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These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 June 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the decision by the PA president to postpone the holding of Palestinian elections that were scheduled to take place on 22 May 2021. It also witnessed the release of various Israeli decisions on an imminent expulsion of several Palestinian families from their homes in al Shaikh Jarrah and the impositions of various restrictions regarding Muslim’s access to al Aqsa Mosque during the month of Ramadan. These developments led to popular non-violent confrontations with the Israeli police and settlers in East Jerusalem that escalated to rocket attacks carried out be Hamas against Israeli cities. Hamas claimed that the attacks came in defense of East Jerusalem. The ensuing war between Hamas and Israel lasted for 11 days and led to the death of more than 250 Palestinians, including 66 children, and more than 10 Israelis, including two children. The period also witnessed a PA campaign to vaccinate Palestinian adults in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip against the coronavirus. The campaign led to a significant reduction in the daily rates of deaths and infections, particularly in the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the second quarter of 2021 show significant changes in public attitudes toward the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leadership, Hamas, and relations with Israel. Two drivers seem to have triggered the change: the popular confrontations in East Jerusalem, the Israel-Hamas war, and their public perception of their outcomes on the one hand and the postponement of elections by the PA leadership on the other.

The findings show a semi-public consensus that Hamas had won the confrontation with Israel and that Hamas’ launching of rockets at Israeli cities has been motivated by its desire to defend al Aqsa Mosque and the Palestinian families in al Shaikh Jarrah. Findings also show widespread public discontent with the performance of the PA government and leadership as well as Fatah during the confrontations and the war. They also show a two-third majority rejection of Abbas’ decision to postpone the elections. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas has postponed the elections because he was afraid of their outcome, not because Israel has prevented the holding of elections in East Jerusalem.

As a result, support for Hamas, and willingness to vote for it, increases dramatically while support for Fatah drops significantly. Moreover, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyyeh, manages to deliver an unprecedented victory over Abbas in a presidential election, if one is held today. Perhaps most importantly, a majority of the Palestinians think that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while a small percentage thinks Fatah under Abbas’ leadership is the one who deserves to do that.

Findings also show that more than 70% want to hold legislative and presidential elections soon and a similar percentage wants the PA to impose elections in East Jerusalem despite Israeli objection, rather than wait for an Israeli approval. The poll results do not have good news for most of the newly created electoral lists that registered for the legislative elections as only nine out of 36 managed to cross the threshold of 1.5% required to win seats in the parliament.

The confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel did not have an impact on the level of support for the two-state solution, which remained unchanged. But they did greatly impact other matters related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For example, support for a return to armed confrontations and intifada rose sharply to 60%, and support for a resumption of negotiations with Israel and the belief that negotiation is the most effective means of ending occupation dropped.  Moreover, the confrontations within Israel between the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Israeli police seem to have contributed to a significant reduction in support for the one-state solution, which declined from a third to a fifth in three months.

It is worth noticing however that the current findings are not fundamentally different from similar findings we obtained in the past immediately after similar Hamas-Israel confrontations. Therefore, they might be reflecting a temporary emotional reaction that might revert back to where things stood before the confrontations. The change from emotional to normal attitudes usually takes three to six months, as can be seen in our previous polls. But it should be pointed out that a return to “normal” attitudes has in the past been associated with a Hamas failure to maintain its gains and a success on the part of the PA to take measures that helped to pacify the public and win back its trust.

For the new Israeli government led by prime minister Naftali Bennett, about a fifth seems to think that it is better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu. Findings also show that while the largest percentage, but not the majority, is opposed to the participation of the Unified Arab List led by Mansour Abbas in the current coalition government, a similar percentage does support (or does not oppose or support) such participation.

(1) Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

• An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (77%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 1% think Israel came out a winner; 18% say no one came out a winner and 2% think both sides came out winners. Moreover, 65% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 26% think it did not.
• 72% think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 9% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 17% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers.
• In an evaluation of the performance of 10 local and regional actors during the Jerusalem confrontations and the ensuing war between Israel and Hamas, the overwhelming majority describes as excellent that of the residents of Jerusalem and its youth (89%) followed by that of Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel (86%), followed by that of Hamas (75%). About one fifth describes as excellent the performance of each of the following governments: Egypt’s (22%), Turkey’s (21%), Jordan’s (21%), and Iran’s (18%). Finally, only 13% describe as excellent the performance of Fatah, 11% the PA government, and 8% Abbas’.
• A majority of 64% views the residents of East Jerusalem as the group most willing to defend Jerusalem and its holy places, followed by Hamas at 29%, and the PA at 3%. In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, a majority of 53% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 14% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians.
• A majority of 60% thinks the participation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel in the recent confrontation was driven, first and foremost, by their desire to defend the holy sites, while 28% think it was driven by their desire to express rejection of integration in the Israeli society and their attachment to their national identity, and only 10% think it came as part of their struggle for equality and rejection of discrimination.
• If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 68% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 18% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 9% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
• When asked about their expectations from the PA under Abbas leadership in case Israel expelled the Shaikh Jarrah families, the largest percentage (38%) said the PA will do nothing; 24% said it will write a complaint to the UN and the ICC; 20% think it will end security coordination with Israel, and 14% think it will launch popular non-violent resistance.
• Public expectations from Hamas are very different: If Israel expels the Shaikh Jarrah families, 77% think Hamas will respond by launching rockets at Israeli cities; 10% think it will wage a non-violent campaign, 6% think it will issue protest statements, and only 5% think it will do nothing.
• A majority of 55% think Israel will not expel the Shaikh Jarrah families and 40% think it will.
• Two thirds of the public think there is a high or a medium chance that Hamas and Israel will reach a long-term truce that will ease the siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 31% think the chances are slim.
• A majority of 52% think that the incident in al Aqsa Mosque in which chants were made against the Jerusalem PA-appointed Mufti during his Friday sermon in the aftermath of the ceasefire between Israel and the “resistance” forces does not reflect its views while 44% think it does reflect them.
• 94% say they are proud of the performance of the Gaza Strip during the May confrontation with Israel while 6% say they are not. When asked about the main reason for being proud, 39% said they are proud because Gaza has delivered a military and rocket strike in defense of Jerusalem that demonstrated the weakness of the Israeli army; another 39% said they were proud because Gaza has brought the Palestinian cause back to forefront of Arab and international politics; and 13% said the reason they are proud is because Gaza has sacrificed and endured all the death and destruction while expressing patience and dignity in defense of Jerusalem.

(2) The postponement of the legislative and presidential elections:

• 65% oppose and 25% support the decision of president Abbas to postpone legislative and presidential elections because Israel refuses to allow the holding of elections in East Jerusalem. Two thirds of the public believe that Abbas postponed the elections because he was worried about the results while 25% think he postponed the elections because Israel refused to allow them in East Jerusalem.
• The largest percentage (43%) believes that there is no point in protesting Abbas’ decision to postpone the elections and that we should therefore accept it. On the other hand, 31% think that there should be protests but they should be conducted through non-violent demonstrations; 17% think the protests should be expressed through the courts and the judicial system routes.
• 72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank.
• 69% say we should not wait for an Israeli approval of elections in East Jerusalem and that we should impose these elections on Israel while 15% say it is better to wait for an Israeli approval. The majority (56%) of those who want the PA to hold elections without an Israeli approval demands holding elections immediately, 24% are in favor of holding the elections within three months, and 13% within a year or more. But about half of the Palestinians (49%) believes there will be no elections in the near future while 44% think elections will take place in the near future.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 27% and the latter 59% of the votes (compared to 46% for Haniyeh and 47% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 30% of the votes (compared to 44% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 60% (compared to 56% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 25% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 59% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 51% and Haniyeh 42%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 26% and the latter 63%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 48% and Haniyyeh 44%. 
• In an open-ended question on the preferred president, in case Abbas is not nominated, 29% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 28% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% Dahlan, 3% Yahia Sinwar, and 2% for each of the following: Khalid Mishaal, Mohammad Shtayyeh, Mustafa Barghouti, and Salam Fayyad.  In a closed-ended question, about potential Abbas successors, 29% say they prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 28% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad (3% each), and Khalid Mishal (2%).
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, that participated in the 2006 elections, 73% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 41% say they will vote for Hamas and 30% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 17% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 43%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 36% three months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 38% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 32% (compared to 53% three months ago).
• We also asked about the vote for the 36 electoral lists that registered to compete in the parliamentary elections that was scheduled for May 2021. Only nine lists managed to pass the threshold of 1.5%: the largest percentage went to Hamas’ list, “Jerusalem is Our Call”  (36%) followed by Fatah’s list with 19%, “the freedom list” led by Nasser al Qidwah (9%), “the Future List” of Dahlan (3%), the “National Initiative” 2%, and the following lists managed to pass the threshold: the PFLP, “Together” led by Salam Fayyad, the “Democratic Change” led by Ibrahim Abu Hijlah, and “Palestine for All” led by Mufeed al Hasayneh. 

(3) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 24%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 65% and in the West Bank at 60%.
• 26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 42% and in the West Bank at 15%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 40% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 57% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 70% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 52% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 19% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 50% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 47% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 46% of Gazans said it was good or very good.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a slight majority of 56% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 35% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 51% viewed the PA as a burden and 44% viewed it as an asset.
• 70% oppose and 26% support making payments to the families of martyrs and prisoners based on need assessment and number of family members rather than on the act committed by the martyr or the number of years in jail.
• 41% are optimistic and 56% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 34%.
• Two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 65% expect failure; only 29% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, one third of the public expects success and 60% expects failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 62% expects failure and 32% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV (13%), Palestine TV (12%), Palestine Today (10%), Maan (7%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (1%). 

(4) The Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• 23% (28% in the West Bank and 16% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 40% (33% in the Gaza Strip and 51% in the West Bank) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 35% (37% in the West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip) say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.
• 66% (81% in the Gaza Strip and 57% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 31% (18% in the Gaza Strip and 40% in the West Bank) are dissatisfied.
• A majority of 57% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 41% are dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction in the West Bank stands at 48% and in the Gaza Strip at 30%.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 68% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at 49%. 

(5) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  
• Support for the two-state solution increases to 41% and opposition drops to 56% when the borders of the Palestinian state are described as being based on the 1967 lines and its capital as East Jerusalem. When the public is asked to pick a choice from among three, 46% pick the two-state solution based on the 1967 lines, 10% pick a Palestinian-Israeli confederation, and only 6% pick a one-state for Jews and Arabs.
• We asked the public about its support for the idea of making Jerusalem, both East and West, an open city, whereby the Eastern part would be the capital of the Palestinian state and Western part would be the capital of the state of Israel. Less than a quarter (23%) supported and 73% opposed the idea.
• A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 33% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 67% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 29% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 11% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 36% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 26% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 49% chose armed struggle, 27% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 37% chose armed struggle and 36% chose negotiations.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 19% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices, 66% supported joining more international organizations; 58% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 60% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 20% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 43% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 42% supported dissolving the PA, and 33% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• 54% are opposed, and 39% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Moreover, 63% are opposed, and 29% are supportive of a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the US leadership. Support for such negotiations stands at 38% under the leadership of the international Quartet and 55% are opposed. Moreover, 52% do not believe, and 38% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.
• The largest percentage (45%) are opposed to the participation of Israeli Arab parties in the Israeli governmental coalitions while 26% say they support Mansour Abbas’ decision to join the current coalition in Israel, and 21% say they neither support or oppose such participation.
• About one fifth (19%) thinks that an Israeli government led by Naftali Bennett from the extreme right wing Yamina party will be better for Israeli-Palestinian relations than a government led by Netanyahu; a large majority of 69% disagree with that.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 47% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 34% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 8% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (24%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 20% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip, 21% (27% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip) said it is the spread of corruption, 20% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 17% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 14% (19% in the Gaza Strip and 10% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 3% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 22 and 25 June 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including several armed attacks by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel, the Israeli army incursions into Jenin’s refugee camp, and the killing of al Jazeera journalists Shireen Abu Akleh by Israeli gunfire in one of the Jenin incursions.  Other developments included the organization of the Flag March by the Israeli right wing inside the Old City of East Jerusalem without ending up in an armed confrontation between Hamas and Israel as many had expected. Internally, a student body associated with Hamas was able to win the majority of seats in the Birzeit University student council elections, President Abbas transferred control of the secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council, and assigned to the PLO Executive Committee member from Fatah, Hussien al Sheikh, the responsibilities of the Committee’s secretariate. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

The results of the second quarter of 2022 show a significant change in the domestic balance of power in favor of Hamas and its leadership only three months after Fatah had managed to restore some of the popularity it had lost in the aftermath of the April 2021 cancellation of the legislative and presidential elections, the May 2021 war between Hamas and Israel, and the killing of the opposition figure Nizar Banat at the hands of the Palestinian security services.

