In an Environment of Increased Pessimism, Greater Support for Violence and Decreased Support for a Permanent Status Agreement Similar to the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Document, Three Quarters Agree with the Prisoners’ Document, but only 47% would Actually Vote for it if a Referendum is to Take Place Today
15-18 June 2006
These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during June 15-18, 2006. The poll deals with the prisoners’ document and the referendum on the document, permanent settlement, peace process and violence, and domestic balance of power. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in the West Bank (830) and the Gaza Strip (440) in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at Tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.
Main Findings:
Findings indicate the development of two contradictory domestic dynamics accompanied by an increase in the level of pessimism about the long and short term future, an increase in the level of support for violence, and a decrease in the support for a permanent status agreement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters, Taba negotiations, and the Geneva Initiative. Findings show the development of an internal consensus on the prisoners’ document with about three quarters supporting its contents as a package. The fact that the document has been the product of an inclusive consultation among prominent prisoners of all the factions may have contributed to its acceptance. Traditionally, prisoners have been subject on internal consensus.
Parallel to this consensus however, polarization is evident in the way the public views the call for a referendum on the same prisoners’ document and the voting intentions in that referendum if it is to take place. In other words, despite public acceptance of the ideas in the document, about half do not intend to vote for it in a referendum if one is to actually be conducted. This finding shows that Hamas has successfully managed to frame the referendum to the public in highly negative terms, as an attempt by PA president Mahmud Abbas to bypass the will of the voters, to marginalize the legislature and the cabinet, and capitulation to international pressure.
But Hamas’ success remains limited. It has failed to prevent the development of the consensus indicated above with regard to the prisoners’ document, and it has lost significant public support compared to the situation three months ago. The loss of popular support may reflect public disappointment with Hamas’ response to the prisoners’ document; it may not necessarily reflect public discontent over Hamas’ inability to deliver vital services. It is possible that the loss of Hamas’ popularity may have more to do with the shift in the source of pressure on that group. When the pressure was external – coming from the Quartet with its conditions and financial sanctions—Hamas gained greater public support. But when pressure became internal – in the form of the prisoners’ document and the apparent consensus of the various factions—Hamas lost some of its popularity.
Findings also indicate a decline in the level of short term and long term optimism and an increase in threat perception. Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians continues to rise. In fact, findings show that support for bombing attacks has more than doubled compared to the situation nine months ago. This development is also reflected in the continued decrease in the level of support for a permanent status agreement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative. This decrease was first detected in the aftermath of the Sharon’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip.
(1) Prisoners’ Document and Referendum
- 74% support the National Conciliation Document and 23% oppose it
- Support for the document’s articles ranges between 62% and 85%
- But support for holding a referendum does not exceed 53% while opposition reaches 43%
- Despite support for the substance of the document, only 47% would actually vote for it if a referendum is to be held and 44% would vote against it
- If Hamas rejects the document after it was approved in a referendum, 65% would support taking steps against it
- If President Abbas refuses the formation of a national unity government based on Hamas’ program after the document was rejected in a referendum, 39% would call for his resignation
Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians (74%) supports the national conciliation document, also known as the prisoners’ document, as one package and 23% oppose it. Support for the main items of the document ranges between 62% and 85% and opposition ranges between 13% and 34%. The greatest support (85%) goes to the three items dealing with: goal of establishing an independent Palestinians state in the areas occupied in 1967 with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital, right of return, and freeing of prisoners in accordance with international legitimacy, Hamas and Islamic Jihad would join the PLO based on proportional representation, a national unity government based on the national conciliation document and a joint program would be established with the participation of Fateh and Hamas. Slightly less support (73%) goes to the item that concentrate resistance to Israeli occupation to areas occupied since 1967, 70% support the item that calls for the acceptance of international and Arab legitimacy, 69% support the item that asserts that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they are located, and 62% support the item that asserts that Negotiations with Israel is the responsibility of the PLO and the president of the PA and agreements reached should be submitted to a vote in the PLO National Council or to a referendum.
But support for the conduct of a referendum on the prisoners’ document is much less than the support for the document itself with 53% in favor and 43% opposed. Moreover, despite the overwhelming support for the prisoners’ document, if the referendum is to take place today, only 47% would vote in favor of it and 44% would vote against it. 9% remain undecided. Only 56% agrees that PA president Mahmud Abbas has the right to call for a referendum on the prisoners’ document and 38% do not agree. And if Hamas called for a boycott of the referendum, 44% would boycott it and 50% would participate in it.
If the referendum was conducted and a majority approved the document, 67% believe that the Hamas government would still reject the document and 23% believe it would accept it. If the Hamas government rejects the document after a majority voted in favor of it in the referendum, 65% would support the taking of steps against it such as reducing its powers and jurisdiction (17%), dismissal of the government and the formation of an emergency government (14%), or the dismissal of government and the dissolution of the parliament and the holding of new elections (33%)
If the referendum was conducted and a majority rejected the document, 60% believe that PA president and Fateh would not accept Hamas’ program and would not form a national unity government based on that program, but 31% believe they would do so. If PA president and Fateh refuse to form a national unity government based on Hamas’ program after a majority rejected the prisoners’ document in the referendum, 61% would in this case support either the reduction of the powers and responsibilities of the president (22%) or his resignation (39%).
(2) Peace Process and support for Violence
- 61% would support and 36% would oppose a mutual recognition of identity after reaching a political settlement and the resolution of all issues of the conflict
- 52% support and 43% oppose the Quartet Road Map and 58% support collection of arms from armed factions today
- 71% would support reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state
- But 49% believe that reconciliation will never be possible and only 13% expect the two sides to return to negotiations and violence to stop
- 70% believe that Hamas should negotiate with Israel and 26% believe it should not
- Significant increase in the level of support for violence against Israeli civilians
A majority of 61% agrees and 36% disagree with the proposal that after reaching a permanent agreement to all issues of the conflict with Israel, there would be a mutual recognition of Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people. Only 54% of the Palestinians however believe that a majority of Palestinians supports such a proposal and 34% think a majority opposes it.
A majority of 52% supports and 43% oppose the Road Map. In this context, 58%, the highest since the Road Map became public, support and 39% oppose collection of arms from Palestinian armed factions as mandated by the Road Map. Moreover, if the collection of arms were restricted to the Gaza Strip, support would increase to 70% and opposition would drop to 27%. Support for the current ceasefire, another requirement of the Road Map, reaches 71% and opposition 27%.
When a permanent status agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by Israel, 71% would support reconciliation between the two peoples and 27% would oppose it. From among various reconciliation steps, 85% would support open border to free movement of people and goods, 74% would support the creation of joint economic institutions and ventures, 37% would support the creation of joint political institutions designed eventually to lead to a confederation between the two states, 33% would support taking legal measures against incitement against Israelis, and 10% would support adopting a school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teaches school children not to demand return of all Palestine to the Palestinians. At the personal level, 32% would under conditions of peace invite an Israeli colleague to visit in their homes and a similar percentage would visit an Israeli colleague in his or her home.
After reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state, belief that reconciliation between the two peoples will be achieved within the next few years or the next generation stands at 26% while 49% believe that reconciliation is not possible ever. Moreover, 51% believe that a political settlement with Israel is impossible while only 23% believe that such a settlement is possible within the next few years or the next generation.
With regard to short term expectations, only 13% expect the two sides to go back to negotiations and that armed confrontations would stop. On the other hand 39% believe that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations. 38% believe that the two sides will return to negotiations but some armed confrontations will continue.
A majority of 70% thinks that if Israel agrees to enter peace negotiation with Hamas, the Islamist group should agree to do so and 26% think that it should not. In March, 75% said Hamas should enter peace negotiations with Israel if it agrees to do so. Despite this, two thirds in this poll believe that Hamas should not accept international demands regarding recognition of Israel as a precondition for continued donor support for the Palestinian Authority and 30% believe it should. Belief that Hamas should accept international demands reached 37% and belief that it should not reached 59% last March.
Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel continues to rise. Today 56% support it and 42% oppose it. Support for such attacks stood at 52% last March and 40% last December while opposition stood at 45% and 58% respectively. Similarly, findings show that support for the bombing attack that took place last April stood at 69% and opposition at 27%. Support in September 2005 for the last suicide attack before the one in April, the one that took place in August 2005, stood at 37% and opposition at 56%. It is worth mentioning that this poll was conducted during the period in which Israeli shelling of the Gaza Strip led to a high number of casualties among Palestinian civilians at a Gaza beach and in populated areas. But while findings show a significant increase in support for violence against Israelis based on emotional drivers, a significant drop has been registered in this poll in the percentage of those who believe that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not from 69% last March to 54% in this poll.
(3) Permanent Status Agreement
- Support for a permanent status agreement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters, the Taba Talks, and the Geneva Initiative continues to drop compared to the situation 6 months and 18 months ago: 44% support this agreement today and 53% oppose it
- A majority of 54% supports the compromise on permanent borders and 58% support the item on end of conflict
- Support for the compromise on refugees reaches 41% and Jerusalem 35%
- Support for the item on creating a state without an army reaches 25% and the item on Israeli use of Palestinian airspace and control of two early warning stations in Palestinian territories reaches 40%
Support for a package of a permanent status deal similar in various degrees to the Clinton Parameters, the Taba negotiations, and the Geneva Initiative reaches 44% and opposition 53%. Support for this solution stood at 54% in December 2004 but went down to 46% one year later in December 2005. 43% of the Palestinians believe that a majority of Palestinians supports this solution and 44% believe a majority opposes it. Moreover, 39% of the Palestinians believe that a majority of Israelis supports this solution and 46% believe that a majority of Israelis opposes it.
Support for the item on final borders, which would be based on the 1967 lines except for about 3% of the West Bank which would be exchanged with an Israeli territory of equal size, reaches 54%. Support for this item stood at 63% in December 2004 and 55% in December 2005.
Support for the item on refugees, which would be based on UNGA resolution 194 while giving refugees five different options for permanent residency with return to Israel being subject to Israeli decision, reaches 41%. Support for this item stood at 46% in December 2004 and 40% in December 2005.
Support for the item on Jerusalem, which would make East Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state but would put Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, reaches 35%. Support for this item stood at 44% in December 2004 and 33% in December 2005.
Support for the item on the establishment of a Palestinian state that has no army but with an international force deployed in it reaches 25%. Support for this item stood at 27% in December 2004 and 20% in December 2005.
Support for the item on security arrangements, which would allow Israel to use Palestinian airspace and maintain two early warning stations in Palestinian territories, reaches 40%. Support for this item stood at 53% in December 2004 and 43% in December 2005.
Support for the item on ending the conflict once the permanent status agreement is implemented, which would allow neither side to make further claims and would require both sides to acknowledge that Palestine and Israel are the homelands of their peoples, reaches 58%. Support for this item stood at 69% in December 2004 and 64% in December 2005.
(4) Domestic Balance of Power and Other Domestic Issues
- If new parliamentary elections are held today, Fateh and Hamas would receive 39% each; 13% are undecided
- Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas drops from 61% to 53% in three months
- Poverty and unemployment is the most important problem confronting Palestinians according to 33% followed by the practices of Israeli occupation according to 26%
- 86% believe that there is corruption in the PA and 82% say they lack personal safety and security
About five months after the parliamentary elections, the gap between Fateh and Hamas narrows to zero. If new elections are held today Fateh’s list would receive the support of 39%, Change and Reform 39%, and all other lists 9%. 13% remain undecided. Three months ago, the gap between Fateh and Hamas stood at 8 percentage points in favor of Hamas with 47% voting for Change and Reform and 39% for Fateh.
Satisfaction with the performance of Mahmud Abbas drops from 61% last March to 53% in this poll. If new elections are held, 30% say they would vote for Abbas, 14% for current prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, 4% for Marwan Barghouti, and 2% each for Mahmud Zahhar, Mustafa Barghouti, and Khalid Misha’al. 38% say they do not know to whom they would give their vote. In a vote for a vice president, the percentage of undecided is 49% while 8% say it will vote for Ismail Haniyeh, 7% for Mahmud Zahhar, 6% for Dahlan, 5% for Marwan Barghouti, 3% for Saeb Erikat, and 2% each for Farouq Qaddumi and Mustafa Barghouti. The two questions on vote intentions were open questions, with no list of names provided.
The largest percentage of Palestinians, 33%, puts poverty and unemployment on top of Palestinian problems today followed by continuation of the Israeli occupation (26%), spread of corruption and lack of reforms (22%), and finally internal anarchy (17%). Last March, the percentage of those who selected poverty and corruption reached 44% and internal anarchy 7%.
Percentage of those who believe that corruption exists in the PA stands at 86% while the percentage of those who believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future stands at 51%. Last March, percentage of those who believe that corruption will stay the same or increase in the future stood at only 29%.
Percentage of those who say their personal security and safety are assured stands at 18% while those who say they lack them stand at 82%. Last March, percentage of those who said their safety and security are assured stood at 25%. In this context, 48% support and an identical percentage oppose the deployment of the paramilitary unit established by the minister of interior in the Gaza Strip. A larger percentage (64%) opposes, and 32% support the deployment of a similar force established by Fateh in the cities of Jenin and Tulkarm. A majority of 62% blames both Fateh and Hamas for the internal shooting incidents in the Gaza Strip in which armed men and civilians were killed while 15% blame Fateh, 11% blame Hamas, and 9% blame neither. The overwhelming majority (86%) supports the integration of the members of the armed groups belonging to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fateh into the PA security services while 13% oppose that.
Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy drops from 34% last March to 28% in this poll.
Support for the various factions among the total population, not just those intending to vote, shows equal support for Fateh (34%) and Hamas (33%). But support for all the Islamists reaches 37% and support for all other factions stands at 8%. 21% say they do not support any of the existing factions.....Full Report
22 August 2016

STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS
- A small majority of Palestinians (51%) and Israelis (58.5%) supports the two-state solution.
- Support for a permanent agreement package, one based on previous rounds of negotiations, is much lower than the support for the two-state solution. Only 39% of Palestinians and 46% of Israelis support a peace agreement package that comprises: a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, a family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims. In general, support for all parameters of a permanent peace deal is highest among Israeli Arabs (see Tables of Findings). However, as their demographic share of the entire Israeli adult population is only around 16%, their contribution to the pro-peace bloc in Israel is limited.
- A quarter of Israelis and Palestinians who oppose the permanent agreement package are willing to reconsider their opposition to the peace deal if it was accompanied by a peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Initiative's principles (for the Israeli public), and an Israeli acceptance of that initiative (for the Palestinian public).
- In selecting between bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral approaches to peacemaking, Palestinians prefer the multilateral (44%) while the Israelis prefer the bilateral (40%). Of various multilateral forums, an Arab forum, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate, is the least rejected by the two sides. All other multilateral forums – an American-led, an EU-led, or an UN-led forum – are acceptable to one side while unacceptable to the other.
- A quarter of Israelis and 35% of Palestinians support a one-state solution.
- Large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians estimate as low the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.
- A majority (68%) of Palestinians admire Israeli democracy while only 10% of the Israelis see positively Palestinian democracy.
- A majority (62%) of Palestinians blame the collapse of peace negotiations on the Israelis. A somewhat smaller majority (52%) of Israelis blame the Palestinians for this collapse. However, significant minorities (on both sides 43%) believe that the majority on the other side wants peace.
Findings show significant Palestinian-Israeli mutual misperception and that this mutual misperception is positively correlated with hardline views. In contrast, clarity/accurate perception about the views on the other side is positively correlated with greater willingness to compromise.
The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between June 2 and 4, 2016. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1,184 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between June 7 and 14, 2016. The margin of error is 3%. The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Tamar Hermann, the academic director of IDI’s Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of PSR.
MAIN FINDINGS
The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs and between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provided the respective findings for these sub groups.
(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process
Two-state solution: Today, majorities on both sides – 59% of Israelis (53% among Jews and 87% among Arabs) and 51% of Palestinians – support what is known as the two-state solution. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view on their side and on the other side regarding this solution. Findings indicate that both sides underestimate and incorrectly assess the level of support for this solution on their side: among the Palestinians, 47% said a majority opposes it; among the Israelis, 57% said the majority opposes it. Worse yet, both sides underestimate the level of support for the two-state solution on the other side and think that there is a majority that opposes the two-state solution. Some 49% of the Palestinians believe a Jewish majority opposes it; on the Israeli side, 44% said a Palestinian majority opposes it.
Permanent status package: We presented Palestinians and Israelis with a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and asked them if they would support or oppose each of its components and the combined package. The majority on both sides, 55% of Israeli Jews and 59% of Palestinians, opposed the combined package. A minority – 46% of Israelis (39% among Israeli Jews and 90% among Israeli Arabs) and 39% of the Palestinians (37% among West Bankers and 43% among Gazans) – support the combined package.
A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package:
1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis and Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side: a minority among the Palestinians (40%) and a majority among the Israelis (68%; 64% among Israeli Jews and 91% among Israeli Arabs) supported this item.
2. A demilitarized independent Palestinian state will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: a minority of Palestinians (20%; 27% in the Gaza Strip and 16% in the West Bank) and a majority (61%) among Israelis supported this item.
3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides: among the Palestinians, a minority (36%) supported it, and among the Israelis, a majority (58%) supported it.
4. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years: on both sides only a minority supported this item: on the Palestinian side 33% (26% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip) and among the Israelis, 42% (38% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs).
5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlements, which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements: a minority (35%) among the Palestinians (28% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip), and a small majority (52%) among the Israelis supported it (among the Israeli Jews only 49% supported it).
6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel: minorities on both sides (31%) among the Palestinians (39% in the Gaza Strip and 26% in the West Bank) and 49% of Israelis, supported it. (The Israeli Jews were actually split in the middle: 46% supported it while 45% opposed it).
7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state: again, minorities – among the Palestinian 30% and among the Israelis 39% (32% among Israeli Jews and 75% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.
8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty: a minority (31%) among Palestinians (24% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) and a similar minority (39%) among Israelis (33% among Israeli Jews and 73% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.
9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated: among the Palestinians, 49% (43% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip) supported it and among the Israelis, 27% (17% among Israeli Jews and 84% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.
We asked the public to assess the attitudes of their side and that of the other side toward the combined package. Both sides assessed correctly that a majority on their side and a majority on the other side would oppose the package; only 23% of Israelis and 35% of Palestinians believed that a majority on their side would support the package. Similarly, 35% of the Israelis (30% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs) and 40% of the Palestinians (32% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) thought that a majority on the other side would support the package.
It is worth noting that among Israeli Jews, support for the combined package among settlers stands at 16% compared to 40% among non-settlers. Support is much higher among Israeli Jews who define themselves as secular, standing at 56% compared to 36% among traditionalists, 10% among the religious, and 9% among the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox).
Support also varies depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: 88% on the left, 83% on the moderate-left, 59% on the center, 26% on the moderate-right, and 10% of the right support the package. Significantly, support for the package is much higher among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution than among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians opposes that solution (64% to 33%). Support is much higher among those Israelis who perceive Palestinian long-term aspirations as least threatening (see the following section for details on Israeli threat perception), standing at 74%, compared to those (22%) who perceive Palestinian long-term aspirations as most threatening (see the following section for details on Israeli threat perception).

Among the Palestinians, as we saw earlier, support for the combined package is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. It is worth noting that 70% of the residents of the Gaza Strip are refugees while only 28% of the residents of the West Bank are refugees. Part of the explanation for greater Gazan support is the fact that support for the package is higher among Palestinian refugees (43%) than non-refugees (37%). Surprisingly, however, those refugees living in refugee camps (estimated to be less than 60% of all refugees) are the least supportive of the combined package, standing at 35% compared to 40% among residents of cities and rural areas. Moreover, support for the package is higher among those who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” (63% and 41%) compared to those who define themselves as religious (35%); and among Fatah voters (57%) compared to Hamas voters (25%). As in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who believe that a majority of Israelis supports the two-state solution compared to those who believe that an Israeli majority is opposed to that solution (48% vs. 33%). Also, as in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who perceive Israeli long-term aspirations as least threatening, standing at 61%, compared to those who perceive Israel’s long term aspirations as most threatening, standing at 31% (See the following section for details on Palestinian threat perception).

