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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the preparation for the holding of the first phase of local elections in rural areas and small towns in the West Bank but without a confirmation of the date for holding the second phase of local elections in cities and big towns. Hamas prevented the holding of the local elections in the Gaza Strip. The first phase of local elections was held in the West Bank on 11 December, the last day of the field work, in 154 localities and the participation rate stood at 66% according the Palestinian Central Elections Commission. The number of participants stood at 262,827 voters. This period witnessed also various violent incidents in Palestinian universities and the death of one student. Israel classified 6 Palestinian human rights NGOs as terrorist organizations. The UK labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization. This press release addresses some of these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2021 show that while the public is pessimistic about the prospects of holding parliamentary or presidential elections in the near future, it is optimistic that the second phase of local elections will take place soon. The second phase of local elections is now set to take place in cities and big towns on 26 March 2022. The findings show that Fatah is more popular than Hamas in West Bank cities that will participate in the second phase of the local elections while Hamas is more popular in the Gazan cities that might participate in the second phase of the local elections.  Nonetheless, the findings show that the overall domestic balance of power between Fatah and Hamas has not changed compared to our findings of September 2021. Hamas is more popular than Fatah, and Ismail Haniyyeh easily wins against president Abba and prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in one to one competitions. But Marwan Barghouti, also from Fatah, wins against Haniyyeh with two-thirds voting for him. Three quarters of the public demand the resignation of president Abbas.

What is noticeable however is that despite the stability in the domestic balance of power, there is a clear disappointment in Hamas’ leadership indirectly expressed by the public compared to the situation six and even three months ago. The findings show that the percentage of those who choose Hamas to represent and lead the Palestinian people has declined significantly and the gap between those who choose Hamas compared to those who choose Fatah, under Abbas’ leadership, has now narrowed to 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas; in September, the gap stood at 26 points in favor of Hamas and in June, a month after the Hamas-Israel May 2021 war, the gap stood at 39% in favor of Hamas. The percentage of those who believe that neither Fatah, under Abbas, nor Hamas deserve to represent and lead the Palestinian people has now increased considerably.

In this poll, we have asked about various political solutions to the conflict with Israel and about the confidence building measures that seek to improve the daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The findings show the following:

• The majority is still opposed to the two-state solution. But support for this solution has increased compared to the September 2021 findings and decreased compared to the October 2021 findings.  
• The two-state solution remains the one with the largest percentage of support compared to other solutions, including that of the one-state solution in which the two sides, Palestinians and Israeli Jews, enjoy equal rights; support for the one-state solution is higher than one quarter and less than one third.
• There is a clear majority, higher than 60%, in favor confidence building measures that improves Palestinian daily living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the current level of support is higher than that of September 2021 when we first asked about the issue.

Findings also show that despite a two-third opposition to a resumption of unconditional bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, a large minority approaching about half of the public is in favor of a resumption of such negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Moreover, despite the opposition of the majority to the resumption of dialogue between the US and PA, a large minority approaching half of the public believes that the US is the most effective in influencing the decisions of the Palestinians and the Israelis on the matter of the renewal of the peace process. Also on the peace process, findings show a decrease in the percentage of those who believe that armed struggle is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and an increase in the percentage of those who believe that negotiation is the most effective. Nonetheless, armed struggle is viewed as more effective than negotiations.

Findings also show that the largest percentage of respondents believes the main Israeli motivation behind the labeling of six Palestinian NGOs as terrorist organizations is to weaken the ability of these organizations to document Israeli violations of human rights and to weaken the PA efforts to take Israelis to the International Criminal Court.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 70% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 27% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 52% (62% in the Gaza Strip and 45% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon. Nonetheless, a majority of 59% (68% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) expect the holding of the second stage of local elections in cities and big towns in the near future; 34% do not expect that.
• Fatah is more popular than Hamas (38% to 30%) in West Bank cities which will participate in the second phase of local elections while Hamas is more popular than Fatah (47% to 29%) in the cities in the Gaza Strip that might participate in the second phase of local elections.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 35% and Haniyeh 58% of the votes (compared to 56% for Haniyeh and 34% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 33% of the votes (compared to 34% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% (compared to 33% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 52% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 65% and from among those Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 52% and from among those the former receives 33% and the latter 59%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received 31% and Haniyyeh 60%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 35% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 5% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 27% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, 74% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 21% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 78% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 73% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 38% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 37% and Fatah at 32%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 27% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago) and Fatah at 40% (compared to 38% three months ago).
• In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 34% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 36% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 45% selected Hamas, 19% Fatah under Abbas, and 28% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 79% and in the West Bank at 51%.
• 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 31% and in the West Bank at 23%. Three months ago, 21% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 36% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 83% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 61% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 39% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 40% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 59% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (56%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 34% viewed it as an asset.
• 33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 32%.
• After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 71% expect failure; only 23% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29% of the public expect success and 65% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 69% expects failure and 27% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 27%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Maan (10%), Palestine Today (9%), al Mayadeen (4%), and al Arabiya (3%).

(3) The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• 58% (68% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 18% (11% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24% say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.
• 77% (87% in the Gaza Strip and 71% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 21% are dissatisfied.
• 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 42% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, only 45% expressed satisfaction.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 69% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 69% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 39%.

(4) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%.  
• When asked about their preferences regarding a political solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from among three specific solutions, one third (33%) preferred the “two state solution, the state of Palestine next to the state of Israel,” 16% preferred a “one state solution, from the River to the Sea, with equal rights to Jews and Arabs,” and 11% preferred a one state solution in which the status of the Palestinians would be “the same as the status of the inside Palestinians,” and 32% preferred other solutions, such as “historic Palestine,” or “full Palestine,” or “independent Palestine,” and others.
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 29% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 65% expressed opposition.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 56% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 50% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 54% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 61% said it looks positively, while 33% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 56% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
• A majority of 59% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 37% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 42% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations.
• A majority of 61% thinks that current international, regional, and local conditions does not make possible a resumption of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis while 35% think that these conditions make a resumption of negotiations possible.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 66% opposes and 26% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. But when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 46%; 49% are opposed.
• 56% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Yet, when asked about the country or party that is most influential in convincing the Palestinian and Israeli sides to return to the peace process, 46% said the US, 33% said Arab countries such as Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, or Qatar, 10% said Europe, and 3% said Russia.
• We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 38% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 19% selected the loss of the will to fight.
• When asked about the country or party most responsible for derailing the peace process in the region, 65% said it is Israel, 15% said it is the US, 15% said it is Arab countries, and 3% said Palestine.
• We asked the public about its views on the reason Israel labelled six Palestinian human rights NGOs, such as Al Haq and Addameer, as terrorists organizations. The largest percentage (40%) said the Israeli decision aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights; 20% said it aimed at weakening the PA-led campaign to try Israelis at the International Criminal Court; 17% said it aimed at weaking the ability of these NGOs to document PA violations of human rights in the West Bank; 11% said it aimed at weakening the ability of these NGOs to document Hamas’ violations of human rights in the Gaza Strip, and another 11% said it aimed at weakening the PFLP.   
• In reaction to the UK government decision to label Hamas as a terrorist organization and the idea of boycotting British products, 49% expressed the belief that such a boycott would be effective in forcing the UK government to rescind its decision while 45% think the boycott would not be effective.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 41% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 11% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (26%; 15% in the Gaz Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 22% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 20% said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 5%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 26% said it is corruption, 16% said it is unemployment, 13% said it is the internal violence, and 10% said it is the split or division.

Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll

With Support for a Permanent Deal Along the Clinton Parameters Dropping among Israelis and Palestinians, only 46% of the Israelis Support Olmert’s Realignment Plan and only 47% of the Palestinians would Approve the Prisoners’ Document in a Referendum

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted June12-17 jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah 

The joint poll examined the impact of the recent political developments in Israel and the Palestinian Authority on Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding President Clinton’s package for a Palestinian-Israeli final status settlement. This is the first time we revisit these issues after Hamas victory in the Palestinian Parliamentary elections and the establishment of Hamas government in the PA. The findings indicate a noticeable decrease in support among Israelis and some decrease in support among Palestinians compared to six months ago. Among Israelis a majority of 55% support these parameters as a combined overall package, down from 64% support in December 2005. Among Palestinians, 44% support the package now, compared to 46% in December 2005. In December 2004, a majority of Israelis (64%) and Palestinians (54%) supported the same parameters as a package. 

The poll further examined Palestinians’ and Israelis’ reactions to Abu Mazin’s call for a referendum in the PA over the prisoners’ national conciliation document, and Israelis’ reactions to Olmert’s realignment plan. With regard to the prisoners’ document, in the PA an overwhelming majority of Palestinians (74%) supports the national conciliation document, also known as the prisoners’ document, and 23% oppose it. Despite the overwhelming support for the prisoners’ document, if the referendum were to take place today, only 47% would vote in favor of it and 44% would vote against it. 9% remain undecided. As to Israelis, 63% are familiar with the prisoners’ document. Of them only 35% believe it can serve as basis for negotiations with the Palestinians. 

As to Olmert’s Realignment plan, 46% of the Israelis support and 50% oppose his plan to evacuate within a few years most of the settlements in West Bank, while realigning into large blocks of settlements along the line of the separation fence. While 54% of the Israelis believe that the outcome of the last election grants Olmert a mandate to carry out his realignment plan, 58% believe a referendum should be carried out over this plan. It should be kept in mind that Israelis usually support calls for referenda as they provide the public a voice in policy making. Nevertheless, this might indicate that the struggle over the legitimacy of Olmert’s plan is not over. 

Other issues examined in this poll are attitudes towards mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish People and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian People and attitudes towards reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis. 

Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 15 and 18, 2006. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 609 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between June 12 and 15, 2006. The margin of error is 4%. The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Clinton Parameters 

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, including (1) Final borders and territorial exchange, (2) Refugees, (3) Jerusalem, (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state, (5) Security arrangements, and (6) End of conflict. We addressed these issues three times before, in December 2003, December 2004, and December 2005. In the current poll we revisit these crucial issues for the first time after the establishment of Hamas government in the Palestinian Authority.

The findings indicate a noticeable decrease in support among Israelis and some decrease in support among Palestinians compared to six months ago. Among Israelis a majority of 55% support these parameters as a combined overall package, a decrease of 9 percentage points from the 64% support in December 2005. Among Palestinians 44% support the package now compared to 46% in December 2005. 

Apparently these results reflect the intensification of the conflict and the ongoing violence between the two sides. The decline in support among Israelis may also be attributed to the increased pessimism with regard to the prospects for reaching a settlement in the conflict following the rise of Hamas to power in the PA.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 54% support or strongly support and 44% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2005. At that time, support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 55% and opposition at 42%.

Among Israelis 47% support and 47% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel.Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2005, 53% of the Israelis supported this component while 42% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians, 41% support and 55% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries likeAustralia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2005, 40% agreed with an identical compromise while 57% opposed it.

Among Israelis 43% support such an arrangement and 53% oppose it, just as in December 2005.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 35% support and 63% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2005, an identical compromise obtained similar results with 33% supporting it and 65% opposing it.

Among Israelis, 37% agree and 60% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2005, 38% supported this arrangement and 60% opposed it.

Apparently, the positions of both sides on the most complex issues in Clinton’s package - Jerusalem and refugees - exhibit much stability over time.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 25% support and 74% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2005 the support of 20% and the opposition of 78%.

Among Israelis 63% agree and 36% disagree to this arrangement compared to 69% who agreed and 30% who disagreed to it in December 2005.

(5) Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 40% support and 57% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In December 2005, 43% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 55% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 52% support and 44% oppose this arrangement compared to 62% who supported it and 33% who opposed it in December 2005. The decline in support in both publics for this component probably reflects security concerns elevated by the recently renewed violence in the Gaza strip.

(6) End of Conflict.  

In the Palestinian public 58% support and 40% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. An identical question received in December 2005 the support of 64% and the opposition of 34%.

In the Israeli public 70% support and 27% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2005, 80% of the Israelis supported it while 18% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 44% support and 53% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2005, 46% supported and 50% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 55% support and 40% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. This constitutes a noticeable decline in support for the Clinton’s final status settlement package compared to six months ago when support stood at 64% support with 33% opposition. 

41% of the Israelis know that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package; 44% believe that the majority opposes it. This level of awareness indicates that despite the solid support for the package it has not acquired widespread normative legitimacy in the Israeli public. Among Palestinians 43% believe now that a majority in their society supports the Clinton parameters as a combined final status package and 44% believe that the majority opposes it. In addition a plurality in both Palestinian and Israeli societies believe that the other side’s majority opposes such a package: 50% of the Israelis and 45% of the Palestinians think so.

SUMMARY TABLE OF THE FINDINGS

(B) Olmert’s Realignment Plan 

• Only 46% of the Israelis support Olmert’s plan to evacuate within a few years most of the settlements in Judea ad Samaria, while realigning into large blocks of settlements along the line of the separation fence. 50% oppose it.
• While 54% of the Israelis believe that the outcome of the last election grants Olmert a mandate to carry out his realignment plan, 58% believe a referendum should be carried out over this plan. It should be kept in mind that Israelis usually support calls for referenda as they provide the public a voice in policy making. Nevertheless, this might indicate that the struggle over the legitimacy of Olmert’s plan is not over.
• These results should be seen in the context of the increased violence and Kassam shelling from the Gaza strip and Israelis’ disillusion with the outcome of Sharon’s disengagement there. 54% see the evacuation from theGaza strip a victory for the Palestinian armed struggle. Similarly 54% of the Israelis believe that the Palestinian armed struggle has achieved Palestinian national and political goals that negotiations could not achieve.

