23 June 2020
Two-thirds of the public expect Israel to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the West Bank and the majority expresses support for the PA policy of ceasing to implement the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with Israel. But large majorities express worry about the likely consequences of the PA policy on them and on their daily lives. Findings also show that despite a decrease in the popularity of president Abbas and Fatah movement in this poll, large majorities of the pubic are satisfied with the performance of the government in managing the Corona crisis.
17-20 June 2020
This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-20 June 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the spread of the Corona virus throughout the world and in the Palestinian territories leading the Palestinian Authority to impose a lockdown throughout the Palestinian territories which brought to a standstill many economic activities. It also witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government lead by prime minister Netanyahu and the announcement of the government intentions to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank. In response, the PA announced ending its commitment to the Oslo agreement and severed relations with Israel in security and civil realms. This was followed by ending Palestinian-Israeli security coordination and Israel stopped the transfer of Palestinian clearance funds thereby negatively affecting the PA’s ability to pay salaries for the month of May 2020. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.
Main Findings:
This quarterly poll was conducted during a period in which the spread of the Corona virus was believed to have been brought under control thereby allowing us to conduct face-to-face interviews throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The poll covered various
Issues, most importantly the intention of the Israeli government to annex Palestinian territories and the Palestinian response to the Israeli plans which amounted to a decision to stop implementation of the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with the Israeli government. We also focused on public perception of the PA government and its performance during the Coronavirus pandemic.
Findings show that two-thirds of the public believe that the new Israeli government led by prime minister Netanyahu will indeed annex Palestinian territories. This realization created a great deal of public concern and worry about the future. Public worry focused on the salary payment to the public sector, access to medical treatment, shortages in water and electricity supplies, eruption of armed clashes, return of security chaos and anarchy, PA collapse, and inability to travel to Jordan.
A large majority supports a Palestinian response to annexation that involves stopping the implementation of the agreements with Israel and severing all relations with it. But the public has doubts about the sincerity of the PA in stopping security coordination with Israel. Despite the fact that a slim majority supports responding to the plan by returning to armed struggle, the findings of this poll in fact show a decrease in supporting armed struggle compared to the findings of our last poll which was conducted four months ago. Moreover, despite the fact that two-thirds are worried about the likely collapse of the PA, only one third thinks that Israel will bring back its military rule and civil administration to the Palestinian territories; three quarters express rejection of such return, if it were to happen.
With regard to the government performance in managing the Coronavirus pandemic, a large majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA and with the various measures taken by the PA government. More than three quarters indicate that they trust that the government has been working to protect the interests of public. But two-thirds say that their income or salary has been reduced and a majority indicates that it has stopped working or has become unemployed during that period. Moreover, more than three quarters express the view that the PA government did not do its best to compensate those who suffered the most due to the closure and lockdown. It is interesting that despite the tense relations between the PA and Israel, two-thirds of the public express agreement with Palestinian-Israeli cooperation and coordination in the health sector that took place during the period of the pandemic.
Findings show a rise in favor of the two-state solution but half of the public remains opposed to this solution. Findings also show a consensus against the Trump plan, or the deal of the century, with a prevailing perception that the plan does not end the Israeli occupation and does not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. Indeed, most of the public believe now that the plan has returned the conflict to its original existential roots. For all of this, a large majority is opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US.
Finally, despite a decline in the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, findings indicate that he would lose a presidential election in which he competes against Ismail Haniyyeh. Findings also show that the gap between Fatah and Hamas, which stood at 6 points four months ago in Fatah’s favor, has now narrowed to 2 points in its favor.
(1) Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories and its potential consequences:
- Two-thirds (66%) believe that the new Israeli government will indeed annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank while 28% think it will not do so.
- However, the majority (59%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Hamas; in fact, 56% expect Israel to wage war against the Gaza Strip while 36% do not expect it to do so.
- Similarly, the majority (57%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach peace arrangements with the PA in the West Bank while the largest percentage (48%) expects, and 43% do not expect, Israel to wage war against the PA to force it to collapse.
- However, a large majority of 73% expects the new Israeli government to deepen the normalization steps with some of the Arab Gulf countries but 53% do not expect, and only 30% expect, Israel to wage war against Iran.
- When asked what the PA should do in response to an Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories: (1) the largest majority (71%) said it should, and 21% said it should not, stop implementing the Oslo agreement and should sever all relations with Israel; (2) 61% said Palestinians should resort to peaceful resistance and 35% disagreed with that; (3) 52% said they support and 42% oppose a return to armed struggle; (4) 37% said they support the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution; and (5) 36% said they support, and 53% said they oppose, a return to the negotiation with Israel and the US based on a detailed Palestinian peace plan that can serve as a counter proposal to the Trump plan.
- When forced to choose only one of these five possible responses, the largest percentage (31%) says that it prefers a return to armed struggle, 23% prefer resumption of negotiations based on a detailed Palestinian counter proposal, 18% prefer non-violent resistance, 15% prefer abandoning the Oslo agreement and the severing of relations with Israel, and 6% prefer to abandon the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
- We asked the public about its expectations regarding the likely responses of external actors to an Israeli annexation, if one is to actually take place. A majority expresses pessimism with 63% indicating that they do not expect Jordan to abandon its peace agreement with Israel; 70% do not expect Jordan or Egypt to recall their ambassadors from Israel; 78% do not expect European countries to impose sanctions on Israel; and another 78% do not expect Arab countries in the Gulf, or some of them, to end normalization measures with Israel.
- Twice we asked the public about its support for the PA leadership’s declared policy of stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, stopping security coordination, and severing relations with Israel, once before detailing possible consequences of such a policy and once again after going over these details. The initial response showed that a majority of 59% support and 31% oppose the leadership’s decision.
- When the questions turns to the details and possible consequences, the public indicates great worries about the future. For example, 81% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 73% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 70% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 65% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 65% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 63% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 62% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
- Despite all these concerns, in answer to the second question about support/opposition to the PA leadership decision to sever relations with Israel, a larger majority of 63% says it supports the decision and only 29% say they oppose it. Yet, the level of support for the PA decision in response to both questions is lower than the support the public is willing to grant to the policy itself, which, as we indicated above, stood at 71%.
- It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (57%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 32% believe it indeed did.
- A majority of 55% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (33%) expects Israel to do so.
- A large majority of 74% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 18% say they do prefer that.
- 50% of the public believe that the PA will back down and resume relations with Israel if the latter declares its intention to resume its direct military rule over the Palestinian territories while 37% believe the PA will not back down.
(2) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:
- Large majorities are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Coronavirus pandemic. But the level of satisfaction differs from one measure to the other. For example, 88% are satisfied with the closure of areas that witnessed the spread of the virus; 80% are satisfied with the closure of schools and universities; 77% are satisfied with the cessation of transportation between the various governorates; 73% are satisfied with the ban on laborers working in Israeli settlements; 60% are satisfied with the closure of mosques and churches; and 57% are satisfied with the ban on Friday prayers and Sunday mass.
- Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 82% express satisfaction with the ministry of health; 75% are satisfied with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas; 67% are satisfied with the performance of the “emergency committee” in their area; 65% are satisfied with the performance of the government spokesperson, Mr. Ibrahim Milhem; 64% are satisfied with the performance of the local municipalities or councils; 62% are satisfied with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh; and 61% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area.
- Similarly, 76% say they have trust, and 22% say they have no trust, that the government, in taking the measures it took, has been working for the interest of the people.
- We asked about the amount of donations made to the “dignity fund:” 48% are satisfied and 44% are dissatisfied. But an overwhelming majority of 77% says that it is not certain that the donation would reach those who truly need it.
- Public trust in the government is also evident in the fact that 56% believe the announcements regarding the number of infections and deaths while 36% believe that the government has not been transparent. Similarly, 57% express the belief that the measures taken by the PA have been adequate, while 23% believe them to be inadequate, and 18% believe they were exaggerated.
- The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 67% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 55% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
- When asked about its impression about of people’s implementation of social distancing, the largest percentage (45%) say it believes the implementation was medium, 18% say it was high, and 36% say it was low.
- A majority of 69% indicates that the closure and lockdown did not cause domestic problems within their own families while 29% indicates that they did have such problems.
- 57% think that remote education has not been useful while 37% think it has been.
- 65% believe that it was not appropriate to allow laborers to continue to work in Israel during the closure and lockdown while 31% think it was appropriate.
- A small majority of 54% believes the pandemic is a divine punishment for people and states for their corruption and injustice while 37% believe it is not. However, the largest percentage (45%) thinsk the virus is manmade and not natural while a similar percentage of 43% thinks it is a product of nature.
- A two-third majority (67%) agrees with the cooperation and coordination in the health sector which took place between the PA and Israel during the period in which the Coronavirus was spreading while 25% say they disagreed with that.
- 44% say popular social solidarity, such as debt forgiveness, increased during the pandemic while 31% say the level of solidarity did not change and 23% think it decreased.
- More than three quarters of the public (77%) believe that the government has not done all it could to compensate those who suffered the most from the closure and lockdown, such as laborers, farmers, cattle breeders, and others, and only 16% believe it did all it could.
(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:
- Support for the concept of the two-state solution rises to 45% and opposition stands at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Four months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 51% believe that the majority opposes it.
- A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.
- The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 38% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 13% prefer to keep the status quo. Four months ago, 22% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 45% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
- When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 45% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Four months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations.
- We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 88% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Four months ago, 94% expressed opposition to the plan when presented to them in its full details.
- Similarly, 87% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 8% believe a majority supports it. By contrast, 66% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.
- In light of the terms of the US plan, a majority of 70% believes the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 5% think the plan makes peace more attainable.
- If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 57% think the chances are zero; 22% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
- A majority of 69% is opposed and 16% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Four months ago 76% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
- A majority of 68% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 24% expect him to win it.
(4) Legislative and presidential election
- 58% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Four months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 48% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
- Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Four months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).
- If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 44% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh four months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% four months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 63% four months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 54% four months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% four months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 36%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% and the latter 45%.