Today, Hamas and Fatah enjoy almost the same level of public support, with the gap narrowing to one percentage point in favor of Hamas after it was six points in favor of Fatah in March 2022. It is noticeable that the drop in Fatah’s popularity has occurred in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, though the drop has been greater in the latter. Fatah’s declining popularity is evident in two other ways. For one, the gap in popularity between the head of Fatah, President Abbas, and the head of Hamas, Ismail Haniyyeh, has now reached 22 points in favor of Haniyyeh after it was only 16 points three months ago. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’ resignation, from the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), has risen to over three quarters while those still in favor of Abbas have dwindled in size to less than one fifth of the public. Another indicator of Fatah’s decline can be seen when looking at the widening gap between those who think Hamas is the more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people compared to those who think “Fatah under Abbas” is more deserving than Hamas. Today, the gap stands at 10 percentage points in favor of Hamas compared to just two points in favor of Hamas three months ago.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the shift in the internal balance of power has been the rise of Hamas' role over the past few months in defending Jerusalem. Other reasons might have been the release by the PA of those Preventive Security men accused of killing Nizar Banat on bail, or because the vast majority of the public believes that the Palestinian government does not make an effort to mitigate the consequences of the rise in prices, or the objection of the majority of the public to President Abbas's internal decisions, such as the transfer of powers over the Secretariat of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council or the appointment  of PLO Executive Committee member Hussein al-Sheikh to serve as the head of the Secretariat of that Committee,.

In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the results for the second quarter indicate a significant decline in support for the two-state solution.  The results show one of the likely reasons for the decline: a significant increase in the belief that a two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion, rising to 70%. But the findings also indicate a similar decline in support for a one-state solution with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, indicating a hardening of public attitudes similar to what we saw in mid-2021 in the aftermath of the Hamas-Israel war. Support for a return to an armed uprising is also rising to form a clear majority, reinforced by a broad support for the recent shootings inside Israel by individual Palestinians who did not belong to known forces and movements.  However, there are significant differences in the attitudes of Gazans compared to West Bankers, where the largest percentage of the latter remains opposed to armed attacks.

Increased Palestinian-Israeli clashes over the past three months may have contributed to this attitudinal shift regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, starting with the Israeli Flag March, the repeated incursions into the Jenin camp, the killing of the very well-known and liked Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, the crackdown by the Israeli police on the raising of the Palestinian flag, and the frequent confrontations between the Israeli police and the Palestinian worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque; all might have led to a hardening of the Palestinian public attitudes.

However, it is worth noting that the percentage of those viewing positively the recent "confidence-building" measures between the PA and Israel has risen to about two-thirds. Moreover, despite the rising tension over al Aqsa Mosque, the majority continues to view the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a national conflict, over land and sovereignty, rather than a religious conflict.

(1) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 71% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 25% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 80% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 54%  believes no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 49% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 33% and Haniyeh 55% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 31% and Haniyeh 50%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 47% and from among those, the former receives 26% and the latter 61%.
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (30%) selected him in an open-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (16%), Mohammad Dahlan (6%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), and Hussein al Sheikh (3%), and 34% said they do not know or have not decided. It is worth noting that this is the first time that al Sheikh’s name has been mentioned by the respondents in an open-ended question. This means that we will continue to ask about his standing as a successor in the next four quarterly poll. In an closed ended questions about succession, Marwan Barghouti is preferred by 39%, Haniyyeh by 19%, Dahlan by 6%, Sinwar by 5%, Khalid Mishal by 2%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 1% each. Al Sheikh’s name was not among those listed in the closed ended question.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 73% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 72% in the West Bank and 84% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 69% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 7% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 36% and Fatah at 42%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 37% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 30% (compared to 27% three months ago) and Fatah at 37% (compared to 47% three months ago).
• The largest percentage (33%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 23% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 38% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 31% selected Hamas, 29% Fatah under Abbas, and 33% said neither side deserves such a role.

(2) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• A majority of 57% is opposed to President Abbas’ decision to transfer the responsibility over the Secretariate of the Palestinian Legislative Council to the Speaker of the PLO National Council; only 27% support Abbas’ decision.
• Similarly, a majority of 61% are opposed to Abbas’ decision to ask the PLO’s Executive Committee member from Fatah, Husein al Sheikh, to assume the responsibility over the secretariate of that Committee; only 23% support Abbas’ decision.
• In explaining the reasons for the electoral victory of the Hamas-affiliated student body at Birzeit University, the majority (59%) attributed it to students’ dissatisfaction with the performance of the PA while about one third (32%) said the victory came as a result in a shift in public opinion in favor of Hamas.
• The majority (57%) of the public says it was supportive of the teachers’ strike who were demanding better representational and associational rights from the government and led to a partial halt to the educational process in public schools; 31% say they were opposed. Support for the strike is higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, 63% and 48% respectively.
• The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 18% say it is doing so.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 26%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 48%.
• 26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 27% and in the West Bank at 26%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 37% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 42% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 54% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 38% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 62% think they cannot.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 55% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.
• 26% are optimistic and 70% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 28%.
• After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 73% expect failure; only 21% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 23% of the public expect success and 69% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 75% expects failure and 19% expects success.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 63% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 41%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 36%, followed by al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (11% each), Palestine TV (10%), Maan (6%), al Arabiya (3%), al Mayadeen (2%), and al Manar (1%). 

(3) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 28% and opposition stands at 69%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 40%.  
• Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 32%.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 56% supported joining more international organizations; 48% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 51% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• A majority of 59% says that the armed attack inside Israel carried out by Palestinians unaffiliated with known armed groups contributes to the national interest of ending the occupation; 37% believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest. Gazans are more likely to view such attacks positively compared to the West Bankers, 77% and 46% respectively. Worth noting also that 47% of West Bankers believe the armed attacks do not contribute to the national interest.
• Similarly, a majority of 56% (73% in the Gaza Strip and 44% in the West Bank) supports armed attacks similar to those carried out lately by unaffiliated Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel; 39% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) say they are opposed to such armed attacks.
• A majority of 56% expects the acts of armed resistance in the Jenin refugee camp to spread to other parts of the West Bank. However, a large minority of 41% expects the acts of armed resistance to remain restricted to the Jenin camp.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 65% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 63% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
• A majority of 70% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 19% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 60% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 50% chose armed struggle (62% in the Gaza Strip and 43% in the West Bank), 22% negotiations, and 21% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 25% chose negotiations.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 69% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• 65% are opposed, and 29% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.  
• The vast majority (78%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 17% say it does not.  However, the majority (63%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 25% say they believe it.
• When asked why they think Hamas did not launch rockets against Israel on the day of the Flag March throughout East Jerusalem, the largest percentage (35%) said that the movement did not want to be dragged into a battle it was not prepared for; one third said that Hamas was willing to comply with the advice and mediation of Arab and international actors. Only 13% said it was afraid of the Israeli reaction against it and the Gaza Strip. One tenth (11%) said that Hamas did not threaten to launch rockets against Israel if he Flag March took place in the Old City of East Jerusalem.
• The largest percentage (40%) believes that Hamas’ unwillingness to launch rockets against Israel during the Flag March will encourage Israeli to take more measures against Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque. By contrast, 26% said that Hamas’ decision will deter Israel in the future, and 28% said it will neither encourage nor deter Israel.
• A consensus is emerging regarding the killing of the al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh: 92% believe Israel has deliberately sought to kill her while only 5% think the killing by the Israeli army was accidental.
• A majority of 61% believes that the reasons the Israeli police attacked the funeral procession of Abu Akleh in Jerusalem had to do with the fac that the funeral demonstrated the unity of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike. On the other hand, one third thinks that the police attack was prompted by the raising of the Palestinian flag during the funeral.
• When asked why Israel insists on preventing the raising of the Palestinian flag in Jerusalem and other occupied territories and in areas inside Israel, the public was split evenly, 49% said the reason has to do with Israeli rejection of the Palestinian national identity while an identical percentage said it has to do with Israeli fear of the Palestinian national identity.
• A majority of 53% (56% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) says that despite the repeated incidents of attacks by the Israeli police against Palestinian worshipers at al Aqsa Mosque, the conflict remains first and foremost over land and sovereignty while 45% say the conflict has now become first and foremost a religious one.
• We asked the public about the expectations that the US aid to the PA will soon resume and asked if they welcome or do not welcome aid resumption. The public is evenly split on US aid: 48% welcome it and 49% do not. It is worth noting that Gazans are more likely to welcome US aid, by 59%, while the percentage drops to 40% in the West Bank.

(4) The war between Russia and Ukraine:

• The largest percentage of the public (42%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 35% blame Ukraine.
• An overwhelming majority (75%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 6% think it should stand with Ukraine.
• A majority of 43% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 53% are not worried. Three months ago, the percentage of those expressing worry that the war would expand stood at 54%.

(5) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 9% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the main problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage, 26% (29% in the Gaz Strip and 23% in the West Bank), said it is unemployment and poverty; 25% (13% in the Gaza Strip and 32% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 17% (24% in the Gaza Strip and 12% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 16% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 13% (17% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4%  said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  
• When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (32%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 23% said it is corruption, 17% said it is unemployment, 16% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-20 June 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the spread of the Corona virus throughout the world and in the Palestinian territories leading the Palestinian Authority to impose a lockdown throughout the Palestinian territories which brought to a standstill many economic activities. It also witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government lead by prime minister Netanyahu and the announcement of the government intentions to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank. In response, the PA announced ending its commitment to the Oslo agreement and severed relations with Israel in security and civil realms. This was followed by ending Palestinian-Israeli security coordination and Israel stopped the transfer of Palestinian clearance funds thereby negatively affecting the PA’s ability to pay salaries for the month of May 2020. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

This quarterly poll was conducted during a period in which the spread of the Corona virus was believed to have been brought under control thereby allowing us to conduct face-to-face interviews throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The poll covered various   

issues, most importantly the intention of the Israeli government to annex Palestinian territories and the Palestinian response to the Israeli plans which amounted to a decision to stop implementation of the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with the Israeli government. We also focused on public perception of the PA government and its performance during the Coronavirus pandemic.

Findings show that two-thirds of the public believe that the new Israeli government led by prime minister Netanyahu will indeed annex Palestinian territories. This realization created a great deal of public concern and worry about the future. Public worry focused on the salary payment to the public sector, access to medical treatment, shortages in water and electricity supplies, eruption of armed clashes, return of security chaos and anarchy, PA collapse, and inability to travel to Jordan.

A large majority supports a Palestinian response to annexation that involves stopping the implementation of the agreements with Israel and severing all relations with it. But the public has doubts about the sincerity of the PA in stopping security coordination with Israel. Despite the fact that a slim majority supports responding to the plan by returning to armed struggle, the findings of this poll in fact show a decrease in supporting armed struggle compared to the findings of our last poll which was conducted four months ago. Moreover, despite the fact that two-thirds are worried about the likely collapse of the PA, only one third thinks that Israel will bring back its military rule and civil administration to the Palestinian territories; three quarters express rejection of such return, if it were to happen.