(C) Prisoners’ Document and Call for Referendum in the PA 

• The overwhelming majority of Palestinians (74%) supports the national conciliation document, also known as the prisoners’ document, as one package, and 23% oppose it. But support for the conduct of a referendum on the prisoners’ document is much less than the support for the document itself with 52% in favor and 43% opposed. Moreover, despite the overwhelming support for the prisoners’ document, if the referendum were to take place today, only 47% would vote in favor of it and 44% would vote against it. 9% remain undecided. Only 56% agree that PA president Mahmud Abbas has the right to call for a referendum on the prisoners’ document and 38% do not agree. And if Hamas called for a boycott of the referendum, 44% would boycott it and 50% would participate in it.
• 48% of the Israelis support negotiations with Hamas if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. This percent does not change even if Hamas’ government recognizes Israel indirectly by endorsing the prisoners’ document or the Saudi peace plan. Moreover, only 35% of the Israelis who are familiar with the prisoners’ document (63%) believe it can serve as basis for negotiations.
• 70% among Palestinians think that if Israel agrees to enter peace negotiations with Hamas, the Islamist group should agree to do so and 26% think that it should not. Despite this, two thirds of the Palestinians believe that Hamas should not accept international demands regarding recognition of Israel as a precondition for continued donor support for the Palestinian Authority; 30% believe it should.

(D) Other Conflict Resolution Issues 

• A majority of 61% among Palestinians and 67% of the Israelis agrees with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict, there would be mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. 36% and 29% respectively disagree to this step. 54% of the Palestinians and Israelis believe that a majority in their public supports such a proposal, and 34% and 31% respectively think the majority opposes it.
• A majority of 52% of the Palestinians and 63% of the Israelis supports the Road Map; 43% of the Palestinians and 34% of the Israelis oppose it. In this context, 58% among Palestinians - the highest since the Road Map became public - support and 39% oppose collection of arms from Palestinian armed factions as mandated by the Road Map. Moreover, if the collection of arms were restricted to the Gaza Strip, support would increase to 70% and opposition would drop to 27%. Support for the current ceasefire, another requirement of the Road Map, reaches 71% and opposition 27%.
• When a permanent status agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel, 71% among Palestinians and 79% of the Israelis would support reconciliation between the two peoples; 27% and 19% respectively would oppose it.
• After reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, belief that reconciliation between the two peoples will be achieved within the next few years or the next generation stands at 26% of the Palestinians while 49% believe that reconciliation is not possible ever. Among Israelis, 50% believe that reconciliation will be achieved within the next few years or the next generation, and 30% think that it is not possible ever. 51% of the Palestinians and 23% of the Israelis believe that a political settlement with the other side is impossible. Only 23% of the Palestinians and 58% of the Israelis believe that such a settlement is possible within the next few years or the next generation.
• With regard to short term expectations, only 13% of the Palestinians and 6% of the Israelis expect that the two sides will go back to negotiations and that armed confrontations will stop. On the other hand 39% and 40% respectively believe that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 38% of the Palestinians and 48% of the Israelis believe that the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed confrontations will continue.
• Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel continues to rise. Today 56% support it and 42% oppose it. Support for such attacks stood at 52% last March and 40% last December while opposition stood at 45% and 58% respectively. Similarly, findings show that support for the bombing attack that took place last April stood at 69% and opposition at 27%. Support in September 2005 for the last suicide attack before the one in April, the one that took place in August 2005, stood at 37% and opposition at 56%. It is worth mentioning that this poll was conducted during the period in which Israeli shelling of the Gaza Strip led to a high number of casualties among Palestinian civilians at a Gaza beach and in populated areas. 
• But while findings show a significant increase in support for violence against Israelis based on emotional drives, a significant drop has been registered in this poll in the percentage of those who believe that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not from 69% last March to 54% in this poll.  

(E) Palestinian Domestic Balance of Power 

• About five months after the parliamentary elections, the gap between Fateh and Hamas narrows to zero. If new elections were held today Fateh’s list would receive the support of 39%, Change and Reform 39%, and all other lists 9%. 13% remain undecided. Three months ago, the gap between Fateh and Hamas stood at 8 percentage points in favor of Hamas with 47% voting for Change and Reform and 39% for Fateh.
• Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas drops from 61% last March to 53% in this poll. If new elections were held, 30% say they would vote for Abbas, 14% for current prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, 4% for Marwan Barghouti, and 2% each for Mahmud Zahhar, Mustafa Barghouti, and Khalid Misha’al. 38% say they do not know to whom they would give their vote. In a vote for a vice president, the percentage of undecided is 49% while 8% say they would vote for Ismail Haniyeh, 7% for Mahmud Zahhar, 6% for Dahlan, 5% for Marwan Barghouti, 3% for Saeb Erikat, and 2% each for Farouq Qaddumi and Mustafa Barghouti. The two questions on vote intentions were open questions, with no list of names provided.

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.

This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

• ·         63% of Israelis and 53% of Palestinians support the two states solution. 41% of Israelis think that Israel should yield if there will be pressure by US President Obama to accept the two states solution. 43% of the Israelis oppose accepting the two states solution even if there will be pressure by US President Obama. Compared to previous polls, there is a decrease in Israeli willingness to yield US pressure to accept a peace arrangement.
• ·         54% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters. These results indicate a slight increase in support for the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement package among Palestinians and a slight decrease among Israelis compared to December 2012. 36% of the Palestinians support yielding if there will be pressure by US on Palestinians and Israelis to accept a settlement along the lines of the Clinton / Geneva ideas and 60% of the Palestinians oppose accepting such American pressure. 
• ·         Following the intensified involvement of the US in the region, 39% of the Israelis expect this involvement to be successful, while 29% of the Israelis think it will be a failure. 22% of the Israelis think it will have no impact. Compared to the poll conducted August 2009, several months after the election of Obama, there is a slight decline in the expectation that US involvement under the leadership of Obama would be successful.
• ·         23% of Israelis think that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 28% think it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 40% think it is supportive of both sides equally. Compared to previous polls, there is an increase in the Israelis belief that the US under the leadership of Obama is more supportive of the Israel or balanced.
• ·         Each side perceives the other side as constituting a threat to its very existence: 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals in the long run are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. 34% of the Israelis think that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 21% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel.

The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 13 and 16, 2013. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 601 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 12 and 21, 2013. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Ifat Maoz, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, and the Department of Communication, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki, at email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Ifat Maoz at email msifat@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

 (A) Attitudes, perceptions and expectations regarding a permanent settlement

Clinton/Geneva Parameters

The Clinton parameters for a Palestinian-Israeli permanent settlement were presented by President Clinton at a meeting with Israeli and Palestinian officials on December 23, 2000, following the collapse of the July 2000 Camp David summit. The Geneva Initiative, along similar lines, was made public around the end of 2003. These parameters address the most fundamental issues which underlie the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: (1) Final borders and territorial exchange; (2) Refugees; (3) Jerusalem; (4) A demilitarized Palestinian state; (5) Security arrangements; and (6) End of conflict. We address these issues regularly since December 2003, and in the current poll we revisited these crucial issues, amidst a turbulent Middle East and the return of the Palestinians and Israelis to permanent status negotiations.

• ·         54% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians support a permanent settlement package along the Clinton parameters. The results are similar to the figures in December 2012 (56% support among Israelis and 43% support among Palestinians).
• ·         Since 2003, we observed only once majority support for such a settlement on both sides: in December 2004, shortly after the death of Arafat. The level of support then was 64% among Israelis and 54% among Palestinians.

Below we detail support and opposition to the individual items in the Clinton / Geneva permanent status package.

(1) Final Borders and Territorial Exchange

Among Palestinians 52% support or strongly support and 48% oppose or strongly oppose an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the exception of some settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank that would be swapped with an equal amount of territory from Israel in accordance with a map that was presented to the Palestinian respondents. The map was identical to that presented to respondents in December 2012, when support for this compromise, with its map, stood at 53% and opposition at 45%.

Among Israelis 44% support and 48% oppose a Palestinian state in the entirety of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip except for several large blocks of settlements in 3% of the West Bank which will be annexed to Israel. Israel will evacuate all other settlements, and the Palestinians will receive in return territory of similar size along the Gaza Strip. In December 2012, 46% of the Israelis supported this component while 49% opposed it.

(2) Refugees

Among Palestinians 46% support and 52% oppose a refugee settlement in which both sides agree that the solution will be based on UN resolutions 194 and 242. The refugees would be given five choices for permanent residency. These are: the Palestinian state and the Israeli areas transferred to the Palestinian state in the territorial exchange mentioned above; no restrictions would be imposed on refugee return to these two areas. Residency in the other three areas (in host countries, third countries, and Israel) would be subject to the decision of these states. As a base for its decision Israel will consider the average number of refugees admitted to third countries like Australia, Canada, Europe, and others. All refugees would be entitled to compensation for their “refugeehood” and loss of property. In December 2012, 41% agreed with an identical compromise while 56% opposed it.

Among Israelis 39% support such an arrangement and 50% oppose it. In December 2012, 42% supported it and 49% opposed.

(3) Jerusalem

In the Palestinian public 32% support and 68% oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state with Arab neighborhoods coming under Palestinian sovereignty and Jewish neighborhoods coming under Israeli sovereignty. The Old City (including al Haram al Sharif) would come under Palestinian sovereignty with the exception of the Jewish Quarter and the Wailing Wall that would come under Israeli sovereignty. In December 2012, an identical compromise obtained 29% support and 70% opposition.

Among Israelis, 37% agree and 56% disagree to this arrangement in which the Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem including the old city and the Temple Mount will come under Palestinian sovereignty, the Jewish neighborhoods including the Jewish quarter and the Wailing Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem the capital of Israel. In December 2012, similarly, 38% supported this arrangement and 59% opposed it.

(4) Demilitarized Palestinian State

Among Palestinians 28% support and 71% oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that would have no army, but would have a strong security force and would have a multinational force deployed in it to ensure its security and safety. Israel and Palestine would be committed to end all forms of violence directed against each other. A similar compromise received in December 2012, 28% support, and opposition reached 71%.

This item receives the lowest level of support by Palestinians, as in previous polls, although the current level of support is the highest since 2003. Unlike the refugees and Jerusalem components, this issue has not received due attention in public discourse, as it should, since it may become a major stumbling block in the efforts to reach a settlement.

Among Israelis 60% support and 33% oppose this arrangement compared to 70% support and 26% opposition obtained in December 2012.

(5) Security Arrangements

In the Palestinian public 52% support and 48% oppose a compromise whereby the Palestinian state would have sovereignty over its land, water, and airspace, but Israel would have the right to use the Palestinian airspace for training purposes, and would maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years. A multinational force would remain in the Palestinian state and in its border crossings for an indefinite period of time. The task of the multinational force would be to monitor the implementation of the agreement, and to monitor territorial borders and coast of the Palestinian state including the presence at its international crossings. In comparison, in December 2012, 46% of the Palestinians supported this parameter while 53% opposed it.

In the Israeli public 52% support and 39% oppose this arrangement compared to 59% who supported it and 35% who opposed it in December 2012.

(6) End of Conflict

In the Palestinian public 63% support and 36% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. In December 2012 59% supported and 39% opposed this item.

In the Israeli public 66% support and 28% oppose this component in the final status framework. In December 2012, similarly, 68% of the Israelis supported it while 28% opposed it.

The Whole Package

Among Palestinians 46% support and 53% oppose the whole package combining the elements as one permanent status settlement. In December 2012, 43% supported and 56% opposed such a package.

Among Israelis 54% support and 37% oppose all the above features together taken as one combined package. In December 2012 56% supported and 40% opposed such a package.

 
 (B) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda

The Israeli-Palestinian Track

• ·         Dismantling settlements - 47% of the Israelis support and 48% oppose the dismantling of most of the settlements in the West Bank as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
• ·         Mutual Recognition - As we do periodically in our joint polls, we asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Our current poll shows that 58% of the Israeli public supports such a mutual recognition and 34% opposes it. Among Palestinians, 43% support and 56% oppose this step. In June 2013, 57% of the Israelis supported and 37% opposed this mutual recognition; among Palestinians, the corresponding figures were similar to the current poll (42% support and 56% oppose).
• ·         63% of Israelis and 53% of Palestinians support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution and 32% of Israelis and 46% of Palestinians oppose it. In June 2013, just before Palestinians and Israelis returned to negotiations, 62% of Israelis supported a two-state solution and 33% opposed it and 53% of the Palestinians supported it and 46% opposed it.
• ·         The Saudi: Plan 64% of the Israelis and 50% of the Palestinians oppose the Saudi peace plan, 33% of the Israelis and 47% of the Palestinians support it. In June 2013, 56% of the Palestinians supported the Saudi plan and 41% opposed it, while 24% of the Israelis supported and 67% opposed it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations.

 (C) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• ·         The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 24% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians.34% among Israelis thinks that the Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel; 21% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 15% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 37% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967.

(D) US policy toward the conflict following the intensified involvement of the US in the region

Following the increase in U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we examined the attitudes towards U.S. involvement in the area.

In December 2008, immediately after the election of Barack Obama for U.S President, we examined Palestinians’ and Israelis’ expectations regarding the policy that the new Obama administration might choose to implement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since then, the our joint polls have been tracing the attitudes of both Palestinian and Israeli public, in order to determine if there has been an attitude change towards U.S. involvement in the area.

Israeli stances toward US policy under the leadership of Obama

·         23% of Israelis think that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 28% think it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 40% think it is supportive of both sides equally. Compared to previous polls, there is a significant increase in the Israeli belief that the US policy under the leadership of Obama is more supportive of Israel or balanced. (In December 2009, 13% of Israelis thought that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 40% thought it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 37% thought it is supportive of both sides equally; In August 2009, the relevant percentages of the Israeli public were 12%, 40% and 23% accordingly).

·         This survey examined the perceptions regarding the results of a more active involvement of the U.S. in the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. If the US plays a more active role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 39% of the Israelis expect this involvement to be successful, while 29% think it will be a failure. 22% of the Israelis think it will have no impact. Compared to the poll conducted in September 2009, there is a slight decline in the expectation that US involvement under the leadership of Obama would be successful - 42% of the Israelis expected this involvement to be successful, while 30% thought it would be a failure and 18% thought it would have no impact.

