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Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll 

Majority of Palestinians and Israelis prefer two-state solution over binational state or confederation

A majority of Israelis and Palestinians prefer a two-state solution as the most acceptable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, as opposed to a single binational state or a Palestinian-Israeli confederation. 

This is the clear conclusion drawn from the latest public opinion survey conducted under the auspices of the Harry S.Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. 

The March joint Israeli Palestinian poll focused on the main political outlines for a final status Palestinian- Israeli agreement. Those surveyed were asked whether they preferred a solution of two states for two peoples, a binational Palestinian-Israeli state, or a Palestinian-Israeli confederation. 

The results were as follows:

• 71% among Israelis and 57% among Palestinians supported the “two-state solution,” namely the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside of Israel.
• Compared to the two-state solution, only 24% of the Israelis and 29% of the Palestinians supported the solution of a binational state, in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state in which Palestinians and Israelis would have equal rights.
• The third outline for a political settlement is a two states for two peoples solution, with joint political institutions which will lead eventually to a confederation of the two states. Only 30% of the Israelis and 26% among Palestinians supported this solution.

In recent months the idea of a binational state has increasingly been put forth as a solution. However, it would seem to be impossible to implement this option given the strong opposition to it in the two publics.

• Palestinians and Israelis also understand that the most difficult solution to implement is the bi-national state solution: 38% of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians think so. Fewer respondents, think so about the two-state solution (29% and 32% respectively), and even less (21% and 18% respectively) believe so about the confederation.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed in person in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 4-6. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 501 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between March 1-10. The margin of error is 4.9%. 

The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll is supported by the Ford Foundation (Cairo) and the Adenauer Stiftung (Jerusaelm and Ramallah). The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or emailpcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 1-4 May 2025. The period prior to the poll witnessed the continuation of the war on the Gaza Strip and the failure of all attempts to reach a new ceasefire after the collapse of the three-phase agreement reached on January 15, 2025, which lasted for a little more than two months after Israel refused to enter into negotiations to implement its second phase. During that period, the US president proposed the idea of displacing the residents of the Gaza Strip to Egypt and Jordan under the pretext of facilitating the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, a proposal that was rejected by all concerned parties except Israel, which began to develop plans to carry out such displacement. Israel has also demanded the disarmament of Hamas as one of the conditions for stopping the war on the Gaza Strip. In a speech to the PLO's Central Council, the PA president called on Hamas to release the Israeli hostages and give up arms in order to deny Israel the pretext of continuing the war on Gaza. Meanwhile, the Israeli military incursion into the Jenin and Tulkarm areas in the West Bank continued, interrupted by clashes between the Israeli army and Palestinian armed groups in the northern West Bank. The Israeli army evacuated tens of thousands of people from the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps and demolished dozens of buildings in those camps. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank also continued and entrances to most towns and villages were closed by the Israeli army in order to prevent residents from accessing main roads. Settler violence against Palestinian towns and villages in unprotected areas in areas B and C also continued.

To ensure the safety of our data collectors in the Gaza Strip, interviews were conducted with residents in areas that did not witness armed clashes and whose residents have not been displaced or returned after being displaced, especially after the recent ceasefire during the first three months of this year. This poll covers all of the above issues as well as other issues such as domestic condition and the internal balance of power, the peace process and the alternatives available to the Palestinians in light of the current stalemate in that process.

This survey was conducted face-to-face in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip using tablets or phones. When each interview is completed, it is automatically sent directly to our server where only our researchers can access. There is no way for anyone to intercept or manipulate the collected data.

The sample size of this survey was 1270 people, of whom 830 were interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank (in 83 residential locations) and 440 in the Gaza Strip (in 44 locations).  The margin of error stands at +/-3.5%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Methodology of data collection in the Gaza Strip:

The interviews for this poll included 44 census “counting areas” in all areas of the Gaza Strip, with the exception of some areas whose residents were displaced in the Rafah governorate and some other specific areas of Gaza City, Khan Younis, and the northern Gaza Strip, so that the number of areas that were not accessible stood at 13 counting areas (five in the Rafah governorate, five in Gaza Governorate, two in Khan the Yunis governorate, and one in the northern Gaza Strip). Residents of these 13 displaced counting areas were interviewed in shelters and refugee camps in the same governorate from which they were displaced. These were randomly selected from an updated list of shelters and refugee camps located in their governorates, with the exception of the Rafah governorate, whose residents were displaced to areas in the Khan Younis governorate.

21-23 May 2009   

 These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 21 and 23 May 2009. The poll was conducted in the aftermath of the failure of the latest round of Palestinian reconciliation talks in Cairo and the formation of a new government headed by Salam Fayyad and after the meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with US president Barak Obama in Washington DC. The poll examines the following topics: domestic issues such as the balance of power, the performance and legitimacy of two governments, that of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad, confidence in the police, the effects of the continued conflict between Fateh and Hamas, as well as the various issues of the peace process such as the support for the two-state vs. the one-state solutions. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. This press release covers domestic Palestinian issues; issues related to the peace process and Israeli-Palestinian relations will be covered in a separate joint Palestinian-Israeli press release. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2009 show a stable balance of power between Fateh and Hamas compared to the situation in the first quarter. Abbas’s popularity increases slightly in comparison to that of Haniyeh. Findings also show that most Palestinians have no confidence in the ability of Fateh and Hamas to reach a reconciliation agreement. In this regard, the public tend to support Hamas’s position on what kind of electoral system should be adopted but the majority supports Fateh’s position on the government platform issue. Findings show a split regarding the new Fayyad government with a larger percentage opposing its formation. Findings show that public evaluation of the performance of various actors during the Gaza war clearly favors Hams and those who support it, like Iran and Syria, while Fateh, Abbas, Fayyad’s government, and Egypt receive lower positive evaluation ratings.

With regard to the peace process, findings indicate a continued state of widespread pessimism regarding the chances for establishing a Palestinian state in the next five years and regarding the chances for a permanent peace agreement with the Netanyahu government. But despite this pessimism, a majority still supports the two-state solution while less than a quarter supports the one-state solution. Pessimism however is reflected sharply in two major issues. Support for launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli communities across the border increases considerably among the pessimists and decreases among the optimists.  Similarly, a larger percentage among the pessimists tends to view positively an Iranian attainment of nuclear weapons while the opposite is true among the optimists.

(1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions

• 42% support the formation of the new Salam Fayyad government and 48% oppose it
• 55% are worried that they or members of their families might be harmed by other Palestinians and 44% are not worried
• 46% support a mixed electoral system as proposed by Hamas and 39% support a fully proportional system as proposed by Fateh; but 50% support Fateh’s position that the program of national unity government must accept all previous agreement signed between Israel and the PLO while 44% support Hamas’s position which rejects this condition
• If new presidential elections are held today, Abbas would receive 49% of the vote and Haniyeh 44%, and if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter 32%
• Fateh receives the support of 41% of potential voters, Hamas 33%, all other electoral lists 9%, and 18% remain undecided; public estimates of the likely outcome of elections are similar with 39% saying Fateh would win and 28% saying Hamas would win
• 41% believe that the performance of Haniyeh’s government is good or very good and 32% say the performance of Fayyad’s government is good or very good
• 33% believe that Fateh’s Sixth Congress will be held in July as announced while 42% say it will be postponed and 14% say it will never be held
• 13% say they have been have been attacked or robbed by other Palestinians during the past year, and among those 43% say they have submitted a complaint while 56% say they have not

Findings indicate that the pubic is divided with regard to the formation of the new Fayyad government with a larger percentage (48%) opposing its formation and 42% supporting it. Opposition increases slightly in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (46%), in cities (53%) compared to refugee camps (49%) and villages and towns (43%), among men (52%) compared to women (44%), among holders of BA degree (56%) compared to illiterates (30%), among those working in the private sector (55%) compared to those working in the public sector (42%), among those opposed to the peace process (77%) compared to those who support the peace process (36%), and among Hamas supporters (78%) compared to Fateh supporters (17%).