Peace Incentives: Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible.” For this end, we offered those who opposed the package various incentives in an attempt to understand the source of their opposition and the extent to which change was possible. Israeli Jews and Arabs and Palestinians opposed to the package were offered seven different incentives. Only the first three of the incentives offered to the three sides were identical or almost identical. The remaining four sought to address either presumed Palestinian or Israeli concerns. In this regard, it should be noted that Israeli Arabs were offered the same four distinct incentives offered to the Palestinian respondents. Below is a detailed breakdown of the responses to the various incentives:
Israeli Incentives (offered only to those Israeli Jews and Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):
1. And if the agreement would include peace with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 26% of Israeli Jews and 42% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept package if it included this amendment.
2. And if free movement throughout Jerusalem – West and East – was insured as if it is one city? 15% of Israeli Jews and 37% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
3. And if Israel was offered by Europe to join the European Union? 12% of Israeli Jews and 37% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
4. What if the agreement includes recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people? 26% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
5. And if the US signs a defense treaty with Israel in order to boost Israel’s security? 19% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
6. And if the agreement will not allow Palestinian refugees to return to Israel to exercise a right of return, but they will be compensated by an international fund? 33% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
7. And if the exchanged territory that the Palestinians would receive in compensation for the settlement blocs annexed to Israel would be the areas populated today by Israeli Arabs, such as the area known as the Triangle? 22% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
In short, on Israeli side: all seven incentive made only a minority of those opposed to a peace agreement package change their minds regarding the combined package.

Palestinian Incentives in addition to the combined package (offered only to Palestinians/Israeli Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):
1. If Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty? 25% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
2. And if free movement throughout Jerusalem, West and East, was insured as if it is one city? 31% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
3. If the state of Palestine was offered by Europe to join the European Union? 32% of Palestinians and an identical percentage of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
4. If Israel acknowledged its responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem? 34% of Palestinians and 26% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
5. If the Palestinian state received $30 billion to $50 billion to help in settling those refugees wishing to live in the Palestinian state and compensating them? 31% of Palestinians and 37% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment;.
6. And if the exchanged territory that the Palestinians would receive in compensation for the settlements blocs annexed to Israel would be along the Gaza border? 18% of Palestinians and 21% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
7. And if the Palestinian state and Jordan become a confederation? 29% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
In short, on the Palestinian and Israeli Arabs sides, all seven incentives made only a minority of those opposed to a peace agreement package change their minds regarding the combined package.

As the findings detailed above indicate, of the three identical or almost identical incentives, a broader regional peace involving the Arab World and Israel is the least opposed, as 26% of Israeli Jews, 25% of Palestinians, and 42% of Israeli Arabs who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept a package with this amendment. A one-quarter "defection" from opposition to support for the combined package increases the level of support for it among Palestinians and Israeli Jews from a minority to a majority position (39% to 54%). Of the distinct Palestinian incentives, the most effective proved to be the inclusion, as part of the refugee solution, of an item in which Israel acknowledges its responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem; such an inclusion managed to persuade more than one-third of the Palestinians who initially opposed the package to change their minds and accept it. On the Israeli side, the most effective incentive proved to be the removal of the line item that allowed 100,000 Palestinian refugees to return to Israel, with one third willing to change their mind and accept the combined package.
Sacred Values: The Pulse also sought to assess the main impediments on the road to peace, the “sacred values” that pull some Palestinians and Israelis away from compromise. We offered each side four such values comprising aspects of history, national identity, holy places, refugees’ rights, and the 1967 borders.
Findings indicate that for Israeli Jews, the two most important of the four values examined related to history: (1) the demand by 79% for Palestinian recognition of the Jewish character of the state; (2) the demand by 73% for Palestinian recognition of the Jewish roots and history in the land of Israel; (3) the demand by 56% of Israeli Jews that the combined package should not include Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 line, or the Green Line; and (4) the demand by 55% of Israeli Jews for the inclusion in the agreement of Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount (al Haram al Sharif).
On the Palestinian side, findings show that the two most important of the four values related to history and territories: (1) the demand by 62% for an Israeli recognition of Palestinian roots/history in historic Palestine; (2) the demand by 61% that the agreement entail an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines; (3) the demand by 58% for an Israeli recognition of the refugees’ right of return; and (4) the demand by 57% for Palestinian sovereignty over al Haram al Sharif (the Temple Mount) .
Mutual Recognition of National Identity: We asked Israelis and Palestinians about their readiness for a mutual recognition of national identity as part of a permanent status agreement and after all issues in the conflict are resolved and a Palestinian State is established. Findings show that a majority (64%) of the Israeli public support such a mutual recognition and among Palestinians, a large minority (43%) support it. We then asked the two sides to tell us whether such recognition should come before or after the signing of a final settlement. For Israeli Jews, the preference is to have the recognition come before: 53% of the Israelis (55% among Israeli Jews and 40% among Israeli Arabs) said it should come before. But the Palestinians are divided into two categories: 39% said it should come before and 41% said it should come after.
(2) Conflict Resolution Management |
We explored issues related to the process of peacemaking, specifically the most effective or “most promising” approaches to revive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the role of outside actors. In selecting from a list of three possible approaches, bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral, findings show that Palestinians and Israeli Arabs prefer the multilateral, while the Israeli Jews prefer bilateral between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.
Among the Palestinians (44%) and among the Israeli Arabs (54%) preferred a multilateral forum in which major powers sponsor the negotiations, while only 27% of the Israelis Jews preferred this approach. Only 22% of the Palestinians preferred bilateral negotiations while 41% of the Israeli Jews preferred this approach. Finally, only 18% of Palestinians and an identical percentage of Israelis selected the unilateral approach, one in which each side takes measures in order to promote its interests.
We also sought a deeper understanding of Israeli and Palestinian views of the multilateral approach. Four models of this approach were presented to the two publics: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led multilateral approach; 3) an EU-led approach; 4) and finally, an UN-led approach. Findings show that Palestinians were almost equally open to three of the four (the Arab forum, the UN and the EU approaches), with support ranging between 20-22%, while only 8% preferred a US-led effort. Israeli Jews preferred almost equally an Arab forum (28%) and a US-led effort (26%). Among Israelis Arabs, support was greater for an UN-led approach (36%) and an EU-led one (27%).
(3) How Israelis and Palestinians View Each Other: |
We asked the two sides how they view various conditions on and attributes of the other side, and in some cases on their own side. The questions focused on matters ranging between democracy and rule of law to issues of long-term aspirations and threat perceptions, and, of course, who to blame for the failure to make peace. While the picture that emerges is discouraging, there are, nonetheless, a few glimmers of hope.
Democracy: 68% of the Palestinians (73% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip) describe Israeli democracy as good or very good. When Israelis were asked to evaluate democracy in the Palestinian Authority, a solid majority (77%) described Palestinian democracy as bad or very bad. It is worth noting that only 32% of the Palestinians describe Palestinian democracy as good or very good. By contrast, 65% of the Israelis describe Israeli democracy as good or very good.
When Palestinians were asked about the future of democracy in Israel, 38% said it will remain as it is now, 26% said Israel will become more democratic and 28% said it will become less democratic. When Israelis were asked about the chances that a better democratic system will be established in the future Palestinian state, a solid majority (83%) said the chances are very slim or fairly slim.
Rule of Law: When Palestinians were asked if the rule of law in Israel is good, 50% (62% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) replied in the affirmative. By contrast, when Israelis were asked if Palestinian rule of law is good, only 20% replied in the affirmative.
Want Peace: 43% of the Palestinians and identical percentage among Israeli Jews agree that the other side wants peace; 77% among Israeli Arabs agree that Palestinians want peace.
Failure of Peace Efforts – Who to Blame: As expected, Palestinians blame Israelis and Israelis blame Palestinians for the collapse of peace negotiations over the years: 62% of the Palestinians put the blame on the Israeli side and 52% of Israeli Jews put the blame on the Palestinian side. Only 8% of the Palestinians and 12% of Israeli Jews blame their side. A little over a quarter (26%) of the Palestinians and about a third (31%) of Israeli Jews place the blame on both sides to the same extent.
Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: The most disturbing, but not surprising, finding relates to the question of trust. Among Palestinians a solid majority (89%) feel Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. On the Israeli Jewish side, a somewhat smaller majority (68%) also indicated that Palestinians cannot be trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides, that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 50% of Israeli Jews, 61% of Israeli Arabs, and 70% of Palestinians agree with this dismal characterization.
Long-Term Aspirations: The level of threat on both sides regarding the aspirations of the other side in the long run is very high: 54% of Palestinians think that Israel’s goal is to extend its borders to cover all area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and expel its Arab citizens. Some 27% think Israel’s goal is to annex the West Bank while denying political rights to the Palestinians. Some 35% of Israelis (40% of Israeli Jews and 8% of Israeli Arabs) think Palestinians’ main aspiration is to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of its Jewish population; 19% think the goal of the Palestinians is to take over the entire state of Israel.
Only 17% of the Palestinians think Israel’s long-term intention is to withdraw from all (7%) or some (10%) of the territories occupied in 1967 after guaranteeing its security. 37% of Israelis (33% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Israeli Arabs) think the aspirations of the Palestinians are limited to regaining some (21%) or all (16%) of the territories conquered in 1967.
However, when we asked Palestinians and Israelis to tell us what they think the long-term aspirations of their side are, the picture shows that the two sides perceive much more moderate aspirations on their side than anticipated by the other side. Only 12% of Israelis say the aspiration of Israel is to annex the West Bank and expel the Palestinians living there; 18% say that Israel intends to annex the West Bank without granting political rights to the Palestinians living there. Among the Palestinians, only 10% say that the Palestinian aspiration is to conquer the State of Israel and destroy much of its Jewish population; 15% say Palestinian aspirations are to conquer the State of Israel and regain control over pre-1948 Palestine.
Fear: Among the Palestinians, 54% do not fear Israeli Jews. By contrast, 65% of Israeli Jews indicate they feel fear toward the Palestinians.
Worry: A solid majority (76%) of the Palestinians are worried or very worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished. Likewise, among the Israelis, 71% are worried or very worried that they or a member of their family may be hurt by Palestinian attacks in their daily life.
We also asked the Israelis if they are worried that “efforts by Palestinian groups and their supporters, such as the BDS movement, will succeed in delegitimizing Israel in the international community.” Israeli Jews (52%) and Israeli Arabs (83%) say their worry in this regard is low or very low.
Our General Conditions and Theirs: 49% of the Palestinians describe conditions in general in Israel as good, 24% describe them as bad, and 20% say they are so-so. By contrast, 45% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the West Bank as bad, 29% say they are so-so, and 25% describe them as good. As for conditions in the Gaza Strip, 72% describe them as bad.
When asked about their future expectations for conditions in the Gaza Strip in the next three to five years, 41% expect them to be worse and 30% expect them to be better. Expectations regarding West Bank conditions were a little more optimistic: 35% expect them to be better and 31% expect them to be worse.
Among the Israelis, 43% describe Palestinian conditions in the West Bank as bad, 24% describe them as good, and 22% describe them as so-so. With regard to conditions in the Gaza Strip, 68% of the Israelis describe them as bad.
By contrast, 39% of the Israelis describe Israel’s conditions as good, 36% describe them as so-so, and 24% describe them as bad. With regard to future expectations regarding the general conditions in Israel in the next three to five years, 31% of the Israelis believe they will be worse, 26% that they will be better, and 33% believe they will remain about the same as today.
(4) Values, Goals, and Expectations |
Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Among Israeli Jews, a Jewish majority is seen as the most important value (35%), followed by peace (32%), democracy (20%), and Greater Israel (10%). Among the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital was seen as the most important value (45%), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (32%), and building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (13%).
Expectations: We asked both sides about their expectations for the near future. Findings show that the Israelis are more pessimistic than the Palestinians. Among the Israelis, 44% think that some violent acts or armed attacks will take place and the two sides will not return to negotiations. Some 29% think the two sides will return to negotiations but some violent acts or armed attacks will take place. Some 10% think the two sides will soon return to negotiations. Some 8% think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks. Among the Palestinians, 24% expect that some violent acts or armed attacks will take place and the two sides will not return to negotiations; 34% think that the two sides will return to negotiations but some violent acts or armed attacks will take place; 22% think that the two sides will soon return to negotiations; and 14% think that the two sides will not return to negotiations and there will be no armed attacks. In other words, 73% of the Israelis compared to 58% of the Palestinians expect violence to continue and 39% of the Israelis compared to 56% of the Palestinians expect the two sides to return to negotiations.
Palestinian State? We asked both side about the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years. On this issue, Israeli and Palestinian views are very similar: 77% of the Israelis and 73% of the Palestinians think the chances are low.
(5) Other |
One-State Solution: The joint poll sought to ascertain the current level of support for the idea of a one-state solution “by which Palestinians and Jews will be citizens of the same state and enjoy equal rights.” Support for the idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 52%). Only a minority among Palestinians (34%) and among Israeli Jews (20%) support this option.
Impact of Palestinian Authority (PA) Collapse on Security: We asked both sides to speculate about the likely impact of a PA collapse on security conditions. Responses were similar: 63% of Israelis and 60% of Palestinians indicated such a collapse will lead to an increase in Palestinian-Israeli violence.

15 September 2020
The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians views the decision of the UAE to normalize relations with Israel as a betrayal or abandonment of the Palestinian cause, one that serves only the interests of Israel. A similar majority thinks that Saudi Arabia and Egypt, by endorsing that normalization, have in effect abandoned the Palestinian leadership. But most Palestinians also place the blame on themselves because they are divided and have normalized relations with Israel long before others
9-12 September 2020
This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 September 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a US announcement about an agreement between the UAE and Israel to normalize relations between the two countries. This normalization agreement stipulated an Israeli suspension or delay of the planned annexation of parts of the West Bank. The period also witnessed a rise in the daily number of coronavirus infections and continued stalemate in Palestinian-Israeli relations that followed a PA decision to sever all security and civil links with Israel which led during the past months to a significant financial loss to the PA. This PA decision came in response to an Israeli announcement about the intention to annex about 30% of the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.
Main Findings:
Finding of the September 2020 poll show a great Palestinian public anger with the UAE decision to normalize relations with Israel viewing it as serving only the interests of Israel and as a betrayal or an abandonment of the Palestinian cause and at the same time as a big failure of Palestinian diplomacy. Additionally, the overwhelming majority estimates that the Palestinian leadership has lost its Arab allies as Saudi Arabia will soon follow the UAE in normalizing relations and that Egypt, by endorsing the deal, has in effect abandoned PA president Mahmoud Abbas. Nonetheless, most believe that the majority of the Arab public is opposed to the normalization deal. Findings show that the public blames the Palestinians
themselves for this development: the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the fact that they had normalized relations with Israel before many others may have hastened the arrival of this day.
The public does not show an appreciation of the fact that the UAE-Israel deal requires the suspension of the annexation plan. The reason for this is the fact that three quarters think that the suspension is only temporary and will soon take place, the normalization deal notwithstanding. Moreover, based on this assessment, the public is opposed to the restoration of PA-Israel security coordination despite the fact that half of the public wishes to restore civil and fiscal relations between the two sides.
Findings also show a significant decline in support for the two-state solution compared to the situation three months ago. They also show that the consensus in rejecting the Trump plan, the deal of the century, first documented in PSR’s February 2020 poll, remains unchanged. Similarly, the overwhelming majority remains opposed to a resumption of contacts with the Trump administration. Despite the majority expectation that Trump will lose the upcoming US presidential elections, only one fifth expects positive policy change if the Democratic candidate Joe Biden wins.
Domestically, findings show continued satisfaction with the PA measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus pandemic despite significant decline in the level of satisfaction, especially with the prime minister’s performance. Moreover, a majority is opposed to the severing of coordination and cooperation with Israel in the fight against the spread of the coronavirus.
Demand for the resignation of president Abbas rises in this poll. Parallel to this, satisfaction with the performance of the president has declined. As a result, if elections were held today, Hamas’ Haniyyeh would win a majority of the public vote. This development might have been boosted by the current economic difficulties in the West Bank resulting from the severing of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel and the resulting inability of the PA to pay the public sector in full. Findings also show a drop in the perception of safety and security in the West Bank and an increase in the desire to emigrate. Despite these developments, the popularity of Fatah in the West Bank is not negatively affected; to the contrary, the findings show a little improvement in its popularity.
(1) UAE-Israel normalization agreement:
- A majority of 63% view the normalization agreement between the UAE and Israel as a major event that represents a significant regional shift while 32% view as minor development.
- Findings show a consensus (86%) that the agreement serves only the interests of Israel while 8% think it serves the interests of both the Palestinians and the Israelis and only 1% think it serves the interests of the Palestinians only.
- We asked the public to pick one word that represents its sentiments toward the normalization agreement: the majority (53%) picked “betrayal,” 17% picked “abandonment” 13% “insult,” 9% “indifference,” 6% “sadness,” while only 1% picked words like “satisfaction,” “pride,” and “joy.”
- Most Palestinians (57%) believe that the majority among the Arab public is opposed to the normalization agreement while 20% believe an Arab majority supports it.
- A large majority (70%) believes that other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, and Morocco, will sign similar agreements with Israel while 24% believe they will not do that.
- An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that Saudi Arabia has given the green light to the UAE to sign the normalization agreement and a similar majority (82%) believes that Saudi Arabia too will sign a similar public agreement.
- Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the public (78%) believes that the Egyptian position welcoming the agreement represents an abandonment of the Palestinian leadership led by Abbas while 18% do not share this view.
- A majority of 55% believes that Mohammad Dahlan was one of the participants in the making of the UAE-Israel normalization agreement while 24% do not share this view.
- Nonetheless, a majority of 53% believes that the blame for the normalization deal falls on the shoulders of the Palestinians themselves due to their division and due to the fact that they have recognized Israel and normalized relations with it long before the others; 42% disagree with this view.
- Also, a majority of 62% views the UAE defection from the previous declared Arab consensus on Palestine as a great failure for Palestinian diplomacy; 31% do not share this view.
(2) Annexation and the severing of relations with Israel in post UAE-Israel normalization:
- Three quarters of the public (75%) believe that the normalization agreement forces Israel to merely postpone annexation while 19% think it forces it to put an end to it.
- Now, after the normalization agreement, a majority of 62% is opposed to the restoration of security coordination with Israel while 32% are in favor of restoring it.
- But half of the public (50%) supports, and 45% oppose, the restoration of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel.
- If Israel conditioned resumption of civil and fiscal coordination with a resumption of security coordination, a majority of 59% will oppose, and 35% will support, the resumption of relations.
- In response to an actual Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories, the public is divided on how to respond. When asked to choose one of five possible responses, 28% favored resumption of armed struggle, 20% selected stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, another 20% favored return to negotiations with Israel and the US on the basis of a Palestinian peace plan, 19% preferred waging nonviolent resistance, and 6% selected the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
- The public indicates great worries about the future in case of continued severing of relations with Israel. For example, 74% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 75% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 77% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 59% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 59% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 70% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 60% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
- It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (63%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 30% believe it indeed did.
- A majority of 61% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (32%) expects Israel to do so.
- A large majority of 75% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 21% say they do prefer that.
(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:
- Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 45%.
- A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 31% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.
- The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 36% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 38% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
- When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 41% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 26% popular resistance. Three months ago, 45% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
- We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 92% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Three months ago, 88% expressed opposition to the plan.
- If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 55% think the chances are zero; 26% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
- A majority of 71% is opposed and 19% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Three months ago, 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
- A majority of 61% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 30% expect him to win it. Nonetheless, only 21% expect a positive change if Biden wins while 34% believe US policy will not change and 35% expect it to become worse.
(4) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:
- A two-third majority (68%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to prevent travel between the various governorates in order to contain the Coronavirus pandemic.
- Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 64% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 57% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 48% today compared to 62% three months ago.
- The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 70% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 52% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
- A majority of 55% say that are dissatisfied with the PA decision during the past several months to stop cooperation and coordination with Israel in the health sector with the aim of combating the coronavirus, 42% are satisfied with that decision.