- We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 2% each.
- We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 36% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Four months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 43% four months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 30% four months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 22% four months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 45% four months ago).
(5) Domestic conditions:
- Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.
- Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 65%.
- 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 34% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.
- Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. Four months ago, 85% expressed a similar view.
- The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 52% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
- With more than a year passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 56% expect failure; only 33% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expect success. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 34% expects success.
- We asked the public about its reaction to the PA decision not to accept medical supplies sent by the UAE via two planes that landed at Ben Gurion airport. About half (49%) of the public indicated approval of the decision but 41% expressed disapproval.
- We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last four months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (14%), Maan TV at 13%, Palestine Today TV at 10%, Al Arabiya at 4%, and finally al Mayadeen at 3%.
(6) Reconciliation:
- Only 29% are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Four months ago, optimism stood at 40%.
- Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 12% believe unity will return soon.
- While waiting for reunification, we asked the public if it would meanwhile support some form of confederation between the two areas. A majority of 60% expressed opposition while 31% supported this type of relationship.
(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:
- 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.
- The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 33% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (27%); 6% say see lack of national unity as the most serious problem and 5% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.
Migration of Palestinian Christians: Drivers and Means of Combating it
Results of a public opinion poll among Palestinian Christians
27 January-23 February 2020
This poll was conducted with support from the Philos Project: https://philosproject.org/

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research conducted a public opinion poll among Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the period between 27 January and 23 February 2020. The poll sought to explore the reasons that drive Christians to emigrate from their homeland in Palestine to other countries and the various means that could potentially stem the flow. The period during the fieldwork of the poll witnessed several developments including the release of Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” and its immediate rejection by the Palestinian leadership. The Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo a few days later and unanimously rejected the plan. A similar rejection followed by representatives of the Islamic countries. Internally, Fatah and Hamas issued conciliatory statements calling for reconciliation, but this was not followed by any concrete measures or efforts to hold Palestinian elections. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, tensions rose significantly during the fieldwork period as popular confrontations developed in various cities and signs of an emerging trade crisis were visible. Total size of the sample is 995 Christian adults interviewed face to face in 98 selected locations in seven Palestinian governorates. Margin of error is +/-3%.
For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.
Summary of Findings:
The findings clearly show that the desire to emigrate is much higher among Palestinian Christians than Palestinian Muslims. Indeed, the percentage among Christians in the West Bank is almost twice as much as that of Muslims. The largest percentage of those wishing to emigrate say that they would like to go to the US, and Canada and Europe placed second and third, respectively. The largest percentage indicate that their desire to emigrate stems from economic reasons, while a smaller percentage indicate a desire to search abroad for educational opportunities, a safer, more stable, and less corrupt place, and a place that allows greater liberties and religious tolerance.
The poll found other reasons for the emigration, some having to do with the conditions of the Israeli occupation and others with the domestic conditions. For example, Christians complain about the impact of occupation measures, such as checkpoints, settlers’ attacks, and land confiscation.
Others complain about the lack of safety and security and a majority believes that the Israeli occupation seeks to expel them from their homeland. Certain domestic conditions are also conducive to a greater demand for emigration. For example, there are complaints and worries about lack of safety, fear of crime and theft, absence of liberties and rule of law, and the spread of corruption. Moreover, there is evidence of worry about the existence of religious Salafist groups in Palestinian society and the presence of armed groups such as Hamas and those that represent political Islam.
Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Palestinian Christians indicate that they face no irritation or harassment from their Muslim neighbors, or at schools and workplaces, findings do show that somewhere between a fifth and a quarter complain of hearing swearwords or curses and accusations of blasphemy. Indeed, a very large minority believe that most Muslims do not wish to see them in the country. Similarly, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority indicate that they do not suffer from religious discrimination, findings show that a fifth to a quarter feel discrimination when searching for jobs or when seeking PA services. The overwhelming majority indicate that they feel integrated into Palestinian society. Still, three out of ten do not see themselves integrated or feel hated by the Muslim citizens. About a quarter say that some of their Muslim acquaintances invite them to convert to Islam and seven out of ten say they have, at one time or another, heard a Muslim asserting that Christians will go to hellfire.
Findings also show that Christians, like Muslims, do not trust the Palestinian government or the PA security services and the justice sector. Indeed, the majority tend to have no trust in the Christian religious leaders or civil society organizations. The majority believe that corruption exists in the PA institutions. While the overwhelming majority indicates that the democratic system is the best, only one in ten describe the Palestinian system as democratic. Findings show that the overwhelming majority of Christians believe that one should be careful in his/her dealings with other people while only one in ten believes that it is possible to trust most people.
The poll found more than half of the Christians hope for a political settlement that leads to the creation of a single state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea in which Palestinians and Israelis would have equal rights while three out of 10 prefer a two-state solution. Half of the Christians view the one-state solution as safer than the two-state solution for Palestinian Christians.
The poll also found that one additional reason for the larger Christian emigration is that a large percentage of Palestinian Christians have relatives who have emigrated in the past, and believe that those relatives would help them if they showed interested in emigrating. About half of the sample believe that immigration laws in counties of destination favor Christians. Other external factors, found among two-thirds of the sample, are the regional political developments, which constitute an additional driver pushing people out from Palestine and the entire region.
Finally, when asked about the means of combating the phenomena of Christian emigration, respondents focus on the need for Palestinian policy makers and the leaders of the church to pay more attention to the problem and to develop means to decrease the outflow. Respondents’ suggestions focused on the importance of improving economic conditions, such as creating job opportunities, providing financial assistance to those in need, facilitating greater access to homes and apartments. Other suggestions focused on improving conditions of safety and security, including greater PA capacity to enforce law and order, and promoting values of democracy and tolerance.
Migration Trends Among Palestinians
Official Israeli statistical sources indicate that the total net emigration among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the period between 1967 and 1989 stood at around 300,000, which means 13,000 per year. For the period between 1990 until the end of 1994, while highlighting the return of the PLO and its security forces to these Palestinian territories, Israeli sources indicate a net return of 30,000 Palestinians after subtracting those who emigrated during that period. For the period between 1995 and 2003, the same Israeli sources indicate a net loss of 88,000, an annual average of 11,000 emigrants. Findings of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) pointed out in a survey conducted in 2010 that 33,000 emigrated from the Palestinian Territories during the period between 2005 and 2009, an annual average of 7,000 and that during this same period more than 30,000 immigrants returned home to Palestine. There are no published or credible numbers on the current conditions, but estimates suggest that the annual average of emigration during the past ten years might be more than 10,000. Moreover, the opening of the Rafah Crossing with Egypt in a semi-permanent manner in 2018 might have opened the door, according to unconfirmed reports, of about 24,000 emigrants from the Gaza Strip in that year alone, while Israeli governmental sources believe the number to be 35,000.
Among Palestinian Christians, the historic record indicates that emigration has been greater than that of Palestinian Muslims. With the end of the Ottoman era in Palestine and the beginning of the British Mandate in 1922, Christians constituted 11% of the population of the entire historic Palestine with the number standing at 70,429. In 1946, the percentage declined to 8% as the British Mandate was about to end, despite the fact that the number had increased to 145,063. In 1949, the number of Christians in the West Bank stood at 51,053 and in the Jordanian 1961 census, 45,855. As the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip started in 1967, the percentage of Palestinian Christians in the occupied Palestinian territories stood at 6% with a total number of 42,719. When the first PA census was completed in 1997, three years after the creation of the PA, the number of Palestinian Christians stood at 40,055, constituting 1.5% of the total Palestinian population. The second PA census in 2007 indicated a slight increase in the number, now standing at 42,565 but constituting only 1.2% of the population. In 2017, the third census showed 46,850 Christian citizens making up only 1% of the population.
The decline in the Christian population has been attributed first and foremost to emigration, particularly among the youth. But other factors have also contributed to this development. For example, population growth has been slower among the Christians compared to Palestinian Muslims. Higher age of marriage among Christians has been another factor. The Palestinian Arab Barometer poll, conducted at the end of 2018, found that 39% of the Christian population in Palestine was over the age of 50, compared to only 21% among the Muslims.
The decline in the Christian population during the past 100 years is evident in the makeup of some of the main Palestinian cities that have traditionally been Christian. For example, the Christian population of Bethlehem declined from 84% in 1922 to only 28% in 2007; in Beit Jala from 99% to 61% and in Beit Sahour from 81% to 65% during the same period.
The Demographic Characteristics of the Christian Poll Sample
PSR selected a sample of 995 Christians from all West Bank and Gaza Strip governorates with a Christian population. The numbers were distributed based on the number of Christians in each governorate with the exception of the Gaza Strip in which 100 people were added and the sample size was reweighted to reflect the proportionate size of Christians in that area. Moreover, 20 Gazan residents presently residing in the West Bank were selected randomly from a list of 100 provided by a Christian source familiar with status of those Gazans. The total number of Christians in the various governorates was obtained from PCBS census data. But PCBS did not provide data on the number of Christians in the various locations in each governorate and therefore fieldwork was conducted in order to assess the distribution in each governorate. Some areas, with a very small number of Christians, were excluded from the sample. With the assistance of local councils and churches, estimates of numbers were made in the various locations. These were cross tabulated with PCBS data to ensure harmony. Maps were developed for all of the locations that were selected, and were drawn and subdivided based on the number of homes in each location. PSR selected 98 locations, and 10 adult Christians were interviewed in each of the selected locations. Using Kish table, one individual was selected in each home. The interviews were conducted face to face by data collectors that were trained for that particular purpose. One focus group was organized by PSR with more than a dozen Christian participants before the conduct of the fieldwork in order to assess the utility of the questionnaire and to gain insights into the best means of gaining the trust of Palestinian Christians and reducing their concerns about the planned survey. The team of data collectors was formed mostly from Christian fieldworkers and each team consisted of two members under the direct supervision of a field coordinator. Data collectors were instructed not to reveal their religion to the respondents by any means including appearance. Interviews were conducted face-to-face using tablets in all cases with the exception of 15 interviews that were conducted over the phone among Gazans residing in the West Bank.

