These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-20 June 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the spread of the Corona virus throughout the world and in the Palestinian territories leading the Palestinian Authority to impose a lockdown throughout the Palestinian territories which brought to a standstill many economic activities. It also witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government lead by prime minister Netanyahu and the announcement of the government intentions to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank. In response, the PA announced ending its commitment to the Oslo agreement and severed relations with Israel in security and civil realms. This was followed by ending Palestinian-Israeli security coordination and Israel stopped the transfer of Palestinian clearance funds thereby negatively affecting the PA’s ability to pay salaries for the month of May 2020. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

This quarterly poll was conducted during a period in which the spread of the Corona virus was believed to have been brought under control thereby allowing us to conduct face-to-face interviews throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The poll covered various   

issues, most importantly the intention of the Israeli government to annex Palestinian territories and the Palestinian response to the Israeli plans which amounted to a decision to stop implementation of the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with the Israeli government. We also focused on public perception of the PA government and its performance during the Coronavirus pandemic.

Findings show that two-thirds of the public believe that the new Israeli government led by prime minister Netanyahu will indeed annex Palestinian territories. This realization created a great deal of public concern and worry about the future. Public worry focused on the salary payment to the public sector, access to medical treatment, shortages in water and electricity supplies, eruption of armed clashes, return of security chaos and anarchy, PA collapse, and inability to travel to Jordan.

A large majority supports a Palestinian response to annexation that involves stopping the implementation of the agreements with Israel and severing all relations with it. But the public has doubts about the sincerity of the PA in stopping security coordination with Israel. Despite the fact that a slim majority supports responding to the plan by returning to armed struggle, the findings of this poll in fact show a decrease in supporting armed struggle compared to the findings of our last poll which was conducted four months ago. Moreover, despite the fact that two-thirds are worried about the likely collapse of the PA, only one third thinks that Israel will bring back its military rule and civil administration to the Palestinian territories; three quarters express rejection of such return, if it were to happen.

With regard to the government performance in managing the Coronavirus pandemic, a large majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA and with the various measures taken by the PA government. More than three quarters indicate that they trust that the government has been working to protect the interests of public. But two-thirds say that their income or salary has been reduced and a majority indicates that it has stopped working or has become unemployed during that period. Moreover, more than three quarters express the view that the PA government did not do its best to compensate those who suffered the most due to the closure and lockdown. It is interesting that despite the tense relations between the PA and Israel, two-thirds of the public express agreement with Palestinian-Israeli cooperation and coordination in the health sector that took place during the period of the pandemic.

Findings show a rise in favor of the two-state solution but half of the public remains opposed to this solution. Findings also show a consensus against the Trump plan, or the deal of the century, with a prevailing perception that the plan does not end the Israeli occupation and does not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. Indeed, most of the public believe now that the plan has returned the conflict to its original existential roots. For all of this, a large majority is opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US.

Finally, despite a decline in the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, findings indicate that he would lose a presidential election in which he competes against Ismail Haniyyeh. Findings also show that the gap between Fatah and Hamas, which stood at 6 points four months ago in Fatah’s favor, has now narrowed to 2 points in its favor.   

(1) Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories and its potential consequences:

• Two thirds believe Israel will annex the Jordan Valley and settlements areas
• 71% want the PA to stop implementing the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with Israel while 52% support a return to armed struggle in a response to annexation
• 36% support and 53% oppose the initiation of a Palestinian counter proposal to the Trump plan and to enter negotiations with Israel and the US based on that proposal
• Large majorities believe that Arab and non-Arab countries will not impose sanctions on Israel because of the annexation
• The public is highly worried about the consequences of the annexation and the PA response, such as the inability to pay salaries to the public sector or even the collapse of the PA
• But a majority does not expect Israel to return its direct military rule or the its civil administration

Two-thirds (66%) believe that the new Israeli government will indeed annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank while 28% think it will not do so.  However, the majority (59%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Hamas; in fact, 56% expect Israel to wage war against the Gaza Strip while 36% do not expect it to do so.  Similarly, the majority (57%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach peace arrangements with the PA in the West Bank while the largest percentage (48%) expects, and 43% do not expect, Israel to wage war against the PA to force it to collapse.  However, a large majority of 73% expects the new Israeli government to deepen the normalization steps with some of the Arab Gulf countries but 53% do not expect, and only 30% expect, Israel to wage war against Iran.

When asked what the PA should do in response to an Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories: (1) the largest majority (71%) said it should, and 21% said it should not, stop implementing the Oslo agreement and should sever all relations with Israel; (2) 61% said Palestinians should resort to peaceful resistance and 35% disagreed with that; (3) 52% said they support and 42% oppose a return to armed struggle; (4) 37% said they support the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution; and (5) 36% said they support, and 53% said they oppose, a return to the negotiation with Israel and the US based on a detailed Palestinian peace plan that can serve as a counter proposal to the Trump plan.

Support for abandoning the Oslo agreement and severing ties with Israel is higher among men (75%) compared to women (67%), among holders of BA degree (74%) compared to illiterates and those who finished elementary school (67% each), among those who work in the public sector (79%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (70%), among those who support third parties and Hamas (84% and 76% respectively) compared to Fatah supporters (70%).

By contrast, support for a return to negotiations based on a Palestinian counter proposal is higher in the West Bank (40%) compared to the Gaza Strip (30%), in villages/towns (51%) compared to cities and refugee camps (34% and 36% respectively), among the non-refugees (39%) compared to refugees (33%), among holders of BA degree (39%) compared to illiterates (29%), among professionals, laborers, and merchants (48%, 42%, and 39% respectively) compared to students (24%), among those who work in the private and non-governmental sector (41%) compared to those who work in the public sector (32%), among the non-religious and the somewhat religious (49% and 42% respectively) compared to the religious (30%), among those with the highest income (43%) compared to those with the lowest income (27%), and among supporters of Fatah (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (12% and 38% respectively).

When forced to choose only one of these five possible responses, the largest percentage (31%) says that it prefers a return to armed struggle, 23% prefer resumption of negotiations based on a detailed Palestinian counter proposal, 18% prefer non-violent resistance, 15% prefer abandoning the Oslo agreement and the severing of relations with Israel, and 6% prefer to abandon the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution. 

We asked the public about its expectations regarding the likely responses of external actors to an Israeli annexation, if one is to actually take place. A majority expresses pessimism with 63% indicating that they do not expect Jordan to abandon its peace agreement with Israel; 70% do not expect Jordan or Egypt to recall their ambassadors from Israel; 78% do not expect European countries to impose sanctions on Israel; and another 78% do not expect Arab countries in the Gulf, or some of them, to end normalization measures with Israel.

Twice we asked the public about its support for the PA leadership’s declared policy of stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, stopping security coordination, and severing relations with Israel, once before detailing possible consequences of such a policy and once again after going over these details. The initial response showed that a majority of 59% support and 31% oppose the leadership’s decision.

When the question turns to the details and possible consequences, the public indicates great worries about the future. For example, 81% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 73% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 70% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 65% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 65% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 63% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 62% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.

Despite all these concerns, in answer to the second question about support/opposition to the PA leadership decision to sever relations with Israel, a larger majority of 63% says it supports the decision and only 29% say they oppose it.  Yet, the level of support for the PA decision in response to both questions is lower than the support the public is willing to grant to the policy itself, which, as we indicated above, stood at 71%.  

It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (57%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 32% believe it indeed did.

A majority of 55% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (33%) expects Israel to do so.  A large majority of 74% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 18% say they do prefer that.  50% of the public believe that the PA will back down and resume relations with Israel if the latter declares its intention to resume its direct military rule over the Palestinian territories while 37% believe the PA will not back down.

(2) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• `Satisfaction with the performance of the Palestinian government in dealing with the Coronavirus pandemic ranges between 80% and 57%
• Similarly, 62% are satisfied with the performance of prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh in managing the crisis
• Two thirds say they have suffered economically due to the pandemic
• Two thirds agree with the cooperation that took place with Israel in managing the Coronavirus pandemic

Large majorities are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Coronavirus pandemic. But the level of satisfaction differs from one measure to the other. For example, 88% are satisfied with the closure of areas that witnessed the spread of the virus; 80% are satisfied with the closure of schools and universities; 77% are satisfied with the cessation of transportation between the various governorates; 73% are satisfied with the ban on laborers working in Israeli settlements; 60% are satisfied with the closure of mosques and churches; and 57% are satisfied with the ban on Friday prayers and Sunday mass.  Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 82% express satisfaction with the ministry of health; 75% are satisfied with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas; 67% are satisfied with the performance of the “emergency committee” in their area; 65% are satisfied with the performance of the government spokesperson, Mr. Ibrahim Milhem; 64% are satisfied with the performance of the local municipalities or councils; 62% are satisfied with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh; and 61% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area.  Satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in managing the Coronavirus pandemic is higher in the West Bank (76%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in villages/towns (83%) compared to cities and refugee camps (60% and 48% respectively), among those whose age is 50 years and above (67%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (58%), among the non-refugees (69%) compared to the refugees (54%), among the illiterates (77%) compared to the holders of BA degree (60%), among farmers and laborers (69% and 67% respectively) compared to students (48%), among those who work in the private and the non-governmental sector (64%) compared to those who work in the public sector (57%), among the somewhat religious and the non-religious (70% and 69% respectively) compared to the religious (54%), among those with the highest income (77%) compared to those with the lowest income (52%), and among supporters of Fatah and third parties (85% and 62% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

Similarly, 76% say they have trust, and 22% say they have no trust, that the government, in taking the measures it took, has been working for the interest of the people. But when asked about the amount of donations made to the “dignity fund:” 48% expressed satisfaction and 44% dissatisfaction. But an overwhelming majority of 77% says that it is not certain that the donation would reach those who truly need it.

Public trust in the government is also evident in the fact that 56% believe the announcements regarding the number of infections and deaths while 36% believe that the government has not been transparent. Similarly, 57% express the belief that the measures taken by the PA have been adequate, while 23% believe them to be inadequate, and 18% believe they were exaggerated.

The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 67% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 55% say they stopped working or became unemployed.

When asked about its impression about of people’s implementation of social distancing, the largest percentage (45%) say it believes the implementation was medium, 18% say it was high, and 36% say it was low. A majority of 69% indicates that the closure and lockdown did not cause domestic problems within their own families while 29% indicates that they did have such problems.  57% think that remote education has not been useful while 37% think it has been.  65% believe that it was not appropriate to allow laborers to continue to work in Israel during the closure and lockdown while 31% think it was appropriate.

A small majority of 54% believes the pandemic is a divine punishment for people and states for their corruption and injustice while 37% believe it is not. However, the largest percentage (45%) thinks the virus is manmade and not natural while a similar percentage of 43% thinks it is a product of nature. The belief that the pandemic is a divine punishment is higher in the Gaza Strip (58%) compared to the West Bank (51%), in cities and refugee camps (55% and 51% respectively) compared to villages/towns (46%), among those whose age is 50 years or over (57%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (50%), among the illiterates (72%) compared to the holders of BA degree (42%), among farmers (75%) compared to professionals (44%), among the religious (62%) compared to the somewhat religious and the non-religious (46% and 36% respectively), among those with the least income (64%) compared to those with the highest income (48%), and among supporters of Hamas (63%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 35% respectively).

A two-third majority (67%) agrees with the cooperation and coordination in the health sector which took place between the PA and Israel during the period in which the Coronavirus was spreading while 25% say they disagreed with that. Approval of cooperation with Israel in the health sector is higher in the West Bank (74%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%), in villages/towns (77%) compared to refugee camps and cities (69% and 65% respectively), among men (71%) compared to women (64%), among those whose age is 50 and over (68%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (56%), among non-refugees (72%) compared to refugees (61%), among those who hold a BA degree (72%) compared to the illiterates (62%), among laborers and employees (75% and 69% respectively) compared to students (45%), and among supporters of third parties and Fatah (82% and 76% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (55%).

44% say popular social solidarity, such as debt forgiveness, increased during the pandemic while 31% say the level of solidarity did not change and 23% think it decreased. More than three quarters of the public (77%) believe that the government has not done all it could to compensate those who suffered the most from the closure and lockdown, such as laborers, farmers, cattle breeders, and others, and only 16% believe it did all it could.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Support for the two-state solution rises from 39% to 45%
• The public is divided on the best means of ending the Israeli occupation: 45% believe it is armed struggle, 24% think it is negotiation, and 22% think it is non-violent resistance
• 88% reject the Trump plan and only 5% accept it
• 69% oppose a resumption of PA dialogue with the US Administration

Support for the concept of the two-state solution rises to 45% and opposition stands at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Four months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 51% believe that the majority opposes it. A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.

The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 38% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 13% prefer to keep the status quo. Four months ago, 22% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 45% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.

When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 45% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Four months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations. Support for armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (41%), in refugee camps (66%) compared to cities and villages/towns (52% and 44% respectively), among men (56%) compared to women (48%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 22 years (55%) compared to those whose age is 50 years or above (52%), among refugees (56%) compared to non-refugees (48%), among holders of BA degree (57%) compared to the illiterates (45%), among employees and students (67% and 66% respectively) compared to professionals, laborers, and housewives (43%, 46%, and 48% respectively), among those who work in the public sector (61%) compared to those who work in the private and non-governmental sectors (51%), among the religious (56%) compared to the non-religious and the somewhat religious (45% and 48% respectively), and among supporters of Hamas (70%) compared to supporters of the third parties and Fatah (49% and 46% respectively).