Findings also indicate that the conflict between Fateh and Hamas is causing anxiety among the majority with 55% saying that they are worried that they or members of their family might be harmed by other Palestinians from Fateh or Hamas and 44% saying they are not worried. The level of worry increases in the Gaza Strip, reaching 65% compared to50% in the West Bank.  In the Gaza Strip, worry among supporters of Fateh reaches 74% compared to 48% among supporters of Hamas. In the West Bank, worry among supporters of Hamas reaches 56% compared to 48% among supporters of Fateh.  Findings also indicate that the overwhelming majority (90%) believes that the price of Fateh-Hamas conflict is high or unbearable while only 10% say it is medium or bearable. Moreover, 60% believe that Palestinian society can endure the price of division between Fateh and Hamas for less than a year or for few years while 8% say it can endure it for a period between 5-10 years, and 23% say it can endure it forever.  Only 25% believe that Fateh’s goal is to integrate Hamas into the political system while avoiding international siege and boycott while 32% say its goal is destroy Hamas’s political, military, financial and social power; 21% say the goal of Fateh is to insure Hamas’s participation in some public institutions as long as it does not pose a threat to Fateh’s dominance, and 16% say its goal is to keep Hamas outside the Palestinian political system. With regard to Hamas’s goal, 38% say it is to integrate itself into the political system on the basis of equality with Fateh and other factions and 29% say the goal is destroy Fateh’s political, military, financial, and social power; 12% say the goal of Hamas is to control the Palestinian political system and marginalize Fateh and other forces, and anther 12% say the goal is to control the Palestinian political system and eliminate Fateh politically.

Findings also indicate the 60% believe that neither Fateh nor Hamas are able to unilaterally settle the conflict in its favor by military or political means and therefore they need dialogue while 22% say that the conflict between the two factions can not be settled unilaterally or even through dialogue. But the largest percentage (56%) believes that dialogue between Fateh and Hamas will fail and only 40% believe it will succeed. In light of this, 27% believe that unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will never resume while only 19% believe it will resume soon. A majority of 51% believes that unity will resume but only after a long time. In our September 2007 poll, only 20% believed that separation between the two Palestinian territories will become permanent and 29% believed unity will be resumed within months.

With regard to the debate between Fateh and Hamas on the terms of reconciliation, 46% tend to support Hamas’s position on the electoral system, preferring a mixed one as proposed by Hamas while 39% tend to support Fateh’s position, preferring a fully proportional representation system as proposed by Fateh. By contrast, 50% support Fateh’s position which insists that the program of national unity government must accept all previous agreement signed between Israel and the PLO while 44% tend to support Hamas’s position which rejects this condition.

Findings show that Abbas’s popularity improves slightly. If new presidential elections were held today and the two candidates were Mahmud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 49% of the vote and the latter 44%. In the Gaza Strip Abbas wins with 53% of the vote compared to 42% for Haniyeh. Three months ago, Abbas received 45% and Haniyeh 47%. It is worth noting that immediately after Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in mid 2007, 59% said they would vote for Abbas and only 36% said they would vote for Haniyeh.  But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former wins the presidency with 64% of the vote compared to 32% for Haniyeh. These results are similar to those we obtained three months ago and those obtained in September 2007 after the Hamas violent takeover of the Gaza Strip.  

42% say that Abbas is the legitimate president today and 43% say they are satisfied with his performance while 54% say they are dissatisfied. 41% describe the performance of Haniyeh’s government as good or very good while 32% describe the performance of Fayyad’s government as good or very good. However, only 10% describe conditions of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as good or very good while 31% describe conditions in the West Bank as good or very good.

If legislative elections were to take place today with the participation of all the lists that participated in the last elections, 33% say they would vote for the Reform and Change list of Hamas while 41% say they would vote for Fateh. All other lists would receive 9% while 18% remain undecided. Vote for Fateh and Hamas is identical with that registered three months ago. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas’s popularity stands at 35% compared to 46% for Fateh. In the West Bank, Hamas stands at 31% compared to 37% for Fateh. With regard to public expectations of election results, 39% say Fateh will win and 28% say Hamas will win. 

With regard to the performance of various actors during the Gaza war, Hamas receives the highest positive rating (51%) followed by Haniyeh’s government (46%), Iran (41%), Syria (34%), Fateh (34%), president Abbas (25%), Fayyad’s government (23%), and finally Egypt (22%).

13% of the public say they have been victims of attacks or robbery by other Palestinians during the past year. Among those, 43% say they have submitted a complaint to the police and security services and 56% say they did not. 35% of those who did not submit a complaint say the reason they did not submit one is that they do not trust the police while 44% say the police can not do any thing to help them. 26% of those who did submit a complaint say they were satisfied with the police work in the investigation to uncover the circumstances of the crime while 73% say they were not satisfied. The percentage of those who have been attacked or victimized during the past year is higher in the Gaza Strip (17%) than the West Bank (10%) but the percentage of those who submitted complaints is higher in the West Bank (50%) than in the Gaza Strip (36%). Nonetheless, the level of distrust in the police among those who did not submit a complaint is higher in the West Bank (41%) than in the Gaza Strip (30%). The levels of satisfaction with the performance of the police among those who submitted a complaint are similar in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Only 33% of the public believe that Fateh’s Sixth party congress will be held in July as announced, 42% say it will be postponed, and 14% say it will never be held. With regard to the venue, 34% prefer holding the congress in the Palestinian territories while only 21% prefer holding it outside. 36% prefer holding it inside and outside through a video link. If during the congress Fateh selected its head, 34% would prefer the election of Marwan Barghouti and 16% would prefer electing Mahmud Abbas. On their expectations regarding who will lead Fateh in the future, the public is evenly divided with 46% believing the leaders will come from the young guard and 45% believing they will come from the old guard.

(2) Peace Process   

• 67% believe that it is not possible these days to reach a permanent peace agreement with Israel and 30% believe it is possible

• 69% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent and 28% believe it medium or high

• 61% support the two-state solution, 23% support the one-state solution, and 9% support other solutions

• 78% prefer a comprehensive peace settlement rather than an interim one and 18% prefer an interim settlement

• 50% accept a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for Palestinian people after all issues of the conflict have been resolved

• 57% support the Arab (or Saudi) Peace Initiative and 40% oppose it

• 51% support and 46% oppose launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli communities across the border inside Israel

• 43% believe that an Iranian acquirement of nuclear arms would have a positive impact on the Arab region and 33% believe it would have a negative impact

Findings indicate a continued slide toward pessimism among Palestinians regarding the chances for peace. A majority of 70% believes that it is impossible to reach a permanent peace agreement with the new Netanyahu government while only 27% believe it is possible. Similarly, 69% believe that the chances for establishing an independent Palestinian state within the next five years are slim to non existent and 28% believe the chances are medium or high. In general, two thirds say that it is impossible these days to reach a permanent peace while only 30% think it is possible.

Findings also show that one third of the Palestinians believe that reaching an agreement on a two-state solution is more difficult than reaching an agreement on a one-state solution while a slightly larger percentage (35%) believes that reaching an agreement on a one-state solution is more difficult and 29% say the two solutions pose similar difficulties. A majority of 61% says that regardless of which negotiation is more difficult, it prefers the two-state solution while only 23% say they support the one state solution. When asking respondents about their preferences, the two state solution was presented as one based on the establishment of a Palestinian state along side Israel and the one-state solution was presented as one in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state whereby Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews would be equal. Support for the one-state solution is equal in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But it increases slightly among residents of refugee camps (28%) compared to residents of cities (23%), among men (26%) compared to women (21), among holders of BA degree (27%) compared to illiterates (18%), among supporters of Hamas (27%) compared to supporters of Fateh (20%) and among supporters of the peace process (28%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (22%).

The overwhelming majority of Palestinians (78%) supports a comprehensive peace settlement, one that lead to permanent peace and end of conflict and resolution of all issues while 18% prefer an interim settlement, one in which a Palestinian state is established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while postponing issues such as refugees. Within the context of a comprehensive settlement and after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues, 50% say they would accept and 49% say they would reject a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. These results indicate a decline in the support for this mutual recognition of identity. The highest level of support (66%) was recorded in March 2006, in out poll #19, but has since declined.

Findings also show that 57% support and 40% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) peace initiative.  The initiative, as presented to the respondents, calls for an Arab recognition of Israel and the signing of peace agreement and normalization of relations with it after it ends its occupation of Arab lands occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of the refugee problem in a just and agreed upon settlement based on UN resolution 194.

Despite the support for the two-state solution, the Saudi initiative, and the mutual recognition of identity, a majority of 51% supports and 46% oppose the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli communities inside Israel. Pessimism regarding the future of peace or changing conditions of boycott and closure imposed on the Gaza Strip seems to influence attitudes regarding violence. For example, support for the launching of rockets reaches 59% among those who believe that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state in the next 5 years are non existent; but it drops considerably to 38% among those believe the chances are high.

Similarly, 43% believe that an Iranian attainment of nuclear capacity would have a positive impact on the region while 33% believe it will have a negative impact. As in the previous example, a larger percentage of pessimists, reaching 52%, believes that a nuclearized Iran would have a positive impact while only 30% of the optimists regarding the chances for a Palestinian state during the next five years tend to view a nuclear Iran positively..... Full Report

Joint Israeli Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 2008  

Israelis strongly oppose cease-fire with Hamas

if agreement does not include release of Gilad Shalit; Palestinians strongly oppose such an agreement if it does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between May 27 and June 7, 2008.  