·         While the support for a two state solution is high, standing at 63%, opinions are divided about the right way to respond if there will be U.S. pressure to accept such a solution. 41% of Israelis think that Israel should yield to American pressure if the US under the Obama’s leadership pressures Israel to accept the two state solution. 43% of Israelis think Israel should reject such pressure. In our June 2009 Poll we found that before President Obama’s speech in Cairo, delivered at the same month, 50% of Israelis thought that Israel should yield to the American pressure if the US under the Obama’s leadership pressures Israel to accept the two state solution and 42% of them thought Israel should reject such pressure. After the speech, willingness to yield to such US pressure increased to 52%, and rejection of it decreased by 4 percentage points to 38%.

Palestinians’ stances toward US policy under the leadership of Obama

• ·         37% of the Palestinians support yielding to the American pressure if the US under the Obama’s leadership pressures Palestinians (and Israelis) to accept the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement. 60% of them think that Palestinians should reject such pressure.
• ·         30% of the Palestinians think that most of the Palestinians will agree to yield to American pressure on Palestinians and Israelis to accept the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement and 65% think that most Palestinians will oppose such pressure.
• ·         63% of the Palestinians think that most Israelis will yield to American pressure on both sides to accept the Clinton / Geneva permanent settlement and 31% think that most Israelis will oppose such pressure.

14-16 September 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during September 14-16, 2006. The poll deals with public evaluation of the performance of the Hamas government, views on the national unity government, attitudes towards peace and violence in the aftermath of the Lebanon war, and the domestic balance of power. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at

 Tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Six months after the establishment of the Hamas government, poll findings show widespread public dissatisfaction with its performance especially in the economic areas of salaries and poverty as well as the enforcement of law and order. This dissatisfaction leads the majority to support the formation of a national unity government that is not under the full control of Hamas. The largest percentage supports the formation of a government in which Hamas and Fateh would enjoy equal weight.

But the dissatisfaction with the performance of the government does not lead to a reduction in the popularity of Hamas compared to where it was three months ago. Moreover, Fateh does not benefit from Hamas’ lack of performance with its popularity remaining essentially stable. Moreover, despite the criticism of the performance of the government, two thirds of the public does not believe that Hamas should recognize Israel as required by the international donor community. This view does not reflect a hardening of public attitude toward the two-state solution. Rather it reflects public rejection of recognition of Israel as a precondition for negotiations. Poll findings show that a Palestinian majority supports recognition of Israel as a state for the Jewish people but only as part of a settlement that creates a Palestinian state along side Israel and resolves all other issues of the conflict.

(1) Domestic Conditions, Governmental Performance, and Views on a National Unity Government

• Only 42% are satisfied with the overall performance of the Hamas government; 54% are dissatisfied. The public is least satisfied with the government’s performance regarding economic issues (26%) and most satisfied with its performance in fighting corruption (46%).
• 46% want a national unity government in which Fateh and Hamas would have equal weight; 25% prefer a national unity government under Hamas’ control; and 24% prefer an apolitical government made up of professionals, not politicians.
• The largest percentage (32%) wants the top priority of the national unity government to be the enforcement of law and order while 25% want the top priority to be the return to the peace process and 23% want it to be the ending of the financial and political sanctions.
• An overwhelming majority (84%) sees conditions of the Palestinians today to be bad or very bad and only 5% see them good or very good; 80% say they are not safe and secure.
• 89% believe corruption exists in the PA and 72% believe that jobs are obtained mainly through wasta, or personal connections.
• 46% believe the strike of PA employees and teachers is not political while 36% believe it is political aimed against Hamas
• 41% define poverty and unemployment to be the biggest problem confronting Palestinians today while 25% define the biggest problem as being occupation and 22% say it is corruption and 11% say it is internal anarchy.
• 86% oppose kidnapping of foreigners residing in Palestinian areas and 13% support it. 

Poll findings show that 54% of the public is dissatisfied with the overall performance of the Hamas government and 42% are satisfied. Satisfaction is at its lowest with regard to performance in economic issues such as providing salaries and alleviating poverty with only 26% satisfied and 69% dissatisfied. Satisfaction is at its highest with regard to performance regarding fighting corruption with 46% satisfied and 49% dissatisfied.

Satisfaction with the overall performance of Hamas government increases in the Gaza Strip (45%) compared to the West Bank (40%), in cities (44%) compared to villages and towns (40%), among the most religious (44%) compared to the least religious (39%) among supporters of Hamas (75%) compared to supporters of Fateh (17%), and among those most unwilling to buy a lottery ticket (51%) compared to those most willing (27%).

Poll findings show that strong correlation exists between satisfaction with the overall performance of Hamas government and those willing to vote for Hamas if new elections are held today: 90% of the highly satisfied intend to vote for Hamas (compared to 4% for Fateh) and 4% of those who are not satisfied at all intend to vote for Hamas (compared to 66% for Fateh) 

To find a way out of the current crisis, the largest percentage (46%) supports the formation of a national unity government in which Fateh and Hamas would enjoy equal weight. A quarter supports the formation of a national unity government in which Hamas would dominate while a similar percentage (24%) prefers a non political government made up of professionals. With regard to the priorities of the future national unity government, the public is divided with about one third (32%) focusing on fighting lawlessness by enforcing law and order, a quarter focusing on renewing the peace process, and a similar percentage (23%) focusing on ending the current financial and political sanctions. Only 18% want the top priority to be fighting corruption.

Findings show a great deal of depression regarding existing conditions with 84% describing current condition as bad or very bad and only 5% describing it good or very good. Moreover, 80% say they and their families do not feel secure and safe in PA areas. The percentage of those believing that corruption exists in PA institutions is at its highest (89%) while 72% believe that jobs today can be obtained largely through wasta, or personal connections.

This gloomy perception might be the reason why the largest percentage (46%) does not view the strike by public employees and teachers as a political strike targeting the Hamas government and instead view it as motivated by professional consideration, a protest against the existing miserable conditions. Only 36% view it as an attack against the Hamas government.

(2) Lebanon War

• 86% believe that Hezbollah emerged as a winner in the Lebanon war and 2% see Israel as a winner.
• 90% oppose the position advanced by some Arab countries that saw the war as an uncalculated adventure by Hezbollah and 9% support this position.
• 73% believe the war strengthens the resistance option in Palestine and 24% believe it weakens it while 75% believe that in light of the war they would support taking Israeli soldiers prisoners in order to exchange them with Palestinians.
• 65% believe that the war was an Israeli calculated step since Hezbollah represented a threat to Israel and only 5% believe it was caused by Iranian and Syrian intentions.
• 84% agree that one of the war lessons is the need to establish soon a Palestinian state in order to prevent in the future a war between Palestinians and Israelis similar to the war in Lebanon but 64% agree with the view that Israel will never allow the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.
• About three quarters agree with the views that the Palestinians can not count on Arab support, that they are in need for international understanding, and that they can not count on armed action only.
• 63% agree that Palestinians should use the same methods as Hezbollah such as the launching of rockets at Israeli cities and 41% only agree with the view that only after it ends its occupation of the West Bank Israel would be able to live in peace.

Findings show a semi consensus among the public (86%) that Hezbollah has emerged victorious from the war in Lebanon while the percentage of those who believe that Israel came out winner is 2%. Moreover, the overwhelming majority (90%) does not share the views expressed by some Arab countries that the war in Lebanon was an uncalculated risk by Hezbollah with about two thirds (65%) believing that the war was a planned Israeli measure because Hezbollah has become a threat against Israel. The percentage of those who believe that the war had  Syrian and Iranian origins did not exceed 5%. In brief, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians accepts Hezbollah’s, rather than Israel’s narrative regarding the origin and outcome of the war in Lebanon.

With regard to lessons learned from the war and their implications for the Palestinian-Israeli situation, findings show apparent inconsistency. On the one hand, 73% believe that the war has strengthened the armed resistance option in Palestine and in light of the war 75% would support taking Israeli soldiers prisoners in order to exchange them with Palestinian prisoners. Moreover, 63% believe that the Palestinians should emulate Hezbollah’s methods by using rockets against Israeli cities.

On the other hand, three quarters agree with the view that Palestinians can not depend on armed action alone and must reach a political settlement with Israel. Moreover, a similar percentage believes that Palestinians can not count on themselves alone and that they need the help and understanding of the international community.

One reason for this apparent inconsistency can be found in the belief of 84% that there is a need to establish soon a Palestinian state in order to prevent a future a war between Palestinians and Israel similar to the war in Lebanon while almost two thirds (64%) believe that Israel will never allow the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. In other words, while the Palestinians recognize the need for a political settlement acceptable to Israel and the international community they do not believe that Israel would agree to a settlement that would establish a Palestinian state; therefore, most Palestinians support armed confrontations.

(3) Peace Process and Olmert’s Realignment Plan

• 74% want permanent status negotiations between Mahmud Abbas and Ehud Olmert but only 44% believe such negotiations if they were to take place would succeed and lead to a compromise agreement.
• 59% want Hamas to negotiate with Israel but only 36% believe such negotiations if they were to take place would lead to a compromise permanent status agreement.
• 67% do not believe Hamas should recognize the state of Israel in order to meet international donor demands. But 63% would support a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a state for the Jewish people after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established.
• 77% support the call for a ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians and 22% oppose it.
• 62% have not heard of Olmert’s realignment plan to evacuate most of the West Bank settlements while realigning into large blocks of settlements along the line of the separation barrier.
• 70% do not welcome Olmert’s plan and only 20% believe it will be implemented.
• 75% believe that the evacuation of the settlements in the Gaza Strip was a victory for armed struggle.
• 52% support the Road Map and 42% oppose it. Also, only 44% support collection of arms from Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This percentage increases to 64% if collection of arms is restricted to Gaza Strip. 82% support the integration of armed groups into the Palestinian security services.
• 57% support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 57% believe that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Findings show that two thirds of the public do not believe that Hamas should accept the international demand to recognize the state of Israel in order to end the current financial and political sanctions. This view does not mean that the public opposes a future Palestinian recognition of Israel as 63% support recognition of Israel as a Jewish state but only as part of a package of permanent status that would resolve all issues of the conflict and lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel as the state for the Palestinian people. Moreover, about three quarters (74%) want President Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) to conduct permanent status negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. A majority of 59% (compared to 70% last June) supports Hamas’ engagement in peace negotiations with Israel. But expectations that such negotiations would succeed are not high: 44% if conducted by Abu Mazin and 36% if by Hamas.

Findings show that 52% support the Road Map plan while 42% oppose it. But only 44% support collection of arms from armed groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as required by the plan. However, if collection of arms is restricted to the Gaza Strip (now, after the Israeli withdrawal from it) support would increase to 64%. Moreover, if the solution to the arms and the armed men and militias can be found in merging them into the Palestinian security services, the overwhelming majority (82%) would support that.

Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians remain relatively high as it was three months ago, standing today at 57% and opposition at 41%. Findings also show that three quarters believe that the Israeli evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip has been victory for armed struggle while 57% believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not and 40% do not share that view.

Most Palestinians have not heard about Olmert’s Realignment Plan for the evacuation of some settlements in the West Bank and the relocation of settlers to settlement blocs near the separation wall. Findings show that 70% do not welcome the plan while only 26% welcome it. Given the war in Lebanon and the continuation of armed confrontations in the Gaza Strip, the majority (65%) does not believe that the plan will be implemented while only 20% think it will.

(4) Domestic Balance of Power

• Despite the dissatisfaction with the performance of Hamas’ government, the percentage of those willing to vote for it in new elections remain as it was three months ago (38%) while Fateh’s popularity increases slightly to 41%.
• Satisfaction with the performance of president Mahmud Abbas reaches 55%. But if new elections are held today, only 31% would elect him, 24% would elect Ismail Hanieh, 13% Marwan Barghouti, 5% Mustafa Barghouti, and 3% Mahmud Zahhar.
• If elections were to be held for a vice president, Ismail Hanieh would receive 20% of the vote, Mahmud Zahhar 16%, Marwan Barghouti 15%, Mohammad Dahlan 9%, and Saeb Erikat, Farouq Qaddoumi, and Mustafa Barghouti 7% each.

Findings show that despite the dissatisfaction with Hamas government, the popularity of Hamas has not dropped compared to where it stood three months ago. 38% say they would vote for Hamas if new elections are held today compared to 39% last June and 47% last March. Support for Fateh remains relatively stable with a slight increase in this poll compared to three months ago. 41% would vote for Fateh if elections are held today compared to 39% in March 2006 and again in June 2006.

Findings show that satisfaction with the performance of Abu Mazin stands today at 55% compared to 53% last June and 61% last March. But if new elections for the presidency are held today and five candidates competed, Abu Mazin would receive 31% followed by Ismail Hanieh, the current Prime Minister, with 24%, Marwan Barghouti (13%), Mustafa Barghouti (5%) and Mahmud Zahhar (3%).

If elections are held for the office of a vice president and seven candidates competed, Ismail Hanieh would receive the largest percentage (20%) followed by Mahmud Zahhar (16%), Marwan Barghouti (15%), Mohammad Dahlan (9%), and Saeb Erikat, Farouq Qaddoumi, and Mustafa Barghouti (7% each)..... Full Report

14-16 December 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during December 14-16, 2006. The poll deals with several issues including armed confrontations, ceasefire, negotiations, permanent peace, Arab Initiative, performance of the government and the president, early elections, and the domestic balance of power. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults, 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Poll findings show a considerable increase in the level of public dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hamas government. More importantly however, the findings show a greater increase in the level of dissatisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas. These developments might explain the poll finding of a high level of support for early parliamentary and presidential elections. The poll shows that if such elections were to take place today, vote for Fateh would be almost identical to the vote it received about one year ago in the January 2006 elections. But the vote for Hamas would be lower than it received in those elections. But the poll shows a large percentage of undecided (10%) voters which indicates that Hamas might be able to regain the votes it has lost. This conclusion is supported by the finding that shows a tie in the race for the presidency between Fateh’s candidate Mahmud Abbas and Hamas’ Isma’il Haniyeh. The considerable support the prime minister receives indicates that the dissatisfaction with the Hamas government does not necessarily mean blaming it for the current conditions. Moreover, the stability in the support for Fateh indicates that those who are dissatisfied with Hamas have not yet shifted their loyalty to Fateh, perhaps because they are also dissatisfied with the nationalist movement.