We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 88% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Four months ago, 94% expressed opposition to the plan when presented to them in its full details.  Similarly, 87% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 8% believe a majority supports it.  By contrast, 66% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.  In light of the terms of the US plan, a majority of 70% believes the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 5% think the plan makes peace more attainable.  If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 57% think the chances are zero; 22% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.

A majority of 69% is opposed and 16% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Four months ago 76% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.  A majority of 68% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 24% expect him to win it.

(4) Legislative and presidential election

• Demand for Abbas’ resignation drops from 62% to 58%
• But in new presidential elections, Ismail Haniyyah from Hamas receives the support of 49% of the public and Abbas 42%
• Marwan Barghouti receives the support of 57% to Haniyyah’s 36% while prime minister Shtayyeh receives the support of 48% to Haniyyah’s 45%
• In parliamentary elections, Fatah wins 36% of the vote and Hamas 34%

58% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Four months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 48% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.  Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Four months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).

If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 44% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh four months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% four months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 63% four months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 54% four months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% four months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 36%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyah, the former receives 48% and the latter 45%. We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 2% each. 

We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in parliamentary elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 36% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Four months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 43% four months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 30% four months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 22% four months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 45% four months ago).

(5) Domestic conditions:

• Perception of safety and security stands at 74% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank
• Demand for emigration stands at 24%
• Belief that corruption exists in PA institutions stands at 81%
• 52% view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset

Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.  Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 65%.  24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 34% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.  Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. Four months ago, 85% expressed a similar view. Overall, the public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 52% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.

With more than a year passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 56% expect failure; only 33% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 34% expects success.

We asked the public about its reaction to the PA decision not to accept medical supplies sent by the UAE via two planes that landed at Ben Gurion airport. About half (49%) of the public indicated approval of the decision but 41% expressed disapproval. Support for the PA decision is higher in the West Bank (51%) compared to the Gaza Strip (47%), in cities (50%) compared to refugee camps (45%), among supporters of Fatah (56%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (48% and 46% respectively).

We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last four months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (14%), Maan TV at 13%, Palestine Today TV at 10%, Al Arabiya at 4%, and finally al Mayadeen at 3%.  

(6) Reconciliation: 

• Optimism about the success of reconciliation declines to 29% only
• But a majority is opposed to the idea of a confederation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an alternative to full reunification

Only 29% are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Four months ago, optimism stood at 40%.  Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 12% believe unity will return soon.  While waiting for reunification, we asked the public if it would meanwhile support some form of confederation between the two areas. A majority of 60% expressed opposition while 31% supported this type of relationship.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% think the most vital goal of the Palestinians should be the ending of Israeli occupation and the building of a Palestinian state
• One third of the public believes that the most serious problem confronting the Palestinian society today is continued occupation and settlement expansion

44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.

The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 33% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (27%); 6% say see lack of national unity as the most serious problem and 5% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8-11 December 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the reversal of PA’s May 2020 decision to end security and civil coordination with Israel and the resumption of that coordination, the election of Joe Biden as president of the US, the signing of a normalization agreement between Sudan and Israel, and the failure of Palestinian reconciliation efforts to reach an agreement on holding Palestinian elections. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the last quarter of 2020 show a majority is opposed to the PA leadership decision to resume coordination with Israel. Yet, they also show that this opposition is not strong and that it is in fact closer to a split between support and opposition. Even when it comes to security coordination with Israel, attitudes reflect an almost even split. Nonetheless, the findings paint a dark public assessment of Palestinian conditions in light of the return to coordination with Israel. The majority believes that Israel is the one to came out a winner from this political battle over coordination and that the Palestinian side is the one that paid the heavy price for engaging in it. Moreover, the overwhelming majority believes Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its commitments under signed agreement; indeed, this overwhelming majority thinks Israel has not abandoned its annexation plans for the Jordan Valley and West Bank settlements. On top of all that, the public thinks that the resumption of coordination will lead to greater Arab 

normalization with Israel, greater settlement expansion, and greater chances for annexation while at the same time diminishing the chances for reconciliation and the holding of elections. But the majority does express satisfaction with the resumption of coordination in the health sector; expects Israelis and Palestinians to resume negotiations; and a large minority expects an improvement in economic conditions.

The optimism about a resumption of negotiations seems linked more to public belief that the electoral victory of Joe Biden in the US elections will lead to an improvement in Palestinian-American relations. Similarly, the expectations about improved economic conditions seem to reflect the belief of two thirds of the public that the Biden Administration will resume financial aid to the PA. Despite the fact that the majority of the public does not expect Biden to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century, or reverse the decision to transfer the US embassy to Jerusalem, a clear majority is in favor of resuming dialogue with the new administration.

Yet, despite the optimism generated by the election of Biden, support for the two-state solution remains low, unchanged from September. Moreover, three quarters do not expect the creation of a Palestinian state along side Israel in the next five years, and the majority thinks the two-state solution is no longer practical or realistic because of settlement expansion. Nonetheless, we see in this poll an increase in the percentage of those who prefer to reach a peace agreement with Israel compared to three months ago while the percentage of those who prefer waging an armed struggle against occupation declines during the same period. Still, the largest percentage of the public views armed struggle as the most effective means of ending occupation.

On domestic condition, findings show that the percentage of those demanding the resignation of president Abbas has increased to two-thirds despite the fact that the balance between Hamas and Fatah support remains unchanged compared to the previous six months. Findings show that three quarters  of the public demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections but only a third or less expects the PA to hold them. If elections are held under current conditions, findings show a sharp split among Fatah voters: the largest percentage of them is more likely to vote for an independent list formed by Marwan Barghouti than for an official Fatah list formed by Abbas and the Fatah leadership. Moreover, if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, he is more likely to take away from the official Fatah list about one fifth of Fatah voters, particularly in the Gaza Strip.

Finally, findings show that only half of the public is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine, when available, while the other half refuses to take it. 

(1) The resumption of PA coordination with Israel:

• A large minority of 44% (54% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) supports, and 53% oppose the decision by the PA leadership to resume civil and security coordination with Israel.
• When asked specifically about security coordination, 41% agreed, and 38% disagreed, with the statement that security coordination should be stopped even if it leads Israel to stop the transfer of clearance funds thereby stopping salary payment to PA employees; 18% said they neither agree nor disagree with the statement.
• A majority of 56% believes there is little or no chance the PA will reverse its decision and once again suspend security coordination with Israel; 13% think the chances of PA doing so are high or very high.
• A majority of 53% says that Israel came out the winner from the PA decision to stop and then resume coordination with Israel; only 9% think the PA came out a winner; 13% think both sides came out winners; and 22% think neither side came out a winner.
• A majority of 60% believes the Palestinians have paid a heavier price for stopping civil and security coordination with Israel while only 12% think Israel paid a heavier price.
• The overwhelming majority (82%) says that Israel has not in fact agreed to honor its signed commitments with the PA despite the written letter submitted to the PA; only 14% think Israel has indeed agreed to honor its commitments.  
• Even if Israel agreed to honor its commitment to signed agreements with the PA, the overwhelming majority (89%) believes Israel will not in fact abide by such commitment; only 8% think Israel will abide by these commitments.
• Similarly, 87% believe that Israel has not abandoned its plan for the annexation of the Jordan Valley and the West Bank settlements; 8% think it has.
• Now, after the resumption of coordination with Israel, 43% expect, and 55% do not expect, an improvement in economic conditions.
• But two thirds (67%) expect, and 28% do not expect, the return of the Palestinian and Israeli sides to the negotiating table.
• A majority of 61% expects the resumption of coordination with Israel to lead to an increase in normalization agreements between Arab countries and Israel; 68% expect it to lead to greater settlement expansion; and 54% expect it to lead to greater chances for Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and the settlements in the West Bank.
• On the domestic implication of the resumption of coordination with Israel, 57% expect it to diminish the chances for reconciliation and the largest percentage (44%) expects it to diminish the chances for holding general Palestinian elections.
• But 60% are satisfied, and 36% are dissatisfied, with the resumption of PA coordination with Israel on health issues and the combating of the coronavirus pandemic.
• If Israel transfers partial clearance funds to the PA, the largest percentage (35%) thinks the PA should accept it and take Israel to the International Court of Justice to demand the rest of the funds; 28% say the PA should accept the partial transfer; and only 34% say the PA should not accept the partial transfer.

(2) Expectations from the Biden Administration and attitudes regarding resumption of Palestinian-American dialogue:

• Now that Biden has won the US presidential elections, a majority of 58% expects, and 36% do not expect, an improvement in Palestinian-American relations.
• In fact, two-thirds (68%) expect the new US administration to resume economic aid to the PA and 52% expect it to allow the reopening of PLO diplomatic mission in the US capital.
• Yet, only 37% expect the Biden Administration to re-open the US consulate in East Jerusalem; 29% expect it to abandon the Trump Plan, known as the deal of the century; 26% expect it to relocate the US embassy to Tel Aviv; and 22% expect it to reverse the decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
• At the regional level, a large minority of 42% expects, and 46% do not expect, the new US administration to recommit itself to the nuclear deal with Iran.
• A majority of 59% supports and 36% oppose the resumption of Palestinian dialogue with the US under the new administration.
• But only 44% think, and 49% do not think, Palestinians should return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership.

(3) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 40% and opposition stands at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  
• A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 34% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 38% of the public while 29% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 19% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 35% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 39% chose armed struggle, 35% negotiations, and 18% popular resistance. Three months ago, 41% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices, 68% supported joining more international organizations; 63% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 48% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 44% supported dissolving the PA; and 29% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis.

(4) Taking the Coronavirus vaccine and PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• Only half of the public (50%) is willing to take the coronavirus vaccine when it is available and the other half refuses to take it.
• Half of the public (50%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to contain the spread of coronavirus pandemic and 48% are dissatisfied.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 53% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 45% today compared to 48% three months ago and 62% six months ago.
• The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 73% say their income or salary has been reduced; 62% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 54% say they stopped working or became unemployed.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• Three quarters demand the holding of general legislative and presidential elections; but only 32% expect such elections to be held soon in the Palestinian territories.
• Among those who demand the holding of elections, the majority (55%) says it should be for simultaneous legislative and presidential elections with no separation between them; 22% prefer holding simultaneous legislative and presidential elections but are not opposed to separating the two by holding them at different dates; and 21% prefer holding legislative elections first followed few months later by presidential elections. A majority of 56% supports, and 39% oppose, holding general elections if Israel does not allow holding them in East Jerusalem.
• We asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 69% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 19% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 29% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 46% three months ago).
• If legislative elections are held today, 38% expect Fatah to win; 25% expect Hamas to win; 23% expect third parties and new lists that are unknow today to win.
• If Marwan Barghouti forms an electoral list independent of the official Fatah list formed by Abbas and Fatah leadership, 25% of the entire public say they would vote for this Barghouti list; only 19% say they would in this case vote for Fatah’s official list. But if Mohammad Dahlan forms his own independent list, only 7% of the entire public (mostly in the Gaza Strip) would vote for his list while 27% would vote for the official Fatah list.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 43% and the latter 50% of the vote (compared to 52% for Haniyeh and 39% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 64% (compared to 62% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 46% three months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 42% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 47% and the latter 47%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 41% and Haniyyeh 51%. 
• 66% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 30% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 61% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 37% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 31% (36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• We asked, in a close-ended question, about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 23% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (2% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Salam Fayyad and Mustafa Barghouti by 3% each. 
• If Fatah nominates Abbas as its candidate for the presidential elections, a majority of 52% of the public would view him as the wrong choice believing that Fatah has other better candidates; only 25% of the public think his is the best Fatah candidate. When asked to name a better candidate, 42% selected Marwan Barghouti, 10% selected Mohammad Dahlan, and 7% selected Mohammad Shtayyeh.  
• The largest percentage (28%) says that the top priority for Palestinian elections should be to restore unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 24% say it is improving economic conditions; 18% say it is the removal of the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip; 15% say it is to fight corruption; 6% say it is to bring back democracy; and another 6% say it is to strengthen resistance to occupation.
• 52% say if elections are held today under current conditions, they will not be fair and free; 41% do not agree with that.  Moreover, 76% think that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah will not accept the results and 58% think if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas will not accept the results.

(6) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 72% and in the West Bank at 54%.
• 28% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 38% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 24% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and only 25% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 86%. Three months ago, 80% expressed a similar view. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, only 63% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions.
• 45% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 54% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas authorities without fear and 46% think they cannot.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 55% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 41% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 62% viewed the PA as a burden.
• A year and nine months since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 66% expect failure; only 27% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expect success.  In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 35% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 22%, followed by Palestine TV, Al Aqsa TV, and Maan TV at 12% each, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 5% each, and finally al Manar at 1%.  

(7) Reconciliation: 

• An overwhelming majority (77%) thinks the reconciliation efforts are not serious and insufficient.
• Only 29% are optimistic and 68% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 37%.

(8) The Arab Peace Initiative, Arab normalization with Israel, and Arab visits to Jerusalem: 

• Three quarters of the public (75%) believe the Arab Peace Initiative is a thing of the past while 19% think it remains standing.
• 81% expect Saudi Arabic will soon join the Arab normalization train while 15% do not expect that.
• Only 11% believe that Arab normalization agreements help in resolving the conflict with Israel while 57% think they cause damage to the efforts to resolve the conflict.
• 29% say they are for and 69% say they are against visits from Arab countries, particularly from the Gulf, to East Jerusalem and for praying at Al Aqsa Mosque. But a majority of 52% says that these visitors should be allowed to pray at the mosque or should be left alone without interference.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 45% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and an identical percentage (13%) believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 29%, the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 26%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 20%,  the continued  siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 11%.