(5) Legislative and presidential election
- 62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 58% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
- Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
- If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 39% and the latter 52% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh threw months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 41% and the latter 51%.
- We asked in an open-ended question about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 22% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Mohammad Shtayyeh is preferred by 5%, Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.
- We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 42% three months ago).
(6) Domestic conditions:
- Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 16%.
- Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 57%.
- 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 25% and in the West Bank at 24%. Three months ago, only 18% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate.
- Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. Three months ago, 81% expressed a similar view.
- The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 62% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, only 52% viewed the PA as a burden.
- A year and a half since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 60% expect failure; only 31% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 33% expect success. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expects success.
- An overwhelming majority of the public (80%) is opposed to the arrest by the PA security services of activists who were planning to demonstrate or were demonstrating against corruption in the PA while 17% support these arrests.
- 56% (66% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 36% (23% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial. Six month ago, 42% said it believes it will receive a fair trial.
- A majority of 64% (75% in the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 31% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law. Six month ago, 41% said the judiciary and courts rule according to the law.
- We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (13%), Maan TV at 12%, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 4% each, and finally al Manar at 2%.
(7) Reconciliation:
- 37% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
- Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 45% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 11% believe unity will return soon.
(8) Muslims in China:
- 80% of the Palestinians believe that if press reports about the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in China are true, Palestinians should condemn the Chines policy towards its Muslim community and 15% disagree with that.
- An overwhelming majority of 79% indicates that it does not believe the statement of the Chinese government that the camps built by China to allegedly detain the Uighur Muslims are in fact teaching centers aiming at eradicating extremism; 10% believe the Chinese statement.
- Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 83% believes that world Muslims should express solidarity with the Uighur Muslims against the Chinese government while 10% disagree with that.
- An overwhelming majority of 80% approves of the Turkish president Erdogan’s decision to transform the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque; 16% disapprove.
(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:
- 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; 13% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
- The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%, the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 10%.
WITH ARAFAT’S POPULAIRTY REACHING ITS HIGHEST LEVEL IN FIVE YEARS, THREE QUEATERS OF THE PALESTINIANS SUPPORT THE MAXIM RESTURANT SUICIDE BOMBING AND TWO THIRDS BELIEVE THE ROADMAP IS DEAD. NONETHELESS, AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF 85% SUPPORT MUTUAL CESSATION OF VIOLENCE, TWO THIRDS SUPPORT RETURN TO HUDNA, AND 59% SUPPORT TAKING MEASURES AGAINST THOSE WHO WOULD VIOLATE A CEASEFIRE
07-14 October 2003
These are the results of opinion poll # 9, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 07-14 October 2003. The poll deals with Arafat’s popularity and other domestic issues, peace and security, public perception of the United States, and local elections. The total sample size of this poll is 1318 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face in West Bank (823) and in Gaza Strip (495), in 120 locations. The margin of error is 3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Ayoub Mustafa at Tel 02-2964933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org
SUMMARY OF RESULTS:
The results of this poll point to a degree of contradictions in Palestinian public attitudes toward domestic political issues as well as issues of peace and security. The results show a large increase in Arafat’s popularity not seen during the last five years. They also show widespread support for his decision to declare a state of emergency and to appoint Ahmad Qurai’ as a prime minister. In addition, 60% support placing all Palestinian security services under the control of a national security council headed by Arafat. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians believe the increase in support for Arafat is due to Sharon’s recent threats against him. Moreover, more than 90% still support internal and external calls for extensive political reforms in the PA and 82% still believe that corruption exists in the PA.
In the realm of peace and security, the findings show widespread support, reaching 75%, for the suicide attack at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, where 20 Israelis were killed. More than two thirds believe that the Roadmap is dead and 78% believe that current Israeli measures, including the building of the separation wall, reduces that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the future. Nonetheless, almost two thirds support a return to the Hunda, 85% support mutual cessation of violence, and, for the first time since the establishment of the PA, 59% support taking measures to prevent attacks on Israelis after reaching an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. Furthermore, about two thirds still support a solution based on two states: Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Main Results:
(1) Arafat and Palestinian Domestic Conditions:
- Arafat’s popularity increases from 35% last June to 50% in this poll. This is his highest level of support in five years.
- About 80% of Palestinians believe that Arafat has become stronger and more popular due to Israeli threat to expel or assassinate him.
- Two thirds support Arafat’s declaration of state of emergency while 26% oppose it
- 61% support the appointment of Ahmad Qurai (Abu Ala’) as prime minister and 27% oppose it, but only 48% are willing, and 37% unwilling, to give confidence to his government.
- 60% support placing all Palestinian security services under the command of a national security council headed by Arafat.
- 46% believe that Abu Ala’ and his government will be more capable than Abu Mazin and his government in dealing with Arafat and the presidency; only 12% believe in the opposite.
- But only 22% believe that Abu Ala’ and his government will be more capable than Abu Mazin and his government in reaching an agreement with Israel; 23% believe in the opposite.
- While 62% believe that Abu Ala’ and his government will be able to return to negotiations with Israel, only 33% believe they will be able to control the security situation and enforce a ceasefire. 44% believe they will be able to carry out political reforms.
- Fall of Abu Mazin and his government is the equal responsibility of Arafat and Israel (27% each). Only 17% put the blame on Abu Mazin himself.
- 32% are satisfied with the reform steps taken by Abu Mazin and 54% are not satisfied
- 90% support internal and external calls for extensive political reforms.
- 82% believe there is corruption in the PA and 71% believe that corruption will increase or remain the same in the future.
- Popularity of Fateh increases slightly from 26% last June to 28% in this poll. Hamas’ popularity remains almost unchanged (21%). Total support for Islamists reaches 29% compared to 31% last June.
- Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular Palestinian figure for the position of vice president 17%, followed by Abdul Aziz Rantisi (14% compared to 3% in an open-ended question last June), Sa’eb Erikat (9%), Ahmad Yasin and Haidar Abdul Shafi (7% each), Farouq Qaddoumi and Hanan Ashrawi (5% each), Ahmad Quarie’ (4%), Mohammad Dahlan (2%), and Mahmoud Abbas (1%).
One of the main results of this poll is the large increase in Arafat’s popularity rising to 50%. This is the highest level of support for Arafat in five years. Arafat’s popularity stood at 35% last June, which is the average percentage for Arafat’s popularity during the three years of the intifada. The majority of the Palestinian public (79%) believes that the Israeli threats to expel or assassinate Mr. Arafat has made him stronger and more popular. The findings also show that Arafat’s decisions to declare a state of emergency, appoint Ahmad Quarai’ (Abu Ala’) as prime minister, and to put the security services under the control of a national security council headed by Mr. Arafat enjoy popular support (66%, 61%, and 60% respectively).
But the street is reluctant to support Abu Ala’s government, with only 48% willing to give it a vote of confidence. In a comparison between Abu Ala’ and his government and Abu Mazin and his government, regarding the ability to deal with Arafat and the office of the presidency, the street tends to believe that Abu Ala is better able to do so. When it comes to reaching an agreement with Israel, the street sees no difference between the two.
Despite the increase in support for Arafat, the overwhelming majority (90%) still supports internal and external calls for wide scale political reforms in the PA and 82% still believes that corruption exists in the PA.
No important change has taken place in the domestic balance of power compared to the situation last June. Fateh’s popularity increased slightly from 26% to 28% and the total for the Islamists decreased from 31% to 29% during the same period. Marwan Barghouti, at 17%, remains the most popular candidate for the office of the prime minister despite the drop from his June’s 21%. But the most dramatic development has been the increase in the popularity of Abdul Aziz Rantisi, one of the main Hamas leaders, rising to 14% compared to 3% in an open-ended question last June. The increase in the popularity of Rantisi may reflect the public response to repeated Israeli attempt to assassinate him.
Arafat’s popularity increases in the Gaza Strip (54%) compared to the West Bank (47%), in refugee camps (54%) compared to villages and towns (48%), among the illiterates and those with elementary education (66% and 56% respectively) compared to holders of BA degree (44%), among housewives (54%) compared to students (43%), among those employed in the public sector (59%) compared to those in the private sector (42%), among the most religious men (55%), (with religiosity measured by the number of praying time in mosques) compared to the least religious men (37%), among those with the lowest income (51%) compared to those with the highest income (33%), and among supporters of Fateh (81%) compared to supporters of Hamas (30%).
Support for Abu Ala’, as a prime minister, increases in villages and cities (64% and 63% respectively) compared to refugee camps (53%), among the old (68%) compared to the young (54%), among the illiterates (70%) compared to holders of BA degree (56%), among merchants and housewives (68% and 65% respectively) compared to students (50%), among the least religious men (63%) compared to most religious (56%), and among supporters of Fateh (72%) compared to supporters of Hamas (48%).
(2) Peace and Security:
- 75% support the suicide attack at Maxim Restaurant in Haifa leading to the death of 20 Israelis.
- 78% believe that current Israeli measures, including the building of the separation wall, reduce the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the future.
- But 64% still support a two-state solution (Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), while only 12% support a one-state solution (for Palestinians and Israelis). 21% want all Palestine back to the Palestinians.
- Percentage of those believing that armed confrontations will not stop and negotiations will not resume soon increases from 24% last June to 39% in this poll. 46% (compared to 56% last June) believe that the two sides will return to negotiations while some violence will continue.
- 68% believe that the roadmap is dead, but 28% believe that it can still be implemented
- 64% want a return to the Hudna that prevailed few weeks ago while 34% oppose it; but 85% (compared to 80% last June) support a mutual cessation of violence while only 14% oppose it.
- If an agreement is reached on a mutual cessation of violence, 59% (compared to 50% last June) would support taking measures by the PA to prevent attacks on Israelis.
- Despite the widespread support for the Hudna and the mutual cessation of violence, 58% would still support Hamas’ decision to oppose the ceasefire.
- 59% believe that current armed confrontations have helped the Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not. In June, 65% shared that belief.
The findings indicate a high degree of pessimism regarding the chances for peace, with two thirds believing that the Roadmap has collapsed while more than three quarters believing that the Israeli measures in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including the building of the separation wall, reduces the chance for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the future. Moreover, the percentage of those believing that armed confrontations will not stop and the two sides will not return to negotiations increases from 24% in June to 39% in this poll. The percentage of those believing that the two sides will return to negotiations and confrontations will stop decreased from 17% to 10% during the same period. This may explain why such a high percentage (75%) supports the suicide bombing attack at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa in which 20 Israelis were killed. It may also explain whey a majority of 58% would support Hamas’ opposition to a ceasefire.
Despite the pessimism and the high level of support for violence, the findings show an additional side to the Palestinian street, one that fully supports a mutual cessation of violence (85%) while a majority (64%) supports a return to the Hudna that prevailed few weeks ago. More importantly, an unprecedented majority of 59% now supports taking measures by the PA to prevent attacks on Israelis once the two sides reach an agreement on mutual cessation of violence. Despite the continued buildup of the separation wall, a majority of 64% still supports a solution based on a two-state solution, while only 12% support a one-state solution, and 21% support a solution that would restore all of historic Palestine to the Palestinians.
Support for the bombing attack at the Maxim restaurant increases in the Gaza Strip (82%) compared to the West Bank (70%), in refugee camps (84%) compared to towns and villages (69%), among women (79%) compared to men (71%), among the young (78%) compared to the old (66%), among students (81%) compared to professionals (33%), and among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fateh (69%).
Support for the two-state (Palestine-Israel) solution increases in the Gaza Strip (69%) compared to the West Bank (61%), among the old (69%) compared to the young (52%), among the illiterates (70%) compared to holders of BA degree (59%), among the professionals (72%) compared to students (48%), among married persons (66%) compared to the unmarried (53%), and among supporters of Fateh (74%) compared to supporters of Hamas (56%).
(3) Perceptions of the US:
- 96% believe that the US is not sincere when it says it works toward the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
- 92% believe that the US is not sincere when it says it wants political reforms and clean government in the PA.
- 78% believe the US is not serious in its declared opposition to the Israeli decision to expel or assassinate President Yasir Arafat.
- 97% believe the current US policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is biased in favor of Israel.
- But Palestinian evaluation of the current US conditions and policies varies on case by case basis. For example, positive evaluation reaches 85% when evaluating American medicine, science, and technology, and reaches 74% when evaluating the status of gender equality, and 63% when evaluating the status of US economic conditions. Positive evaluation drops to 53% with regards to arts and entertainment, 53% with regard to freedom of press and expression, and 44% to democracy and respect for human rights. Positive evaluation drops further when it comes to treatment of minorities (17%), respect for religious freedom (27%), or foreign policy (23%).
The findings show a clear lack of trust in the US policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli issue. But Palestinians show a positive evaluation of American values and achievements. For example, almost all Palestinians (97%) believe the US policy is biased in favor of Israel, while 96% believe the US is not sincere when it says it is working toward the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the Palestinians believes the US is not sincere in its position toward Palestinian political reform and that it is not serious about its opposition to the Israeli decision to expel or assassinate Yasir Arafat.
On the other hand, the Palestinians tend to give a positive evaluation to US achievements in medicine, science, and technology (85%), US gender equality (74%), arts and entertainment (53%), and freedom of the press (53%). Positive evaluation drops when it comes to democracy and human rights (44%), religious freedom (27%), foreign policy (23%), and treatment of minorities (17%).
It is clear that the US response to 11 September has affected Palestinian evaluation of internal American conditions regarding human rights, religious freedom and treatment of minorities especially Arabs and Muslims. The Bush Administration’s support for Israeli assassination and incursion policy may have contributed to the clear distrust in the USintentions in the peace process. While half of the Palestinians were convinced last June the belief that President Bush was determined to implement the Roadmap and move the peace process forward, this conviction has completely disappeared in this poll.
(4) Municipal Elections:
- 60% support holding local elections today, but 32% support the continued functioning of the appointed local councils due to existing conditions
- If elections are held today, 61% oppose holding them piecemeal, wherever possible, and demand holding them in all areas at once
- 80% support the direct election of the head of the local council by the voters while 18% support the election of the council head by the elected members of the council
- 67% support the participation of refugee camps located inside cities in the local elections while 25% support independent elections of local camp committees
- 42% give a positive evaluation for the work of the local councils in their areas; 46% believe these councils does represent the majority of the residents while 47% believes that they do not.
- If elections take place today, 33% would vote for the current local council in their area
- If elections take place today, 70% would participate
- Despite the support for local elections and despite the high level of readiness to participate, 51% believe that if local elections are held today, they would not be honest while only 38% believe they would be.
- 80% say they would vote for the candidate in accordance with their knowledge of the candidate’s positions, ethics, and qualifications, while 11% say they would vote for the candidate chosen by the family or tribe. In all cases, 81% say they would vote that candidate even if it turns out to be a woman. 16% say they would not vote for a woman candidate.
The findings show a majority of 60% in support of holding local elections today, while a third of the public supports, due to current conditions, the continued functioning of the existing PA-appointed councils. If a decision is made to hold elections now, a majority of 61% would oppose holding them piecemeal, wherever possible, and would insist on holding them simultaneously in all Palestinian areas. Two thirds of the public support the participation of the residents of refugee camps that are located within the municipal boundaries of existing cities, while 25% support holding separate elections for independent camp committees. There are no differences between refugees and non-refugees regarding the inclusion of the refugee camps in the municipal elections. But in refugee camps, support for the participation of refugee camp residents in the local elections decreases to 58% while support for separate elections for camp committees increases to 36%. The opposition to refugee camp participation in local elections does not exceed 5% among the public at large and among the residents of the camps. The findings also show that the overwhelming majority (80%) supports the direct elections of council heads, while only 18% support the election of the council heads by elected council members.
If local elections are held today, 70% say they would participate in them. When participating, 80% say they would vote for based on their knowledge of the candidate’s positions, ethics, and qualifications. 11% say they would vote for the candidate chosen by their family while only 6% say they would for the candidate chosen by their political party or faction. In all cases, an overwhelming majority (81%) says that it would vote for its preferred candidate even if it was a woman.
Despite the fact that a majority supports holding local elections today, and despite the fact that a large percentage is ready to participate in them if held today, confidence in the honesty of such elections is not high, not exceeding 38% while 51% say they would not be honest. Perhaps the reason for demanding elections now despite the lack of confidence in their honesty is the belief of almost half of the public (47%) that the current appointed councils do not represent the majority of the residents in their areas while only 46% believe that they do indeed represent the majority of the residents. Moreover, the percentage of the positive evaluation of the performance of the appointed local councils does not exceed 42%. In case local elections are held today, only 33% would vote the current heads of their local councils....Full Report
13 December 2022
The World Cup in Qatar helps to restore Palestinian public trust in the Arab World after years of disappointment; and in light of the escalating armed clashes in the West Bank and the near formation of a right wing and extreme government in Israel, the Palestinian public becomes more hardline while indicating a greater confidence in the efficacy of armed struggle
7-10 December 2022
This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah
These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 7 and 10 December 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a decision by the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, to form a high judicial council under his chairmanship, a new reconciliation agreement reached in Algeria by Palestinian factions, and media outlets reporting various cases of drowning of Palestinian emigrants in the Mediterranean Sea. On the Israeli side, after winning the November parliamentary elections, the Likud and other right wing and extreme right-wing groups agreed to form a governing coalition under Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, a UN agency adopted a decision to seek the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the Israeli occupation. Moreover, various armed groups resisting the Israeli occupation in the northern parts of the West Bank, such as the “Lions’ Den,” which received a wide press coverage, went public during this period. In Qatar, the World Cup football games started and were widely followed by the Palestinians due to a considerable expression of support for and solidarity with Palestine by the fans attending the games.
This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org
Main Findings:
The findings of the last quarter of 2022 point to a limited change in the domestic balance of power favoring Hamas and centering in the West Bank. Moreover, the popularity of president Abbas drops several percentage points, mostly in the West Bank. In other domestic issues, findings indicate that only one quarter of the public thinks that the factional agreement in Algeria will lead to actual reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and the level of pessimism about the prospects for reunification exceeds 70%. Findings also show that the public views negatively Abbas’ decree forming a high council for the judiciary under his chairmanship as only one in five Palestinians think it aims to strengthen the judiciary while a vast majority of more than 70% think it aims at weakening the independence of the judiciary.
The findings of the current quarter also indicate a significant decline in the level of support for the two-state solution accompanied by a significant rise in the percentage of those who think this solution is no longer feasible or possible due to settlement expansion. This change is not accompanied by an increase in the percentage of those who support the one-state solution in which Palestinians and Israeli Jews enjoy equal rights. To the contrary, support in the current quarter for this one-state solution has also dropped. These findings point to the possibility that the change in attitudes toward the political settlement with Israel reflects a hardening of public attitudes signifying less willingness to compromise. This hardening of attitudes can also be seen in the significant rise in support, in the West Bank, for a return to armed intifada. Furthermore, findings show a significant decrease, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in the percentage of those who view positively Israeli-Palestinian confidence building measures. On top of that, more than 70% of the public support the idea of forming armed groups, such as the “Lions’ Den,” and only one in ten says the PA has the right to arrest members of these groups or disarm them.
These findings come in a context of three major political and security-related developments, during the current quarter, that might have shaped Palestinian public attitudes, particularly in the West Bank:
- Perhaps the single most important development has been the escalating military clashes between Palestinian armed groups and the Israeli army in the northern part of the West Bank. The number of armed clashes and Israeli military incursions and the number of Palestinian casualties have been unprecedented since the end of the second intifada. This particular development sheds light on the fact that the most significant changes in our findings are centered in the West Bank.
- The results of the Israeli elections and the start of negotiations to form a right-wing coalition government, between the Likud, the religious parties, and the extreme right wing in Israeli politics, might have contributed to the increase in the percentage of those who think the two-state solution is no longer practical or possible. This same development might have also contributed to the rise in the belief that armed struggle, not negotiations, is the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation. Indeed, the findings indicate that a large Palestinian majority expects the worse from the upcoming Israeli government including high expectation that it will change the status quo in holy places in al Haram al Sharif in East Jerusalem, expel Palestinian families from their homes in East Jerusalem, transfer Bedouin residents, such as Arab al Jahalin, from their villages and encampments in the southeastern parts of Jerusalem to other locations, and annex settlements or the Jordan Valley to Israel.