The distribution of the sample in the West Bank stood at 88% of the total, 10% in the Gaza Strip, and 2% were Gazans residing in the West Bank. Bethlehem had the largest percentage of interviews (42%) followed by Ramallah (24%), Jerusalem (15%), Gaza (12%), Jenin (5%), and Nablus and Jericho (1% each). Males constituted 50% and females 50%. Age distribution shows that the biggest group (64%) came from those whose age is over 40 years, followed by those between the ages of 18 and 29 years (19%) and those between 30 and 39 years (17%). The percentage of illiterates stood at 3%, those who completed elementary school (6%), preparatory education (9%), secondary education (33%), two-year college (19%), BA degree (25%), and MA and higher (5%). The percentage of the married respondents stood at 65%, the unmarried 24%, and widowed or divorced 10%. Those who worked in PA institutions represented only 3% of the sample, Church institutions 7%, private sector 29%, NGOs 6%, Israeli institutions 3%, housewives 25%, unemployed 9%, retirees 7%, and students 5%.
Data collectors and their impressions: The team of data collectors included 17 fieldworkers, most females, of whom 15 were Christians and were distributed as follows: 2 in the Gaza Strip, 3 in the northern West Bank, 6 in the south, and 6 in the middle of the West Bank.[1]
[1] Data collectors in the fieldwork teams deployed in the various parts of the West Bank were pleased with public response, as most of the respondents were cooperative and the rejection rate did not exceed 2%. Data collectors also expressed the belief that the overwhelming majority of respondents did not show fear to express political views or affiliation. But conditions were different in Jerusalem where data collectors found concern and fear and a higher rejection rate that exceeded 20% particularly in places like Beit Safafa, al Tur, and Beit Hanina. In other Jerusalem areas, such as the Old City, the reception was much better and the rejection rate did not exceed 7%. Fieldworkers also indicated that in Jerusalem they were repeatedly asked about their own personal religion. As instructed by PSR for such cases, the fieldworkers replied that they could not reveal their religion for fear it might influence responses. In the Gaza Strip, data collectors were also pleased with the public response as the rejection rate did not exceed 10%. PSR’s data collectors expressed the belief that little or no fear was shown by the Gazan respondents.
Joint Palestinian-Israeli Public Opinion Poll
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN LEBANON, PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR HAMAS UNCHANGED WITH GREATER PRAGMATISM AMONG ISRAELIS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS
These are the results of the most recent poll conducted September 10-19 jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah
The joint poll examined Israelis’ and Palestinians’ attitudes on the conflict in the aftermath of the second war in Lebanon. It tracked both publics’ attitudes regarding the resumption of a political process and their assessments of the impact of the war on the propensity for further violence in the Israeli-Palestinian arena.
67% of the Israelis support negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement. Even when a Hamas-led government is concerned, we observe increased moderation among Israelis: 56% support and 43% oppose talks with a Hamas government if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In our June 2006 poll before the war, 48% supported such talks with 49% opposing it. Among Palestinians, however, we observe some hardening in this regard. Before the war, in our June poll, 70% thought that a Hamas-led PA should negotiate with Israel and 26% believed it should not; after the war, 59% support such talks while 38% oppose them.
As to the impact of the war on attitudes towards violence, our findings suggest that Hizballah tactics provide an attractive model for Palestinians’ armed resistance. A majority of Palestinians (63%) agree that Palestinians should emulate Hizballah’s methods by launching rockets at Israeli cities, compared to 35% who disagree. Similar levels of support for emulating Hizballah’s methods were obtained in July 2000, following Israel’s evacuation of Southern Lebanon (63% of the Palestinians supported it with 29% who opposed). However, the context of the question we asked in 2000 was quite different from the present context. The model of violence then implied mainly guerrilla war directed against the Israeli army. Regarding other modes of violence, following the war, there is no change in Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel. 56% of the Palestinians supported it before the war in March 2006 compared to 57% who support it now. When the abduction of Israeli soldiers for exchange with Palestinian prisoners is concerned, 75% of the Palestinians support such operations compared to 23% who oppose it. Despite the militant views of the Palestinians in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon, 77% of the Palestinians support the call for a ceasefire between Palestinians and Israelis and 74% believe that Palestinians can not depend on armed action only and must reach a political settlement.
The poll also examined the sentiments of Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel toward the war in the context of public criticism regarding Arab sympathy towards Hizballah and its military goals during the war.
The results show both discrepancies and agreements in Jewish and Arab respondents’ assessments of the degree of solidarity between Hizballah and the Arab citizens of Israel. While only 24% of the Israeli Jews believe that Nasrallah cares for the fate of the Arab citizens of Israel, 70% of Israel’s Arab citizens believe that he cares for their fate. Looking at it the other way around, both sectors are much more in agreement. 77% of the Israeli Jews and 68% of the Arabs believe that the Arab citizens of Israel care for the fate of Hizballah in Lebanon.
In a separate Israeli omnibus survey conducted August 28-30, we followed up on Israeli attitudes towards a settlement with Syria, previously studied in August 2000, following the collapse of the Syrian-Israeli talks that year. This allows us to assess whether these attitudes have changed following the war in Lebanon, which has brought back this question to the public agenda.
The findings indicate that Israelis’ attitudes regarding a settlement with Syria have not been affected by the war and remain remarkably similar to those held six years earlier in August 2000. In our recent survey, 56% of the Israelis oppose full evacuation of the Golan Heights in return for a full peace agreement with Syria, 32% support it, and 12% are somewhere in the middle. Six years earlier, in August 2000, 55% opposed such a settlement, 34% supported it, and 10% were in the middle. Israelis’ expectations with regard to the feasibility of such a settlement however changed drastically. While 49% of the Israelis believed in August 2000 that within five years such a settlement will take place, only 26% thought so in our recent survey.
Total Palestinian sample size is 1270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between September 14 and 16, 2006. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli data are based on telephone interviews with a representative sample of 500 Israeli Jews and a representative sample of 401 Israeli Arabs. The Israeli sample was properly weighted according to the proportion of the respective sectors in the population to produce the overall Israeli estimates (overall sampling error of 3.9%). The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian between September 10 and 19.
The poll was planned and supervised by Dr. Yaacov Shamir, the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University and Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).
For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Dr. Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.
MAIN FINDINGS
(A) Impact of the War in Lebanon on the Israeli-Palestinian Arena
In our survey we attempted to assess by comparison to our previous survey the extent to which the war had a moderating, hardening, or rather mixed impact on Israelis’ and Palestinians’ sentiments regarding the conflict between them.
- Both publics believe that the war strengthened Palestinian willingness to use armed resistance against Israel. 59% of the Israelis and 73% of the Palestinians think so, 12% of the Israelis and 5% of the Palestinians believe it weakened these tendencies, and 28% of the Israelis and 20% of the Palestinians think they did not change.
- Examining this issue more directly, 63% among Palestinians agree that Palestinians should emulate Hizballah’s methods by launching rockets at Israeli cities compared to 35% who disagree. In July 2000, followingIsrael’s evacuation of Southern Lebanon, similar levels of support for emulating Hizballah’s methods were obtained (63% of the Palestinians supported it and 29% opposed). At that time however the question implied guerilla war against the Israeli army rather than launching rockets against Israeli cities.
- Regarding other modes of violence, following the war, there is no change in Palestinians’ support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel. 56% of the Palestinians supported it before the war in March 2006, compared to 57% who support it now. However when the abduction of Israeli soldiers for exchange with Palestinian prisoners is concerned, 75% of the Palestinians support such operations compared to 23% who oppose it.
- 74% of the Palestinians and 73% of the Israelis support negotiations between Israel and Abu Mazin over a final status settlement. Despite these levels of support only 44% of the Palestinians and 51% of the Israelis believe that it is possible to reach nowadays a compromise settlement between Abu Mazin and Olmert.
- The war in Lebanon seems to have facilitated Israelis’ willingness to overcome the hurdle of a Hamas government in order to resume a political process for resolving the conflict. 67% of the Israelis support negotiations with a Palestinian national unity government which includes Hamas if needed to reach a compromise agreement.
- Even when a Hamas-led government is concerned, we observe greater pragmatism among Israelis. 56% of the Israelis support and 43% oppose talks with it if needed in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians. In our June 2006 poll before the war, 48% supported such talks with 49% opposing it.
- Among Palestinians, however, we observe some hardening in this regard. While in our June poll before the war 70% thought that a Hamas-led PA should negotiate with Israel and 26% believed it should not, after the war, only 59% support such talks now while 38% oppose them. This is consistent with Palestinian support (67%) for Hamas’ refusal to recognize the state of Israel in order to meet international donor demands and Palestinians’ feelings of empowerment following their perception of the results of the war. 86% of the Palestinians believe that Hizballah emerged as a winner in the Lebanon war and 2% see Israel as a winner and 11% think neither won. Among Israelis, 25% believe Hizballah, won, 12% think Israel won and 64% think neither won.
The joint poll further focused on lessons both publics can learn from the war pertinent to the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Three major lessons seem to have trickled down to the discourse of both publics.
- First, that reliance on military power or armed action is futile and a political settlement must be reached. 80% of the Israelis and 74% of the Palestinians agree to that.
- Secondly and not unrelated, both publics believe that in order to prevent in the future a war between them similar to the war in Lebanon, there is a need to reach soon a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. 65% of the Israelis agree to this. Among Palestinians 84% agree that there is a need to establish soon a Palestinian State for that purpose.
- Thirdly, both publics seem to have become more forthcoming of the role of the international community in the conflict resolution process. 70% of the Israelis agree that Israel cannot rely only on itself and must also count on the international community. Similarly, 76% of the Palestinians agree that Palestinians need the support and understanding of the international community because they cannot depend only on themselves.