Assuming that Shalit’s release was part of an agreement, the Israeli public is split in supporting an accord in which Hamas will cease the violent attacks and Kassam launching from the Gaza Strip, and Israel will stop its military operations in the Gaza Strip and remove the closure. The figures were: 50% opposing and 47% supporting such an agreement. If the agreement does not include Shalit, 68% oppose and only 30% support such an agreement. Among Palestinians, 78% support the cease-fire with Israel, but support declines sharply to around 20% if the cease-fire agreement does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt.   

The joint poll also examined Israelis’ and Palestinians’ assessments of the various negotiation tracks including the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Israeli-Syrian track and the Saudi (Arab League) plan.  

The poll indicates a hardening of Israeli opposition to the return of the Golan Heights for full peace with Syria: 67% of Israelis oppose such an agreement, compared to 56% in March 2008. There is also a noticeable decline in Israelis’ support for concessions to the Palestinians as embodied in the Clinton parameters or Taba negotiations. These parameters have been considered to be the most realistic framework for a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. For the first time since December 2003, support for Clinton’s package decreased below 50% (49%), whereas in previous polls, support reached as high as 64%. Among Palestinians, findings show that two-thirds believe that Syrian-Israeli progress or a peace agreement would contribute to successful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations or have no impact on those negotiations. Minority support among Palestinians for a package along the lines of the Taba negotiations or the Clinton Parameters remains stable at 46%.  Recent talks among Palestinians in favor of the one-state solution did not affect their public attitudes, as only 27% support this solution while a majority of 58% prefers the two-state solution.  

The weeks preceding the poll were characterized by significant political events in Israel, including the Talanski testimony and Barak’s demand of Olmert to detach himself from political decisions. Israeli data collection began after the Talanski scandal so it reflects the full impact of the testimony. Barak’s statement however was made midway the poll so it reflects only part of its impact. Israelis’ decline in support for concessions to the Palestinians and Syria can be interpreted as a result of the public’s confusion and disillusion with its leadership and Olmert’s loss of legitimacy to conduct negotiations on such crucial issues while being under police investigation.   

The Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 5 and 7, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1006 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between May 27 and June 5, 2008. The margin of error is 3%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).  

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 022964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 036419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS  

(A) Current Negotiation Tracks

• Of all negotiation tracks and options currently under way, 24% of the Israelis believe that the Palestinian track should be most preferred by Israel, 20% believe that the Saudi (Arab League) option which offers a comprehensive peace agreement with all states in return for all the territories occupied in 1967 should be most preferred, and only 12% think that a full peace agreement and normalization with Syria in return for the Golan Heights should be preferred. 32% believe neither track should be preferred and only 2% think that all tracks should be pursued.
• As to which is the most promising track, 25% think it is the Palestinian track, 16% think it is the track with Syria and 17% think so about the Saudi option; 30% of the Israelis think none of the tracks currently underway is promising. These results indicate the depth of Israelis’ disenchantment with the diplomatic venues and options currently on the agenda.
• With regard to support for the main peace initiatives currently underway, our poll indicates noticeable decline among Israelis. Support for the overall package of the Clinton parameters decreased below 50% for the first time since December 2003. 49% of Israelis support the overall package now compared to majority support we found in 4 previous polls in 2005 through 2007. Among Palestinians support remains relatively stable at 46% compared to 47% last December. Opposition among Palestinians for this package stands today at 52% compared to 49% last December.  
• 67% of Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a complete peace agreement with Syria, and 22% support it. These figures constitute a significant increase in opposition to the return of the Golan Heights compared to our March poll, where 56% opposed and 25% supported such an agreement. If in the peace agreement, Syria will commit to disconnect itself from Iran and stop its support of Hizbulla and Hamas, support increases only marginally - to 27%. In this regard, 32% of the Palestinians believe that if significant progress is made in the Israeli-Syrian talks, it will contribute to successful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, 26% think that it will represent an impediment to successful Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and 35% think that it will have no impact on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• 57% of the Israelis oppose and 39% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. These figures did not change from our March poll. Among Palestinians, 67% support the plan and 28% oppose it
• It seems that the Talanski affair stripped Olmert of his remaining legitimacy to continue with negotiations over peace agreements. Almost two thirds (64%) of the Israelis believe that it is inappropriate for Olmert to continue peace negotiations while being under police investigation; only 32% think he can continue negotiations under these circumstances. Moreover, only 32% of the Israeli public believe that the Talanski affair is an attempt by the Israeli Right to stop Olmert’s negotiations over peace agreements; 54% don’t believe so and 13% don’t know.
• 55% of the Israelis believe that the meetings between Mahmud Abbas and Ehud Olmert are not beneficial and should be stopped while 36% believe they should continue. Palestinians show even greater disappointment with these talks. Among Palestinians a sizeable majority of 68% believe the talks should come to a halt while only 27% believe they are beneficial and should be continued.
• 50% among Israelis oppose a cease fire agreement with Hamas in which Hamas will cease the violent attacks and Kassam launching from the Gaza Strip, and Israel will stop its military operations in the Gaza Strip and remove the closure; 47% support such an agreement. Opposition increases to 68% if such an agreement will not include the release of Gilad Shalit. Among Palestinians, 78% support the ceasefire with Israel but support declines sharply to 23% only if the ceasefire agreement is restricted to the Gaza Strip and does not include the West Bank. Moreover, support declines further to 20% if the agreement does not stipulate an immediate opening of the crossings, especially the Rafah crossing to Egypt.  
• Nevertheless 47% of the Israelis support and 51% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However a sizeable Israeli majority (62%) support and only 35% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. Among Palestinians, if Israel agrees to conduct peace negotiations with Hamas, 60% believe that Hamas should negotiate with Israel and 35% believe it should not.
• Similarly, 43% of the Israelis support and 52% oppose the release of Marwan Barghouti from prison and negotiation with him, if needed to reach such an agreement. 28% of the Israelis believe that there is greater likelihood to reach a compromise agreement if negotiated with Marwan Barghouti, while 36% think that negotiations with Abu Mazin have a greater chance to succeed. 4% believe that both have similar chance to succeed, and 26% - that neither of them is likely to succeed. Among Palestinians, 31% believe that Mahmud Abbas is more able than Barghouti to force Israel to make more concessions in negotiations while 28% believe Barghouti is more able than Abu Mazin in doing so. 11% believe both are equally able to force Israel to concede while 25% believe neither one is able to do so.
• 67% of the Israelis support and 29% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people as part of a permanent status agreement. Among Palestinians, 56% support and 43% oppose this step. The results in both publics are the same as in our March poll.
• 69% among Israelis and 66% of the Palestinians believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state during the next five years are non-existent or weak. Only 28% of Israelis and 30% of Palestinians believe chances are fair or high. Despite the fact that only slightly more Palestinians believe that the one state solution is more difficult to achieve than the two state solution, a much larger percentage (58%) prefers the two-state solution and only 27% support the one state solution. The one state solution was presented to the Palestinians as one in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state whereby Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews would be equal. The two-state solution was presented as one that entails the establishment of a Palestinian state along side Israel.

 (B) Threat perceptions and support of violence  

·        Among Israelis, 63% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 74% three months ago, after the shooting attack in the religious seminary in Jerusalem. Among Palestinians 56% fear that their security and safety and that of their family is not assured compared to 63% three months ago in the aftermath of the Israeli major incursion into the Gaza Strip that left more than 130 Palestinians dead.

• With Palestinian threat perception reduced, Palestinians support of armed attacks against Israeli civilians drops considerably from 67% last March to 55% in this poll. Similarly, support for launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon drops during the same period from 64% to 57%.
• Among Israelis, 29% suggest that Israel should reoccupy the Gaza Strip and stay there if the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza Strip continues, just as in our March poll; 43% think that Israel should carry out ad-hoc operations against the shelling and get out compared to 41% in March. Only 22% compared to 27% three months ago believe that Israel should use primarily diplomatic rather than military steps

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, November-December 2010 

A majority of Israelis opposes intolerant steps toward Arab citizens. Palestinians incorrectly believe that the majority of Israeli Jews supports such steps  

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem. 

In recent months Israel witnessed a wave of intolerance directed toward its Arab citizens. It is expressed by calls of rabbis not to rent apartments to Arab students and by several legislation proposals pending in the Knesset. We included several questions on these issues to examine the degree of support of these expressions in the Israeli public. Our poll indicates that only minorities of Israelis and of Israeli Jews support these steps. Palestinians however err in their assessment of the Israeli sentiment in this regard and believe that the majority of Israelis supports such expressions. 

