (compared to 24% two months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 46% wo months ago).

We asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the upcoming elections: 39% (44% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) expect Fatah to win the upcoming legislative elections while only 26% (19% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) expect Hamas to win.  A plurality of 45% of the public expects general elections to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 43% believe no elections will take place. Two months ago, a majority of 52% expected elections to take place soon.  43% support the holding of simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose a separation between the two, while 20% say they support the holding of parliamentary elections to be followed few months later by presidential elections, and 23% prefer simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections but do not oppose separating them by few months.  46% (51% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) say that if Israel prevented Palestinian legislative elections in East Jerusalem, voting should be made possible for the residents in any polling station in the Jerusalem governorate or in the West Bank; 46% disagree and say that no election should take place if Israel prevents it in East Jerusalem. Two months ago, a majority of 56% said that if Israel prevented East Jerusalemites from voting in the city, they should be allowed to vote in any polling station in the Jerusalem governorate or in the West Bank.

51% trust and 42% do not trust the integrity of the Palestinian Election Commission in managing the election process.  Similarly, only 45% believe, and 45% do not believe, that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair.  Moreover, only 47% trust, and 47% do not trust, the ability of the West Bank Palestinian police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Similarly, only 49% trust, and 40% do not trust, the ability of the Gaza Strip police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. 

A majority of 63% say that it will not be possible, and 32% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Hamas’, to conduct their election campaigns in the West Bank without restrictions or interference from the Palestinian security services. Similarly, a majority of 55% says that it will not be possible, and 39% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Fatah’s, to conduct their election campaigns in the Gaza Strip without restrictions or interference from the Gaza security services.  70% believe that if Hamas wins the upcoming elections, Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 24% think Fatah will indeed allow Hamas to do so. Similarly, 60% believe that if Fatah wins the upcoming elections, Hamas will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 34% think Hamas will indeed allow Fatah to do so.

(4) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and in the West Bank at 21%
• Belief that there is corruption in the PA stands at 85% and the belief that there is corruption in the public institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 65%
• 47% view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people and 46% view it as an asset
• The largest percentage views the performance of the Shtayyeh government as similar to that of the previous government while 13% to 24% see a better performance and 26% to 42% see it worse 
• Evaluation of the judiciary is not high: 50% say they will not receive a fair trial if they find themselves in front of a Palestinian court 

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 21%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 58%.  23% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 28% and declines in the West Bank to 19%.

Only 42% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 54% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 55% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 42% say they cannot. Moreover, perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 85% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 65%. Generally speaking, the public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 47% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than ten months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (50%), the economy (41%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (50%), the preparation to hold general elections (49%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (51%). But a percentage ranging between 26% and 42% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 13% and 24% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a slight decline in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings two months ago.  Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 55% expects failure; only 35% expects success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a plurality of 48% expects failure and 41% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 55% expects failure and 35% expects success.

Half of the public (50%: 58% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 42% (33% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.  A majority of 54% (64% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 41% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (14% each), Maan TV at 13% each, Palestine Today TV at 10%, al Mayadeen at 5%, and Al Arabiya at 4%.  

(5) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the chances for reconciliation rises in two months from 36% to 40% and 49% think elections could contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• A majority believes that the chances for a long term hudna or truce in the Gaza Strip is slim 

40% are optimistic and 56% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Two months ago, optimism stood at only 36%. But 49% are optimistic, and 45% are not optimistic, that the upcoming legislative elections will contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A majority of 58% believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 30% believe the chances are medium and only 8% believe the chances are high.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 49% view ending occupation and building a state as the most vital goal of the Palestinian people and 30% think it should be the protection of the right of return
• Continuation of the occupation is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today in the eyes of 29% while 28% think it is poverty and unemployment 

49% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 10% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 29% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (25%); 14% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, December 2008  

Following Obama’s Election, Palestinians and Israelis Seek a more active role of the US in Moderating the Conflict  

Among other findings of the joint Truman-PSR poll: both publics support continuation of the cease-fire agreement between Hamas and Israel. Only about a quarter of Israelis support reoccupation of the Gaza Strip if shelling of Israeli communities continues 

November 26-December 5, 2008

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between November 26 and December 5, 2008. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.  

Following the election of Obama for president, a majority of the Palestinians and half of the Israelis want the US to play a more active role in moderating the conflict. Half of the Israelis and half of the Palestinians think that a more active American involvement will be successful, whereas the other half splits between expecting it to have no impact or to fail. Nevertheless both sides expect no change in the US role in the conflict. While the Israelis expect no change in US military economic and political support of Israel, the Palestinians expect that US support of Israel will strengthen.                                                                                                                                               

Our poll also examined both publics’ attitudes toward the Arab League (Saudi) plan, given the recent public diplomacy campaign by the PLO negotiation team which published the full plan in Israeli newspapers in order to increase Israelis’ awareness of the plan. Only 25% of the Israelis reported having seen the ad. Following this public diplomacy initiative the level of support for the plan remained stable: 36% of the Israelis support and 61% oppose the plan now, while in September 38% supported and 59% opposed the plan. Among Palestinians 66% support the Arab League plan and 30% oppose it.  

With regard to the cease fire with Hamas, support is slightly down compared to three months ago: 51% of the Israelis support its continuation and 44% oppose it; among Palestinians, 74% support and 23% oppose the continuation of the cease fire agreement.

The joint poll examined Israelis’ and Palestinians’ expectations and assessments of the US policy toward the conflict, following the election of President Obama. The poll also examined various negotiation tracks including the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Israeli-Syrian track and the Saudi (Arab League) plan currently on the public agenda; threat perceptions, support of violence, and domestic political affairs.  

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 3 and December 5, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 600 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between November 26 and December 2, 2008. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).  

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

 (A) Expectations regarding the US policy toward the conflict following the election of Barack Obama for President

• 49% of Israelis and 57% of Palestinians want a more active role for the US in the conflict following the election of Obama for president. 31% of Israelis do not want the US to intervene, and 18% want the US to continue to play its current role in the peace process. 35% of Palestinians do not want the US to intervene, and only 4 % want it to continue to play its current role.
• As to the results of such an involvement, 49% on both sides expect it to be successful, while 22% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians think it will be a failure, and 23%of Israelis and 16% of Palestinians think it will have no impact.
• Despite the two publics’ preference for a more active American role, 50% of Israelis and 59% of Palestinians expect that the US role will not change. 19% of Israelis and 7% of Palestinians even think the US will play a weaker role than in the past.
• 59% of Israelis believe that US support of Israel will not change, and the others are split between expecting that this support will weaken (19%) or strengthen (15%). Palestinians on the other hand expect US support of Israel to strengthen (56%), and 29% more expect it not to change. Only 7% expect it to weaken.
• Two thirds of Palestinians think that Israel would benefit more if the US intervened strongly in the peace process. Among Israelis 39% say that both sides would benefit, 25% - that the Palestinians would benefit and only 14% - that Israel would benefit from such intervention.
• Israelis and Palestinians are quite split as to the possibility of American pressure on the two sides to accept and implement the peace plans currently on the agenda. On each side a majority would accept such pressure with regard to the plan on which there is majority support in the society, but reject pressure with regard to the plan on which there is no majority support. Thus, with regard to the Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative (detailed below in section B), 44% of Israelis think Israel should accept such American pressure and 50% think it should reject such pressure. With regard to a permanent settlement along the Clinton/Geneva parameters (as detailed below) 51% think Israel should accept such pressure and 43% think that it should reject it. Among Palestinians the pattern is the other way around: 56% of them think they should accept American pressure to accept and implement the Saudi Plan, 39% say they should reject such pressure. As to a permanent settlement along the Clinton/Geneva parameters, 47% of Palestinians think they should accept and 49% think they should reject such American pressure.
• Among Israelis, 48% believe that the Palestinians would accept American pressure on the two sides on both plans, and 39% believe that the Palestinians would reject it. Similarly, more Palestinians believe that most Israelis would accept than reject American pressure on both plans: on the Arab/Saudi plan, 49% believe most Israelis would accept American pressure, and 43% think that most Israelis would reject such pressure. On the Clinton/Geneva parameters, 55% think most Israelis would accept American intervention, and 36% think Israelis would reject it.

(B) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda 

The Saudi Plan

• 61% of the Israelis oppose and 36% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In our September poll 59% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 38% supported it. Among Palestinians, 66% support the plan and 30% oppose it, just like in September.
• Following the extraordinary step of public diplomacy initiated by the PLO negotiation department which published the full plan in the Israeli papers on November 20, 2008, 11% of the Israelis report they saw the ads but did not read it, and 14% claim they saw it and also read it. 75% did not see the ad. About half of those who report that they saw the ad and those who saw it and also read it expressed support for the plan while only a third of those who did not see the ad at all supported it. The fact that there is no difference in support between those who only noticed the ad and those who also read it indicates a self selection process where respondents who are more interested in peace also exposed themselves more to the Palestinian campaign, and the difference in support between those who did not see the ad at all and those who saw it does not necessarily indicate a success of the Palestinian campaign.

Clinton/Geneva Parameters  

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials eight years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues several times in the past since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the Annapolis conference and the resumption of the peace talks between the parties. The findings indicate stability in support of the overall package among Israelis compared to 2006 and 2007, with a slight majority supporting the package (52%). This is a significant decline from close to two thirds support in December 2004 and December 2005. Among Palestinians, a minority of 41% supports the overall package, down from 47% a year ago. Since we have been tracking these issues in 2003, there was only once majority support for this package on both sides, in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat which was followed by a surge of optimism and considerable moderation in both publics. Among Israelis there is consistent majority support for the Clinton package since 2004, but this majority has shrunk. Palestinian support for this permanent status framework package seems to have been affected in the past more by the disengagement and the disappointment from it, than by Hamas' rise to power. Israeli support only fell following the Palestinian political turnabout, and does not seem to have been affected by the disengagement. Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 54% support or strongly support and 44% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2007, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 56% and opposition at 42%.

Among Israelis 46% support and 48% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2007, similarly 46% of the Israelis supported this component while 50% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians, 40% support and 58% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2007, 39% agreed with an identical compromise while57% opposed it.