(B) Assessment of the War in Lebanon by Israeli Jews and Arabs
- 33% of the Israeli Arabs and 23% of the Jews believe that Hizballah came out the winner from the war in Lebanon. 4% of the Arabs and 13% of the Jews think Israel was the winner and 59% of the Arabs and 64% of the Jews think neither one was the winner.
- Regarding the reasons for the outbreak of the war, Israeli Jews stress the responsibility of Hizballah while Arabs emphasize Israel’s role. 46% of the Jews and 17% of the Arabs think the reason was Hizballah’s taking over of Southern Lebanon and the threat it posed to Israel, 37% of both Jews and Arabs think that the main reason was Israel’s excessive response to the abduction of the soldiers by Hizballah, 24% of the Arabs and 1% of the Jews believe that the main reason was Israel’s persistent control of the Shaba farms, 14% of the Jews and 12% of the Arabs think the main reason was Iran and Syria’s intention to hurt the US by hurting Israel.
- 78% of the Israeli Jews and 15% of the Arabs believe that Israel should have launched a war after the abduction of the soldiers; 21% of the Jews and 84% of the Arabs think it should not have launched a war.
- 21% of the Arabs and 13% of the Jews, believe that the war in Lebanon strengthened the identification of the Arab citizens with the state of Israel, 40% of the Arabs and 36% of the Jews, believe it weakened their identification, 36% of the Arabs and 47% of the Jews believe it did not change their identification. 52% of the Israeli Arabs and 65% of the Jews agree that many of the Arab citizens of Israel identify with Israel in private but refrain from expressing it in public due to social pressures. 45% of the Arabs and 31% of the Jews disagree.
- 77% of the Israeli Jews and 68% of the Arabs believe that the Arab citizens of Israel care for the fate of Hizballah in Lebanon.
- As to Nasrallah’s sentiment towards the Arab citizens of Israel, 70% of Israel’s Arab citizens believe that Nasrallah cares for their fate compared to 24% of the Israeli Jews who believe so.
(C) Impact of the War on the Israeli-Syrian Arena
In a separate Israeli omnibus survey conducted August 28-30, we followed up on Israelis’ attitudes towards a settlement with Syria, previously studied in August 2000, following the collapse of Syrian-Israeli talks that year. The results indicate that Israelis’ attitudes regarding a settlement with Syria remained remarkably similar to those held six years earlier in August 2000.
- 40% of the Israelis will vote for and 59% will vote against in a referendum about returning the Golan Heights to Syria for full peace and proper security arrangements. In August 2000, 41% said they will vote for and 53% were against.
- Israeli expectations with regard to the feasibility of a settlement involving the return of the Golan however changed dramatically. While 49% of the Israelis believed in August 2000 that within five years such a settlement will take place, only 26% thought so in our recent survey.
In the survey we also examined changes in Israelis’ justifications for their position on the Golan. Here Israelis seemed to draw on their recent experience from the war:
- 66% of the Israelis reject and 33% accept the argument that holding to territory is less important to security in an era of modern weaponry. In August 2000, 54% rejected and 43% accepted this very argument.
- 62% of the Israelis reject and 37% accept the argument that peace with Syria will restrain Hizballah in Lebanon and guarantee tranquility to the communities in the north. In August 2000, 50% rejected and 49% accepted this argument.
- 79% of the Israelis reject and 21% accept the argument that following the death of Hafez Assad and the coming to power of Bashar, there is a window of opportunity for peace with Syria. In August 2000, 52% rejected and 43% accepted this argument.
- 67% of the Israelis reject and 33% accept the argument that if a peace agreement with Syria is not reached now, war is bound to erupt in the future. In August 2000, the results were virtually identical: 66% rejected and 33% accepted the same argument.
(D) Other Conflict Resolution Issues
- 67% Of the Palestinians do not believe Hamas should recognize the state of Israel in order to meet international donor demands. But 63% would support a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a state for the Jewish people after a peace agreement is reached, a Palestinians state is established, and all issues in dispute, including the refugees and Jerusalem, are settled.
- While 57% of the Palestinians support armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and while 57% believe that armed confrontations have helped Palestinians achieve national rights in ways that negotiations could not, 77% support the call for a ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians and 22% oppose it.
- 62% Of the Palestinians have not heard of Olmert’s realignment plan to evacuate most of the West Bank settlements while realigning into large blocks of settlements along the line of the separation barrier. 70% do not welcome Olmert’s plan and only 20% believe it will be implemented. But 75% believe that the evacuation of the settlements in the Gaza Strip was a victory for armed struggle.
(E) Palestinian Domestic Balance of Power The Palestinian poll found that only 42% are satisfied with the overall performance of the Hamas government and 54% are dissatisfied. Despite the dissatisfaction with the performance of Hamas’ government, the percentage of those willing to vote for it in new elections remain as it was three months ago (38%) while Fateh’s popularity increases slightly to 41%.
- Satisfaction with the performance of president Mahmud Abbas reaches 55%. But if new elections are held today, only 31% would elect him, 24% would elect Ismail Haniyeh, 13% Marwan Barghouti, 5% Mustafa Barghouti, and 3% Mahmud Zahhar.
MR. Walid Ladadwa:
Walid Ladadweh
Walid Ladadweh is the head of the Survey Research Unit at PSR. He completed his Master’s degree in Society from Birzeit University in 2003 and completed training courses in survey research techniques at the University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, USA, in 2010. Between 2005 and 2008, he served in the Advisory Committee of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Mr. Ladadweh supervised more than 50 public opinion surveys in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. His responsibilities included sample design, supervision of data collection, fieldwork training, data entry, and statistical data analysis using SPSS. He presented a paper on “Religion in Palestinian Society and Politics” at a conference on the Rise of Public Engagement: the Region and the World” in 2013. He wrote a chapter on “Methodology Used During Exit Poll” and “Demographic Characteristics of Voters—2005-2006” published in The Second Palestinian Elections: Presidential, Parliamentary, and Local Government,” edited by Khalil Shikaki and Jehad Harb, 2007.
Email: Waleed Ladadweh

Walid Ladadweh is the head of the Survey Research Unit at PSR. He completed his Master’s degree in Sociology from Birzeit University in 2003 and completed training courses in survey research techniques at the University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor, USA, in 2010. Between 2005 and 2008, he served in the Advisory Committee of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Mr. Ladadweh supervised more than 50 public opinion surveys in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. His responsibilities included sample design, supervision of data collection, fieldwork training, data entry, and statistical data analysis using SPSS. He presented a paper on “Religion in Palestinian Society and Politics” at a conference on the Rise of Public Engagement: the Region and the World” in 2013. He wrote a chapter on “Methodology Used During Exit Poll” and “Demographic Characteristics of Voters—2005-2006” published in The Second Palestinian Elections: Presidential, Parliamentary, and Local Government,” edited by Khalil Shikaki and Jehad Harb, 2007.
Fateh-Hamas Agreement:
A Deal worth Nurturing
Khalil Shikaki *
The agreement signed on 8 February by Fateh, represented by President Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas, represented by the head of its political bureau Khalid Mishal, in Mecca to form a national unity government represents a return in Palestinian political culture to the traditions of dialogue and consensus building that guided most of the history of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It represents recognition that neither Fateh nor Hamas, when acting alone, can deliver effective governance or enforcement of signed agreements with Israel. However, as in all previous efforts to moderate Palestinian politics, consensus building produces only limited and gradual, though steady progress. Instead of searching for faults in the text of the agreement, the international community needs to nurture it by fully engaging the national unity government. As the case was with the Palestinian nationalist movement in the 1970s and the 1980s, only such an engagement can create an environment conducive to more moderation.
Instead of demanding an iron-clad guarantee that the national unity government headed by a Hamas prime minister would fully commit itself to agreements signed by the PLO, President Abbas opted for the more ambiguous term of “respecting signed agreements.” In Mecca, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas changed his hierarchy of priorities. Up until recently he viewed the immediate and complete lifting of financial sanctions and diplomatic boycott as his top priority. Now, however, aborting civil war became his top priority. Moreover, the Saudi role was important: political support of the country closest to the US means that the US reaction could not be very hostile even if it did not like the agreement. Maintaining Saudi-American alliance in the face of terrorism and Iranian threat, he probably calculated, would prevent the US from rejecting the deal outright.
But as importantly, Abbas is not Arafat, the man who turned Palestinian politics in the second half of the 1990 into authoritarianism. He could not rule by dictate. As he did when he was first elected in January 2005, Abbas sought Hamas’s cooperation in arranging a ceasefire with Israel by integrating it into the formal political process, an integration that eventually led to its electoral victory. But it was not the dictates of electoral politics that led to the Mecca Agreement; Hamas already has a 60% majority in the parliament. Instead, it was the recognition of both Fateh and Hamas that the alternative to mutual compromise is continued bloodshed. Consensus building, not electoral politics, will now dominate Palestinian politics. This is a positive development that needs to be encouraged because it is the most effective means of bringing Hamas into the larger Palestinian and international consensus on the need for a two-state solution to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
There are other reasons to view the Mecca Agreement positively. First, it is not a bad deal. Hamas dropped its insistence that the government's "respect" for PLO-Israel agreements and commitments be conditioned by its own definition of what is in Palestinian interest. The Mecca Agreement now "commits" the government to all PLO National Council and Arab Summit resolutions. This includes the National Council’s 19th session, referred to specifically in the Agreement, which explicitly endorses the two-state solution and recognizes the state of Israel. It also includes the Beirut Summit which endorsed the Saudi initiative with its conditional recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel. Second, without a deal, violence would have continued and public polarization increased. Israel would have been dragged into the conflict and Fateh would probably have lost out to Hamas in Gaza even if Abbas remains in control in the West Bank. Public opinion would not have been able to understand why Fateh and Abu Mazin rejected such a deal. Abu Mazin would have been weakened considerably and his ability to negotiate with Israel would have diminished.