 44% of Jews support and 48% oppose the call to avoid renting apartments to Arabs. 40% support a law that would allow small communities to reject admission of new candidates based on social national or economic suitability; 48% oppose it. 41% support and 52% oppose a law that would ban the use of burkas or other face cover of women in public places. However regarding a law that would require candidates for citizenship to pledge allegiance to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, 27% of Israeli Jews oppose such a law altogether, and 55% support its application to all candidates. 

There is a significant increase in support for the Clinton permanent settlement framework among Israelis and a marginal increase among Palestinians compared to 2009. 52% of Israelis support and 39% oppose it; 40% of Palestinians support and 58% oppose it. 

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 16 and 18, 2010. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 511 adult Israeli Jews and 408 Israeli Arabs weighted according to their proportion in the population interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between November 21 and 29, 2010. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il. 

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding the recent wave of  intolerance directed toward the Arab citizens of Israel

• 44% of the Israeli Jews support the call to avoid renting apartments to Arab students in the city of Safed (Tzfat or Safad) while 48% oppose such a call. Among Israeli Arabs, 7% support and 90% oppose it. Overall, a slim majority in the general population (52%) opposes such a step. Palestinians (71%) however incorrectly believe that the Israeli majority supports such a step .
• A law considered these days by the Knesset proposes to allow small communities to reject candidates based on social, national or economic suitability. 40% of Israeli Jews 50% of Israeli Arabs oppose the law altogether.  40% of the Jews and 20% of the Arabs support such a law, 3% of the Jews and 22% of the Arabs oppose the law if it facilitates discrimination between Jews and Arabs, 5% of the Jews and 1% of the Arabs oppose the law if it facilitates discrimination between secular and religious. Palestinians (75%) however incorrectly believe that the Israeli majority supports such a law that would allow Israeli communities to reject admission of non-Jewish residents.
• Still another pending law is to ban the use of burkas or other face covers of women in public places. 52% of Israeli Jews and 88% of Israeli Arabs oppose such a law altogether. 10% of Israeli Jews and 3% of Israeli Arabs support the law if it applies only to Muslims, less than 1% of the Arabs and Jews support it if it applies only to Jews, 30% of Jews and 9% of Arabs support the law if it applies to all. Palestinians (78%) however incorrectly believe that the Israeli majority supports such a law.
• As to a law that would require candidates for citizenship to pledge allegiance to Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state, 6% of the Jews and 3% of the Arabs support such a law if it applies only to non- Jews; 9% of the Jews and 8% of the Arabs support the law if it applies only to Jews. 55% of the Jews and 17% of the Arabs support a law that would apply to all candidates for citizenship. 27% of Jews and 69% of Arabs oppose such a law altogether. Palestinians (71%) correctly perceive that the Israeli majority supports such a law.

(B) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda  

The Saudi Plan

• 61% of the Israelis oppose and 32% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee’s problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In our October 2010 poll 56% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 33% supported it. Among Palestinians, 54% support the plan and 42% oppose it; 57% supported it in October and 39% opposed it.

Clinton/Geneva Parameters 

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials ten years ago, on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues several times in the past since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues following the intensified diplomatic activity of the US with regard to the conflict and the efforts to resume the peace talks between the parties.

• The findings indicate that support for the overall package and most of its components on both sides increased compared to August 2009.
• 52% of the Israelis support the overall package and 39% oppose it. This level of support is significantly higher than in 2009. It is similar to the levels of support we observed in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008, but represents a significant decline compared to the close to two thirds majority support for the package among Israelis in 2004 and 2005.
• Among Palestinians 40% support the overall package in the current poll, compared to 38% support in August 2009.
• Since we have been tracking these issues in 2003, there was only once majority support for this package on both sides, in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat which was followed by a surge of optimism and considerable moderation in both publics. 

Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton permanent status package. 
 

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 49% support or strongly support and 50% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in August 2009, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 49% and opposition at 50%.

Among Israelis 49% support and 43% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of the West bank and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In August 2009 47% of the Israelis supported this component while 48% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians 41% support and 57% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In August 2009, 37% agreed with an identical compromise while 61% opposed it.

Among Israelis 36% support such an arrangement and 52% oppose it. In August 2009, 36% supported it and 58% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 36% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In August 2009, an identical compromise obtained 31% support and 68% opposition.

Among Israelis, 38% agree and 58% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In August 2009, 34% supported this arrangement and 62% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 24% support and 74% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in August 2009 24% support, and opposition reached 76%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

Among Israelis 62% support and 34% oppose this arrangement compared to 56% support and 40% opposition obtained in August 2009.

(5)  Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 38% support and 61% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In August 2009, 34% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 64% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 52% support and 39% oppose this arrangement compared to 49% who supported it and 44% who opposed it in August 2009.

(6) End of Conflict  

In the Palestinian public 58% support and 41% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. In August 2009 55% supported and 44% opposed this item.

In the Israeli public 68% support and 25% oppose this component in the final status framework. In August 2009, similarly, 68% of the Israelis supported it while 28% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 40% support and 58% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In August 2009, 38% supported and 61% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 52% support and 39% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In August 2009 46% supported and 46% opposed such a package. 

It is important to see that the pattern of support for the overall package is more than the sum of its parts, suggesting that people’s calculus is compensatory and trade-offs are considered. Despite strong reservations regarding some of the components, the overall package always receives greater support in both publics, where the desirable components and the chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the undesirable parts. 

• 32% of the Israelis estimate that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package; 51% believe that the majority opposes it. These perceptions tap the normative facet of public opinion and indicate that the package has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 40% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 51% believe that the majority opposes it.
• A  majority among Palestinians (53%) incorrectly assumes that the majority of Israelis oppose the package, The assessment of Israelis of the Palestinian majority is split: 40% of Israelis think that a majority of Palestinians supports the parameters, 41%% think that a majority opposes them. 
   

Summary Table: Support for Clinton’s Permanent Settlement Framework 2003-2010 

(C) Conflict management and threat perceptions 

• Given the stalemate in the direct negotiations, 10% of the Israelis and 19% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will continue and armed confrontations will stop, 46%of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians believe that negotiations will continue but some armed attacks will continue as well, 36% of the Israelis and 35% of the Palestinians think that armed attacks will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations.
• 54% of the Israelis support and 41% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. However 57% think that the majority of the Israeli public opposes such negotiations and only 24% think a majority supports it.
• 27% of Israelis support full construction freeze in all settlements, 37% support the continuation of construction only in the settlement blocks which will remain under Israeli rule in a future agreement, and 29% support unlimited construction in all settlements. This distribution of opinion is quite similar to that obtained in October 2010.
• In our poll we also examine periodically Israelis’ and Palestinians’ readiness for a mutual recognition of identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 63% of the Israeli public, Jews and Arabs alike, support such a mutual recognition; 29% of the Jews and 32% of the Arabs oppose such a mutual recognition of identity. Among Palestinians, 49% support and 49% oppose this step. In October 2010, 64% of the Israelis supported and 24% opposed this mutual recognition of identity, among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were 49% and 48%.
• Among Israelis, 54% are worried and 43% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, just like in our previous poll in October. Among Palestinians 75% are worried and 25% are not worried that they or a member of their family might be hurt by Israelis or that their land might be confiscated or homes demolished. In October 76% of the Palestinians were worried and 24% were not worried.
• Neither Palestinians nor Israelis consider it likely that an independent Palestinian State will be established next to the State of Israel in the next five years. 71% of the Palestinians and 66% of the Israelis think that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low; 29% of Israelis and 27% of Palestinians believe the chances are medium or high. In October 2010, two thirds of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis thought that chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State next to the State of Israel are non-existent or low.
• Now that the US has stopped to demand an Israeli settlement freeze as a condition for returning to direct negotiations and after Israel has resumed settlement construction, 67% of the Palestinians oppose and 30% support Palestinian entry into indirect negotiations with Israel through American mediation. Despite this, 59% of the Palestinians believe that Israel would come out the winner if the Palestinian side did not return to indirect negotiations with Israel through American mediation. While only 13% believe the Palestinians will come out the winner, 16% believe both sides will come out losers and 9% believe both sides will come out winners.
• In the absence of negotiations, going to the UN Security Council to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state is the option receiving the greatest level of support among Palestinians (31%) followed by the option calling for a return to armed confrontations and attacks against Israel (29%), and organizing widespread peaceful and nonviolent confrontations and dissolving the PA (16% each). 