3-7 April 2003

These are the results of opinion poll # 7, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 3-7 April 2003. The poll deals with the public attitudes toward the appointment of a Palestinian prime minister, political reform, the Quartet's roadmap, war in Iraq, the popularity of Yasir Arafat and political affiliation. The total sample size of this poll is 1315 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face, in 120 locations in the West Bank (821) and the Gaza Strip (494). The margin of error is 3%. 

To obtain full information, explanation and results, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki, PSR – Ramallah, Tel: +972 2 296 4933, fax 02-296 4934, or e-mail: pcpsr@pcpsr.org

MAIN RESULTS:

The results indicate that despite the war in Iraq, the Palestinian public tends to be optimistic about the chances for a return to the peace process. The optimism is derived mainly from the appointment of Abu Mazin as a prime minister, an appointment that receives the support of a clear majority. The optimism may also reflect the fact that a clear majority supports a mutual cessation of violence. This majority may believe that once mutual violence stops, the two sides may find it easier to return to negotiations. At the same time however, the Palestinian public is concerned about the impact of the war in Iraq on the future of the peace process and does not show a great confidence in the ability of the Abu Mazin to control the security situation or even carry out political reforms. Despite the fact that half of the Palestinians sees in the appointment of Abu Mazin an erosion in the status and powers of Yasir Arafat, the popularity rate of both men remains unchanged compared to five months ago. 

1) The appointment of Abu Mazin as a Prime Minister

• ·        A majority of Palestinians (64%) supports the creation of the position of a prime minister while 28% oppose it
• ·        Support for the appointment of Abu Mazin as a prime minister reaches 61% and opposition 32%
• ·        50% sees in the appointment of Abu Mazin an erosion in Arafat's status and authority
• ·        A majority of 86% supports internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms, but only 44% support the call to change the political system to a parliamentary one in which power resides in the hands of a prime minister and the position of the president becomes ceremonial

The results show that a majority of Palestinians (64%) supports the creation of the position of a prime minister while 28% oppose that step. But support for Abu Mazin as a prime minister is slightly less at 61% and opposition slightly higher at 32%. Support for Abu Mazin as a prime minister increases in the Gaza Strip (64%) compared to the West Bank (59%), among the old (68%) compared to the young (53%), among the illiterates (67%) compared to holders of BA degree (52%), among the farmers and retired persons (71% and 68% respectively) compared to students (50%), and among supporters of Fateh (71%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%).

While a majority of 70% believes that a government headed by Abu Mazin would be able to renew negotiations with Israel and 50% believe that it would improve economic conditions, only 39% believe that it would be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire on all Palestinian factions and 53% believe that it would not. Moreover, only 43% believe that it would be able to carry out political reform and 44% believe that it would be able to fight corruption. It is worth noting that while the appointment of Abu Mazin has not changed Palestinian expectations regarding the prospect for combined cessation of violence and return to negotiations (standing at 18%, compared to 16% last November), a shift did occur in the expectations regarding the prospect for a combined continuation of armed confrontations and no return to negotiations. In this poll, only 27% (compared to 42% last November) believe that armed confrontations would not stop and the two sides would not return to negotiations.

Palestinians are also divided in two halves over the issue of whether Abu Mazin will be able to form a government that could win the confidence of the Palestinians, with 43% believing he would and 43% believing he would not. It is worth remembering that only 40% were willing in November 2002 to give confidence to Arafat's current government. Palestinians are also divided over the issue of whether the appointment of Abu Mazin represents erosion in the authority and status of Yasir Arafat with 50% agreeing with that and 43% disagreeing.

Belief that the appointment of Abu Mazin represents an erosion in Arafat's power increases in the West Bank (52%) compared to the Gaza Strip (48%), in cities and villages (51% and 52% respectively) compared to refugee camps (45%), among men (55%) compared to women (46%), among the young (52%) compared to the old (45%), among holders of BA degree (58%) compared to illiterates (37%), among students, merchants, and farmers (62%, 63%, and 71% respectively) compared to professionals, retired persons, and the unemployed (44% each), among middle income people —monthly earning between JD300-600 (55%) compared to low income people (48%), and among supporters of Hamas (54%) compared to supporters of Fateh (47%).

While a majority of 86% supports internal and external calls for wide and fundamental political reforms, only 44% support (and 50% oppose) the call for changing the Palestinian political system so that power would reside in the hands of the prime minister while the position of the president would become ceremonial. Support for this change in the political system stood at 47% last November and opposition at 49%. Support for changing the political system to make the office of the president ceremonial increases in the West Bank (46%) compared to the Gaza Strip (41%), in cities (47%) compared to refugee camps (38%), among men (48%) compared to women (41%), among the old (53%) compared to the young (35%), among non-refugees (48%) compared to refugees (39%), among retired persons, farmers, professionals, craftsmen, and laborers (68%, 65%, 56%, 50% and 51% respectively) compared to students, employees, and housewives (33%, 39%, and 40% respectively), among those working in the private sector (50%) compared to those working in the public sector (41%), among high income people (56%) compared to low income people (44%), and among national independents and the unaffiliated (58% and 47% respectively) compared to those who support Hamas and Fateh (39% and 41% respectively).

2) The Peace Process:

• ·        The roadmap receives the support of 55% and the opposition of 39%
• ·        45% believe, and 46% do not believe, the US and other Quartet members will put great pressure on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept the read map
• ·        Support for American pressure on the Palestinian Authority to accept the roadmap does not exceed 17% while 79% oppose such pressure
• ·        48% oppose the deployment of international forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if it means pressuring the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement the roadmap; support stands at 38%; additional 9% would support the deployment if it was European only, and less than 1% support a deployment of American forces
• ·        A majority of 71% supports mutual cessation of violence

Palestinian attitude toward the Quartet's roadmap has become slightly more positive with 55% supporting it and 39% opposing it. Last November, 54% supported and 42% opposed it. Support for the roadmap is reinforced with a strong support for a ceasefire. A majority of 71% (compared to 76% last November) supports a mutual cessation of violence while 27% (compared to 22% last November) oppose it. Under conditions of mutual ceasefire, 50% of all the public would support taking measures against those who would continue to carry out attacks against Israeli civilians while 45% would oppose doing so. Last November, support for such measures stood at 56% and opposition at 40%.  Still, three quarters acknowledge that failure to take such measures would impede the revival of the peace process. On the other hand, 79% express concern that taking such measures may lead to civil war.

Support for taking measures against those who continue to attack Israeli civilians after a mutual cessation of violence increases among men (53%) compared to women (47%), among the old (54%) compared to the young (47%), among the illiterates (57%) compared to holders of BA degree (46%), among laborers, professionals, and craftsmen (59%, 56%, and 56% respectively) compared to students and employees (45% each), among those working in the private sector (57%) compared to those working in the public sector (46%), and among supporters of Fateh (64%) compared to supporters of Hamas (40%).

In the absence of a mutual cessation of violence, a majority of 57% (compared to 53% last November) continues to support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 40% oppose it. Support for attacks on soldiers and settlers remains very high (over 90%) as in the previous poll. As in November, two thirds continue to believe that armed confrontations have so far helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not.

Palestinians are divided over whether the US and other members of the Quartet would put heavy pressure on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept the roadmap with 45% believing that they would and 46% that they would not. A clear majority of 79% would oppose such American and international pressure if it was put on the Palestinian Authority while only 17% would support it. Moreover, only 38% would support the deployment of international forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to force the Palestinians and the Israelis to accept and implement the roadmap. An additional 9% would support such deployment only if the forces were European. Forty-eight percent would oppose any deployment of international forces, and less than one percent would support the deployment if the forces were made up of Americans only.

A majority of 65% (compared to 73% last November) supports reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinians state is established and recognized by the state of Israel. In this context, 82% would support open borders between the two states, 65% would support building joint economic institutions and ventures, 26% would support building joint political institutions, and 30% would support adopting Palestinian laws that would prohibit incitement against Israel. However, only 7% would support changing the Palestinian curriculum so that it no longer call for the return of all of Palestine to Palestinians

3) War in Iraq

• 99% of the Palestinians oppose the war against Iraq, with 58% believing that its aim is to control the Iraqi oil
• 46% believe the war in Iraq will make it possible for Israel to carry out mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 44% believe that it will not
• A majority of 61% believes the war in Iraq will make it more difficult for Palestinians and Israelis to return to the peace process and a majority of 78% believes the war will strengthen Palestinian motivation to carry out armed attacks against Israelis

The results show that almost all Palestinians oppose the war on Iraq; with 58% of them believing that the primary motive of the US is to seize Iraqi oil, 32% believing the motive to be to help Israel, and only 2% believing it to be to disarm Iraq from weapons of mass destruction. While 78% of the respondents believe that the war in Iraq would strengthen Palestinian desire to carry out attacks on Israelis and 61% believe that it would take Israelis and Palestinians further away from the peace process, only 46% believe (and 44% do not believe) that Israel would be able to exploit the opportunity to carry out a mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The belief that Israel will be able to exploit the war to carry out mass expulsion of Palestinians increases among residents of villages and towns (48%) compared to refugee camps (40%), among the old (50%) compared to the young (43%), among the illiterates (51%) compared to holders of BA degree (31%), among farmers, retired persons, and craftsmen (59% and 50% respectively) compared to professionals, laborers and students (33%, 40%, and 42% respectively), among those with low income (47%) compared to those with high income (22%), and among supporters of Fateh and Hamas (50% and 47% respectively) compared to the unaffiliated (40%).

Most Palestinians (61%) believe that Iraq of Saddam Hussein would win the war in Iraq while only 12% believe that the winner will be the US and its allies. Eighteen percent see all sides as losers. The results show that socio-economic factors (such as income and education), rather than political affiliation, determine beliefs regarding the outcome of the war. Belief that Iraq's Saddam would win increases among women (71%) compared to men (51%), among illiterates (73%) compared to holders of BA degree (44%), among housewives and farmers (72% and 65% respectively) compared to retired persons, professionals and employees (32%, 39%, and 47% respectively), and among low income persons (65%) compared to high income persons (33%).  On the other hand, the results show that political affiliation plays no role in shaping beliefs regarding this matter.

4) Domestic Palestinian Issues

• ·        81% believe there is corruption in the institutions of the Palestinian Authority
• ·        Arafat's popularity stands at 35%, as in our survey of last November, followed by Ahmad Yasin (15%), and Haidar Abdul Shafi (10%)
• ·        For a vice president, Marwan Barghouti receives the highest rating with 20% (compared to 21% last November)
• ·        Fateh receives the support of 26%, followed by Hamas with 17%

The poll shows that Arafat's popularity, at 35%, remains unchanged since last November. Marwan Barghouti is the second most popular Palestinian leader with 20% support. Despite his appointment as a prime minister, Abu Mazin's popularity remains unchanged at 3%. Fateh, at 26%, is still the most popular faction followed by Hamas at 17%. Fateh's support stood at 27% last November. Total support for Islamists (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and independent Islamists) stands at 29% compared to 25% last November. The combined strength of all Palestinian opposition factions, Islamist and nationalist, stands at 32% while 41% remain undecided. 

A majority of 81% believes that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority and only 30% among those believe that corruption will decline in the future. Last November, 84% believed corruption existed in the PA. Palestinians are divided over the performance of the finance minister, Salam Fayyad, with 35% satisfied, 36% unsatisfied, and 29% unsure.

Fourteen percent, compared to 20% last November, say that conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip lead them to seek permanent emigration. The desire to emigrate increases among men (19%) compared to women (9%), among the young 23%) compared to the old (5%), among the holders of BA degree (20%) compared to illiterates (3%), among professionals, students, and laborers (33%, 26%, and 22% respectively) compared to retired persons and housewives (6% and 8% respectively).

December 2004 - January 2005

22-24 March 2007 

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during March 22-24, 2007. This poll deals with several issues including the national unity government, the peace process, the domestic balance of power, and the Sunni-Shii strife in Iraq. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults, 830 in the West Bank and 440 in the Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings show that the Palestinian public is satisfied with the make-up of the national unity government which was formed just one week before the conduct of the poll. The success of Fateh and Hamas in forming a unity government has created hope, optimism, and great expectations particularly regarding the ability of the new government to end infighting, enforce law and order, and reduce international financial sanctions and diplomatic boycott.

But the public is divided on the issue of international or Quartet conditions for resumption of financial assistance and diplomatic engagement. Half of the public wants the government to accept the conditions and the other half does not want it to do so. Despite this split, a clear majority supports the recognition of Israel when this recognition is part of a settlement that creates a Palestinians state and resolves all issues of the conflict. Moreover, an overwhelming majority supports the current ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and wants to see it expanded to include the West Bank.

Moreover, it seems that the formation of the national unity government, the majority belief that this development will lead to more moderation regarding Israel inside Hamas, and the increased talk about reaffirming Arab commitment to it in the March 2007 Arab Summit have increased public support for the Saudi Initiative from about 60% last December to about three quarters in this poll. It is worth noting that support for a permanent settlement, such as the Saudi Initiative, does not preclude support for an interim one. Findings show that more than 70% support the conduct of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on an interim settlement that would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the largest part of the occupied territories to be followed by negotiations leading to a comprehensive permanent settlement. 