- Finally, it is clear from the findings that the pro-Palestine scenes at the World Cup in Qatar have contributed to a restoration of the confidence of the Palestinians in the justice of their cause and their right to resist the occupation by all legitimate means. The vast majority of the Palestinians say they have now regained much, or some, of the lost confidence in the Arab peoples in light of the solidarity with Palestine expressed by the fans during the football games. The findings show strong association between the restoration of trust and attitudes regarding the two-state solution and the return to an armed intifada.
(1) “Lions’ Den” and other armed groups:
- 72% of the public (84% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 22% are against that.
- Nonetheless, 59% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 39% are not worried.
- 79% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 17% say they are for it.
- The vast majority (87%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 10% say they favor it.
- A majority of 59% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 15% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 14% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups.
(2) The formation of a new Israeli government of right wing and extreme right
- A majority of 61% expects the policies of the upcoming Israeli government, that is currently being formed under the leadership of Netanyahu from the right wing and the extreme right, to be more extreme and aggressive while 30% expect them to be similar to the current policies; 4% expect them to be less extreme.
- A majority of 58% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to change the status quo in al Haram al Sharif in East Jerusalem by allowing Jews to pray at the site; 38% do not expect that.
- A majority of 64% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to expel Palestinian families from al Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem; 33% do not expect that.
- A majority of 68% expects the new Israeli government under Netanyahu to transfer the Palestinian Bedouin community currently living in the area between Jerusalem and Jericho, such as Arab al Jahalin, in order to build a big settlement to the east of Abu Din and al Ezariyya; 28% do not expect that.
- A majority of 69% expects the upcoming Israeli government under Netanyahu to annex settlements or the Jordan Valley to Israel; 27% do not expect that.
- A majority of 67% is less optimistic about the prospects of an improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations, such as reaching new agreements on confidence building measures or reducing the expansion of the settlements during next year; 12% say they are more optimistic today; and 20% are neither optimistic nor pessimistic.
(3) Legislative and presidential elections:
- 69% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 29% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 65% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 63% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon.
- If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 36% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 53% for Haniyeh and 38% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 36% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 60%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 36% and Haniyeh 46%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 62% and from among those, Barghouti receives 61% and Haniyeh 34%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 31% and the latter 60%.
- If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (39%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (17%), Mohammad Dahlan (5%), Yahya al Sinwar (4%), Mohammad Shtayyeh, Khalid Mish’al and Hussein al Sheikh (3% each), and 22% said they do not know or have not decided.
- Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 23% in the West Bank and 23% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 74%. Moreover, a vast majority of 75% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 20% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 73% in the West Bank and 79% in the Gaza Strip.
- If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 65% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 34% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 44% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 26% (compared to 21% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 38% three months ago).
- 28% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 25% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 40% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 27% selected Hamas, 26% Fatah under Abbas, and 42% said neither side deserves such a role.
(4) Domestic conditions, the “assassination” of Yasir Arafat, independence of the Judiciary, and those responsible for the drowning of Palestinian emigrants:
- In light of the leaks in the media regarding the investigation into the death of Yasir Arafat, 50% of the public believe a Palestinian party or actor had implemented the plot to get rid of Arafat but that the planning had been done by Israel; 24% think no Palestinian actor or party had been involved in the death of Arafat; and 14% think a Palestinian party or actor had plotted and implemented the killing of Arafat.
- A large majority of 72% thinks the decree issued by president Abbas to form a high judiciary council under his chairmanship was meant to weaken the independence of the judiciary; 19% think it was meant to strengthen it.
- We asked the public about the party indirectly responsible for the drowning in the Mediterranean Sea of Palestinian emigrants from the Gaza Strip while attempting to illegally reach Europe. The largest percentage (27%) puts the responsibility on Hamas, 24% on Israel, 18% on the PA, another 18% blame the emigrants themselves, and 3% blame Egypt.
- 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 30% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 29% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
- Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%.
- Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 77% and in the West Bank at 46%.
- Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 86% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 73% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
- 46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 51% think they cannot.
- In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (59%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 36% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 57% viewed the PA as a burden and 38% viewed it as an asset.
- 26% are optimistic and 72% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 25%. When asked about the prospects for the implementation of the agreement reached in factional meetings sponsored by Algeria, only 26% expressed the belief that the agreement would lead to actual reconciliation while 67% expressed the belief that it will not lead to reconciliation.
- After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 78% expect failure; only 18% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 20% of the public expect success and 76% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 79% expects failure and 17% expects success.
- We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 31%, followed by Palestine TV (13%), al Aqsa TV (11%), Palestine Today TV (9%), Maan TV (6%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Mayadeen (2%).
(5) Palestinian-Israeli Relations, the Peace process, and the decision to go to ICJ:
- Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 32% and opposition stands at 66%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 37%.
- A majority of 69% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 28% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 72% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 25% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 64% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
- Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 26% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 71% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 30%.
- When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 59% supported joining more international organizations; 51% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 55% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 48% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 46% supported dissolving the PA; and 23% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
- When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 51% chose armed struggle (53% in the Gaza Strip and 50% in the West Bank), 21% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 41% chose armed struggle and 30% chose negotiations.
- We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 57% said it looks positively, while 38% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 69% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
- When asked about PA negotiations with the upcoming Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu, 47% said they opposed such negotiations while 25% said they support negotiations with him on a peace agreement and confidence building measures while 11% said they support negotiations if restricted to a peace agreement and 12% said they support negotiations with him if restricted to confidence building measures. In other words, a total of 36% are in favor of negotiations with Netanyahu about a peace agreement and 37% are in favor of negotiations with him about confidence building measures. In light of the decision by a UN agency to go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to ask for its consultative opinion on the legality of the Israeli occupation, half of the public (50%) say the decision and any opinion by the ICJ will have no benefits for the Palestinian people; 28% say the benefit will be symbolic but will have no impact on Israeli policies; 16% say the decision will have an impact on constraining Israeli policies on matters such as settlement construction.
(6) World Cup in Qatar:
- 66% of the Palestinians say that they now, after having seen the scenes of solidarity and support for Palestine in the World Cup in Qatar, have regained much of the trust in the Arab peoples after many disappointments stemming from the Arab normalization with Israel; 21% say they have regained some of that trust; 5% say their trust in the Arab peoples has remained small; and 4% say they have no trust at all in the Arab World.
- In light of the Qatari organization of the World Cup, 68% of the Palestinians say they think Qatar’s international standing has improved a lot compared to where it was before; 17% say it has improved somewhat; 8% say Qatar’s standing has not changed; and 1% say it has worsened.
- We asked the public about its predictions for the winner in the World Cup. When the number of remaining country teams was eight, 48% said it expected Morocco to win; when the number of country teams went down to six, 54% expected Morocco to win. By contrast, 22% expect Argentina to win; and 15% expect France to win.
(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:
- 39% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
- In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 25% (8% in the Gaz Strip and 36% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 21% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 20% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 17% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 11% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 10% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.
- When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 22% said it is corruption, 15% said it is unemployment, 15% said it is the split or division, and 6% said it is the internal violence.
22 March 2022
The public favors a neutral stand in the Russian war against Ukraine even as slightly more people blame Russia for starting the war; closer to home, Israel-PA “confidence building measures” are increasingly viewed favorably even as two-thirds share the view that Israel is an apartheid state; and domestically, ten months after the Israel-Hamas War, Fatah’s popularity returns to its pre-May 2021 level despite the fact that almost three quarters continue to demand the resignation of president Abbas 
16-20 March 2022
This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 16 and 20 March 2022. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several domestic developments including the launching of a second round of the local election campaigns in the West Bank and the holding of a special session for the PLO Central Council in which important decisions relevant to Palestinian-Israeli relations and the filling of several senior positions in the organization’s leadership. It also witnessed increased settlers’ attacks in areas labeled B and C of the West Bank and increased tension in the Shaikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Amnesty International issued a report in which it characterized Israel as an apartheid state. Finally, after weeks of anticipation, war erupted between Russia and Ukraine. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.
Main Findings:
The results of the first quarter of 2022 indicate a return to the internal balance of power between Fatah and Hamas, as the case was before the May 2021 Israel-Hamas war. In other words, ten months after the war, Fatah's popularity returns to outperform Hamas’. It is noticeable that Fatah's popularity is rising equally in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In other words, the rise is unlikely to be associated with the launch of the West Bank’s local election campaigns. The local elections, scheduled to take place on 26 March, will take place only in the West Bank. However, the rise might be linked to two things:
(1) the success of the so-called "confidence-building steps" between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel, and (2) Hamas's inability to translate the gains it made in the May war with Israel to positive change on the ground in the Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem.
However, President Abbas' popularity has not risen. Indeed, Hamas’ leader, Ismail Haniyeh is still able to win presidential elections in which only the two compete. Fatah's competitiveness is also clearly diminished when its name is associated with President Abbas', as Hamas continues to outperform Fatah when the latter is listed as "Fatah under the leadership of President Abbas." For example, when asked about the party most deserving of representing the Palestinian people, Hamas or “Fatah under President Abbas' leadership,” Hamas still beats Fatah, even if just by a little.
The results also indicate that a large majority of the Palestinian public wants the PA to take a neutral stand in the Russian-Ukrainian war, although more people blame Russia for starting that war. The results show a small majority indicating concern about the prospect of war expansion and the entry of other countries in it. Moreover, a large majority says it expects prices to rise sharply in Palestine because of that war. When asked to compare the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to that of the Ukraine and Russia, the majority asserts that the war has demonstrated a western double standards as the US and Europe show no willingness to impose any sanctions on Israel, while showing a great enthusiasm to impose crushing sanctions on Russia. Moreover, more than three quarters of the public believe that the war has also shown European discrimination in the treatment of refugees from Ukraine as opposed to refugees from the Middle Eastern wars.
We also asked the public about the PLO’s Central Council meeting in Ramallah at the beginning of February and the resolutions it made. The findings show that a majority, albeit small, believes that the current PLO remains the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, a larger majority believes that this particular meeting of the Central Council was illegitimate, although a majority, of more than sixty percent, supports the decisions it took. Perhaps the main reason for delegitimizing this meeting relates to the rejection of the results of the elections that were held during its sessions, with only a quarter or less accepting these election results, and the absence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad from the meeting. Two-thirds of the public say that Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad's entry into the PLO will make it more representative of the Palestinian people.
On Palestinian-Israeli relations, poll findings show that support for a two-state solution remains almost the same as it was three months ago while support for a one-state solution, with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians, rises to about a third during the same period. Despite the increased level of approval for the one-state solution, two thirds of the public support the description of Israel is an apartheid state. Indeed, the public sees the publication of the report of Amnesty International on the subject as an indication of the beginning of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of the Palestinians, as previously happened in the case of South Africa.
The results also show an increase in support for confrontations and an armed uprising and a decrease in the belief in the effectiveness of negotiations. Finally, in this survey, we asked, for the first time, about the belief in a Qur'anic prophecy about the demise of Israel. We found that a vast majority actually believes that such prophesy does indeed exist in the Qur'an. However, the poll found that most of the public does not believe the assessment that 2022 is the precise year of Israel's demise. Even among religious people and the believers of the existence of this prophecy in the Qur'an, only a minority believes the assessment regarding a specific year.
(1) The war between Russia and Ukraine:
- The largest percentage of the public (43%) blames Russia for starting the war with Ukraine while 40% blame Ukraine.
- An overwhelming majority (71%) wants the PA to stay neutral in the conflict in the Ukraine while 14% believe the PA should stand with Russia and 10% think it should stand with Ukraine.
- A majority of 54% says it is worried that the Russian-Ukraine war might expand to include other counties; 42% are not worried.
- The overwhelming majority thinks Palestine will be impacted by the war in the Ukraine while only 5% think the war will have no impact on Palestine. 63% think it will lead to a sharp rise in prices, 26% think Israel will exploit it to expand settlements and annex Palestinian territories, and 1% think it could lead to expansion of armed confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis.
- A majority of 57% says the war show the double standard of US and Europe when the conflict is about the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories compared to that of Russia-Ukraine conflict; 28% think the two conflicts are different, and 10% think the Western countries stand against the Israeli occupation just as they stand against the Russian occupation of Ukraine.
- An overwhelming majority of 76% thinks there is a difference in the manner in which Europe treats refugees from Ukraine compared to its treatment of refugees from the Middle East; refugees from Arab and Islamic countries are treated badly and in a discriminatory manner.
(2) PLO Central Council’s meeting and decisions:
- More than 60% support the decisions made by the PLO Central Council in its latest meeting in February 2022: 67% support the suspension of the PLO recognition of Israel and 61% support the decision to end the implementation of agreements with Israel including security coordination.
- Despite the fact that a majority of 62% support the Central Council’s decision to defer to the PLO Executive Committee on the setting of a mechanism to implement the Council’s decisions, a majority of 59% thinks the Executive Committee will not implement these decisions while only 31% think it will implement them.
- Indeed, 56% share the belief expressed by those who boycotted the Council’s meeting in viewing the session as illegitimate; only 29% think the session was legitimate.
- The largest percentage is not in favor of the election of the various members of the Central Council to senior positions in the PLO: only 24% support the election of Rouhi Fattouh as the Speaker of the PLO’s National Council; 26% support the election of Hussein al Shaikh to the Executive Committee; and only 22% support the election of Mohammad Mustafa or Ramzi Rihan to that committee.
- However, a majority of 51% views the current PLO as its own sole legitimate representative and 53% say the PLO is viewed by the Palestinian people as their sole legitimate representative.
- If the PLO is reformed and Hamas and Islamic Jihad become members in that organization, 65% think it would in this case become more representative of the Palestinian people while 12% think that, in this case, it will become less representative of the Palestinian people.
(3) Legislative and presidential elections:
- 72% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 26% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 75% in the Gaza Strip and 69% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 52% (57% in the Gaza Strip and 48% in the West Bank) believe no legislative or legislative and presidential elections will take place soon.
- If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 51% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 38% and Haniyeh 54% of the votes (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 35% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 62%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 41% and Haniyeh 47%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 64% and from among those, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 50% and from among those, the former receives 33% and the latter 60%.
- If Abbas does not run for elections, the public would vote for the following: 37% say they want Marwan Barghouti, 20% say Ismail Haniyyeh, 6% say Dahlan and 4% say Yahia Sinwar, Khalid Mishaal 3%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad 2% each.
- Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 70%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 29% in the West Bank and 25% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 26% and dissatisfaction at 71%. Moreover, 73% of the public want president Abbas to resign while only 23% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 74% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 71% in the West Bank and 76% in the Gaza Strip.
- If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 64% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 36% say they will vote for Hamas and 42% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 14% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 38% and Fatah at 35%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 37% (compared to 29% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 27% (compared to 30% three months ago) and Fatah at 47% (compared to 40% three months ago).
- The largest percentage (31%) says Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 29% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 33% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 34% selected Hamas, 23% Fatah under Abbas, and 36% said neither side deserves such a role.
- In the areas in which the second stage of local elections are set to take place soon, 55% say they will participate in these elections and 38% say they will not participate.
- When asked about the most important consideration that will influence their vote in the upcoming local elections, the largest percentage (42%) select the ability to deliver services to their area of residence; 14% select the political party of the list, another 14% select the closeness of the list to family and friends, and another 14% sat their vote will be influenced by the ability of the list to combat corruption. 9% say that their vote will depend on the extent to which the members of the list are religious, and 7% say it depends on the level of education among the list members.
(4) Domestic conditions and satisfaction with the Shtayyeh government:
- A majority of 54% say that the current rise in the cost of living affects them significantly or very significantly, while 45% say it affects them moderately or slightly.
- The vast majority (79%) says the Palestinian government is not doing enough to reduce prices, while 19% say it is doing so.
- Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 7% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
- Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 57%.
- 27% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 37% and in the West Bank at 20%. Three months ago, 23% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 31% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
- Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 84%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 69% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 84% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
- 35% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 60% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 42% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 56% think they cannot.
- In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (55%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 39% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 56% viewed the PA as a burden and 39% viewed it as an asset.
- 28% are optimistic and 69% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 39%.
- After more than two years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 74% expect failure; only 20% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28% of the public expect success and 67% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 71% expects failure and 25% expects success.
- The vast majority (70%) says that domestic violence in which individual killings turn into family and clan confrontations for revenge reflects primarily the society's weak confidence in the justice and law enforcement system, while 27% say it reflects the traditional and tribal nature of Palestinian society.
- To stop these incidents of internal violence, the vast majority (72%) says law enforcement services should be strengthened, while 24% say tribal reform committees should be strengthened.
- We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV and Maan (11% each), Palestine Today (9%), al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).
(5) The Coronavirus and PA performance during the pandemic:
- 53% are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the spread of the coronavirus while 46% are dissatisfied. Three months ago, 57% expressed satisfaction.
- The majority is satisfied with the performance of the various actors involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis: 65% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 67% are satisfied with the performance of the ministry of health. However, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister in the management of the coronavirus crisis stands at 46%. Three months ago, satisfaction with the prime minister’s performance in the coronavirus crisis stood at 46%.
(6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations and the Peace process:
- Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 40% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%.
- Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, only 32% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 63% expressed opposition.
- When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 60% supported joining more international organizations; 52% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 52% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 49% supported dissolving the PA; and 32% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 24% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
- We asked the public about its views regarding Palestinian-Israeli confidence building measures that would improve living conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, such as approval of family unification permits or making available to the PA additional financial resources. A majority of 63% said it looks positively, while 30% said it looks negatively, at such measures. Three months ago, 61% of the public said it viewed these measures positively.
- A majority of 60% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 36% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 68% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 30% believe the chances to be medium or high.
- When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 25% negotiations, and 24% popular resistance. Three months ago, 42% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiations.
- Under current conditions, a majority of 70% opposes and 22% support an unconditional resumption of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. However, when asked about a resumption of negotiations in a multilateral forum, support for a return to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations under the leadership of the international Quartet increase to 38%; 57% are opposed.
- 64% are opposed, and 30% are supportive, of a return to dialogue with the new US administration under president Joe Biden.
- The vast majority (73%) believes the Qur'an contains a prophecy on the demise of the State of Israel, while 22% say it does not. However, the majority (57%) does not believe the assessment, stated by few Qur'anic scholars, that verses in the Qur'an predict the exact year of the demise of Israel and that it is the year 2022; 32% say they believe it.
- Against the backdrop of the assassination of three members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Nablus, a majority of 64% says it is the duty of the Palestinian security forces to confront the Israeli armed forces when they enter areas under the control of the PA: 32% say they do not agree.
- The main reason for the failure of the Israeli army to stop settlers’ terrorism in the eyes of a majority of 54% is that the settlers are a tool in the hands of the army and it uses them to fight the Palestinian residents in order to expel them from their land; 20% say the reason is that settlers are the decision makers in the Israeli government; 12% say that settlers hide and wear masks, and 10% say that the army does not have the jurisdiction to arrest settlers.
- When asked why the Palestinian police and national security forces could not protect the residents from settlers’ terrorism in Area B, the largest percentage (34%) says it is because the Palestinian leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with the Israeli army than to provide protection to the Palestinian population; 29% say it is because the Palestinian police and national security forces do not want to engage in armed conflict with the Israeli army; 20% say it is because the Palestinian police does not have jurisdiction to protect the residents of area B; and 12% say terrorist attacks take place at night when Palestinian security services are not present.
- Two-thirds of the public (65%) approve and 27% disapprove of the assessment that Israel is an apartheid state. Moreover, 48% agree and 40% disagree that Amnesty International's report on Israel's racism is an indication of a shift in Western public opinion in favor of Palestinians and against Israel, as it has previously did regarding apartheid in South Africa.
(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:
- 38% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 14% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 13% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
- In a question about the two main problems confronting the Palestinians today, the largest (25%; 17% in the Gaz Strip and 30% in the West Bank) said it is corruption in the PA; 24% said it is the unemployment and poverty, 19% said it is the continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 15% said it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 12% said it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% said it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.