Among Israelis 40% support such an arrangement and 54% oppose it. In December 2007 44% supported it and 52% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 36% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2007, an identical compromise obtained 36% support and 63% opposition.

Among Israelis, 40% agree and 57% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2007, 36% supported this arrangement and 63% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 27% support and 73% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2007 23% support, and opposition reached76%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

Among Israelis 64% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 61% support and 38% opposition obtained in December 2007.

(5) Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 35% support and 64% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2007, 51% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 47% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 56% support and 40% oppose this arrangement compared to 53% who supported it and 44% who opposed it in December 2007.

(6) End of Conflict  

In the Palestinian public 55% support and 44% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2007 the support of 66% and the opposition of 32%.

In the Israeli public 67% support and 29% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2007, similarly, 66% of the Israelis supported it while 30% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 41% support and 57% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. This level of support is lower by 6 percentage points than that obtained in December 2007, when 47% supported and 49% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 52% support and 43% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2007, similarly, 53% supported and 43% opposed such a package.

It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people’s calculus is compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the undesirable parts.

31% of the Israelis estimate that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package. 55% believe that the majority opposes it. These perceptions tap the normative facet of public opinion and indicate that despite the consistent support in the package over time, it has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 45% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 46% believe that the majority opposes it. In addition 48% among Palestinians incorrectly assume that the majority of Israelis opposes the package, and 40% think there is an Israeli majority for the package. The assessment of Israelis of the Palestinian majority is quite split: 43% of Israelis think that a majority of Palestinians supports the parameters, and 40% think that a majority opposes them.

• In addition to our systematic assessment of the two sides’ support of the Clinton parameters we also examine periodically Israelis and Palestinians readiness for a mutual recognition of identity. Our current poll shows that 69% of the Israelis support and 28% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Among Palestinians, 54% support and 46% oppose this step after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established.

Other Tracks

• 63% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria, and 25%, like three months ago, support it. If in the peace agreement, Syria will commit to disconnect itself from Iran and stop its support of Hizbulla and Hamas, support increases somewhat to 29%.
• 55% of the Israelis support and 43% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In September 57% supported and 42% opposed such talks. A sizeable Israeli majority (67%) support and only 31% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. In September these figures were 65% and 32% respectively.

  (C) Conflict management, threat perceptions and support of violence

• 51% of the Israelis support the continuation of the cease fire agreement with Hamas and 44% oppose it. Three months ago in our September poll, 55% supported and 39% opposed it. Among Palestinians 74% support the continuation of the cease fire agreement and 23% oppose it. Also among Palestinians, this level of support is somewhat lower than it was in September, when 81% supported and 15% opposed it.
• A majority of Israelis (59%) support the deployment of a Palestinian Authority military force in Hebron. Palestinians are quite split as to what this force will accomplish: 45% think it will bring about law order and safety to the residents, while 48% think it will not do that.
• Among Israelis, 62% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. Among Palestinians 47% fear that their security and safety and that of their family are not assured.
• Among Israelis, 27% suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues; 40% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out; 28% believe that Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps.
• A majority of Israelis (59%) think that Israel should bomb the Iranian nuclear facilities in case all the international measures taken to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon will fail; 34% oppose it.

D) Domestic political affairs

• If personal elections for prime minister were held today in Israel, 37% would vote for Bibi Netanyahu, Tzipi Livni would receive 30% of the vote, and 11% would vote for Ehud Barak. Netanyahu is also considered by Israelis as the best candidate to lead the country toward peace with the Palestinians and/or Syria: 33% of the Israelis think he is the most able to do so; 26% choose Tzipi Livni; Barak comes out third with 10%. When security challenges are concerned, 38% of the Israelis trust Bibi Netanyahu most, 20% trust Barak, and 20% believe in Livni. As to the economic challenges Israel is currently facing, 49% trust Netanyahu, 26% believe in Livni, and 7% in Barak.
• In the Palestinian Authority, if presidential elections were to take place today, Mahmud Abbas, the Fatah nominee, would receive 48% of the vote, while Ismail Haniyeh as the Hamas nominee would receive 38% of the vote.
•  

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 11-14 September 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a presidential termination of the work of the Supreme Judicial Council and the formation of a transitional one, a presidential statement requiring former ministers, who illegally received salary increases, to return these funds, and a widespread internal debate over “honor killing” in the context of the death of a woman from Bethlehem in suspicious circumstances. In relations with Israel, five main developments occurred during this period: an Israeli demolition of a large built up area in Wadi Hommos which is located in an area under PA zoning control, responding to this incident, Abbas announced his intention to suspend the implementation of agreements with Israel, an explosive device was detonated in an area near the settlement of Dolev, west of Ramallah, killing an Israeli woman, Israeli prime minister Netanyahu announced his intentions to annex the Jordan Valley if he wins the Israeli elections scheduled for 17 September 2019, and finally, Israel transferred to the PA about two billion Shekels from the Palestinian custom revenues which the PA had previously announced it will not accept if it was not transferred in full. On Palestinian-American relations, US ambassador David Friedman stated that the US peace plan does not call for the creation of a Palestinian state but that it allows for Palestinian autonomy. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2019 show an overwhelming majority, reaching about three quarters, dissatisfied with the performance of the PA and the political factions in their response to the Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes in Wadi al Hommos, near Jerusalem. The majority views the response of president Abbas to the demolition—by declaring that the PA is stopping its implementation of the agreements with Israel— as inappropriate. Indeed, an overwhelming majority, exceeding three quarters of the public, believes that Abbas’ decision is merely a media stunt aiming at absorbing public anger with the PA leadership over its failure to prevent Israel from carrying out that demolition. Furthermore, public anger with the PA is probably driven by the belief of more than 80% that the Palestinian leadership will not implement the decision to stop implementing the agreements with Israel.

In domestic matters, findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public views “honor killing” of women as a heinous crime that must be punished severely. Only 10% think that this type of crimes is understandable and punishment should thereby be reduced. By contrast, findings show that almost half of the public, much more in the Gaza Strip, believes human beings can be possessed by Jinn or demons while a slightly smaller percentage believes this to be a superstition.

Findings also show that Shtayyeh’s government has failed so far in winning the trust of the public. Indeed, public trust in the ability of the government to perform better than the previous government has declined compared to the findings three months ago. Similarly, the public is dissatisfied with the performance of the judiciary, particularly the courts, with about two-thirds believing that its functioning is marred by corruption, lack of independence, or that it rules not according to the law but in accordance with whims and personal interests. But the public is evenly divided in its satisfaction with the decisions made by Abbas regarding the judiciary. Moreover, the largest percentage believes that the Transitional Judicial Council will not succeed in the next year or two in reforming the judiciary. Furthermore, trust in the presidency is also low as more than 60% demand the resignation of president Abbas; slightly more than a third wants him to stay in office. If Abbas runs in a presidential election against Ismail Haniyyeh, the votes would be very close.

In foreign affairs, findings show that the largest percentage of the Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, does not view Iran as a friend or an ally of the Palestinians. Yet, a majority, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, believes that if war breaks out between Iran and Israel, the former would be able to defeat the latter, as Iran is believed to have a stronger military force.  

In light of prime minister Netanyahu’s statement announcing his intentions to annex the Jordan Valley, findings show a significant increase in the percentage of those who believe that the two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical. As in the past, feasibility is linked to support for the two-state solution. Findings show a significant decline in support for that solution accompanied by an increased support for armed attacks against Israelis. Moreover, public perception of the Trump peace plan continues to worsen, compared to attitudes two years ago, with two-thirds of the public demanding the Palestinian leadership to reject the plan out of hand even before reading the plan’s content, because it must be bad. More than 80% reject the idea presented by the US ambassador to Israel offering self-rule, rather than sovereign and independent statehood, to the Palestinians. More than 70% oppose resumption of the dialogue with the Trump Administration. 

(1) Home demolition in Wadi al Hommos and Abbas’ response by suspending implementation of agreements with Israel:

• 74% are dissatisfied with the performance of the PA and the various political factions toward the Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes in Wadi al Hommos
• 61% the believe that the decision of president Abbas to stop implementing agreements with Israel was not an appropriate response to the Israeli demolition of homes in Wadi al Hommos
• 76% think Abbas’ decision to stop implementation of agreements with Israel was just a media stunt or show
• 78% think the PA will not stop implementing agreements with Israel

An overwhelming majority of 74% thinks that the PA and the political factions have not done all they could to prevent the Israeli demolition of buildings and homes in Wadi al Hommos near Jerusalem and 19% think they have done their best. Two thirds of the public (66%) believe that it was the duty of the PA and its security services and the police to protect the homes in Wadi al Hommos by serving as a buffer between the buildings and the Israeli bulldozers.  61% say that Abbas’ decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel was not the most appropriate response to the demolition of homes in Wadi al Hommos while 32% think it was the appropriate response.  The belief that the PA and the political factions have not done all they could to prevent the demolition is higher among supporters of Hamas and third parties (83% and 82% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (62%), among those who oppose the peace process (84%) compared to supporters of the peace process (70%), and among those who work in the private sector (75%) compared to those who work in the public sector (65%).

A large majority of 71% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean dissolving the PA and 18% think he does mean that.  Similarly, a majority of 67% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending security coordination with Israel and 24% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 69% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending civil coordination with Israel and 19% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 69% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean annulling the PLO recognition of Israel and 20% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 76% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending negotiations with Israel and returning to armed struggle and 15% think he does mean that.  A large majority of 65% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean returning to Israel those VIP cards issued to senior PA officials and 22% think he does mean that.

We asked the public if it thinks the PA is serious about implementing Abbas’ decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel. An overwhelming majority of 78% says the PA will not do that and only 16% say it will.  Similarly, we asked the public about Abbas’ motivation behind making the decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel. A similar overwhelming majority (76%) indicates that the president’s decision is a media stunt or show and it will not be implemented while only 16% say the decision is serious and will be implemented.  The belief that Abbas’ decision is a media stunt or show and will not be implemented is higher among supporters of Hamas and third parties (87% and 78% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (61%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (90%) compared to those who support the peace process (72%), and among those who work in the private sector (79%) compared to those who work in the public sector (72%).