The formation of the national unity government did not lead to changes in the domestic balance of power between Fateh and Hamas as both have maintained the same levels of popularity as in our poll last December. The same applies to the popularity of PA president Mahmud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh; as in our December poll both receive in this poll almost equal percentage of support.

In this poll, we have examined for the first time public perception of the Shii-Sunni sectarian violence in Iraq. Findings show that a majority of Palestinians view the current violence in Iraq to be partly sectarian in nature. Among those who do see it that way, a majority believes that the PA, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Fateh and Hamas side with the Sunnis while Iran and Hezbollah side with the Shiis. As for Syria, about one third believes it stands with the Sunnis and another third believes it to side with the Shiis. 

(1) National Unity Government  

• 88% are satisfied with the make-up of the national unity government and 11% are dissatisfied.
• In evaluating the Mecca Agreement between Fateh and Hamas, 62% believe that both sides had to compromise a little while 9% believe that Hamas had to accept Fateh’s position and 4% believe that Fateh had to accept Hamas position.
• A small minority not exceeding 13% blames Hamas for the failure of its former government to improve Palestinian conditions
• The largest percentage (43%) wants the enforcement of law and order to be the top priority of the unity government.
• 69% expect the unity government to last at least until the end of the year while 23% expect it to fall before the end of the year.
• 48% want the unity government to accept the conditions of the Quartet and 48% does not want it to accept them.
• In the aftermath of the formation of the national unity government, public expectations are high: a majority ranging between 65% and 71% expect improvements in the ability of the government to pay salaries, the enforcement of law and order, the fight against corruption, the prevention of infighting, the easing of financial sanctions, and the return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (88%) is satisfied with the make-up of the national unity government while 11% say they are dissatisfied with it. Among other things, this near consensus may have been caused by the perception of a large part of the respondents (62%) that the Mecca Agreement that led to the formation of the unity government has been the outcome of modification in the positions of the two sides, Fateh and Hamas, with only 9% believing that Hamas had to acquiesce to Fateh’s demands and 4% believing that Fateh had to acquiesce to Hamas’s demands. 20% said neither side had to change its position.

Findings also show that only a small percentage (13%) holds Hamas responsible for the failure of its former government to improve Palestinian conditions. The largest percentage (37%) blames Israel, 25% blame the international community and the US, and 13% blame other Palestinian parties such as Fateh.

The largest percentage (43%) believes that the top priority for the unity government should be the enforcement of law and order while 26% believe that it should be the ending of the current financial sanctions. 17% believe the top priority should be the conduct of political reforms and 13% believe it should be the return to the peace process. One reason for placing the peace process at a low level of importance might be due to public perception that it is not the role of the unity government to negotiate and that negotiation with Israel is the responsibility of the PA president and the PLO. Alternatively, the public might believe that no progress is possible in negotiations any way.

The public is divided into two equal halves regarding how the unity government should respond to the Quartet conditions: 48% want it to accept them and 48% do not want it to accept them. If Israel recognizes the unity government, 49% say the government should in this case recognize Israel and 47% say it should not. Support for the recognition of Israel increases among men (52%) compared to women (47%), among supporters of Fateh (66%) compared to supporters of Hamas (32%), among retired persons (76%) and employees (57%) compared to students (36%), and among people older than 48 years of age (56%) compared to those between 18-22 years of age (38%).

Findings also show high expectations among the majority of Palestinians with 69% expecting the unity government to continue in office at least until the end of the year while 23% expect it to fall before the end of the year. Moreover, 71% expect improvement in the ability of the government to pay salaries, 69% expect improvement in the government’s ability to enforce law and order, 65% expect improvement in economic conditions, 65% expect improvement in their personal safety and security, and 65% expect improvement in the fight against corruption and the implementation of reform measures. 71% expect the chances for infighting to recede while 67% expect the financial sanctions to ease. Almost two thirds (65%) expect return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in the near future. In fact, 54% expect that formation of the national unity government to lead Hamas to become more flexible and moderate in its position regarding Israel. 18% expect the opposite to happen.  

(2) Domestic Conditions  

• 53% are satisfied with the performance of PA President Mahmud Abbas and 43% are dissatisfied
• Only 6% view conditions of Palestinians in PA areas are good while 82% view them as bad or very bad
• Most important problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty followed by Israeli occupation and its daily practices
• 84% believe that corruption exists in the PA and 49% of those believe that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future
• 27% say that their personal security and safety is assured while 73% say it is not
• 51% evaluate the performance of the “Executive Force” as negative, increasing the level of anarchy and lawlessness, while only 29% see it as positive, contributing to the enforcement of law and order
• In light of the last election experience, 56% see democracy as a viable political system suitable for Palestine while 40% see it as nonviable and unsuitable for Palestine
• 32% say they believe Hamas’s goal is to establish a state that guarantees rights but where Sharia, or Islamic law, is the only source of legislation and 16% say they believe it seeks to establish a Sharia state similar to Saudi Arabia

Findings show significant increase in the level of public satisfaction with the performance of PA president Mahmud Abbas compared to findings in our last poll in December 2006: 53% are satisfied now compared to 40% last December. Dissatisfaction in this poll reaches 43%. Despite this improvement and despite the high level of satisfaction with the make-up of the unity government, only 6% describe current condition of the Palestinians in PA areas as good or very good while 82% describe it as bad or very bad. About one third (32%) believe the most important problem confronting Palestinians today is unemployment and poverty while 24% believe it is the continuation of occupation and its daily measure, 23% believe it is corruption and lack of internal reforms, and 20% believe it is internal anarchy.

Findings also show that 84% believe that corruption exists in the PA and among those 49% believe that this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future. About 42% believe it will decrease. It is interesting to note that only 21% believed last December that corruption will decrease in the future. The change might be due to an increase in the level of optimism generated by a high level of expectations from the national unity government.

Only 27% say that their personal safety and security is assured and 73% say it is not. In this regard, it is worth noting that 51% evaluate the performance of the “Executive Force” negatively viewing it as contributing to lawlessness while only 29% evaluate it positively viewing it as contributing to enforcement of law and order. These findings are identical to those we found in our December 2006 poll which means that the formation of the national unity government did not change public views regarding the performance of this force.

But the formation of the unity government might have positively affected, even if slightly, public evaluation of democracy in light of the outcome of the legislative elections in January 2006. Today, 56% view democracy as a viable political system suitable for Palestine (compared to 53% three months ago) while 40% view it as nonviable and unsuitable for Palestine (compared to 43% three months ago).

Finally, the formation of the national unity government did not affect public reading of Hamas’s goals regarding the nature of the Palestinian state it seeks to create. 21% (compared to 23% six months ago) view Hamas’s goal as the creation of a state that guarantees public liberties and in which Sharia would be one of the sources of legislation. By contrast, 32% (compared to 33% six months ago) view Hamas’s goal as the creation of a state that guarantees public liberties and in which Sharia would be the only source of legislation. Moreover, 16% (compared to 13% six months ago) view its goal as the creation of a state based on Sharia like in Saudi Arabia, and 5% (compared to 7% six months ago) view it as the creation of a state based on Sharia like in Afghanistan under the Taliban. 16%, compared to 15% six months ago, believe Hamas’s goal is the creation of a state like other Arab states in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.

 (3) Peace Process  

• A majority of 72% supports the Saudi, or Arab, initiative and 26% oppose it.
• 63% support and 35% oppose mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict.
• A majority of 54% supports and 43% oppose a permanent settlement in which Israel withdraws from all occupied territories with the exception of settlement areas in less than 3% of the West Bank which would be subject to territorial exchange
• 43% support and 55% oppose a permanent settlement in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state and Israel annexes Jewish neighborhoods and the Wailing Wall.
• 43% support and 54% oppose a permanent settlement in which the refugee problem is resolved based on UN resolution 194 but with restrictions on refugee return to Israel which would be subject to an Israeli decision.
• A majority of 71% support and 27% oppose the conduct of negotiations with Israel that would aim at establishing a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations between the Palestinian state and Israel on a permanent settlement.
• A majority of 85% supports the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, 84% support the extension of the current ceasefire to include the West Bank.
• 47% believe that Hamas’s goal is to reach a long term Hudna or truce with Israel, 24% believe its goal is to insure the continuation of the conflict and 22% believe its aim is to seek permanent peace with Israel.

Findings show that about three quarters of the Palestinians (72%) support the Saudi Initiative while 26% oppose it. This finding points to a significant increase in support for this initiative compared to the situation three months ago when support stood at 59% and opposition at 38%. The increase in the level of support might have the result of increased Arab and international interest in the initiative and in light of the plan by the Arab Summit in Riyadh to reaffirm Arab commitment to it. Moreover, the Mecca Agreement, the formation of the unity government, and the public expectation that Hamas will show more moderation regarding Israel might have played a role in increasing public support for the initiative. Support for the initiative increases among supporters of Fateh (82%) compared to supporters of Hamas (63%), among non refugees (76%) compared to refugees (66%), among illiterates (81%) compared to holders of BA degree (70%), among retired persons (87%) compared to students (69%), and among those most willing to buy a lottery ticket (86%) compared to the most unwilling (61%).

Findings show that a majority of 63% supports and 35% oppose a mutual recognition in which Palestinians recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israel recognizes Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the establishment of a Palestinian state and the resolution of all issues of conflict. Support for this mutual recognition stood at 58% and opposition at 40% in our poll last December.

Findings show a majority of 54% supports and 43% oppose a permanent territorial solution in which Israel withdraws from all occupied territories with the exception of settlement areas not exceeding 3% of the size of the West Bank which would be exchanged with an equal territory from Israel. Support for this settlement stood at 61% three months ago. With regard to a permanent settlement in Jerusalem -- in which East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state but in which Israel would annex Jewish neighborhoods and the Wailing Wall – 43% would support and 55% would oppose the proposed solution. Three months ago, support for this solution stood at 39%. Similarly, 43% would support and 54% would oppose a refugee permanent settlement based on UN resolution 194 but in which actual return to Israel would be restricted and be subject to an Israeli decision. Three months ago, support for this solution stood at 41% and opposition at 54%.

The poll found a high level of support (71%) for entering negotiations whose objective would be the creation of a Palestinian state in all Gaza and about 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by negotiations on permanent issues to be conducted by the state of Palestine and the state of Israel. 27% opposed entering such negotiations. It is worth mentioning that three months ago we found that 58% would support a Palestinian-Israeli agreement that would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state in all Gaza and 80% to 90% of the West Bank to be followed by permanent status negotiations on borders, refugees, and holy places.

As in our last poll three months ago, an overwhelming majority (85%) supports the current ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and a similar percentage (84%) supports extending it to include the West Bank.

Findings show that only 22% consider Hamas’s objective to be the arrival at a permanent settlement with Israel while 47% believe that Hamas aims at reaching a long term Hudna or armistice. About one quarter (24%) believe that Hamas wants to insure the continuation of the conflict with no settlement at all.

(4) Domestic Balance of Power 

• If new legislative elections are held today, 37% would vote for Hamas, 43% for Fateh, 11% for other lists, and 8% remain undecided. These results are almost identical to those obtained in our last poll conducted three months ago in December 2006.
• If new presidential elections are held today and the only two candidates were PA President Mahmud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh, 47% would vote for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh. These results are almost identical with those obtained in our last poll three months ago. But if the only two candidates were Marwan Barghouti and Isma’il Haniyeh, Barghouti would receive 52% and Haniyeh 43%. 

Findings show that the formation of the unity government did not affect the popularity of the various factions. If elections are held today, Hamas would receive 37% of the vote (compared to 36% last December), Fateh 43% (compared to 42% last December), all other factions 11% (compared to 12% last December),  and 8% remain undecided (compared to 10% last December). It is worth noting however that the popularity of Hamas has finally stabilized after continued but slight decline since June 2006.

If new presidential elections are to be held today with only two candidates, PA president Mahmud Abbas and PA Prime Minister Isma’il Haniyeh, competing, the two would receive almost identical percentages of the vote: 47% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh. These are almost identical to the results we obtained last December. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Isma’il Haniyeh, Barghouti would win with 52% of the vote against 43% for Haniyeh. In our December 2006 poll, we measured the popularity of Marwan Barghouti against that of Khalid Mish’al: Barghouti received 57% of the vote to Mish’al’s 36%.

(5) Sunni-Shii Strife in Iraq   

• 59% agree and 39% disagree that part of the conflict in Iraq is a sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shiis
• Majorities ranging between 50% to 69% believe that Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority take the side of the Sunni Iraqis in their conflict with Shii Iraqis
• On the other hand, 79% believe Iran takes the side of the Shiis and 74% believe Hezbollah too takes the sides of the Shiis in Iraq.
• 69% believe Fateh stands with the Sunnis and 76% believe that Hamas too stands with the Sunnis.
• 75% of the respondents say they stand with the Sunnis of Iraq in their conflict with the Shiis

Findings show that a majority of Palestinians (59%) believes that part of the armed conflict in Iraq is a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiis while 39% disagree with that. A majority (ranging between 50% and 69%) of those who do believe that a sectarian conflict exists in Iraq believes that the Palestinian Authority and Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia stand on the side of the Sunnis in their conflict with the Shiis. By contrast, 79% believe Iran stands on the side of the Shiis. When asked about Syria, about one third (34%) said it stood on the side of the Sunnis and 31% said it stood on the side of the Shiis.

When asked about the position of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Fateh, findings show that about three quarters believe that Hezbollah stands on the side of the Shiis, but 69% said Fateh stands on the side of the Sunnis and 67% said Hamas too stands on the side of the Sunnis. It is worth mentioning that while only 3% said Fateh stands on the side of the Shiis, 13% said Hamas stands on the side of the Shiis.