Findings show relative stability in public attitude regarding the peace process and armed confrontations despite the continued decline in confidence in the role played until now by armed confrontations in achieving national rights and despite the great level of support for a ceasefire. A large percentage of Palestinians believe that armed action can play a positive role in ending occupation despite the overwhelming support for the Gazaceasefire agreement and for extending it to the West Bank. 

Findings show an overwhelming preference among Fateh and Hamas voters for conducting negotiations for permanent peace and end of conflict while only a small minority prefers a track for an interim or partial settlement. But the public is divided over the substance of a permanent settlement with one half supporting and one half opposing a settlement along the lines of the Geneva Initiative and the Clinton Parameters. Support for the Arab or Saudi Initiative and for a settlement based on a two-state solution in which the Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israel recognizes Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people is greater than support for one along the lines of the Geneva Initiative.  

Despite public preference for a permanent deal track, a majority of 58% would support an agreement that would create a Palestinian state in the whole Gaza Strip and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations over permanent issues such as final borders, Jerusalem, and refugees. 

(1) Armed Confrontations and Ceasefire

• 85% support and 14% oppose the current Gaza Ceasefire agreement and identical percentages (85% and 14%) support and oppose extending it to the West Bank.
• The public is divided in its evaluation of the outcome of the last round of armed confrontations but the largest percentage (46%) believes that the two sides or none of them came out a winner.
• Similarly, the public is divided in identifying who benefits more from the ceasefire, Israel or the Palestinians; but the largest percentage (36%) believes the two sides or none of them benefit from it.
• The public is also divided over who benefits domestically from the ceasefire, Fateh or Hamas; but the largest percentage (58%) believes that both or none of them benefit from it.
• The public is divided into two halves in the evaluation of the role of rocket launching from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns with 48% believing it serves and 48% believing it hurts Palestinian interests.
• Despite the fact that 57% of the public believe that a role does exist for violence in ending Israeli occupation, only 49% believe that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of respondents (85%) supports the ceasefire agreement currently observed in the Gaza Strip while only 14% oppose it. Similarly, 85% support and 14% oppose extending the agreement to cover the West Bank as well. The widespread support for the ceasefire might reflect a decrease in the positive evaluation of the role of violence in achieving national rights. Findings show that the public is split into two equal halves on this matter with 49% believing that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. This percentage stood at 54% six months ago and at 68% one year ago. 

Belief that armed confrontations serve Palestinian interests increases among men (56%) compared to women (44%), among students (61%) compared to housewives (43%), among those who would definitely refuse to buy a lottery ticket (59%) compared to those who would definitely agree to buy a lottery ticket (37%), among supporters of Hamas (62%) compared to supporters of Fateh (37%), and among those who define themselves as opponents of the peace process (74%) compared to those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (43%).

Findings show that the public does not view the outcome of the armed confrontations that preceded the ceasefire as a Palestinian victory with only 24% seeing it that way and a similar percentage (27%) seeing it as an Israeli victory. The largest percentage (29%) believes that no one came out a winner and 18% believe that both sides came out winners. When evaluating the previous period of the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns, the public becomes divided into two equal halves with 48% believing that it served national interests and an identical percentage believing it hurts the national interests. 

When determining who the beneficiaries from the current ceasefire are, one third believes the Palestinians benefit more and 29% believe the Israelis benefit more. One quarter believes that the two sides benefit and 11% believe neither side benefits. With regard to domestic actors, 21% believe Mahmud Abbas and Fateh benefit more from the ceasefire while 15% believe that Isma’il Haniyeh and Hamas benefit more. 34% believe both sides benefit and 24% believe that neither side benefits.

With regard to expectations in the aftermath of the ceasefire, only 19% believe the two sides will return to negotiations and violence will stop soon while 38% believe that negotiations will be resumed but some violence will continue. 37% believe armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. It is worth mentioning that the percentage of those who believed that armed confrontations will not stop and negotiations will not be resumed soon stood at 26% three months ago. The increased pessimism about the future might explain the finding regarding the future of the peace process with 57% believing that there is a positive role for violence in ending occupation (21% believe the peace process has failed in ending occupation and should be stopped and Palestinians should instead resort to violence while 36% believe that the peace process should not be stopped but at the same time violence too should not be stopped). By contrast, only 38% believe that armed attacks have no positive role to play in ending occupation (27% believe that the peace process has not failed and should be given more time and in the meanwhile violence should be stopped while 11% believe that armed attacks are responsible for the stagnation in the peace process and if stopped peace making would be more successful.

Belief that the peace process has failed and should be replaced with armed attacks increases among men (25%) compared to women (16%), among holders of BA degree (20%) compared to illiterates (12%), among those who definitely would not buy a lottery ticket (29%) compared to those who would definitely buy one (15%), among supporters of Hamas (32%) compared to supporters of Fateh (10%), and among those who define themselves as opponents of the peace process (50%) compared to those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (15%).

(2) Negotiations and Permanent Status

• 62% believe that the government led by Hamas should conduct peace negotiations with Israel and 34% believe it should not.
• 58% support and 40% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people in the context of a permanent settlement and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
• 48% support and 49% oppose a package of permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters, Taba negotiations, and the Geneva Initiative. But support for the various elements of the package ranges between 28% and 63%.
• 49% support and 45% oppose the plan known as the Road Map.
• 81% prefer a permanent status track of negotiations that would lead to permanent peace and end of conflict while only 16% prefer a track that would lead to an interim settlement that would postpone the resolution of some issues such as refugees.
• But a majority of 58% would support and 37% would oppose an interim agreement that would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the whole Gaza Strip and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations over permanent issues such as final borders, Jerusalem, and refugees.
• 59% support the Arab or Saudi Initiative and 38% oppose it.

Findings show that the majority of the respondents (62%) supports and 34% oppose peace negotiations between a Hamas-led government and Israel. A majority of 58% supports and 40% oppose a permanent settlement that would resolve all issues of the conflict in which Palestinians would recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis would recognize Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.  A similar percentage (59%) supports and 38% oppose the Arab (or Saudi) Initiative which calls for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab land including Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the solution of the refugee problem based on UN resolution 194 which allows refugees to return to Israel and their compensation in return for recognition of Israel by all Arab countries and recognition of Israel’s right to live within secure borders and the signing of a peace agreement and the establishment of normal relations with Israel.

But the public is divided into two equal halves with regard to a permanent settlement along the lines of the Geneva Initiative, the Clinton Parameters, and the Taba negotiations with 48% supporting such a settlement and 49% opposing it. Six months ago, support for such a settlement stood at 44% and opposition at 53%. But as the table below shows, the highest level of support for this package stood at 54% in December 2004. Current support for the item dealing with withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 with equal territorial swap stands at 61% and opposition at 37%. Support for the item dealing with the establishment of a Palestinian state without an army but with international forces deployed for its protection stands at 28% and opposition at 70%.  Support for the item on dividing East Jerusalem stands at 39% and opposition at 59%. Support for a refugee settlement stands at 41% and opposition at 54%. Support for ending the conflict stands at 63% and opposition at 34%. Finally, support for security arrangements stands at 42% and opposition at 55%.  46% of the public believes that a majority of Palestinians supports this package and 39% believe that a majority rejects the package and 15% do not know. Similarly, 43% believe a majority of Israelis supports the package and 39% believe a majority in Israel rejects it.

Support for a Permanent Settlement Framework along the Lines of the Geneva Initiative, the Clinton Parameters, and the Taba Negotiations

(2003-2006)

Support for the package increases slightly in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (46%), among those who definitely would buy a lottery ticket (63%) compared to those who would definitely not buy a lottery ticket (32%), among supporters of Fateh (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas (34%), and among those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (58%) compared to those who define themselves as opponents of the peace process (16%).

Findings also show that 49% support the Road Map and 45% oppose it. Last September, support for this plan stood at 52% and opposition at 42%.

Findings show that an overwhelming majority (81%) prefers a track of negotiations that would focus on reaching a permanent status agreement that would end the conflict and create permanent peace while only 16% prefers a track that would focus on reaching an interim agreement that would create a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while postponing the settlement of other issues such as refugees. But if an agreement is actually reached on the establishment of a Palestinian state in the whole Gaza Strip and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel on the remaining issues such as final borders, refugees, and holy places, a majority of 58% would support it and 37% would oppose it.

The poll found that 39% of the Palestinians view Olmert’s speech in which he stated his willingness to evacuate settlements and withdraw from large areas as contributing to the peace process while 37% view it as not contributing to the peace process and 19% view it as having no effect on the peace process.  By contrast, a majority of 59% view the statement by Isma’il Haniyeh in which he offered Israel a long term Hudna of ten years or more in return for an Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state as contributing to peace, and 22% viewed it as not contributing to peace and 13% viewed it as having no effect on the peace process.  

(3) Governmental Performance, Early Elections, and Balance of Power

• Satisfaction with the performance of the Hamas government drops from 42% three months ago to 33% today. Similarly, satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas drops from 55% three months ago to 40% in this poll.
• More than 90% describe current Palestinian conditions as bad or very bad and only 2% describe it as good.
• 48% agree and 47% disagree that Hamas government should resign, and 61% support and 37% oppose the holding of early parliamentary and presidential elections.
• A majority of 56% agrees with Fateh and the president that PA president has the right to call for early elections and 38% agree with Hamas that he does not have that right.
• After one year since the electoral experience early this year, a majority of the Palestinians is still in favor of democracy: 53% say it is appropriate for the Palestinians and 43% say it is inappropriate.
• If early parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 36% of the vote, Fateh 42%, and all others 12%. 10% remain undecided. Three months ago, Hamas received 38% and Fateh received 41%.
• If early presidential elections were to take place today and only two were to compete, Mahmud Abbas from Fateh and Isma’il Haniyeh from Hamas, Abbas would receive 46% of the vote and Haniyeh would receive 45%. 9% remain undecided.  But if the race was between Marwan Barghouti from Fateh and Khalid Mish’al from Hamas, Barghouti would receive 57% and Mish’al would receive 36%. 7% remain undecided.

Findings show that satisfaction with the performance of the Hamas government has dropped significantly compared to where it was three months ago, from 42% to 33%. Drop in satisfaction covers all aspects of government work: enforcing law and order dropped from 41% to 27%, reforming the PA and fighting corruption dropped from 46% to 35%, reducing the plight of occupation and confronting Israeli settlement policy and the building of the separation barrier from 33% to 26%, and improving economic conditions, such as resolving the salaries problem, from 26% to 23%. It is interesting to note that 39% of those who voted for Hamas in the January 2006 elections say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the Hamas government while 30% of those who say they would vote for Hamas if new elections are held are dissatisfied with the performance of the Hamas government. It is also noticeable that satisfaction with the performance of the government is greater in the Gaza Strip (37%) than in the West Bank (31%).

Dissatisfaction however is not restricted to the performance of the Hamas government. Satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas has also dropped significantly in three months from 55% to 40%. As the case had been three months ago, more than 90% describe the current Palestinian conditions today as bad or very bad and only 2% describe it as good. Moreover, 87% say they and their families do not feel secure or safe in the PA and 87% say they believe corruption exists in the PA and 69% of those say that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future. It is worth noting that belief that corruption will increase or remain the same dropped significantly to 28% in the first poll, conducted in March 2006, after Hamas’ electoral victory. The huge increase to the current level indicates that the public has reached the conclusion that given the current internal dynamics, Hamas’ control over the parliament and government does not necessarily mean it has the capacity to fight corruption.

For all these reasons, the poll found half of the public (48%) wanting the Hamas government to resign while the other half (47%) remains opposed to that. Moreover, a majority of 61% support and 37% oppose the conduct of early parliamentary and presidential elections. More importantly, 56% of the public agrees with Fateh and Abbas that the PA president has the right to call for early elections while 37% agree with Hamas that he does not have that right. It is interesting to note that despite public frustration with current conditions, Palestinians are still committed to democracy with 53% saying that given the experience of the last year since the elections, democracy is indeed appropriate for Palestine and 43% say it is inappropriate.

If parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would receive 36% of the vote (compared to 38% three months ago), Fateh would receive 42% (compared to 41% three months ago), all other lists combined would receive 12% (compared to 9%) three months ago). 10%, compared to 12% three months ago, are undecided. Support for Hamas compared to Fateh increases in the Gaza Strip (43% vs. 41% for Fateh) and decreases in the West Bank (32% vs. 43% for Fateh). Support for Hamas also increases in refugee camps (41% vs. 40% for Fateh) and decreases in towns and villages (34% vs. 45% for Fateh) and in cities (36% vs. 41% for Fateh). Support for Hamas also increases among women (42% vs. 40% for Fateh) and decreases among men (30% vs. 45% for Fateh). Support for Hamas also increases among those who definitely would not buy a lottery ticket (50% vs. 27% for Fateh) and decreases among those who definitely would buy a lottery ticket (19% vs. 58% for Fateh). Support for Hamas also increases among those between 33 and 42 years of age (44% vs. 33% for Fateh) and decreases among those between 18 and 32 years of age (34% vs. 48% for Fateh), among those between 43 and 52 years of age (35% vs. 42% for Fateh), and among those over 52 years of age (28% vs. 42% for Fateh). Support for Hamas increases significantly among those who define themselves as opponents of the peace process (74% vs. 5% for Fateh) and decreases significantly among those who define themselves as supporters of the peace process (29% vs. 52% for Fateh). Support for Hamas and Fateh is close among those in the private sector (35% for Hamas and 37% for Fateh), but support for Hamas decreases significantly among those in the public sector (24% vs. 55% for Fateh).