Third, the agreement brings Fateh and its allies (like Salam Fayyad) to power in a power-sharing mechanism that does not give Hamas a majority vote. Yes, Hamas can bring the government down by a vote of no confidence, but by initiating such a process, it would be blamed for its outcome, i.e., civil war. Hamas is likely to think twice before voting the unity government out of office if it remains opposed to holding new elections. Control over money will be in the hands of Abu Mazin and Fayyad who enjoys the confidence of the US and Israel. Fourth, Abu Mazin will emerge much stronger domestically than before. In any area of cabinet responsibility, a disagreement in the government leaves Abu Mazin, the referee, in charge. This will apply most importantly to matters related to control over security services, but can also apply to conflicts related to the functioning of the judiciary, foreign policy, and public finance.
Fifth, Abu Mazin will emerge stronger in negotiations with Israel. While part of a national unity government with him, Hamas will not have a free hand to "frame" any deal he makes with Israel as "treason." Of course, this means he needs to bring Hamas into the consultation process, but this can only mean that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would become more rational.
Ultimately, this is a good deal because only a coalition of Fateh and Hamas has the capacity and willingness to enforce law and order domestically as well as a ceasefire with Israel. Most likely, it will quickly lead to the release of the imprisoned Israeli soldier and to the extension of the ceasefire to the West Bank. Only such a coalition has the capacity to neutralize Islamic Jihad, war lords, and other spoilers. Finally, at the regional level, the deal will reduce Hamas' ties with Iran and strengthen its ties with Saudi Arabia. Without Hamas on board, the ability of the Saudis to confront the threat of Iran and Shiites in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf would be reduced.
____________________________________________________________________
* Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah
Dr. Khalil Shikaki
The agreement signed on 8 February by Fateh, represented by President Mahmud Abbas, and Hamas, represented by the head of its political bureau Khalid Mishal, in Mecca to form a national unity government represents a return in Palestinian political culture to the traditions of dialogue and consensus building that guided most of the history of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It represents recognition that neither Fateh nor Hamas, when acting alone, can deliver effective governance or enforcement of signed agreements withIsrael. However, as in all previous efforts to moderate Palestinian politics, consensus building produces only limited and gradual, though steady progress. Instead of searching for faults in the text of the agreement, the international community needs to nurture it by fully engaging the national unity government. As the case was with the Palestinian nationalist movement in the 1970s and the 1980s, only such an engagement can create an environment conducive to more moderation.
Instead of demanding an iron-clad guarantee that the national unity government headed by a Hamas prime minister would fully commit itself to agreements signed by the PLO, President Abbas opted for the more ambiguous term of “respecting signed agreements.” In Mecca, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas changed his hierarchy of priorities. Up until recently he viewed the immediate and complete lifting of financial sanctions and diplomatic boycott as his top priority. Now, however, aborting civil war became his top priority. Moreover, the Saudi role was important: political support of the country closest to the US means that the US reaction could not be very hostile even if it did not like the agreement. Maintaining Saudi-American alliance in the face of terrorism and Iranian threat, he probably calculated, would prevent the US from rejecting the deal outright.
But as importantly, Abbas is not Arafat, the man who turned Palestinian politics in the second half of the 1990 into authoritarianism. He could not rule by dictate. As he did when he was first elected in January 2005, Abbas sought Hamas’s cooperation in arranging a ceasefire with Israel by integrating it into the formal political process, an integration that eventually led to its electoral victory. But it was not the dictates of electoral politics that led to the Mecca Agreement; Hamas already has a 60% majority in the parliament. Instead, it was the recognition of both Fateh and Hamas that the alternative to mutual compromise is continued bloodshed. Consensus building, not electoral politics, will now dominate Palestinian politics. This is a positive development that needs to be encouraged because it is the most effective means of bringing Hamas into the larger Palestinian and international consensus on the need for a two-state solution to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
There are other reasons to view the Mecca Agreement positively. First, it is not a bad deal. Hamas dropped its insistence that the government's "respect" for PLO-Israel agreements and commitments be conditioned by its own definition of what is in Palestinian interest. The Mecca Agreement now "commits" the government to all PLO National Council and Arab Summit resolutions. This includes the National Council’s 19th session, referred to specifically in the Agreement, which explicitly endorses the two-state solution and recognizes the state of Israel. It also includes the Beirut Summit which endorsed the Saudi initiative with its conditional recognition of and normalization of relations with Israel. Second, without a deal, violence would have continued and public polarization increased. Israel would have been dragged into the conflict and Fateh would probably have lost out to Hamas in Gaza even if Abbas remains in control in the West Bank. Public opinion would not have been able to understand why Fateh and Abu Mazin rejected such a deal. Abu Mazin would have been weakened considerably and his ability to negotiate with Israel would have diminished.
Third, the agreement brings Fateh and its allies (like Salam Fayyad) to power in a power-sharing mechanism that does not give Hamas a majority vote. Yes, Hamas can bring the government down by a vote of no confidence, but by initiating such a process, it would be blamed for its outcome, i.e., civil war. Hamas is likely to think twice before voting the unity government out of office if it remains opposed to holding new elections. Control over money will be in the hands of Abu Mazin and Fayyad who enjoys the confidence of the US andIsrael. Fourth, Abu Mazin will emerge much stronger domestically than before. In any area of cabinet responsibility, a disagreement in the government leaves Abu Mazin, the referee, in charge. This will apply most importantly to matters related to control over security services, but can also apply to conflicts related to the functioning of the judiciary, foreign policy, and public finance.
Fifth, Abu Mazin will emerge stronger in negotiations with Israel. While part of a national unity government with him, Hamas will not have a free hand to "frame" any deal he makes with Israel as "treason." Of course, this means he needs to bring Hamas into the consultation process, but this can only mean that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would become more rational.
Ultimately, this is a good deal because only a coalition of Fateh and Hamas has the capacity and willingness to enforce law and order domestically as well as a ceasefire with Israel. Most likely, it will quickly lead to the release of the imprisoned Israeli soldier and to the extension of the ceasefire to the West Bank. Only such a coalition has the capacity to neutralize Islamic Jihad, war lords, and other spoilers. Finally, at the regional level, the deal will reduce Hamas' ties with Iran and strengthen its ties with Saudi Arabia. Without Hamas on board, the ability of the Saudis to confront the threat of Iran and Shiites in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf would be reduced.
February 16, 2017
A majority of Israelis and just under half of Palestinians still support the two state solution in principle, but under half on both sides support the detailed framework for its implementation. However, despite mutual fear, distrust and pessimism regarding the likelihood and feasibility of the two-state solution, a majority of Palestinians and Israelis may support comprehensive peace agreement that ends the conflict if offered additional symbolic or concrete incentives

These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah, with funding from the European Union (EU).
MAIN HIGHLIGHTS
- A majority of Israelis (55%) and a large minority of Palestinians (44%) support the two-state solution. By contrast, support for a one-state solution stands at 36% among Palestinians, 19% among Israeli Jews and 56% among Israeli Arabs.
- Support for a detailed permanent agreement package, one based on previous rounds of negotiations, is lower than the support for the two-state solution. Only 42% of Palestinians, 41% of Israeli Jews, and 88% of Israeli Arabs support a peace agreement package that comprises: a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, a family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, and the end of the conflict and claims.
- A quarter to one-third of Israelis and Palestinians who oppose the permanent agreement package are willing to reconsider their opposition to the peace deal if it was accompanied by a peace agreement with all Arab states according to the Arab Initiative's principles (for the Israeli public), and an Israeli acceptance of that initiative (for the Palestinian public). This incentive alone increases the overall support for the combined package on both sides, up to 57% to 59%, when those who changed their minds are added to the original supporters. While some of the incentives presented to those who opposed the package manage to change the attitude of fewer people, others, including non-zero sum ones, presented separately to each side, are able to change the attitude of many more people, 40% and above of the opposition, thereby considerably increasing the support to the combined package to much higher levels, up to 65% on both sides.
- In selecting between bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral approaches to peacemaking, Palestinians prefer the multilateral (51%) while the Israelis prefer the bilateral (61%). Of various multilateral forums, an Arab forum, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate, is the least rejected by the two sides. All other multilateral forums – an American-led, an EU-led, a US-Russian led, or an UN-led forum – are acceptable to one side while unacceptable to the other.
- Two-thirds of the Israelis and more than three quarters of the Palestinians view US President Donald Trump as pro-Israel. Moreover, a minority on both sides, 28% of Israeli Jews and 10% of Palestinians, think he will seek to renew peace negotiations
- Large majorities of Israelis and Palestinians estimate as low the chances that an independent Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.
The Palestinian sample size was 1,270 adults interviewed face-to-face in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between December 8 and 10, 2016. Number of interviewees in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 830 and in the Gaza Strip 440. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 1,207 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between December 19 and 30, 2016. The number of Jews interviewed inside Israel is 727, West Bank settlers 300, and Israeli Arabs 180. Size of Israeli settlers and Israeli Arabs was deliberately increased in order to allow for detailed analysis of their attitudes. But the combined Israeli data file has been reweighted to reflect the exact proportionate size of these two groups in the Israeli society. The data file was further reweighted to reflect current societal religious-secular division. The margin of error is 3%. The following summary has been drafted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki and Walid Ladadwa from PSR, and Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin together with the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research and its director, Dr. Ephraim Lavie.
MAIN FINDINGS
The following sections compare and contrast findings regarding Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in general. However, when important differences, mainly between Israeli Jews and Arabs, or between Israeli Jews living inside the Green Line and settlers living in the West Bank, or between Palestinians living in the West Bank (West Bankers) and Gazans were found, we also provided the respective findings for these sub groups.