With regard to the government performance in managing the Coronavirus pandemic, a large majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA and with the various measures taken by the PA government. More than three quarters indicate that they trust that the government has been working to protect the interests of public. But two-thirds say that their income or salary has been reduced and a majority indicates that it has stopped working or has become unemployed during that period. Moreover, more than three quarters express the view that the PA government did not do its best to compensate those who suffered the most due to the closure and lockdown. It is interesting that despite the tense relations between the PA and Israel, two-thirds of the public express agreement with Palestinian-Israeli cooperation and coordination in the health sector that took place during the period of the pandemic.

Findings show a rise in favor of the two-state solution but half of the public remains opposed to this solution. Findings also show a consensus against the Trump plan, or the deal of the century, with a prevailing perception that the plan does not end the Israeli occupation and does not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. Indeed, most of the public believe now that the plan has returned the conflict to its original existential roots. For all of this, a large majority is opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US.

Finally, despite a decline in the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, findings indicate that he would lose a presidential election in which he competes against Ismail Haniyyeh. Findings also show that the gap between Fatah and Hamas, which stood at 6 points four months ago in Fatah’s favor, has now narrowed to 2 points in its favor.   

(1) Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories and its potential consequences:

• Two thirds believe Israel will annex the Jordan Valley and settlements areas
• 71% want the PA to stop implementing the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with Israel while 52% support a return to armed struggle in a response to annexation
• 36% support and 53% oppose the initiation of a Palestinian counter proposal to the Trump plan and to enter negotiations with Israel and the US based on that proposal
• Large majorities believe that Arab and non-Arab countries will not impose sanctions on Israel because of the annexation
• The public is highly worried about the consequences of the annexation and the PA response, such as the inability to pay salaries to the public sector or even the collapse of the PA
• But a majority does not expect Israel to return its direct military rule or the its civil administration

Two-thirds (66%) believe that the new Israeli government will indeed annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank while 28% think it will not do so.  However, the majority (59%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Hamas; in fact, 56% expect Israel to wage war against the Gaza Strip while 36% do not expect it to do so.  Similarly, the majority (57%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach peace arrangements with the PA in the West Bank while the largest percentage (48%) expects, and 43% do not expect, Israel to wage war against the PA to force it to collapse.  However, a large majority of 73% expects the new Israeli government to deepen the normalization steps with some of the Arab Gulf countries but 53% do not expect, and only 30% expect, Israel to wage war against Iran.

When asked what the PA should do in response to an Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories: (1) the largest majority (71%) said it should, and 21% said it should not, stop implementing the Oslo agreement and should sever all relations with Israel; (2) 61% said Palestinians should resort to peaceful resistance and 35% disagreed with that; (3) 52% said they support and 42% oppose a return to armed struggle; (4) 37% said they support the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution; and (5) 36% said they support, and 53% said they oppose, a return to the negotiation with Israel and the US based on a detailed Palestinian peace plan that can serve as a counter proposal to the Trump plan.

Support for abandoning the Oslo agreement and severing ties with Israel is higher among men (75%) compared to women (67%), among holders of BA degree (74%) compared to illiterates and those who finished elementary school (67% each), among those who work in the public sector (79%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (70%), among those who support third parties and Hamas (84% and 76% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (70%).

By contrast, support for a return to negotiations based on a Palestinian counter proposal is higher in the West Bank (40%) compared to the Gaza Strip (30%), in villages/towns (51%) compared to cities and refugee camps (34% and 36% respectively), among the non-refugees (39%) compared to refugees (33%), among holders of BA degree (39%) compared to illiterates (29%), among professionals, laborers, and merchants (48%, 42%, and 39% respectively) compared to students (24%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (41%) compared to those who work in the public sector (32%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (49% and 42% respectively) compared to the religious (30%), among those with the highest income (43%) compared to those with the lowest income (27%), and among supporters of Fatah (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (12% and 38% respectively).

When forced to choose only one of these five possible responses, the largest percentage (31%) says that it prefers a return to armed struggle, 23% prefer resumption of negotiations based on a detailed Palestinian counter proposal, 18% prefer non-violent resistance, 15% prefer abandoning the Oslo agreement and the severing of relations with Israel, and 6% prefer to abandon the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution. 

We asked the public about its expectations regarding the likely responses of external actors to an Israeli annexation, if one is to actually take place. A majority expresses pessimism with 63% indicating that they do not expect Jordan to abandon its peace agreement with Israel; 70% do not expect Jordan or Egypt to recall their ambassadors from Israel; 78% do not expect European countries to impose sanctions on Israel; and another 78% do not expect Arab countries in the Gulf, or some of them, to end normalization measures with Israel.

Twice we asked the public about its support for the PA leadership’s declared policy of stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, stopping security coordination, and severing relations with Israel, once before detailing possible consequences of such a policy and once again after going over these details. The initial response showed that a majority of 59% support and 31% oppose the leadership’s decision.

When the question turns to the details and possible consequences, the public indicates great worries about the future. For example, 81% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 73% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 70% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 65% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 65% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 63% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 62% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.

Despite all these concerns, in answer to the second question about support/opposition to the PA leadership decision to sever relations with Israel, a larger majority of 63% says it supports the decision and only 29% say they oppose it.  Yet, the level of support for the PA decision in response to both questions is lower than the support the public is willing to grant to the policy itself, which, as we indicated above, stood at 71%.  

It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (57%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 32% believe it indeed did.

A majority of 55% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (33%) expects Israel to do so.  A large majority of 74% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 18% say they do prefer that.  50% of the public believe that the PA will back down and resume relations with Israel if the latter declares its intention to resume its direct military rule over the Palestinian territories while 37% believe the PA will not back down.

(2) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• `Satisfaction with the performance of the Palestinian government in dealing with the Coronavirus pandemic ranges between 80% and 57%
• Similarly, 62% are satisfied with the performance of prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in managing the crisis
• Two thirds say they have suffered economically due to the pandemic
• Two thirds agree with the cooperation that took place with Israel in managing the Coronavirus pandemic

Large majorities are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Coronavirus pandemic. But the level of satisfaction differs from one measure to the other. For example, 88% are satisfied with the closure of areas that witnessed the spread of the virus; 80% are satisfied with the closure of schools and universities; 77% are satisfied with the cessation of transportation between the various governorates; 73% are satisfied with the ban on laborers working in Israeli settlements; 60% are satisfied with the closure of mosques and churches; and 57% are satisfied with the ban on Friday prayers and Sunday mass.  Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 82% express satisfaction with the ministry of health; 75% are satisfied with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas; 67% are satisfied with the performance of the “emergency committee” in their area; 65% are satisfied with the performance of the government spokesperson, Mr. Ibrahim Milhem; 64% are satisfied with the performance of the local municipalities or councils; 62% are satisfied with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh; and 61% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area.  Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in managing the Coronavirus pandemic is higher in the West Bank (76%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in villages/towns (83%) compared to cities and refugee camps (60% and 48% respectively), among those whose age is 50 years and above (67%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (58%), among the non-refugees (69%) compared to the refugees (54%), among the illiterates (77%) compared to the holders of BA degree (60%), among farmers and laborers (69% and 67% respectively) compared to students (48%), among those who work in the private and the non-governmental sector (64%) compared to those who work in the public sector (57%), among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (70% and 69% respectively) compared to the religious (54%), among those with the highest income (77%) compared to those with the lowest income (52%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (85% and 62% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

Similarly, 76% say they have trust, and 22% say they have no trust, that the government, in taking the measures it took, has been working for the interest of the people. But when asked about the amount of donations made to the “dignity fund:” 48% expressed satisfaction and 44% dissatisfaction. But an overwhelming majority of 77% says that it is not certain that the donation would reach those who truly need it.

Public trust in the government is also evident in the fact that 56% believe the announcements regarding the number of infections and deaths while 36% believe that the government has not been transparent. Similarly, 57% express the belief that the measures taken by the PA have been adequate, while 23% believe them to be inadequate, and 18% believe they were exaggerated.

The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 67% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 55% say they stopped working or became unemployed.

When asked about its impression about of people’s implementation of social distancing, the largest percentage (45%) say it believes the implementation was medium, 18% say it was high, and 36% say it was low. A majority of 69% indicates that the closure and lockdown did not cause domestic problems within their own families while 29% indicates that they did have such problems.  57% think that remote education has not been useful while 37% think it has been.  65% believe that it was not appropriate to allow laborers to continue to work in Israel during the closure and lockdown while 31% think it was appropriate.

A small majority of 54% believes the pandemic is a divine punishment for people and states for their corruption and injustice while 37% believe it is not. However, the largest percentage (45%) thinks the virus is manmade and not natural while a similar percentage of 43% thinks it is a product of nature. The belief that the pandemic is a divine punishment is higher in the Gaza Strip (58%) compared to the West Bank (51%), in cities and refugee camps (55% and 51% respectively) compared to villages/towns (46%), among those whose age is 50 years or over (57%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (50%), among the illiterates (72%) compared to the holders of BA degree (42%), among farmers (75%) compared to professionals (44%), among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (46% and 36% respectively), among those with the least income (64%) compared to those with the highest income (48%), and among supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 35% respectively).

A two-third majority (67%) agrees with the cooperation and coordination in the health sector which took place between the PA and Israel during the period in which the Coronavirus was spreading while 25% say they disagreed with that. Approval of cooperation with Israel in the health sector is higher in the West Bank (74%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%), in villages/towns (77%) compared to refugee camps and cities (69% and 65% respectively), among men (71%) compared to women (64%), among those whose age is 50 and over (68%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (56%), among non-refugees (72%) compared to refugees (61%), among those who hold a BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (62%), among laborers and employees (75% and 69% respectively) compared to students (45%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (82% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (55%).

44% say popular social solidarity, such as debt forgiveness, increased during the pandemic while 31% say the level of solidarity did not change and 23% think it decreased. More than three quarters of the public (77%) believe that the government has not done all it could to compensate those who suffered the most from the closure and lockdown, such as laborers, farmers, cattle breeders, and others, and only 16% believe it did all it could.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Support for the two-state solution rises from 39% to 45%
• The public is divided on the best means of ending the Israeli occupation: 45% believe it is armed struggle, 24% think it is negotiation, and 22% think it is non-violent resistance
• 88% reject the Trump plan and only 5% accept it
• 69% oppose a resumption of PA dialogue with the US Administration

Support for the concept of the two-state solution rises to 45% and opposition stands at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Four months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 51% believe that the majority opposes it. A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 38% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 13% prefer to keep the status quo. Four months ago, 22% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 45% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 45% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Four months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations. Support for armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (41%), in refugee camps (66%) compared to cities and villages/towns (52% and 44% respectively), among men (56%) compared to women (48%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (55%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or above (52%), among refugees (56%) compared to non-refugees (48%), among holders of BA degree (57%) compared to the illiterates (45%), among employees and students (67% and 66% respectively) compared to professionals, laborers, and housewives (43%, 46%, and 48% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (61%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (51%), among the religious (56%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (45% and 48% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (70%) compared to supporters of the third parties and Fatah (49% and 46% respectively).

We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 88% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Four months ago, 94% expressed opposition to the plan when presented to them in its full details.  Similarly, 87% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 8% believe a majority supports it.  By contrast, 66% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.  In light of the terms of the US plan, a majority of 70% believes the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 5% think the plan makes peace more attainable.  If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 57% think the chances are zero; 22% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.

A majority of 69% is opposed and 16% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Four months ago 76% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.  A majority of 68% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 24% expect him to win it.

(4) Legislative and presidential election

• Demand for Abbas’ resignation drops from 62% to 58%
• But in new presidential elections, Ismail Haniyyah from Hamas receives the support of 49% of the public and Abbas 42%
• Marwan Barghouti receives the support of 57% to Haniyyah’s 36% while prime minister Shtayyeh receives the support of 48% to Haniyyah’s 45%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah wins 36% of the vote and Hamas 34%

58% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Four months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 48% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Four months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 44% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh four months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% four months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 63% four months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 54% four months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% four months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 36%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyah, the former receives 48% and the latter 45%. We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 2% each. 