Three quarters of those who believe that a sectarian conflict exists in Iraq say they stand with the Sunnis, less that 1% say they stand with the Shiis, 18% say they stand with neither side, and 4% say they stand with both sides. Percentage of those who stand with the Sunnis increases in the Gaza Strip (87%) compared to the West Bank (67%), among those living in refugee camps (84%) compared to those living in villages and towns (71%), and among men (79%) compared to women (71%). But supporters of Fateh and Hamas say equally that they stand with the Sunnis (82% and 80% respectively). .... Full Report

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 15-18 September 2021. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the killing of a political activist, Nizar Banat, right after his arrest and sever beating by the Palestinian security services, the eruption of widespread demonstrations against the PA demanding justice for Banat, the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel and the capture of four of them (just before the fieldwork began), the continued Egyptian-mediated Hamas-Israeli negotiations to strengthen the ceasefire reached in May and begin the process of reconstruction, the meeting of PA president Mahmoud Abbas with the Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz in Ramallah to talk about Palestinian-Israeli relations and means of improving them while strengthening the PA by implementing various trust-building measures. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2021 show the centrality of domestic issues on shaping public attitudes. Three developments in particular are worth observing: the killing of the political activist Nizar Banat by PA security services, the manner in which PA security services dealt with protests during the last few months, and the residual impact of the last Hamas-Israel war of May 2021. Findings also show the great importance attached by the public to the issue of prisoners in Israeli jails. Impacted by all of the above, findings reflect continued PA loss of status and support.

A large majority rejects that the notion that the killing of Banat was a mistake unintentionally made by security officers. Instead, the public is confident that the death of the political activist was premediated, ordered by the political or security leadership. Because of that, the public is not 

satisfied with the step taken by the PA to ensure justice by putting all security officers involved on trial. The public is also angry with the manner in which the PA cracked down on public protests that demanded justice in the Banat case. In fact, three quarters view the behavior of the security services as a violation of liberties and human rights.

Findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public has been following, on daily basis, the news regarding the escape of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel. The overwhelming majority views the prisoners’ behavior, even after they were captured, as inspiring to the Palestinians to rise and take the initiative to resist the occupation.  Yet, on this issue of public consensus, one in which the PA is not a party, the Palestinian leadership and the security establishment do not come out looking good at all. While the public is easily convinced by Hamas’ proclamations and plans for freeing the prisoners, the PA is distrusted with the majority believes that the PA security services would not defend the prisoners.

The impact of the May 2021 confrontations in Jerusalem and the war between Hamas and Israel is still strongly felt in this poll. An overwhelming majority still thinks Hamas came out the winner and that Hamas goal has been to defend East Jerusalemites and al Aqsa Mosque. Indeed, the largest percentage (but not the majority) believes that Hamas is more deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people. The majority calls upon Hamas to relaunch rockets against Israel if East Jerusalemites are expelled from their homes in the city or if restrictions are imposed on Palestinian access to al Aqsa Mosque. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that now, after three months have passed since our last poll, we do see some decline in some of those indicators that measure the ascendance of Hamas. In almost all indicators, we see a small decline ranging between two to eight percentage points.

If new presidential and parliamentary elections were to take place today, Hamas would do relatively well compared to Fatah. This is particularly true for a presidential election, assuming president Abbas is Fatah’s candidate. The outcome would be dramatically different and more beneficial to Fatah if its candidate for the presidency is Marwan Barghouti. Most importantly for Fatah, findings show a significant increase in the demand for Abbas’ resignation, with almost 80% making the demand, an unprecedent PSR finding.

Findings show that in the context of increased Covid-19 infection rates, the majority is in favor of mandatory vaccination; but opposition is slightly more than a third. Yet, even among those who reject making vaccination mandatory to all of the public, a minority favors making it mandatory to those working in the public sector such as schools and ministries.

Findings on the peace process show continued but slow decline in support for the two-state solution. They also show high levels of support for armed struggle as the best means of ending the occupation with almost half of the public endorsing this position. Consistent with that we find a slim majority opposing a resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the sponsorship of the Quartet. Despite this, a majority of Palestinians view positively the confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

1) Prisoners escape from the Gilboa prison:

• An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (86%) says that it has heard about and followed on daily basis the news about the escape of the six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel and the capture of some of them while 12% say they did that occasionally and only 2% say they have not heard about or followed the news
• Similarly, 87% say the escape of the six prisoners and the capture of some of them will serve as an inspiration to Palestinians outside the prison to take the initiative and actively work toward the ending of occupation; only 7% think the escape and capture will have the opposite impact of bringing frustration and despair; 5% say it will have no impact.
• 81% believe that Hamas will soon succeed in making a deal with Israel on a prisoners’ exchange that will include the release of the escaped and recaptured prisoners; 14% believe no such exchange will take place soon.
• On the other hand, if the escaped prisoners managed to reach the Palestinian territories, only 24% think the PA security services would in this case protect them while 68% think they would not do so.

2) The death of Nizar Banat:

• A majority of 63% of the public believes that the killing of Nizar Banat soon after his arrest by PA security officials was a deliberate measure ordered by the PA political or security leaders while only 22% believe it was an unintentional mistake by those who arrested him.
• 63% support and 28% oppose the demonstrations that erupted after the death of Banat demanding the departure of the president from office and the removal of his government.
• A large majority of 69% feels the measures take by the PA to ensure justice in the Banat case, including putting on trial all 14 security officials who took part in his arrest, are insufficient; only 20% think they are sufficient.
• Almost three quarters (74%) believe the steps taken by the PA security services in arresting the demonstrators who demanded justice for Banat is a violation of liberties and human rights while only 18% view these measures as a legitimate enforcement of law and order.

3) Three months after the Jerusalem confrontations and the war between Hamas and Israel:

• An overwhelming majority of Palestinians (71%) believes that Hamas has come out a winner in its last war with Israel while only 3% think Israel came out a winner; 21% say no one came out a winner and 3% think both sides came out winners. Three months ago, 77% thought Hamas came out the winner. Moreover, 63% think that Hamas has achieved its declared goal behind firing rockets at Israel: to force Israel to stop the expulsion of the families in al Shaikh Jarrah and to bring to an end Israeli restriction on Muslim access to al Aqsa; 29% think it did not. Three months ago, 65% said Hamas has achieved its declared goal
• 67% think that Hamas’ decision to launch rockets at Israeli cities came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque while 10% think it came as a protest against the PA cancelation of elections with the aim of weakening the PA leadership; 19% think Hamas’ decision was motivated by these two drivers. Three months ago, 72% thought that Hamas’ decision came in defense of Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque.
• In light of the recent confrontations with Israel, 45% think Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while only 19% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 28% think neither side deserve such a role. Three months ago, 53% thought Hamas is more deserving of representation and leadership and 14% thought Fatah under the leadership of Abbas is the more deserving.
• If Israel expels the families of al Shaikh Jarrah or reimposes restrictions on access to al Aqsa Mosque, 60% believe the response in this case should be the launching of rockets at Israeli cities, while 20% think it should be the waging of non-violent resistance, and 13% believe Palestinians should respond by submitting a complaint to the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

4) Legislative and presidential elections:

• 73% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 23% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 82% in the Gaza Strip and 67% in the West Bank. But a majority of 56% (63% in the Gaza Strip and 52% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 34% and Haniyeh 56% of the votes (compared to 59% for Haniyeh and 27% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 34% of the votes (compared to 30% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 60% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 33% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Haniyeh 52% (compared to 59% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 66% and from among those Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 49% and from among those the former receives 31% and the latter 60%. Three months ago, Shtayyeh received the support of 26% and Haniyyeh 63%. 
• If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 33% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 22% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and another 6% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal and Mustafa Barghouti 3% each, and Salam Fayyad 2%.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 24% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 22% in the West Bank and 26% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas six months ago stood at 32% and dissatisfaction at 65%. Moreover, 78% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 19% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 68% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 78% in the West Bank and 77% in the Gaza Strip.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 68% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 37% say they will vote for Hamas and 32% say they will vote for Fatah, 13% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 41% and Fatah at 30%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 45% three months ago) and for Fatah at 27% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 28% (compared to 38% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 32% three months ago).

5)  Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 23%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%.
• 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 36% and in the West Bank at 21%. Three months ago, 15% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 42% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 83%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 61% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 57% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
• 38% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 58% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the West Bank, 18% of West Bankers said it was good or very good. In the Gaza Strip, 58% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 37% think they cannot. When asked to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the Gaza Strip, 43% of Gazans said it was good or very good.
• In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 34% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 35% viewed it as an asset.
• 32% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 41%.
• After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 70% expect failure; only 22% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 29%  of the public expect success and 63% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 64% expects failure and 30% expects success.
• We asked the public about its view regarding the demands for a change in the current PA government. A majority of 54% expresses support for comprehensive change leading to the appointment of a new government and a new prime minister, while 26% want only to change some of the ministers, and 14% do not want to make any change and want the government to stay as it is.
• We also asked the public about its views on the recuring internal violence similar to the one witnessed recently in which an incident between two individuals led to widespread family and tribal violence. A majority of 57% expressed the view that such incidents indicate a weak pubic trust in the justice system including law enforcement agencies; but 35% expressed the view that such incidents reflect the traditional nature of Palestinian society that is difficult or impossible to change.
• When asked how should the PA deal with such incidents, 66% expressed the view that first and foremost, the PA should strengthen the law enforcement authorities while 27% expressed the view that the PA should strengthen the tribal reform committees and cooperate with them.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 23%, followed by Palestine TV (14%), al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine Today (11%), Maan (10%), al Mayadeen (4%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Manar (2%).

6)  The Coronavirus: Mandatory vaccination and PA performance during the pandemic:

• With the big rise in the number of Covid infections, we asked the public about the steps it thinks the PA government should take in order to protect people from the pandemic: 39% said it should follow the normal procedures of enforcing social distance, face masks, and payment of fines for violators; a similar percentage (37%) said it should make vaccination mandatory to all those who are allowed to take it; 5% said it should impose a full closure; and 15% said they are in favor of all of the above.
• When asked specifically about mandatory vaccination, a majority of 63% expressed support while 35% expressed opposition.
• Among those who reject mandatory vaccination, 29% are in favor, and 69% are not in favor, of making it mandatory to those who work in the public sector such as those working in schools and ministries.
• 48% (55% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) report that they have already received the coronavirus vaccination; 27% (19% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) says that they are willing to take the vaccine when available; and 24 say they and their families are not willing to take the vaccine when it becomes available to them.
• 74% (84% in the Gaza Strip and 68% in the West Bank) are satisfied with the efforts made by the government to obtain the vaccine and 24% are dissatisfied.
• 45% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 53% are dissatisfied.
• The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 59% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 63% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. But satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the Coronavirus crisis stands at only 39%.

7)  The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process and the new Israeli government:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 36% and opposition stands at 62%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.  
• A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 32% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 73% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 18% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 27% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 48% chose armed struggle, 28% negotiations, and 19% popular resistance. Three months ago, 49% chose armed struggle and 27% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public to speculate about the reasons for the lack of mass popular participation in non-violent resistance and provided the following list: trust in leadership and parties, burden of living conditions, or loss of will to fight. The largest percentage (44%) replied that it is due to lack of trust in the PA political leadership and; 39% said it has to do with the preoccupation and the burden of daily living conditions; and only 16% selected the loss of the will to fight.
• Under current conditions, a majority of 61% opposes and 24% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
• When asked about support for specific policy choices, 63% supported joining more international organizations; 54% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 54% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 47% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 60% supported a return to confrontations and armed intifada, 47% supported dissolving the PA, and 20% supported the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• 58% are opposed, and 36% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden. Support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet stands at 39% and 52% are opposed. Moreover, 49% do not believe, and 41% believe, that the election of Biden and the resumption of American aid to the PA opens the door for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations within the framework of the two-state solution.
• We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 56% said it looks positively, while 35% said it looks negatively, at such measures.

8)  American withdrawal from Afghanistan:

• 40% view the events leading to the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan as a victory for Taliban against the US and its Afghani allies. But a third (33%) thinks that the events leading to the US withdrawal were orchestrated ahead of time between the US and Taliban; 27% say they not know.
• The largest percentage of the public (43%) does not expect what happened in Afghanistan to happen in Palestine in case of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a scenario in which such withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the PA and its government and the takeover of armed Islamist groups, such as Hamas; but 36% believe this scenario could indeed happen and 21% do not know.    
• Moreover, 46% believe the Palestinians should learn a lesson from what happened in Afghanistan by strengthening the forces of armed resistance, but not the PA and its government, while 28% think the lesson should lead us to strengthen the PA and its legitimacy so that it would not collapse as the Afghani government did.

9)  Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 32% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 10% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (36%; 31% in the Gaz Strip and 40% in the West Bank) said it is the continued siege and blockade percentage of the Gaza Strip, 23% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 13% said it is the continuation of the occupation, 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10%  said it is the spread of corruption, and 6% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.  

PressRelease  

Table of findings 

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, in partnership with and support from the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and with funding from the European Union (EU).

STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS

• A small majority of Palestinians (51%) and Israelis (58.5%) supports the two-state solution.
• Support for a permanent agreement package, one based on previous rounds of negotiations, is much lower than the support for the two-state solution. Only 39% of Palestinians and 46% of  Israelis support a peace agreement package that comprises:  a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, a family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine,  the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. In general, support for all parameters of a permanent peace deal is highest among Israeli Arabs (see Tables of Findings). However, as their demographic share of the entire Israeli adult population is only around 16%, their contribution to the pro-peace bloc in Israel is limited.
• A quarter of  Israelis and Palestinians who oppose the permanent agreement package are willing to  reconsider their opposition to the peace deal if it was accompanied by a peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Initiative's  principles (for the Israeli public), and an Israeli acceptance of that initiative (for the Palestinian public).
• In selecting between bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral approaches to peacemaking, Palestinians prefer the multilateral (44%) while the Israelis prefer the bilateral (40%). Of various multilateral forums, an Arab forum, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate, is the least rejected by the two sides. All other multilateral forums – an American-led, an EU-led, or an UN-led forum –  are acceptable to one side while unacceptable to the other.
• A quarter of Israelis and 35% of Palestinians support a one-state solution.
• Large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians estimate as low the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.
•  A majority (68%) of Palestinians admire Israeli democracy while only 10% of the Israelis see positively Palestinian democracy.
• A majority (62%) of Palestinians blame the collapse of peace negotiations on the Israelis. A somewhat smaller majority (52%) of Israelis blame the Palestinians for this collapse.  However, significant minorities (on both sides 43%) believe that the majority on the other side wants peace.

Findings show significant Palestinian-Israeli mutual misperception and that this mutual misperception is positively correlated with hardline views. In contrast, clarity/accurate perception about the views on the other side is positively correlated with greater willingness to compromise.

The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 2 and 4, 2016. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1,184 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between June 7 and 14, 2016. The margin of error is 3%.  The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Tamar Hermann, the academic director of IDI’s Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR.

MAIN FINDINGS

The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs and between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provided the respective findings for these sub groups.  

(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Two-state solution: Today, majorities on both sides – 59% of Israelis (53% among Jews and 87% among Arabs) and 51% of Palestinians – support what is known as the two-state solution. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view on their side and on the other side regarding this solution. Findings indicate that both sides underestimate and incorrectly assess the level of support for this solution on their side: among the Palestinians, 47% said a majority opposes it; among the Israelis, 57% said the majority opposes it. Worse yet, both sides underestimate the level of support for the two-state solution on the other side and think that there is a majority that opposes the two-state solution. Some 49% of the Palestinians believe a Jewish majority opposes it; on the Israeli side, 44% said a Palestinian majority opposes it.

Permanent status package: We presented Palestinians and Israelis with a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and asked them if they would support or oppose each of its components and the combined package. The majority on both sides, 55% of Israeli Jews and 59% of Palestinians, opposed the combined package. A minority – 46% of Israelis (39% among Israeli Jews and 90% among Israeli Arabs) and 39% of the Palestinians (37% among West Bankers and 43% among Gazans) – support the combined package.

A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package:

1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis and Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side: a minority among the Palestinians (40%) and a majority among the Israelis (68%; 64% among Israeli Jews and 91% among Israeli Arabs) supported this item.

2. A demilitarized independent Palestinian state will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: a minority of Palestinians (20%; 27% in the Gaza Strip and 16% in the West Bank) and a majority (61%) among Israelis supported this item.

3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides: among the Palestinians, a minority (36%) supported it, and among the Israelis, a majority (58%) supported it.

4. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years: on both sides only a minority supported this item: on the Palestinian side 33% (26% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) and among the Israelis, 42% (38% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs).

5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlements, which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements: a minority (35%) among the Palestinians (28% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip), and a small majority (52%) among the Israelis supported it (among the Israeli Jews only 49% supported it).

6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel: minorities on both sides (31%) among the Palestinians (39% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) and 49% of Israelis, supported it. (The Israeli Jews were actually split in the middle: 46% supported it while 45% opposed it).

7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state: again, minorities – among the Palestinian 30% and among the Israelis 39% (32% among Israeli Jews and 75% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty: a minority (31%) among Palestinians (24% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) and a similar minority (39%) among Israelis (33% among Israeli Jews and 73% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated: among the Palestinians, 49% (43% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip) supported it and among the Israelis, 27% (17% among Israeli Jews and 84% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.

We asked the public to assess the attitudes of their side and that of the other side toward the combined package. Both sides assessed correctly that a majority on their side and a majority on the other side would oppose the package; only 23% of Israelis and 35% of Palestinians believed that a majority on their side would support the package. Similarly, 35% of the Israelis (30% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs) and 40% of the Palestinians (32% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) thought that a majority on the other side would support the package.

It is worth noting that among Israeli Jews, support for the combined package among settlers stands at 16% compared to 40% among non-settlers. Support is much higher among Israeli Jews who define themselves as secular, standing at 56% compared to 36% among traditionalists, 10% among the religious, and 9% among the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox).

Support also varies depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: 88% on the left, 83% on the moderate-left, 59% on the center, 26% on the moderate-right, and 10% of the right support the package. Significantly, support for the package is much higher among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution than among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians opposes that solution (64% to 33%). Support is much higher among those Israelis who perceive Palestinian long-term aspirations as least threatening (see the following section for details on Israeli threat perception), standing at 74%, compared to those (22%) who perceive Palestinian long-term aspirations as most threatening (see the following section for details on Israeli threat perception).

Among the Palestinians, as we saw earlier, support for the combined package is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. It is worth noting that 70% of the residents of the Gaza Strip are refugees while only 28% of the residents of the West Bank are refugees. Part of the explanation for greater Gazan support is the fact that support for the package is higher among Palestinian refugees (43%) than non-refugees (37%). Surprisingly, however, those refugees living in refugee camps (estimated to be less than 60% of all refugees) are the least supportive of the combined package, standing at 35% compared to 40% among residents of cities and rural areas. Moreover, support for the package is higher among those who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” (63% and 41%) compared to those who define themselves as religious (35%); and among Fatah voters (57%) compared to Hamas voters (25%). As in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who believe that a majority of Israelis supports the two-state solution compared to those who believe that an Israeli majority is opposed to that solution (48% vs. 33%). Also, as in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who perceive Israeli long-term aspirations as least threatening, standing at 61%, compared to those who perceive Israel’s long term aspirations as most threatening, standing at 31% (See the following section for details on Palestinian threat perception). 

Peace Incentives: Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible.” For this end, we offered those who opposed the package various incentives in an attempt to understand the source of their opposition and the extent to which change was possible. Israeli Jews and Arabs and Palestinians opposed to the package were offered seven different incentives. Only the first three of the incentives offered to the three sides were identical or almost identical. The remaining four sought to address either presumed Palestinian or Israeli concerns.  In this regard, it should be noted that Israeli Arabs were offered the same four distinct incentives offered to the Palestinian respondents. Below is a detailed breakdown of the responses to the various incentives:

Israeli Incentives (offered only to those Israeli Jews and Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):

1. And if the agreement would include peace with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 26% of Israeli Jews and 42% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept package if it included this amendment.

2. And if free movement throughout Jerusalem – West and East – was insured as if it is one city? 15% of Israeli Jews and 37% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

3. And if Israel was offered by Europe to join the European Union? 12% of Israeli Jews and 37% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

4. What if the agreement includes recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people? 26% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

5. And if the US signs a defense treaty with Israel in order to boost Israel’s security? 19% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

6. And if the agreement will not allow Palestinian refugees to return to Israel to exercise a right of return, but they will be compensated by an international fund? 33% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

7. And if the exchanged territory that the Palestinians would receive in compensation for the settlement blocs annexed to Israel would be the areas populated today by Israeli Arabs, such as the area known as the Triangle? 22% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

In short, on Israeli side: all seven incentive made only a minority of those opposed to a peace agreement package change their minds regarding the combined package.

Palestinian Incentives in addition to the combined package (offered only to Palestinians/Israeli Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):

1. If Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty?  25% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

2. And if free movement throughout Jerusalem, West and East, was insured as if it is one city?  31% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

3. If the state of Palestine was offered by Europe to join the European Union?  32% of Palestinians and an identical percentage of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

4. If Israel acknowledged its responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem? 34% of Palestinians and 26% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

5. If the Palestinian state received $30 billion to $50 billion to help in settling those refugees wishing to live in the Palestinian state and compensating them? 31% of Palestinians and 37% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment;.

6. And if the exchanged territory that the Palestinians would receive in compensation for the settlements blocs annexed to Israel would be along the Gaza border?  18% of Palestinians and 21% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

7. And if the Palestinian state and Jordan become a confederation?  29% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.

In short, on the Palestinian and Israeli Arabs sides, all seven incentives made only a minority of those opposed to a peace agreement package change their minds regarding the combined package.

As the findings detailed above indicate, of the three identical or almost identical incentives, a broader regional peace involving the Arab World and Israel is the least opposed, as 26% of Israeli Jews, 25% of Palestinians, and 42% of Israeli Arabs who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept a package with this amendment. A one-quarter "defection" from opposition to support for the combined package increases the level of support for it among Palestinians and Israeli Jews from a minority to a majority position (39% to 54%). Of the distinct Palestinian incentives, the most effective proved to be the inclusion, as part of the refugee solution, of an item in which Israel acknowledges its responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem; such an inclusion managed to persuade more than one-third of the Palestinians who initially opposed the package to change their minds and accept it. On the Israeli side, the most effective incentive proved to be the removal of the line item that allowed 100,000 Palestinian refugees to return to Israel, with one third willing to change their mind and accept the combined package.

Sacred Values: The Pulse also sought to assess the main impediments on the road to peace, the “sacred values” that pull some Palestinians and Israelis away from compromise.  We offered each side four such values comprising aspects of history, national identity, holy places, refugees’ rights, and the 1967 borders.

Findings indicate that for Israeli Jews, the two most important of the four values examined related to history: (1) the demand by 79% for Palestinian recognition of the Jewish character of the state; (2) the demand by 73% for Palestinian recognition of the Jewish roots and history in the land of Israel; (3) the demand by 56% of Israeli Jews that the combined package should not include Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 line, or the Green Line; and (4) the demand by 55% of Israeli Jews for the inclusion in the agreement of Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount (al Haram al Sharif).

On the Palestinian side, findings show that the two most important of the four values related to history and territories: (1) the demand by 62% for an Israeli recognition of Palestinian roots/history in historic Palestine; (2) the demand by 61% that the agreement entail an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines; (3) the demand by 58% for an Israeli recognition of the refugees’ right of return; and (4) the demand by 57% for Palestinian sovereignty over al Haram al Sharif (the Temple Mount) .

Mutual Recognition of National Identity: We asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition of national identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Findings show that a majority (64%) of the Israeli public support such a mutual recognition and among Palestinians, a large minority (43%) support it. We then asked the two sides to tell us whether such recognition should come before or after the signing of a final settlement. For Israeli Jews, the preference is to have the recognition come before: 53% of the Israelis (55% among Israeli Jews and 40% among Israeli Arabs) said it should come before. But the Palestinians are divided into two categories:  39% said it should come before and 41% said it should come after.

We explored issues related to the process of peacemaking, specifically the most effective or “most promising” approaches to revive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the role of outside actors. In selecting from a list of three possible approaches, bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral, findings show that Palestinians and Israeli Arabs prefer the multilateral, while the Israeli Jews prefer bilateral between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.

Among the Palestinians (44%) and among the Israeli Arabs (54%) preferred a multilateral forum in which major powers sponsor the negotiations, while only 27% of the Israelis Jews preferred this approach. Only 22% of the Palestinians preferred bilateral negotiations while 41% of the Israeli Jews preferred this approach. Finally, only 18% of Palestinians and an identical percentage of Israelis selected the unilateral approach, one in which each side takes measures in order to promote its interests.

We also sought a deeper understanding of Israeli and Palestinian views of the multilateral approach. Four models of this approach were presented to the two publics: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led multilateral approach; 3) an EU-led approach; 4) and finally, an UN-led approach. Findings show that Palestinians were almost equally open to three of the four (the Arab forum, the UN and the EU approaches), with support ranging between 20-22%, while only 8% preferred a US-led effort. Israeli Jews preferred almost equally an Arab forum (28%) and a US-led effort (26%). Among Israelis Arabs, support was greater for an UN-led approach (36%) and an EU-led one (27%). 

We asked the two sides how they view various conditions on and attributes of the other side, and in some cases on their own side. The questions focused on matters ranging between democracy and rule of law to issues of long-term aspirations and threat perceptions, and, of course, who to blame for the failure to make peace. While the picture that emerges is discouraging, there are, nonetheless, a few glimmers of hope.

Democracy: 68% of the Palestinians (73% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip) describe Israeli democracy as good or very good. When Israelis were asked to evaluate democracy in the Palestinian Authority, a solid majority (77%) described Palestinian democracy as bad or very bad. It is worth noting that only 32% of the Palestinians describe Palestinian democracy as good or very good. By contrast, 65% of the Israelis describe Israeli democracy as good or very good.

When Palestinians were asked about the future of democracy in Israel, 38% said it will remain as it is now, 26% said Israel will become more democratic and 28% said it will become less democratic. When Israelis were asked about the chances that a better democratic system will be established in the future Palestinian state, a solid majority (83%) said the chances are very slim or fairly slim.

Rule of Law: When Palestinians were asked if the rule of law in Israel is good, 50% (62% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) replied in the affirmative. By contrast, when Israelis were asked if Palestinian rule of law is good, only 20% replied in the affirmative.

Want Peace: 43% of the Palestinians and identical percentage among Israeli Jews agree that the other side wants peace; 77% among Israeli Arabs agree that Palestinians want peace.