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, August 2009 

Israelis are more apprehensive and Palestinians somewhat more favorable about US involvement in the Peace Process compared to their expectations last December after Obama’s election

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 25 June 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including several armed attacks by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel, the Israeli army incursions into Jenin’s refugee camp, and the killing of al Jazeera journalists Shireen Abu Akleh by Israeli gunfire in one of the Jenin incursions.  Other developments included the organization of the Flag March by the Israeli right wing inside the Old City of East Jerusalem without ending up in an armed confrontation between Hamas and Israel as many had expected. Internally, a student body associated with Hamas was able to win the majority of seats in the Birzeit University student council elections, President Abbas transferred control of the secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council, and assigned to the PLO Executive Committee member from Fatah, Hussien al Sheikh, the responsibilities of the Committee’s secretariate. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the second quarter of 2022 show a significant change in the domestic balance of power in favor of Hamas and its leadership only three months after Fatah had managed to restore some of the popularity it had lost in the aftermath of the April 2021 cancellation of the legislative and presidential elections, the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel, and the killing of the opposition figure Nizar Banat at the hands of the Palestinian security services.

Today, Hamas and Fatah enjoy almost the same level of public support, with the gap narrowing to one percentage point in favor of Hamas after it was six points in favor of Fatah in March 2022. It is noticeable that the drop in Fatah’s popularity has occurred in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, though the drop has been greater in the latter. Fatah’s declining popularity is evident in two other ways. For one, the gap in popularity between the head of Fatah, President Abbas, and the head of Hamas, Ismail Haniyyeh, has now reached 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh after it was only 16 points three months ago. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’ resignation, from the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), has risen to over three quarters while those still in favor of Abbas have dwindled in size to less than one fifth of the public. Another indicator of Fatah’s decline can be seen when looking at the widening gap between those who think Hamas is the more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to those who think “Fatah under Abbas” is more deserving than Hamas. Today, the gap stands at 10 percentage points in favor of Hamas compared to just two points in favor of Hamas three months ago.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the shift in the internal balance of power has been the rise of Hamas' role over the past few months in defending Jerusalem. Other reasons might have been the release by the PA of those Preventive Security men accused of killing Nizar Banat on bail, or because the vast majority of the public believes that the Palestinian government does not make an effort to mitigate the consequences of the rise in prices, or the objection of the majority of the public to President Abbas's internal decisions, such as the transfer of powers over the Secretariat of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council or the appointment  of PLO Executive Committee member Hussein al-Sheikh to serve as the head of the Secretariat of that Committee,.

In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results for the second quarter indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution.  The results show one of the likely reasons for the decline: a significant increase in the belief that a two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion, rising to 70%. But the findings also indicate a similar decline in support for a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, indicating a hardening of public attitudes similar to what we saw in mid-2021 in the aftermath of the Hamas-Israel war. Support for a return to an armed uprising is also rising to form a clear majority, reinforced by a broad support for the recent shootings inside Israel by individual Palestinians who did not belong to known forces and movements.  However, there are significant differences in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers, where the largest percentage of the latter remains opposed to armed attacks.

Increased Palestinian-Israeli clashes over the past three months may have contributed to this attitudinal shift regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, starting with the Israeli Flag March, the repeated incursions into the Jenin camp, the killing of the very well-known and liked Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, the crackdown by the Israeli police on the raising of the Palestinian flag, and the frequent confrontations between the Israeli police and the Palestinian worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque; all might have led to a hardening of the Palestinian public attitudes.

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of those viewing positively the recent "confidence-building" measures between the PA and Israel has risen to about two-thirds. Moreover, despite the rising tension over al Aqsa Mosque, the majority continues to view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a national conflict, over land and sovereignty, rather than a religious conflict. 

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• In presidential elections between Abbas and Haniyyeh, the former receives 33% of the popular vote and the latter 55%
• In presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, the former receives 61% and the latter 34%
• Satisfaction with the performance of President Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%; 77% demand the resignation of Abbas
• In parliamentary elections, Hamas receives 36% of the popular vote and Fatah 35%
• 33% say Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people and only 23% say “Fatah under Abbas’ is more deserving

A majority of 71%  supports the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 54%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 49% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 55% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 31% and Haniyeh 50%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 47% and from among those, the former receives 26% and the latter 61%.

If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (30%) selected him in an open-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (16%), Mohammad Dahlan (6%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%), and 34% said they do not know or have not decided. It is worth noting that this is the first time that al Sheikh’s name has been mentioned by the respondents in an open-ended question. This means that we will continue to ask about his standing as a successor in the next four quarterly poll. In an closed ended questions about succession, Marwan Barghouti is preferred by 39%, Haniyyeh by 19%, Dahlan by 6%, Sinwar by 5%, Khalid Mishal by 2%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 1% each. Al Sheikh’s name was not among those listed in the closed ended question.

Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 73% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 72% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 69% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 7% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 37% (compared to 47% three months ago).

The largest percentage (33%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 38% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 31% selected Hamas, 29% Fatah under Abbas, and 33% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• 57% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the PLC’s secretariate to the Speaker of PLO National Council; 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to appoint Hussein al Sheikh as the Secretary General of the PLO Executive Committee
• 59% believe the electoral  victory of Hamas’ student body at Birzeit University is an expression of protest against the performance of the PA
• 79% say the PA is not doing enough to mitigate the consequences of high prices
• 26% want to emigrate from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
• 86% believe there is corruption in the PA
• 59% believe the PA has now become a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset
• Only one quarter is optimistic about the future of reconciliation
• A large majority does not expect the Shtayyeh government to succeed in unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the holding of general elections, or the improvement of economic conditions

A majority of 57% is opposed to President Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the Secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council; only 27% support Abbas’ decision.  The opposition the president’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (62%) compared to the West Bank (54%), among the holders of BA degree (64%) compared to the illiterates (36%), and among supporters of Hamas and third parties (73% and 83% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (36%).

Similarly, a majority of 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to ask the PLO’s Executive Committee member from Fatah, Husein al Sheikh, to assume the responsibility over the secretariate of that Committee; only 23% support Abbas’ decision.

In explaining the reasons for the electoral victory of the Hamas-affiliated student body at Birzeit University, the majority (59%) attributed it to students’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the PA while about one third (32%) said the victory came as a result in a shift in public opinion in favor of Hamas. The belief that there is a shift in public attitudes in favor of Hamas is higher in the Gaza strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (26%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 (37%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or higher (33%), among refugees (36%) compared to non-refugees (29%), among merchants and students (47% and 40% respectively) compared to laborers and housewives (25% and 32% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (38%) compared to those who work in the private sector (32%), among the lowest income group (38%) compared to the highest income group (34%), among the religious (40%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (27% and 17% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (61%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (22% and 16% respectively).

The majority (57%) of the public says it was supportive of the teachers’ strike who were demanding better representational and associational rights from the government and led to a partial halt to the educational process in public schools; 31% say they were opposed. Support for the strike is higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 63% and 48% respectively.

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%. Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 48%. The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 18% say it is doing so.

26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 27% and in the West Bank at 26%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 37% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.

42% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 54% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 38% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 62% think they cannot.

In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 55% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.

26% are optimistic and 70% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 28%.

After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 73% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 23% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 75% expects failure and 19% expects success.

The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 41%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (11% each), Palestine TV (10%), Maan (6%), al Arabiya (3%), al Mayadeen (2%), and al Manar (1%). 

(3) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the two-state solution declines from 40% to 28%
• Support for the one-state with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis declines from 32% to 22%
• 55% support a return to confrontations and armed intifada and 47% support dissolving the PA
• 59% view armed attacks against Israelis inside Israel as serving the national interest in ending the occupation and 56% support these attacks
• 65% view positively Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures
• 78% think the versus of the Quran contain a prophecy regarding the demise of the state of Israel; but 63% do not believe that this demise will take place in the year 2022
• A semi consensus that the killing of the journalist Shireen Abu Akleh was a deliberate assassination
• A majority of 53% believes the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains national, over land and sovereignty and 45% believe it has become a religious conflict   
• Half of the public welcomes the resumption of US aid to the PA

Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 69%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  A majority of 70% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 60% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.

Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 32%.

When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 48% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 51% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.

A majority of 59% says that the armed attack inside Israel carried out by Palestinians unaffiliated with known armed groups contributes to the national interest of ending the occupation; 37% believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest. The belief that armed attacks contribute to the national interest is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (77%) compared to the West Bank (46%), in cities and refugee camps (59% respectively) compared to villages/towns (50%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (69%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or older (57%), among refugees (68%) compared to non-refugees (51%), among students (66%) compared to professionals (51%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in  the private sector (55%), among the lowest income group (71%) compared to the highest income group (55%), and among supporters of Hamas (86%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third powers (51% and 55% respectively).

Similarly, a majority of 56% (73% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) supports armed attacks similar to those carried out lately by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel; 39% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) say they are opposed to such armed attacks.

A majority of 56% expects the acts of armed resistance in the Jenin refugee camp to spread to other parts of the West Bank. However, a large minority of 41% expects the acts of armed resistance to remain restricted to the Jenin camp.