We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in parliamentary elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 36% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Four months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 43% four months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 30% four months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 22% four months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 45% four months ago).

(5) Domestic conditions:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 74% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank
• Demand for emigration stands at 24%
• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions stands at 81%
• 52% view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 65%.  24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 34% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. Four months ago, 85% expressed a similar view. Overall, the public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 52% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than a year passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 56% expect failure; only 33% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 34% expects success.

We asked the public about its reaction to the PA decision not to accept medical supplies sent by the UAE via two planes that landed at Ben Gurion airport. About half (49%) of the public indicated approval of the decision but 41% expressed disapproval. Support for the PA decision is higher in the West Bank (51%) compared to the Gaza Strip (47%), in cities (50%) compared to refugee camps (45%), among supporters of Fatah (56%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (48% and 46% respectively).

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last four months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (14%), Maan TV at 13%, Palestine Today TV at 10%, Al Arabiya at 4%, and finally al Mayadeen at 3%.  

(6) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the success of reconciliation declines to 29% only
• But a majority is opposed to the idea of a confederation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an alternative to full reunification

Only 29% are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Four months ago, optimism stood at 40%.  Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 12% believe unity will return soon.  While waiting for reunification, we asked the public if it would meanwhile support some form of confederation between the two areas. A majority of 60% expressed opposition while 31% supported this type of relationship.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% think the most vital goal of the Palestinians should be the ending of Israeli occupation and the building of a Palestinian state
• One third of the public believes that the most serious problem confronting the Palestinian society today is continued occupation and settlement expansion

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 33% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (27%); 6% say see lack of national unity as the most serious problem and 5% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the reversal of PA’s May 2020 decision to end security and civil coordination with Israel and the resumption of that coordination, the election of Joe Biden as president of the US, the signing of a normalization agreement between Sudan and Israel, and the failure of Palestinian reconciliation efforts to reach an agreement on holding Palestinian elections. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2020 show a majority is opposed to the PA leadership decision to resume coordination with Israel. Yet, they also show that this opposition is not strong and that it is in fact closer to a split between support and opposition. Even when it comes to security coordination with Israel, attitudes reflect an almost even split. Nonetheless, the findings paint a dark public assessment of Palestinian conditions in light of the return to coordination with Israel. The majority believes that Israel is the one to came out a winner from this political battle over coordination and that the Palestinian side is the one that paid the heavy price for engaging in it. Moreover, the overwhelming majority believes Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its commitments under signed agreement; indeed, this overwhelming majority thinks Israel has not abandoned its annexation plans for the Jordan Valley and West Bank settlements. On top of all that, the public thinks that the resumption of coordination will lead to greater Arab 

normalization with Israel, greater settlement expansion, and greater chances for annexation while at the same time diminishing the chances for reconciliation and the holding of elections. But the majority does express satisfaction with the resumption of coordination in the health sector; expects Israelis and Palestinians to resume negotiations; and a large minority expects an improvement in economic conditions.

The optimism about a resumption of negotiations seems linked more to public belief that the electoral victory of Joe Biden in the US elections will lead to an improvement in Palestinian-American relations. Similarly, the expectations about improved economic conditions seem to reflect the belief of two thirds of the public that the Biden Administration will resume financial aid to the PA. Despite the fact that the majority of the public does not expect Biden to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century, or reverse the decision to transfer the US embassy to Jerusalem, a clear majority is in favor of resuming dialogue with the new administration.

Yet, despite the optimism generated by the election of Biden, support for the two-state solution remains low, unchanged from September. Moreover, three quarters do not expect the creation of a Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years, and the majority thinks the two-state solution is no longer practical or realistic because of settlement expansion. Nonetheless, we see in this poll an increase in the percentage of those who prefer to reach a peace agreement with Israel compared to three months ago while the percentage of those who prefer waging an armed struggle against occupation declines during the same period. Still, the largest percentage of the public views armed struggle as the most effective means of ending occupation.

On domestic condition, findings show that the percentage of those demanding the resignation of president Abbas has increased to two-thirds despite the fact that the balance between Hamas and Fatah support remains unchanged compared to the previous six months. Findings show that three quarters  of the public demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections but only a third or less expects the PA to hold them. If elections are held under current conditions, findings show a sharp split among Fatah voters: the largest percentage of them is more likely to vote for an independent list formed by Marwan Barghouti than for an official Fatah list formed by Abbas and the Fatah leadership. Moreover, if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, he is more likely to take away from the official Fatah list about one fifth of Fatah voters, particularly in the Gaza Strip.

Finally, findings show that only half of the public is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine, when available, while the other half refuses to take it. 

(1) The resumption of PA coordination with Israel:

• A large minority of 44% (54% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) supports, and 53% oppose the decision by the PA leadership to resume civil and security coordination with Israel.
• When asked specifically about security coordination, 41% agreed, and 38% disagreed, with the statement that security coordination should be stopped even if it leads Israel to stop the transfer of clearance funds thereby stopping salary payment to PA employees; 18% said they neither agree nor disagree with the statement.
• A majority of 56% believes there is little or no chance the PA will reverse its decision and once again suspend security coordination with Israel; 13% think the chances of PA doing so are high or very high.
• A majority of 53% says that Israel came out the winner from the PA decision to stop and then resume coordination with Israel; only 9% think the PA came out a winner; 13% think both sides came out winners; and 22% think neither side came out a winner.
• A majority of 60% believes the Palestinians have paid a heavier price for stopping civil and security coordination with Israel while only 12% think Israel paid a heavier price.
• The overwhelming majority (82%) says that Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its signed commitments with the PA despite the written letter submitted to the PA; only 14% think Israel has indeed agreed to honor its commitments.  
• Even if Israel agreed to honor its commitment to signed agreements with the PA, the overwhelming majority (89%) believes Israel will not in fact abide by such commitment; only 8% think Israel will abide by these commitments.
• Similarly, 87% believe that Israel has not abandoned its plan for the annexation of the Jordan Valley and the West Bank settlements; 8% think it has.
• Now, after the resumption of coordination with Israel, 43% expect, and 55% do not expect, an improvement in economic conditions.
• But two thirds (67%) expect, and 28% do not expect, the return of the Palestinian and Israeli sides to the negotiating table.
• A majority of 61% expects the resumption of coordination with Israel to lead to an increase in normalization agreements between Arab countries and Israel; 68% expect it to lead to greater settlement expansion; and 54% expect it to lead to greater chances for Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and the settlements in the West Bank.
• On the domestic implication of the resumption of coordination with Israel, 57% expect it to diminish the chances for reconciliation and the largest percentage (44%) expects it to diminish the chances for holding general Palestinian elections.
• But 60% are satisfied, and 36% are dissatisfied, with the resumption of PA coordination with Israel on health issues and the combating of the coronavirus pandemic.
• If Israel transfers partial clearance funds to the PA, the largest percentage (35%) thinks the PA should accept it and take Israel to the International Court of Justice to demand the rest of the funds; 28% say the PA should accept the partial transfer; and only 34% say the PA should not accept the partial transfer.

(2) Expectations from the Biden Administration and attitudes regarding resumption of Palestinian-American dialogue:

• Now that Biden has won the US presidential elections, a majority of 58% expects, and 36% do not expect, an improvement in Palestinian-American relations.
• In fact, two-thirds (68%) expect the new US administration to resume economic aid to the PA and 52% expect it to allow the reopening of PLO diplomatic mission in the US capital.
• Yet, only 37% expect the Biden Administration to re-open the US consulate in East Jerusalem; 29% expect it to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century; 26% expect it to relocate the US embassy to Tel Aviv; and 22% expect it to reverse the decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
• At the regional level, a large minority of 42% expects, and 46% do not expect, the new US administration to recommit itself to the nuclear deal with Iran.
• A majority of 59% supports and 36% oppose the resumption of Palestinian dialogue with the US under the new administration.
• But only 44% think, and 49% do not think, Palestinians should return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership.

(3) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 40% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  
• A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 34% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 38% of the public while 29% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 19% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 35% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 39% chose armed struggle, 35% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 41% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices, 68% supported joining more international organizations; 63% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 44% supported dissolving the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis.

(4) Taking the Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• Only half of the public (50%) is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine when it is available and the other half refuses to take it.
• Half of the public (50%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to contain the spread of coronavirus pandemic and 48% are dissatisfied.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 53% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 45% today compared to 48% three months ago and 62% six months ago.
• The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 73% say their income or salary has been reduced; 62% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 54% say they stopped working or became unemployed.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• Three quarters demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections; but only 32% expect such elections to be held soon in the Palestinian territories.
• Among those who demand the holding of elections, the majority (55%) says it should be for simultaneous legislative and presidential elections with no separation between them; 22% prefer holding simultaneous legislative and presidential elections but are not opposed to separating the two by holding them at different dates; and 21% prefer holding legislative elections first followed few months later by presidential elections. A majority of 56% supports, and 39% oppose, holding general elections if Israel does not allow holding them in East Jerusalem.
• We asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 46% three months ago).
• If legislative elections are held today, 38% expect Fatah to win; 25% expect Hamas to win; 23% expect third parties and new lists that are unknow today to win.
• If Marwan Barghouti forms an electoral list independent of the official Fatah list formed by Abbas and Fatah leadership, 25% of the entire public say they would vote for this Barghouti list; only 19% say they would in this case vote for Fatah’s official list. But if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, only 7% of the entire public (mostly in the Gaza Strip) would vote for his list while 27% would vote for the official Fatah list.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 43% and the latter 50% of the vote (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 39% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 42% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 47% and the latter 47%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 41% and Haniyyeh 51%. 
• 66% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 30% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 61% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 37% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• We asked, in a close-ended question, about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 23% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (2% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Salam Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouti by 3% each. 
• If Fatah nominates Abbas as its candidate for the presidential elections, a majority of 52% of the public would view him as the wrong choice believing that Fatah has other better candidates; only 25% of the public think his is the best Fatah candidate. When asked to name a better candidate, 42% selected Marwan Barghouti, 10% selected Mohammad Dahlan, and 7% selected Mohammad Shtayyeh.  
• The largest percentage (28%) says that the top priority for Palestinian elections should be to restore unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 24% say it is improving economic conditions; 18% say it is the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip; 15% say it is to fight corruption; 6% say it is to bring back democracy; and another 6% say it is to strengthen resistance to occupation.
• 52% say if elections are held today under current conditions, they will not be fair and free; 41% do not agree with that.  Moreover, 76% think that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah will not accept the results and 58% think if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will not accept the results.

(6) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 72% and in the West Bank at 54%.
• 28% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 38% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 24% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and only 25% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. Three months ago, 80% expressed a similar view. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, only 63% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions.
• 45% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 54% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas authorities without fear and 46% think they cannot.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 55% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 62% viewed the PA as a burden.
• A year and nine months since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 66% expect failure; only 27% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 35% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 22%, followed by Palestine TV, Al Aqsa TV, and Maan TV at 12% each, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 5% each, and finally al Manar at 1%.  

(7) Reconciliation: 

• An overwhelming majority (77%) thinks the reconciliation efforts are not serious and insufficient.
• Only 29% are optimistic and 68% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 37%.

(8) The Arab Peace Initiative, Arab normalization with Israel, and Arab visits to Jerusalem: 

• Three quarters of the public (75%) believe the Arab Peace Initiative is a thing of the past while 19% think it remains standing.
• 81% expect Saudi Arabic will soon join the Arab normalization train while 15% do not expect that.
• Only 11% believe that Arab normalization agreements help in resolving the conflict with Israel while 57% think they cause damage to the efforts to resolve the conflict.
• 29% say they are for and 69% say they are against visits from Arab countries, particularly from the Gulf, to East Jerusalem and for praying at Al Aqsa Mosque. But a majority of 52% says that these visitors should be allowed to pray at the mosque or should be left alone without interference.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and an identical percentage (13%) believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 29%, the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 26%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 20%,  the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 11%.