If new presidential elections are to take place today with only two candidates participating, Isma’il Haniyeh from Hamas and Mahmud Abbas from Fateh, public vote would split equally among the two with Haniyeh receiving 45% and Abbas 46%. Haniyeh receives 49% of the vote in the Gaza Strip and 43% of the vote in the West Bank; Abbas receives 44% in the Gaza Strip and 47% in the West Bank. But if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti from Fateh and Khalid Mish’al from Hamas, Mish’al would receive 36% and Barghouti 57%. Barghouti receives a majority of the vote in the Gaza Strip (58% vs. 37% for Mish’al) and in theWest Bank (56% vs. 35% for Mish’al).....Full Report

 31 Dec.04 - 2 January 2005

Results in Numbers

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, June 2011

Palestinians are determined to go to the UN in September and not to return to negotiations with Netanyahu, in line with Israelis’ expectations

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem. 

65% of the Palestinians believe they should go to the UN in September to obtain recognition for their state, despite President Obama’s statement that it would be a mistake for them to do so. 65% of Israelis believe the Palestinians will indeed go to the UN. 

61% of the Palestinians think they should not accept President Obama’s call to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government, and 60% of Israelis do not expect them to do so. In light of President Obama’s speech, a majority of 88% of the Palestinians think the US position is closer to Israel, while only 8% think it is closer to the Palestinian position. Israelis are split in their assessment: 42% think the US position is closer to Israel and 40% think it is closer to the Palestinians. 

Majorities on both sides, 57% of Palestinians and 51% of Israelis, believe that if the Palestinians turn to the UN General Assembly for recognition of a Palestinian state, they will succeed to obtain a two thirds majority. Majorities on both sides, 76% of the Palestinians and 65% of the Israelis, also believe that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 

Almost 60% of Israelis think Israel should accept the decision if indeed the UN recognizes a Palestinian state, and either start negotiations with the Palestinians about its implementation or not allow any change on the ground by the Palestinians; 20% believe Israel should oppose the decision and intensify the construction in the settlements; 5% think that Israel should annex to Israel the PA territory; and 6% think Israel should  invade the PA and use force in order to prevent the establishment of  a Palestinian state. 

Palestinians are split in the ways they think they can force Israel to withdraw from the territories, if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state. About a third thinks they can do so through armed attacks on army and settlers, and another third thinks peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw; 26% think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw.

The Palestinian sample size was 1196 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in  127 randomly selected locations between June 16 and 18, 2011. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 604  adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew Arabic or Russian between June 12 and 21, 2011. The margin of error is 4.0%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS 

(A) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes regarding Obama and Netanyahu’s recent speeches

• A majority of 50% of Palestinians support President Obama’s call for a Palestinian state within the 1967 lines with territorial swaps; 46% oppose it. A majority of 54% of Israelis opposes this plan and 40% support it.
• With regard to the security issues, Israeli opinion is split, while Palestinians oppose Obama’s proposal that the Palestinian state will be demilitarized, it will have no airplanes, tanks, missiles, or any other heavy armaments, and the Israeli army would carry out a full and phased withdrawal from the Palestinian state. 66% of the Palestinians disagree with this principle, and only 31% support it; 46% of Israelis disagree and 48% agree with it.
• President Obama also said that a permanent peace should be based on the principle of two states for two peoples, the state of Israel as a Jewish state and a homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people, each would have the right to self determination, mutual recognition, and peace. 51% of the Palestinians and 67% of Israelis support this principle, while 47% and 29% respectively oppose it.
• President Obama stated that it would be a mistake for the Palestinians to go to the UN in September to obtain recognition for their state. Despite this statement, 65% of the Palestinians believe they should go to the UN in September and 31% believe they should not go. 65% of Israelis believe the Palestinians will go to the UN, while 24% think they will not go.
• President Obama also called upon the Palestinians to return to negotiations with the Netanyahu government, even though Prime Minister Netanyahu declared during his stay in Washington DC that Israel will not freeze settlement construction and refuses to accept the principle of returning to the lines of 1967 with swaps. 61% of the Palestinians think they should not accept the call to return to negotiations, and 60% of Israelis do not expect them to do so.
• In light of President Obama’s speech, a majority of 88% of the Palestinians think the US position is closer to the Israeli position, while only 8% think it is closer to the Palestinian position. Israelis are split in their assessment: 42% think the US position is closer to the Israeli position and 40% think it is closer to the Palestinian position.
• Considering the two speeches by Obama and Netanyahu during Netanyahu's visit to the US, we asked Palestinians whom they think decide what the other should do regarding the peace process. 63% said Israel decides what the US should do and 32% said the US decides what Israel should do. 2% said neither decides what the other should do.

(B) Israeli and Palestinian attitudes and expectations towards September

• Majorities on both sides - 57% of Palestinians and 51% of Israelis - believe that if the Palestinians turn to the UN General Assembly for recognition of a Palestinian state, they will succeed to obtain a two thirds majority. 36% of the Palestinians and 41% of the Israelis believe they will not succeed to obtain this majority.
• Majorities on both sides also believe that the US will use its veto power in the UN Security Council in order to prevent the UN from admitting the state of Palestine as a UN member. 76% of the Palestinians and 65% of the Israelis think so, while 18% and 22% respectively think that the US will not use its veto power.
• Palestinians are split with regard to the question whether a state of Palestine will become a UN member in September, while a majority of Israelis do not think so. 48% of the Palestinians think this will happen while 44% do not believe so. 34% of the Israelis think this will happen while 57% do not believe so.
• A majority of Israelis (52%) believe that if Palestinians appeal for the recognition of the UN, Israel should take diplomatic measures to prevent such a step; 21% think Israel should support this step, and 13% believe Israel should threaten to annex the Palestinian Authority territories in this case.
• If indeed the UN recognizes a Palestinian state, 30% of the Israelis think Israel should accept the decision and start negotiations with the Palestinians about its implementation; 29% think Israel should accept the decision but not allow any change on the ground by the Palestinians; 20% believe Israel should oppose the decision and intensify the construction in the settlements; 5% think that Israel should annex to Israel the PA territory; 6% of the Israelis think Israel should invade the PA and use force in order to prevent the establishment of  a Palestinian state.
• On the Palestinian side, two thirds believe that if the UN recognizes the state of Palestine, Israel will respond by making the occupation worse and by increasing settlement building while 18% think Israel will do nothing and the status quo will prevail. 13% of the Palestinians think conditions in the occupied territories will become a little better.
• We asked Palestinians how they think Palestinians can force Israel to withdraw from the territories, if the UN recognizes the Palestinian state, and Israelis what they think Palestinians will do. A majority of Israelis (54%) thinks the Palestinians will resume the Intifada including armed confrontations, while 18% think they will start non-violent resistance such as peaceful demonstrations. Palestinians however are split between these two options: 34% think armed attacks on army and settlers, and 32% think peaceful non-violent resistance can force Israelis to withdraw. 26% of the Palestinians think negotiations with Israel can bring it to withdraw, and 19% of the Israelis think the Palestinians will resume negotiations with Israel.
• We asked Palestinians what they think the PA should do after the UN recognizes the Palestinian state in September. 76% think the PA president and government should enforce Palestinian sovereignty over all the territories of the West Bank, for example by opening roads in area C, start building an airport in  the Jordan valley, and deploy Palestinian security forces in area C even if this leads to confrontations with the Israeli army and settlers. 20% think the PA should not do that. Similarly, 75% think the PA should insist on assuming control over the Allenby Bridge terminal from the Israeli side even if this leads to the closure of the terminal. 20% think the PA should not do that.
• Majorities on both sides, 58% of the Palestinians and 70% of the Israelis, think that most European countries will recognize the Palestinian state in September, while 37% of the Palestinians and 23% of the Israelis think that most European countries will not recognize it.
• A majority of Palestinians (56%) think the position of the EU countries regarding the peace process is closer to the Israeli position, while a majority of Israelis (64%) think it is closer to the Palestinian position. 

 (C) Conflict management, peace initiatives and threat perceptions

• 58% of the Palestinians support the Saudi initiative and 38% oppose it, while 29% of the Israelis support and 61% oppose it. The plan calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugee problem will be resolved through negotiations in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relations. In our March 2011 poll there was a similar level of support for the plan among both Israelis and Palestinians.
• Palestinians and Israelis have a mirror image perception of the chances that Fateh and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation agreement they reached. 59% of the Palestinians and 34% of the Israelis believe they will succeed to do so, while 37% of the Palestinians and 59% of the Israelis believe that Fateh and Hamas will not succeed.
• 56% of the Israelis oppose and 39% support talks with the Hamas government if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.
• 45% of the Israelis oppose and 51% support talks with a government of specialists supported by Hamas and Fatah if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.
• Majorities on both sides regard the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years as non-existent or low: 53% on the Israeli side and 62% on the Palestinian side. 29% and 30% respectively regard these chances as medium, and only 14% of Israelis and 6% of Palestinians regard these chances as high.
• Majorities on both sides - 69% of Israelis and 64% of Palestinians - do not think that if a peaceful popular revolt like in Egypt or Tunisia were to erupt against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank it would be capable of ending occupation. Only 19% of Israelis and 34% of Palestinians think it would be capable of ending occupation.
• After the UN recognition of a Palestinian state, if large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in order to break through check points and close army and settlers' roads, 52% of the Palestinians say they think they will participate in them and 46% say they think they will not. A majority of 51% of the Palestinians think that if such large peaceful demonstrations were to take place in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, they would contribute to speeding the process of ending Israeli occupation.
• Among Palestinians, 70% are worried and 30% are not worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Israelis in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Among Israelis, 59% are worried and 39% are not worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life.
• The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high. 60% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goals are to extend its borders to cover all the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens, and 21% think the goals are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. The modal category among Israelis is that the Palestinians’ aspirations in the long run are to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of the Jewish population in Israel (37%); 18% think the goals of the Palestinians are to conquer the State of Israel. Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s aspirations in the long run are to withdraw from part or all of the territories occupied in 1967; and 38% of Israelis think the aspirations of the Palestinians are to regain some or all of the territories conquered in 1967.

Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll, December 2009

In Israel: A slim majority (52%) believes Israel should pay almost any price to return prisoners of war.

In the PA: If released from jail, Marwan Barghouti would beat Ismail Haniyeh for Presidency by a large margin.

These are the results of the most recent poll conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, between December 9-15, 2009. This joint survey was conducted with the support of the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem.

Following important domestic developments in Israel and the Palestinian Authority, our poll focused on these developments:

• In the PA President Abbas announced his decision not to run in the next presidential elections; 57% of the Palestinians support and 36% oppose this decision. Nevertheless, 58% believe Abbas will withdraw his decision and will eventually run in the next elections. If presidential elections were between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas receives 54% and Haniyeh 38%; and if they were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive 67% and Haniyeh would receive 28%.
• In Israel, 52% think that Israel should pay almost any price to return prisoners of war home since this is the moral obligation of the state which sent them to war. 35% however think that Israel should not free “terrorists” who killed Israelis in “terrorist” acts inside Israel since this will encourage further abductions and acts of “terror.” 58% of the Israelis support and 36% oppose the release of Israeli Arabs who carried out violent attacks within Israel in return for the release of Gilad Shalit.
• 49% of Israelis support and 42% oppose Netanyahu’s decision to enforce a 10 month freeze on construction in the West Bank settlements, excluding East Jerusalem.
• Following these developments, 44% of the Israelis and 38% of the Palestinians think that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 8% of the Israelis and19% of the Palestinians think that negotiations will resume soon enough and armed confrontations will stop. 38% of the Israelis and 37% of the Palestinians expect that negotiations will resume but some armed attacks will continue.
• Given the continued American involvement in an attempt to resolve the conflict, 69% among Palestinians but only 13% of the Israelis see Obama’s policy as supportive of Israel; 37% of Israelis and 3% of Palestinians see his policy as supportive of the Palestinians; and 36% of Israelis and 22% of Palestinians see this policy as supportive of both sides equally.

The Palestinian sample size was 1200 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 120 randomly selected locations between December 10 and 12, 2009. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 604 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 9 and 15, 2009. The margin of error is 4.5%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). 

For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.

MAIN FINDINGS

(A) US policy toward the conflict

• Since the election of President Obama and following the intensified involvement of the US in the region we have been tracking in our poll Israelis and Palestinians' attitudes toward the US policy in the region. Our previous polls revealed an increased apprehension of Israelis with regard to a more intensive American involvement to resolve the conflict while Palestinians were somewhat more favorable to it.
• Our current poll indicates that 13% of Israelis and 69% of the Palestinians think that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel, 37% and 3% respectively think it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 36% and 22% respectively think it is supportive of both sides equally. In August, 12% of Israelis and 64% of Palestinians believed that Obama’s policy is more supportive of Israel; 40% and 7% respectively thought it is more supportive of the Palestinians, and 38% and 23% respectively thought it is supportive of both sides equally.
• 55% of the Palestinians believe and 39% do not believe that the US has now abandoned its demand from Israel to implement a comprehensive freeze on settlement construction. 68% of the Palestinians oppose and 30% support unconditional return to negotiations, as requested by the US, before Israel implements a comprehensive freeze on settlement construction that would include East Jerusalem. 

 (B) Israeli and Palestinian Domestic Developments

• Netanyahu’s decision to put a freeze on construction in the West Bank settlements caused a significant political roar mainly from settlers and right wing parties. Our poll however indicates that 42% among Israelis oppose such a freeze, whereas 49% support it.
• Moreover, 58% among Israelis support the removal of illegal settlement posts in the West Bank, while 32% oppose.
• 49% of the Israelis also support and 43% oppose the dismantling of most of the settlements in the West Bank as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians. However support for this step has been decreasing consistently since the disengagement from Gaza in August 2005.
• Another related development which intensified following Netanyahu’s freeze decision is protest and refusal to evict settlers from illegal posts within the Israeli military. Our poll examined Israelis attitudes on this issue:34% of Israelis support and 57% oppose the refusal of soldiers to evict settlers in the West Bank
• Only 27% support and 66% oppose to the refusal of soldiers to serve in the West Bank.
• 43% of the Israelis think that soldiers who refuse to serve in the territories and those who refuse to remove settlements should be equally punished. 19% believe that those who refuse to serve in the territories should be punished but not those who refuse to remove settlements, while 6% think that those who refuse to remove settlements should be punished but not those who refuse to serve in the territories. 22% think that both kinds of refusals should not be punished.
• In the Palestinian Authority, President Abbas announced his decision not to run in the next presidential elections, 57% of the Palestinians support this decision, while 36% oppose it. Nevertheless, 58% believe Abbas will withdraw his decision and will eventually run in the next elections. If presidential elections were between Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former receives 54% and the latter 38% and if they were between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive 67% (compared to 62% last August) and Haniyeh would receive 28% (31% in August).