We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 65% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 63% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 50% chose armed struggle (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank), 22% negotiations, and 21% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 25% chose negotiations.

Under current conditions, a majority of 69% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

65% are opposed, and 29% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  

The vast majority (78%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 17% say it does not.  However, the majority (63%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 25% say they believe it.

When asked why they think Hamas did not launch rockets against Israel on the day of the Flag March throughout East Jerusalem, the largest percentage (35%) said that the movement did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for; one third said that Hamas was willing to comply with the advice and mediation of Arab and international actors. Only 13% said it was afraid of the Israeli reaction against it and the Gaza Strip. One tenth (11%) said that Hamas did not threaten to launch rockets against Israel if he Flag March took place in the Old City of East Jerusalem. The belief that Hamas did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for is more widespread in the Gaza Strip (47%) compared to the West Bank (28%), in refugee camps (43%) compared to villages and cities (30% and 35% respectively), among women (37%) compared to men (33%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (44%) compared to those whose age is 50 and above (31%), among the holders of BA degree (38%) compared to the illiterates (19%), among students (39%) compared to employees and laborers (33% each), among the lowest income group (44%) compared to the highest income group (29%), among the religious (37%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (34% and 28% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (48%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (28% and 31% respectively).

The largest percentage (40%) believes that Hamas’ unwillingness to launch rockets against Israel during the Flag March will encourage Israeli to take more measures against Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque. By contrast, 26% said that Hamas’ decision will deter Israel in the future, and 28% said it will neither encourage nor deter Israel.

A consensus is emerging regarding the killing of the al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh: 92% believe Israel has deliberately sought to kill her while only 5% think the killing by the Israeli army was accidental.

A majority of 61% believes that the reasons the Israeli police attacked the funeral procession of Abu Akleh in Jerusalem had to do with the fac that the funeral demonstrated the unity of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. On the other hand, one third thinks that the police attack was prompted by the raising of the Palestinian flag during the funeral.

When asked why Israel insists on preventing the raising of the Palestinian flag in Jerusalem and other occupied territories and in areas inside Israel, the public was split evenly, 49% said the reason has to do with Israeli rejection of the Palestinian national identity while an identical percentage said it has to do with Israeli fear of the Palestinian national identity.

A majority of 53% (56% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) says that despite the repeated incidents of attacks by the Israeli police against Palestinian worshipers at al Aqsa Mosque, the conflict remains first and foremost over land and sovereignty while 45% say the conflict has now become first and foremost a religious one. The percentage of those who believe the conflict has now become religious is higher in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (41%), in cities and refugee camps (46% and 45% respectively) compared to villages/towns (39%), among the illiterates (58%) compared to the holders of BA degree (45%), among those who work in the private sector (50%) compared to those who work in the public sector (42%), among the highest income group (51%) compared to  the lowest income group (43%), among the religious (50%) compared to the somewhat religious and the not religious (42% and 41% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (58%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (39% and 41% respectively). 

We asked the public about the expectations that the US aid to the PA will soon resume and asked if they welcome or do not welcome aid resumption. The public is evenly split on US aid: 48% welcome it and 49% do not. It is worth noting that Gazans are more likely to welcome US aid, by 59%, while the percentage drops to 40% in the West Bank.  The percentage of those welcoming the resumption of US aid is higher in the Gaza Strip (59%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in cities and refugee camps (49%) compared to villages/towns (41%), among refugees (53%) compared to non-refugees (44%), among employees and professionals (57% and 55% respectively) compared to farmers and merchants (33% and 36%), among those who work in the public sector (70%) compared to those who work in the private sector (43%), among the highest income group (57%) compared to the lowest income group (52%), and among supporters of Fatah (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (44% and 48% respectively). 

(4) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• 42% blame Russia for starting the war in Ukraine and 35% blame the Ukraine
• Three quarters want the PA to remain neutral in the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine

The largest percentage of the public (42%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 35% blame Ukraine. An overwhelming majority (75%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 6% think it should stand with Ukraine. A majority of 43% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 53% are not worried. Three months ago, the percentage of those expressing worry that the war would expand stood at 54%.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe the ending of occupation to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian state should be the top priority of the Palestinian people
• Unemployment and poverty followed by corruption are the two most important problems confronting the Palestinian society today; but the largest percentage (32%) view the ending of the Israeli occupation as the most urgent problem.

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 9% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 26% (29% in the Gaz Strip and 23% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; 25% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 17% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 12% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 13% (17% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 23% said it is corruption, 17% said it is unemployment, 16% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 13 and 17 September 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli army without the participation of Hamas, the visit of the US president Joe Biden to Bethlehem and his meeting with president Abbas, the appointment of Yair Lapid as a prime minister replacing Bennet and the setting of a date for new Israeli elections, an announcement by the United Arab Emirates of $25  millions in support to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem, talk about opening the Israeli Ramon airport to Palestinian travel, an Israeli decision to increase the number of Gazan laborers working in Israel, an attempted assassination against the former deputy prime minister in Hamas’ government, Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir, near Nablus, a PA announcement that salaries of Palestinian laborers working in Israel would be paid via Palestinian banks, plans by the PA to reduce the number of employees working in the public sector, and Abbas talk during his visit to Germany of 50 Holocausts.  This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org

Main Findings:

The results of the third quarter of 2022 show a limited change in the domestic balance of power as the gap between Fatah and Hamas is now two percentage points in favor of Fatah while, three months ago, it was one point in favor of Hamas. Similarly, the gap in the 

popularity of president Abbas vs. Ismail Haniyyeh has now narrowed to 15 percentage points in favor of Haniyyeh while, three months ago, it was 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh. It seems there are two main reasons for this limited change: the disapproval of Hamas, especially in the West Bank, regarding its non-involvement in the armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel in August and the rise of Abbas popularity, also especially in the West Bank, in light of the Israeli and German criticism of his reference to the “Holocaust” when describing the Israeli massacres against the Palestinians.

Among the findings on the domestic side, three in particular stand out and should raise an alarm:

1. There is a widespread worry among all Palestinian sectors, reaching about 70% in the West Bank, who view the attempted assassination of Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir as an indication that an internal armed strife might erupt in the West Bank when conditions are ripe, as happened in the past in the Gaza Strip.
2. The narrative of the PA government, regarding the transfer of salary payments to Palestinian laborers who work in Israel, has no credibility among the public as the poll finds only one in ten Palestinians trusting the PA statements regarding this matter while the vast majority stand with the laborers and sympathize with their fears.
3. There is a widespread rejection, reaching about 80%, of the PA government plans to cut down the number of the public sector employees. In case the PA goes ahead with its plans, a large majority wants the cuts to take place in the security sector only which reveals existing concerns among the public regarding the justification for having such a large security sector to begin with.

On Israeli- Palestinian relations, support for the two-state solution and for the one-state solution rises in this poll. It now resembles the support that existed about 6 months ago. This development is accompanied, as expected, with a decline in the percentage of those who think the two-state solution is no longer feasible due to settlement expansion. The findings also show a continued rise in the positive view of the public regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures, reaching 70% for the first time, with an even greater appreciation of the measure in which a larger number of work permits are issued by Israel for laborers from the Gaza Strip.

Perhaps because of the above, but also due to the negative public assessment of the last armed confrontation between Islamic Jihad and Israel, the findings indicate a significant decline in support for armed attacks or a return to an armed intifada and a significant rise in support for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 69% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 29% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 78% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 57%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 53% of the votes (compared to 55% for Haniyeh and 33% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 59%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 40% and Haniyeh 46%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 63% and Haniyeh 33%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 45% and from among those, the former receives 32% and the latter 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (41%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), Mohammad Shtayyeh (3%), Hussein al Sheikh (2%), and 22% said they do not know or have not decided.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 26% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, a vast majority of 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 77% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 34% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 44% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 21% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 37% three months ago).
• 27% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 26% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 42% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 33% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 38% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 76% and in the West Bank at 54%.
• 25% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 29% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 26% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 27% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 73% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 86% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 71% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 46% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 54% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (57%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 38% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 36% viewed it as an asset.
• 25% are optimistic and 73% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 26%.
• After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 25% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 73% expects failure and 22% expects success.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 67% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 49%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 41%.
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding the identity of the perpetrators of the attempted assassination against Dr. Nasser al Sha’ir near Nablus two months ago. The responses did not indicate a clear trend but about 27% pointed the figure at the Palestinian security services and Fatah: 14% said the security services and 13% said armed men from Fatah. Additionally, about 14% said the assassination attempt came as a result of a struggle within al Najah university, where Dr. al Sha’ir works, while an identical percentage accused the Israeli army, 9% thought it resulted from personal or family conflict, and 6% thought it resulted from conflict within Hamas.
• A large majority of 63% is worried that this assassination attempt might lead to internal armed confrontations when conditions are ripe as had happened in the past in the Gaza Strip; 28% say they are not worried. The level of worry is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, 69% and 53% respectively.
• A majority of 61% is opposed the lawyers’ strike which was waged to protest the decisions of the PA president to amend legislation affecting the judiciary; 26% stand in favor.
• An overwhelming majority of 79% says it opposes PA plans to cut down the size of the public sector while only 19% say they are in favor.  When asked about the sector whose size should be cut, the majority (62%) selected the security sector, 15% selected education, 10% selected health, and 6% selected social affairs.
• The overwhelming majority (85%) expresses solidarity with Palestinian laborers who work in Israel in rejecting the PA announcement that the salaries of these laborers will be paid to them via Palestinian banks while only 12% say they trust the government assurances to the laborers that this measure will help protect their interests, allowing them to benefit from the banking services, and that no new taxes will be imposed on those salaries. Trust in the PA assurances stands at 6% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip.
• The vast majority (73%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 25% say it is doing so.
• We asked the public about the burden imposed on their households due to the rise in prices and asked them to tell us which sector or sectors were the most affected: 48% selected the food sector; 27% selected energy such as electricity, solar, and gasoline, 14% said rent, 6% said education, 3% said transportation, and 3% said health.   
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 29%, followed by al Aqsa TV (11%), Maan, Palestine Today TV, and Palestine TV (10% each), al Arabiya (4%), al Mayadeen (3%), and al Manar (1%).