3-7 April 2003

These are the results of opinion poll # 7, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 3-7 April 2003. The poll deals with the public attitudes toward the appointment of a Palestinian prime minister, political reform, the Quartet's roadmap, war in Iraq, the popularity of Yasir Arafat and political affiliation. The total sample size of this poll is 1315 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face, in 120 locations in the West Bank (821) and the Gaza Strip (494). The margin of error is 3%. 

To obtain full information, explanation and results, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki, PSR – Ramallah, Tel: +972 2 296 4933, fax 02-296 4934, or e-mail: pcpsr@pcpsr.org

MAIN RESULTS:

The results indicate that despite the war in Iraq, the Palestinian public tends to be optimistic about the chances for a return to the peace process. The optimism is derived mainly from the appointment of Abu Mazin as a prime minister, an appointment that receives the support of a clear majority. The optimism may also reflect the fact that a clear majority supports a mutual cessation of violence. This majority may believe that once mutual violence stops, the two sides may find it easier to return to negotiations. At the same time however, the Palestinian public is concerned about the impact of the war in Iraq on the future of the peace process and does not show a great confidence in the ability of the Abu Mazin to control the security situation or even carry out political reforms. Despite the fact that half of the Palestinians sees in the appointment of Abu Mazin an erosion in the status and powers of Yasir Arafat, the popularity rate of both men remains unchanged compared to five months ago. 

1) The appointment of Abu Mazin as a Prime Minister

• ·        A majority of Palestinians (64%) supports the creation of the position of a prime minister while 28% oppose it
• ·        Support for the appointment of Abu Mazin as a prime minister reaches 61% and opposition 32%
• ·        50% sees in the appointment of Abu Mazin an erosion in Arafat's status and authority
• ·        A majority of 86% supports internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms, but only 44% support the call to change the political system to a parliamentary one in which power resides in the hands of a prime minister and the position of the president becomes ceremonial

The results show that a majority of Palestinians (64%) supports the creation of the position of a prime minister while 28% oppose that step. But support for Abu Mazin as a prime minister is slightly less at 61% and opposition slightly higher at 32%. Support for Abu Mazin as a prime minister increases in the Gaza Strip (64%) compared to the West Bank (59%), among the old (68%) compared to the young (53%), among the illiterates (67%) compared to holders of BA degree (52%), among the farmers and retired persons (71% and 68% respectively) compared to students (50%), and among supporters of Fateh (71%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%).

While a majority of 70% believes that a government headed by Abu Mazin would be able to renew negotiations with Israel and 50% believe that it would improve economic conditions, only 39% believe that it would be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire on all Palestinian factions and 53% believe that it would not. Moreover, only 43% believe that it would be able to carry out political reform and 44% believe that it would be able to fight corruption. It is worth noting that while the appointment of Abu Mazin has not changed Palestinian expectations regarding the prospect for combined cessation of violence and return to negotiations (standing at 18%, compared to 16% last November), a shift did occur in the expectations regarding the prospect for a combined continuation of armed confrontations and no return to negotiations. In this poll, only 27% (compared to 42% last November) believe that armed confrontations would not stop and the two sides would not return to negotiations.

Palestinians are also divided in two halves over the issue of whether Abu Mazin will be able to form a government that could win the confidence of the Palestinians, with 43% believing he would and 43% believing he would not. It is worth remembering that only 40% were willing in November 2002 to give confidence to Arafat's current government. Palestinians are also divided over the issue of whether the appointment of Abu Mazin represents erosion in the authority and status of Yasir Arafat with 50% agreeing with that and 43% disagreeing.

Belief that the appointment of Abu Mazin represents an erosion in Arafat's power increases in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), in cities and villages (51% and 52% respectively) compared to refugee camps (45%), among men (55%) compared to women (46%), among the young (52%) compared to the old (45%), among holders of BA degree (58%) compared to illiterates (37%), among students, merchants, and farmers (62%, 63%, and 71% respectively) compared to professionals, retired persons, and the unemployed (44% each), among middle income people —monthly earning between JD300-600 (55%) compared to low income people (48%), and among supporters of Hamas (54%) compared to supporters of Fateh (47%).

While a majority of 86% supports internal and external calls for wide and fundamental political reforms, only 44% support (and 50% oppose) the call for changing the Palestinian political system so that power would reside in the hands of the prime minister while the position of the president would become ceremonial. Support for this change in the political system stood at 47% last November and opposition at 49%. Support for changing the political system to make the office of the president ceremonial increases in the West Bank (46%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in cities (47%) compared to refugee camps (38%), among men (48%) compared to women (41%), among the old (53%) compared to the young (35%), among non-refugees (48%) compared to refugees (39%), among retired persons, farmers, professionals, craftsmen, and laborers (68%, 65%, 56%, 50% and 51% respectively) compared to students, employees, and housewives (33%, 39%, and 40% respectively), among those working in the private sector (50%) compared to those working in the public sector (41%), among high income people (56%) compared to low income people (44%), and among national independents and the unaffiliated (58% and 47% respectively) compared to those who support Hamas and Fateh (39% and 41% respectively).

2) The Peace Process:

• ·        The roadmap receives the support of 55% and the opposition of 39%
• ·        45% believe, and 46% do not believe, the US and other Quartet members will put great pressure on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept the read map
• ·        Support for American pressure on the Palestinian Authority to accept the roadmap does not exceed 17% while 79% oppose such pressure
• ·        48% oppose the deployment of international forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if it means pressuring the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement the roadmap; support stands at 38%; additional 9% would support the deployment if it was European only, and less than 1% support a deployment of American forces
• ·        A majority of 71% supports mutual cessation of violence

Palestinian attitude toward the Quartet's roadmap has become slightly more positive with 55% supporting it and 39% opposing it. Last November, 54% supported and 42% opposed it. Support for the roadmap is reinforced with a strong support for a ceasefire. A majority of 71% (compared to 76% last November) supports a mutual cessation of violence while 27% (compared to 22% last November) oppose it. Under conditions of mutual ceasefire, 50% of all the public would support taking measures against those who would continue to carry out attacks against Israeli civilians while 45% would oppose doing so. Last November, support for such measures stood at 56% and opposition at 40%.  Still, three quarters acknowledge that failure to take such measures would impede the revival of the peace process. On the other hand, 79% express concern that taking such measures may lead to civil war.

Support for taking measures against those who continue to attack Israeli civilians after a mutual cessation of violence increases among men (53%) compared to women (47%), among the old (54%) compared to the young (47%), among the illiterates (57%) compared to holders of BA degree (46%), among laborers, professionals, and craftsmen (59%, 56%, and 56% respectively) compared to students and employees (45% each), among those working in the private sector (57%) compared to those working in the public sector (46%), and among supporters of Fateh (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas (40%).

In the absence of a mutual cessation of violence, a majority of 57% (compared to 53% last November) continues to support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 40% oppose it. Support for attacks on soldiers and settlers remains very high (over 90%) as in the previous poll. As in November, two thirds continue to believe that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Palestinians are divided over whether the US and other members of the Quartet would put heavy pressure on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept the roadmap with 45% believing that they would and 46% that they would not. A clear majority of 79% would oppose such American and international pressure if it was put on the Palestinian Authority while only 17% would support it. Moreover, only 38% would support the deployment of international forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to force the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement the roadmap. An additional 9% would support such deployment only if the forces were European. Forty-eight percent would oppose any deployment of international forces, and less than one percent would support the deployment if the forces were made up of Americans only.

A majority of 65% (compared to 73% last November) supports reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinians state is established and recognized by the state of Israel. In this context, 82% would support open borders between the two states, 65% would support building joint economic institutions and ventures, 26% would support building joint political institutions, and 30% would support adopting Palestinian laws that would prohibit incitement against Israel. However, only 7% would support changing the Palestinian curriculum so that it no longer call for the return of all of Palestine to Palestinians

3) War in Iraq

• 99% of the Palestinians oppose the war against Iraq, with 58% believing that its aim is to control the Iraqi oil
• 46% believe the war in Iraq will make it possible for Israel to carry out mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 44% believe that it will not
• A majority of 61% believes the war in Iraq will make it more difficult for Palestinians and Israelis to return to the peace process and a majority of 78% believes the war will strengthen Palestinian motivation to carry out armed attacks against Israelis

The results show that almost all Palestinians oppose the war on Iraq; with 58% of them believing that the primary motive of the US is to seize Iraqi oil, 32% believing the motive to be to help Israel, and only 2% believing it to be to disarm Iraq from weapons of mass destruction. While 78% of the respondents believe that the war in Iraq would strengthen Palestinian desire to carry out attacks on Israelis and 61% believe that it would take Israelis and Palestinians further away from the peace process, only 46% believe (and 44% do not believe) that Israel would be able to exploit the opportunity to carry out a mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The belief that Israel will be able to exploit the war to carry out mass expulsion of Palestinians increases among residents of villages and towns (48%) compared to refugee camps (40%), among the old (50%) compared to the young (43%), among the illiterates (51%) compared to holders of BA degree (31%), among farmers, retired persons, and craftsmen (59% and 50% respectively) compared to professionals, laborers and students (33%, 40%, and 42% respectively), among those with low income (47%) compared to those with high income (22%), and among supporters of Fateh and Hamas (50% and 47% respectively) compared to the unaffiliated (40%).

Most Palestinians (61%) believe that Iraq of Saddam Hussein would win the war in Iraq while only 12% believe that the winner will be the US and its allies. Eighteen percent see all sides as losers. The results show that socio-economic factors (such as income and education), rather than political affiliation, determine beliefs regarding the outcome of the war. Belief that Iraq's Saddam would win increases among women (71%) compared to men (51%), among illiterates (73%) compared to holders of BA degree (44%), among housewives and farmers (72% and 65% respectively) compared to retired persons, professionals and employees (32%, 39%, and 47% respectively), and among low income persons (65%) compared to high income persons (33%).  On the other hand, the results show that political affiliation plays no role in shaping beliefs regarding this matter.

4) Domestic Palestinian Issues

• ·        81% believe there is corruption in the institutions of the Palestinian Authority
• ·        Arafat's popularity stands at 35%, as in our survey of last November, followed by Ahmad Yasin (15%), and Haidar Abdul Shafi (10%)
• ·        For a vice president, Marwan Barghouti receives the highest rating with 20% (compared to 21% last November)
• ·        Fateh receives the support of 26%, followed by Hamas with 17%

The poll shows that Arafat's popularity, at 35%, remains unchanged since last November. Marwan Barghouti is the second most popular Palestinian leader with 20% support. Despite his appointment as a prime minister, Abu Mazin's popularity remains unchanged at 3%. Fateh, at 26%, is still the most popular faction followed by Hamas at 17%. Fateh's support stood at 27% last November. Total support for Islamists (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and independent Islamists) stands at 29% compared to 25% last November. The combined strength of all Palestinian opposition factions, Islamist and nationalist, stands at 32% while 41% remain undecided. 

A majority of 81% believes that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority and only 30% among those believe that corruption will decline in the future. Last November, 84% believed corruption existed in the PA. Palestinians are divided over the performance of the finance minister, Salam Fayyad, with 35% satisfied, 36% unsatisfied, and 29% unsure.

Fourteen percent, compared to 20% last November, say that conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip lead them to seek permanent emigration. The desire to emigrate increases among men (19%) compared to women (9%), among the young 23%) compared to the old (5%), among the holders of BA degree (20%) compared to illiterates (3%), among professionals, students, and laborers (33%, 26%, and 22% respectively) compared to retired persons and housewives (6% and 8% respectively).

December 2004 - January 2005

22-24 March 2007 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during March 22-24, 2007. This poll deals with several issues including the national unity government, the peace process, the domestic balance of power, and the Sunni-Shii strife in Iraq. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults, 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the Palestinian public is satisfied with the make-up of the national unity government which was formed just one week before the conduct of the poll. The success of Fateh and Hamas in forming a unity government has created hope, optimism, and great expectations particularly regarding the ability of the new government to end infighting, enforce law and order, and reduce international financial sanctions and diplomatic boycott.