Failure of Peace Efforts – Who to Blame: As expected, Palestinians blame Israelis and Israelis blame Palestinians for the collapse of peace negotiations over the years: 62% of the Palestinians put the blame on the Israeli side and 52% of Israeli Jews put the blame on the Palestinian side. Only 8% of the Palestinians and 12% of Israeli Jews blame their side. A little over a quarter (26%) of the Palestinians and about a third (31%) of Israeli Jews place the blame on both sides to the same extent.

Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: The most disturbing, but not surprising, finding relates to the question of trust. Among Palestinians a solid majority (89%) feel Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. On the Israeli Jewish side, a somewhat smaller majority (68%) also indicated that Palestinians cannot be trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides, that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 50% of Israeli Jews, 61% of Israeli Arabs, and 70% of Palestinians agree with this dismal characterization.

Long-Term Aspirations: The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high: 54% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goal is to extend its borders to cover all area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens. Some 27% think Israel’s goal is to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Some 35% of Israelis (40% of Israeli Jews and 8% of Israeli Arabs) think Palestinians’ main aspiration is to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of its Jewish population; 19% think the goal of the Palestinians is to take over the entire state of Israel.

Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s long-term intention is to withdraw from all (7%) or some (10%) of the territories occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security. 37% of Israelis (33% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Israeli Arabs) think the aspirations of the Palestinians are limited to regaining some (21%) or all (16%) of the territories conquered in 1967.

However, when we asked Palestinians and Israelis to tell us what they think the long-term aspirations of their side are, the picture shows that the two sides perceive much more moderate aspirations on their side than anticipated by the other side. Only 12% of Israelis say the aspiration of Israel is to annex the West Bank and expel the Palestinians living there; 18% say that Israel intends to annex the West Bank without granting political rights to the Palestinians living there. Among the Palestinians, only 10% say that the Palestinian aspiration is to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of its Jewish population; 15% say Palestinian aspirations are to conquer the State of Israel and regain control over pre-1948 Palestine.

Fear: Among the Palestinians, 54% do not fear Israeli Jews. By contrast, 65% of Israeli Jews indicate they feel fear toward the Palestinians.

Worry: A solid majority (76%) of the Palestinians are worried or very worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Likewise, among the Israelis, 71% are worried or very worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Palestinian attacks in their daily life.

We also asked the Israelis if they are worried that “efforts by Palestinian groups and their supporters, such as the BDS movement, will succeed in delegitimizing Israel in the international community.” Israeli Jews (52%) and Israeli Arabs (83%) say their worry in this regard is low or very low.

Our General Conditions and Theirs: 49% of the Palestinians describe conditions in general in Israel as good, 24% describe them as bad, and 20% say they are so-so. By contrast, 45% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the West Bank as bad, 29% say they are so-so, and 25% describe them as good. As for conditions in the Gaza Strip, 72% describe them as bad.

When asked about their future expectations for conditions in the Gaza Strip in the next three to five years, 41% expect them to be worse and 30% expect them to be better. Expectations regarding West Bank conditions were a little more optimistic: 35% expect them to be better and 31% expect them to be worse.

Among the Israelis, 43% describe Palestinian conditions in the West Bank as bad, 24% describe them as good, and 22% describe them as so-so. With regard to conditions in the Gaza Strip, 68% of the Israelis describe them as bad.

By contrast, 39% of the Israelis describe Israel’s conditions as good, 36% describe them as so-so, and 24% describe them as bad. With regard to future expectations regarding the general conditions in Israel in the next three to five years, 31% of the Israelis believe they will be worse, 26% that they will be better, and 33% believe they will remain about the same as today.

Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Among Israeli Jews, a Jewish majority is seen as the most important value (35%), followed by peace (32%), democracy (20%), and Greater Israel (10%). Among the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital was seen as the most important value (45%), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (32%), and building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (13%).

Expectations: We asked both sides about their expectations for the near future. Findings show that the Israelis are more pessimistic than the Palestinians. Among the Israelis, 44% think that some violent acts or armed attacks will take place and the two sides will not return to negotiations. Some 29% think the two sides will return to negotiations but some violent acts or armed attacks will take place. Some 10% think the two sides will soon return to negotiations. Some 8% think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.  Among the Palestinians, 24% expect that some violent acts or armed attacks will take place and the two sides will not return to negotiations; 34% think that the two sides will return to negotiations but some violent acts or armed attacks will take place; 22% think that the two sides will soon return to negotiations; and 14% think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks.  In other words, 73% of the Israelis compared to 58% of the Palestinians expect violence to continue and 39% of the Israelis compared to 56% of the Palestinians expect the two sides to return to negotiations.

Palestinian State? We asked both side about the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years. On this issue, Israeli and Palestinian views are very similar: 77% of the Israelis and 73% of the Palestinians think the chances are low.

One-State Solution: The joint poll sought to ascertain the current level of support for the idea of a one-state solution “by which Palestinians and Jews will be citizens of the same state and enjoy equal rights.” Support for the idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 52%). Only a minority among Palestinians (34%) and among Israeli Jews (20%) support this option.

Impact of Palestinian Authority (PA) Collapse on Security:  We asked both sides to speculate about the likely impact of a PA collapse on security conditions. Responses were similar: 63% of Israelis and 60% of Palestinians indicated such a collapse will lead to an increase in Palestinian-Israeli violence. 

16-18 March 2006

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during March 16-18, 2006. The poll deals with Palestinian perceptions and the popularity of Fateh and Hamas in the post election period, attitudes towards the peace process after Hamas’ victory, attitudes regarding the Israeli raid on Jericho jail, and several domestic issues. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (809) and the Gaza Strip (463) in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.  

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings

This poll was conducted less than two months after the Palestinian legislative elections which took place on 25 January 2006 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but before Hamas government was presented to the new PLC and gained its vote of confidence. At the time of the poll, the international community was threatening to suspend aid to the PA but no action had been taken at that time.

The results indicate that despite threats of sanctions and despite public expectations that donors will indeed cut off support once a Hamas government is formed, support for Hamas has never been as high as it is today. In fact, support for Hamas today is higher than the support it received on the day of elections. By contrast, Fateh’s popularity decreased significantly compared to where it was before the elections. In fact, support for Fateh today is less than the support it had on the day of elections.

These results indicate that Israeli and Western threats increase rather than decrease public support for Hamas. Support for Fateh is dropping as some Palestinians might be punishing it for the role it seems, in their eyes, to play in bringing about the downfall of Hamas and the undoing of its victory.  

But the increased support for Hamas does not indicate increased support for its views on the peace process. To the contrary, Palestinian public opinion seems today more moderate and willing to compromise than it has been at any time before. Despite public objection to a  Hamas’ recognition of Israel in response to international pressure, a majority wants Hamas to negotiate with Israel and to implement the Road Map. More importantly, a majority supports the two-state solution and in this context supports a mutual recognition of Israelas the state for the Jewish people in exchange for an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people.

(1) Hamas and Fateh in the Post Legislative Elections’ Environment

• Hamas’ popularity continues to increase: 47% would vote for Hamas and 39% for Fateh if new elections are held today
• Two main reasons are given by the public for Hamas’ victory: the desire to have an authority that would implement Islamic Sharia code and the desire to have an authority that would fight corruption
• Fateh’s loss is attributed by the public to three main factors: the voters’ desire to punish it for corruption, its divisions and fragmentation, and its failure to enforce law and order
• Majority expects Hamas’ success in government, donors’ suspension of aid, and Hamas’ success in finding alternative sources of support
• Majority opposes a Hamas recognition of Israel in compliance with donors’ demands

In the estimate of 37% of the respondents, Hamas won the January parliamentary elections because voters wanted first and foremost an Islamist authority that implements the Sharia code. But 36% believe that voters wanted instead a clean government that fights corruption, 9% believe that voters wanted a strong authority that can put an end to anarchy and enforce law and order, and 7% believe that voters wanted a fighting authority that resists occupation. In the estimate of 52% of the respondents, Fateh lost the elections because voters wanted first and foremost to punish it for the spread of corruption in the PA. But 19% attribute the loss to Fateh’s divisions and lack of leadership, 17% to its failure to put an end to anarchy, and 5% to the failure of the peace process.

If new elections are to take place today, 47% of those who would participate say they would vote for Hamas, 39% for Fateh, and 8% for the four other factions represented in the current PLC. When asked about their actual vote in the last parliamentary elections in January, 46% said they voted for Hamas, 44% for Fateh, and 8% for the four other factions. (Actual official results were 44% for Hamas, 41% for Fateh, and 12% for the four other winning factions.) 

Support for Hamas increases in the Gaza Strip (51%) compared to the West Bank (45%). By contrast, support for Fateh increases in the West Bank (40%) compared to the Gaza Strip (37%). Support for Hamas increases in cities (52% compared to 36% for Fateh) and refugee camps (47% compared to 37% for Fateh). The two factions receive equal support in rural areas. Support for Hamas increases among women (51% compared to 36% for Fateh) and decreases among men (43% for Hamas compared to 41% for Fateh). It also increases among refugees (49% for Hamas compared to 37% for Fateh) and decreases among non refugees (45% for Hamas compared to 41% for Fateh). It also increases among the illiterates (57% for Hamas compared to 33% for Fateh), students (48% for Hamas compared to 37% for Fateh), housewives (51% for Hamas compared to 35% for Fateh), religious respondents (54% for Hamas compared to 35% for Fateh), and among those opposed to the peace process (68% for Hamas and 16% for Fateh).

A majority of 70% expects Hamas to succeed in leading and managing the affairs of the PA while 22% expect the opposite. A similar percentage (69%) is not worried about its personal freedom after Hamas’ victory and 30% are worried. The large percentage of those expecting a Hamas success is somewhat surprising given the fact that a similar percentage (68%) believe that the PA can not manage without donor support and that 50% of the respondents believe that aid will indeed be suspended as long as Hamas does not meet donors’ conditions. Despite the strong moderate peace tendencies of the respondents in this poll, a majority of 59% nonetheless believes that Hamas should not recognize the state of Israel in compliance with donors’ demands while 37% believe it should.

(2) The Peace Process in the Post Hamas’ Victory

• 75% want Hamas to negotiate peace with Israel
• Majority supports the implementation of the Road Map and a majority supports a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people under conditions of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state in a two-state solution
• Sharp divisions over collection of arms from armed groups but an overwhelming majority supports the integration of armed groups into PA security services
• About three quarters welcome a negotiated Israeli disengagement from the West Bank while only 23% would support the disengagement if it was unilateral
• 80% would support a declaration of Palestinian statehood if it comes as an outcome of negotiations with Israel and 59% would support it if it was unilaterally declared by the PA

Despite Hamas’ electoral victory and despite the added increase in its popularity after the elections, public support for the peace process is on the rise. Public willingness to compromise has increased significantly during the last few months with about three quarters of the Palestinians wanting Hamas to conduct peace negotiations with Israel and only 22% opposing it. A majority of 64% says it supports the peace process while only 14% says it is opposed to it. These percentages stood at 59% and 17% respectively in our exit poll on the day of elections last January. A majority of 53%, compared to 51% in the exit poll) wants the Hamas government to implement the Road Map and 40% oppose that.

But perhaps the most moderate and surprising attitude is the one toward the two state solution and mutual recognition of identity. In this poll, 66% said they would support, and 32% would oppose, the recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people in the context of peace based on a two-state solution and an Israeli recognition of Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. Support for this solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict stood at 57% and opposition at 41% last December. On the day of elections, only 49% supported this solution and 48% opposed it. As in our December poll, three quarters would support reconciliation between the two peoples under conditions of peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state recognized by Israel.

But divisions remain over how to handle the issue of arms collection. About half (49%) wants the new government to collect the arms of the various armed groups while 21% wants it to do nothing about those arms and 27% prefer to see the new parliament enacting a law that would allow armed groups to keep their arms. Identical results were registered on the day of elections.

Findings show that about three quarters of the respondents (73%) prefer to see a new Israeli disengagement from the West Bank carried out through negotiations while only 23% prefer to see it accomplished unilaterally. Moreover, the poll found that a majority (59%) believes that unilateral steps reduce the chances of eventually reaching permanent settlement to the conflict. Despite this, 59% would support a Palestinian unilateral step such as a PA unilateral declaration of statehood while 37% would oppose that. If the statehood declaration is the outcome of negotiations with Israel, a larger percentage (80%) would support it and only 17% would oppose it.

(3) Jericho Jail Raid

• A semi consensus that both the US and the UK are implicated in the Israeli raid on the Jericho jail
• 51% support non-violent reactions to protest the US and UK involvement but 46% support in various degrees other steps such as kidnappings or armed attacks

Findings show an almost total consensus among the Palestinians (93%) that the US and UK are implicated with Israel in the raid on the Jericho jail which took place few days before the poll was conducted. The raid and the arrest of Ahmad Sa’adat and his colleagues from the PFLP was followed by various types of reaction including demonstrations, attacks and burning of offices and other facilities belonging to the two countries, and kidnapping of foreigners. Findings show that 51% of the respondents supported only peaceful reaction or no reaction at all. Other types of reaction were supported to various degrees. For example, 9% supported attacks on and burning of offices and installations, 12% supported also the kidnapping of foreigners, and 25% supported also armed attacks against nationals from those two countries.