- When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (33%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 28% said it is corruption, 14% said it is unemployment, 14% said it is the split or division, and 8% said it is the internal violence.
3 July 2019
Ninety percent do not trust the US Administration, 80% supported the boycott of the Bahrain workshop, 80% view the participation of Arab countries as an abandonment of the Palestinian cause, three quarters want the PA to reject the US “Deal of the Century,” and the majority expects Israel to annex parts of the West Bank. Despite fears of PA collapse, the majority supports PA decision not to accept partial custom revenues. On domestic issues, Shtayyeh’s government has not yet earned public confidence, the leak about ministers’ salary raise deepens perceptions of PA corruption, and the majority rejects setting preconditions for reconciliation
27-30 June 2019
This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 27-30 June 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the formation of a new government led by Mohammad Shtayyeh, the intensification of the PA financial crisis as the PA was unable to provide full salary payment to its public sector, and the leaking of documents indicating illegal salary hikes for ministers by the previous government. It also witnessed the continued failure of reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas and the inability of Israel and Hamas to reach a long term hudna or cessation of violence. Jifna, a predominantly Christian town in the West Bank, came under attack from some Palestinian Muslims who had quarreled earlier with one of its residents. Despite the personal nature of the attack, it nonetheless generated concerns about Muslim-Christian tensions. In Israel, the right wing won the elections but could not form a government leading to the dissolution of the new parliament with new snap elections called for in September. This Israeli development led the Trump Administration to postpone the release of its long-awaited peace deal, the so-call “Deal of the Century.” This was followed by the holding of an economic workshop in Bahrain in which the US Administration unveiled the economic side of its peace plan. Finally, tensions escalated in the region after Iran downed a US unmanned drone, a further threat to the region as concerns grow about a possible war. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.
Main Findings:
Findings of the second quarter of 2019 show a widespread rejection of the US Administration, the “Deal of the Century,” and the Bahrain workshop: Ninety percent say that they do not believe or trust the US administration; about 80% supported the PA decision to boycott the Bahrain workshop; three quarters want the PA to reject the Trump peace plan when released; and more than three quarters believe that the US economic plan will not bring them economic prosperity. Similarly, an overwhelming majority reject the participation of Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, in the Bahrain workshop and 80% view that participation as an abandonment of the Palestinian cause.
Findings also show that half of the public continues to oppose the two-state solution, a solution which is viewed by the majority as impractical or infeasible due to West Bank settlement expansion. The public is divided into three groups in its assessment of the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation: armed action comes first followed by negotiations and then popular nonviolent resistance. Findings show that the majority expects the future Israeli government, that will be formed after the upcoming elections, to annex settlement areas in the West Bank, wage war against the Gaza Strip, and take measures that would bring about PA collapse.
On internal matters, the public is not yet willing to give the Shtayyeh government a passing grade, as most view its performance similar or worse than that of the previous government while a small number views positively that performance. Similarly, findings show that despite public support for the PA decision to refuse to accept the Israeli transfer of partial custom revenues, the majority is worried that this decision could lead to PA collapse. A large majority, more than two-thirds, views the sudden discovery that the former government has illegally increased the salaries of its ministers as an indication that PA corruption is deep rooted while only a quarter believes that PA corruption is limited and subject to accountability.
The majority of the public remains pessimistic about the prospects for reconciliation. A majority is opposed to those preconditions imposed on reconciliation by Fatah, i.e., the “one gun” demand, and Hamas, i.e., the demand to keep the “resistance arms.” Nonetheless, two thirds of those who oppose these two preconditions reject Abbas’s demand to disarm Hamas. Those who support preconditions are divided equally: one half sides with Hamas’s and the other with Fatah’s. As we found in previous polls, the overwhelming majority demands the immediate removal of sanctions imposed previously by Abbas against Hamas and the Gaza Strip.
Finally, findings show that the domestic balance of power remains largely stable compared to the first quarter. Fatah did manage to increase the gap in its popularity with Hamas slightly in its favor. But the gap in the vote for Abbas vs. Ismail Haniyyeh, in a presidential election, narrowed slightly in Haniyyeh’s favor. Moreover, the demand for Abbas’s resignation continues to decline despite the fact that it remains very high. The overwhelming majority of the public demands the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose elections restricted to the parliament.
(1) The Bahrain economic workshop and Trump peace plan:
- An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians (79%) supports the PA decision to boycott the Bahrain economic workshop while 15% are opposed.
- After describing the details of the economic part of the US peace plan, we asked public if it thinks the US Administration will succeed in implementing it: two thirds (68%) say it will not succeed and 22% say it will.
- Similarly, the overwhelming majority of the public (76%) says that based on what it has heard about the outcome of the Bahrain workshop, it does not expect the US economic plan to lead to Palestinian prosperity; 17% do expect it to do that.
- An overwhelming majority of 90% indicates that it does not trust the US Administration when it says that the goal of the Bahrain workshop is to improve Palestinian economic conditions; only 6% trust the US Administration.
- Similarly, 80% say that the participation of Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, in the Bahrain workshop signifies an Arab abandonment of the Palestinians while 12% believe the participation of these countries signifies support for the Palestinians.
- When asked if it believes that the PA leadership will show willingness to accept the Trump peace plan in order to benefit from its economic dimension, about two thirds (65%) say it will not while 27% say it will.
- When asked to choose between economic prosperity and independence, the overwhelming majority (83%) opts for independence; only 15% chose economic prosperity.
- Can economic prosperity be achieved under Israeli occupation? 73% say it cannot, as restrictions imposed by the occupation impede prosperity, while 24% say that it is possible to have prosperity while still under occupation.
- When we shift to the political dimension of the Trump peace plan, the overwhelming majority (86%) says that based on what it has heard so far about the plan, it feels pessimistic about its content while only 9% express optimism.
- We asked the public if it thinks acceptance of the Trump peace plan by the PA would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 85% say no; only 10% say yes it would.
- When asked if it thinks the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 72% says it does and only 22% say it does not.
- Almost three quarters (73%) believe that in response to Palestinian rejection of the Trump peace plan, the US will impose further sanctions on the Palestinians; 18% say it will amend its plan in case of Palestinian rejection.
- Nonetheless, three quarters believe that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan; 15% say it should accept it with reservations; and 4% believe it should accept it without reservation.
- Moreover, a majority of 66% is opposed and 24% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
(2) Presidential and parliamentary elections:
- Only 41% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 47% believe no elections will take place.
- An overwhelming majority (71%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 11% want parliamentary elections only. 13% do not want any elections.
- If elections were held for a parliament and a president, 73% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 21% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip.
- 57% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 60% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 49% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 55% in the West Bank and 68% in the Gaza Strip.
- Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 58%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 42% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 34% (40% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
- If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter 42% of the vote (compared to 51% for Abbas and 41% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 43% of the vote (compared to 47% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 52% (compared to 51% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 52% (compared to 55% three months ago) and Haniyeh 36% (compared to 33% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 59% and Haniyeh 34%.
- In an open-ended question, we ask about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 27% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 4% (1% in the West Bank and 11% in the Gaza Strip) and Khalid Mishal, Salam Fayyad, and Mustafa Barghouti are selected after him by 2% each.
- If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 67% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 30% say they would vote for Hamas and 39% say they would vote for Fatah, 10% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 21% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 38% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 33% (compared to 32% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 25% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 45% three months ago).
(3) A new government led by Mohammad Shtayyeh:
- With more than two months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (53%), the economy (44%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (53%), the preparation to hold general elections (55%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (54%). But a percentage ranging between 45% and 24% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 7% and 12% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government.
- Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 59% expects failure; only 28% expects success.
- In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expects success.
- In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 30% expects success.
(3) Domestic conditions:
- A majority of 62% supports and 29% oppose the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues. However, a majority of 52% says that it is worried that this decision could lead to the collapse of the PA while 39% indicat that it could not. A majority of 65% believes that the new Israeli government that will be formed after the upcoming elections will continue to deduct money from the Palestinian custom revenues while 25% expect it to stop this practice.
- Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.
- Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 67%. In the West Bank perception of safety and security stands at 59%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 64% and in the West Bank at 57%.
- 26% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 42% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.
- Only 40% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 57% say that they cannot. Three months ago, 65% of West Bankers said they could not criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear.
- Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. When asked about the measures taken by the previous government in illegally raising the salaries of its ministers, 67% indicate that they believe that this kind of corruption is deep rooted in the PA while only 25% think it is partial and subject to accountability; 4% think that there is no corruption in the PA.
- The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 48% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
- Asked about the implications of the incident in the predominantly Christian town of Jifna in the West Bank, in which a group of Palestinians attacked the town, 69% indicated that they believe Palestinian Christian-Muslim relations are normal, as one would expect from the people who belong to one nation; but 24% thought relations between the two communities might be heading to greater tensions.
- We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 21%, followed by Palestine TV (14%), Maan TV (13%), Al Aqsa TV (12%), Palestine TV (9%), and al Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (4% each).
(4) Reconciliation and the reconciliation government:
- 33% are optimistic and 63% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 30%.
- When asked about the preconditions imposed by Fatah (the demand for “one arm”) and Hamas (the demand for the preservation of the “arms of the resistance,”) on reconciliation and reunification, a majority of 53% of the public indicates that it opposes such preconditions and 38% indicate support.
- Among those who support the imposition of preconditions (i.e., the 38% of the public), the respondents are divided evenly between those who support Hamas’s precondition (42%) and those who supported Fatah’s (41%).
- However, among those who oppose the imposition of preconditions (i.e., the 53% of the public), the majority of the respondents (67%) indicates its opposition to disarming Hamas while only 29% express opposition to preserving party-affiliated armed groups alongside the PA security forces.
- Moreover, the overwhelming majority (79%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 17% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government.
- A majority of 51% (down to 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 8% believe the chances are high.
5) The peace process
- Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 47% and opposition at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 48%. 44% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 48% believe that the majority opposes it. Similarly, 48% support and 45% oppose the Arab Peace Initiative.
- A majority of 56% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 40% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 71% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 26% believe the chances to be medium or high.
- The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 34% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and a minority of 10% prefers to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 39% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 30% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
- The public is divided over the role of negotiations and armed struggle in the establishment of a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel: 38% think armed struggle is the most effective means; 35% think that negotiation is the most effective means; and 23% believe that non-violent resistance is the most effective. Three months ago, 37% said negotiation is the most effective means and 36% said armed struggle is the most effective means.
- Similarly, when asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public splits into three groups: 38% chose armed struggle, 31% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance.
- In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 62% support popular non-violent resistance; 47% support a return to an armed intifada; 38% support dissolving the PA; and 31% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 47% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 41% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
- A majority of 57% expects the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 18% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections.
- A majority of 59% expects the future Israeli government, that will be formed after the upcoming Israeli elections, to annex some West Bank settlements while 30% think the Israeli talk of annexation is merely an election campaign slogan.
- Similarly, 52% expect the future Israeli government to force the PA to collapse while 38% believe it will seek to maintain the PA.
- A majority of 56% believes the future Israeli government will wage a war against the Gaza Strip while 33% expects it to seek a long term hudna of cessation of violence with Hamas.
6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:
- 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
- The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 32% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 29% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 19% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 16% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.
Pre-local elections: Palestinian Public Opinion Poll
Six months after the postponement of the legislative elections and months after the Hamas-Israel fourth War and the killing of Nizar Banat, and two months before the holding of the first phase of the local elections, Fatah recovers some of its lost support which gives it the ability to compete in the first phase of the local election but it remains unable to win in the second phase
14-23 October 2021

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 14-23 October 2021. The six-month period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several important developments including the indefinite postponement of the parliamentary elections that were planned for May 2021, the eruption of popular confrontations in East Jerusalem in protest against conflict over access to Muslim holy places and the threat of expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in al Shaikh Jarrah which were followed by the fourth Hamas-Israel war that was triggered by these confrontations. The Palestinians were also preoccupied with the killing of a political activist, Nizar Banat, by the Palestinian security services. PA president Mahmoud Abbas met with the Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz in Ramallah to talk about Palestinian-Israeli relations and means of improving them while strengthening the PA by implementing various trust-building measures. The period witnessed the escape and recapture of six Palestinian prisoners from the Gilboa prison in Israel. Finally, the period witnessed the setting of the month of December 2021 as a date for the holding of local elections in villages and small towns with population of less than 11,000. This press release addresses a selected number of domestic issues such as the evaluation of the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights, the internal balance of power, and the results of legislative and presidential elections if they were to take place today. It also covers attitudes regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations, such as the two-state solution, return to negotiations, and the best means to end the Israeli occupation given the current stalemate. Total size of the sample is 1800 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.
Main Findings:
This poll was conducted six months after the indefinite postponement of legislative elections that were scheduled to take place in May 2021 and two months before the holding of the first phase of local elections, scheduled for December 2021. The past six months witnessed important developments that significantly decreased the popularity of Fatah and president Abbas, most importantly in addition to the postponement of elections, the fourth war between Hamas and Israel and the killing of the opposition activist Nizar Banat by members of a Palestinian security service.
In order to analyze the findings, we compared the levels of support for Fatah and Hamas before and during these developments. We also compared public attitudes regarding domestic issues and Palestinian-Israeli relations. Specifically, we compared the results obtained in March 2021 in the areas that will now go to the first phase of the local elections with the current findings for the same exact areas. The number of the relevant areas that were part of our sample in March and are part of the current sample is 27 and the total number of respondents is 270 in March and 405 in the current poll.
The current findings show that Fatah continues to suffer the consequences of the developments of the past six month but they also show that it has managed to narrow the gap with Hamas which gives it the ability to effectively compete in the upcoming first phase of the local elections, which will take place in places that are mainly rural. But it remains unable to win in the second phase of the local elections, which will take place mostly in cities and big towns. The findings show that the overall support for Fatah has increased and it is now higher than that of Hamas. But the gap between the two parties today, five percentage points in favor of Fatah, is smaller that the one that prevailed in March, which stood at 13 percentage points in favor of Fatah. Nonetheless, the current findings represent a huge improvement for Fatah compared to the findings of June 2021 when the gap between the two stood at 11 percentage points in favor of Hamas. The levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of president Abbas and the demand for his resignation remain very high as about three quarters continue to make that demand. Perhaps one reason for the rise in Fatah’s popularity might be the implementation by Israel of some of the confidence building measures that the PA and Israel agreed to recently, such as family unifications and the rise in the number of laborers working in Israel. It is worth mentioning that a month ago, in our September 2021 poll, majority of the Palestinians supported such measures.
The current findings indicate a significant rise in support for the two-state solution compared to our findings during the past six months. Similarly, the current poll shows an increase in public belief in the effectiveness of negotiations. Indeed, for the first time in six months the percentage of those who prefer to change the status quo through negotiations is higher than those who prefer to do so through waging armed struggle. It is possible that this change is driven by the same dynamics that increased the support for Fatah.
1) Domestic conditions: democracy, elections, the performance of the president, and the balance of power:
- We asked Palestinians to evaluate people’s ability to criticize the authority without fear in the area where they live, 71% of West Bankers believe that people in their area cannot criticize the PA without fear. In the Gaza Strip, 62% say people in that area cannot criticize Hamans’ authority without fear; 28% of West Bankers and 38% of Gazans say people in their areas can do that without fear.
- We asked the public to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the areas where they live, under the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and under Hamas’ control in the Gaza Strip: 22% of West Bankers and 29% of Gazans describe these conditions as good or very good, 50% of West Bankers and 35% of Gazans describe them as bad or very bad, and the rest describe the conditions as neither good nor bad.
- As indicated in chart (1) below, positive (good or very good) evaluation of democracy and human rights is higher among those with the highest income (30%) compared to those with the lowest income (18%), among supporters of Fatah and Hamas (33% and 30% respectively) compared to supporters of third or other parties (13%).

- If parliamentary and presidential elections were to take place today, the following should, in the eyes of the public, be the top five priorities that these elections should aim to achieve: the unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (selected by 29% of the public), followed by improving economic conditions (25%), combating corruption (15%), lifting the siege and blockade over the Gaza Strip (14%), and strengthening the resistance to occupation (9%). The percentage of those who selected “improving economic conditions” stands at 35% in the Gaza Strip, making it the top priority for Gazans, while the percentage of selecting “combating corruption” stands at 20% in the West Bank, making it the second priority in that area after the “unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” which is selected by 33% of the West Bankers.
- When asked about the party or faction that is better able to achieve the priority selected by the respondents, 26% selected Hamas while only 18% selected Fatah and 14% selected third or other parties. One third (33%) believe all factions and parties have equal ability to achieve the priorities selected. Hamas is selected as the most able by those who selected the following priorities: strengthen the resistance to occupation (45% selected Hamas as most able), lift the siege and blockade (39%), combat corruption and unify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (24% each). Those who select Fatah are more likely to have selected the improvement of economic conditions (25%) and making progress in the peace process (21%). The peace process was not among the top five priorities selected by the Palestinian public. Those who selected the priority of creating a democratic political system with periodic elections, another priority that was not among the top five, selected third parties as the most able faction or political party (30%).
- Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 27% and dissatisfaction at 71%. About three quarters (74%) want Abbas to resign while 22% want him to stay in the office. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stood at 78% in September 2021.
- If new presidential elections were to take place today with three candidates competing, president Abbas, Ismail Haniyyeh from Hamas, and Marwan Barghouti from Fatah 64% of the public would participate and from among those the first receives 16%, the second 30%, and the third 51%. Vote for Barghouti in this three-way competition is higher in the West Bank (61%) compared to the Gaza Strip (38%), among supporters of third parties and Fatah (96% and 57% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (15%), among the somewhat religious (57%) compared to the religious and the not religious (47% and 44% respectively), among those working in the private sector (60%) compared to those who work in the public sector (39%), among those with the highest income (51%) compared to those with the lowest income (45%). Vote for Haniyyeh is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (23%), among women (33%) compared to men (28%), among the religious (40%) compared to the not religious and the somewhat religious (7% and 23% respectively), among supporters of Hamas (83%) compared to supporters of third parties and Fatah (1% and 2% respectively). Vote for Abbas is higher in the Gaza Strip (20%) compared to the West Bank (12%), among men (18%) compared to women (13%), and among supporters of Fatah (39%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (1% and 2% respectively).

- If the competition was between two, Abbas and Haniyyeh, only 46% say they would participate and from among those the former receives 39% and the latter 55%. But if the competing two candidates were between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyyeh, 62% would participate and from among those, the former would receive 65% and the latter 32%.
- If new parliamentary elections were to take place today, 60% would participate and from among those Fatah receives 38%, Hamas 33%, and the third parties combined 10%; 20% are undecided. It is worth mentioning that in September, Hamas received 37% of the vote and Fatah 32%. Voting for Fatah is higher in the West Bank (39%) compared to the Gaza Strip (36%), among men (40%) compared to women (35%), among those with the highest income (40%) compared to those with the lowest income (35%). Vote for Hamas is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) compared to the West Bank (28%), among the religious (42%) compared to the not religious and the somewhat religious (12% and 27% respectively), and among those with the least income (39%) compared to those with the highest income (28%).

- 43% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 10% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
2) Comparing attitudes in areas of the first phase of local elections with attitudes in other areas:
- In order to assess attitudes of the residents of the villages and towns in which local elections will take place in December 2021, we divided respondents into three categories: those residing in the areas of the first phase of the local election, residents of cities and other urban areas in which the second phase of the local elections will take place, and residents of refugee camps who will not participate in local elections. Here below are the main attitudinal differences between the three areas:
- Fatah enjoys more support than Hamas and third parties (41%, 27%, and 7% respectively) in those areas where the first phase of the local election will take place. It is worth mentioning that back in March 2021 Fatah received the support of 56% of respondents in those areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections while Hamas received the support of only 23% in those same areas. These findings are confirmed when looking at the outcome of a three-way presidential elections in which Marwan Barghouti receives 59% compared to Ismael Haniyyeh (23%) and Mahmoud Abbas (14%). It is worth mentioning that Fatah receives the highest percentage of the vote in the refugee camps followed by the areas participating in the first phase of the local elections and thirdly in cities and other urban areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections: 48%, 41%, and 35% respectively. Hamas receives its highest vote from cities and other urban areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections followed by areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections, and finally in refugee camps (35%, 28%, and 27% respectively). In other words, Hamas and Fatah have exactly the same level of support in the areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections.
- Satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 33% in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections while standing at 24% in the urban areas that will participate in the second phase and 37% in refugee camps. Demand for Abbas resignation in the areas of the first phase of the local elections stands at 68% compared to 66% in refugee camps and 77% in cities and other urban areas that will participate in the second phase of the local elections.
- Evaluation of the status of democracy and human rights, standing at 25%, is the lowest among the residents of the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections, followed by the urban aeras that will participate in the second phase of the local elections (24%) and refugee camps (28%).
- Support for the two-state solution is the lowest in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections (40%) compared to urban areas which will participate in the second phase (46%) and finally in refugee camps (50%).
- Support for waging an armed struggle against the occupation is the lowest in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections, standing at 30% only, compared to 34% in the cities and urban areas and 38% in refugee camps.
- Support for a return to negotiations under US leadership is the lowest in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections (27%) while standing at 35% in urban areas and 37% in refugee camps.
Comparing attitudes of those residing in the areas that will participate in the first phase of the local elections to other areas
| Local elections | |||
Phase 1 | Refugee camps | Phase 2 | ||
1) If new elections are held today in agreement between all factions in which the same list that participated in the 2006 elections were to participate, you would vote for: | 1) Fatah | 41.0% | 47.6% | 35.4% |
2) Hamas | 27.1% | 27.5% | 35.4% | |
3) Others | 7.2% | 8.6% | 10.5% | |
4) None/undecided | 14.0% | 11.8% | 13.0% | |
5) DK/NA | 7.6% | 4.6% | 4.5% | |
6) NA | 3.0% | 0.0% | 1.3% | |
2) What if the competition was between Marwan Barghouti, Ismael Haniyyeh, and Mahmoud Abbas, to whom you would vote? | 1) Marwan Barghouti | 59.0% | 44.6% | 49.8% |
2) Ismail Haniyyeh | 22.8% | 26.1% | 32.7% | |
3) Mahmoud Abbas | 13.7% | 24.4% | 15.0% | |
4) DK/NA | 4.6% | 4.9% | 2.5% | |
3) Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of president Abbas since his election? | 1) Very satisfied | 4.1% | 2.8% | 4.5% |
2) Satisfied | 29.4% | 34.5% | 19.2% | |
3) Dissatisfied | 36.8% | 31.6% | 32.1% | |
4) Not satisfied at all | 25.9% | 28.1% | 42.3% | |
5) DK/NA | 2.6% | 2.2% | 1.3% | |
6) NA | 1.2% | .9% | .5% | |
4) If it is up to you, you would want president Abbas to resign or stay in office? | 1) Certainly resign | 35.8% | 33.2% | 48.2% |
2) Resign | 31.8% | 33.0% | 28.8% | |
3) Stay in office | 20.8% | 24.8% | 15.4% | |
4) Certainly stay in office | 5.0% | 4.2% | 4.4% | |
5) DK/NA | 5.3% | 4.0% | 2.5% | |
6) NA | 1.3% | .9% | .6% | |
5) If you want to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights in the area where you live (West Bank under the PA and Gaza Strip under Hamas), you would say it is: | 1) Good/very good | 25.3% | 27.7% | 24.0% |
2) Neither good nor bad | 29.3% | 37.2% | 29.6% | |
3) Bad/very bad | 43.9% | 35.0% | 45.3% | |
4) DK/NA | 1.4% | .1% | .9% | |
5) NA | .2% | 0.0% | .2% | |
6) Do you support or oppose the solution based on the establishment of a Palestinian state along side the state of Israel, knows as the two-state solution? | 1) Support | 40.4% | 49.9% | 46.4% |
2) Oppose | 56.7% | 48.9% | 52.4% | |
3) DK/NA | 2.6% | .5% | .9% | |
4) NA | .3% | .7% | .3% | |
7) The following four alternatives point to what can be done now regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations. Which one you prefer? | 1) Maintain the status quo | 20.8% | 13.4% | 18.7% |
2) Wage armed struggle | 30.1% | 38.1% | 34.0% | |
3) Wage non-violent resistance | 8.7% | 10.0% | 8.6% | |
4) Reach a peace agreement with Israel | 37.3% | 36.5% | 36.2% | |
5) Other | .5% | 1.8% | .7% | |
6) DK/NA | 2.7% | .3% | 1.1% | |
7) NA | 0.0% | 0.0% | .6% | |
8) Do you support or oppose the return to negotiations with Israel led by the US under the Biden administration? | 1) Support | 26.9% | 36.5% | 34.5% |
2) Oppose | 68.5% | 61.6% | 62.6% | |
3) DK/NA | 4.6% | 1.3% | 2.2% | |
4) NA | 0.0% | .7% | .7% | |
(3) The Palestinian-Israeli Peace process:
- Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 46% and opposition stands at 53%. No description or details were provided for the concept. One months ago, support for the concept stood at 36%. Support for the two-state solution is higher among men (48%) compared to women (43%), among the not-religious and the somewhat religious (54% and 50% respectively) compared to the religious (39%), among supporters of Fatah (64%) compared to supporters of third parties and Hamas (43% and 31% respectively). More than three quarters (76%) believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.

- One third (33%) support return to negotiations with Israel under US leadership but a majority of 64% oppose it. Support is higher in the Gaza Strip (35%) compared to the West Bank (32%), among the somewhat religious and the not-religious (37% and 34% respectively) compared to the religious (29%), among supporters of Fatah and third parties (51% and 38% respectively) compared to supporters of Hamas (20%).
- When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the public split into three groups: 44% chose armed struggle, 36% negotiations, and 16% popular resistance. One month ago, 48% chose armed struggle and 28% chose negotiations. Support for armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (50%) compared to the West Bank (40%), among men (50%) compared to women (39%), among supporters of Hamas (74%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (28% and 45% respectively). Support for negotiations is higher among women (38%) compared to men (34%), among those whose age in between 40 and 59 years (36%) compared to those whose age is between 18 and 22 years (29%), and among supporters of Fatah (51%) compared to supporters of Hamas and third parties (16% and 27% respectively).
- The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 36% of the public while 34% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 9% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 19% prefer to keep the status quo. One month ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle. The percentage of those who prefer waging an armed struggle is higher in the Gaza Strip (39%) compared to the West Bank (30%), among men (38%) compared to women (30%), among the youth between the ages of 18 and 29 years (37%) compared to those whose age is between 40 and 59 years (32%), and among supporters of Hamas (61%) compared to supporters of Fatah and third parties (20% and 35% respectively).

Has Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) orchestrated and led the intifada since September 2000 in order to weaken and humiliate Israel and force it to accept exaggerated Palestinian demands for a political settlement? And have he and the PA, as a result, gained added legitimacy and popularity in the Palestinian street? Or was the intifada a spontaneous response, to a provocative Ariel Sharon’s visit to al Haram al Sharif, by an enraged but unorganized Palestinian street; a street that has additionally been disillusioned and disappointed by the failure of the peace process over a period of several years to produce an end to a thirty-three year old Israeli military occupation? While most Israelis, but specially members of the intelligence community, advocate the first thesis and explain every thing that happens in the intifada in light of it, the PA and most Palestinians subscribe to the second.
This article provides a third thesis. It argues that the intifada has been a clearly articulated and organized response by the Young Guard in the Palestinian national movement not only to Sharon’s visit to al Haram al Sharif and to the failure of the peace process to end Israeli occupation, but also to the failure of the PLO’s Old Guard to lead the Palestinian process of independence, state building, and governance. Through theintifada, and influenced by the Lebanese Hizbullah methods, the Young Guard sought to force Israel to unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to simultaneously weaken and eventually displace the Old Guard. In particular, the resort of the Young Guard to the use of arms, as means of national liberation, was conceived of as the means to help it achieve both objectives in a short period of time, not only in the face of a much superior Israeli army but also in the face of a much stronger PA armed forces and security services.
Fourteen months into the intifada, the Young Guard’s determination to do just that is unshakable. So far, it has managed to force Israel to seriously consider unilateral separation, and has succeeded in greatly weakening the Old Guard. Indeed, it has managed to assume a de facto control over most PA civil institutions, to penetrate PA security services, and to force Yasir Arafat to appease it and seek its blessings for fear of losing his own legitimacy or confront the specter of a Palestinian civil war. While developments in the Israeli-Palestinian relations will have serious consequences for the domestic dynamics, only a combination of a truly viable peace process and a serious PA commitment to good governance can begin to provide Israel and the PA with an exit strategy from their current predicament.
Two Intifada Dynamics
The intifada crystallized two highly significant dynamics within the Palestinian politics and society. The first relates to developments within the national movement and the other to the competition between the Islamists and the nationalists. The consequences of the first, entailing a split between an Old Guard and a Young Guard within the national movement, are immediate and far-reaching, greatly constraining the capacity of the PA leadership to manage the current crises and to engage in a viable political process with Israel. The consequence of the second dynamic, entailing a change in the domestic balance of power favoring the Islamists for the first time in seven years, takes a much longer time to be felt; but once entrenched, will be difficult to reverse since it brings with it ideological and social change. In the long run, the consequence of the second dynamic poses a serious challenge to the capacity of the national movement to continue to lead the Palestinian people. The failure of the peace process and the process of national reconstruction to meet the expectations of most or all Palestinians has already set the stage for these developments. This paper addresses the ramifications of the first dynamic for the PA and the peace process.
Failed Processes, Angry Street (1)
Upon signing the Oslo agreement in September 1993, two-thirds of the Palestinian public immediately gave it support. Palestinian expectations were very high: Oslo was supposed to usher in three processes: the end of occupation, the establishment of an open and democratic political system and national authority, and a quick improvement in economic and living conditions. The golden era of the peace process did not last long. The high point was the 1995-96 period following a disappointing year in 1994. Support for the peace process in 1996 peaked to 80% and support for violence against Israeli targets dropped to 20%. Just before the general elections of January 1996, support for Fateh, the mainstream nationalist movement, reached the unprecedented level of 55%, and Arafat’s popularity skyrocketed to 65%. The size of all opposition groups, Islamists and nationalist, receded to 20% in early 1996 compared to 40% two years earlier.
When the Palestinian political system came into existence after the elections of January 1996, it had the attributes of legitimacy. Seventy-five percent of eligible voters participated in the election despite the call by the opposition groups for a boycott. Arafat received the positive support of more than 70%, with about 22% casting blank ballots, and only 8% voting for his rival, Ms. Samiha Khalil. Fateh won an unbelievable 77% of the seats of the new Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).
Between 1993-01, with the sole exception of 1994, support for the Oslo agreement never dropped below 60% despite the right wing electoral victory in the Israeli elections in mid-1996. But Palestinian expectation from, and confidence in, the peace process began to erode as a result of the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s Prime Minister and the continued building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Not too high to begin with, Palestinian expectation that the peace process will soon bring to an end the limited self-rule arrangement leading to a permanent settlement of statehood, dropped from 44% in 1996, when Shimon Peres led Israel, to 30%, in the same year, under Netanyahu. Four years later, with Ehud Barak leading Israel and Jewish settlement expansion continuing, expectation of a permanent settlement was still very low at 24%. Upon the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel’s Prime Minister, that expectation dropped by 55%, to a mere 11%.
The loss of confidence in the ability of the peace process to deliver a permanent agreement had a dramatic impact on the level of Palestinian public support for violence against Israelis. In July 2000, right after the Camp David Summit but just before the eruption of the second Palestinian intifada, support for violence has already reached 52%. One year later, and ten months into the intifada, it reached the unprecedented level of 86%.
A second casualty has been the popularity of Arafat and the support for Fateh. In July 2000, upon returning from Camp David, Arafat’s popularity, which has been dropping steadily since 1996, plummeted to 47%. Ten months into the second intifada, Arafat suffered his greatest loss in eight years with a popularity drop of 30% in a single year to 33%. Similarly, support for Fateh dropped to 37% in July 2000, a drop of about 33% in four years. One year later, Fateh lost an additional 22% of its support dropping to 29%. Surprisingly, the Islamists did not gain much support in the four years between 1996, when their support stood at 15%, and 2000 with a 17% support. Those who deserted the nationalists did not shift loyalty to the Islamists and instead chose to remain on the sideline. The intifada changed that: by July 2001, the Islamists have increased their support by 60%, rising 27%. The intifada brought about the first significant change in the domestic balance of power since 1995 with more and more people shifting loyalty from the natioto the Islamists. Indeed, in July 2001, and for the first time ever, support for Islamist and nationalist opposition groups, standing together at 31%, surpassed that of the mainstream Fateh and its allies, standing at 30%. (2)
The diminishing support for Arafat and Fateh has been caused by other factors in addition to a collapsing peace process and deteriorating economic and living conditions. The street has been highly disappointed and disillusioned by the perceived failure of the process of national reconstruction and good governance. Street’s evaluation of the status of democracy, PA performance, and levels of corruption have moved from bad to worse during the past six years. In 1996, 43% positively evaluated the status of Palestinian democracy and human rights. By 2000-01, that percentage dropped by more than 50% to about 21%. Similarly positive evaluation of the performance of PA institutions dropped from 64% in 1996 to 44% in 2000 and to 40% in 2001. Worse yet, while in 1996 only 49% believed that there was corruption in the institutions of the PA, that percentage increased to 76% in 2000 and to 83% in 2001
The public’s ever-multiplying disappointments have been aggravated during the intifada leading to further erosion in its confidence in the peace process and in its willingness to extend legitimacy to the PA. The unrelenting Israeli siege, closure, and collective punishment measures have succeeded in practically halting Palestinian civil, social and economic life thereby devastating the economy and creating an environment of heightened perception of threat and coercion that breeds nothing but pessimism, blind hate, and the desire to kill. The expectation, in the aftermath of the collapsed Camp David Summit, that there would be no violence and that negotiation would soon resume, gave way to much deeper pessimism ten months into the intifada, dropping from 44% to 17%. While in July 2000 only 23% saw the failure at Camp David as indicating an end to the peace process, the percentage doubled in July 2001. Correspondingly, while in July 2000 only 31% believed that violence, if resorted to, would help the Palestinians achieve goals in ways that negotiations could not, that percentage increased to 59% one year later. Indeed, in July 2001, a clear majority of 71% believed that the intifada has already achieved that.
The perceived failure of the peace process, combined with a highly negative assessment of all issues related PA governance, the continued inability of the PA to deliver services to the bulk of the population at a time of extreme economic and social hardships, and, worse yet, a prevailing perception of Arafat’s inability to project leadership in the face of an uncertain future did significant damage to PA’s legitimacy allowing other sources of legitimacy to emerge and assert themselves in the face of weakened PA. One of those new sources has been a “revolutionary legitimacy” claimed by the Young Guard. Taking advantage of the great popular anger at Sharon’s visit to al Haram al Sharif and the subsequent death of tens of Palestinian civilians in few days of popular confrontations, the Young Guard was ready to seize the moment.
Young Guard Against Old Guard
Between 1967 and 1994 the leadership of the Palestinian national leadership lived in diaspora, moving from Jordan to Lebanon, and since 1983 to Tunisia. Local leadership in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip sought to assert itself from time to time only to be decapitated by the Israelis or to be discouraged by the PLO. The defeat of the PLO during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 lessened the centrality of the PLO in Palestinian politics and weakened its hold on Palestinians in the occupied territories. Indeed, the center for gravity in Palestinian politics began to shift from the outside to the inside, i.e., to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Despite the strong role played by the outside PLO leadership during the first Palestinian intifada, it was the newly emerging leadership in the occupied territories that had initiated and sustained that intifada.
In 1994, the PLO leadership returned home to the West Bank and Gaza to establish the Palestinian Authority (PA) in implementation of the Declaration of Principles negotiated by the PLO and Israel in Oslo in 1993. Since then, the relationship between the two leaderships, the old and the established on one hand and the young and emerging on the other, has not been an easy one. Efforts to co-opt and even accommodate the young leaders of the first intifada did not always succeed due to the authoritarian nature of the PLO leadership. Nonetheless, the euphoria accompanying the partial Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory, the holding of the first general national elections in 1996, and the establishment of the first Palestinian government in modern history produced an appearance of harmony between the two groups.
The established PLO leadership is a historic one. It is composed of the founding fathers of the Palestinian national movement along with the leaders of the different guerrilla organizations and the PLO bureaucracy. It has spent most of its life in the outside. Most members of this group tend to be old, over 50 years of age. It dominates all the institutions of the PLO: the Palestinian National Council, the Central Council, and the Executive Committee. It also dominates the highest decision making body of the largest faction of the PLO, the Fateh Central Committee, as well as the PA Cabinet. One third of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) comes from this group, even though elections for this body were held in the West Bank and Gaza only. Members of this group, such as Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin) Ahmad Qurie (Abu Ala) and Nabil Sha’ath have led all negotiations with Israel. This essay calls this group the Old Guard.
The Young Guard refers to newly emerging local leaders as well as the former leaders of the first intifada. They tend to be young, below or around 40 years of age. Although some individuals from this group are members of the PA Cabinet and the PLC, and few are heads or senior members of security services, the group as a whole lacks cohesion, leadership, and de jure power. Indeed, to some Palestinians some of the leaders of the Young Guard seem more like gangsters and warlords. Warlords, such as Sami Abu Samhadaneh in Rafah and Aatif Ebiat in Bethlehem have been targeted for assassination by the Israeli army, the latter was killed in October 2001. Other leaders of the Young Guard, such as Marwan Barghouti in Ramallah and Husam Khader in Nablus have more respectability in their communities. While the Young Guard has little voice in the main PLO institutions, it has much more relative power in the different Fateh bodies, namely the Tanzim and Fateh’s High Committee and its Revolutionary Council.
The Old Guard derives legitimacy from the PLO legacy as well as the Oslo agreement and its outcome. Its power is also derived from its control over the financial resources of the PLO and the PA, the diplomatic recognition accorded it by the international community, and the control it exercises over the main bodies and institutions of the PLO and the PA, including the bureaucracy and the security services.
The Young Guard relies on a claim to pre-Oslo legitimacy. Its power is derived from its alliance with the Islamists, the overwhelming public dissatisfaction with the peace process and the process of national reconstruction, and the support the public gives to the use of arms against the Israeli occupation forces and settlers. This support for the Young Guard neutralizes the Old Guard’s tools of coercive force and, under certain conditions, renders them almost irrelevant. While the size of the armed wing of the Young Guard may not be large, it is sufficient to allow it to take control of many of the crumbling PA civil institutions and to deter any attempts by the PA security services for a quick cragainst it.
Despite the fact that many of the institutions controlled by the Old Guard are steadily losing relevance in the face of the reality on the ground, thYoung Guard has not sought to create new institutions to compete with the old ones. Instead, the Young Guard seems to hope to eventually control the existing national institutions. For this reason, while clearly opposed to some of the steps and decisions taken by these institutions, the Young Guard has refrained from opposing them or questioning their legitimacy.
The Old Guard has a clear leadership hierarchy, even if authoritarian. At the top sits Arafat; he does not need approval from the Old Guard, nor does he need to demonstrate credibility to it. Indeed, the Old Guard seeks his approval and derives its own legitimacy from him. Its survival as a group depends on Arafat’s continued presence and support. The Young Guard too recognizes Arafat’s leadership and legitimacy. It does not, however, derive its legitimacy from him; indeed, it is he who needs to demonstrate credibility to it. By allowing the Young Guard to seek an alliance with the Islamists and to engage in armed confrontations with the Israeli army, Arafat gains the acceptance and approval of the Young Guard. Indeed, after Israel began to target the regular PA police and security forces, and despite the risks involved, he allowed units from the Presidential Guard and the intelligence services to participate in occasional attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers. Arafat’s alternative option to gain the approval of the Young Guard is to open the Palestinian political system to political participation and to encourage a true transition to democracy; something he has, thus far, sought to avoid.