But the public is divided on the issue of international or Quartet conditions for resumption of financial assistance and diplomatic engagement. Half of the public wants the government to accept the conditions and the other half does not want it to do so. Despite this split, a clear majority supports the recognition of Israel when this recognition is part of a settlement that creates a Palestinians state and resolves all issues of the conflict. Moreover, an overwhelming majority supports the current ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and wants to see it expanded to include the West Bank.

Moreover, it seems that the formation of the national unity government, the majority belief that this development will lead to more moderation regarding Israel inside Hamas, and the increased talk about reaffirming Arab commitment to it in the March 2007 Arab Summit have increased public support for the Saudi Initiative from about 60% last December to about three quarters in this poll. It is worth noting that support for a permanent settlement, such as the Saudi Initiative, does not preclude support for an interim one. Findings show that more than 70% support the conduct of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on an interim settlement that would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the largest part of the occupied territories to be followed by negotiations leading to a comprehensive permanent settlement. 

The formation of the national unity government did not lead to changes in the domestic balance of power between Fateh and Hamas as both have maintained the same levels of popularity as in our poll last December. The same applies to the popularity of PA president Mahmud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh; as in our December poll both receive in this poll almost equal percentage of support.

In this poll, we have examined for the first time public perception of the Shii-Sunni sectarian violence in Iraq. Findings show that a majority of Palestinians view the current violence in Iraq to be partly sectarian in nature. Among those who do see it that way, a majority believes that the PA, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Fateh and Hamas side with the Sunnis while Iran and Hezbollah side with the Shiis. As for Syria, about one third believes it stands with the Sunnis and another third believes it to side with the Shiis. 

(1) National Unity Government  

• 88% are satisfied with the make-up of the national unity government and 11% are dissatisfied.
• In evaluating the Mecca Agreement between Fateh and Hamas, 62% believe that both sides had to compromise a little while 9% believe that Hamas had to accept Fateh’s position and 4% believe that Fateh had to accept Hamas position.
• A small minority not exceeding 13% blames Hamas for the failure of its former government to improve Palestinian conditions
• The largest percentage (43%) wants the enforcement of law and order to be the top priority of the unity government.
• 69% expect the unity government to last at least until the end of the year while 23% expect it to fall before the end of the year.
• 48% want the unity government to accept the conditions of the Quartet and 48% does not want it to accept them.
• In the aftermath of the formation of the national unity government, public expectations are high: a majority ranging between 65% and 71% expect improvements in the ability of the government to pay salaries, the enforcement of law and order, the fight against corruption, the prevention of infighting, the easing of financial sanctions, and the return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (88%) is satisfied with the make-up of the national unity government while 11% say they are dissatisfied with it. Among other things, this near consensus may have been caused by the perception of a large part of the respondents (62%) that the Mecca Agreement that led to the formation of the unity government has been the outcome of modification in the positions of the two sides, Fateh and Hamas, with only 9% believing that Hamas had to acquiesce to Fateh’s demands and 4% believing that Fateh had to acquiesce to Hamas’s demands. 20% said neither side had to change its position.

Findings also show that only a small percentage (13%) holds Hamas responsible for the failure of its former government to improve Palestinian conditions. The largest percentage (37%) blames Israel, 25% blame the international community and the US, and 13% blame other Palestinian parties such as Fateh.

The largest percentage (43%) believes that the top priority for the unity government should be the enforcement of law and order while 26% believe that it should be the ending of the current financial sanctions. 17% believe the top priority should be the conduct of political reforms and 13% believe it should be the return to the peace process. One reason for placing the peace process at a low level of importance might be due to public perception that it is not the role of the unity government to negotiate and that negotiation with Israel is the responsibility of the PA president and the PLO. Alternatively, the public might believe that no progress is possible in negotiations any way.

The public is divided into two equal halves regarding how the unity government should respond to the Quartet conditions: 48% want it to accept them and 48% do not want it to accept them. If Israel recognizes the unity government, 49% say the government should in this case recognize Israel and 47% say it should not. Support for the recognition of Israel increases among men (52%) compared to women (47%), among supporters of Fateh (66%) compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), among retired persons (76%) and employees (57%) compared to students (36%), and among people older than 48 years of age (56%) compared to those between 18-22 years of age (38%).

Findings also show high expectations among the majority of Palestinians with 69% expecting the unity government to continue in office at least until the end of the year while 23% expect it to fall before the end of the year. Moreover, 71% expect improvement in the ability of the government to pay salaries, 69% expect improvement in the government’s ability to enforce law and order, 65% expect improvement in economic conditions, 65% expect improvement in their personal safety and security, and 65% expect improvement in the fight against corruption and the implementation of reform measures. 71% expect the chances for infighting to recede while 67% expect the financial sanctions to ease. Almost two thirds (65%) expect return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in the near future. In fact, 54% expect that formation of the national unity government to lead Hamas to become more flexible and moderate in its position regarding Israel. 18% expect the opposite to happen.  

(2) Domestic Conditions  

• 53% are satisfied with the performance of PA President Mahmud Abbas and 43% are dissatisfied
• Only 6% view conditions of Palestinians in PA areas are good while 82% view them as bad or very bad
• Most important problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty followed by Israeli occupation and its daily practices
• 84% believe that corruption exists in the PA and 49% of those believe that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future
• 27% say that their personal security and safety is assured while 73% say it is not
• 51% evaluate the performance of the “Executive Force” as negative, increasing the level of anarchy and lawlessness, while only 29% see it as positive, contributing to the enforcement of law and order
• In light of the last election experience, 56% see democracy as a viable political system suitable for Palestine while 40% see it as nonviable and unsuitable for Palestine
• 32% say they believe Hamas’s goal is to establish a state that guarantees rights but where Sharia, or Islamic law, is the only source of legislation and 16% say they believe it seeks to establish a Sharia state similar to Saudi Arabia

Findings show significant increase in the level of public satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas compared to findings in our last poll in December 2006: 53% are satisfied now compared to 40% last December. Dissatisfaction in this poll reaches 43%. Despite this improvement and despite the high level of satisfaction with the make-up of the unity government, only 6% describe current condition of the Palestinians in PA areas as good or very good while 82% describe it as bad or very bad. About one third (32%) believe the most important problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty while 24% believe it is the continuation of occupation and its daily measure, 23% believe it is corruption and lack of internal reforms, and 20% believe it is internal anarchy.

Findings also show that 84% believe that corruption exists in the PA and among those 49% believe that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future. About 42% believe it will decrease. It is interesting to note that only 21% believed last December that corruption will decrease in the future. The change might be due to an increase in the level of optimism generated by a high level of expectations from the national unity government.

Only 27% say that their personal safety and security is assured and 73% say it is not. In this regard, it is worth noting that 51% evaluate the performance of the “Executive Force” negatively viewing it as contributing to lawlessness while only 29% evaluate it positively viewing it as contributing to enforcement of law and order. These findings are identical to those we found in our December 2006 poll which means that the formation of the national unity government did not change public views regarding the performance of this force.

But the formation of the unity government might have positively affected, even if slightly, public evaluation of democracy in light of the outcome of the legislative elections in January 2006. Today, 56% view democracy as a viable political system suitable for Palestine (compared to 53% three months ago) while 40% view it as nonviable and unsuitable for Palestine (compared to 43% three months ago).

Finally, the formation of the national unity government did not affect public reading of Hamas’s goals regarding the nature of the Palestinian state it seeks to create. 21% (compared to 23% six months ago) view Hamas’s goal as the creation of a state that guarantees public liberties and in which Sharia would be one of the sources of legislation. By contrast, 32% (compared to 33% six months ago) view Hamas’s goal as the creation of a state that guarantees public liberties and in which Sharia would be the only source of legislation. Moreover, 16% (compared to 13% six months ago) view its goal as the creation of a state based on Sharia like in Saudi Arabia, and 5% (compared to 7% six months ago) view it as the creation of a state based on Sharia like in Afghanistan under the Taliban. 16%, compared to 15% six months ago, believe Hamas’s goal is the creation of a state like other Arab states in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

 (3) Peace Process  

• A majority of 72% supports the Saudi, or Arab, initiative and 26% oppose it.
• 63% support and 35% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict.
• A majority of 54% supports and 43% oppose a permanent settlement in which Israel withdraws from all occupied territories with the exception of settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank which would be subject to territorial exchange
• 43% support and 55% oppose a permanent settlement in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state and Israel annexes Jewish neighborhoods and the Wailing Wall.
• 43% support and 54% oppose a permanent settlement in which the refugee problem is resolved based on UN resolution 194 but with restrictions on refugee return to Israel which would be subject to an Israeli decision.
• A majority of 71% support and 27% oppose the conduct of negotiations with Israel that would aim at establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the Palestinian state and Israel on a permanent settlement.
• A majority of 85% supports the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 84% support the extension of the current ceasefire to include the West Bank.
• 47% believe that Hamas’s goal is to reach a long term Hudna or truce with Israel, 24% believe its goal is to insure the continuation of the conflict and 22% believe its aim is to seek permanent peace with Israel.

Findings show that about three quarters of the Palestinians (72%) support the Saudi Initiative while 26% oppose it. This finding points to a significant increase in support for this initiative compared to the situation three months ago when support stood at 59% and opposition at 38%. The increase in the level of support might have the result of increased Arab and international interest in the initiative and in light of the plan by the Arab Summit in Riyadh to reaffirm Arab commitment to it. Moreover, the Mecca Agreement, the formation of the unity government, and the public expectation that Hamas will show more moderation regarding Israel might have played a role in increasing public support for the initiative. Support for the initiative increases among supporters of Fateh (82%) compared to supporters of Hamas (63%), among non refugees (76%) compared to refugees (66%), among illiterates (81%) compared to holders of BA degree (70%), among retired persons (87%) compared to students (69%), and among those most willing to buy a lottery ticket (86%) compared to the most unwilling (61%).

Findings show that a majority of 63% supports and 35% oppose a mutual recognition in which Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israel recognizes Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict. Support for this mutual recognition stood at 58% and opposition at 40% in our poll last December.

Findings show a majority of 54% supports and 43% oppose a permanent territorial solution in which Israel withdraws from all occupied territories with the exception of settlement areas not exceeding 3% of the size of the West Bank which would be exchanged with an equal territory from Israel. Support for this settlement stood at 61% three months ago. With regard to a permanent settlement in Jerusalem -- in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state but in which Israel would annex Jewish neighborhoods and the Wailing Wall – 43% would support and 55% would oppose the proposed solution. Three months ago, support for this solution stood at 39%. Similarly, 43% would support and 54% would oppose a refugee permanent settlement based on UN resolution 194 but in which actual return to Israel would be restricted and be subject to an Israeli decision. Three months ago, support for this solution stood at 41% and opposition at 54%.

The poll found a high level of support (71%) for entering negotiations whose objective would be the creation of a Palestinian state in all Gaza and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations on permanent issues to be conducted by the state of Palestine and the state of Israel. 27% opposed entering such negotiations. It is worth mentioning that three months ago we found that 58% would support a Palestinian-Israeli agreement that would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state in all Gaza and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by permanent status negotiations on borders, refugees, and holy places.

As in our last poll three months ago, an overwhelming majority (85%) supports the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and a similar percentage (84%) supports extending it to include the West Bank.

Findings show that only 22% consider Hamas’s objective to be the arrival at a permanent settlement with Israel while 47% believe that Hamas aims at reaching a long term Hudna or armistice. About one quarter (24%) believe that Hamas wants to insure the continuation of the conflict with no settlement at all.