(3) Islamic Jihad-Israel armed confrontation:

• The largest percentage (42%) thinks that neither Israel nor Islamic Jihad won the last armed confrontations between the two sides last month. But 27% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 24% in the West Bank) think Israel came out a winner while only 12% think Islamic Jihad came out a winner. Surprisingly, 11% think Hamas, who did not participate in the confrontation, came out a winner.
• Half of the public (50%) says that Hamas’ decision not to become directly involved in the armed exchange between Islamic Jihad and the Israeli army was the correct decision while 37% say it was the wrong decision. The percentage of those who think it was the correct decision is much higher in the Gaza Strip (68%) than in the West Bank (38%).
• But only 27% expect Hamas’ decision to lead to an improvement in economic conditions in the Gaza Strip while the largest percentage (42%) thinks economic conditions will remain unchanged and 22% think they will worsen. In the Gaza Strip, 34% expect conditions to improve while only 23% of West Bankers think that.

(4) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 37% and opposition stands at 60%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 28%.   When few details were added, such as “two states for two peoples” along the lines of 1967 with small and equal border modifications, support rose slightly to 38% and opposition dropped to 57%.
• A majority of 64% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 76% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 18% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 70% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 30% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 67% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 22%.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 55% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 46% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 55% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 41% chose armed struggle (50% in the Gaza Strip and 35% in the West Bank), 30% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 22% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 69% said it looks positively, while 27% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 65% of the public said it viewed these measures positively. A vast majority of 78% looks positively at the Israeli decision to increase the number of laborers from the Gaza Strip who work in Israel; only 20% look at that decision negatively.
• We asked the public about its willingness to use the Israeli Ramon airport, located near Elate, instead of the Amman or Cairo airports: 41% expressed willingness to do so while a majority of 55% said it is not willing to do so.  But when we asked the public if it looks positively or negatively about the possibility of allowing Gaza residents to use that airport, the majority (58%) said it looks at such a step positively and only 37% said it looks at it negatively.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 68% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about support and opposition to negotiations with Israel under Arab and international sponsorship, 42% were in favor and 56% against.
• Similarly, when asked about PA negotiations with the current Israeli prime minister, Yair Lapid, only 35% said they opposed such negotiations while 30% said they support negotiations with him on a peace agreement and confidence building measures while 13% said they support negotiations if restricted to a peace agreement and an identical percentage said they support negotiations with him if restricted to confidence building measures. In other words, a total of 43% are in favor of negotiations with Lapid about a peace agreement and an identical percentage is in favor of negotiations with him about confidence building measures.  
• The largest percentage (36%) expects Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and form the next government while 21% expect Lapid to win the elections; 26% say neither will win.
• 61% are opposed, and 34% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the US administration under president Joe Biden.  
• In light of the visit to Bethlehem by the US president Joe Biden, 53% say they are less optimistic about the prospects for improvement in economic conditions after the visit and the meeting with Abbas while only 16% express optimism and 26% say they are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
• Similarly, 53% are less optimistic that internal conditions, such as reconciliation or the holding of elections, will improve now after the visit by Biden; 17% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
• Moreover, 58% are less optimistic that Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as agreement on more confidence building measures or reduction in settlement construction, will see improvement now after the Biden visit; only 13% are more optimistic and 27% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
• Despite the overall lack of optimism, 43% say they now, after the Biden visit, expect the US to increase its aid to the PA while 53% say the do not expect that.
• Two-thirds think it was right for Abbas to use the “Holocaust” in reference to Israeli massacres against Palestinians during his visit to Germany; 26% think it was wrong for him to use that term.

(5) Support from the UAE to East Jerusalem hospital:

• We asked about the support provided by the United Arab Emirates to al Makasid Hospital in East Jerusalem: 61% said the support helps the steadfastness of the Palestinians while 36% said it does not help.
• We then asked about expectations that other Arab countries, that recently normalized relations with Israel, such as Bahrain and Morocco, would also provide similar support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank: a majority of 54% said it does not expect that while 42% said they expect that.
• We then asked the public if it welcomes or does not welcome support to Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip from these countries that recently normalized relations with Israel: two thirds said the do not and 31% said they do.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 40% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 17% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 27% (28% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; another 27% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 37% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% (34% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 11% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 8% (11% in the Gaza Strip and 6% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (36%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the split or division, and 9% said it is the internal violence.

10-12 March 2005

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between March 10-12, 2005. The poll deals with the peace process,Sharon’s disengagement plan, Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation, and internal Palestinian matters. Total size of the sample is 1319 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (835) and the Gaza Strip (484) in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3% and rejection rate 2%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

MAIN RESULTS:

The poll finds a significant change in public attitudes regarding violence, particularly suicide attacks. Support for such attacks has dropped sharply to its lowest level in seven years. This public rejection of a return to violence at this time reflects continued and widespread public support for mutual cessation of violence, and a desire to return to normal life and to allow the newly elected president, Abu Mazin, a chance to revive the peace process. But the public is opposed to steps taken by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to crackdown on those who are carrying out attacks against Israelis, such as arrests. This opposition might reflect public perception that the future of the peace process is still uncertain and that Israel might not be serious about or willing to end its occupation and that therefore the PA should maintain the option of returning to violence if the need arise in the future.

The findings indicate also that the public prefers a see negotiations leading to a permanent agreement rather than a new interim one. This attitude reflects public belief that the Osloprocess has failed in part due to its interim and partial nature. The public seems more willing than any time before to pay the price of a permanent settlement as the findings show greater levels of support for reconciliation between the two peoples once a permanent settlement is reached.

Three quarters of the public view, as the case has been during the past year, the Israeli disengagement plan as a victory for armed struggle. Despite that, two thirds would oppose continued armed attacks against Israelis from the Gaza Strip once the Israelis fully withdraw.

Internally, the findings show a rise in the popularity of Hamas and a decline in the support for Fateh. The public believes that Hamas’ victory in the December 2004 and January 2005 local elections has been due to incorruptibility of its candidates while Fateh and the PA are perceived as corrupt. The public also believes that the unity and discipline within Hamas vs. the fragmentation and lack of discipline within Fateh has been a second reason for Hamas’ victory.

(1) Peace Process

• ·      Support for bombing (or suicide) attacks inside Israel drops from 77% last September to 29% in this poll. But support for arrest of the perpetrators of suicide attacks does not exceed 40%.
• ·      84% support return to negotiations and 59% prefer a permanent, rather than interim agreement. 59% believe that it is possible to reach a compromise agreement with the Israeli leadership.
• ·      59% support the Road Map and 35% oppose it.
• ·      79% support the participation of Hamas in the negotiations with Israel while 79% prefer to see more active American involvement in the search for a peace agreement.
• ·      A majority believes that the Oslo peace process failed because Israel was not forthcoming and continued to build Israeli settlements. Similarly, a majority blames Israel for the failure of the Camp David Summit believing the Israeli offer was insufficient.