The Young Guard wants more from Arafat. It demands transparency, accountability, a clean-up campaign against corruption, a comprehensive political reform, and a much greater role for security services in confrontations with Israel. Statements, issued by Fateh and the Nationalist-Islamist Committee for the Intifada, have highlighted the urgent need to fight corruption. Such a fight is seen as means of encouraging more popular participation in the intifada and of unseating all those members of the Old Guard accused of corruption. The Young Guard has also called for the establishment of a national unity government that would include, not only members from among its ranks, but also senior members of Islamists and other opposition groups. The Young Guard has strongly supported local and international demands for good governance including respect for the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, stronger role for the legislature, and much stronger and more efficient public institutions.
With regard to the peace process, the Young Guard shares with the Old Guard the same goals and aspirations for an independent state, to live in peace side by side with the state of Israel, with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital, and with a just solution to the refugee problem. In today’s highly inflamed environment, most members of the Young Guard tend to advocate hawkish position. But this is probably a reflection of the heightened threat perception generated by the daily bloodshed. Indeed, some members of the group, such as Sari Nusseibeh, the president of al Quds University and Arafat’s representative in East Jerusalem, advocate very moderate views and indeed oppose the resort by the Young Guard to arms.
For now however, the Young Guard is strongly opposed to any cease-fire agreement that would entail a crackdown on nationalist or Islamist activists. Indeed, it has expressed public opposition to both, the Mitchell Report and the Tenet Plan. In fact, it wants Arafat to “come out of the closet,” by publicly endorsing its intifada goals and methods and by ordering all PA security forces to join the armed confrontations. In its eyes, this would be the ultimate test of credibility. The Old Guard, on the other hand, is highly skeptical of the efficacy of violence. Indeed, it is greatly critical of the involvement of some of PA security forces in the confrontations. For now, many members of the Old Guard are convinced that Arafat can not seriously confront the Young Guard in the absence of a reasonable chance for a peace agreement with Israel. In fact, some accept the argument that the occasional participation of official security services in the fighting against Israel is essential for pragmatic considerations: when the time comes to put an end to the armed confrontations, only those in the security services with a credible record of fighting the Israelis will have the legitimacy and the resolve to confront and detain those who may wish to continue the fight.
Some non-PA members of the Old Guard have sought to distance themselves from the PA Old Guard and to establish a new forum for political mobilization and reform. In January 2001, the Speaker of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) called for the establishment of a “National Independence Organization,” and demanded that the PA fully addresses problems of corruption and the absence of the rule of law, put on trial those accused of corruption, respect and implement decisions of the courts, and call upon the cabinet to resign in order to form a new one and appoint a prime minister. The Young Guard was not quick to embrace the call of the PNC speaker as it suspected the motivation behind the call and sought to gain strength and assert itself, not through the open condemnation of the PA’s Old Guard, but through defeating the Israeli army through the use of arms.
The Young Guard differentiates itself from the Old Guard through the way it defines victory in its battle against occupation. The Old Guard seeks a negotiated settlement that meets the vital needs of the Palestinians. Such an outcome would not only end occupation, but would also allow the Old Guard to remain in power for years to come. The Young Guard on the other hand does not, for now, define victory in a negotiated outcome. An Israeli unilateral withdrawal or separation would fit perfectly well with the Young Guard’s definition of victory, as it can be viewed as comparable to the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon under the pressure of Hizbullah. Such an outcome would render the Old Guard’s leadership irrelevant and useless and would elevate the Young Guard to leadership position. The Young Guard cannot, however, oppose a negotiated settlement supported by the majority of the Palestinians if one becomes feasible. But it realizes that only the Old Guard can negotiate such a settlement. The Young Guard lacks the capacity to conduct serious negotiations with the Israelis: it is short of a unified national leadership and a well-articulated vision, as well as knowledge of, experience, and contacts with Israelis.
In the initial period of the intifada, the Old Guard welcomed the popular uprising hoping that it would strengthen its negotiating position in the face of Sharon’s provocation. Yet it had never been certain that once started, the Old Guard would have the capacity to bring it to a halt or even to publicly oppose it. The Young Guard on the other hand saw the intifada as the means to express opposition to the efforts of the Old Guard to bring about an end to occupation through negotiations. The failure at Camp David affirmed the Young Guard’s belief that only through popular and armed confrontation can the Palestinians bring about an end to occupation. Even though it does not publicly oppose it, the Young Guard has little or no confidence in the current diplomatic process. Instead, it hopes that by increasing the cost of occupation, it could force Israel to unilaterally withdraw its army from Palestinian areas, just as it did from South Lebanon.
In pursuing the intifada through armed confrontations, the Young Guard sought a second objective: to insure their dominance in the post-intifada/post-occupation era. In the meanwhile, by creating armed militias, the Young Guard was able to fill a power vacuum left by crumbling PA institutions. PA security services, armed but not part of the confrontation with Israel, could not challenhighly popular and armed militias engaged in confrontations with Israeli forces.
To increase the intifada’s pressure on Israel and to strengthen its doposition vis-à-vis the Old Guard, the Young Guard formed an alliance with the Islamists and other opposition forces. Despite the perceived long term Islamist threat, the Young Guard preferred to have the Islamists in its coalition and under its leadership recalling that in the first intifada, the Islamists created their own parallel leadership, institutions and strike forces.
Obviously the division along Young Guard vs. Old Guard is not the only consequential division in Palestinian politics and society. We have already referred to the nationalist-Islamist divide. There is still one more. Many influential members, in both the Young Guard and the Old Guard, continue to view the success of the Oslo peace process as a vital national interest. Young Guard members, particularly those already integrated into the PA and PLO institutions, such as Mohammad Dahlan, head of the Preventive Security service in the Gaza Strip and Jibril al Rojoub, head of the same security service in the West Bank (also others who have been influenced by the non-violent techniques of the first intifada, such as Sari Nusseibeh), are united with the majority of those in the Old Guard, in their opposition to the violent dimensions of the current one. However, under the current political stalemate and given the overwhelming support for armed confrontations in the Palestinian street, this group and the PA institutions and security services they control, remain marginal. But under certain scenarios, discussed in the following section, some of them can play a highly critical role in shaping Palestinian domestic outcomes.
Domestic Dynamics under Three Scenarios
One can view the future of Palestinian domestic dynamics in light of three possible scenarios: a continuation of the status quo, an Israeli unilateral separation, and a negotiated settlement. A continuation of the status quoassumes that violence will continue to be initiated by Israel, the Young Guard, as well the Islamists and other groups opposed to the PA, but that the PA, with or without Arafat at the helm, will remain largely reactive. It does not exclude the possibility of a serious violent escalation along the way. The continuation of the status quo serves well the interests of the Islamists. An Israeli unilateral separation, on the other hand, would benefit the Young Guard. This second scenario assumes an Israeli army withdrawal from certain parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the possibility that such a withdrawal would be accompanied by an evacuation of several isolated and sparsely populated settlements and outposts. The scenario assumes that Arafat remains in his current position, but it does not exclude the possibility that he may no longer be present. The third scenario assumes that a negotiated settlement of some sort has been reached with Arafat. The settlement might be a transitional or a permanent one. This last scenario would clearly serve the interests of the Old Guard.
The continuation of the status quo will most likely allow existing dynamics to proceed with little obstacles. In such a case, support among Palestinians for the peace process and the compromises entailed in it will continue to decrease while support for violence will remain high. The legitimacy of the PA will continue to diminish and along with it the popularity of Arafat. Within the national movement, conflict between the Young Guard and the Old Guard will continue to weaken the movement with the Young Guard gaining greater autonomy and weight while the voice of the Old Guard gradually disappearing.
In the absence of an alternative leadership, Arafat will probably assume full leadership of the Young Guard, but his room for maneuver will be extremely constrained. His absence from the scene can hasten the demise of the Old Guard and create greater opportunity for internal infighting within the Young Guard with many vying for leadership. Young guard leaders, currently integrated into the PA, such as Dahlan and Rojoub, will most probably join forces with other Young Guard members providing them with much needed foot-soldiers, added public support, and above all political respectability. In the meanwhile, with Arafat present or absent, the overall domestic balance of power will continue to shift towards the Islamists who will probably succeed in few years to become the mainstream with a majority of the Palestinian street supporting them. Indeed, current ideological and societal shifts toward conservatism and political Islam will probably intensify.
An Israeli unilateral separation fits perfectly well with the Young Guard’s definition of victory. In the absence of a negotiated outcome, the search in Israel for an alternative to the status quo will continue. The policy of unilateral separation might seem attractive to some Israelis because it does not require a partner on the other side. As more and more Israelis reach the conclusion that the Palestinians cannot or will not accept the compromise offered by their governments, they become convinced that separation is the way out as the means to reduce Israel’s vulnerabilities. Building a wall of separation is supported by a majority of Israelis today. The extent of support depends on the size of Israeli army withdrawal from Palestinian areas and the number of settlements that would have to be evacuated. The larger the withdrawal and the evacuation are, the more lukewarm the support becomes. Nonetheless, sufficient support among most or all groups across the political spectrum provides a realistic basis for this scenario.
Forcing Israel to withdraw its forces from Palestinian areas will be compared by the Young Guard to the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon. The PA is likely to behave in the same manner as the Lebanese government did, while the Young Guard is likely to behave like Hizbullah. In other words, the PA is not likely to assume control over the newly evacuated territory and settlements. The Young Guard and the Islamists will most likely declare these areas liberated and use them as bases from which to continue the war against the Israeli army in the zones remaining occupied. The alliance between the Young Guard and the Islamists is likely to be strengthened.
The ability of the Old Guard to use the occasion of the Israeli withdrawal as an opportunity to restart the negotiations is likely to be scuttled by the Young Guard. Indeed, the Young Guard will most likely utilize the circumstances of its “victory” as an occasion to openly defy and perhaps even displace the Old Guard, and thus consolidate its leadership of the national movement. Arafat will remain the only viable leader for the Young Guard until such a time as an alternative leadership, with national rather than local credential, emerges. His absence would hasten the search for new national leaders from among the Young Guard, but it may not necessarily engender greater infighting among the Young Guard. This would be particularly true if, as expected, senior Young Guard members, currently integrated into the PA, would join forces with the Young Guard. This “bandwagon” process may involve not only security chiefs referred to earlier, but also members of the Young Guard currently in senior bureaucratic positions. Interpreted as a clear victory for the Young Guard, Israeli unilateral withdrawal will dramatically increase public support for the national movement and thus impede efforts by the Islamists to secure hegemony.
A negotiated outcome can be arrived at only with the Old Guard. For the Old Guard, such an outcome could be a lifeline. The Young Guard cannot arrive at a negotiated settlement, even if it wanted one; it is leaderless, lack a clear overall vision, and has no previous dealings with the Israelis. In any case, it would be almost unimaginable for the Young Guard, who has been very critical of the Old Guard’s handling of negotiations with the Israel, to agree to something that the Old Guard could not accept at Camp David and later at Taba.
In thiscenario, the Old Guard reasserts its leadership reaching an agreement that finds support among the majority of the Palestinian stre. The Young Guard, in an alliance with the Islamists, will probably seek to torpedo any negotiated efforts, but public support for an agreement would most likely render futile attempts by the Young Guard to oppose it. More significantly, PA-integrated Young Guard security chiefs are likely to give their support, in this scenario, to the Old Guard thus tipping the scales against any violent dissent by the Young Guard. A negotiated deal with Israel, particularly if accompanied by a process of domestic political reform, can extend the life of the leadership of Old Guard. It can also open the way for more peaceful and perhaps fruitful efforts to reintegrate the two branches of the national movement in a way that can unify the two and thereby weaken the appeal of the Islamists.
What Negotiated Outcome?
But is a negotiated outcome possible? Three options are available: a comprehensive agreement, a stabilization package, and a mid-term transitional arrangement. None seems likely today. But with some American and European vision and leadership, certainly Arafat, but even Sharon, might be convinced to accept a stabilization package along the lines described below.
A Comprehensive Agreement
A comprehensive agreement would solve all the issues of conflict, including Jerusalem and refugees, thereby put an end to the conflict. As demonstrated by various Palestinian-Israeli rounds of negotiations since Camp David, a comprehensive agreement is feasible. If and when the two sides return to serious negotiation, it will most likely seek to complete the work started with the Clinton ideas in December 2000 and built on at Taba in January 2001.
For this option to become a reality, three conditions need to be met. None exists today. These are: a change of government in Israel that would bring about a leadership and a coalition less wedded to greater Israel ideology, a determined and devoted US leadership that is committed to make the process succeed, and a unity of purpose between the Old Guard and the Young Guard in the Palestinian community and leadership. This last condition could be met through domestic political reform that seeks to open the political system and to create a viable partnership between the two groups.
Furthermore, Israeli and Palestinian publics are highly skeptical of the ability of the two sides to reach such an agreement. Indeed, neither public is willing, under the present conditions of heightened threat perception, to support the painful compromises required for a successful process of full reconciliation. This should not lead to despair; but rather to the conclusion that only a strong leadership, one with a strong perception of legitimacy, can have the courage to take this path. Once reached, the two publics will most likely support such compromises, but not a day before.
On the Palestinian side, a comprehensive agreement can only be reached with the Old Guard leading the process but with the acquiescence of the emerging leaders of the Young Guard. Under the present conditions, in which political reform is absent, this is an unlikely outcome. On the Israeli side, such an agreement can be reached with a government that views Israeli democracy, combined with a Jewish character of the state, as preferable to a control over the land of “greater Israel” even if through continued occupation. With the current governmental coalition in Israel, such a development is highly unlikely.
Stabilization
A stabilization package can only serve as a stop-gap measure aiming at creating the necessary conditions for reducing mutually perceived threats, restoring public confidence in the peace process, and facilitating a return to a more promising final status negotiations. Such a package would include the following elements: a cessation of all forms of violence, a return to the pre intifada military deployment, a freeze on settlement building, an implementation of existing interim commitments most notably a credible Israeli redeployment from area “C” accompanied by PA implementation of its own interim commitments, and a return to final status negotiations. The publics on both sides are willing to support such a stabilization package as it can be rightly described and packaged as a more constructive way of implementing existing agreements.
For a successful conclusion of a stabilization package, the current Israeli government could be made a partner, as it does not require it to fully renounce its “Greater Israel” leanings. There would be a need for a more active role for the international community, including the US, something that has been made easier since 11 September 2001. On the Palestinian side, a full integration of the Young Guard into the political system and its decision-making bodies would be essential for a successful implementation of a stabilization package. In the absence of such integration, the Old Guard would be required to enforce an unpopular cease-fire against a potentially strong and violent resistance by the Young Guard in the nationalist movement and the armed wings of the Islamist and national opposition groups. In all cases, some minor violence is likely to linger threatening to poison the environment and eventually destroy the process of stabilization unless efforts to bring about a comprehensive agreement succeed first.
Stabilization requires multinational monitoring as a confidence building measure. Monitoring makes it difficult for the Young Guard to openly engage in initiated attacks against Israeli targets without openly defying and embarrassing Arafat. Therefore, the deployment of monitors increases the cost of cease-fire violation and increases the chances that the cease-fire will be self-enforced. Indeed, by placing responsibility for failure on those who ignore the terms of agreement, monitoring deters violation and insures compliance by both sides. It also helps each side verify the intentions of the other when monitors are given access to areas and information. Finally, monitoring can provide independent means of triggering the implementation of the different phases of the agreement and thereby provide an incentive for each side to fully comply with terms applying to it.
Monitoring, however, cannot solve the problem of “impasse,” as the two sides may have legitimate grievances that cannot be addressed through good intentions alone. Those grievances may lead either or both sides to freeze the implementation of their commitments or even to act in ways contrary to the explicit articles of the agreement. To provide means to partially address the issue of impasse, one may seek to upgrade the monitoring function by adding a political role to it, whereby senior officials from the countries involved in the monitoring process, may meet regularly to assess the whole process of implementation and negotiations.
On the Palestinian side, like in the first option, only the Old Guard can lead the process of negotiations toward stabilization. The Young Guard, however, would most likely seek to impede the process of stabilization if they perceive it as a means to reestablish and consolidate the control of the Old Guard. Needless to say, the Young Guard has already succeeded in imposing a de facto control over many or most of the PA civil institutions, and along with the Islamist, has greatly penetrated the PA security services.
On the Israeli side, stabilization will require steps that will most likely have an impact on the Jewish settlement enterprise. A complete freeze on settlement building will pose a serious threat to the viability of that enterprise, as it will impede settlers’ efforts to create facts on the ground and, thereby, keep alive the option of “greater Israel” and prevent the advancement toward a permanent settlement. The settlement enterprise will also suffer a serious setback when the Israeli army carries out, under this option, a third redeployment from area “C” in the West Bank. Indeed, a full and credible third redeployment would require the evacuation of many small and isolatsettlements and outposts, most built or inhabited since the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993. Such an eis likely to be opposed by the settlers and their right wing supporters in the current governmental coalition. While this may not necessarily bring down the Sharon government, it will clearly weaken the right wing support for Sharon.
A Mid-Term Transition Arrangement
The stabilization option can be upgraded to serve as a mid-term transition arrangement. Sharon may want to call this option a “long term interim agreement.” Arafat may prefer to call it a new and improved mechanism for the implementation of the existing Interim Agreement. Under an appropriate packaging, an upgraded stabilization package can be sold to both Israeli and Palestinian publics.
Under this option, four additional components would be added to those already listed above. These would include: an Israeli evacuation of the whole Gaza Strip including the removal of all settlements in the strip, an added Israeli redeployment measures in the West Bank that would insure full Palestinian territorial contiguity, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and extending the mandate of the international monitors to include the supervision of Israeli force deployment and Palestinian control over international border crossings. Israeli Foreign Minister has already advocated most of these components. Sharon has reportedly been willing to discuss the Gaza evacuation since his first visit to the US as a Prime Minister. He has repeatedly declared his willingness to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state that has contiguous territory.
Conclusion
The dramatic events of September 11 had a significant but temporary impact on domestic Palestinian conditions. International outrage and disgust with terrorism and the determination shown by the US and other Western countries to form a world alliance to combat it created certain fears and provided opportunities for the Palestinians. Arafat was determined to avoid any association with terror against civilians and eager to show solidarity with the US. Most Palestinians, including the Young Guard, were fearful that Israel would take advantage of the human tragedy and launch a devastating attack against the PA-controlled areas. In addition, Palestinian Islamists feared association, whether organizational or in goals and methods, with the terrorist group responsible for the attacks against the US. Such an association would have made them an immediate target for US retaliation. Therefore, for them, the immediate aftermath of the attack was not the appropriate time to engage in suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. For the Young Guard, the alliance it had with the Islamists threatened to become a liability, while Arafat’s and the Old Guard’s international credentials became an asset and a cover to be sought after. For Arafat, the cost of continued appeasement of the Young Guard had just increased many folds; with international attention focused elsewhere, he feared for his own survival.
Furthermore, the need for an Arab and Islamic support for the US war against terror provided opportunities. It was only in the aftermath of similar conditions, in the Gulf war of 1990-91, that an American administration exerted sufficient pressure on the then right wing Israeli government of Yitzhak Shamir to go to the Madrid international peace conference. Arafat and the Old Guard hoped for something similar this time. They effectively employed pressure and persuasion against the Young Guard who were disposed to accept a temporary calm. Even the Islamists were willing to go along. In addition to wanting to deny Sharon the opportunity to strike at them with impunity, the two allied groups were skeptical about the chances for a political breakthrough and convinced that Sharon was not going to play along an American tune in the same way Shamir did.
So far, they have been proven right. Committed to a thesis that sees Arafat’s deliberate and calculated hand behind every violent incident, Sharon and senior members of the Israeli army and intelligence community seem to have already reached the conclusion that Arafat was no longer a partner. Indeed, they may have been engaged in a steady but piecemeal process of de-legitimation and liquidation of his authority. They have understood that the relative calm was temporary. More importantly, they have assumed that the post September 11 international diplomacy may provide him a lifeline, and they were determined to make it difficult from him to get away with it. The Israeli policy of assassination and incursions into Area A continued despite the fact that Arafat had succeeded in reducing the level of violence by more that 80% in a short period of time. In the end, the vicious cycle of violence found a way to circumvent the opportunity provided by the events of September 11. International diplomacy, unable to force Arafat to make a full commitment to the cease-fire or to check Sharon’s continued provocations, was not up to the challenge.