(2) “Honor killing,” Jinn possession, economic conditions, the performance of the Shtayyeh government, and others:

• 81% view “honor killing” as a dreadful crime
• 48% believe and 44% do not believe in “demon possession”
• Support for the PA decision to reject a partial custom revenue transfer drops from 62% to 54%
• Wish to emigrate stands at 41% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank
• Positive evaluation of the performance of the Shtayyeh government worsens rather than improves

An overwhelming majority of 81% say that “honor killing” is an dreadful crime that should be punished severely while 7% say that it is a normal crime that should be punished like any other crime. Only 10% (5% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) say that it is an understandable act that should be punished lightly. The belief that “honor killing” is a dreadful crime is higher in the West Ban (90%) than in the Gaza Strip (66%), in villages/towns and cities (86% and 82% respectively) compared to refugee camps (60%), among women (84%) compared to men (77%), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (76% and 72% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (82%) compared to those who work in the public sector (77%), among the married (82%) compared to the unmarried (72%), and among those with the highest income (87%) compared to those with the lowest income (69%).

The public is divided on the issue of humans being possessed by Jinn or demons: 48% say they believe it is real while 44% (56% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip) believe it is superstition. The belief that demon possession is real is higher in the Gaza Strip (67%) compared to the West Bank (37%), in refugee camps and cities (55% and 50% respectively) compared to villages/towns (37%), among supporters of Hamas (57%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (48% and 44% respectively), among the religious (55%) compared to the somewhat religious (43%), among those who work in the public sector (53%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), and among those with the lowest income (68%) compared to those with the highest income (36%).

59% of the public say that their income has declined during the past six months due to the inability of the PA to pay the salary of the public sector in full; 35% say their income did not change and 4% say it has increased. A majority of 54% supports and 37% oppose the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues. However, 43% say that they are worried that this decision could lead to the collapse of the PA while 50% indicate that it could not. Three months ago, 62% said they supported the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues and 52% said they were worried that this decision could lead to PA collapse.

 Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%. But perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 63% and in the West Bank at 52%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%. 31% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 41% and declines in the West Bank to 24%.

Only 36% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 59% say that they cannot. Three months ago, 57% of West Bankers said they could not criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear. In the Gaza Strip, 43% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 53% say they cannot. Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 65%. When asked about Abbas decision mandating that ministers of the previous government return illegal pay raise they received, 80% said this measure was not sufficient. The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 49% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than five months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (44%), the economy (37%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (50%), the preparation to hold general elections (49%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (47%). But a percentage ranging between 50% and 32% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 16% and 8% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a drop in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings three months ago. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 61% expects failure; only 27% expects success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 30% expects success. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 60% expects failure and 28% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Al Aqsa TV and Maan TV (13% each), Palestine TV (12%), Palestine Today TV (11%), al Al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).  

3) Public evaluation of the judiciary and views on the president’s decisions regarding the judiciary:

• Trust in Palestinian judiciary and its integrity is low, especially in the West Bank
• The public is divided in its view on Abbas’ decision to dissolve the Supreme Judicial Council and to form a transitional judicial council
• Half of the public does not expect success in reforming the judiciary in the near future

A majority of 60% (65% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 32% believe that they will receive a fair trial. The belief that one can receive a fair trial is higher in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (26%), in refugee camps (38%) compared to cities and villages/towns (31% and 29% respectively), among supporters of Hamas (43%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (36% and 32% respectively), among the religious (37%) compared to the somewhat religious (29%), among the illiterates (44%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (32%), and among those with the lowest income (37%) compared to those with the highest income (30%).

A majority of 63% thinks that the Palestinian judiciary is marred by corruption, lacks independence, or rules according to whims and interests; 29% disagree and believe that it is has integrity, independence, or rules according to the law. The belief that corruption or other defects exist in the judiciary is higher in the West Bank (72%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), in villages/towns and cities (71% and 63% respectively) compared to refugee camps (54%), among men (66%) compared to women (61%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (65% and 61% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (49%), among the somewhat religious (67%) compared to the religious (57%), among those who work in the private sector (68%) compared to those who work in the public sector (59%), and among those with the highest income (76%) compared to those with the lowest income (52%).

The public makes a similar assessment of Palestinian layers: 66% (74% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) think lawyers’ work is marred by corruption and incompetence and that lawyers are untruthful with clients; 25% think lawyers’ work has integrity, competent, and lawyers are truthful with the clients.

The public is divided in its view of Abbas’ decision to lower the retirement age for judges, to dismiss the Supreme Judicial Council, and to appoint a Transition Supreme Judicial Council: 42% are in favor, 42% are not in favor, and 16% are uncertain. 49% believe that the Transitional Judicial Council will not succeed in the next year or two in reforming the judiciary while 36% believe it will succeed.  A plurality of 47% does not agree and 39% agree, with the view that the judicial matters are not part of jurisdiction of the PA president or that his decisions regarding the judiciary constitute an interference in the affairs of the judiciary.  The public is divided on the view that Abbas’ decision regarding the judiciary was necessary in light of the fact that it has failed to reform itself: 43% agree and an identical percentage disagree with this statement.

(4) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 61% demand Abbas’ resignation and 35% want him to stay in office
• In presidential elections between Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% of the vote and the latter 46%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 38% and Hamas 29%

Only 38% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 49% believe no elections will take place. An overwhelming majority (72%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 12% want parliamentary elections only. 12% do not want any elections. If elections were held for a parliament and a president, 69% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 21% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip. 

61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 57% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 49% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 38% (42% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter 46% of the vote (compared to 48% for Abbas and 42% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 39% of the vote (compared to 43% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 57% (compared to 52% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 56% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 36% (compared to 36% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 62% and Haniyeh 34%. Support for Haniyeh is higher in cities and refugee camps (49% and 47% respectively) compared to villages/towns (30%), among women (49%) compared to men (42%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (95% and 57% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (3%), among the religious (58%) compared to the somewhat religions (37%), among those opposed to the peace process (71%) compared to those who support the peace process (37%), among those who work in the private sector (43%) compared to those who work in the public sector (36%), among the married (47%) compared to the unmarried (34%), and among those of lowest income (50%) compared to those of the highest income (32%).

We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 36% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 8% (2% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 3% each. 

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 38% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 31% (compared to 33% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 20% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 43% three months ago). Support for Fatah is higher in villages/towns (51%) than in cities and refugee camps (36% and 34% respectively), among men (40%) compared to women (35%), among the somewhat religious (43%) compared to the religious (31%), among supporters of the peace process (47%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (20%), among those who work in the public sector (44%) compared to those who work in the private sector (40%), and among those with middle and highest income (44% and 38% respectively) compared to those with the lowest income (33%).

(5) Reconciliation, Hamas and Iran: 

• Optimism about reconciliation continues to drop
• 72% demand the removal of measures taken by the PA against the Gaza Strip
• 48% say that Iran is not an ally to the Palestinians and 40% say it is
• 55% believe that Iran can defeat Israel in war

30% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 33%. Moreover, the overwhelming majority (72%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 23% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government. A majority of 52% (down to 37% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 9% believe the chances are high.

In the context of the visit of a senior Hamas delegation to Iran, we asked the public to tell us how it views Iran: a plurality of 48% says Iran is not a friend or ally to the Palestinians and 40% say it is a friend and ally. The belief that Iran is a Palestinian ally is higher in the Gaza Strip (48%) than in the West Bank (36%), in refugee camps (54%) compared to cities and villages/towns (39% each), among women (43%) compared to men (38%), among those whose age is 50 or higher (43%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 (33%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties (66% and 56% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (28%), among the religious (48%) compared to the somewhat religious (35%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (52%) compared to supporters of the peace process (38%), among the illiterates (44%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (38%), among those with the lowest income (52%) compared to those with the highest income (37%).

In the context of the statements by Iran and its allies indicating that the Islamic republic has the military capacity to defeat Israel in war, we asked the public if it believes this to be true: 55% say they believe this to be true and 32% believe it to be untrue. The belief that Iran can defeat Israel in war is higher in the West Bank (57%) than in the Gaza Strip (52%), among supporters of Hamas (67%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% each), among those opposed to the peace process (60%) compared to the supporters of the peace process (55%), and among those who work in the private sector (53%) compared to those who work in the public sector (48%).

 (6) The Trump peace plan:

• 83% think the “deal of the century” does not end the Israeli occupation and 65% think it allows Israeli annexation of a large part of the West Bank
• 69% want the PA to reject the US plan, 19% want it to accept it with reservation, and 5% want it to accept it without reservation
• 81% reject the proposal made by the US ambassador to Israel in which the Palestinians are offered self-rule, not a state
• 72% reject US plan for refugees’ resettlement in host countries

We asked the public if Palestinian acceptance of the Trump peace plan would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 83% say no; only 9% say yes it would. When asked if the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 65% of the public says it does and only 27% say it does not. Two thirds (67%) believe that in response to a Palestinian rejection of the Trump peace plan, the US will impose further sanctions on the Palestinians; 23% say it will amend its plan in case of Palestinian rejection. 

A large majority of 69% believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan; 19% say it should accept it with reservations; and 5% believe it should accept it without reservation. Three months ago, 75% said the PA leadership should reject the plan.  We asked this same question with a slightly different options: 64% indicate that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 21% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 9% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo. A year ago, only 50% said the PA should reject the plan out of hand. 