(4) Domestic Balance of Power 

• If new legislative elections are held today, 37% would vote for Hamas, 43% for Fateh, 11% for other lists, and 8% remain undecided. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our last poll conducted three months ago in December 2006.
• If new presidential elections are held today and the only two candidates were PA President Mahmud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh, 47% would vote for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh. These results are almost identical with those obtained in our last poll three months ago. But if the only two candidates were Marwan Barghouti and Isma’il Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive 52% and Haniyeh 43%. 

Findings show that the formation of the unity government did not affect the popularity of the various factions. If elections are held today, Hamas would receive 37% of the vote (compared to 36% last December), Fateh 43% (compared to 42% last December), all other factions 11% (compared to 12% last December),  and 8% remain undecided (compared to 10% last December). It is worth noting however that the popularity of Hamas has finally stabilized after continued but slight decline since June 2006.

If new presidential elections are to be held today with only two candidates, PA president Mahmud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh, competing, the two would receive almost identical percentages of the vote: 47% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh. These are almost identical to the results we obtained last December. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Isma’il Haniyeh, Barghouti would win with 52% of the vote against 43% for Haniyeh. In our December 2006 poll, we measured the popularity of Marwan Barghouti against that of Khalid Mish’al: Barghouti received 57% of the vote to Mish’al’s 36%.

(5) Sunni-Shii Strife in Iraq   

• 59% agree and 39% disagree that part of the conflict in Iraq is a sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shiis
• Majorities ranging between 50% to 69% believe that Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority take the side of the Sunni Iraqis in their conflict with Shii Iraqis
• On the other hand, 79% believe Iran takes the side of the Shiis and 74% believe Hezbollah too takes the sides of the Shiis in Iraq.
• 69% believe Fateh stands with the Sunnis and 76% believe that Hamas too stands with the Sunnis.
• 75% of the respondents say they stand with the Sunnis of Iraq in their conflict with the Shiis

Findings show that a majority of Palestinians (59%) believes that part of the armed conflict in Iraq is a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiis while 39% disagree with that. A majority (ranging between 50% and 69%) of those who do believe that a sectarian conflict exists in Iraq believes that the Palestinian Authority and Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia stand on the side of the Sunnis in their conflict with the Shiis. By contrast, 79% believe Iran stands on the side of the Shiis. When asked about Syria, about one third (34%) said it stood on the side of the Sunnis and 31% said it stood on the side of the Shiis.

When asked about the position of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Fateh, findings show that about three quarters believe that Hezbollah stands on the side of the Shiis, but 69% said Fateh stands on the side of the Sunnis and 67% said Hamas too stands on the side of the Sunnis. It is worth mentioning that while only 3% said Fateh stands on the side of the Shiis, 13% said Hamas stands on the side of the Shiis.

Three quarters of those who believe that a sectarian conflict exists in Iraq say they stand with the Sunnis, less that 1% say they stand with the Shiis, 18% say they stand with neither side, and 4% say they stand with both sides. Percentage of those who stand with the Sunnis increases in the Gaza Strip (87%) compared to the West Bank (67%), among those living in refugee camps (84%) compared to those living in villages and towns (71%), and among men (79%) compared to women (71%). But supporters of Fateh and Hamas say equally that they stand with the Sunnis (82% and 80% respectively). .... Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-18 September 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the killing of a political activist, Nizar Banat, right after his arrest and sever beating by the Palestinian security services, the eruption of widespread demonstrations against the PA demanding justice for Banat, the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel and the capture of four of them (just before the fieldwork began), the continued Egyptian-mediated Hamas-Israeli negotiations to strengthen the ceasefire reached in May and begin the process of reconstruction, the meeting of PA president Mahmoud Abbas with the Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz in Ramallah to talk about Palestinian-Israeli relations and means of improving them while strengthening the PA by implementing various trust-building measures. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2021 show the centrality of domestic issues on shaping public attitudes. Three developments in particular are worth observing: the killing of the political activist Nizar Banat by PA security services, the manner in which PA security services dealt with protests during the last few months, and the residual impact of the last Hamas-Israel war of May 2021. Findings also show the great importance attached by the public to the issue of prisoners in Israeli jails. Impacted by all of the above, findings reflect continued PA loss of status and support.

A large majority rejects that the notion that the killing of Banat was a mistake unintentionally made by security officers. Instead, the public is confident that the death of the political activist was premediated, ordered by the political or security leadership. Because of that, the public is not 

satisfied with the step taken by the PA to ensure justice by putting all security officers involved on trial. The public is also angry with the manner in which the PA cracked down on public protests that demanded justice in the Banat case. In fact, three quarters view the behavior of the security services as a violation of liberties and human rights.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public has been following, on daily basis, the news regarding the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel. The overwhelming majority views the prisoners’ behavior, even after they were captured, as inspiring to the Palestinians to rise and take the initiative to resist the occupation.  Yet, on this issue of public consensus, one in which the PA is not a party, the Palestinian leadership and the security establishment do not come out looking good at all. While the public is easily convinced by Hamas’ proclamations and plans for freeing the prisoners, the PA is distrusted with the majority believes that the PA security services would not defend the prisoners.

The impact of the May 2021 confrontations in Jerusalem and the war between Hamas and Israel is still strongly felt in this poll. An overwhelming majority still thinks Hamas came out the winner and that Hamas goal has been to defend East Jerusalemites and al Aqsa Mosque. Indeed, the largest percentage (but not the majority) believes that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people. The majority calls upon Hamas to relaunch rockets against Israel if East Jerusalemites are expelled from their homes in the city or if restrictions are imposed on Palestinian access to al Aqsa Mosque. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that now, after three months have passed since our last poll, we do see some decline in some of those indicators that measure the ascendance of Hamas. In almost all indicators, we see a small decline ranging between two to eight percentage points.

If new presidential and parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would do relatively well compared to Fatah. This is particularly true for a presidential election, assuming president Abbas is Fatah’s candidate. The outcome would be dramatically different and more beneficial to Fatah if its candidate for the presidency is Marwan Barghouti. Most importantly for Fatah, findings show a significant increase in the demand for Abbas’ resignation, with almost 80% making the demand, an unprecedent PSR finding.

Findings show that in the context of increased Covid-19 infection rates, the majority is in favor of mandatory vaccination; but opposition is slightly more than a third. Yet, even among those who reject making vaccination mandatory to all of the public, a minority favors making it mandatory to those working in the public sector such as schools and ministries.

Findings on the peace process show continued but slow decline in support for the two-state solution. They also show high levels of support for armed struggle as the best means of ending the occupation with almost half of the public endorsing this position. Consistent with that we find a slim majority opposing a resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Despite this, a majority of Palestinians view positively the confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

1) Prisoners escape from the Gilboa prison:

• An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (86%) says that it has heard about and followed on daily basis the news about the escape of the six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel and the capture of some of them while 12% say they did that occasionally and only 2% say they have not heard about or followed the news
• Similarly, 87% say the escape of the six prisoners and the capture of some of them will serve as an inspiration to Palestinians outside the prison to take the initiative and actively work toward the ending of occupation; only 7% think the escape and capture will have the opposite impact of bringing frustration and despair; 5% say it will have no impact.
• 81% believe that Hamas will soon succeed in making a deal with Israel on a prisoners’ exchange that will include the release of the escaped and recaptured prisoners; 14% believe no such exchange will take place soon.
• On the other hand, if the escaped prisoners managed to reach the Palestinian territories, only 24% think the PA security services would in this case protect them while 68% think they would not do so.

2) The death of Nizar Banat:

• A majority of 63% of the public believes that the killing of Nizar Banat soon after his arrest by PA security officials was a deliberate measure ordered by the PA political or security leaders while only 22% believe it was an unintentional mistake by those who arrested him.
• 63% support and 28% oppose the demonstrations that erupted after the death of Banat demanding the departure of the president from office and the removal of his government.
• A large majority of 69% feels the measures take by the PA to ensure justice in the Banat case, including putting on trial all 14 security officials who took part in his arrest, are insufficient; only 20% think they are sufficient.
• Almost three quarters (74%) believe the steps taken by the PA security services in arresting the demonstrators who demanded justice for Banat is a violation of liberties and human rights while only 18% view these measures as a legitimate enforcement of law and order.

3) Three months after the Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

• An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (71%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 3% think Israel came out a winner; 21% say no one came out a winner and 3% think both sides came out winners. Three months ago, 77% thought Hamas came out the winner. Moreover, 63% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 29% think it did not. Three months ago, 65% said Hamas has achieved its declared goal
• 67% think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 10% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 19% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers. Three months ago, 72% thought that Hamas’ decision came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque.
• In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 45% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while only 19% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 28% think neither side deserve such a role. Three months ago, 53% thought Hamas is more deserving of representation and leadership and 14% thought Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is the more deserving.
• If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 60% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 20% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 13% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

4) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 73% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 23% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 82% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 56% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 34% and Haniyeh 56% of the votes (compared to 59% for Haniyeh and 27% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 34% of the votes (compared to 30% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 60% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 33% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 59% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 49% and from among those the former receives 31% and the latter 60%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 26% and Haniyyeh 63%. 
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 33% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 22% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and another 6% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 22% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas six months ago stood at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Moreover, 78% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 19% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 68% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 78% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 37% say they will vote for Hamas and 32% say they will vote for Fatah, 13% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 41% and Fatah at 30%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 27% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 38% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 32% three months ago).

5)  Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 23%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%.
• 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 36% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 15% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 42% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 83%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 61% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 57% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 38% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 18% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 58% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 37% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 43% of Gazans said it was good or very good.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 34% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 35% viewed it as an asset.
• 32% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 41%.
• After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 70% expect failure; only 22% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29%  of the public expect success and 63% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 64% expects failure and 30% expects success.
• We asked the public about its view regarding the demands for a change in the current PA government. A majority of 54% expresses support for comprehensive change leading to the appointment of a new government and a new prime minister, while 26% want only to change some of the ministers, and 14% do not want to make any change and want the government to stay as it is.
• We also asked the public about its views on the recuring internal violence similar to the one witnessed recently in which an incident between two individuals led to widespread family and tribal violence. A majority of 57% expressed the view that such incidents indicate a weak pubic trust in the justice system including law enforcement agencies; but 35% expressed the view that such incidents reflect the traditional nature of Palestinian society that is difficult or impossible to change.
• When asked how should the PA deal with such incidents, 66% expressed the view that first and foremost, the PA should strengthen the law enforcement authorities while 27% expressed the view that the PA should strengthen the tribal reform committees and cooperate with them.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 23%, followed by Palestine TV (14%), al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine Today (11%), Maan (10%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (2%).

6)  The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• With the big rise in the number of Covid infections, we asked the public about the steps it thinks the PA government should take in order to protect people from the pandemic: 39% said it should follow the normal procedures of enforcing social distance, face masks, and payment of fines for violators; a similar percentage (37%) said it should make vaccination mandatory to all those who are allowed to take it; 5% said it should impose a full closure; and 15% said they are in favor of all of the above.
• When asked specifically about mandatory vaccination, a majority of 63% expressed support while 35% expressed opposition.
• Among those who reject mandatory vaccination, 29% are in favor, and 69% are not in favor, of making it mandatory to those who work in the public sector such as those working in schools and ministries.
• 48% (55% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 27% (19% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24 say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.
• 74% (84% in the Gaza Strip and 68% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 24% are dissatisfied.
• 45% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 53% are dissatisfied.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 59% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at only 39%.

7)  The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 36% and opposition stands at 62%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  
• A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 48% chose armed struggle, 28% negotiations, and 19% popular resistance. Three months ago, 49% chose armed struggle and 27% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 39% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 16% selected the loss of the will to fight.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 61% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 54% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 54% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 60% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 47% supported dissolving the PA, and 20% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• 58% are opposed, and 36% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet stands at 39% and 52% are opposed. Moreover, 49% do not believe, and 41% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 56% said it looks positively, while 35% said it looks negatively, at such measures.