Findings show that support for the Tel Aviv night club suicide attack, which took place about three weeks ago, reaches 29% compared to 77% for the Bir Shiba suicide attack in September 2004 and 75% for the Maxim Restaurant suicide attack in Haifa in October 2003. Opposition to the Tel Aviv attack reaches 67%. But support for the steps taken by the PA to punish the perpetrators, such as arrests, does not exceed 40% while 57% oppose them. Public opposition to a crackdown on those who commit violence against Israelis might reflect belief that the peace process has not yet been revived. For example, only 44% view positively the achievements of Sharm al Sheikh summit in reviving the peace process. In other words, the public seeks to maintain the option of returning to violence if diplomacy fails.

Opposition to the Tel Aviv suicide attack increases in the Gaza Strip (70%) compared to the West Bank (65%), among holders of BA degree (71%) compared to illiterates (61%), among retired individuals and among employees (86% and 75% respectively) compared to students (62%), among the eldest (69%) compared to the youngest (61%), among individuals willing to buy lottery tickets (74%) compared to those unwilling to buy them (64%), and among supporters of Fateh (75%) compared to supporters of Hamas (53%).

In the current Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the public organizes its short term priorities as follows: release of prisoners is on top followed by three issues having the same exact importance: freezing settlement construction, stop building the separation barrier inside the West Bank, and return of laborers to work inside Israel. The next priority is the removal of Israeli checkpoints. In the West Bank alone, the list of priorities puts stopping the barrier in second place after release of prisoners, then the freeze of settlement construction, and the removal of checkpoints. In the Gaza Strip, release of prisoners’ is also the top priority but it is followed by return of laborers to work inside Israel.

The poll also examined Palestinian preferences concerning the next steps that should be taken in the course of the peace process. 84% of the Palestinians support a return to negotiations on a comprehensive settlement and 59% prefer immediate return to final status negotiations on all issues in dispute at once, while 31% prefer a gradual step by step approach. Despite these preferences, 51% of the Palestinians say they will support their leadership decision to proceed in the peace process with the approach they prefer less, and 41% will not support their leadership decision in such a case. 

59% of the Palestinians believe that it is possible to reach a compromise settlement with the other side’s current leadership while 41% don’t think it is possible. 62% believe the Palestinian leadership is strong enough to convince its constituency to accept such an agreement. Moreover, 65% of the Palestinians believe that the Israeli leadership is strong enough to convince its public to accept such a compromise.

Palestinians were further asked to assess the reasons for the Oslo process and the Camp David summit failures. A majority of the Palestinians (54%) put the blame mainly on Israel for not being forthcoming enough and continuing to build settlements. Only 5% of the Palestinian believe that the main reason for why the Oslo process failed was because the Palestinians were not forthcoming enough and maintained the use of violence. 33% blame the step by step approach for the failure. As to the Camp David summit, 50% of the Palestinians believe it failed because Barak yielded much less than he claimed he did. Only 5% believe that it failed because Arafat did not seriously intend to reach a final and comprehensive settlement with Israel.  36% of Palestinians think the problems were too numerous and the differences too big to be solved all at once.

59% of the Palestinians support the Quartet’s Roadmap plan compared to 35% among Palestinians who oppose it. Moreover, 79% support the participation of the Hamas in the negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel compared to 19% who oppose it. Despite this, an identical percentage (79%) believe that the US should increase its involvement in trying to solve the Israeli Palestinian conflict, while 15% say it should decrease its involvement.

(2) Sharon’s Disengagement Plan

• ·      Three quarters see Sharon’s disengagement plan as victory for armed struggle against Israeli occupation.
• ·      Only 30% believe the PA has high capacity to control things in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal.
• ·      Two thirds oppose continued armed attacks against Israelis from the Gaza Strip after a full Israeli withdrawal from it.

Three quarters of the Palestinians see Sharon’s plan to evacuate the Israeli settlements from Gaza as a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, while 23% do not see it as such. Despite that, only 29% of the Palestinians support and 68% oppose the continuation of armed attacks against Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip after full Israeli disengagement.  30% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinian Authority has high capacity to control matters in the Gaza Strip after Israel’s disengagement, 43% of think it has reasonable capacity and 23% think it has low or no capacity.

(3) Reconciliation between the Two Peoples

• ·      81% support reconciliation between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples after reaching a peace agreement with Israel.
• ·      Increase in the levels of support for various reconciliation measures: 89% support open borders between the two states; 73% support joint economic ventures and institutions; 40% support building joint political institutions; 42% support taking legal measures against incitement; and 13% support adopting school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians

With Arafat’s departure from the scene and with the renewed political activity, expectations and support for reconciliation following a comprehensive solution increased in a meaningful way for the first time. 24% of the Palestinians expect full reconciliation to be achieved in the next decade or in the next few years compared to 15% last June. 81% of the Palestinians support reconciliation today compared to 67% last June. 

More important however is the consistent across the board increase in support for a list of specific reconciliation steps 89% of the Palestinians will support open borders to free movement of people and goods after a comprehensive settlement is reached, compared to 82% who said so last June. 73% support joint economic institutions and ventures compared to 66% and 66% respectively last June. 40% will support joint political institutions designed eventually to lead to a confederate system given a comprehensive settlement compared to 26% who said so last June. 42% support taking legal measures against incitement directed towards Israelis compared to 35% who said so in June 2004. 13% of the Palestinians will support adoption of a school curriculum that recognizes the sovereignty of the other state and educates against irredentist aspirations. In June 2004, only 4% of the Palestinians thought so.

 (4) Internal Palestinian Conditions

• ·      Three quarters are satisfied with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas in the peace process and 62% think he is serious about fighting corruption.
• ·      Only 45% give confidence to the new cabinet headed by Abu Ala’.
• ·      80% view success in holding the presidential elections as a step forward toward democracy in Palestine, but only 35% give positive evaluation of the current status of Palestinian democracy.
• ·      Three quarters support a quota system for women whereby they are guaranteed 20% of the seats of the parliament. But the public is divided on the preferred electoral system: a district-based majority system, a proportional representation system, or a mixed system.
• ·      Hamas’ victory in local elections in December 2004 and January 2005 is attributed by the public to incorruptibility of its candidates and to the unity and disciple of its members while Fateh’s loss is attributed to the corruption within the PA and the lack of the discipline within that movement.
• ·      Support for Fateh drops to 36% and increases for Hamas to 25%.

Findings show that 80% of the Palestinians believe that the successful January elections for presidency could be seen as a step forward towards democracy in the PA, while 17% don’t see the elections as such. 35% think there are slim chances that a democratic system will be established in the PA or a future Palestinian State. 44% think there are medium chances for that, and 19% give it high chances. Despite the appreciation of the role of the presidential elections in bringing about a possible democratic transition, only 35% evaluate the current state of democracy in the PA as good or very good, 34% think it is fair and 29% think democracy is in bad or very bad condition.

Three quarters are satisfied with Abu Mazin’s performance with regard to steps taken to revive the peace process, such as the ceasefire and release of prisoners. 70% are satisfied with his dismissal of senior security officers, and 62% believe that Abu Mazin is serious about fighting corruption in the PA.  On the other hand, only 45% give confidence in the new cabinet headed by Abu Ala’. Despite that, 71% believe the new cabinet will be able to return to the peace process; 57% believe it will be able to improve economic conditions; 52% believe it will be able to control the security situation including the enforcement of a ceasefire; a similar percentage believes the new cabinet will be able to fight corruption; and 49% believe it will be able to carry out political reforms.

With regard to the current debate on the election law, 75% support a women quota of 20% guaranteed seats in the legislative council. But the public is split on the electoral system with 39% supporting the current district-based majority system, 26% supporting a proportional representation system, and 25% supporting a mixed system combining elements of the two other systems.

With regard to reform, 91% support internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms in the PA, and 87% believe there is corruption in the PA, and 51% believe this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.

Support for Fateh reaches 36% (compared to 40% last December) and for Hamas 25% (compared to 18% last December). The public expects close results for Fateh and Hamas in the upcoming May local elections and a victory for Fateh in the legislative elections scheduled for July 2005. But in the Gaza Strip, the public expects a major victory for Hamas in the local elections and a victory for Fateh in the legislative elections. The public believes that Hamas’ victory in the previous local elections has been due firstly to the integrity and incorruptibility of its candidates and secondly to the unity and discipline within the movement. Fateh’s loss is attributed firstly to the spread of corruption in the PA and Fateh and secondly to divisions and lack of discipline in the movement.

Support for Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (33%) compared to the West Bank (21%), in refugee camps (29%) compared to villages and towns (21%), among women (29%) compared to men (21%), among students and housewives (28% and 31% respectively) compared to employees and merchants (18% and 13% respectively), among those with the lowest income (32%) compared to those with the highest income (23%),  among the youngest (30%) compared to the eldest (20%), among those who would strongly refuse to buy lottery tickets (37%) compared to those who would buy such tickets (14%), and among the most religious (28%) compared to the least religious (6%)..... Full Report

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

10-12 December 2015