 (C) Negotiation Tracks on the Agenda 

The Israeli-Palestinian Track

• Now, more than 40 years after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 66% of the Israelis and 68% of the Palestinians believe that the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years are non-existent or low. 30% of the Israelis and 31% of the Palestinians believe they are medium or high. These figures are very similar to those we obtained in August.
• Similarly, 65% of the Israelis and 67% among Palestinians think that it is impossible to reach these days a final status settlement with the Palestinians; 32% in both publics believe it is possible.
• 64% of Palestinians and 73% of Israelis believe that the best solution to the conflict is the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, known as the two-state solution. 20% of the Palestinians and 9% of the Israelis think that the best solution is to establish one state shared by Palestinians and Israelis in all the area west to the Jordan River
• 57% of the Israelis support and 35% oppose the proposal that after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the settlement of all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem issues, there will be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people. Among Palestinians, 53% support and 46% oppose this step. In August, 64% of the Israelis supported this proposal, while 31% opposed it. Among Palestinians, 49% supported the proposal in August and 49% opposed it.

The Saudi Plan

• 57% of the Israelis oppose and 36% support the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel after it ends its occupation of Arab territories occupied in 1967 and after the establishment of a Palestinian state. The plan calls for Israeli retreat from all territories occupied in 1967 including Gaza the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The refugees' problem will be resolved through negotiation in a just and agreed upon manner and in accordance with UN resolution 194. In return, all Arab states will recognize Israel and its right to secure borders, will sign peace treaties with her and establish normal diplomatic relation. In August, 54% of the Israelis opposed the plan while 40% supported it. Among Palestinians, 68% support the plan, and 30% oppose it; 64% supported it in August and 34% opposed it.

 (D) Conflict management and threat perceptions

• 53% of the Israelis support and 42% oppose talks with Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In August, 52% supported and 44% opposed such talks.
• A sizeable Israeli majority (66%) support and only 27% oppose talks with a national unity government composed jointly of Hamas and Fatah if such a government is reestablished. In August, these figures were 66% and 30% respectively.
• 17% of the Palestinians and 32% of the Israelis believe that Israel will agree in the future to a complete freeze on settlement construction, including in East Jerusalem. 81% and 59% respectively don’t believe this will happen.
• 58% of the Israelis support and 36% oppose the release of Israeli Arabs who carried out violent attacks within Israel in return for the release of Gilad Shalit. In August, 63% of the Israelis supported and 27% opposed this act.
• Some 52% of Israelis think that Israel should pay almost any price to return prisoners of war home since this is the moral obligation of the state which sent them to war. 35% however think that Israel should not free “terrorists” who killed Israelis in “terrorist” acts inside Israel since this will encourage further abductions and acts of “terror.” This reflects the general parameters of public debate in Israel regarding the negotiations with Hamas over Gilad Shalit, but we deliberately avoided mentioning his name in this question in order not to bias our respondents.
• Among Israelis, 57% are worried that they or their family may be harmed by Arabs in their daily life, compared to 50% in August. Among Palestinians 77% are worried or very worried that they or members of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished and 23% are not worried. But we also found that 36% of the Palestinians fear that their security and safety and that of their family are not assured, compared to 40% in August, indicating further increased public perception of safety and security among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• 14% of the Israelis believe that Palestinian aspirations in the long run are to return some of the territories occupied in 1967. 26% think that they aspire to return all the territories occupied. 14% think that they want to conquer the State of Israel, and 40% fear that they plan to conquer the state of Israel and destroy its Jewish population. Palestinians similarly don’t trust Israelis long run aspirations. Only 12% of the Palestinians believe that Israel wants to guarantee its security and withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967. 11% of the Palestinians believe that Israel wants to Guarantee its security and withdraw from part of the occupied territories. 23% believe that Israel plans the annexation of the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinians, and 53% fear that Israel aspires the realization of Greater Israel borders and transfer of the Palestinians.  With regard to their own long term aspirations, about half of the Palestinians (49%) believe they aspire to reach a peace agreement with Israel that would establish a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital;, 10% believe the aspiration is to force Israel to end its occupation and withdraw to the 1967 lines without a peace agreement, 16% believe the goal is to return all Palestine from the river to the sea to Arab sovereignty by force, and 23% believe the goal is to conquer the state of Israel and destroy its Jewish population. As to Israelis, a majority of them (54%) think that the aspirations of Israel for the long run are to guarantee its security and withdraw from part of the territories occupied in 1967; 10% think that the aspirations are to guarantee security and withdraw from all the territories; 8% believe Israel’s aspirations for the long run are to annex the West Bank while denying political rights of Palestinians, and 15% think it is the realization of Greater Israel borders and transfer of the Palestinians. These results emphasize the mirror image perceptions and misperceptions of the two sides which remain severe obstacles in the peace process.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the reversal of PA’s May 2020 decision to end security and civil coordination with Israel and the resumption of that coordination, the election of Joe Biden as president of the US, the signing of a normalization agreement between Sudan and Israel, and the failure of Palestinian reconciliation efforts to reach an agreement on holding Palestinian elections. This report addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2020 show a majority is opposed to the PA leadership decision to resume coordination with Israel. Yet, they also show that this opposition is not strong and that it is in fact closer to a split between support and opposition. Even when it comes to security coordination with Israel, attitudes reflect an almost even split. Nonetheless, the findings paint a dark public assessment of Palestinian conditions in light of the return to coordination with Israel. The majority believes that Israel is the one to came out a winner from this political battle over coordination and that the Palestinian side is the one that paid the heavy price for engaging in it. Moreover, the overwhelming majority believes Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its commitments under signed agreement; indeed, this overwhelming majority thinks Israel has not abandoned its annexation plans for the Jordan Valley and West Bank settlements. On top of all that, the public thinks that the resumption of coordination will lead to greater Arab 

normalization with Israel, greater settlement expansion, and greater chances for annexation while at the same time diminishing the chances for reconciliation and the holding of elections. But the majority does express satisfaction with the resumption of coordination in the health sector; expects Israelis and Palestinians to resume negotiations; and a large minority expects an improvement in economic conditions.

The optimism about a resumption of negotiations seems linked more to public belief that the electoral victory of Joe Biden in the US elections will lead to an improvement in Palestinian-American relations. Similarly, the expectations about improved economic conditions seem to reflect the belief of two thirds of the public that the Biden Administration will resume financial aid to the PA. Despite the fact that the majority of the public does not expect Biden to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century, or reverse the decision to transfer the US embassy to Jerusalem, a clear majority is in favor of resuming dialogue with the new administration.

Yet, despite the optimism generated by the election of Biden, support for the two-state solution remains low, unchanged from September. Moreover, three quarters do not expect the creation of a Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years, and the majority thinks the two-state solution is no longer practical or realistic because of settlement expansion. Nonetheless, we see in this poll an increase in the percentage of those who prefer to reach a peace agreement with Israel compared to three months ago while the percentage of those who prefer waging an armed struggle against occupation declines during the same period. Still, the largest percentage of the public views armed struggle as the most effective means of ending occupation.

On domestic condition, findings show that the percentage of those demanding the resignation of president Abbas has increased to two-thirds despite the fact that the balance between Hamas and Fatah support remains unchanged compared to the previous six months. Findings show that three quarters  of the public demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections but only a third or less expects the PA to hold them. If elections are held under current conditions, findings show a sharp split among Fatah voters: the largest percentage of them is more likely to vote for an independent list formed by Marwan Barghouti than for an official Fatah list formed by Abbas and the Fatah leadership. Moreover, if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, he is more likely to take away from the official Fatah list about one fifth of Fatah voters, particularly in the Gaza Strip.

Finally, findings show that only half of the public is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine, when available, while the other half refuses to take it. 

(1) The resumption of PA coordination with Israel:

• A majority of 53% opposes the resumption of coordination with Israel; the public is divided when transfer of clearance funds is conditioned by return of coordination
• A majority of 53% believes Israel came out a winner from the battle over coordination while 9% think the PA came out a winner; the majority thinks it was the Palestinian side that suffered the consequences of the cessation of coordination
• An overwhelming majority of 87% thinks Israel did not abandon its annexation plan
• 43% expect an improvement in economic conditions now after the resumption of coordination
• 61% believe the resumption of coordination will increase the cases of Arab normalization with Israel
• 57% believe the resumption of coordination diminishes the prospects of reconciliation
• 60% are satisfied with the resumption of coordination in health matters such as those aiming at combating the coronavirus pandemic

A large minority of 44% supports, and 53% oppose the decision by the PA leadership to resume civil and security coordination with Israel. When asked specifically about security coordination, 41% agreed, and 38% disagreed, with the statement that security coordination should be stopped even if it leads Israel to stop the transfer of clearance funds thereby stopping salary payment to PA employees; 18% said they neither agree nor disagree with the statement.  A majority of 56% believes there is little or no chance the PA will reverse its decision and once again suspend security coordination with Israel; 13% think the chances of PA doing so are high or very high.  Support for the PA decision to resume coordination with Israel is higher in the West Bank (54%) compared to the Gaza Strip (29%), in villages/towns (55%) compared to cities and refugee camps (43% and 32% respectively), among non-refugees (51%) compared to refugees (35%), among illiterates (49%) compared to holders of BA degree (39%), among farmers, housewives, laborers, and professionals (52%, 49%, 48%, and 46% respectively) compared to students (33%), among married respondents (45%) compared to the non-married (37%), among those with the highest income (53%) compared to those with the lowest income (40%), among the somewhat religious (48%) compared to the religious (40%), and among supporters of Fatah (66%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (21% and 41% respectively).

A majority of 53% says that Israel came out the winner from the PA decision to stop and then resume coordination with Israel; only 9% think the PA came out a winner; 13% think both sides came out winners; and 22% think neither side came out a winner.  A majority of 60% believes the Palestinians have paid a heavier price for stopping civil and security coordination with Israel while only 12% think Israel paid a heavier price.

The overwhelming majority (82%) says that Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its signed commitments with the PA despite the written letter submitted to the PA; only 14% think Israel has indeed agreed to honor its commitments.  Even if Israel agreed to honor its commitment to signed agreements with the PA, the overwhelming majority (89%) believes Israel will not in fact abide by such commitment; only 8% think Israel will abide by these commitments.  Similarly, 87% believe that Israel has not abandoned its plan for the annexation of the Jordan Valley and the West Bank settlements; 8% think it has.

Now, after the resumption of coordination with Israel, 43% expect, and 55% do not expect, an improvement in economic conditions.  But two thirds (67%) expect, and 28% do not expect, the return of the Palestinian and Israeli sides to the negotiating table.  A majority of 61% expects the resumption of coordination with Israel to lead to an increase in normalization agreements between Arab countries and Israel; 68% expect it to lead to greater settlement expansion; and 54% expect it to lead to greater chances for Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and the settlements in the West Bank.

On the domestic implication of the resumption of coordination with Israel, 57% expect it to diminish the chances for reconciliation and the largest percentage (44%) expects it to diminish the chances for holding general Palestinian elections. But 60% are satisfied, and 36% are dissatisfied, with the resumption of PA coordination with Israel on health issues and the combating of the coronavirus pandemic.

If Israel transfers partial clearance funds to the PA, the largest percentage (35%) thinks the PA should accept it and take Israel to the International Court of Justice to demand the rest of the funds; 28% say the PA should accept the partial transfer; and only 34% say the PA should not accept the partial transfer.

(2) Expectations from the Biden Administration and attitudes regarding resumption of Palestinian-American dialogue:

• The majority expects an improvement in Palestinian-American relation and two thirds expects an American resumption of economic aid to the PA
• A majority of 59% supports a resumption of PA dialogue with the new US administration, but only 44% support the return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership

Now that Joe Biden has won the US presidential elections, a majority of 58% expects, and 36% do not expect, an improvement in Palestinian-American relations.  In fact, two-thirds (68%) expect the new US administration to resume economic aid to the PA and 52% expect it to allow the reopening of PLO diplomatic mission in the US capital.  Yet, only 37% expect the Biden Administration to re-open the US consulate in East Jerusalem; 29% expect it to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century; 26% expect it to relocate the US embassy to Tel Aviv; and 22% expect it to reverse the decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.  At the regional level, a large minority of 42% expects, and 46% do not expect, the new US administration to recommit itself to the nuclear deal with Iran.

A majority of 59% supports and 36% oppose the resumption of Palestinian dialogue with the US under the new administration.  Support for the resumption of dialogue with the US administration is higher in the Gaza Strip (61%) compared to the West Bank (58%), among men (63%) compared to women (55%), among those with the highest income (63%) compared to those with the lowest income (57%), among the somewhat religious (64%) compared to the religious (51%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (70% and 72% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (44%).

But only 44% think, and 49% do not think, Palestinians should return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership.  Support for the resumption of negotiations with Israel under US leadership is higher in the West Bank (47%) compared to the Gaza Strip (39%), among those whose age is over 50 years (44%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (38%), among the illiterates (51%) compared to holders of BA degree (40%), among the somewhat religious (50%) compared to the religious (37%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (62% and 48% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (19%).

(3) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process:

• 40% support the two-state solution; but 62% think this solution is no longer practical due to settlement expansion
• When choosing between reaching a peace agreement or waging an armed struggle against occupation, 38% go for the former and 29% for the latter.
• But support for an armed intifada remains high at 48%
• 29% support abandoning the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution

Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 40% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.   A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 34% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 38% of the public while 29% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 19% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 35% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.  When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 39% chose armed struggle, 35% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 41% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.