An overwhelming majority of 81% reject the proposed self-rule idea that deny Palestinian statehood that was proposed by US ambassador to Israel David Friedman while 9% say they accept it and 10% are uncertain.  Similarly, 72% say that they are against, and 22% for, American ideas proposed to solve the refugee problem in which Palestinian refugees are offered full citizenship and rights in the host countries and in which the host countries receive billions of US dollars in assistance and investments.  A majority of 68% is opposed and 20% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

7) The peace process:

• Support for the two-state solution drops from 47% to 42% in three months
• 44% think armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the occupation and 24% think negotiation is the most effective
• 50% are in favor of a return to an armed intifada, 62% are in favor of non-violent resistance, and 32% support the one-state solution
• 61% support the armed attack that took place few weeks ago in an area west of Ramallah
• 83% support the local and international movement to boycott Israel

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 42% and opposition at 56%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 47%. 37% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 56% believe that the majority opposes it. Support for the two-state solution is higher among those whose age is 50 and above (45%) compared to the youth between 18 and 22 years (35%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (61% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (27%), among the somewhat religious (45%) compared to the religious (36%), among supporters of the peace process (50%) compared to those who are opposed to the peace process (20%), among the illiterates (52%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (38%), among farmers (66%) compared to students (32%), and among those who work in the public sector (51%) compared to those who work in the private sector (42%).

A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 34% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 78% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high. The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 32% of the public while 37% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 17% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 36% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 34% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the largest group (44%) chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Three months ago, 38% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.  The percentage of those who view armed struggle as the most effect means is higher in the Gaza Strip (52%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in refugee camps (56%) compared to cities and villages/towns (45% and 35% respectively), among men (49%) compared to women (40%), among those between the 18 and 22 years (50%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or above (44%), among Hamas’ and third parties’ supporters (69% and 48% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (24%), among the religious (52%) compared to the the somewhat religious (39%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (64%) compared to supporters of the peace process (37%), among those who work in the private sector (47%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), and among those with the lowest income (50%) compared to those with the highest income (41%).

In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 62% support popular non-violent resistance; 50% support a return to an armed intifada; 40% support dissolving the PA; and 32% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 47% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 38% said they prefer to dissolve the PA. We asked about the armed attack that took place few weeks ago in an area west of Ramallah, near the settlement of Dolve, in which one Israeli woman was killed: 61% supported it and 33% opposed it. A majority of 54% views this attack as a one-time, lone wolf, event while 39% think it is the beginning of the return to armed struggle. Support for the attack near Dolev is higher in the Gaza Strip (80%) compared to the West Bank (49%), in refugee camps and cities (74% and 62% respectively) compared to villages/towns (50%), among men (63%) compared to women (59%), among those between 18 and 22 years old (63%) compared to those who are 50 or above (56%), among supporters of third parties and Hamas (79% and 78% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (52%), among the religious (68%) compared to the somewhat religious (57%), among those who oppose the peace process (75%) compared to those who support the peace process (56%), among students (67%) compared to laborers (59%), among those who work in the public sector (67%) compared to those who work in the private sector (60%), and among those with the least lowest income (86%) compared to those with the highest income (47%).

An overwhelming majority of 83% supports the local and international boycott movement against Israel while 15% are opposed to it. A majority of 52% say that they are currently boycotting non-essential Israeli products and those that have non-Israeli substitutes while 33% say they are not. 57% say the boycott of non-essential Israeli products and those that have non-Israeli substitutes will be effective in contributing to the end of occupation and 42% say it will not. About two-thirds of the public believe that the European countries will not boycott Israel or impose sanctions on it while 26% believe they will.  An overwhelming majority of 74% says that Palestinians should condemn visits of Arab journalists to Israel while 7% say the visits should be encouraged.

A majority of 52% expects the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 19% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections; 29% do not know who is likely to win.  About half of the public (48%) does not encourage the participation of the Joint Arab List in an Israeli government coalition led by the center and the left while 37% encourage such participation and 15% have no opinion. The public is divided in its position regarding the participation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel in the Knesset elections: 46% support and 42% oppose such participation.  Support for the boycott of elections is higher in the Gaza Strip (55%) compared to the West Bank (41%), among supporters of Hamas (56%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (40% and 46% respectively), among the religious (52%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among those who are opposed to the peace process (55%) compared to those who supportive of the peace process (44%), and among those with the lowest income (60%) compared to those with the highest income (35%).

8) Most vital goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% view the end of occupation and the establishment of a state as the first top priority for the Palestinians
• Poverty/unemployment is viewed by 28% as the most serious problem confronting the Palestinians today

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.  The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; another 25% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, September 2012

Around 80% of Palestinians and of Israelis think that if Israel were to carry out a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, a major regional war will erupt. However a majority of Israelis do not believe that Israel will strike and the climate of opinion is against it

These are the results of the most recent Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. The poll was supported by the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

82% of Palestinians and 77% of Israelis think that if Israel were to carry out a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, a major regional war will erupt. 

A majority of Israelis (70%) do not believe now that Israel will bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities without the US, and the climate of opinion in Israel regarding such a strike changed significantly since June: 65% of Israelis think now that the majority of the Israeli public opposes an Israeli strike against Iran without the US, compared to 52% in June. The actual level of support of Israelis for a strike against Iran has not changed: 52% support the cooperation between the US and Israel in bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, 18% support a strike by Israel alone without the cooperation of the US, and 24% oppose any strike. 

Given the ongoing stalemate in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the most popular options among Palestinians are to go to the Security Council to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state (73%), followed by popular non-violent and unarmed resistance (61%) and a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state (56%). Israelis however think that the two most likely actions of the Palestinians are to approach the UN Security Council to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state (27%) and to return to the armed intifada (23%). 

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between September 13 and 15, 2012. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 600 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between September 9 and 14, 2012. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS: 

(A) Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities

• 77% of Israelis think that if Israel were to carry out a military strike against Iran, a major regional war will erupt; 20% of Israelis do not think so. Among Palestinians, 82% think that such a strike would lead to a major war and 16% do not think so.
• 52% of Israelis support the cooperation between the US and Israel in bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, 18% support a strike by Israel alone without the cooperation of the US, and 24% oppose any strike. The corresponding figures in our previous poll in June were very similar: 51%, 19% and 26% correspondingly. However the climate of opinion changed significantly since June: 65% of Israelis think now that the majority of the Israeli public opposes an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities without the US compared to 52% in June.
• Correspondingly, Israelis (70%) do not believe that Israel will bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities without the US in the coming months; 23% believe it will.
• 56% of Israelis think that all the Iranians hate Jews (26% oppose this statement). But only 20% believe that the purpose of the Iranians is to destroy Israel (60% oppose this statement), and 22% believe that the Iranians understand only the language of force (58% oppose). 28% blame only the Iranians for the current crisis, while 51% oppose it.

 (B) Attitudes and expectations regarding the peace process

• Majorities among Israelis (73%) and Palestinians (71%) view the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to Israel in the next five years as low or non-existent.
• A majority of 61% Israelis and 52% of Palestinians supports a two-state solution, while 36% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians oppose it. However 50% of Israelis and 57% of Palestinians think that the two-state solution is bound to fail because of the settlements; 47% of Israelis and 37% of Palestinians think the two-state solution is still relevant. At the same time, majorities among Israelis (65%) and among Palestinians (68%) oppose the one state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equality; 31% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians support this solution.
• As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 62% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 30% oppose it. Among Palestinians, 44% support and 54% oppose this step. In June 2012, 53% of the Israelis supported and 43% opposed this mutual recognition of identity; among Palestinians, 43% supported and 55% opposed this step.

(C) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• Given the ongoing stalemate in the peace process, 42% of the Israelis think that armed attacks will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 46% of the Israelis believe that negotiations will continue but some armed attacks will continue as well. Only 7% of Israelis believe negotiations will continue and armed confrontations will stop. Among the Palestinians, 19% think that some armed attacks will take place and the two sides will not return to negotiations, 31% think the two sides will soon return to negotiations, and 26% think the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed attacks will take place. Finally, 18% think the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.
• Given the stalemate in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the most popular options among Palestinians are to go to the Security Council to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state, followed by popular non-violent and unarmed resistance. 73% support the first option, 61% support the second. 56% support a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state; 44% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority; 39% support return to an armed Intifada; and 28% support the abandonment of the two-state solution and the demand for the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis
• When Israelis are asked what they think the Palestinians will do if there will be no negotiations in the near future, 27% of the Israelis say they will go to the Security Council to obtain a recognition of a Palestinian state; 23% think they will return to the armed intifada; 15% think they will unilaterally declare the establishment of a Palestinian state; 11% think they will abandon the two-state solution and demand the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis; 6% think they will resort to popular non violent and unarmed resistance; and 6% say they will dissolve the Palestinian Authority.
• Among Israelis, 51% are worried and 48% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, as they were in June 2012. Among Palestinians, 72% are worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished; 28% are not worried. Similar results were obtained in our June poll.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 58% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 23% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (36%); 18% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 10% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part of the territories occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security, and 6% think Israel aspires to withdraw from all of the territories occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security. 26% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain all of the territories conquered in 1967, and 16% think the Palestinians aspire to regain some of the territories conquered in 1967.
• These mutual perceptions are very much off the mark.

15% of the Israelis say the aspirations of Israel are to withdraw to the 1967 border after guaranteeing Israel’s security; 43% say it is to withdraw from parts of the territories after guaranteeing Israel’s security; 15% say it is to annex the West Bank without granting political rights to the Palestinians living there; and 15% say it is to annex the West Bank and expel the Palestinians living there.           

• Among the Palestinians 37% say that the aspirations of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO are to regain some of the territories conquered in the 1967 war; 29% say it is to regain all the territories conquered in the 1967 war; 15% say it is to conquer the State of Israel and regain control over the pre 1948 Palestine; and 9% say it is to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel
• Given the election of President Morsi in Egypt and the big changes he recently enacted in the senior military leadership, we asked Israelis and Palestinians what they expect will happen with the peace treaty and the relationship between Egypt and Israel. 9% of the Israelis and 12% of the Palestinians think that the peace treaty will be cancelled and armed conflict will resume; 28% of the Israelis and 19% of the Palestinians think that Egypt will work to erode the peace treaty but armed conflict will not resume; 47% of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians think that there will be no change in the relationship between Egypt and Israel or with regard to the peace treaty; and 12% of the Israelis and 21% of the Palestinians think that the Egyptian government will respect the peace treaty and relations between Israel and Egypt will improve.