8)  American withdrawal from Afghanistan:

• 40% view the events leading to the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan as a victory for Taliban against the US and its Afghani allies. But a third (33%) thinks that the events leading to the US withdrawal were orchestrated ahead of time between the US and Taliban; 27% say they not know.
• The largest percentage of the public (43%) does not expect what happened in Afghanistan to happen in Palestine in case of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a scenario in which such withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the PA and its government and the takeover of armed Islamist groups, such as Hamas; but 36% believe this scenario could indeed happen and 21% do not know.    
• Moreover, 46% believe the Palestinians should learn a lesson from what happened in Afghanistan by strengthening the forces of armed resistance, but not the PA and its government, while 28% think the lesson should lead us to strengthen the PA and its legitimacy so that it would not collapse as the Afghani government did.

9)  Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 10% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (36%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 40% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip, 23% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 13% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10%  said it is the spread of corruption, and 6% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

16-18 March 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during March 16-18, 2006. The poll deals with Palestinian perceptions and the popularity of Fateh and Hamas in the post election period, attitudes towards the peace process after Hamas’ victory, attitudes regarding the Israeli raid on Jericho jail, and several domestic issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (809) and the Gaza Strip (463) in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.  

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings

This poll was conducted less than two months after the Palestinian legislative elections which took place on 25 January 2006 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but before Hamas government was presented to the new PLC and gained its vote of confidence. At the time of the poll, the international community was threatening to suspend aid to the PA but no action had been taken at that time.

The results indicate that despite threats of sanctions and despite public expectations that donors will indeed cut off support once a Hamas government is formed, support for Hamas has never been as high as it is today. In fact, support for Hamas today is higher than the support it received on the day of elections. By contrast, Fateh’s popularity decreased significantly compared to where it was before the elections. In fact, support for Fateh today is less than the support it had on the day of elections.

These results indicate that Israeli and Western threats increase rather than decrease public support for Hamas. Support for Fateh is dropping as some Palestinians might be punishing it for the role it seems, in their eyes, to play in bringing about the downfall of Hamas and the undoing of its victory.  

But the increased support for Hamas does not indicate increased support for its views on the peace process. To the contrary, Palestinian public opinion seems today more moderate and willing to compromise than it has been at any time before. Despite public objection to a  Hamas’ recognition of Israel in response to international pressure, a majority wants Hamas to negotiate with Israel and to implement the Road Map. More importantly, a majority supports the two-state solution and in this context supports a mutual recognition of Israelas the state for the Jewish people in exchange for an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.

(1) Hamas and Fateh in the Post Legislative Elections’ Environment

• Hamas’ popularity continues to increase: 47% would vote for Hamas and 39% for Fateh if new elections are held today
• Two main reasons are given by the public for Hamas’ victory: the desire to have an authority that would implement Islamic Sharia code and the desire to have an authority that would fight corruption
• Fateh’s loss is attributed by the public to three main factors: the voters’ desire to punish it for corruption, its divisions and fragmentation, and its failure to enforce law and order
• Majority expects Hamas’ success in government, donors’ suspension of aid, and Hamas’ success in finding alternative sources of support
• Majority opposes a Hamas recognition of Israel in compliance with donors’ demands

In the estimate of 37% of the respondents, Hamas won the January parliamentary elections because voters wanted first and foremost an Islamist authority that implements the Sharia code. But 36% believe that voters wanted instead a clean government that fights corruption, 9% believe that voters wanted a strong authority that can put an end to anarchy and enforce law and order, and 7% believe that voters wanted a fighting authority that resists occupation. In the estimate of 52% of the respondents, Fateh lost the elections because voters wanted first and foremost to punish it for the spread of corruption in the PA. But 19% attribute the loss to Fateh’s divisions and lack of leadership, 17% to its failure to put an end to anarchy, and 5% to the failure of the peace process.

If new elections are to take place today, 47% of those who would participate say they would vote for Hamas, 39% for Fateh, and 8% for the four other factions represented in the current PLC. When asked about their actual vote in the last parliamentary elections in January, 46% said they voted for Hamas, 44% for Fateh, and 8% for the four other factions. (Actual official results were 44% for Hamas, 41% for Fateh, and 12% for the four other winning factions.) 

Support for Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (45%). By contrast, support for Fateh increases in the West Bank (40%) compared to the Gaza Strip (37%). Support for Hamas increases in cities (52% compared to 36% for Fateh) and refugee camps (47% compared to 37% for Fateh). The two factions receive equal support in rural areas. Support for Hamas increases among women (51% compared to 36% for Fateh) and decreases among men (43% for Hamas compared to 41% for Fateh). It also increases among refugees (49% for Hamas compared to 37% for Fateh) and decreases among non refugees (45% for Hamas compared to 41% for Fateh). It also increases among the illiterates (57% for Hamas compared to 33% for Fateh), students (48% for Hamas compared to 37% for Fateh), housewives (51% for Hamas compared to 35% for Fateh), religious respondents (54% for Hamas compared to 35% for Fateh), and among those opposed to the peace process (68% for Hamas and 16% for Fateh).

A majority of 70% expects Hamas to succeed in leading and managing the affairs of the PA while 22% expect the opposite. A similar percentage (69%) is not worried about its personal freedom after Hamas’ victory and 30% are worried. The large percentage of those expecting a Hamas success is somewhat surprising given the fact that a similar percentage (68%) believe that the PA can not manage without donor support and that 50% of the respondents believe that aid will indeed be suspended as long as Hamas does not meet donors’ conditions. Despite the strong moderate peace tendencies of the respondents in this poll, a majority of 59% nonetheless believes that Hamas should not recognize the state of Israel in compliance with donors’ demands while 37% believe it should.

(2) The Peace Process in the Post Hamas’ Victory

• 75% want Hamas to negotiate peace with Israel
• Majority supports the implementation of the Road Map and a majority supports a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people under conditions of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state in a two-state solution
• Sharp divisions over collection of arms from armed groups but an overwhelming majority supports the integration of armed groups into PA security services
• About three quarters welcome a negotiated Israeli disengagement from the West Bank while only 23% would support the disengagement if it was unilateral
• 80% would support a declaration of Palestinian statehood if it comes as an outcome of negotiations with Israel and 59% would support it if it was unilaterally declared by the PA

Despite Hamas’ electoral victory and despite the added increase in its popularity after the elections, public support for the peace process is on the rise. Public willingness to compromise has increased significantly during the last few months with about three quarters of the Palestinians wanting Hamas to conduct peace negotiations with Israel and only 22% opposing it. A majority of 64% says it supports the peace process while only 14% says it is opposed to it. These percentages stood at 59% and 17% respectively in our exit poll on the day of elections last January. A majority of 53%, compared to 51% in the exit poll) wants the Hamas government to implement the Road Map and 40% oppose that.

But perhaps the most moderate and surprising attitude is the one toward the two state solution and mutual recognition of identity. In this poll, 66% said they would support, and 32% would oppose, the recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people in the context of peace based on a two-state solution and an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. Support for this solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict stood at 57% and opposition at 41% last December. On the day of elections, only 49% supported this solution and 48% opposed it. As in our December poll, three quarters would support reconciliation between the two peoples under conditions of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel.

But divisions remain over how to handle the issue of arms collection. About half (49%) wants the new government to collect the arms of the various armed groups while 21% wants it to do nothing about those arms and 27% prefer to see the new parliament enacting a law that would allow armed groups to keep their arms. Identical results were registered on the day of elections.

Findings show that about three quarters of the respondents (73%) prefer to see a new Israeli disengagement from the West Bank carried out through negotiations while only 23% prefer to see it accomplished unilaterally. Moreover, the poll found that a majority (59%) believes that unilateral steps reduce the chances of eventually reaching permanent settlement to the conflict. Despite this, 59% would support a Palestinian unilateral step such as a PA unilateral declaration of statehood while 37% would oppose that. If the statehood declaration is the outcome of negotiations with Israel, a larger percentage (80%) would support it and only 17% would oppose it.

(3) Jericho Jail Raid

• A semi consensus that both the US and the UK are implicated in the Israeli raid on the Jericho jail
• 51% support non-violent reactions to protest the US and UK involvement but 46% support in various degrees other steps such as kidnappings or armed attacks

Findings show an almost total consensus among the Palestinians (93%) that the US and UK are implicated with Israel in the raid on the Jericho jail which took place few days before the poll was conducted. The raid and the arrest of Ahmad Sa’adat and his colleagues from the PFLP was followed by various types of reaction including demonstrations, attacks and burning of offices and other facilities belonging to the two countries, and kidnapping of foreigners. Findings show that 51% of the respondents supported only peaceful reaction or no reaction at all. Other types of reaction were supported to various degrees. For example, 9% supported attacks on and burning of offices and installations, 12% supported also the kidnapping of foreigners, and 25% supported also armed attacks against nationals from those two countries.

(4) Domestic Issues

• Poverty and unemployment is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today followed by Israeli occupation and PA corruption
• Three quarters do not feel safe or secure in the PA
• 91% believe corruption exists in the PA but two thirds believe it will decrease in the future
• Large percentage wants to give greater jurisdiction to the new legislative council than the president
• If new presidential elections are held today, 37% would vote for Mahmud Abbas, 25% for Mahmud Zahhar, and 15% for Mustafa Barghouti from among a closed list
• If elections are held today for a vice president, 30% would vote for Ismail Haniyyeh, 20% for Marwan Barghouti, 11% for Mahmud Zahhar, 8% for Mohammad Dahlan, 7% for Farouq Qaddoumi, and 6% each for Saeb Erikat and Mustafa Barghouti
• Support for Fateh drops considerably from 45% in our December 2005 poll to 34% in this poll. Support for Hamas increases from 28% to 37% and for the Islamists in general from 35% to 43% during the same period.

The period in the post Hamas’ victory is witnessing a significant change in public priorities. Concern is growing over economic issues such as poverty and unemployment with 44% of the respondents viewing it as the most important problem confronting the Palestinians today while only 25% views the continued occupation as the most important problem and 24% views corruption as the most important problem. On the day of elections only 27% identified poverty and unemployment as the most important problem with corruption coming first with 29% and occupation coming second, like poverty and unemployment, with 27%.

Findings also show that three quarters of the Palestinians do not feel safe in their homes. This finding is identical with that we found on the day of elections. Absence of safety is felt more strongly in the West Bank, which is under semi full Israeli control, reaching 79% compared to 68% in the Gaza Strip, which is under semi full Palestinian control.

The poll shows that Hamas’ victory has also affected public perception regarding the future of corruption in the PA. While 91% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions (the highest level registered since the formation of the PA), findings show that 65% believe that this corruption will decrease in the future. This is the first time that a majority indicated its belief that corruption will decrease in the future. Last December, only 34% believed that corruption will decrease in the future.  

But Hamas’ victory caused no change in public perception regarding the status of Palestinian democracy. Positive evaluation of democracy under the PA reached 34% in this poll compared to an almost identical result (35%) last December.

Despite the fact that 61% of the public are satisfied (and 37% are dissatisfied) with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, only a small minority of 19% wants to give him more powers than those of the newly-elected PLC. On the other hand, 44% want to give the PLC greater powers than those enjoyed by the president and 32% want both to have equal powers.

Despite this result, the popularity of Fateh’s Abbas (37%) remains higher than that of Mahmud Zahhar of Hamas (25%) and Mustafa Barghouti of other groups (15%). This came in a response to a closed question with respondents asked to choose one of the three. In another closed question on a vote for a vice president, Ismail Haniyyah, the current prime minister, emerged as the most popular with 30% followed by Marwan Barghouti with 20%, Mahmud Zahhar with 11%, Mohammad Dahlan (8%), Farouq Qaddoumi (7%) and Saeb Erikat and Mustafa Barghouti (6% each).

Findings show that support for Fateh has dropped significantly compared to last December while support for Hamas has increased during the same period. Support for Fateh stood at 45% three months ago dropping to 34% in this poll. Hamas’ popularity reached 28% last December rising to 37% in this poll. Support for the Islamists in general (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) increased from 35% to 43% during the same period. .... Full Report