(1) Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process
Two-state solution, one-state solution, and two-state confederation: Today, a majority of Israelis and a large minority of Palestinians– 55% of Israelis (50% among Jews and 82% among Arabs) and 44% of Palestinians – support what is known as the two-state solution in a general question testing the concept, but without giving specific details about an agreement. Six months ago, in June 2016, 59% of Israelis (53% among Jews and 87% among Arabs) and 51% of Palestinians supported that solution. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view on their side and on the other side regarding this solution. Findings indicate that that the Israelis underestimate and incorrectly assess the level of support for this solution on their side while the Palestinians correctly estimate the level of support on their side: only 26% of the Israelis said the majority of their own public supports while 63% of the Israelis said the majority opposes it; among the Palestinians, 41% said a majority supports and 53% said a majority opposes it. But while the Israelis correctly estimate the level of support for the concept of the two-state solution on the other side, the Palestinians underestimate the level of support for that solution among the Israelis: only 33% of the Palestinians believe the majority of Israelis supports that solution and 38% of the Israelis believe the majority of Palestinians supports it. However, wide majorities are skeptical about the implementation of such a solution. Over 80% of Israeli Jews and 72% of Palestinians do not believe a Palestinian state will be established in the next five years.
The joint poll sought to ascertain the current level of support for the idea of a one-state solution “by which Palestinians and Jews will be citizens of the same state and enjoy equal rights.” Support for the idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 56%). Only a minority among Palestinians (36%) and among Israeli Jews (19%) support this option (although 26% of settlers supported the one-state solution). When we asked Israeli Jews if they are for or against the annexation of the West Bank without granting the Palestinians their full citizen rights, two thirds said they are against it and only 31% said they support it. Forty-six percent of settlers supported annexation without full rights for Palestinians (almost precisely the same portion, 45%, of settlers are opposed).
We also sought to assess the level of support for the idea of a confederation between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine whereby citizens of one country would be free to reside in the territory of the other and live under its own laws and where two the states jointly decide on matters of political, security and economic policy. As the case in the one-state solution, support for the confederation idea is highest among Israeli Arabs (standing at 74%, significantly higher than Israeli Arab support for a one-state solution). But only a minority of Palestinians (34%) and Israeli Jews (20%) support the idea.
Permanent status package: For the second time in six months, we presented Palestinians and Israelis with a detailed combined package of a permanent settlement, gathered from previous rounds of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and asked them if they would support or oppose each of its components and the combined package. Findings show that the level of support for the package has increased slightly on both sides: 48% of the Israelis (41% among Israeli Jews and 88% among Israeli Arabs) and 42% of the Palestinians (40% among West Bankers and 46% among Gazans) support the combined package. Six months ago, only 39% of Israeli Jews and 39% of Palestinians supported the package. Current findings indicate that the majority on both sides, 56% of Israeli Jews and 55% of Palestinians, continue to oppose the combined package, if offered to them without any other additional incentives (see below the section on incentives).
A detailed breakdown of attitudes regarding the nine components of the package follows:
1. Mutual recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. The agreement will mark the end of conflict, the Palestinian state will fight terror against Israelis and Israel will fight terror against Palestinians, and no further claims will be made by either side: a minority among the Palestinians (43%) and a majority among the Israelis (69%; 66% among Israeli Jews and 84% among Israeli Arabs) supported this item.
2. A demilitarized independent Palestinian state will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: a minority of Palestinians (22%; 29% in the Gaza Strip and 17% in the West Bank) and a majority (56%) among Israelis supported this item.
3. A multinational force will be established and deployed in the Palestinian state to ensure the security and safety of both sides: among the Palestinians, a minority (42%) supported it, and among the Israelis, a majority (53%) supported it.
4. The Palestinian state will have sovereignty over its air space, its land, and its water resources, but Israel will maintain two early warning stations in the West Bank for 15 years: on both sides only a minority supported this item: on the Palestinian side 35% (29% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) and among the Israelis, 44% (42% among Israeli Jews and 57% among Israeli Arabs).
5. The Palestinian state will be established in the entirety of West Bank and the Gaza strip, except for several blocs of settlements, which will be annexed to Israel in a territorial exchange. Israel will evacuate all other settlements: a minority (37%) among the Palestinians (33% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip), and 50% among the Israelis supported it (among the Israeli Jews 48% supported it).
6. The territories Palestinians will receive in exchange will be similar to the size of the settlement blocs that will be annexed to Israel: minorities on both sides (31%) among the Palestinians (34% in the Gaza Strip and 29% in the West Bank) and 47% of Israelis supported it. (The Israeli Jews were split: 45% supported it while 48% opposed it).
7. West Jerusalem will be the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state: again, minorities – among the Palestinian 27% and among the Israelis 36% (29% among Israeli Jews and 76% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.
8. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter and the Western Wall will come under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and Temple Mount/al Haram al Sharif will come under Palestinian sovereignty: a minority (28%) among Palestinians and a similar minority (37%) among Israelis (33% among Israeli Jews and 63% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.
9. Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. Israel will allow the return of about 100,000 Palestinians as part of a of family unification program. All other refugees will be compensated: among the Palestinians, 52% (50% in the West Bank and 56% in the Gaza Strip) supported it and among the Israelis, 30% (20% among Israeli Jews and 81% among Israeli Arabs) supported it.
It is worth noting that among Israeli Jews, support for the combined package among settlers stands at 16% compared to 42% among non-settlers. Support is much higher among Israeli Jews who define themselves as secular, standing at 61% compared to 34% among traditionalists (masortim), 9% among the religious, and 10% among the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox). Secular people make up the plurality of Israeli Jews, with roughly 45%; about one-third of Jews are traditional, and under one-quarter are religious (orthodox) or Haredi. Among Israelis, support also varies depending on where respondents place themselves on the right-left political continuum: Among Jews, 89% of the left, 47% of the center, and 18% of the right support the package.

Among the Palestinians, as we saw six months ago, support for the combined package is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. But it is worth pointing out however that the findings show no difference in support between refugees and non-refugees (43% and 42% respectively). Nonetheless, residents of refugee camps (estimated to be less than 60% of all refugees) are the least supportive of the combined package, standing at 38% compared to 42% among residents of cities and 49% in rural areas. Moreover, support for the package is higher among those who define themselves as “not religious” and “somewhat religious” (64% and 47%) compared to those who define themselves as religious (35%); and among Fatah voters (64%) compared to Hamas voters (21%).
Beyond this regular demographic and political differences that typically signify support or opposition to peace, background attitudes also affect support. Among Israelis who believe that a majority of Palestinians support the two-state solution, support for the combined package is higher than among those who believe that a majority of Palestinians opposes that solution (53% to 33%). These comparisons are closely similar to those found in our previous joint poll six months ago. As in the Israeli case, support for the combined package is significantly higher among those Palestinians who believe that a majority of Israelis supports the two-state solution compared to those who believe that an Israeli majority is opposed to that solution (52% vs. 34%).

Peace Incentives: Our joint poll sought to explore the extent to which the opposition to the combined package was “firm” or “flexible.” For this end, we offered those who opposed the package various incentives in an attempt to understand the source of their opposition and the extent to which change was possible. Israeli Jews opposed to the package (56% of the total Jewish sample) were offered eight different incentives and Palestinians and Israeli Arabs opposed to the package (55% of all Palestinians, and 9% of the Israeli Arabs) were offered seven incentives in total. Only three of the incentives offered to the two sides were identical or almost identical. The remaining incentives sought to address either presumed Palestinian or Israeli concerns. In this regard, it should be noted that Israeli Arabs were offered the same four distinct incentives offered to the Palestinian respondents. Below is a detailed breakdown of the responses to the various incentives:
Israeli Incentives (offered only to those Israeli Jews and Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):
1. And if the Jews who left their homes and property in the Arab countries when they had to leave following the 1948 War and the establishment of the state of Israel will be compensated for the lost assets left behind? 40% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
2. And if the Palestinians acknowledge the historic and religious links between Jews and historic Palestine? 34% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
3. What if the agreement includes recognition by the Palestinian state of Israel as a Jewish state? 32% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
4. And if the agreement would include peace with all Arab states according to the Arab Peace Initiative? 30% of Israeli Jews and 13% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept package if it included this amendment.
5. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was assured? 24% of Israeli Jews and 50% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
6. And if the agreement guarantees that Israelis are guaranteed free access to holy sites in Jerusalem and other places? 23% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
7. And if settlers are allowed to choose to stay in their homes after the Israeli withdrawal, to keep their Israeli citizenship and at the same time have their safety guaranteed by the Palestinian state? 21% of Israeli Jews were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
8. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US? 10% of Israeli Jews and 31% of Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
In short, on the Israeli Jewish side a minority ranging between 10% and 40% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it were certain conditions to be met. On the Israeli Arab side, 13% to 50% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it based on the incentives offered to both Jews and Arab Israelis.

Palestinian incentives in addition to the combined package (offered only to Palestinians/Israeli Arabs who expressed opposition to the combined package):
1. And if Palestinian laborers can freely work in Israel after the establishment of the Palestinian state? 44% of Palestinians and 47% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
2. And if the state of Israel acknowledges the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine? 44% of Palestinians and 38% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
3. And if refugees in camps in the Palestinian state are compensated and provided with homes and land in which they can be settled and rehabilitated? 42% of Palestinians and 56% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
4. And if free movement for both sides throughout the other side’s state was assured? 40% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
5. And if the peace agreement between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel is based on a long term hudna between the two sides? 34% of Palestinians and 31% of the Israeli Arabs were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment;.
6. If Israel agreed to accept the Arab peace initiative and in return all Arab countries supported this peace treaty? 28% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
7. And if the holy sites are not under Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty but are placed under the custody of a multi-national committee made up of Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US? 19% of Palestinians were willing to change their mind and accept the combined package if it included this amendment.
In short, on the Palestinian side, a minority ranging between 19% and 44% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it. On the Israeli Arab side, 31% to 56% of those who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept it.