Arafat and the Old Guard will remain for now incapable of making a full commitment to the cease-fire. They lack the capacity to enforce one. Indeed, since the eruption of the second intifada, they have to walk a delicate tightrope: the PA no longer enjoys a monopoly over the use of force, its legitimacy is questioned by the street, the public is also very supportive of violence and highly opposed to any clampdown on the Islamists or the Young Guard, and no viable political process is looming over the horizon. If Arafat acts now against the Islamists and the Young Guard, he risks, if successful, being seen by the Palestinians as an Israeli lackey, or even a “Sa’d Haddad,” the Lebanese commander of the South Lebanon army created by Israel in the late 1970s to provide security for Northern Israel. If unsuccessful, he faces the prospects of civil war. His choices are therefore limited. Under a changed political environment, one in which Arafat obtains legitimacy and public support, he can move to enforce a cease-fire. A viable political process, initiated and led by the US and supported by the international community, can help trigger the required change. September 11th notwithstanding, the chances today for such an international effort are slim.
If the current situation is bad, imagine how it will be without Arafat. Today, his leadership is the glue that keeps together the Old Guard and the Young Guard preventing a full and immediate take-over by the former. Despite his poor communication skills, Arafat continues to give the Palestinian public a sense of stability preventing large-scale violations of law and order. His presence deters the Islamists from posing an immediate threat to the shaky dominance of the nationalists. In his absence, all hell could break lose. Arafat and the PA have an alternative to this bleak future: instead of waiting for an American-international peace plan, they can embark, now, on a process of political reform. By doing so, Arafat and the national movement can regain the support of most Palestinians and at the same time integrate the Young Guard into the PA. Indeed, for Arafat, Old Guard, and all Palestinians, the message is clear: reform or perish.
Endnotes:
Khalil Shikaki, an associate professor of political science, currently teaching at Bir Zeit University. He is the director of The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Ramallah.
(1) Data cited in this section are based on more than 75 surveys conducted by the author between 1993 and 2001. The surveys were conducted in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including Arab East Jerusalem. The sample size in each of the surveys ranged between 1300-2000 persons in face-to-face interviews. For details, visit the website of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research at www.pcpsr.org.
(2) For more details on the period between 1993-98, see, Khalil Shikaki, “Peace Now or Hamas Later,” Foreign Affairs, July-August 1998, pp. 29-43.
14 March 2023
In light of the recent events in Huwara and the northern West Bank, Palestinian public attitudes become more militant as support for armed struggle rises, support for the two-state solution drops, and the vast majority opposes the Aqaba meeting; parallel to that, trust in the PA declines, demand for the resignation of president Abbas rises, and for the first time since the creation of the PA, a majority says that its dissolution or collapse serves the interest of the Palestinian people
8-11 March 2023
This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 8 and 11 March 2023. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the continuation of the teachers’ strike in public schools, the imposition by the PA of one Shekel added to each telecommunication bill as a donation to an East Jerusalem fund, the holding of student elections at Hebron University in which a Fatah affiliated bloc won against a Hamas affiliated one. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, armed confrontations continued to escalate in the West Bank, the PA announced a suspension of security coordination with Israel, and Israel took punitive measures against the PA including the confiscation and withholding of funds. Settlers attacked the town of Huwara and burned dozens of homes with residents inside as well as shops and cars and killed one civilian in a revenge attack following the killing of two settlers in the town earlier that day. A Palestinian-Israeli meeting took place in Aqaba, in the presence of Egyptian, Jordanian, and American delegations, to discuss means of de-escalation and the ending of unilateral measures. In Israel, tens of thousands demonstrated against the Netanyahu government’s plan to change the judicial system. Regionally, an earthquake hit Turkey and Syria bringing vast destruction and the death of tens of thousands.
This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as the general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org
Main Findings:
The findings of the first quarter of 2023 indicate that the internal factional balance of power remains unchanged, with parity between Fatah and Hamas, if new parliamentary elections were to take place today, and a majority vote for Hamas’ candidate, Ismail Haniyyeh, over Mahmud Abbas in presidential elections. Satisfaction with president Abbas drops four percentage points and the demand for resignation increases by two points.
Public evaluation of internal conditions points to a greater deterioration in the standing of the PA and a significant loss of trust in it. Findings show a rise in the belief that the PA is now a burden on the Palestinian people and for the first time in our polls, a majority supports the dissolution of the PA and views its collapse as an interest for the Palestinian people. In fact, a majority thinks that the continued existence of the PA serves the interests of Israel and that its dissolution or collapse would strengthen Palestinian armed groups.
The declining status of the PA can also be seen in the vast public support, standing at 70% in the West Bank, for the strike of the West Bank teachers in public schools and the belief of about 80% or more of the public that the current PA government will fail in conducting elections, reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or improving economic conditions. Loss of trust in the PA can be seen in the overwhelming opposition to the PA’s imposition of a one-Shekel tax on the telecommunication bill to support East Jerusalem. On top of that opposition, about 80% say the money will not really go to East Jerusalemites.
Findings of the current quarter point a significant decline in the support for the two-state solution accompanied by an increase in the percentage of those who think this solution is no longer practical or feasible due to settlement expansion. Furthermore, the public expresses widespread pessimism about the ability of international organizations and the international community, including the US, the EU, and the Arab states, to impose sanctions on the current Israeli government to pressure it to change its settlement policy or its violations of international law.
In light of all that, findings show a rise in the percentage of those who support a return to armed confrontation and intifada. In fact, 70% of West Bankers expect the eruption of a third armed intifada. Moreover, more than 70% declare support for the latest Huwara shooting attack against settlers; two thirds support the formation of armed groups, such as the Jenin Battalion or the Lions’ Den; and almost all express the view that the PA security services should not arrest or disarm members of these groups. More than 60% of the West Bankers believe that members of these armed groups will resist with arms any attempt by the PA security services to disarm or arrest them. Public support for armed resistance is further confirmed by overwhelming opposition to the Palestinian participation in the Aqaba meeting. Almost all Palestinians think Israel will not honor its commitments in that meeting. A large majority, standing at 70%, think Israeli counter measures, which are meant to punish those who commit armed attacks or their families, such as home demolition, expulsion, or the imposition of the death penalty, will only lead to an increase in the intensity of such attacks.
On the background of the settlers’ attack on Huwara and given the current right wing government in Israel, two thirds of the public expect an increase in these attacks. In light of the call by the Israeli finance minister to wipe out Huwara, a large minority, approaching almost half of the public, expect Israel to commit massacres and force a large-scale mass expulsion. Three quarters of the public view the Huwara settlers’ attack as an expression of the behavior of the Israeli government and army rather than the behavior of the most extreme settlers.
(1) Armed escalation, security coordination, the Aqaba meeting, and a third intifada:
- A vast majority of 73% is against and only 21% are in favor of the Palestinian attendance of the Aqaba meeting which took place last month in order to stop the escalation of the armed conflict in the West Bank.
- 84% think Israel will not honor its commitments in the Aqaba meeting; only 12% think Israel will implement its commitments.
- 64% say that now, after the Aqaba meeting, they are less optimistic regarding possible improvement in Palestinian-Israeli relations, such as the prospects for the implementation of confidence building measures or the slowing down of settlement expansion next year; only 8% say they are more optimistic and 24% say they are neither more nor less optimistic.
- 68% of the public (71% in the Gaza Strip and 66% in the West Bank) say they are in favor of forming armed groups such as the “Lions’ Den,” which do not take orders from the PA and are not part of the PA security services; 25% are against that.
- Nonetheless, 52% are worried that the formation of such armed groups could lead to armed clashes with the PA security services; 44% are not worried.
- 83% say they are against the surrender of the armed groups’ members and their arms to the PA in order to receive protection against Israeli assassination; 12% say they are for it.
- The vast majority (87%) says the PA does not have the right to arrest member of these armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israel or to provide them with protection; only 8% say they favor it.
- A majority of 58% expects these armed groups to expand and spread to other areas in the West Bank; 15% expect Israel to succeed in arresting or killing their members; and 14% expect the PA to succeed in containing or coopting these groups.
- A majority of 61% (69% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) expect security conditions in the West Bank to continue to escalate leading to the eruption of a third armed intifada; 36% say they do not expect a third intifada.
- If security conditions escalate further or if a third intifada were to erupt, a majority of 62% does not expect the PA security services to join forces with the Palestinian armed groups; 33% say they expect them to do so.
- A majority of 56% says they do not expect the PA to deploy its security forces in the Jenin refugee camp or the old city of Nablus and other areas in which armed groups have recently been formed in order to enforce law and order and ensure “one authority-one gun” by disarming these groups and arresting their member in return for concessions that Israel might provide; 37% say they expect the PA to do so.
- If the PA attempted to disarm the newly created armed groups, a majority of 59% thinks that members of these groups will use their arms to resist the PA security services; 8% think they will surrender; and 23% think they will resist the PA but non-violently.
- A majority of 63% says it supports the ending of security coordination with Israel that was announced recently by the PA while 32% say they are opposed to it. But the overwhelming majority (79%) thinks the PA did not actually suspend security coordination with Israel; only 13% think it did.
- The vast majority (77%) thinks Israel will not stop its army incursions into PA territories in order to encourage the PA to return to security coordination; 18% think Israel will do so. 61% think the PA will not return to security coordination if Israel continued its daily incursions while 32% think the PA will resume security coordination even if the Israeli army incursions continue.
- 70% (73% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip) believe the Israel measures aimed at punishing Palestinian attackers and their families, such as demolishing their homes, or expelling them, or imposing the death penalty, will lead to greater armed attacks; 8% think these measures will lead to lesser attacks; and 20% think they will have no impact on armed attacks.
(2) Whose interest is served by the continued existence or the collapse of the PA?
- The largest percentage (41%) says Israeli punitive measures against the PA aim at weaking it; 27% think Israel aims at forcing a PA collapse; and 27% think Israel does not want to weaken the PA or bring it to collapse.
- When asked to define Israel’s interest regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse, the majority (57%) says the survival of the PA is in Israel’s interest while 39% think Israel’s interest lies in the collapse of the PA.
- When asked to define the interest of the Palestinian people regarding the PA, its continued existence or its collapse or dissolution, a majority of 52% says the Palestinian people’s interest lies in the collapse or dissolution of the PA while 42% define the continued existence of the PA as a Palestinian interest.
- In the event that the PA becomes weak or collapses, such a development is seen by 57% of the public as leading to the strengthening of the armed groups in the West Bank while 12% think it will weaken them; 27% think it will neither weaken nor strengthen the armed groups.
- If it becomes pretty clear that Israel aims at weakening the PA or even forcing its collapse, 67% of the public thinks the major Arab countries, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, will abandon the PA; 28% think they will stand with the PA.
(3) The shooting in Huwara, the settler’s terror, and the absence of PA police:
- A large majority of 71% say they support the shooting of two settlers in Huwara while 21% express opposition to this and similar armed attacks.
- Three quarters (75%) believe the settlers’ terror attack on Huwara after the killing of the two settlers is an expression of the policy of the Israeli government and army while 20% think it is an expression of the behavior of the extreme settlers only.
- Two thirds (67%) expect increased settlers’ attacks under the current right wing Israeli government, but 16% say there will less attacks, and 14% think the frequency of settlers’ attacks will remain unchanged.
- When asked why the PA police and other security services were unable to protect the residents of Huwara and other towns located in area B of the West Bank, despite the fact that the PA has jurisdiction over law enforcement in such areas, the public was divided into four groups. One group of 32% thinks the PA leadership and government prefer to maintain security coordination with Israel over protecting its own people. A second group, of 27%, thinks the PA police and national security forces do not wish to engage the Israeli army in an armed confrontation. A third group, of 24%, thinks the PA police does not have a jurisdiction over the settlers and cannot arrest them. A fourth group, of 11%, thinks the settlers’ attacks occur during the night when the PA police is not present in the targeted areas.
- When asked what should the PA do to protect the residents of Huwara and other towns located in area B of the West Bank, the largest percentage (39%) says it should form civil guards units made up of volunteers from these towns; 27% say it should build police stations or place permanent police units in these areas; 13% say it should complain to the UN and the International Criminal Court; and 9% say it should issue statements of condemnation.
- In light of the call by Smotrich, the Israeli minister of finance, to wipe out the town of Huwara, a large minority of 44% expects the Israeli government to commit massacres and force a mass expulsion of Palestinians if and when Palestinian armed attacks expand; but a majority of 53% says it does not expect that.
(4) Legislative and presidential elections:
- 68% say they support the holding of presidential and legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in the near future while 28% say they do not support that. Demand for elections stands at 76% in the Gaza Strip and 63% in the West Bank. However, a majority of 69% believes no legislative, or legislative and presidential, elections will take place soon.
- If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, only 46% would participate and from among those, Abbas would receive 36% and Haniyeh 52% of the votes (compared to 54% for Haniyeh and 36% for Abbas three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 35% of the votes and Haniyeh receives 61%. In the West Bank, Abbas receives 37% and Haniyeh 43%. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, participation would increase to 62% and from among those, Barghouti receives 58% and Haniyeh 37%. If the competition is between Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, participation rate would decrease to 43% and from among those, the former receives 29% and the latter 60%.
- If Abbas does not run for elections, the public prefers Marwan Barghouti to succeed him as the largest percentage (35%) selected him in a closed-ended question, followed by Ismail Haniyyeh (18%), Khalid Mish’al (5%), Mohammad Dahlan and Mohammad Shtayyeh (4% each), Yahya al Sinwar (3%), and Hussein al Sheikh (2%); 26% said they do not know or have not decided.
- Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 19% and dissatisfaction at 77%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 17% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas three months ago stood at 23% and dissatisfaction at 73%. Moreover, a vast majority of 77% of the public wants president Abbas to resign while only 18% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 75% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands today at 76% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip.
- If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions that participated in the 2006 elections, 67% say they would participate. Of those who would participate, 33% say they will vote for Hamas and 35% say they will vote for Fatah, 9% will vote for all third parties combined, and 22% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 34%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 43% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 30% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 26% three months ago) and Fatah at 38% (compared to 38% three months ago).
- 26% say Hamas is most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while 24% think Fatah under president Abbas is the most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinians; 44% think neither side deserves such a role. Three months ago, 28% selected Hamas, 25% Fatah under Abbas, and 40% said neither side deserves such a role.
- A majority of 53% thinks that the recent student election results of Hebron University, in which the student bloc affiliated with Fatah won sixty percent of the vote against the Islamic bloc, which received forty percent of the vote, does not necessarily reflect the balance of power between Fatah and Hamas in the larger Palestinian society in the West Bank or in the Hebron district; 19% think it reflects the balance of power in the Palestinian society in the West Bank; and 15% think it reflects the balance of power in the Hebron district.
(5) Domestic conditions, the “assassination” of Yasir Arafat, independence of the Judiciary, and those responsible for the drowning of Palestinian emigrants:
- Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 9% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 19%.
- Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 73% and in the West Bank at 46%. Three months ago, the perception of safety and security in the West Bank stood at 64% and at 77% in the Gaza Strip.
- Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82%. When asked about institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 71% indicated that there is corruption in these institutions. Three months ago, 81% said there is corruption in PA institutions and 69% said there is corruption in public institutions controlled by Hamas.
- 46% of West Bankers think people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear while 51% think they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 48% think people in the Strip can criticize Hamas’ authorities without fear and 51% think they cannot.
- In its assessment of the PA, a majority of the Palestinians (63%) views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, 59% viewed the PA as a burden and 36% viewed it as an asset.
- 22% are optimistic and 75% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 26%.
- After more than three years since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 81% expect failure; only 14% expect success. When asked about the ability of the government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 16% of the public expect success and 79% expect failure. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 81% expects failure and 16% expects success.
- 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 32% and in the West Bank at 19%. Three months ago, 20% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate and 30% of Gazans expressed the same desire.
- A vast majority of 71% says it opposes the imposition of tax of one Shekel on each telecommunication bill to support an East Jerusalem fund and 28% say are in favor. A large majority of 79% thinks the collected funds will not go to the benefit of East Jerusalemites while only 12% think the money will go to the residents of East Jerusalem.
- A majority of 56% says it supports the strike of the public school teachers in the West Bank while 42% say they are against it. Support for the strike in the West Bank rises to 65% and declines to 44% in the Gaza Strip.
- In light of the devastating earthquake in Turkey and Syria last month, a majority of 52% thinks that the chances that a similar one might hit Palestine during this or next year are slim to nonexistent while 36% think they are high or medium. When asked about their impressions about the PA’s capacity to deal with such earthquake if it were to happen in Palestine, the vast majority (81%) thinks it is slight or nonexistent while 18% think it is high or medium.
- We asked the public about its TV viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that al Jazeera TV has the highest viewership, standing at 28%, followed by al Aqsa TV (14%), Palestine TV (11%), Palestine Today TV (9%), Maan TV (6%), al Arabiya (3%), and al Mayadeen (2%).
(6) Palestinian-Israeli Relations, the Peace process, and the decision to go to ICJ:
- Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 27% and opposition stands at 71%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 32%.
- A majority of 74% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 24% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 74% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 23% believe the chances to be medium or high. Three months ago, only 69% said the two-state solution was no longer feasible or practical due to settlement expansion.
- Reflecting on the latest UN speech of president Abbas in which he described the situation on the ground in the West Bank as “apartheid” and that the Palestinian people will demand equal rights in one state for two peoples, 22% say that they are in favor of such one state solution while 75% expressed opposition. Three months ago, support for Abbas’ position on the one-state solution stood at 26%.
- When asked about support for specific policy choices to break the current deadlock, 57% supported joining more international organizations; 49% supported resort to non-violent resistance; 58% supported return to armed confrontations and intifada; 52% supported dissolving the PA; and 28% supported abandoning the two-state solution and embracing a one state solution for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 55% supported a return to armed confrontations and intifada; 48% supported dissolving the PA; and 27% supported abandoning the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
- When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation and building an independent state, the public split into three groups: 54% chose armed struggle (55% in the Gaza Strip and 54% in the West Bank), 18% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Three months ago, 51% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations.
- A vast majority of 69% says that international organizations, such as the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice, will not be able to constrain Israeli policies that violate international law and that these organizations will be content with expressions of opposition and condemnation. Only 13% think they will be able to constrain these Israeli policies while 12% think they will have a limited impact.
- The overwhelming majority (84%) thinks the Biden Administration will not impose sanctions on Israel to pressure it to change its settlement policy; only 12% think the US will impose such sanctions.
- Similarly, 82% think the European Union and European countries like France, the UK, and Germany will not impost sanctions on Israel in order to pressure it to change its settlement policy; 14% think they will do so.
- Moreover, 83% think the Arab countries that have recently normalized relations with Israel, such as UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, will not impose sanctions on Israel in order to pressure it to change its settlement policy; only 15% think they will do so.
- In light of the anti-government demonstrations in Israel, half of the public (50%) thinks they could lead to the fall of the Netanyahu government while 44% think they do not expect that to happen.
(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:
- 37% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 16% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings and 15% believes it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
- In a question about the main problem confronting Palestinian society today, the largest percentage, 26% (12% in the Gaz Strip and 35% in the West Bank), say it is corruption; 21% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 18% in the West Bank) say it is unemployment and poverty; 20% say it is the continuation of the occupation and settlement construction; 16% (26% in the Gaza Strip and 9% in the West Bank) say it is continued siege and blockade of the Gaza Strip; 11% say it is the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and 4% say it is the weakness of the judiciary and the absence of liberties, accountability and democracy.
- When asked about the most pressing problem confronting the Palestinians today, the largest percentage (38%) said it is the Israeli occupation, while 24% said it is corruption, 15% said it is the split or division, 13% said it is unemployment, and 5% said it is the internal violence.