When asked about support for specific policy choices, 68% supported joining more international organizations; 63% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 44% supported dissolving the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis.

(4) Taking the Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• Half of the Palestinian public does not want to be vaccinated against the coronavirus
• Half of the public expresses satisfaction with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus

Only half of the public (50%) is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine when it is available and the other half refuses to take it.  Those unwilling to be vaccinated are divided into those who are certain they will not take it (32%) and those who think they will not take it (18%).  The percentage of those who indicate that they are certain they will not take the vaccine rejecting the vaccine is much higher in the West Bank (50%) compared to the Gaza Strip (5%), in villages/towns (55%) compared to cities and refugee camps (29% and 19% respectively), among non-refugees (43%) compared to refugees (18%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (36%) c0mpared to those who work in the public sector (20%), among those with the highest income (57%) compared to those with the lowest income (12%), among the somewhat religious (40%) compared to the religious (22%), and mong supporters of Fatah (30%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (21% and 24% respectively).  

Half of the public (50%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to contain the spread of coronavirus pandemic and 48% are dissatisfied. The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 53% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 45% today compared to 48% three months ago and 62% six months ago.

The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 73% say their income or salary has been reduced; 62% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 54% say they stopped working or became unemployed.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• Three quarters demand the holding of legislative and presidential elections
• 38% say they will vote for Fatah and 34% for Hamas
• But if Marwan Barghouti forms an independent list, his would receive 25% of the vote of the public while only 19% say they would in this case vote for the official Fatah list
• But if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, his would receive the vote of 7% of the public and 27% would vote in this case for the official Fatah list
• In presidential elections between Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former would receive 43% of the vote and the latter 50%
• 66% demand the resignation of president Mahmoud Abbas
• If presidential elections between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyyeh, the former receives 61% of the vote and the latter 37%; in elections between Mohammad Shtayyeh and Ismail Haniyyeh, the two receive the same percentage of the vote (47%)

Three quarters demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections; but only 32% expect such elections to be held soon in the Palestinian territories. The demand for elections is higher in the Gaza Strip (76%) compared to the West Bank (70%), among those whose age is over 50 years (74%) compared to the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (67%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (85% and 81% respectively) and supporters of Hamas (78%).

Among those who demand the holding of elections, the majority (55%) says it should be for simultaneous legislative and presidential elections with no separation between them; 22% prefer holding simultaneous legislative and presidential elections but are not opposed to separating the two by holding them at different dates; and 21% prefer holding legislative elections first followed few months later by presidential elections. A majority of 56% supports, and 39% oppose, holding general elections if Israel does not allow holding them in East Jerusalem.

We asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 46% three months ago).  If legislative elections are held today, 38% expect Fatah to win; 25% expect Hamas to win; 23% expect third parties and new lists that are unknow today to win.

If Marwan Barghouti forms an electoral list independent of the official Fatah list formed by Abbas and Fatah leadership, 25% of the entire public say they would vote for this Barghouti list; only 19% say they would in this case vote for Fatah’s official list. The vote for the Barghouti’s electoral list is higher in the West Bank (30%) compared to the Gaza Strip (18%), among men (28%) compared to women (22%), among non-refugees (29%) compared to refugees (20%), among holders of BA degree (27%) compared to illiterates (15%), among those with the highest income (38%) compared to those with the lowest income (18%), among the somewhat religious (31%) compared to the non-religious and the religious (14% and 19% respectively), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (31% and 37% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (10%). 

But if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, only 7% of the entire public (mostly in the Gaza Strip) would vote for his list while 27% would vote for the official Fatah list. The vote for Dahlan is higher in the Gaza Strip (10%) compared to the West Bank (5%), in villages/towns and cities (8% and 7% respectively) compared to refugee camps (3%), among men (10%) compared to women (4%), among the somewhat religious (8%) compared to the religious (3%), and among supporters of Fatah (11%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (6% and 1% respectively). 

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 43% and the latter 50% of the vote (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 39% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 42% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 47% and the latter 47%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 41% and Haniyyeh 51%.  Support for Shtayyeh is higher in the West Bank (54%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), in villages/towns (60%) compared to refugee camps and cities (43% and 45% respectively), among the youth between the ages of 23 and 29 years (53%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 49 years (39%), among the non-refugees (54%) compared to refugees (37%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (55% and 50% respectively) compared to the religious (42%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (90% and 51% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (4%).

66% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 30% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 61% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 37% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).  We asked, in a close-ended question, about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 23% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (2% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Salam Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouti by 3% each. 

If Fatah nominates Abbas as its candidate for the presidential elections, a majority of 52% of the public would view him as the wrong choice believing that Fatah has other better candidates; only 25% of the public think his is the best Fatah candidate. When asked to name a better candidate, 42% selected Marwan Barghouti, 10% selected Mohammad Dahlan, and 7% selected Mohammad Shtayyeh.  

The largest percentage (28%) says that the top priority for Palestinian elections should be to restore unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 24% say it is improving economic conditions; 18% say it is the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip; 15% say it is to fight corruption; 6% say it is to bring back democracy; and another 6% say it is to strengthen resistance to occupation.  52% say if elections are held today under current conditions, they will not be fair and free; 41% do not agree with that.  Moreover, 76% think that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah will not accept the results and 58% think if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will not accept the results.

(6) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• About two thirds are opposed to changing the criteria for payment for the families of martyrs and prisoners
• Perception of safety and security stands at 54% in the West Bank and 72% in the Gaza Strip
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86% and in institutions controlled by Hamas at 63%
• 45% think it is possible to criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear; 54% think it is possible to criticize the institutions of Hamas without fear
• 55% view the PA as a burden and 41% view it as an achievement for the Palestinian people
• Expectations from the Shtayyeh government reflect continued pessimism regarding reconciliation, elections, and economic conditions

31% of the public support and 65% oppose the idea of changing the criterial for payment for the families of martyrs and prisoners so that it would be based on financial needs and family members and not based on the act carried out by the martyr or the year of imprisonment. Support for the idea is higher in the West Bank (33%) compared to the Gaza Strip (29%), among the illiterates (50%) compared to holders of BA degree (26%), among the somewhat religious (34%) compared to the religious (28%), and among supporters of Fatah (40%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (24% and 31% respectively).

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.   Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 72% and in the West Bank at 54%.  28% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 38% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 24% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and only 25% of Gazans expressed the same desire.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. Three months ago, 80% expressed a similar view. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, only 63% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions.   45% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 54% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas authorities without fear and 46% think they cannot.  The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 55% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 62% viewed the PA as a burden.

A year and nine months since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 66% expect failure; only 27% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 35% expects success.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 22%, followed by Palestine TV, Al Aqsa TV, and Maan TV at 12% each, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 5% each, and finally al Manar at 1%.  

(7) Reconciliation: 

• The majority views the reconciliation efforts as lacking seriousness
• Only 29% are optimistic about reconciliation

An overwhelming majority (77%) thinks the reconciliation efforts are not serious and insufficient.  As a result, only 29% are optimistic and 68% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 37%.

(8) The Arab Peace Initiative, Arab normalization with Israel, and Arab visits to Jerusalem: 

• 75% believe the Arab Peace Initiative is a “thing of the past”
• 57% believe Arab normalization hurts the prospects of peace with Israel
• The majority is opposed to visits to East Jerusalem by Arab tourists, particularly those from the Gulf

Three quarters of the public (75%) believe the Arab Peace Initiative is a thing of the past while 19% think it remains standing.  In fact, 81% expect Saudi Arabic will soon join the Arab normalization train while 15% do not expect that.  Only 11% believe that Arab normalization agreements help in resolving the conflict with Israel while 57% think they cause damage to the efforts to resolve the conflict.  29% say they are for and 69% say they are against visits from Arab countries, particularly from the Gulf, to East Jerusalem and for praying at Al Aqsa Mosque. But a majority of 52% says that these visitors should be allowed to pray at the mosque or should be left alone without interference.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% think the top Palestinian goal should be achieving end of occupation and building a Palestinian state while 29% think it should be obtaining the right of return
• The most serious problem facing the Palestinian people today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 29% while 26% think it is the continuation of occupation

45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and an identical percentage (13%) believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 29%, the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 26%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 20%,  the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 11%.

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 10 December 2016. Internally, the period before the poll witnessed the holding of Fatah’s Seventh Convention and the election of its Central Committee and Revolutionary Council, the dismissal of the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, and the publication of a ruling by the recently appointed Constitutional Court that grants President Abbas the authority to revoke the immunity of the members of the parliament. The period also witnessed Abbas’ participation in the funeral of the former Israeli president Shimon Peres. The Israeli settlement construction accelerated considerably during this period and the Israeli government approved legislation that would legalize the seizure by settlers of private Palestinian land for the purpose of building settlements. The period also witnessed fires breakout across Israel, Netanyahu’s invitation to Abbas to speak in front of the Israeli Knesset, Israeli defense minister Avigdor Lieberman statement that Gazans can reopen their airport and build a seaport if Hamas ceases the digging of tunnels and the launching of rockets. The Israeli Knesset debated a government bill to ban the use of loudspeakers in the mosques’ call for prayer in Israel and the occupied East Jerusalem. At the international level, Donald Trump was elected as the new president of the United States and talks continued about a possible international conference in Paris, part of the French Initiative to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers attitudes regarding Fatah’s convention, judicial matters, reconciliation, and others. It also covers Palestinian-Israeli issues such as the peace process, the Israeli fires, and the French Initiative. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2016 indicate an increase, particularly in the Gaza Strip, in the percentage of those demanding Abbas’ resignation. They also indicate a slight decline in public satisfaction with the performance of the president. If presidential elections were to take place today, Hamas’ candidate Ismail Haniyeh would win. But Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular among all nationalist and Islamist leaders. In the domestic balance of power, Hamas remains at the same 

level it attained three months ago and Fatah improves its standing in the West Bank. It should be pointed out that the findings show a significant rise in public perception of safety and security in the West Bank.

Now in the aftermath of Fatah’s Seventh Convention, findings indicate that the newly elected Fatah leadership faces a tough challenge winning the trust and confidence of the public; a majority indicates that it does not have confidence in those elected. In fact, a majority is also dissatisfied with the Convention’s decision to declare Abbas the head of Fatah for five more years and does not believe that the meeting has helped to unify the movement, improve the chances for reconciliation, or facilitate the convening of the Palestinian National Council. It should be noted however, that a majority of the likely Fatah voters does have confidence in the new leadership, is satisfied with the selection of Abbas as the head of the movement, and believes that the convention did indeed help unify Fatah ranks.

Abbas faces an additional challenge as findings clearly indicate that the public rejects the recent ruling by the newly appointed Constitutional Court granting the PA president the authority to revoke the immunity of the members of the Palestinian parliament. Moreover, the public rejects Abbas’ decision to dismiss the head of the Supreme Judicial Council and believes that such dismissal is not part of the mandate of the presidency.

In matters related to the Palestinian-Israeli relations, public perception that the two state solution is no longer viable increases significantly, probably due to the dramatic increase in settlement construction during the period under consideration. Moreover, findings also show an increase in the percentage of those who favor the abandonment of the Oslo agreement. More significantly however, the poll found a majority in favor of armed attacks and a return to armed intifada. During the past nine months, support for violence has been in retreat. The overwhelming majority of the public sees nothing but incitement against Arabs in Netanyahu’s claim that some of the recent fires in Israel were initiated by Palestinians. Moreover, there is almost a consensus among the public that the decision by the Israeli government to ban the use of loudspeakers in the mosques’ call for prayer is tantamount to declaring war against Islam.

(1) Fatah’s Seventh Convention:

• Only one third of the Palestinian public has confidence in the newly elected Fatah leadership
• Only one third of the public is satisfied with the Seventh Convention’s selection of  Abbas as head of Fatah
• Only one third believes that the Seventh Convention will contribute to Fatah’s unity
• Only one quarter believes that the Seventh Convention will help facilitate Fatah-Hamas reconciliation

In the aftermath of Fatah’s Seventh Convention and the election of its new leaders, only one third of the Palestinian public expresses confidence in the ability of the new leadership to attain the goals Palestinians aspire to; 54% do not have confidence in the new leadership.  Distrust in the new Fatah leadership is higher in the Gaza Strip (58%) compared to the West Bank (51%), in cities (55%) compared to villages and refugee camps (50% each), among those opposed to the peace process (73%) compared to supporters of the peace process (40%), among the religious (60%) compared to the somewhat religious (49%), among supporters of Hamas and third parties, the undecided, and those who will not participate in future elections (79%, 61%, 62%, and 58% respectively) compared to supporters of Fatah (24%), among those who work in the private sector (59%) compared to those who work in the public sector (48%), among the retired, merchants, and professionals (74%, 64%, and 62% respectively) compared to housewives, laborers, and students (45%, 54%, and 58% respectively), and among holders of two-year college and BA degrees (62% and 58% respectively) compared to illiterates and holder of the preparatory certificate (35% and 46% respectively).

Similarly, only 33% of the public is satisfied with the choice made by the Seventh Convention in selecting President Abbas as head of Fatah for five more years; 57% of the public is dissatisfied with that choice. Yet, among Fatah’s likely voters, satisfaction with the selection of Abbas stands at 70%. Moreover, only 34% believe, and 52% do not believe, that the Seventh Convention has contributed to the unification of Fatah. Among Fatah’s likely voters, belief that the convention has contributed to Fatah’s unity stands at 62%. Furthermore, only a quarter (26%) believes, and 62% do not believe, that the Convention has increased the chances for reconciliation.

Only one third (34%) of the public believes that success in holding the Seventh Convention will lead to further success in holding the next session of the Palestinian National Council; 48% believe it will not lead to that. Nonetheless, 42% believe, and 48% do not believe, that the selection of Abbas as head of Fatah will help consolidate Abbas’ legitimacy as the president of the PA and chairman of the PLO Executive Committee.