(D) Domestic affairs and other issues

• A majority of the Palestinians think that if Obama wins the US Presidential elections, his victory will have no impact on Palestinian conditions (51%); 32% think it will have a negative impact, and 9% believe it will have a positive impact. Israelis prefer Mitt Romney to Barack Obama: 34% think Romney will be a better President for Israel, while only 26% say Obama; about a fifth of the respondents do not know.
• When Palestinians are asked to chose among four vital national goals for the Palestinian people, 44% selected the end of Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital; 30% selected the right of return of refugees, 15% selected building an Islamic society, and 11% selected the establishment of a democratic political system.
• As in other opinion polls carried out recently, the Likud leads in terms of vote intention of Israelis if the elections for the Knesset were to be held now with 16%` the Labor party is in second place with 12%. When we add to the list of political parties a party of the social protest movement, 10% indicate they would vote for such a party, which puts her in third place after the Likud which declines to 12% and Labor with 11%. Since such a party has not been actually proclaimed, this prognosis is premature and speculative; however these results are noteworthy as they hold for a long time after the social protest of the summer of 2011; in March 2012 14% indicated they would vote for such a party in a similar question, and in June – 8%.
• On the Palestinian side, if presidential and parliamentary elections were to take place today, Abbas receives 51% of the vote and Ismail Haniyeh 40% of those participating in the presidential elections, while Fateh wins 37% and Hamas 28% of the popular vote of those participating in the parliamentary elections; all other parties combined receive 13% of the vote and 23% say they have not decided to whom they will vote.

Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (28)

With Abbas Regaining Some of his Popularity and Hamas losing some of its popularity, and despite widespread support for a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, an overwhelming majority of Palestinians opposes a ceasefire that does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt

5-7 June 2008   

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5 and 7 June 2008. This period witnessed the declaration by the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Mahmud Abbas of his desire to renew dialogue with Hamas. It also witnessed continued closure of the Rafah border crossing despite Hamas’s attempt to open it. Indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel on a ceasefire failed to produce agreement while the threat of a possible Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip escalated further. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. This press release covers domestic Palestinian issues; issues related to the peace process and Israeli-Palestinian relations will be covered in a separate joint Palestinian-Israeli press release. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

 Main Findings:

Findings indicate a limited decline in the various indicators of Hamas’s power in the second quarter of 2008 compared to the first quarter of the year. Decline can be seen in the popularity of the movement, the popularity of its prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, and in the percentage of those who describe Haniyeh’s government as legitimate.  By contrast, Mahmud Abbas’s popularity and the positive evaluation of his performance increase compared to his standing in the first quarter of this year. Moreover, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank increases as feelings of safety and security improve. A majority believes that the recently deployed Palestinian security forces have succeeded in enforcing law and order in the areas of their deployment in the West Bank; this is particularly true in the Nablus and Jenin areas. As expected, the largest percentage believes that Abbas is more able than Hamas’s government in reaching a peace agreement with Israel. But surprisingly, the largest percentage believes that Abbas is also more able than Hamas’s government in forcing Israel to make more concessions to the Palestinians.

The changes in the second quarter of 2008 might have been the result of two developments: Abbas has taken the initiative away from Hamas when he gave the green light for a resumption of dialogue with Hamas and Hamas has failed in moving forward any of the issues it championed during this period. These issues included the opening of the Rafah border crossing and forcing Israel to agree to a ceasefire with the Islamist group. In the first quarter of this year, Abbas and his government, headed by Salam Fayyad, were seen by the public as impotent in confronting Israel’s policies such as settlement construction and the increased restrictions on movement. By contrast, Hamas was seen as successful in breaking the siege on Gaza and in retaliating against Israel by carrying out two major armed attacks inside Israel, such as the suicide attack in Dimona and the attack at Merkaz Harav religious school in West Jerusalem. The measures taken by Hamas in the first quarter of 2008 managed to present the Islamist group as successful in confronting Israel at a time when Abbas and his government were seen as lacking the initiative.

Findings also indicate that an overwhelming majority of Palestinians supports a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel. But this support disappears if the agreement is to be restricted to the Gaza Strip and does not include the West Bank or if it does not stipulate the immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt. Findings also show stability in the Palestinian position regarding a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters or the Geneva Initiative with a minority support of less than half of the public. Finally, findings indicate that the idea that says that the two state solution is becoming difficult to achieve and that it is better for the Palestinians to embrace a one state solution where Palestinians and Jews would be equal is unacceptable to the majority of the Palestinians; indeed, only a little more than a quarter support it while the majority continues to support the two-state solution.

1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• Standing of Abbas improves as the gap between him and Ismail Haniyeh widens from almost zero to 12 percentage points during the past three months.
• Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas increases from 41% last March to 46% in this poll; moreover, positive evaluation of the performance of Salam Fayyad increases from 30% to 33%, and positive evaluation of the performance of Haniyeh decreases from 39% to 37% during the same period. Belief that Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one rises slightly to 31% and belief that Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate one diminishes slightly to 29%.
• Hamas’s popularity decreases from 35% last March to 31% in this poll; Fateh’s popularity remains stable standing today at 43% compared to 42% last March.
•  Perception of safety and security improves in the West Bank during the past three months rising from 32% to 40%; 57% say that the deployment of Palestinian security forces in the West Bank has been successful in helping to enforce law and order.
• Positive evaluation of democracy in the West Bank is higher than in the Gaza Strip: 33% to 23%.
• 59% believe that the PA handling of the case of the smuggling of mobile phones in the car of the former PLC Speaker was a cover for corruption while only 28% believe it was a case of fighting corruption.
• A larger percentage believes that Abbas is more able than Hamas’s government to reach a peace agreement with Israel and to force Israel to make more concessions to the Palestinians.

The Gap between the standing of PA President Mahmud Abbas and Hamas’s Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh has increased to 12 percentage points in favor of Abbas. If new presidential elections are held today, and the only two candidates were Abbas and Haniyeh, the former would receive the support of 52% and the latter 40%. This finding represents an increase in the popularity of Abbas which stood at 46% last March compared to 47% for Haniyeh. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% to Haniyeh’s 34%. Level of non-participation in the presidential elections would reach 39% if the competition was between Abbas and Haniyeh and 27% if the competition was between Barghouti and Haniyeh. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas reaches 46% in this poll (compared to 41% last March). Moreover, 33% (compared to 30% last March) say the performance of Fayyad’s government is good or very good and 38% say it is bad or very bad. By comparison, 37% (compared to 39% last March) say the performance of Haniyeh’s government is good or very good and 35% say it is bad or very bad.

Findings indicate that 45% (compared to 49% last March) believe that Haniyeh should stay in office as prime minister while 47% say he should not. By contrast, 42% (compared to 38% last March) say Fayyad’s government should stay in office and 51% say it should not.  29% say Haniyeh’s government is the legitimate Palestinian government and 31% say Fayyad’s government is the legitimate one; 7% say both governments are legitimate and 28% say both are illegitimate. Three months ago, 34% said Haniyeh’s government was legitimate while 29% said Fayyad’s was legitimate.

Moreover, the gap between Fateh and Hamas increases from 7 percentage points last March to 12 percentage points in this poll. If new parliamentary elections are to take place today, Hamas would receive 31% (compared to 35% last March) and Fateh would received 43% (compared to 42% last March).

Perception of personal and family security and safety increases in the West Bank from 32% last March to 40% in this poll. But the percentage of personal and family security and safety in the Gaza Strip is higher than in the West Bank as it reaches 49% (compared to 46% in Gaza last March). In this regard, 57% say that the deployment of the Palestinian security forces in some cities and towns in the West Bank has succeeded or somewhat succeeded in enforcing law and order while 34% say the deployment has failed to do that. Belief in the success of the security deployment is greatest in the areas of Nablus and Jenin (87% and 81% respectively) followed by Tulkarm (77%), Qalqilia (65%), Ramallah (59%), Bethlehem (57%), Hebron (50%), and Jerusalem (47%). When asked about their perceptions regarding the true purpose of the deployment, 35% said the purpose was to enforce law and order, 28% said it was to disarm the resistance forces, and 23% said it was both, the enforcement of law and order and the disarming of the resistance forces.

While only 23% give a positive evaluation of the status of democracy in the Gaza Strip under the Hamas government, the percentage for the West Bank under Fayyad’s government is higher (33%). Moreover, while only 5% describe the overall conditions of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as good or very good, the percentage for the overall conditions in the West Bank is higher (25%). A majority of 77% believes that corruption exists in PA institutions that are under the control of PA president and his government and only 14% believe there is no corruption in PA institutions. Among those who believe corruption exists in the PA, 60% believe this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.  Moreover, a majority of 59% describes PA handling of the case of the smuggling of mobile phones in the car of the former PLC Speaker of the Palestinian parliament as a cover for corruption while only 28% describe it as an example of fighting corruption.

About half of the Palestinians (49%) say that the PA under Mahmud Abbas is more able than Hamas’s government under Ismail Haniyeh to reach a peace agreement with Israel while only 15% say the Hamas government is more able to do so. Moreover, 41% believe that the PA under Abbas is more able than Hamas’s government to force Israel to make more concessions to the Palestinians while only 25% believe Hamas’s government is more able to do so. Even if the choice was between Abbas and Marwan Barghouti, Abbas comes on top with 31% while only 28% believe Barghouti would be more able than Abbas to force Israel to make more concessions to the Palestinians. Belief that Abbas is more able than Hamas to force Israel to make concessions can be seen both in the West Bank (40% to 24%) and the Gaza Strip (44% to 27%), but is more evident among women (45% to 23%) compared to men (37% to 27%), among supporters of the peace process (48% to 22%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (19% to 40%), among illiterates (48% to 18%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (31% to 27%), among those who intend to vote for Fateh’s list (64% to 11%) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas’s list (31% to 53%). 