As the findings detailed above indicate, of the three identical or almost identical incentives, a broader regional peace involving the Arab World and Israel is the least mutually opposed, as 30% of Israeli Jews and 28% of Palestinians who opposed the combined package were willing to change their minds and accept a package with this amendment. This incentive alone increases the level of support for it among Palestinians from the initial 42% to 57% and among Israeli Jews from the initial 41% to 58%. Of the distinct Palestinian incentives, three proved highly effective leading 42% to 44% of the opposition to change its view and accept the package: access to Israeli labor market for Palestinian laborers, an Israeli acknowledgement of the historic and religious links between Palestinians and historic Palestine, and granting refugees homes and land in the Palestinian state. On the Israeli side, the most effective incentive, reversing the attitude of 40% of the opposition, proved to be the compensation of Jews from Arab countries for the lost assets left behind. On both sides, gestures of symbolic recognition of their historical attachment, identity and experience are among the more powerful motivator for changing attitudes in support of the package.
(2) Approaches to Conflict Resolution |
Bilateral vs. multilateral approaches: We explored issues related to the process of peacemaking, specifically the most effective or “most promising” approaches to reviving Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the role of outside actors. In selecting between two possible approaches, bilateral and multilateral, findings show that Palestinians and Israeli Arabs prefer the multilateral, while the Israeli Jews prefer bilateral between the Israeli government and the Palestinians.
Among the Palestinians (51%) and among the Israeli Arabs (52%) preferred a multilateral forum in which major powers sponsor the negotiations, while only 27% of the Israelis Jews preferred this approach. Only 29% of the Palestinians preferred bilateral negotiations while 61% of the Israeli Jews preferred this approach.
We also sought a deeper understanding of Israeli and Palestinian views of the multilateral approach. Five models of this approach were presented to the two publics: 1) an Arab forum in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan participate; 2) an American-led peace process; 3) an EU-led peace process; 4) a UN-led peace process; 5) and finally, a US-Russian-led peace process. Findings show that Palestinians are most receptive to the first, or Arab regional, approach (31%) followed by a UN and an EU approaches (14% and 13% respectively); 7% selected the US-Russian peace process. Only 4% preferred a US-led effort. Israeli Jews preferred a US-led peace process (32%) followed by the regional approach and a US-Russian approach (18% each). The two other approaches, a UN-led process and EU-led process were selected by 5% and 4% of the Israeli Jewish public, respectively. Among Israelis Arabs, equal support (17%) went to an EU-led process, a UN-led process, and a regional process.
The Trump Administration: Our findings show that two thirds of the Israeli Jews (69%) and more than three quarters of Palestinians (77%) believe that Donald Trump is pro-Israel; 18% of the Israeli Jews and 8% of the Palestinians think he is neutral. We asked the two sides to tell us what they expect Trump to do about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Only 28% of Israeli Jews (still a plurality, with the highest score relative to other options offered) and 10% of Palestinians think the new US president will seek to renew peace negotiations and smaller percentages (16% of Israeli Jews and 8% of the Palestinians) think he will seek to impose a solution on both sides. But almost half of the Palestinians (47%) and a quarter of all Israelis (27%) think he will side with one side against the other while 19% of the Israelis and 30% of the Palestinians think he will do nothing.
Role of Israeli Arabs in the peace process: In assessing the role of Israeli Arabs in the peace process, we asked the two sides to tell us how they view them: as Israelis or Palestinians, or both. While 63% of the Palestinians view them as Palestinians, only 23% of Israeli Jews view them as such. Among Israeli Arabs, 31% said they view themselves as Palestinians. Only 10% of Palestinians compared to 41% of Israeli Jews and 27% of Israeli Arabs view them as Israelis. About one quarter (24%) of the Palestinians and 34% of Israeli Jews, and 37% of Israeli Arabs view them as both (Palestinians and Israelis). We also asked both sides to speculate about the manner in which Israeli Arabs view the PLO and its role in the peace process: do Israeli Arabs see it as representing them and all other Palestinians or do they see it as representing other Palestinians only? About half the Palestinians (49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as their representative as well as the representative of all Palestinians with only 41% thinking that they view it as representing other Palestinians only. By contrast, about half of the Israeli Jews (49%) think that Israeli Arabs view the PLO as representing other Palestinians only; 32% of Israeli Jews think Israeli Arabs view the PLO as their representative. Israeli Arabs think the same as Israeli Jews: 63% believe that Israeli Arabs see the PLO as representing other Palestinians only; 21% believe that they see it as their representative.
Bottom-up peace efforts: We asked the two sides for their assessment of the effectiveness of grassroots movements and religious leaders in putting pressure on leaders to pursue peace. Over two-thirds of the Israeli Jewish respondents (69%) think that groups such as “Women Wage Peace” are not effective but 53% think religious leaders are. Israeli Arabs think differently when it comes to groups such as “Women Wage Peace”: 68% think they are effective. But they think the same as the Israeli Jews when it comes to religious leaders: 61% think they are effective. Among the Palestinians 49% think peace groups are not effective and 41% think they are; and 47% think men of religion are not effective and 46% think they are.
Violence and countering violence: We asked Palestinians if they support or oppose attacks, such as stabbings, on Israeli civilians: 49% opposed such attacks and 47% supported them. Opposition to such attacks in the West Bank (60%) is twice as much as it is in the Gaza Strip (30%). Although the difference could be partly explained by the fact that West Bank residents experience Israeli retaliatory measures, Palestinians are likely to deny the effects. When Palestinian respondents were asked about the deterrent effect of the Israeli measures, such as home demolitions, used against the families of the attackers, more than three quarters (78%; 84% among West Bankers and 69% among Gazans) answered that such measures do not deter potential attackers. We asked Palestinians and Israelis to assess the majority view among the Palestinians regarding such attacks. Findings indicate that a majority on both sides (53% among the Palestinians and 52% among Israeli Jews) think a majority of Palestinians support them. We asked Israeli Jews if they support harsh policies (such as prolonged closures or curfews) against all residents of a village of town from which Palestinians attacked with knives or committed other violent acts against Israelis. A majority of Israeli Jews (58%) support such harsh measures and 38% oppose them.
(3) How Israelis and Palestinians View Each Other: |
We asked the two sides whether they have met or talked to each other and how they view the other. Issues raised included wanting peace, trust, fear, and how good or bad their current conditions are. But we also asked them how they view the nature of the conflict, in zero sum terms, or with some openness towards the other side. While the picture that emerges is discouraging, there are nonetheless, a few glimmers of hope.
Talking to each other: Palestinians and Israelis were asked if they have talked with each other during the past few months: 12% of Palestinians said they have talked to Israelis, other than soldiers and settlers, and 23% of Israeli Jews and 78% of Israeli Arabs said that they have talked to Palestinians. Among the Palestinians, 71% said the talk with the Israelis was pleasant and 95% of the Israeli Jews and the Israeli Arabs indicated the same.
Want Peace: 38% of the Palestinians and 41% of the Israeli Jews agree with a statement that the other side wants peace; 79% among Israeli Arabs agree that Palestinians want peace and 53% agree that Israeli Jews want peace.
Trust/Zero-Sum Conflict: The most disturbing, but not surprising, finding relates to the question of trust. Among Palestinians a solid majority (86%) feel Israeli Jews are untrustworthy. On the Israeli Jewish side, a somewhat smaller majority (71%) also indicated that Palestinians cannot be trusted. Among Israeli Arabs, two-thirds (67%) indicated that Palestinians can be trusted. Distrust is reinforced by a prevailing perception on both sides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by zero-sum relations: “Nothing can be done that’s good for both sides; whatever is good for one side is bad for the other side.” Findings show that 51% of Israeli Jews, 48% of Israeli Arabs, and 68% of Palestinians agree with this dismal zero-sum characterization. As with various other questions in the survey, young Israeli Jews show higher levels of hardline thinking and distrust than other groups: among 18-34 year old Jews, 59% agree with the zero-sum statement, compared to 43% among Jews aged 35-54.
Fear: We asked Palestinians and Israeli Jews about fear of each other. Among Israeli Jews, 66% indicate they feel fear toward the Palestinians but among the Palestinians, only 43% indicate that they fear Israeli Jews. When asked about fear of Israeli soldiers and armed settlers 52% of Palestinians replied in the affirmative. We also asked Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs about fear of each other: 48% of the Jews feel fear toward Israeli Arabs while 82% of Israeli Arabs do not feel fear toward Israeli Jews. Jews living as settlers in the West Bank are more fearful of both Palestinians and of Israeli Arabs, relative to Jews inside Israel – 72% of settlers are afraid of Palestinians, and 60% are afraid of Israeli Arabs.
General Conditions of the two sides: 54% of the Palestinians describe conditions in the Palestinian territories as bad or very bad while only 22% of Israeli Jews and 34% of Israeli Arabs describe conditions in Israel in general as bad or very bad.
(4) Values and Goals |
Values and Goals: We asked Israelis and the Palestinians about the hierarchy of the values and goals they aspire to maintain or achieve. Among Israeli Jews, Jewish majority is seen as the most important value (34%), followed by democracy (27%), peace (23%), and Greater Israel (14%). Among the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital was seen as the most important value (46%), followed by obtaining the right of return to refugees to their 1948 towns and villages (30%), building a pious or moral individual and a religious society (13%) and building a democratic political system (11%).

استطلاع فلسطيني-إسرائيلي مشترك
أغلبية من الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين يفضلون حل الدولتين على حلول أخرى مثل حل الدولة الواحدة أو الحل القائم على كونفدرالية فلسطينية-إسرائيلية. هذا هو الاستنتاج الواضح من الاستطلاع الأخير الذي أجراه المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية في رام الله ومعهد ترومان لأبحاث السلام في الجامعة العبرية.
ركز الاستطلاع المشترك لآذار (مارس) على الحلول السياسية الرئيسية للتسوية الدائمة وتم سؤال المبحوثين عما إذا كانوا يؤيدون حل الدولتين أم حل الدولة الواحدة، أو حل الكونفدرالية الفلسطينية-الإسرائيلية.
تشير النتائج إلى ما يلي:
· 71% من الإسرائيليين و57% من الفلسطينيين يؤيدون حل الدولتين، أي الحل القائم على قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة إلى جانب إسرائيل.