(4) Domestic Issues

• Poverty and unemployment is the most serious problem confronting Palestinians today followed by Israeli occupation and PA corruption
• Three quarters do not feel safe or secure in the PA
• 91% believe corruption exists in the PA but two thirds believe it will decrease in the future
• Large percentage wants to give greater jurisdiction to the new legislative council than the president
• If new presidential elections are held today, 37% would vote for Mahmud Abbas, 25% for Mahmud Zahhar, and 15% for Mustafa Barghouti from among a closed list
• If elections are held today for a vice president, 30% would vote for Ismail Haniyyeh, 20% for Marwan Barghouti, 11% for Mahmud Zahhar, 8% for Mohammad Dahlan, 7% for Farouq Qaddoumi, and 6% each for Saeb Erikat and Mustafa Barghouti
• Support for Fateh drops considerably from 45% in our December 2005 poll to 34% in this poll. Support for Hamas increases from 28% to 37% and for the Islamists in general from 35% to 43% during the same period.

The period in the post Hamas’ victory is witnessing a significant change in public priorities. Concern is growing over economic issues such as poverty and unemployment with 44% of the respondents viewing it as the most important problem confronting the Palestinians today while only 25% views the continued occupation as the most important problem and 24% views corruption as the most important problem. On the day of elections only 27% identified poverty and unemployment as the most important problem with corruption coming first with 29% and occupation coming second, like poverty and unemployment, with 27%.

Findings also show that three quarters of the Palestinians do not feel safe in their homes. This finding is identical with that we found on the day of elections. Absence of safety is felt more strongly in the West Bank, which is under semi full Israeli control, reaching 79% compared to 68% in the Gaza Strip, which is under semi full Palestinian control.

The poll shows that Hamas’ victory has also affected public perception regarding the future of corruption in the PA. While 91% believe that corruption exists in PA institutions (the highest level registered since the formation of the PA), findings show that 65% believe that this corruption will decrease in the future. This is the first time that a majority indicated its belief that corruption will decrease in the future. Last December, only 34% believed that corruption will decrease in the future.  

But Hamas’ victory caused no change in public perception regarding the status of Palestinian democracy. Positive evaluation of democracy under the PA reached 34% in this poll compared to an almost identical result (35%) last December.

Despite the fact that 61% of the public are satisfied (and 37% are dissatisfied) with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas, only a small minority of 19% wants to give him more powers than those of the newly-elected PLC. On the other hand, 44% want to give the PLC greater powers than those enjoyed by the president and 32% want both to have equal powers.

Despite this result, the popularity of Fateh’s Abbas (37%) remains higher than that of Mahmud Zahhar of Hamas (25%) and Mustafa Barghouti of other groups (15%). This came in a response to a closed question with respondents asked to choose one of the three. In another closed question on a vote for a vice president, Ismail Haniyyah, the current prime minister, emerged as the most popular with 30% followed by Marwan Barghouti with 20%, Mahmud Zahhar with 11%, Mohammad Dahlan (8%), Farouq Qaddoumi (7%) and Saeb Erikat and Mustafa Barghouti (6% each).

Findings show that support for Fateh has dropped significantly compared to last December while support for Hamas has increased during the same period. Support for Fateh stood at 45% three months ago dropping to 34% in this poll. Hamas’ popularity reached 28% last December rising to 37% in this poll. Support for the Islamists in general (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists) increased from 35% to 43% during the same period. .... Full Report

04-09 December 2003

These are the results of opinion poll # 10, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 04-09 December 2003. The poll deals with Geneva Document, the peace process, Abu Ala’s government, the popularity of Arafat and the political factions. The total sample size of this poll is 1319 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face in West Bank (835) and in Gaza Strip (484), in 120 locations. The margin of error is 3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa at Tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. 

 

SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

The poll shows significant opposition to the Geneva document among those Palestinians familiar with it and that support for the document is lukewarm. But it also shows that only a very small minority is fully aware of the content of the document and that when respondents become aware of its main components, both support and opposition increase significantly. A majority of the Palestinians sees red lines in two components: the refugee solution and the limits imposed on sovereignty. On the other hand, a majority welcomes the proposed deployment of a multinational force in the Palestinian state and the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the basis of the 1967 lines, with equal territorial exchange.

The poll also shows a Palestinian hesitation between the desire to see armed confrontations continuing (with a majority seeing such confrontations contributing to the achievement of national rights) and the desire for a mutual cessation of violence, including readiness to support the PA in taking measures to prevent armed attacks on Israelis when a mutual ceasefire is achieved. As for the long term vision, Palestinian readiness to support reconciliation between the two peoples has never been stronger.

Finally, the findings show that the Palestinian public is willing to give Abu Ala’s government a very limited vote of confidence especially in terms of its ability to implement political reforms. Arafat’s popularity drops significantly while Fateh’s decreases slightly. Support for Islamist and nationalist opposition continues to rise.

Main Results:

(1) Geneva Document

• ·        73% have heard of the Geneva document and the rest has not. But only 4% say they have full knowledge of it.
• ·        Only 7% have learned about Geneva from the pamphlet containing the document that were distributed with al Quds and al Ayyam newspapers while 79% have heard about it from the media.
• ·        Support for the document among those who have heard of it (i.e., among 73% of the public) reaches 25% (19% of all the public), opposition 61% (44% of all the public), and the undecided 14%. 37% of all the public are either undecided or have not heard of it.
• ·        Upon reading a summary of the main points of the document, support for the full package proposed by the document (among 100% of the public) increases from 19% to 39%, opposition increases from 44% to 58%, and the undecided and uninformed decreases from 37% to 3%. All the figures below referring to the Genevadocument have been obtained after informing our respondents in detail about the various components of the Geneva document.
• ·        A majority supports two main components of the document: security arrangements involving the deployment a multinational force (58%) and the Israeli withdrawal based on the 1967 borders with mutual 1:1 territorial exchange (57%). A map showing borders and territorial exchange was presented to respondents. The percentage of opposition to the deployment of a multinational force reaches 40% and to territorial exchange 41%.
• ·        The Jerusalem component of the document received the support of 46% with 52% opposing; end of conflict received 42% support with 55% opposing; and the establishment of a state without an army received 36% support with 63% opposing.
• ·        A minority not exceeding a quarter gives support to the components of a refugee solution (25%) and the limitations on the sovereignty of the Palestinian state (23%). The percentage of opposition to the refugee component reaches 72% and to the limitation on sovereignty 76%. No difference between refugees and non-refugees exists when it comes to the Geneva refugee solution. Both segments of the society oppose it equally. 
• ·        In the eyes of the Palestinian public, the best component of the Geneva document is the one that deals with the territorial exchange and Israeli army withdrawal and the worst is the one that deals with refugees.

In this poll, we have asked respondents to express their attitudes toward the Geneva document based on what they have heard or read about it so far. We then provided them with a summary of seven core elements of the document and asked them to express attitudes regarding each element. We have finally asked them for their opinion on the whole document as a package. The findings show that the Palestinian public is lukewarm on the Geneva document and in fact has significant reservations about two of its components. On the other hand, the public is supportive of two other components while showing limited opposition to the remaining three components.

The poll found that the 73% of the public have heard of or read about the Geneva document and that among those who have heard of or read about it, support reaches 25% and opposition is 61%. Among the whole public these figures translate into 19% support and 44% opposition while the percentage of the undecided and those who have not read, or heard of, it is 37%. After informing the respondents of seven core elements of the document, support increased from 19% to 39%, opposition from 44% to 58%, and the undecided (and those who did not read or hear of it) decreased from 37% to 3%.

From among the seven components read to respondents, support is given to two only: the one dealing with the deployment of a multinational force (58%) and the one dealing with the Israeli withdrawal based on the 1967 borders with an equal territorial exchange (57%). Two components received the biggest opposition: the one dealing with refugees, opposed by 72%, and the one dealing with limitations on Palestinian sovereignty, opposed by 76%.  Support for the other three components vary with Jerusalem receiving 46%, end of conflict42%, and the de-militarization of the Palestinian state 36%. From among those who have been previously informed of the document (i.e., 73% of the public), support increases amongFateh supporters (36%) compared to Hamas’ (26%). Support for the Geneva document as a package after being informed about its main components  increases among women (42%) compared to men (35%), among non refugees (41%) compared to refugees (36%), among those with preparatory education (47%) compared to those holding a BA degree (29), among housewives (44%) and farmers (40%) compared to students (32%), and among Fateh supporters (55%) compared to Hamas’ (33%).

The following table shows refugee and non refugee attitudes toward seven main components of the Geneva documents:

(2) Peace, Violence and Reconciliation

• ·        58% believe that the Roadmap is dead, compared to 68% last October. Only one third, compared to 28% in October, believes that there is still a chance to implement it.
• ·        Percentage of support for attacks on soldiers and settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip remains very high at 87%. But supports for attacks on Israeli civilians drops to the lowest level since the start of the intifada (48%, compared to 59% last October).
• ·        Despite the high level of support for violence, a large majority of 83% supports mutual cessation of violence while 15% oppose it. And if an agreement on mutual cessation of violence were reached with Israel, 53% would support crackdown on those who would continue the violence. But 80% are worried that such a crackdown would lead to internal Palestinian strife; on the other hand, 73% believe that continuation of the violence would impede return to negotiations.
• ·        64% believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not.
• ·        After reaching a peace agreement with Israel, 77% would support reconciliation between the two peoples with 87% supporting open borders between the two states, 69% supporting joint economic ventures and institutions, 42% supporting enacting laws that prohibit incitement against Israel, 29% supporting joint political institutions such as a parliament, and 10% supporting school curriculum that does not call for the return of all Palestine to Palestinians.

A majority of Palestinians is not optimistic about the chances for the implementation of the Roadmap as 58% believe that it has collapsed. But this percentage is smaller than the one registered in our October poll when 68% believed it had collapsed. The poll shows a large percentage (87%) supporting armed attacks on soldiers and settlers. But support for attacks on Israeli civilians inside Israel has dropped significantly from 59% last October to 48% in this poll. The current level of support for attacks on civilians is the lowest since the start of the intifada more than three years ago. Nonetheless, the belief that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian rights in ways that negotiations could not remains high at 64%.

After reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, 77% of the Palestinians would support reconciliation between the two peoples, the Israelis and the Palestinians. As in our previous polls, support varies depending on the nature of the reconciliation measure proposed. For example, while support for joint economic ventures and institutions reaches 69%, support for enacting laws that prohibit incitement against Israelis does not exceed 42%, and support for the adoption of a school curriculum that does not demand the return of all Palestine to Palestinians is very law, at 10%.

(3) Abu Ala’s Government, Reform, and Corruption

• ·        37% are willing to give confidence to Abu Ala’ government, 42% are not, and 21% undecided. Last June, 41% gave confidence to Abu Mazin’s government and 52% refused to do so.
• ·        Confidence in the ability of Abu Ala’s government to carry out political reforms does not exceed 39%, fighting corruption 37%, improve economic conditions 45%, renewing negotiations with Israel 67%, and controlling the security situation and enforcing a ceasefire 34%. Those figures are similar to those obtained by Abu Mazin’s government last June except for that related to improving the economic conditions which received 56%.
• ·        Support for internal and external calls for fundamental political reforms reaches 89% with 9% opposing them.
• ·        Belief in the existence of corruption in PA institutions reaches 81% with less than 10% believing it does not exist. Two thirds of those who believe in the existence of corruption believe that it will increase or remain the same in the future while 21% believe that it will decrease.

Palestinian pubic is reluctant to give confidence to Abu Ala’s government (37% give it, 42% do not, and 21% are undecided). Confidence in Abu Ala’s government ability to implement political reforms does not exceed 39%. But confidence in its ability to renew negotiations with Israel is very high (67%), even though only 34% believe that the Palestinian government will be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire.

Confidence in Abu Ala’s government increases among non-refugees (42%) compared to refugees (33%), among those with elementary education (39%) compared to holders of BA degree (31%), among farmers (55%) and merchants (49%) compared to professionals (23%) and specialists (28%), among those working in the private sector (39%) compared to those working in the public sector (33%), and among Fateh supporters (55%) compared to Hamas’ (32%).

(4) Popularity of Arafat and the political factions

• ·        Arafat’s popularity decreases from 50% last October to 38% in this poll.
• ·         Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular (as a vice president) with 16% (compared to 17% last October). Hamas’ Abdul Aziz Rantisi is the second most popular with 14% followed by Sa’eb Erikat (7%), Ahmad Yasin (6%), Hanan Ashrawi and Farouq Qaddumi (5% each), Haider Abdul Shafi (4%), and Abu Ala’ (3%).
• ·         Fateh’s popularity stands at 25%, Hamas 20%, Islamic Jihad 5%, independent Islamists 6% (with the Islamists reaching a total of 31%). With national opposition groups (PFLP and DFLP) receiving the support of 4%, total support for nationalist and Islamist opposition stands today at 35%.The unaffiliated remains the largest group however with 40%. Last October, Fateh received the support of 28% and Hamas 21%.

Arafat’s popularity drops from 50% last October to 38% in this poll. Arafat’s popularity increased from 35% to 50% last October in the aftermath of the Israeli threats to kill or expel him. The popularity of Marwan Barghouti and Abdul Aziz Rantisi (as vice president) remain almost unchanged at 16% and 14% respectively.  The poll shows that these two are the most popular after Arafat.

Support for Fateh drops from 28% last October to 25% in this poll. Hamas’ support remains almost unchanged at 20%. But support for Islamist and nationalist opposition increases by three percentage points from 32% to 35%. Opposition forces include Hamas, Islamic Jihad, independent Islamists, PFLP, and DFLP......Full Report