2) Ceasefire, the One-State Solution, and the Peace Process

• An overwhelming majority supports a ceasefire with Israel, but a similar majority opposes the ceasefire if it does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate the immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt.
• In a comparison between the one-state solution and the two-state solution, 58% prefer the two-state solution and 27% prefer the one-state solution.
• Stability in the position of Palestinians regarding a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative; 46% support it and 52% oppose it.
• 56% support and 43% oppose mutual recognition of Israel and the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after reaching a permanent settlement.
• 67% support and 28% oppose the Saudi peace initiative.
• 50% support the Roadmap and 47% oppose it.
• An overwhelming majority prefers a permanent settlement and only 15% prefers an interim one.
• 66% believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state during the next five years are either low or non existent.
• 76% believe that the negotiations launched by the Annapolis conference will fail.
• 68% believe that Olmert-Abbas meetings are not useful and should be stopped while only 27% believe they are useful and should continue.
• Support for armed attacks against Israelis drops from 67% to 55% during three months;  similarly, support for launching rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip drops from 64% to 57% during the same period.
• Two thirds believe that success in the Syrian-Israeli track will not have a negative impact on the Palestinian-Israeli track.

Findings show that 78% support and 21% oppose a ceasefire agreement with Israel. But support decreases sharply to 23% if the agreement is to be restricted to the Gaza Strip and exclude the West Bank. Moreover, support drops further to 20% if the agreement does not include the immediate opening of the Gaza Crossings, especially the Rafah crossing to Egypt. Opposition to a ceasefire agreement that does not include the West Bank is high both in the Gaza Strip (78%) and the West Bank (74%). The same is true if the agreement does not stipulate the opening of the crossings, reaching 80% in the Gaza Strip and 78% in the West Bank.

Findings indicate that 38% believe that a one-state solution (one based on the establishment of a unified state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip whereby Palestinian Arabs enjoy equal rights as Israeli Jews) is more difficult to achieve than a two-state solution (one in which a Palestinian state is established next to the state of Israel). But a similar percentage (36%) believes the two-state solution is more difficult to achieve, and 25% believe that the two solutions are equally difficult to achieve. Regardless of its difficulty, 58% say they prefer the two-state solution while only 27% prefer the one state solution. 10% prefer other solutions. Support for the two state solution compared to the one state solution increases in the West Bank (58% to 25%) compared to the Gaza Strip (56% to 31%), in rural areas (61% to 23%) compared to cities (57% to 28%) and refugee camps (50% to 36%), among supporters of the peace process (63% to 26%), compared to those opposed to the peace process (40% to 32%), among the illiterates (65% to 21%) compared to holders of BA degree (52% to 25%), among those who are certainly willing to buy a lottery ticket (75% to 17%) compared to those who are certainly unwilling to buy a lottery ticket ( 49% to 25%), among refugees (58% to 25%) compared to non-refugees (58% to 28%), and among those who intend to vote for Fateh’s list (68% to 25%) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas’s list (46% to 30%).

Support for a permanent settlement along the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative remains stable with a minority support of 46% and 52% opposition. A majority of 63% supports the article on borders and territorial exchange and a majority of 56% supports the article on end of conflict. Only a minority supports all other articles: 28% support a state without an army, 38% support the Jerusalem compromise, 41% support the refugee compromise, and 38% support the security measures. Findings also indicate that 56% support and 43% oppose a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the two sides reach an agreement on all other issues of permanent settlement including Jerusalem and refugees. Moreover, 73% would support and 26% would oppose reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement. 67% support and 28% oppose the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of relations with it after its withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Support for the Roadmap reaches 50% and opposition 47%. Findings indicate that the overwhelming majority (81%) prefers a comprehensive and permanent settlement that ends the conflict while only 15% prefer an interim settlement that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state but postpone other issues such as refugees.

Findings show a pessimistic outlook dominating Palestinian expectations regarding the peace process. 66% believe that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are low or non existent and only 30% believe the chances are medium or high. Moreover, 76% believe that the negotiations launched by the Annapolis Conference will fail and only 16% believe they will succeed. 75% believe that it is impossible these days to reach a permanent settlement with the current Olmert government while only 22% believe it is possible to reach an agreement with it. These percentages are similar to those we found during the past six months. For all of this, 68% believe that meetings between Abbas and Olmert are not useful and should be stopped while only 27% believe they are useful and should continue.

Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel drops from 67% last March to 55% in this poll. Moreover, support for launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon has dropped from 64% last march to 57% in this poll.

Finally, 32% believe that serious progress in Syrian-Israeli peace talks or reaching a peace agreement will contribute positively to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, but 26% believe that such development would constitute an impediment in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and 35% believe such progress will have no impact.

3) Conflict in Lebanon between Hezbollah and the Future trend

• 52% describe Hezbollah’s temporary armed control of West Beirut as legitimate and 36% describe it as illegitimate.
• Half of the public expects the eruption of civil war in Lebanon between the Sunnites and the Shiites in the aftermath of Hezbollah’s control over West Beirut.
• If civil war does erupt, 37% expect the Shiites to win and 18% expect he Sunnites to win.
• If such civil war erupts, 34% say they will support the Sunnites under the leadership of the Future trend and 21% say they will support the Shiites under the leadership of the Shiites and Hezbollah; 35% say they will support neither side.

Findings show that a majority of 52% view Hezbollah’s armed control over West Beirut in August as legitimate and 36% view it as illegitimate. Despite the fact that the Lebanese parties have reached an agreement in Doha to settle their differences, 45% of the Palestinians expect a return to civil war in Lebanon, this time between Sunnites and Shiites as a result of the Hezbollah behavior and the conflict between Hezbollah and the Future trend while 44% do not expect that. If civil war between Sunnites and Shiites erupts in Lebanon, 37% expect the Shiites under the leadership of Hezbollah and Amal movement to win it, 18% expect the Sunnites under the leadership of the Future trend to win it, 29% expect neither side to win it, and 16% do not know who would win it. As to which side they will support if civil war erupts, 34% say they will support the Sunnites under the leadership of the Future trend, 21% say they will support the Shiites under the leadership of Hezbollah and Amal movement, and 35% say they will support neither side. Support for Sunnites vs. Shiites increases in the Gaza Strip (45% to 14%) compared to the West Bank (28% to 26%), in refugee camps (43% to 14%) compared to cities (36% to 19%) and rural areas (29% to 26%), among supporters of the peace process (36% to 22%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (32% to 23%), among those who describe themselves as religious (37% to 20%) compared to those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (33% to 22%), among holders of BA degree (37% to 17%), compared to illiterates (20% to 32%), among those working in the public sector (44% to 15%), compared to those working in the private sector (33% to 23%), among those who certainly refuse to buy a lottery ticket (38% to 17%) compared to those who certainly accept to buy a lottery ticket (33% to 29%), among refugees (36% to 17%) compared to non refugees (33% to 24%), and among supporters of Fateh (44% to 18%) compared to supporters of Hamas (37% to 26%). ....Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 7-10 December 2017. The poll was conducted one day after the announcement by President Trump that he is recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and during a period in which limited clashes occurred between Palestinian protesters and Israeli soldiers throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By then, the Palestinian Authority has already publicly condemned the US measure and announced cessation of peace-related contacts with Washington. On the domestic front, reconciliation efforts continued to produce slow progress and a meeting held in Cairo declared that elections will take place before the end of 2018. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as general conditions in the Palestinian territories and certain aspects of the peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2017 show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians view the decision by US President Donald Trump as a threat to Palestinian interests, one that requires an appropriate response. But the public is divided on what would be considered appropriate. While the largest percentage favors ending contacts with the US, submitting a formal complaint to the International Criminal Court, and a resumption of an armed intifada, the majority continues to favor responses that exclude armed struggle, despite the rise in support for such struggle during the past three months. Furthermore, it seems obvious that the public does not think that its leadership shares its view on what is considered to be an appropriate response to the American step.

In light of the US step, findings show an almost total public distrust of the role of regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan and Qatar, in the peace efforts organized by the US Administration. More than three quarters believe that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s first cause. Indeed, more than70% believe that despite the continuation of Israeli occupation, an alliance already exists between Sunni Arab states and Israel.

On top of that there is little or no confidence in the US Administration and its peace intentions. An overwhelming majority believes that any Trump peace plan will not meet the basic Palestinian need to end occupation and build an independent state. But here too one can see the gap between the position of the public and the public assessment of the position of the Palestinian leadership. Despite public confidence that the Trump ideas cannot serve as a basis for negotiations, about half of the public believes that President Abbas might accept the American ideas. Furthermore, more than 70% of the public believe that major Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt will also accept the Trump ideas.

Findings show that the public fully supports the assumption of security control by the reconciliation government in the Gaza Strip. In return, the public demands that the reconciliation government pay the salaries of the civil and security sectors which worked in the past under Hamas’ government. The public is also firmly opposed to the disarmament of the various armed groups in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, a majority demands the resignation of the reconciliation government if it does not lift the sanctions imposed by the PA over the Strip. If a national unity government is established, about half of the public rejects the idea that such a government should follow the peace program of President Abbas; only a minority wants the unity government to embrace Abbas’ peace program.

Finally, findings show how the US step has harmed Abbas’ popularity with further decline in his standing and increased demand for his resignation. Demand for Abbas resignation stands today at 70%, a first since such demand became high three years ago. If new presidential elections, in which Abbas competes against Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh, are held today, the latter could easily win. Even if the candidate against Abbas came from the small third parties (such as Mustafa Barghouti from al Mubadara), findings show that it is doubtful that Abbas could win. On the other hand, the party balance remains relatively stable, compared to the findings three months ago, with Fatah having an edge against Hamas. Hamas is more popular than Fatah in the Gaza Strip while Fatah is more popular than Hamas in the West Bank.

(1) Presidential and parliamentary elections: 

• 70% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 26% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 67% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 64% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago demand for Abbas resignation stood at 60% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip.
• If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Mohammad Dahlan 7% (1% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip); Mustapha Barghouti (5%); Rami al Hamdallah (5%), Khalid Mishal (3%), and Salam Fayyad (2%).
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 66%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 36% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (38% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 53% and the latter 41% of the vote (compared to 50% for Haniyeh and 42% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 33% of the vote (compared to 36% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 66% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and Haniyeh 43% (compared to 42% three months ago). If the competition was between President Abbas from Fatah and Mustafa Barghouti from al Mubadara (Initiative), the two receive an identical percentage of 45%. Mustafa Barghouti receives 57% of the vote in the Gaza Strip and 36% in the West Bank.
• If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 18%, Barghouti 41% and Haniyeh 36%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%.
• If presidential elections are held soon, 42% want Hamas to nominate one of its leader while 45% prefer to see Hamas supporting a third party or an independent candidate.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they would vote for Hamas and 36% say they would vote for Fatah, 6% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 27% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 36% (compared to 31% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 41% (compared to 42% three months ago).