(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• 64% want Abbas’ resignation and 32% want him to stay in office
• In an election involving two candidates, Abbas and Ismail Haniyah, the latter receives 49% of the vote and the former 45%; if the two candidates are Marwan Barghouti and Haniyah, the latter receives 36% and the former 59%.
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah receives 41% of the vote, Hamas 32%, and third factions combined 10%

64% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 32% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation increases in the Gaza Strip (72%) compared to the West Bank (59%), in refugee camps and cities (67% and 66% respectively) compared to villages (53%), among those opposed to the peace process (81%) compared to supporters of the peace process (52%), among the religious (68%) compared to the somewhat religious (61%), among supporters of Hamas and third factions (91% and 81% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (29%), among those who work in the private sector (64%) compared to those who work in the public sector (56%), among the retired, the professionals, and students (82%, 71%, and 68% respectively) compared to housewives (62%), and among holders of BA degree (68%) compared to illiterates and holders of elementary certificate (41% and 51% respectively).

If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 36% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 20% prefer Ismail Haniyeh; Khalid Mishal receives 6%; Rami al Hamdallah 5%; Mohammad Dahlan 4%; Mustapha Barghouti 3%; Salam Fayyad 2%, and Saeb Erekat 1%. Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 35% today compared to 37% three months ago. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 38% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip. If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud Abbas, the former would receive 49% (compared to 48% three months ago) and the latter 45% (compared to 45% three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 45% of the vote (compared to 47 three months ago) and Haniyeh receive 51% (compared to 50% three months ago). In the West Bank Abbas receives 45% (compared to 43% three months ago) and Haniyeh 47% (compared to 46% three months ago). If presidential elections were between three: Mahmud Abbas, Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Abbas would receive 24%, Barghouti 39% and Haniyeh 33%.  If presidential elections were between two: Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 36%.

If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 70% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they would vote for Hamas and 41% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 37%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 37% three months ago) and for Fatah at 40% (compared to 39% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 29% (compared to 29% three months ago) and Fatah at 41% (compared to 36% three months ago).

(3) Domestic conditions and the independence of the judiciary:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 11% and the West Bank at 31%
• Perception of safety and security stands at 47% in the Gaza Strip and 56% in the West Bank
• 46% of Gazans and 24% of West Bankers wish to emigrate to other countries
• 49% view the PA as a burden and 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people
• 60% reject the decision of the Constitutional Court giving Abbas the authority to revoke the immunity of PLC members
• 57% believe that Abbas does not have the authority to dismiss the head of the Supreme Judicial Council

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 11% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 31%. Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 47%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 56%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 48% and in the West Bank at 42%.  Findings show that the percentage of Gazans who say they seek to immigrate to other countries stands at 46%; in the West Bank, the percentage stands at 24%. Three months ago 46% of Gazans and 29% of West Bankers said they seek to emigrate.

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV viewership is the highest, standing at 19%, followed by al Aqsa TV (at 16%), Maan TV (at 15%), Palestine TV and Filasteen al Youm (Palestine Today) at 12 % each, Al Arabiya at 6%, al Quds TV at 5%, and al Mayadeen at 3%.

Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 76%. Moreover, only 36% of the Palestinian public say people in the West Bank can criticize the PA authority without fear. This percentage rises to 41% among West Bankers and drops to 27% among Gazans. Furthermore, 49% view the Palestinian Authority as a burden on the Palestinians while 46% view it as an asset.

60% of the public reject and 30% accept the decision of the recently-appointed Constitutional Court that gives president Abbas the authority to revoke the immunity of the members of the parliament. Rejection of the Court’s decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (64%) compared to the West Bank (57%), in cities (62%) compared to villages and refugee camps (54% and 52% respectively), among men (62%) compared to women (57%), among those who oppose the peace process (81%) compared to supporters of the peace process (48%), among the religious (65%) compared to the somewhat religious (55%), among supporters of the Hamas and third factions (85% and 77% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (39%), among the retired, the professionals, and students (79%, 66%, and 61% respectively) compared to housewives and merchants (55% each), and among holders of BA degree (64%) compared to holders of the elementary and the preparatory certificates and the illiterates (51%, 53%, and 58% respectively).

Commenting on President Abbas’ recent dismissal of the head of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), 57% of the public believe that the president does not have the authority to do so while 31% believe that the president has such authority. Belief that the president does not have the authority to dismiss the head of the SJC rises to 65% in the Gaza Strip and drops to 52% in the West Bank. It is also higher in cities (61%) compared to villages and refugee camps (45% and 49% respectively), among men (59%) compared to women (55%), among those who oppose the peace process (74%) compared to supporters of the peace process (46%), among the religious (65%) compared to the somewhat religious (51%), among supporters of Hamas and third factions (80% and 71% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (38%), among the retired and the professionals (89% and 66% respectively) compared to housewives (53%), and among holders of BA degree (63%) compared to holders of the elementary certificate and the illiterates (38% and 41% respectively).

(4) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:

• Optimism about reconciliation stands at 35%, pessimism at 61%
• Only 28% are satisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government, 63% are dissatisfied
• Only 18% put the blame for the shortcomings of the reconciliation government on Hamas
• 71% want the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of the employees who worked for the former Hamas government and 71% support the integration of the police forces in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank under the command and jurisdiction of the reconciliation government

Optimism about the success of reconciliation and the end of the split stands today at 35% and pessimism at 61%. Three months ago optimism stood at 31% and pessimism at 65%.  28% say they are satisfied and 63% say they are dissatisfied with the performance of the reconciliation government. In the Gaza Strip, dissatisfaction stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 56%.  Belief that Hamas was responsible for hindering the functioning of the reconciliation government does not exceed 18% (9% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) while 34% believe that the PA and president Abbas were to blame for that and 13% blame the prime minister of the reconciliation government.

 71% believe that the reconciliation government must be responsible for paying the salaries of the civilian employees of the former Hamas government in the Gaza Strip while 18% believe it is not its responsibility.  Similarly, 67% believe that it is the responsibility of the reconciliation government to pay the salaries of Hamas’ former security sector and police while 21% believe it is not its responsibility.  In return, 61% believe that the reconciliation government, not Hamas, should command and supervise the work of the security sector and police in the Gaza Strip while 25% believe that Hamas should continue to command and supervise this sector.  Similarly, 71% support the unification of the security sectors in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the command and control of the reconciliation government while 22% support maintaining the status quo.

(5) Fires and the bill to ban use of loudspeakers in call for prayers: 

• 50% support and 47% do not support the PA decision to send fire fighting vehicles and men to help put out fires in Israel
• 85% believe that Netanyahu’s claim that Palestinians stand behind some of the fires in Israel is tantamount to incitement against Arabs
• 87% believe that Israeli intent to ban use of loudspeakers to call for prayers is tantamount to waging war against Islam

A majority of 73% believes that the recent wave of fires in Israel has been the result of natural disasters; only 12% think it was initiated by Palestinians, and 9% think they were the outcome of other causes. Palestinians are divided in their position regarding the PA leadership decision to send fire fighting vehicles and men to combat the fires in Israel: 50% think it was a wrong decision and 47% think it was a right decision. Belief that it was the wrong decision is higher in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (38%), among residents of refugee camps (65%) compared to residents of cities and villages (49% and 41% respectively), among women (51%) compared to men (48%), among those who oppose the peace process (64%) compared to supporters of the peace process (43%), among the religious (61%) compared to the somewhat religious (42%), among Hamas supporters (74%) compared to supporters of third factions and Fatah (46% and 31% respectively), among the married (51%) compared to non-married (46%), among those who work in the private sector (51%) compared to those who work in the public sector (45%), among holder of BA degree (58%) compared to illiterates (49%), and among refugees (56%) compared to non-refugees (45%).

The overwhelming majority of the public (85%) believes that anti-Arab incitement is what lies behind Israeli Prime Minister’s claim that Palestinians have carried out the fires in Israel; only 12% believe that Netanyahu actually believes what he claims.  Similarly, an overwhelming majority (87%) believes that the Israeli government decision to legislate a law that would ban the use of loudspeakers when calling for prayer at mosques is an indication of a war against Islam waged by the government while only 9% believe that the Israeli government is simply trying to protect the Israeli public.

(6) The peace process:

• 33% believe that negotiation is the most effective means of creating a Palestinian state and 37% think armed resistance is the most effective
• Two thirds of the public believe that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to settlement construction
• 83% are unhappy with Abbas’ participation in Peres’ funeral
• 62% support abandoning the Oslo agreement, but 64% believe Abbas is not serious about doing so
• 46% support and 44% oppose the French Initiative; only 26% expect it to succeed
• 83% believe that the Obama Administration did not do all it could to advance Palestinian-Israeli peace and 53% want Trump to keep out of the peace process
• 74% support joining more international organizations; 62% support a non-violent resistance; and 53% support a return to an armed intifada

Palestinians are divided into three groups on the most effective means of building a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 33% believe that negotiation is the most effective; 37% think armed action is the most effective; and 24% think non-violent popular resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 34% said armed action is the most effective means. Findings show a sharp increase in the percentage of those who believe that the two-state solution is no longer viable due to settlement expansion from 56% three months ago to 65% in this poll; today only 31% believe that it is still viable.

An overwhelming majority of 80% believe that Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman was not serious when he indicated in a press interview that Israel would allow the rebuilding of the airport and a construction of a seaport in the Gaza Strip if Hamas stopped building tunnels and launching rockets; only 13% believe he is serious.  An almost three quarters (73%) believe that Abbas should reject Israeli Prime Minister’s invitation to speak in front of the Israeli Knesset; 21% believe that Abbas should accept the invitation. An overwhelming majority of the public (83%) is unhappy and 14% are happy with Abbas participation in the funeral of the former Israeli president Shimon Peres.

62% support and 30% oppose abandoning the Oslo agreement. Three months ago, 54% of the public supported the abandonment of the Oslo agreement and 36% opposed it. Support for the abandonment of the Oslo agreement stands at 60% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip.  But 64% of the public believe that despite his statement to the contrary, president Abbas is not serious about abandoning Palestinian Oslo obligations and only 29% think he is serious. Three months ago, 63% expressed the view that the president is not serious. We also asked that public if it thinks Abbas is serious when he announced during Fatah’s Seventh Convention that the PA will withdraw its recognition of Israel if it continues to reject the recognition of the Palestinian state: 30% said he is serious and 61% said he is not.

We asked the public about its support for the French Initiative. The initiative we presented to respondents as one that “calls for the formation of an international support group for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the holding of an international peace conference that would seek a settlement based on the two-state solution and the Arab Peace Initiative in accordance with a specific time frame.” 46% of the respondents supported and 44% opposed the initiative. Three months ago, support for the French initiative stood at 53% and opposition at 38%.  Opposition to the French Initiative is higher in the Gaza Strip (48%) compared to the West Bank (42%), in refugee camps (49%) compared to villages and cities (37% and 45% respectively), among those who oppose the peace process (68%) compared to supporters of the peace process (34%), among the religious (52%) compared to the somewhat religious (39%), among Hamas supporters (65%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third factions (26% and 44% respectively), among those who work in the private sector (49%) compared to those who work in the public sector (44%), among merchants and professionals (55% and 51% respectively) compared to housewives and students (42% each), and among holders of a two-year college degree and holders of BA degree (52% and 45% respectively) compared to the illiterates (30%).  We also asked respondents to indicate their expectations regarding the success or failure of the French Initiative in assisting the goal of reaching Palestinian-Israeli peace. 26% expected success and 61% expected failure.

 In evaluating the past eight years of President Obama’s efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an overwhelming majority of 83% said that he did not make serious efforts to resolve the conflict and only 10% said he did.  When asked what they want the newly elected US President Donald Trump to do, a majority of 53% of the respondents said they want him to stay out of the peace process while 30% said they want him to play a strong role in that process and 10% said they want him to play the same role the current administration plays.

In the absence of peace negotiations, 74% support joining more international organizations, 62% support non-violent popular resistance, 53% support a return to an armed intifada, and 48% support the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. Three months ago, support for a return to an armed intifada stood at 48% and 44% supported the dissolution of the PA.  We asked the respondents if they wish to see the PA continue to seek support from and joint international organizations, like the UN, or to return to the bilateral negotiations with Israel: 58% said they prefer to stay with the international approach while only 24% said they prefer to return to bilateral negotiations.

The percentage of those who are worried that they would be hurt by Israel or that their land would be confiscated or homes demolished stands at 73%; 27% are not worried. Furthermore, a majority of 54% believes that Israel’s long term aspiration is to annex the lands occupied in 1967 and expel their population and 28% believe that Israel wants to annex the West Bank while denying the Palestinians their rights. 16% believe that Israel’s long term aspiration is to insure its security and withdraw from all or most of the territories occupied in 1967.  A majority believes that al Haram al Sharif is in grave danger: 52% believe that Israel intends to destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and replace them with a Jewish temple; 15% believe that it intends to divide the plateau on which the two mosques sit so that Jews would have a synagogue alongside the Muslim holy places. Only 12% believe that Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo without change.

(7) The Arab World, ISIS:

• 80% believe that the Arab World is preoccupied with its own concerns and Palestine is no longer its principle cause
• 54% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran
• 90% view ISIS as an extremist group that does not represent true Islam; 82% support waging war against it

80% say the Arab World is too preoccupied with its own concerns, internal conflicts, and the conflict with Iran and that Palestine is no longer the Arab’s principal or primary issue or cause. Only 18% think Palestine remains the Arab’s principle cause. 54% believe that there is an Arab Sunni alliance with Israel against Iran despite the continued Israeli occupation of Arab land while 31% believe that the Arabs would not ally themselves with Israel until it ends its occupation and allows the creation of a Palestinian state.

An overwhelming majority of 90% believes that ISIS is a radical group that does not represent true Islam and 5% believe it does represent true Islam. 6% are not sure or do not know. In the Gaza Strip, 9% (compared to 2% in the West Bank) say ISIS represents true Islam. 82% support and 15% oppose the war waged by Arab and Western countries against ISIS.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 46% believe that the first and most vital Palestinian goal should be the creation of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital
• Poverty and unemployment is seen by 31% of the public as the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today

46% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 11% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 31% of the pubic; 28% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 21% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings; and 3% say it is the absence of national unity.