· مقارنة مع حل الدولتين 24% فقط من الإسرائيليين و29% من الفلسطينيين يؤيدون حل الدولة الواحدة ثنائية القومية بحيث تكون إسرائيل متحدة مع الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة في دولة واحدة يتمتع فيها الفلسطينيون والإسرائيليون بحقوق متساوية.
· أما الحل الثالث القائم على دولتين لشعبين ولكن مع خلق مؤسسات سياسية مشتركة تخلق في نهاية الأمر كونفدرالية بين الدولتين فقد أيده 30% فقط من الإسرائيليين و26% من الفلسطينيين.
· كانت مسألة حل الدولة الواحدة قد طرحت مؤخراً على أجندة النقاش في المنطقة لكن تطبيق حل الدولة الواحدة قد يكون مستحيلاً نظراً للمعارضة القوية من الطرفين له.
· يدرك الطرفان الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي أن الحل الأكثر صعوبة هو القائم على الدولة الواحدة حيث يعتقد 38% من الإسرائيليين و42% من الفلسطينيين بذلك. لكن نسبة أقل، تبلغ 29% بين الإسرائيليين و32% بين الفلسطينيين تعتقد أن حل الدولتين هو الأصعب فيما تعتقد نسبة أقل، تبلغ 21% بين الإسرائيليين و18% بين الفلسطينيين أن حل الكونفدرالية هو الأصعب.
بلغ حجم العينة في الجانب الفلسطيني 1270 شخصا تمت مقابلتهم وجها لوجه في 127 موقعا سكانيا تم اختيارها عشوائيا في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة في الفترة الواقعة ما بين 4-6 آذار (مارس) 2010. بلغت نسبة الخطأ 3%. أما العينة الإسرائيلية فبلغت 501 تمت مقابلتهم من خلال الهاتف وذلك باللغات العبرية والعربية والروسية، وذلك في الفترة ما بين 1-10 آذار (مارس) 2010 ، وبلغت نسبة الخطأ 4.9%.
تم إعداد الاستطلاع والإشراف عليه من قبل د.خليل الشقاقي أستاذ العلوم السياسية ومدير المركز الفلسطيني للبحوث السياسية والمسحية ود. يعقوب شامير أستاذ الاتصالات بالجامعة العبرية. لمزيد من التفاصيل حول الاستطلاع الفلسطيني يمكن الاتصال بـ خليل الشقاقي أو وليد لدادوة (ت: 2964933-02) أو البريد الإلكتروني pcpsr@pcpsr.org. أما بالنسبة للاستطلاع الإسرائيلي فيمكن الاتصال بـ يعقوب شامير (ت: 036419429) أو البريد الإلكتروني jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.
Joint Israeli Palestinian Poll
Majority of Palestinians and Israelis prefer two-state solution over binational state or confederation
A majority of Israelis and Palestinians prefer a two-state solution as the most acceptable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, as opposed to a single binational state or a Palestinian-Israeli confederation.
This is the clear conclusion drawn from the latest public opinion survey conducted under the auspices of the Harry S.Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.
The March joint Israeli Palestinian poll focused on the main political outlines for a final status Palestinian- Israeli agreement. Those surveyed were asked whether they preferred a solution of two states for two peoples, a binational Palestinian-Israeli state, or a Palestinian-Israeli confederation.
The results were as follows:
- 71% among Israelis and 57% among Palestinians supported the “two-state solution,” namely the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside of Israel.
- Compared to the two-state solution, only 24% of the Israelis and 29% of the Palestinians supported the solution of a binational state, in which Israel is unified with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to establish one state in which Palestinians and Israelis would have equal rights.
- The third outline for a political settlement is a two states for two peoples solution, with joint political institutions which will lead eventually to a confederation of the two states. Only 30% of the Israelis and 26% among Palestinians supported this solution.
In recent months the idea of a binational state has increasingly been put forth as a solution. However, it would seem to be impossible to implement this option given the strong opposition to it in the two publics.
- Palestinians and Israelis also understand that the most difficult solution to implement is the bi-national state solution: 38% of the Israelis and 42% of the Palestinians think so. Fewer respondents, think so about the two-state solution (29% and 32% respectively), and even less (21% and 18% respectively) believe so about the confederation.
The Palestinian sample size was 1270 adults interviewed in person in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in 127 randomly selected locations between March 4-6. The margin of error is 3%. The Israeli sample includes 501 adult Israelis interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between March 1-10. The margin of error is 4.9%.
The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll is supported by the Ford Foundation (Cairo) and the Adenauer Stiftung (Jerusaelm and Ramallah). The poll was planned and supervised by Prof. Yaacov Shamir of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University, and Prof. Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).
For further details on the Palestinian survey contact PSR director, Prof. Khalil Shikaki or Walid Ladadweh, at tel. 02-2964933 or emailpcpsr@pcpsr.org. On the Israeli survey, contact Prof Yaacov Shamir at tel. 03-6419429 or email jshamir@mscc.huji.ac.il.
Armed Attacks, Palestinian-Jordanian Relations, Negotiations, Elections and Other Issues of Concern
August-September 1995
This is the nineteenth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) at the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reactions of the Palestinian community with regard to current political events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate politically motivated attempts to influence the conclusions reached or published. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to analysis and objective study and to publishing the results of all our studies and research. Poll results provide a vital resource for the community and for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls give members of the community opportunity to voice their opinion and to seek to influence decision makers on issues of concern to them. This poll focuses on prospects for peace, direction of the Palestinian society, the PNA performance, armed attacks, elections, and political affiliation. The main findings are:
- A majority of Palestinians (59.5%) do not expect a lasting peace with Israel; only 23% expect a lasting peace.
- Respondents were equally divided as to whether or not Palestinian society is headed in the correct direction: 32.6% affirm the present direction and 28.9% question it.
- A majority of 97.1% believe the PNA must guarantee freedom of speech.
- A total of 37.4% of respondents support a form of unity with Jordan and 61.2% support two independent states.
- A total of 49.5% were optimistic about the future compared to 28.8% who said they were pessimistic.
- Support for the continuation of peace negotiations is at 70.6%.
- About 70% of Palestinians support armed attacks against Israeli army targets and against settlers, while less than 19% support attacks against other civilians.
- Most Palestinians feel their economic situation or standard of living has either gotten worse (43.5%) or stayed the same (45.2%).
- About 39% of Palestinians feel that the performance of the PNA is above average.
- Support for Arafat is at 53.7%, and Fateh is at 43.2%.
- A large majority (86.3%) believe that political elections offer the best means to choose the members of PISGA.
- 74.1% say that they will participate in the elections if and when they occur.
Enclosed are the results of the current public opinion poll that has been conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (See Appendix), including a summary of the analysis of the results. For the full text of the poll or for further information, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki or the coordinator of SRU, Dr. Nader Izzat Sa'id, at Tel (09) 380383/381619 - Fax (09) 380384.
General Background
The period preceding this poll was marked by increasing provocations by settlers as they occupied a number of mountain tops around the West Bank and succeeded in closing several roads. The negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis faced problems especially regarding the issue of withdrawal from Hebron. Two suicide bombings were carried out against Israeli targets in Ramat Gan and Jerusalem resulting in the death of eleven Israelis. The Israeli military and the Palestinian Authority arrested a large number of Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists. The West Bank and Gaza Strip were under tightened closures on several occasions. The PNA issued an order to close two newspapers supportive of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. In this period, Jerusalem was the focus of many observers as settlers and the Jewish city council waged a campaign against Palestinian institutions in the city, resulting in confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis.
Methodology
The present poll is part of a larger survey of social and political attitudes that includes 300 items, the results of which will be published in the near future. The results of this survey will be the basis for a large number of scholarly research papers on political and social attitudes among Palestinians. For the purpose of this survey, some adjustments had to be made in the research methodology. More specifically, the selection of the respondents in the household was based on a table designed by CPRS researchers to guarantee the representation of all ages, education levels, and men and women. Our system resulted in the over representation of educated Palestinians as 40% of the respondents had more than 12 years of education. To adjust the sample, we had to weight for education by deflating the percentage of the educated sample.
Survey Instrument
The questionnaire was designed through consultations with experts. A pre-test involving fifty questionnaires was conducted in the Nablus area prior to the poll. The questionnaire instrument includes a large number of demographic variables as indicated in the section on sample distribution.
Household Sample Selection
SRU researchers adopted a multi-stage sample selection process. The process of sample selection began with the creation of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to district, population size and distribution, and type of locality (city, town, village, and refugee camp). A simple random sample of locations to be surveyed was selected from these lists. Fieldworkers and researchers created maps for these localities. These maps indicated the boundaries, main streets, and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these localities which were further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks) with each unit comprising an average of two hundred housing units. The sample units (blocks) to be surveyed were selected randomly.
Sample Distribution
(Expressed as a % of the total sample / Data is not weighted in this table)
Sample Distribution |
| Sample |
|
West Bank | 62.3(63) | Refugee | 44.4(42) |
City | 39.9 | Single | **33.1 |
Age |
| Occupation |
|
Male | 49.7(49) | Muslim | 95.9(95.5) |
Education |
| Nablus | 10.5 |
*Specialists (University teacher, engineer, doctor, lawyer, pharmacist, executive)
**Employees(school teacher, government employee, nurse, lower-level company employee)
--Population Estimates are based on the "Statistical Abstract of Israel" (1993), FAFO(1993), and Palestinian Statistical Bureau, 1995.
Households were selected based on a systematic sampling framework. For example, if the fieldworker estimated the number of houses in the sampling unit to be one hundred and is assigned five interviews, the fieldworker divided the 100 by 5, obtaining 20. Therefore, the fieldworker would conduct the first interview in the 20th house, and the secin the 40th, and so on. Fieldworkers were asked to start their sample selection of housing units from a well-defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque, business, etc. They were asked to report on the direction of their sampling walks. Fieldworkers played an active role in drawing the maps for the localities in the sample and in estimating the number of houses in each block. We received 740 questionnaires from the West Bank and 449 from Gaza, representing a total of 1190 interviews with Palestinians 18 years or older....More