(2) Domestic conditions:

• Only 34% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear; 61% of the public say that people cannot criticize the PA without fear.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 12%.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 53%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 45%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 49% and in the West Bank at 50%.
• Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 41%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 22%. Three months ago, 43% of Gazans and 22% of West Bankers indicated that they seek to immigrate.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Maan TV (15%), al Aqsa TV (14%), Filasteen al Youm/Palestine Today (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Al Arabiya (6%) al Quds TV (6%), and al Mayadeen (3%).  
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 77%.

(3) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:  

• 81% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the civil employees of the former Hamas government but 14% do not want it to do so.
• Similarly, 81% of the public want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the security sector employees of the former Hamas government and 14% do not want it to do so.
• 78% support placing the police department in the Gaza Strip, which is currently under the control of Hamas, to come under the control of the reconciliation government so that the police departments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would come under the one command and control center; 19% are opposed to that and prefer to maintain the current status quo.
• Now that it has taken control of the border crossings and the headquarters of the ministries and other public agencies, 38% are satisfied and 55% are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government.
• 50% are optimistic and 45% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 31% and pessimism at 61%.
• Despite the rise in optimism, only 43% expect the reconciliation government to take real control of the security conditions in the Gaza Strip; 47% do not expect that to happen.
• 78% support the formation of a national unity government composed of Fatah, Hamas, and other faction while only 17% prefer to keep the current reconciliation government.
• If a national unity government is established, the public is divided over its peace program: 43% want it to adhere to Abbas policy but 49% does not want to do so.
•  Responding to Abbas’ call for “one government, one gun,” only 22% support disbanding the armed wings of the various Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip and 72% want these armed groups to remain in place.
• Only 43% believe that the date set for elections in the latest factional meeting in Cairo is appropriate while 33% think it is late and 16% think it is too early.
• 70% support holding legislative and presidential elections but only after resolving all remaining issues such as control over security, PLO, and the armed factions; 26% support holding elections immediately, without resolving these other issues.
• The largest percentage (45%) believes that the reason behind Abbas’ decision not to remove the sanctions he had imposed on the Gaza Strip is to pressure Hamas to make more concessions that would remove the obstacles to reconciliation. On the other hand, 23% believe that he has not removed the sanctions in order to insure a slow process of reconciliation and 22% think he seeks to bring about the collapse of the process of reconciliation.
• 51% support and 38% oppose the resignation of the reconciliation government led by Rami al Hamdallah if it does not immediately remove the Abbas-imposed sanctions on the Gaza Strip.
• 45% of the public believe the latest factional meeting in Cairo has been neither a success nor a failure while 19% view it as a success and 27% as a failure.
• For the next three months, the top priority of the reconciliation government in the eyes of 42% of the public should be the delivery of electricity and water to Gazans on daily basis while 30% believe it should be the opening of the crossings, 10% think it should be the resolution of the problem of the payment to the employees of the former Hamas government, 9% believe it should be the holding of elections, 6% the imposition of control over security matters in the Gaza Strip, and 2% the convening of the existing Palestinian Legislative Council.
• For the next year, the top priority of the reconciliation government in the eyes of 41% of the public should be the opening of the crossings; delivery of electricity and water to Gazans on daily basis (31%), while 11% think it should be the holding of elections, 7% think it should be the resolution of the problem of the payment to the employees of the former Hamas government, 7% believe it should be the imposition of control over security matters in the Gaza Strip, and 3% the convening of the existing Palestinian Legislative Council.
• 51% believe that the reconciliation effort is not linked to the restoration of negotiations and the peace process while 43% think that it is indeed linked.
• 24% think Fatah and Abbas came out of reconciliation winners and 20% think Hamas came out a winner. But 48% believe that Fatah and Hamas have come out neither winners no losers. 
• With regard to regional players, the largest percentage (51%) believes that Egypt came out of reconciliation a winner while only 34% described Saudi Arabia as a winner (and 25% as a loser), 33% said Qatar came out a winner (and 26% as a loser), and 27% said Iran came out a winner (and 26% as a loser). Although 33% characterized Israel as a winner, 46% characterized it as a loser.

(4) The peace process:  

• 91% characterize Trumps declaration recognizing Jerusalem as a capital of Israel as a threat to Palestinian interests (79% as a great threat and 12% as a limited threat) while only 7% saw no threat in the declaration.
• The largest percentage (45%) believes that the most appropriate Palestinian measure against the US step is to stop all contacts with the American Administration, submit a formal complaint to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and resort to an armed intifada. But 27% think it should stop the contacts and submit a complaint to the ICC, but should resort to non-violent resistance. Still, 12% want the PA to only denounce the US step and stop the contacts with the US Administration and an identical percentage wants it to denounce the step while maintaining contacts with the US toward reaching a permanent peace.
• On the other hand, only 27% of the public believe that the Palestinian leadership will actually stop contacts with the US, submit an ICC complaint, and resort to an armed intifada while 24% believe the PA will denounce the US step but will maintain contacts with the Trump Administration.
• The largest percentage (44%) believes that armed resistance is the most effective means of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel while 27% think negotiation is the most effective means and 23% think non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, only 35% indicated that armed resistance is the answer and 33% sided with negotiation.
• An overwhelming majority of 72% believes that the Trump Administration will not submit any ideas or plans for Palestinian-Israeli peace while 24% think it will do so.
• But even if the US does submit a peace proposal, an even larger majority of 86% believes that such a proposal will not meet Palestinian need to end occupation and build a state; only 11% think the proposal will indeed meet such needs.
• Nonetheless, 49% believe that president Abbas might accept the American peace plan if one is indeed submitted to him while 42% believe he will not accept it.
• On the other hand, 65% think the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu will accept such American peace plan; only 26% think he will not accept it.
• Moreover, 72% of the public believe that major Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia (or at least one of them) will accept this American plan if submitted; only 20% think they will not accept it.
•  Regarding public trust in the roles and positions of major Arab countries in the peace process and the US efforts to develop a regional agreement in the context of Palestinian-Israeli peace, an overwhelming majority of 82% says that it does not trust the Saudi role, 75% do not trust the Emirati role, 70% do not trust the Egyptian role, and 59% do not trust the Jordanian or the Qatari roles.  
• Moreover, 76% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 23% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause.
• In fact, 71% believe that there is already an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 21% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state. Three months ago, only 64% said that an Arab Sunni alliance already exists with Israel.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 48% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 28% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 29% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities while 26% say it is poverty and unemployment; 20% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 4% say it is the absence of national unity.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, June 2013

Despite the launching of the efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and the modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative (API) accepting minor territorial swaps, both sides display pessimism regarding the peace process and Israeli support for the API drops

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

• Israelis and Palestinians continue to display pessimism regarding the peace process despite efforts by US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and despite modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative: Only 27% of the Palestinians and 10% of the Israelis think that the two sides will return to negotiations and violence will stop while 34% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue as well. On the other hand, 44% of the Israelis and 15% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and armed attacks will not stop and 21% of the Palestinians believe that the two sides will not return to negotiations but that violence will not resume.
• Furthermore, findings indicate that each side perceives the other side as constituting a threat to its very existence: 57% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals in the long run are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 25% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 37% of the Israelis think that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 17% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 13 and 16, 2013. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 601 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between June 14 and 21, 2013. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Ifat Maoz, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Department of Communication and Journalism and Director of the Swiss Center for Conflict Research at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey,
contact Prof Ifat Maoz at email msifat@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

 (A) Attitudes and expectations regarding the peace process

• The majority of Israelis (68%) and Palestinians (69%) view the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to Israel in the next five years as low or non-existent. A majority of Israelis (62%) supports a two-state solution while 33% oppose it. Among the Palestinians, 53% support and 46% oppose the two-state solution. 51% of Israelis think that the two-state solution is bound to fail because of settlements.  58% of Palestinians think that the two-state solution is no longer viable. At the same time, a majority of Israelis (63%) and Palestinians (69%) oppose the one state solution in which Arabs and Jews enjoy equality; while32% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians support this solution.
•  56% of the Palestinians support the Saudi peace plan and 41% oppose it, while 24% of the Israelis support and 67% oppose it. A year ago, in June 2012, 51% of the Palestinians supported the Saudi plan and 45% opposed it, while 36% of the Israelis supported and 59% opposed it. In other words, the Arab modification of the plan, by accepting territorial swap, did not positively change the views of the Israelis. On the other hand, the Arab modification did not negatively affect Palestinian support for the initiative. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194.  In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations.
• As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition of national identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 57% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 37% opposes it. Among Palestinians, 42% support and 56% oppose this step. In June 2012, 53% of the Israelis supported and 43% opposed this mutual recognition; among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll (43% support and 55% oppose).

 (B) Conflict management and threat perceptions 

•  Given the launching of the efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry to renew the peace process and the modification introduced to the Arab Peace Initiative accepting minor territorial swaps, 27% of the Palestinians and 10% of the Israelis think that the two sides will return to negotiations and violence will stop while 34% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue as well. On the other hand, 44% of the Israelis and 15% of the Palestinians think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and armed attacks will not stop and 21% of the Palestinians believe that the two sides will not return to negotiations but that violence will not resume.
• Among Israelis, 50% are worried and 49% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, this is similar to our June 2012 findings. Among Palestinians, 74% are worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. In June 2012, perception of worry among Palestinians was identical.
• The level of perceived threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 57% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 25% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (37%); 17% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 36% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967.

Pessimism among Israelis and Palestinians regarding the prospects for a settlement and a Palestinian state in the next few years, but majorities on both sides support a two-state solution.  

Following Obama’s Cairo speech, Israelis’ pessimism decreased somewhat and support for the two-state solution increased slightly  

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between May 21-June 3, 2009. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem. The poll was conducted before Obama’s Cairo speech on June 4. Following the speech, another survey was conducted (June 7-8) which repeated some of the first survey questions on a representative sample of the Israeli public to assess the speech’s impact. We did not conduct a similar poll among Palestinians after the Obama speech.  

• 67% of the Palestinians and 62% of the Israelis believe that it is impossible to reach these days a final status agreement. Only 30% and 35% respectively believe it is possible. In the same vein, 69% of the Palestinians and 61% among Israelis think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel in the next five years are non-existent or low; 28% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe the chances are medium or high. Nonetheless, a majority of Israelis (59%) and Palestinians (61%) support a two-state solution. 36% of Israelis oppose it; 23% of the Palestinians support a one-state solution.
• Following Obama’s Cairo speech, Israelis’ support for a two-state solution increased slightly from 59% to 63%. Obama’s speech had greater impact on Israelis’ expectations as to the chances for a final status settlement with the Palestinians and for the establishment of a Palestinian state: Assessment that the chances for a Palestinian state are medium or high increased by 10 percentage points after the speech, and beliefs that it is possible to reach a final status settlement increased by 6 percentage points.
• Among other findings of the joint Truman PSR poll: 43% of the Palestinians feel that nuclearization of Iran holds positive consequences for the Arab region; 33% see it negatively.   52% of the Israelis support the bombing of the Iranian nuclear facilities if the international efforts to prevent it from obtaining a nuclear device fail.
• The poll also reveals that 52% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians would support a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and of Palestine as the  state of the Palestinian people after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute. While a majority of the publics still supports this mutual recognition of identity, the current figures indicate a decrease in support among both publics compared to past surveys.  

 The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between May 21-23, 2009. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 606 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between May 24 and June 3, 2009. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).  

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il. 

MAIN FINDINGS  

(A) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda

The Israeli-Palestinian track

• 50% of the Israelis support and 48% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. The same figures were obtained in our March 2009 poll. A sizeable Israeli majority (62%) support and only 31% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. In March 2009 these figures were 69% and 27% respectively.
• 78% of the Palestinians and 51% among Israelis prefer a comprehensive settlement over an interim one where a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza while other issues such as refugees would be postponed. Only 18% of the Palestinians and 33% of the Israelis prefer the interim option.
• 68% of the Israeli public don’t believe that the new Israeli government will succeed to lead Israel to a final status settlement with the Palestinians, while 25% believe it will succeed. Similarly, among the Palestinians, 70% do not believe it is possible to reach such a settlement with the new Netanyahu government; 27% think it is possible.
• More generally, 67% of the Palestinians and 62% of the Israelis believe that it is impossible to reach these days a final status agreement; 30% and 35% respectively believe it is possible.
• 69% of the Palestinians and 61% among Israelis think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel in the next five years are non-existent or low; 28% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe the chances are medium or high.
• Nevertheless, 59% of the Israelis support and 36% oppose a two-state solution. Among Palestinians, 61% support the two-state solution while 23% support a one-state solution and 9% support other solutions. The two-state solution was presented to the Palestinians as one “based on the establishment of a Palestinian state along side Israel” while the one-state solution was presented as “one in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state whereby Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews would be equal.”
• Moreover, 52% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians agree that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. 41% and 49% respectively oppose such a proposal. While a majority of the publics still supports this mutual recognition of identity, the current figures indicate a decrease in support among both publics compared to past surveys. Among Palestinians, support peaked at 66% in early 2006, and has since been declining steadily. Among Israelis, support has drastically declined following the 2009 elections.
• Following Netanyahu’s refusal to accept the two-state solution and Abbas’s condition for resumption of negotiations that Israel accepts this solution and freezes settlements, 46% of the Israelis and 44% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue. 40% of the Israelis and 36% of the Palestinians think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 6% of the Israelis and 16% of the Palestinians think that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop.

The Arab League (Saudi) Plan

• 56% of the Israelis oppose and 36% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In our March 2009 poll 63% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 33% supported it. Among Palestinians, 57% support the plan and 40% oppose it; in March 2009, 58% supported the plan and 39% opposed it.

Israeli-Syrian  Track

• 62% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria, and 26% support it. If in the peace agreement, Syria will commit to disconnect itself from Iran and stop its support of Hizbulla and Hamas, support increases to 34%
• 69% of the Israeli public do not believe that the new Israeli government will succeed to lead Israel to a peace agreement with Syria, while 22% believe it will succeed.

 (B) Conflict Management, Support for Violence, Threat and Conflict Toll Perceptions

• Among Israelis, 27% suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues; 42% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out; 24% believe that Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps. Among Palestinians, 51% support and 46% oppose launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities like Sderot and Ashkelon.
• 58% of the Israelis believe that Israel can overthrow the Hamas regime in Gaza; 36% believe that it cannot.
• Among Israelis, 61% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life. Among Palestinians 45% fear that their security and safety and that of their family are not assured.
• 52% of the Israeli public believe that Israel should bomb the Iranian nuclear reactor if the efforts of the international community to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons fail; 35% oppose it. Among Palestinians, 43% feel that nuclearization of Iran holds positive consequences for the Arab region; 33% see it negatively.  
• 69% of the Israelis think that the price the Israeli-Palestinian conflict imposed on the Israeli society is high or unbearable; 28% think that it is mid-range or low. However, 60% think the Israeli society can bear this price for decades or forever; 14% think it can bear it another 10 years, and 13% believe that the Israeli society will be able to bear this price another year or two.
• Only 23% of the Israelis feel that Israel’s condition these days is good or very good; 40% say it is so-so; 35% see it as bad or very bad. 
• Among Palestinians, only 10% describe the conditions of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as good or very good, 13% say so-so, and 74% say bad or very bad. As to the conditions in the West Bank these days, 31% describe the conditions of the Palestinians in the West Bank as good or very good, 27% say so-so, and 38% say bad or very bad.

(C) The Impact of Obama’s Cairo Speech on the Israeli Public

Following Obama’s Cairo speech on June 4^th we carried out a second survey which repeated some of the first survey questions on a representative sample of the Israeli public (N=528) to assess the speech’s impact. The interviews took place 3 days after the speech (June 7-8).

• Before the speech, 50% of the Israelis thought that Israel should accept American pressure if the US under the leadership of Obama pressures Israel to accept the two states for two people solution; 42% thought it should reject such pressure. After the speech, willingness to accept such US pressure increased to 52%, and rejection of it decreased by 4 percentage points to 38%. A similar increase of 4 percentage points is observed in Israelis’ support for the two-state solution (59% support before the speech and 63% thereafter).
• As to the Saudi plan, before Obama’s speech, 34% of the Israelis thought that Israel should accept American pressure on this issue, and 53% thought it should reject it. After the speech, there was almost no change, and the figures were 33% and 54% respectively. This stability is consistent with Israeli majority opposition to the Saudi plan, which remained steadfast as well following Obama’s speech.
• Before Obama’s speech, 35% of the Israelis thought that Israel should accept American pressure if the US pressures Israel to join the nuclear non proliferation treaty; 52% thought Israel should reject it. (This question was not asked in the second survey).

Greater differences before and after Obama’s speech were observed in expectations of Israelis with regard to the evolution of the conflict:

• Expectations with regard to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years increased. 42% thought the chances for it are medium or high after the speech, compared to 32% before.
• Similarly, Israeli beliefs that it is possible to reach these days a final status settlement with the Palestinians increased from 35% before the speech to 41% after it.
• Finally, Israeli beliefs in the success of international mediation of the conflict increased following the speech from 49% to 52%, and the percentage disbelieving in such mediation declined from 48% to 42%.
•  

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 1-4 May 2025. The period prior to the poll witnessed the continuation of the war on the Gaza Strip and the failure of all attempts to reach a new ceasefire after the collapse of the three-phase agreement reached on January 15, 2025, which lasted for a little more than two months after Israel refused to enter into negotiations to implement its second phase. During that period, the US president proposed the idea of displacing the residents of the Gaza Strip to Egypt and Jordan under the pretext of facilitating the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, a proposal that was rejected by all concerned parties except Israel, which began to develop plans to carry out such displacement. Israel has also demanded the disarmament of Hamas as one of the conditions for stopping the war on the Gaza Strip. In a speech to the PLO's Central Council, the PA president called on Hamas to release the Israeli hostages and give up arms in order to deny Israel the pretext of continuing the war on Gaza. Meanwhile, the Israeli military incursion into the Jenin and Tulkarm areas in the West Bank continued, interrupted by clashes between the Israeli army and Palestinian armed groups in the northern West Bank. The Israeli army evacuated tens of thousands of people from the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps and demolished dozens of buildings in those camps. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank also continued and entrances to most towns and villages were closed by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in unprotected areas in areas B and C also continued.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in areas that did not witness armed clashes and whose residents have not been displaced or returned after being displaced, especially after the recent ceasefire during the first three months of this year. This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as domestic condition and the internal balance of power, the peace process and the alternatives available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

This survey was conducted face-to-face in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip using tablets or phones. When each interview is completed, it is automatically sent directly to our server where only our researchers can access. There is no way for anyone to intercept or manipulate the collected data.

The sample size of this survey was 1270 people, of whom 830 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 83 residential locations) and 440 in the Gaza Strip (in 44 locations).  The margin of error stands at +/-3.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Methodology of data collection in the Gaza Strip:

The interviews for this poll included 44 census “counting areas” in all areas of the Gaza Strip, with the exception of some areas whose residents were displaced in the Rafah governorate and some other specific areas of Gaza City, Khan Younis, and the northern Gaza Strip, so that the number of areas that were not accessible stood at 13 counting areas (five in the Rafah governorate, five in Gaza Governorate, two in Khan the Yunis governorate, and one in the northern Gaza Strip). Residents of these 13 displaced counting areas were interviewed in shelters and refugee camps in the same governorate from which they were displaced. These were randomly selected from an updated list of shelters and refugee camps located in their governorates, with the exception of the Rafah governorate, whose residents were displaced to areas in the Khan Younis governorate.